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Evaluating Domestic Implications of Eurosceptic Political Parties in Denmark and the United KingdomOset BaburProfessor Joel KriegerPOL 350: Independent Study in Political Science, Spring 2015

Part I: Setting the Stage for SkepticismWhen evaluating the development of the United States of America, one can look back on a revolution, a civil war, and decades of innovation. The result is a union of fifty states that share a common language, culture, and currency. The United States of Europe has never come to be called such, but has worked to achieve a similar state of harmony and integration to its neighbors across the Atlantic. In 2001, Niall Ferguson wrote, From conception, the euro has consistently proved the skeptics wrong. Some thought chauvinistic voters would reject the single currency in referenda. Others doubted that all applicants would fulfill the Maastricht criterion.[footnoteRef:1] Yet, the Economic and Monetary Union has thus far proceeded according to plan. This statement applies not only to the creation of a common currency, but also the creation of a single market, harmonized trade policies, a common agricultural policy, and a European Union in general. Skepticism about the realism integration has been present at from Maastricht to Lisbon, as each treaty looked to refine ascension criteria to create a union that would attract progressive new members, and continue to benefit the old. These concerns are now popularized by the rise of right-wing political parties across the continent. What does this mean for the future of the European Union, in terms of continuing to uphold its message of cooperation? What power do Eurosceptic parties have over their political systems? What issues do they help elevate to the public sphere, and through what means? [1: Overtveldt, Johan Van.The End of the Euro the Uneasy Future of the European Union. Chicago: B2, 2011. Print. 22. ]

This paper will first define hard and soft euroscepticism, to present a system through which it is possible to gauge the euroscepticism exhibited by public opinion polls, legislation, and political action in Denmark and the United Kingdom. The two political parties this paper will focus on are the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the Danish Peoples Party (DPP), particularly because both parties have enjoyed, relative to the rest of Europes right-wing political parties, exception success in parliament throughout the recent years. It will then describe shifts in legislation, public opinion, and, most important, the influence the DPP and UKIP have had on larger parties. As a result, this paper will argue that the greatest influence that these parties can exert on the existing party system, is through the elevation and absorption of their platforms by larger parties, like the Labour party in the United Kingdom, or the Social Democrats in Denmark party system. It will also support that political motives will prove the most compelling, especially in the case of a pro-leave British referendum that will put Prime Minister David Cameron in a difficult spot with regards to accountability to both the EU, and more importantly, to his citizens. However, economic factors, such as Londons position as Europes financial hub, as well as the economic benefits both Denmark and the United Kingdom get from favorable trade relations with the EU, will prove difficult to compensate for in the case that either of these countries elect to leave the union. Part II: The Nuanced Concept of EuroscepticismThe term euroscepticism first appeared in the British press in the mid 1980s[footnoteRef:2], and was used to qualify Margaret Thatchers criticisms of the European Community at the time. The term has been twisted into many different contexts since then, including anti-common market and anti-EMU, to a blanket term to speak for a countrys disenchantment with the European Union and its policies as a whole. Such generalizations are very dangerous, because they oversimplify a multifaceted problem, and places countries into categories that are simply not black and white; a country can express dissatisfaction with a set of EU policies, without being anti-integrationist, or actively considering withdrawing from the union. Sensationalism is a favorite of journalists who cover the Eurosceptic Isle, as Great Britain has come to be called, but it is important that academics and politicians view the concept of euroscepticism as a spectrum, not an absolute category. Once politicians and journalists are better able to embrace that spectrum, they can start making strides towards understanding where Eurosceptic parties get their power. [2: Sitter, Nick. The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism a government-opposition dynamic? West European Politics. Dec 3 2007. 25.]

Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the actual roots of Euroscepticism lie in broad political, social, and economic issues. The Eurobarometer survey divides its questions into social, economic, and political questions, to better understand the nuanced criticisms of European citizens. In 2012, the survey found that a majority of European citizens, roughly fifty-three percent, felt that their voice was not taken into account by the EU, due to a lack of political efficacy, and the failure for a more cohesive union as a whole. Almost ten years ago, policymakers attempted to quell the latter concern by establishing a European Constitution. It would have replaced the existing treaties with a single text, introduced further conditions for harmonized standards in the EU, and instated a symbolically unifying European Union flag[footnoteRef:3]. The Constitutional Treaty ultimately failed to receive the necessary support from both France and the Netherlands, but this negotiation process was far from the end of the debate regarding support for the European Union as an entity. This issue would resurface in the Spring 2013 Eurobarometer poll[footnoteRef:4], in which twelve percent of EU citizens said they viewed the EU primarily as a loss of their national identity, and twenty-seven percent viewed it as a waste of money, with those statistics roughly thirty-one percent in the United Kingdom, and eighteen percent in Denmark. The progression of these statistics in an anti-EU direction has proved to be one of the most important reasons to break down the concept of euroskepticism, so as to tackle its roots. The European Council on Foreign Relations conducted a survey in 2007 and 2012, to gauge net support for the following statement: I trust the European Union. These statistics would be calculated by subtracting the people who expressed that they tended to trust the EU, from the people who tended not to trust the EU. In Denmark, the 2007 net trust statistic was thirty-five. By 2012, the number had fallen to -5. To put the numbers into perspective, If 195 people were surveyed in both years, 115 people in 2007 trusted in the EU, while eighty surveyed citizens did not. Five years later, of the 195 citizens who were surveyed, only 95 trusted the EU, and 100 expressed distrust. This shows a marked increase in the number of respondents who shifted their answer to I tend not to trust the EU. The United Kingdom observed already dismal statistics drop even further, with 2007 pulling in a net support of -15 in 2007, dropping to -48 by 2012[footnoteRef:5]. With numbers like these, lumping the change into one, homogeneous pile of eurosceptics is the least helpful way to understand why domestic politics in countries like the United Kingdom and Denmark have enabled radical right-wing parties to win votes. Therefore, the first step to analyzing what UKIP and the DPP have done and may continue to do to promote anti-EU sentiment in their respective countries, is to understand what issues they capitalize on in their political platforms. [3: Nugent, Neill.The Government and Politics of the European Union. 3rd ed. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1994. Print.] [4: Public Opinion in the European Union: Standard Eurobarometer 79. May 2013. ] [5: Torreblanco Ignacio, Jose and Mark Leonard. The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Memo. 22.]

Part III: A Brief Explanation of Hard and Soft EuroscepticismTo further complicate the concept of euroscepticism, this paper will benefit from using classifications like hard and soft, when examining legislation and behaviors espoused by countries like the UK and Denmark. Catharina Srenson, a project researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, explores Danish public opinion on EU institutions and effectiveness, and uses the classifiers hard and soft to better understand its implications for domestic and international politics. According to Srenson, only hard euroscepticism amounts to a questioning of membership itself. It is possible to be skeptical or even unwelcoming towards the ascension of new countries joining the European Union, without wanting to leave the EU altogether. This second phenomenon is an example of soft euroscepticism. Srenson breaks her study into economic, sovereignty-based, democratic, and social questions. For example, a soft economic Eurosceptic is dissatisfied with the output from the EU, whereas his hard counterpart wants to leave the EU on the grounds that it is not useful, predominantly on economic grounds.[footnoteRef:6] Had Srenson lumped economic and social factors together, it would be impossible to classify euroscepticism in that country as truly hard or soft--- much of the mainstream media fails to break down euroscepticism in this way. What if a country wants to leave the EU on economic grounds, but not on political grounds? Identifying the exact roots of euroscepticism allow policymakers to negotiate with countries on the specific regulations that are problematic, and potentially find an agreement that prevents an exit from the Union, while also quelling domestic unrest. No country has, as of yet, identified as a hard Eurosceptic in all four of Srensons criteria; if it did, it would have no reason to remain in the European Union. [6: Srenson, Catharina. Danish Euroscepticism: Unique or Part of Broader Patterns? Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008. 86. ]

To add another layer to the analysis, this paper will also discuss similarities in soft and hard euroscepticism by occupation and socio-economic class; do blue collar workers in multiple member states exhibit hard euroscepticism in their opinions about what the EU brings to the labor economy? If so, can we truly attribute legislation that imposes a freeze on labor mobility to a national sentiment, say, a British anti-immigration movement? Or, is this a broader trend, because it is able to attract support in Denmark, Finland, the UK, and the Netherlands?

Part IV: The Political Skepticism of Denmark, Disguised in an Economic Referendum The impact of the Euro on individual European economies has been analyzed since the currency was first introduced in January of 1999. Denmark and the United Kingdom are both members of the EU, but chose not to adopt the common currency in joining the European Monetary Union. In Denmark, much of the media coverage of the Euro focused on the implications of this launch for domestic economies, and individual businesses. For example, days after the Euro was introduced, the Danish television channel Avisen covered a story of a local company whose competitive position in the Danish economy would be threatened by the Eurozone[footnoteRef:7]. The story focused on the negative effects competitive advantage would bring to Denmark by favoring other European countries that benefitted from currency stability and savings on money transfers within the EMU. Most pertinent to the discussion of Euroscepticism, is why Denmark stayed out of the European Union; many politicians, including the Danish minister of finance, favored adopting the Euro. A strong show of public opinion against this crucial step towards a United States of Europe, however, held Denmark back. In fact, from 2010 to 2014, almost every public opinion poll conducted by the Greens Analyseinstitut in Brsen showed Danes voting definitively against abolishing the kroner and joining the Eurozone[footnoteRef:8]. One possible explanation for this support is the loyalty many Danes have for their monarch, and the monarchs prominence on the domestic currency--- this argument can be substituted as a possible explanation for the British Sterling case, as well. In 1993, Danish voters gained four opt outs from portions of the Maastricht Treaty. These opt-outs included membership in the European Monetary Union, Union citizenship, Justice and Home Affairs, and Common Defense policies. The 1993 opt-outs are important reflections of social, economic, and political issues Danish citizens feel strongly about, and rejection of the EMU is the most important indication of EU economic policies that Denmark is not comfortable with. [7: Holli A. Smetko, Claes H. De Vreese, Jochen Peter. Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News. Taylor & Francis. 110.] [8: Holli A. Smetko, Claes H. De Vreese, Jochen Peter. Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News. Taylor & Francis. 118.]

Danish economic skepticism about the European Union is, to some extent, due to its position as a smaller country that wishes to maintain its identity and autonomy for fear of exploitation by bigger member states, such as Germany or the United Kingdom. At this juncture, the If You Give a Mouse a Cookie effect seems appropriate: Denmark is afraid that if it gives a mouse (the EU) a cookie (EMU membership), the mouse will also ask for a glass of milk, which could be any number of concessions that erode Danish sovereignty. One camp of Danish voters oppose an economic union on the grounds that it will prompt a political union, which some voters find undesirable for a number of reasons that will be explored further on in this paper. Another camp supports full cooperation with EU economic policies, for fear that this will negatively impact the Danish economy as more countries join the European Union. Very small margins of Danes oppose Danish membership in the EU altogether. Therefore, euroscepticism is very much present in Denmark, but on a spectrum, and in varying degrees. Also important, is Denmarks economic success relative to other countries in the European Union. In 1997, Denmark had the highest per capita national income (in USD) across the European Union, according to the World Bank[footnoteRef:9]; the only countries that came close were Germany and Belgium. If Germany and Belgium were able to accept the Euro, despite having economic conditions comparable Denmarks, what other factors motivate Danish economic euroscepticism? One answer might lie in ideological discrepancies among Euro supporters in Denmark. In 2000, Prime Minister Rasmussen called another referendum to vote on the adoption of the EMU; the Danish kroner had now been shadowing the Euro in terms of exchange rate, and government officials made a strong case for the employment losses that would be had should Denmark continue to opt out of the EMU. As both political and business leaders pushed for the Euro, the opposing camp drew significant support from the Danish Peoples Party (the DPP). The DPP was smart about its campaign, appealing to Danish pride in its autonomy and nationalism, and portrayed the European Monetary Union as a real threat to the welfare state. More specifically, according to political scientist Dr. William Downs, the Euros supporters lost the referendum due to three main reasons: firstly, the Danish government failed to make completely transparent what the Euro would mean for Denmark. Therefore, when the highly respected Danish Economic Council released a report prior to the referendum stating that the economic advantages of joining the Euro were at best slight and uncertain[footnoteRef:10], people began questioning the true benefits of the common currency, if not preventing Denmark from slipping off the edge of Rasmussens supposed fiscal cliff. The second factor was more luck, and less poor planning on the Danish governments part. In 2000, the Euro had dropped in value by twenty-five percent, below parity with the US dollar. Lastly, the Danish Freedom Party, a right-wing political party that had, until 2000, failed to make any real waves in domestic politics, was able to provoke the ire of Danish voters when the EU blocked its entrance into the Austrian coalition government. Support for the Freedom Party was irrelevant: this was a clear example of the European Union violating the autonomy of a Danish political party, and a sign that the EU would meddle in the internal affairs of a small country. [9: Holmes, Martin. The Eurosceptical Reader 2. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Print. 34. ] [10: Downs, Williams. Denmarks referendum on the euro: The mouse that roaredagain. Volume 24, Issue 1. 222-226. ]

The EMU referendum failed by 53.1 to 46.9 percent against the Euro, and generated the second highest voter turnout for European Union referendums since the original vote to decide whether Denmark would join the European Community in 1972. It was already a well-known fact that Danes were fiercely passionate about their sovereignty, but the failure the second referendums failure helped to confirm just how far Denmark was willing to go to preserve its current state, and at what potential fiscal risks. Is this decision hard, or soft euroscepticism? There are multiple perspectives from which to face this question. Danish public opinion was, repeatedly, in favor of abstaining from the European Monetary Union. By a loose interpretation of Srensons definition, Denmark is a hard economic Eurosceptic, because it chose to leave (or, in this case, never join) the EMU. However, although Denmarks four opt outs are superficially an indicator of economic euroskepticism, they are really signs of its hesitation to join a political union. According to a Eurobarometer survey from around the time of the second referendum, Danish economic euroscepticism was nearly on par with the EU overall average, but relatively higher with regards to political euroscepticism[footnoteRef:11]. The Danish case of 2000 is an important one, if not one with conclusive results; abstinence from a currency or economic union is not necessarily indicative of that countrys complete indifference towards integration. When it comes to actually implementing policies, Denmark is often called a model member, enacting EU laws and directives without delay, rarely earning the criticism of the European Court of Justice for failures in implementation[footnoteRef:12]. Ultimately, EU membership has not undermined the Danish polity and its welfare system, because the EU has stayed focused on bettering its customs union and building an internal market. EU policies have had a modest impact on the Danish economy, partially because Denmark has taken steps to protect itself from directives that could have had a negative impact. For a nation like Denmark, the need for autonomy and preservation of state sovereignty manifests itself in public opinion on a variety of issues, including economic policies. [11: Srenson, Catharina. Danish Euroscepticism: Unique or Part of Broader Patterns? Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008. 89] [12: Christensen, Joren Gronnegaard. Keeping in Control: The Modest Impact of Eu on Danish Legislation. University of Aarhus. 3.]

Part V: How Did the DPP Become the True Peoples Party?Denmarks pride in its state has a long history that becomes apparent upon a closer examination of its domestic party structure, particularly on the radical left and right wings. In 1995, Denmarks Progress Party gave birth to a splinter faction that would come to be known as the Danish Peoples Party (DPP). The Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) rested on a platform of economic liberalism, and supported cuts in government spending, taxation, the abolition of existing diplomatic services, and the disbandment of most of the civil services. Most vocally, the party encouraged a gradual abolishment of the income tax; in fact, founder Mogens Glistrup publically declared in 1971 that he paid zero percent income tax[footnoteRef:13]. The party gained its first true success in 1998, when it won 7.6% of the national votes, making it the main right-wing political party in Denmark. Three years later, the DPP had twenty-four members in Parliament, and thirteen percent of electoral support. Integral to the partys rise are its low barriers to entry (one need only be a citizen over the age of fourteen, and not be affiliated with any other party)[footnoteRef:14]. The DPP has also worked to make itself transparent and easily accessible to potential members, with street activities serving as recruitment events for locals to meet party leaders. The value of giving voters face-time as opposed to ad-time has certainly played in the partys favor, and so has their unique journey to legitimacy; the DPP came to be on a platform that set it as against all other parties, yet, it grew very much as a mainstream party would have, by recruiting members, and establishing itself in the vein of a traditional party organization that seeks seats in Parliament and political influence. Its alternative message infused with a traditional party structure has undoubtedly helped the DPP become an important player in Danish politics. [13: Bjorklund, Tor. Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish Peoples Party. Aalborg Universitat. March 1999.] [14: Pedersen, Karina. Driving a Populist Party: The Danish Peoples Party. Institut for Statskundskab. 2006/06. 15.]

However, much of the partys rise to power comes from its ability to capitalize upon policy issues that are important to Danish voters. The Danish Peoples Party is committed to retaining Denmarks constitutional monarchy, preserving the Danish Lutheran Churchs role as Denmarks national church, and most importantly, wishes friendly and dynamic cooperation with all the democratic and freedom-loving peoples of the world, but will not allow Denmark to surrender its sovereigntyas a consequence, the Danish Peoples Party opposes the European Union.[footnoteRef:15] By strategically appealing to the pride Danes feel towards their culture, sovereignty, and established way of life, the DPP equates the European Union with a potential to diminish these values. The partys official platform also makes generalizations about Danish society, stating, Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society. However, the annual population survey conducted by Statistics Denmark showed that in 2014, immigrants from western countries of origin made up 41.88% of the population, whereas 58.12% had non-western countries of origin[footnoteRef:16]. For a non-multiethnic society, these numbers show a significant degree of diversity; if such discrepancies exist between actual society and the DPPs perception of its constituency, how are they the true peoples party? How is the DPP able to garner support by making claims that can be deemed factually inaccurate through even the most rudimentary means of verification? Given the bold claims the DPP makes in its mission statement, it is crucial to closely examine how the partys anti-immigration and anti-EU messages have actually impacted Danish society, and whether these impacts can be deemed soft or hard examples of euroskepticism. [15: The Party Program of the Danish Peoples Party. October 2002. ] [16: Immigration and their descendants: Population at the first day of the quarter. Statistics Denmark. ]

Part VI: If Denmark is For Danes, Where Will Over Half of the Population Go?Given the conflicting result of surveys conducted by organizations like Statistics Denmark, and the DPPs anti-immigrant platform, it is critical to examine Danish immigration and labor policies and discuss the impact parties like the DPP may have had upon them. The country has often been subject to international criticism for its questionable immigration policies. In 2009, Lars Lokke Rasmussen became Prime Minister, with the support of a right-wing coalition that included Venstre[footnoteRef:17] and the Conservatives. The Danish Peoples Party provided valuable parliamentary support during Rasmussens bid for Copenhagen, and its influence was palpable in some of the governments earliest policies. Among the most controversial, were alleged cash incentives of roughly 12,000 offered to immigrants who are unable to assimilate into Danish culture, conditional upon voluntary deportation[footnoteRef:18]. The law is a bold addition to an existing provision from 1997, that offered immigrants a much smaller sum, so that they may have a strong financial basis to start a new life outside of Denmark. Given their power in parliament at this time, the DPP was present for all budgetary negotiations conducted by Rasmussens government. Another controversial policy the DPP helped bring into motion is commonly referred to as the 24-year rule of 2002. This rule states that in order for a Danish citizens spouse to qualify for citizenship, the couple must both be over 24 years of age[footnoteRef:19]. The policy is, according to Danish officials, motivated from a humanitarian concern against arranged marriages for purposes like citizenship and residency, but undeniably puts the government in negative spot when it becomes responsible for families being kept apart. [17: Venstre is also known as Danmarks Liberale Parti, or, Left, Denmarks Liberal Party. It is an agrarian-based political party, and espouses an economically liberal pro-free market ideology. ] [18: Hall, Allen. Denmark to pay immigrants 12,000 to go home if they cant or wont assimilate. Dailymail.com. 10 Nov 2009. ] [19: Newtodenmark.dk: the official portal for foreigners. ]

The Danish Peoples Party has also had an impact on the number of housing permits that were awarded to Danish families between 2001 and 2005. Danish officials were asked to assess if each member of the couple applying for spouse reunification, under the 24-year rule, had a greater attachment to Denmark or another nation. The stated aim of these evaluations would be to ensure that Danish society remained patriotic and proud of its roots; the attempt to prevent migrants who were less committed to Denmarks sovereignty and message was an ill-disguised form of the DPPs goal to turn Denmark back into society for ethnic Danes. Furthermore, any applicant under the 24-year rule who had received social assistance from the Danish government within a year of their application was rejected. Since 2002, there has been no access to seek asylum at a Danish embassy or any consulate abroad. Rasmussens government came under considerable fire for the subjective nature of many of these assessments, especially because the DPPs influence was so clear in its policies. Housing permits that enabled spousal reunification dropped from 13,000 in 2001, to under 5,000 by 2005[footnoteRef:20]. Without the DPPs support, this policy package would not have passed into law, as the votes of the Liberal-Conservative government would have been insufficient on its own. [20: Andersen, Jorgen Goul. Restricting access to social protection for immigrants in the Danish welfare state. The Policy Press. 2007. 257]

Most interestingly, however, is that these policies do not seem to have had a negative impact on the DPPs support in Parliament. The partys influence has been discernible in many of the immigration policies passed in Denmark between 2001 and 2005, yet the DPPs parliamentary numbers jumped from 22 to 24 in 2005, and gained yet another seat in the 2007 election. Is this to say Danish citizens are in favor of having radical right-wing parties shape immigration legislation, because they vocalize the beliefs of the majority? Although the harsh immigration policies did enjoy a high level of support back in 2002, these statistics have fallen in subsequent years; in 1994, sixty-five percent of Danes were against the idea of equal access to social security for everyone who was granted a Danish residency permit, while only forty-nine percent felt this way in 2005. Therefore, these seemingly complementary variables seem to be moving in opposite directions; Danes are allowing the Danish Peoples Party to exert its influence via an increasing number of seats in parliament, yet its citizens are increasingly vocalizing opinions that strongly deviate from the partys main platform. One possible explanation lies in a shift in composition of the immigrant population since 2002. The number of work permits and European Union residency permits to citizens from western countries increased from 15,233 to 41,548[footnoteRef:21]. Arguably, Denmark is looking to encourage migration from countries who, presumably, send laborers equipped with western educations, skillsets, and goals; French or German migrants, as opposed to those from Eastern Europe, for example. While denying family reunifications, residency permits, and imposing language tests on prospective immigrants is an aggressive way to achieve this goal, the DPP is, essentially, helping reshape the labor force that is afforded the opportunity to enter and permanently reside in Denmark. If the overall quality of the Danish migrant population is improved- and, if improvement is subjectively defined by the Danish public opinion polls that show inclination towards immigrants from a certain part of the world, is the DPP taking euroskepticism to a new level, by using it to cater to the peoples demands? The 2002 policies are, without a doubt, examples of hard euroskepticism, because they have established laws that limited labor mobility across the European Union. In 2007, a new party called the New Alliance was established to protest the asymmetric influence of the DPP on immigration policies[footnoteRef:22]. It garnered ten percent of overall support in public opinion polls, almost immediately- an unprecedented feat for any political party in Denmark to date. Ultimately, the DPPs Eurosceptic policies have had a very noticeable impact on both Danish social and economic policies, but also on the countrys domestic party structure, whether through the acquisition of seats in parliament, the ability to get legislation passed by throwing its support behind larger parties that need extra support, or, by inspiring the creation of retaliatory groups. [21: Andersen, Jorgen Goul. Restricting access to social protection for immigrants in the Danish welfare state. The Policy Press. 2007. 259.] [22: Andersen, Jorgen Goul. Restricting access to social protection for immigrants in the Danish welfare state. The Policy Press. 2007. 266.]

Part VII: The Origins of British EuroscepticismThe other side of this study is one with no dearth of arguments, given that the United Kingdom is often cited as the birthplace of both the term of euroskepticism, and houses some of the most vocal critics of EU membership. The Labour party is often credited with the origins of British Euroscepticism, but the meaning of the term has shifted through different leadership. In the Thatcher era, Euroscepticism was connoted with her famous No, no, no monologue of 1990, with regards to more steps towards an increasingly integrated European Union. By 1994, the Conservative Party conference became a platform for politicians like Norman Lamont to suggest that the time was right for the UK to leave the EU altogether. The Campaign for an Independent Britain has undergone several evolutions and cosmetic changes since its foundations in 1976; its most prominent demand is a complete repeal of the 1972 European Communities Act, under which EU directives are granted precedence over UK law[footnoteRef:23]. Aside from the CIB, Euroscepticism has found a home in several party platforms. The Conservative Party, first under Margaret Thatcher, and later with the direction of John Major, was known for its growing unease over the increasing Europeanization of the United Kingdom, with EU directives, laws, and policies seeping into almost every facet of British domestic life. Single-issue parties, eponymously, were able to dedicate almost all of their political energies to a single issue: in the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party, which is central to this study, that issue has always been EU membership. Part of the reason these parties have gained traction, is because they serve as vote catchers, which forces the major parties to take their platforms into account so as to avoid losing majority votes by small margins. [23: Spiering, Menno and Robert Harmsen. European Studies, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity, and European Integration. 129. ]

British public opinion is another important factor in the foundations of euroskepticism. In 1975, the Referendum on the United Kingdoms continued membership of the Common Market gauged British support for a union it had joined in 1973. At this juncture, two-thirds of Britons were in favor of remaining in the EU, and one-third already supported an exit. The significant amount anti-EU sentiment in the United Kingdom even before the economic, political, and social impacts of the common policies were felt is important; it shows that British society was already considerably opposed to European integration from the start, meaning any negative repercussions of EU regulations would add fuel to an already burning fire. Sure enough, by 1977, 53% of Britons surveyed expressed a desire to remain a part of the EEC, but 47% said they would support a decision to withdraw. Three years later, that 47% jumped to an alarming 71%[footnoteRef:24]. Today, public opinion polls do not show that British society is so strongly opposed to European Union membership; a February 2015 YouGov poll reflected that 45% of Britons supported remaining in the European Union, while 35% would vote to leave[footnoteRef:25]. According to YouGov, this poll is a record high for UK support to stay in the EU; this means that at best, over a third of Britons still want to leave the European Union. The pollsters at YouGov attribute much of this good will to rising economic confidence in the UK, but also, with a dip in support for the United Kingdom Independence Party. According to another poll from February 2015, 53% of UK citizens believe that in 10 years time, UKIP will fade from politics, while only 30% held that it would remain salient to the British political system. Compared to results for the same question in October 2014, which showed 49% of Britons supporting that UKIP would remain a force in politics, these numbers seem to indicate a significant trend in pro-EU sentiment in the United Kingdom. However, just as it is dangerous to accept euroskepticism as a blanket term for dissatisfaction with policies of the EU, it is just as misguided to interpret these statistics as a sign of complete satisfaction Britons have with the European Union. [24: Spiering, Menno. European Studies, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity, and European Integration. British Euroscepticism. 134. ] [25: Jordan, William. Record support for staying in the European Union. YouGov UK. 24 Feb 2015. ]

Part VIII: UKIPs Legislative GoalsAs previously discussed, there are many Eurosceptic organizations, movements, and campaigns, but in the day and age of the Internet many is a relative concept. A good number of these groups appear only to exist as a web page of single individuals.[footnoteRef:26] It is true that UKIP has been far less successful in compelling Eurosceptic legislation to move into law, especially relative to its Danish counterparts. British euroscepticism therefore is a better example of what Dr. Catharina Sorenson would deem soft euroscepticism. In the 21st century, it is often difficult to discern which are the opinions of the masses, and which the opinions of a few, seated behind computer screens in remote locations. Public opinion polls do a good job of better reflecting where actual public support lies, but until such polls or elections are held, the results can often seem murky. For example, the Monster Raving Loony Party, which is a registered political party in the United Kingdom that primarily satirizes British politics at its core, received roughly ten times as many votes as UKIP in the 1997 parliamentary by-election to elect a new Member of Parliament for the constituency of Uxbridge in London[footnoteRef:27]. While hardly a political upset, these results are a prime example of how difficult it is to determine how big a political movement will get. In this case, is it realistic to call UKIP an example of hard euroscepticism in the European Union? Although it is currently the most popular (i.e, has the most seats in Parliament) right-wing eurosceptic political party on the continent, is its mere existence powerful enough to call the entirety of British society skeptical of the EU? [26: Spiering, Menno. European Studies, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity, and European Integration. British Euroscepticism. 135.] [27: The UKIP Manifesto 2015. UKIP. Web.]

Runnymede, the UKs leading independent think tank on race equality and race relations, provides an interesting perspective on the immigration discussion. As Europe has become more diverse, Europeans have increasingly been susceptible to exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare demagoguery that worked so well in the United States. Fittingly, one of UKIPs key legislative aims is to keep the National Health Service and GP visits free for UK citizens, but require non-UK citizens to have approved medical insurance as a condition of entering the country[footnoteRef:28]. This pseudo-welfare approach to the National Health System makes the benefits of accessible care, and affordable medication a luxury to some 7.5 million foreign-born residents, and is touted as an end to health tourism. Another proposed UKIP law imposes a five-year moratorium on all unskilled workers, and introduces an Australian-style points based system to manage the number and skills of people coming into the country. The latter would force all migrants to take a test that confirms their skillset and background is of benefit to the British government, and demands a minimum score of 65 points out of one hundred from all who enter the country. UKIPs proposed plan to restore jobs to their so-called rightful native owners, however, contradicts findings from multiple surveys of the British labor market, and its composition. In 2010, the Office for National Statistics reported that total unemployment in the UK was 2.46m in December. Despite this figure, employers were finding it necessary to fill vacancies with migrant workers, because of a skills shortage in the UK; an article by Christina Meredith for The Guardian reported, the argument that foreign workers are taking the jobs of British workers is very short-sighted. If Britain has a shortage of skilled workers, migrants are needed to fill these positions. It is not acceptable to require migrants to undertake the jobs that British people do not want to do, and not allow them to do any other jobs.[footnoteRef:29] The article emphasizes the following conclusion: migrants arent taking jobs from native Britons. Native Britons simply arent successfully filling the vacancies migrant workers are able to fill, for a number of reasons, be it willingness to work, or skillset. Short of compelling British employers to give preferential treatment to local applicants, the unemployment phenomenon that UKIP continually misattributes to the floodgates of EU immigration would be impossible to control in a way that does not inflict even greater damage on the British labor economy. [28: The UKIP Manifesto 2015. UKIP. Web. ] [29: Meredith, Christina. Unskilled Britain. The Guardian. 4 Mar 2010. ]

Part VIIII: Fleeting Signs of Hard British EuroscepticismIn 2006, Labor politician and then home secretary Jacqui Smith announced the National Identity Card Project. Its goal was to give British workers a chance to apply first for UK jobs, and to be more selective about the migrants who were granted entrance into the UK from outside the European Economic Area. The cards were compulsory for foreign students (targeting ERASMUS students in particular), as well as airport staff. The cards would cost an estimated 60 per person, and cost the government roughly 5.3 billion[footnoteRef:30]. Many of the concerns about the project were privacy-related, as each registration would demand roughly fifty different categories of information from each citizen, included a facial scan, fingerprints, and detailed information about current and past places of residence. The cards would be necessary to obtain many social services, and would also, according to the Labor government, help better protect Great Britain against terrorist attacks, by keeping closer tabs on citizens, particularly in migrant communities. In fact, the first to receive these ID cards were foreign nationals, from November 2008 until the programs cancellation at the hands of the Conservative-Liberal coalition government in 2010. The National Identity Card project was ambitious from a technical standpoint, but also would have made strides in pushing the UK towards hard euroskepticism. In a post-9/11 world, terrorism became a focal point for many Western governments. Provisions to protect citizens from potential terrorist attacks often closely resembled xenophobia and anti-immigration policies, and the NIC is no exception. While its database was completely destroyed less than a decade after its creation via the Identity Documents Act of 2010, the philosophy behind the project is, essentially, a fleeting sign of hard British euroscepticism, i.e., an actual policy was set into legislative action that would monitor or complicate the free movement of immigrants from the EU, in and into the UK. Although the identity cards were not required just for foreign-born residents, they were initially made mandatory for them, an important detail that suggests eurosceptic intent at the root of the motion. [30: Arnott, Sarah. Cost of ID card technology penciled in at 800m pounds. Oct 12 2006. ]

Other examples of British euroscepticism can be found in the multiple Eurosceptic think tanks that the United Kingdom houses. Open Europe, the Bruges Group, and the European Foundation are all examples of organizations that support varying levels of reform for the UK-EU relationship, although none of them clearly advocates for an exit strategy[footnoteRef:31]. Open Europes platform states, the EU is (literally) not working. Millions of its young people are without work and political extremism is spreading across the Continent. Faced with the challenges of weak economic growth, rising global competition and a looming demographic crisis, there is an urgent need to find a new model for European cooperation. Its vision is to allow powers to flow back to the member states, and let some countries integrate more than others.[footnoteRef:32] Similarly, the Bruges Group touts its mission statement as spearheading the intellectual battle against the notion of ever-closer Union in Europe and, above all, against British involvement in a single European state.[footnoteRef:33] A think tank would fail to fall into Sorensons categorization of hard euroscepticism, because it is technically incapable of passing laws, enacting measures, or legally promoting Eurosceptic acts in any way. However, think tanks like Open Europe and the European Foundation are, arguably, the strongest of all soft Eurosceptic agents present today. They have the funding, credibility, and media coverage to spread their ideas to a wide audience; aside from the need to win votes, they resemble Eurosceptic parties like UKIP and the BNP, albeit with somewhat less inflammatory rhetoric, arguably to retain credibility as a research organization. [31: European Sources Online: Information Guide, Euroscepticism. Cardiff University. 2013.] [32: Open Europe, Vision Statement. Open Europe. ] [33: Bruges Group, Vision Statement. Bruges Group.]

Part X: Smaller Parties Running The Show Behind the ScenesAlthough it is difficult to find exact parallels between British and Danish Eurosceptic legislation, there have been noticeable shifts in the immigration policies of existing major political parties in the UK. The Labour Party touts itself as Great Britains democratic socialist party, and its ideologies align with the center-left on the political spectrum. The partys leader, Ed Miliband, announced publically in December 2014 that Labour would stop cheap foreigners from replacing British staff[footnoteRef:34] and said a future Labour government would go so far as to criminalize such behavior in the UK. More importantly, this statement came shortly after The Telegraph leaked a Labour strategy report that advised current MPs to move the discussion away from encouraging immigration, as it might prove to be unhelpful in the current political climate. The document was entitled Campaigning Against UKIP, which was regarded by most as a less-than-subtle acknowledgement on Labours behalf that UKIP had been making considerable progress in stealing votes, particularly in the North. An entire section of the report describes a table of polling districts where our models indicate the highest 1% of electors whose demographic profile looks like those of voters who have or are considering switching from Labour to UKIP.[footnoteRef:35] Labours need to shift its policy to engage with UKIP is, in fact, one of the most important ways the United Kingdom Independence Party can influence British politics. As a radical right-wing party, UKIP has only become truly influential in the political spectrum in the last two years, especially given its success in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, where it earned 27.49% of the popular vote, and brought ten new MEPs with it[footnoteRef:36]. Labour trailed behind at 25.40% of the vote, casting further light on the partys qualms about losing critical support to UKIP. Nigel Farage, UKIP leader, seems fully aware of what the results mean for British politics; UKIP now has the power to elevate its platform, and gain the attention of the traditional political sphere, which, for the first time since 1910, does not seem to be running the show in Parliament. [34: Ed Miliband: Labour taking immigration issue seriously. BBC News, UK Politics. Dec 15 2014. ] [35: Campaigning Against UKIP. Labour. November 14. ] [36: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10855972/Ukip-storms-European-elections.html]

While the results clearly struck the Labour party at its core, the Liberal Democrats, spearheaded by Nick Clegg, were not left in much better shape. Cleggs authority was challenged by his own party, as exhibited by a letter bearing over 200 signatures in favor of his retirement from the leadership. The South West, a traditional stronghold for the party, went completely to UKIP, and the partys representation in Parliament went from eleven to just one in matter of years, since 2009. UKIP has bold ambitions about its continuing rise in Parliamentary seats, but even with its current representation, it is contributing to serious tumult within Conservative, Lib Dem, and Labour ranks, much to the delight of Farage and his cohort. In The Impact of Radical-Right Wing Parties in West European Democracies, Michelle Hale Williams argues, Radical right wing parties affect other parties in the political system by shifting the ideological spectrum further to the right. These radical parties seek out their opportunities for influence where other parties leave vacuums by failing to address popular concerns.[footnoteRef:37] This is certainly true of the contemporary political spectrum in Great Britain, given Labours increasingly conservative approach to immigration policy, and the anti-integrationist rhetoric Milliband espoused in his December 2014 platform. Williams study also categorizes radical right-wing parties with a typology of fascist legacy, entrepreneurs, or bandwagoners; the DPP and the National Democrats (one of whose primary leaders, Gary Cartwright, joined UKIP when the National Democrats deregistered in 2011). The bandwagoner category includes parties that watched the entrepreneur category seek opportunities to inject themselves into politics, and then adopted similar platforms and strategies to win over support[footnoteRef:38]. Essentially, they allowed the entrepreneur parties to test the waters, find a way in, ideologically, and then followed suit. In the case of Denmark, the Progress Party paved the way for the Danish Peoples Party, and this becomes apparent in their similar political platforms; the Progress Party supports a drastic stop to immigration, and pulling Denmark gradually out of the European Union altogether. [37: Williams Hale, Michelle. The Impact of Radical-Right Wing Parties in West European Democracies. Palgrave Macmillan. Sep 3, 2006. 45. ] [38: Williams Hale, Michelle. The Impact of Radical-Right Wing Parties in West European Democracies. Palgrave Macmillan. Sep 3, 2006. 56. ]

The Williams thesis also argues that weak organizational hierarchy and poor leadership are amongst the two biggest factors that hinder the growth of peripheral right-wing parties. UKIP has seen its share of tumult at the leadership level. Alan Sked resigned from UKIP after the 1997 general election, with public claims that the party had been infected by racism and radicalism, and that it would be fated as a fringe party incapable of any real political change of influence. Nigel Farage was first elected to the helm of the part in 2006, only to resign three years later, and then resume leadership in 2010. According to Williams thesis, the frequent changes UKIP has experienced both in terms of it public face and its internal structure, explain why it has struggled to exhibit party dynamism like bandwagoner parties in particular, who exhibit only moderate organizational strength. Dynamism is crucial to any partys continuing influence on politics; parties must change their platforms and stated goals to adapt to the climate and demands of the times. The Labour party, for example, although criticized for leaking a document that clearly encouraged MEPs to shift their stances on immigration policy to win back votes lost to UKIP, exhibited a necessary shift in platform to remain relevant and popular. Politics is a game of influence, and the party that can change its colors the quickest to match the needs of the publicwithout seeming too much of a flip flop party, tends to win influence. For smaller parties like UKIP and the DPP, this influence comes in the form of impacting major parties.

Section XI: Open Europes Brexit Study, and the Power of LondonIn March 2015, Open Europe released a study that examined several potential outcomes of a Brexit. The results were analyzed by the media and policymakers alike, especially given the different implications each outcome had for both the EU and the United Kingdom. Despite its anti-EU rhetoric, the think tank acknowledges that leaving the European Union would result in a dent of about 2.23% in British GDP by 2020. This essentially means the British economy will have to do without 54 billion each year, meaning those funds will come from pensions, healthcare, and other social services--- or, at the risk of imposing even higher taxes on British citizens. The first option Open Europe provides entails total removal from the European Union, without any favorable negotiation or trade relationships, meaning a hard border would be erected between Great Britain and the rest of Europe. This is undoubtedly the least favorable outcome not only because of the money the British economy will lose, but also because of the access the rest of Europe will lose to the financial hub of London. In this case, its very possible that Europeans would see a shift to the Asian countries for the services currently provided by the British financial sector. The second Open Europe option depicts a watered down version of Switzerlands current relationship with the European Union. Great Britain would have a free trade deal with the EU, meaning it would avoid the hard border scenario. However, this option still brings a .81% loss to British GDP, and does not protect against high tariffs on goods like car exports, which would vary dependent on industry-specific negotiations[footnoteRef:39]. A third option shows unilateral free trade for the UK and EU, meaning the UK would open its borders to foreign competitors. Interestingly, this case shows an overall rise of British GDP by nearly .64%. Lastly, Open Europe entertains the possibility of the UK securing a deal in which maximum deregulation on EU rules are negotiated, in addition to the unilateral free trade arrangement. With a GDP boost of %1.55, the United Kingdom would avoid many of the financially debilitating side effects of a total Brexit, and negotiate policies that are currently demanding the most funds from the UK. It is difficult to imagine a world in which Great Britain leaves the European Union, amicably negotiates policies that free it from the more financially demanding regulations, all without causing economic or political turmoil in the EU--- or prompting other countries to consider the option of leaving, given precedent. [39: Watt, Nicholas. Thinktank tells UKIP departing from EU would cost UK economy 56 billion pounds. The Guardian. 22 Mar 2015.]

With this reality in perspective, the most valuable aspect of the Open Europe study is the confirmation of how detrimental a Brexit would be for British GDP. The city of London, according to research conducted by the Centre for European Reform, presents multiple advantages as a financial hub for the EU, including, The predictability of the legal system, the international status of the English language, a generally accommodating regulatory environment, and a tradition of openness to foreign firms and migrants.[footnoteRef:40] London is home to major hubs for Barclays, HSBC, the Royal Bank of Scotland group, and Lloyds group. If the UK leaves the EU, banks from other EU countries will face a difficult choice. Many currently use London as a base, as it is the largest center for foreign branches on the continent. If Great Britain leaves, it will be relegated to third country status, according to EU financial regulations, therefore it would not have power to stop the EU from insisting line-by-line equivalence tests, and there would be a risk that it could lose access to the single market, or sign up to EU rules without having a role in the legislative process. If the EU and UK both have much to lose from an economic perspective if a Brexit were to happen, what factors could prove strong enough to compensate for these potential upsets? Politics. [40: Springford, John and Philip Whyte. The consequences of Brexit for the City of London. Centre for European Reform. May 2014.]

Section XII: ConclusionRight-wing political parties have the potential to appear far larger than they actually are, as a result of the media and inflammatory rhetoric. In the case of UKIP and the DPP, this presence was confirmed by the landslide successes both parties enjoyed in the 2014 parliamentary election, with UKIP winning 27.49% of the vote, and the DPP winning 26.6% of the vote. Given that both parties are founded around the fundamental aim of leaving the European Union, these results should indicate that there is substantial public support in Denmark and the United Kingdom to leave the European Union--- so, why dont they just leave? This paper has shown why it is important to understand the roots of anti-EU thought, commonly termed euroscepticism. The European Union was developed as a network of cooperation and mutual prosperity after the war-ridden years of the 20th century, yet it must accept that its members demands are shifting with the economic and political times. Recently, Nick Clegg publically announced that he would never be party to a government that recommended withdrawal from the EU. His statement implies that a second Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government could never reach a negotiating point when leaving the EU would seem attractive enough; meanwhile, David Cameron has made a vague promise for a 2017 referendum about EU membership, although the details of that vote remain unclear[footnoteRef:41]. If the British public votes to leave the EU, Cameron will find himself stranded in between a necessity to cater to his constituency, and the realities of what a Brexit would do to the UK economically and politically. Denmark currently faces no clear referendum to leave the EU in the near future, but the DPPs continued influence on major political parties like the Social Democrats will continue to elevate its concerns to the public eye, especially given the approaching Danish national elections in September of 2015. Right wing political parties have made euroscepticism a term worth discussing, and are likely to continue to fight for their goals by influencing larger parties, and gaining influence (though unlikely to ever gain total dominance) in their respective parliaments. In the meantime, it is crucial to continue to examine the polls, laws, and politicians that impact this discussion, so as to ensure that the European Union remains accountable, effective, and free of overly-dramatized claims that the end is near for the great European experiment. [41: Wintour, Patrick. Clegg will not let second coalition advocate EU withdrawal. The Guardian. May 5 2015.]

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