EUROPEANISATION

EUROPEANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND CANDIDATECOUNTRIES : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GREEK AND TURKISHCASES Özlem Terzi L'Harmattan | Politique européenne 2005/3 - n° 17pages 113 à 136

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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Terzi Özlem, « Europeanisation of foreign policy and candidate countries : a comparative study of greek and turkish

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Politique européenne, 2005/3 n° 17, p. 113-136.

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Politique européenne, n°17, automne 2005, p. 113-136

Özlem TERZI

EUROPEANISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GREEK AND

TURKISH CASES

This paper analyses the processes of Europeanisation of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries and focuses on their comparison through the Greek and Turkish examples. It firstly presents a theoretical framework on the concept of Europeanisation with respect to the foreign policy realm in the EU. The paper, secondly, differentiates between the Europeanisation processes of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries, and argues that these two processes can be compared by analysing Greek and Turkish foreign policies towards each other since 1999, when Turkey was declared as a candidate country to the EU. The Turkish and Greek cases are, thus, taken as mirror examples of the Europeanisation processes in EU member and candidate country foreign policies. The paper concludes the result of such a comparison is that these processes in member and candidate countries bear more similarities than differences.

Introduction

This paper analyses the processes of Europeanisation of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries and focuses on their comparison through the Greek and Turkish examples. It firstly presents a theoretical framework on the concept of Europeanisation with respect to the foreign policy realm in the EU. It presents Europeanisation as a process of domestic adaptation in the conduct of foreign policy, as a result of current or prospective EU membership. The paper, secondly, differentiates between the Europeanisation processes of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries, and argues that these two processes can be compared by analysing Greek and Turkish foreign policies towards each other since 1999, when Turkey was declared as a candidate country to the EU.

The paper, thirdly, takes the Europeanisation process of Greek

foreign policy as an example of Europeanisation of a member state foreign policy. It takes the Europeanisation process of the Turkish foreign policy as an example of that of a candidate country. Although

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Europeanisation is a concept attributed to member states, recent research shows that it can also be applied to EU candidates. This paper applies the concept of Europeanisation to Turkish foreign policy and security definition since 1999, and analyses whether Turkey’s EU candidacy has at all affected Turkish foreign and security policy in the last 6 years. The most convenient cases to compare these two processes of Europeanisation of foreign policy are Turkey’s relations with Greece and Turkey’s policy towards the Cyprus problem. These two issues are already identified in the Accession Partnerships of Turkey in 2000 and 2003 as issues of particular concern in the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU. Thus, these two issues of Turkish foreign policy are the best examples to compare the processes of Europeanisation of foreign policy in both Greece and Turkey.

The Turkish and Greek cases are, thus, taken as mirror examples

of the Europeanisation processes in EU member and candidate country foreign policies. Greece has been experiencing a process of Europeanisation in its policy towards Turkey signified by Turkey’s declaration as a candidate country to the EU. Correspondingly, the main foreign policy issues with respect to Turkey’s accession process to the EU are about its relations with Greece and the Cyprus problem. By comparing the Europeanisation processes of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries in such an example, the paper, fourthly, aims to display the reasons of differences and similarities between the candidates and current members in the process of foreign policy Europeanisation. 1. Processes of Europeanisation: Top down vs Bottom-up

Europeanisation can be broadly defined as the process of

downloading EU regulations and institutional structures to the domestic level, which mainly signifies a downloading process but is coupled with a bottom-up process of uploading national policies and preferences to the EU level (Howell, 2004). Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse analyse how the process of Europeanisation functions. They identify two conditions for expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanisation. First, Europeanisation must be inconvenient, that is, there must be some degree of “misfit” or incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and institutions on the one hand, and the domestic level processes, policies and institutions on the

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other. There is no need for domestic changes, if Europeanisation fits perfectly well with domestic ways of doing things. This degree of misfit leads to adaptational pressures, which constitute a necessary but not adequate condition for expecting domestic change. Accordingly, the second condition is that various facilitating factors- be it actors or institutions- respond to the adaptational pressures, thus inducing the change. Thus, the lower the compatibility between domestic and European processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure. As policy misfits produce adaptational costs at the domestic level, the member states strive to “upload” their policies to the European level not only in order to reduce their compliance problems (Börzel and Risse, 2003, 58-66) but also in order to address problems that cannot be addressed effectively at the domestic level any more (Börzel,2001). Börzel outlines three strategies used by member states while responding to Europeanisation by uploading national preferences: pace-setting (actively pushing policies at the European level which reflect a member state’s policy preference and thus minimizes implementation costs), foot-dragging (blocking or delaying costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or achieve some compensation for implementation costs), and fence-sitting (neither pushing policies nor trying to block them, but building tactical coalitions with both pace-setters and foot-draggers) (Börzel, 2001). Correspondingly, as Howell summarises, Radaelli identifies four ways by which member states respond to Europeanisation in the downloading sense: accommodation, in which downloading is compatible with domestic policies; transformation, where downloading poses a challenge to national policies; inertia, which is when a political will to bring about change does not exist; and retrenchment, which is when a downloaded EU policy strengthens opposition to the EU (Howell, 2004).

The misfit between European and domestic processes, policies,

and institutions provides the societal and political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests. As explained by Börzel and Risse, sociological institutionalism suggests that Europeanisation leads to domestic change through socialisation and collective learning process, resulting in norm internalisation and the development of new identities. Hence, the domestic effect of Europeanisation can be conceptualised as a process of change at the domestic level in which member states adapt their processes, policies and institutions to new practices, norms, rules, and procedures that

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emanate from the emerging European system of governance. Sociological institutionalism draws on the “logic of appropriateness” according to which actors are guided by collective understanding of what constitutes proper, that is, socially accepted behaviour in a given structure. These collective understandings influence the ways in which actors define their goals and what they perceive as “rational” action. Rather than maximizing their subjective desires, actors try to fulfil social expectations (Börzel and Risse, 2003). “To act appropriately” is defined by James March and Johan P. Olsen as to proceed according to the institutionalised practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good and involves a learning process (March and Olsen 2004). From this perspective, Europeanisation is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic practices and structures (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Thus, inclusion in EU processes influence domestic perceptions of interests and the valid way of achieving their ends, resulting in changes in ways of policy definition (due to empowerment of new domestic actors and new perceptions), policy outcome and ways of policy pursuit. National executives especially have a key position in a member state’s response to Europeanisation by the role they play in decision-making and implementation of European policies. Additionally, domestic actors pressure their national executives to pursue policies at the European level that are favourable to their interests,(Börzel, 2001) and they blame their national governments for the costs that European policies incur on them(Börzel, 2003).

Several studies have applied the concept of Europeanisation to

national foreign policies of EU member states (Manners and Whitman, 2000; Tonra, 2001; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004). Manners and Whitman ask what the impact of the evolving European political/ economic/ societal environment is on the foreign policies of EU states. They take into consideration the way in which EU member states adapt their foreign policy through membership of the EU, as well as towards the EU itself, and towards the other member states of the EU. They state that although the process of adaptation is more sudden for new member states, even the founding states had to change their policies towards previously third party states, in order to bring it in line with existing EC/EU policies. The main question is

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thus what has been the effect of membership of EU on these states’ foreign policies. Does the sharing of information and common practices (in the EU) lead to socialisation or engrenage and thus do habits of working together transform the common perceptions of policy makers ? (Manners and Whitman 2000) As Adrian Hyde-Price reminds us, perceptions are vital in the policy-making process. Perceptions provide a means of intercepting, classifying and interpreting information in terms of structured systems that set cognitive limits to rational decision-making (Hyde-Price, 2004). One could also ask whether a re-definition of self-or national interest is taking place. As Lisbeth Aggestam explains; definitions of identity and foreign policy interests may be redefined as a consequence of current transformations be they internal or external to the state. She reminds us of the Deutschian perspective that says different social communicative processes between actors may affect and shape their identities and interests. High levels of interaction between states can encourage the development of a growing “we feeling” and a common “ role identity”. She argues that identities may be reconstructed through cooperative and positive interaction with other actors (Aggestam, 2004). Finally, it has been argued that an extension of these practices, through a more European orientation of policy-making groups, might lead to an actual “Europeanisation” of foreign policy as a logical step. These questions indicate a process whereby habits become practices, which shape the participants and may lead to a re-orientation of their beliefs and behaviour. As Ohrgard mentions, implicit in the processes of socialisation and upgrading of common interests is the idea that eventually the participants might come to conceive their interests differently than as a direct result of their participation in the enterprise (Ohrgard, 2004). Another question Manners and Whitman ask is the way in which participation in the CFSP of the EU and the external relations of the EC alters the foreign policy of member states. Whether this participation provides a constriction on foreign policy choice or an opportunity for foreign policy action. While looking at such a general framework of foreign policy definition, they also take into consideration the notion of special relationships or the concept of special issues due to national sensitivities(Manners and Whitman, 2001, 1-11). Ben Tonra draws attention to the process of socialisation, in which officials acquire a habit of thinking in terms of consensus building. He also states that the creation of European Foreign and Security policy has limited the extent to which national foreign policies react independently.

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Consensus and consultation have become important features of the domestic foreign policy process. However, member states have gained greater effectiveness through the collective voice and common action. A major contribution of his work is also the views expressed by foreign policy practitioners from three small member states of the Union, namely Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands on the Europeanisation process of their national foreign policies (Tonra, 2001). 2. Europeanisation and EU candidates: A Relationship Between Unequals

Although the concept of Europeanisation is generally considered

an experience unique to EU member states, recent research by Heather Grabbe shows that the term can successfully be applied to the then EU candidates in Central and Eastern Europe and with additional effectiveness due to the unilateral policy inducing capacity of the EU on these countries. Grabbe explains that the Central and Eastern European Countries have been taking on all the obligations of EU membership, so the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them are likely to be comparable to the effects of the EU on its current member states. She argues that the Europeanisation literature is relevant to the Central and Eastern European applicant states because these countries are already subject to the same pressures of adaptation to EU policies as current member states. However, the way Europeanisation occurs in these states is different than in the member states. One reason for this is that they are candidates rather than members of the Union, thus they are positioned in an asymmetrical relationship which gives the EU more coercive routes of influence in domestic policy making processes. Additionally, the applicants cannot influence EU policy-making from the inside, that is, the candidates cannot “upload” their own preferences into the European level policies. They cannot object if an EU policy fits very badly with their domestic structures or policies. They have less room for manoeuvre in their implementation because they have to prove themselves to be worthy potential member states. Besides, they have a stronger motivation than existing members to implement EU policies because they are trying to gain admission. Secondly, the creation of formal accession conditions has given the EU much wider leverage to get these applicants to comply with its demands than the previous ones. It has also reduced the ability of the

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applicants to negotiate concessions such as transitional periods and derogations in comparison with previous enlargements. Thirdly, accession partnership and regular reports provide a direct route into domestic policy making in the Central and Eastern European countries, because the EU sets out a list of policy priorities that have to be implemented within the year or in the medium term. Criticisms made in the EU reports can have a powerful impact on domestic debates about public policy and a candidate government’s political prospects. Conversely, gaining international approval is an important way of legitimising political choices in the post-communist context of the Central and Eastern European candidates. Fourthly, the EU has a direct line into policy-making structures in CEE through its twinning program. Twinning pays for the secondment of civil servants from EU member states to work in Central and Eastern European ministries and other parts of public administration that provides a direct route for cognitive convergence, as EU civil servants work alongside their Central and Eastern European counterparts. Fifth, EU’s most powerful conditionality tool is access to different stages in the accession process, particularly achievement of a candidate status and the start of negotiations. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU explicitly made the fulfilment of political criteria for accession a prerequisite for starting negotiations and excluded Turkey from negotiations on these grounds. Another problem of Europeanisation in the candidate status is that the applicants face uncertainty about whom to satisfy: Commission or the Council, if the Council then which member states (Grabbe, 2003). An additional problem of the EU candidates in the Europeanisation process is that new members have to download EU policies that are already established before they become members and the candidate countries, even when they become members as late-comers, become policy takers rather than policy makers, due to their inexperience on contributing to European policy making, which is often coupled with limited expertise and financial resources (Börzel, 2001).

With the addition of the Europeanisation process of candidates to

the literature on “Europeanisation”, the rest of the paper fits the analysis of change in Greek and Turkish foreign and security policies, in the last 6 years, into the theoretical framework on the process of Europeanisation in foreign policy formation in EU member and candidate countries. Turkey is an unusual candidate to analyse the Europeanisation process due to the fact that it has not even started

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the accession negotiations with the EU, yet. On the other hand, the fulfilment of political criteria is a precondition to start accession negotiations with the Union. Turkey’s candidate status has initiated an atmosphere of public debate on many domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. Secondly, although the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey and Turkey’s policy towards the Cyprus problem have not been cited as part of the Copenhagen political criteria, they are part of the political dialogue between the Union and Turkey. Thus, even the candidate status of Turkey was enough to start a process of Europeanisation in the definition and pursuit of Turkish foreign and security policy. The next section focuses on the Europeanisation process of Greek foreign policy in the late 1990s, especially with regard to Greek-Turkish relations.

3. Europeanisation of Greek Policy Towards Turkey: Downloading the Style, Uploading the Content.

In the initial years of Greek accession to the EC, Greece perceived itself to be a very different country than the rest of the EC members. First of all, it was geographically a peripheral country and had no common borders with the other EC states. Secondly, it perceived itself to be in a very turbulent region with an external threat from Turkey and was thus spending 7% of its GDP on military expenditure. By its membership in the EC, Greece sought not only a consolidation of its democracy but also a security guarantee. For these reasons, foreign policy and security issues were always on the agenda of Greece’s membership of the EC, although the true Europeanisation of Greek foreign and security policy can be attributed to the Simitis government from 1996 on.

Conflict with Ottoman and modern Turkey has been central to

the development of Greek nationalism. The perception of a threat from Turkey has traditionally dominated Greek thinking about the strategic environment, including defence planning. In Greek defence policy, Turkey has ranked as the main military threat to Greek national interests. High defence spending was justified in terms of the perceived military threat from Turkey(Kollias, 2005). Unquestionably, strategic uncertainty regarding Turkey has absorbed enormous energy and resources on the Greek side (Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos, 2001).

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Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy reflects a certain change of style in its conduct, rather than content. Greece downloaded the EU’s rhetoric of reconciliation between neighbours, i.e. with Turkey, and uploaded its policy towards Turkey to the EU level and even became the pace-setter of improved relations between Turkey and the EU. This change of conduct may, in time, even lead to change of content in Greek policy towards Turkey by building a partner out of its former “other”. Foreign policy is considered to be one of the most “successful” areas of the Europeanisation in Greece which is generally perceived as a change of “style” in the way politics are conducted away from a rather confrontational to a more consensual type of conduct, coupled with the use of coalition-building in the EU (Stavridis, 2003b). This can be explained as the Europeanisation of the general approach to what is usually known as ethnika themata (issues of national interest) that comprised, especially relations with Turkey and Cyprus, but also the US and the Balkans (Stavridis, 2003a). Within the Europeanisation process of Greek foreign policy, the traditional personal approach to foreign policy has been replaced by a more institutionalised form of decision-making (Stavridis, 2003a). Relations with Turkey is seen as the most Europeanised area of foreign policy and was embodied in George Papandreou as the foreign minister (Stavridis, 2003b).

An indication of the Europeanisation of Greek security policy is

that throughout the EU Treaty reform in the 1990s, i.e. Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, Greece tried to have a defence guarantee clause included, but only succeeded in having a general political clause to that effect stating the mutual political solidarity of EU states in the Amsterdam Treaty Article 11.2. So, Greek objectives of security policy have not yet been fulfilled. This shows that the objective of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy is uploading its security preferences to EU level policies. The Europeanisation process of Greek foreign policy is expected to reduce the degree of divergence between the EU and Greece, resulting in first the uploading of Greek preferences to EU policies and then in the elimination of national considerations from Greek national foreign policy (Stavridis, 2003a). The uploading of the Cyprus dispute by Greece to the EU level was initiated by the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, who emphasised the need for Cyprus to become a member of the EU in order to put pressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to help resolve the dispute on terms favourable to Greek Cypriots. Some EU officials

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also supported the view that the prospect of accession could help bring the two communities on the island together. The start of the accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1998 and its final accession to the EU in 2004 also helped Europeanise the Cyprus problem for Greece (Hale, 2002, 254).

Following the change of Greek foreign minister in 1999 due to a

scandal by Pangalos of providing shelter to PKK leader Öcalan and his eventual capture by the Turkish authorities, the new Foreign minister George Papandreou marked a noticeable change in Greek policy towards Turkey. In summer 1999, Turkish and Greek foreign ministers, Cem and Papandreou, agreed to establish committees to work on low politics issues of mutual interest in order to build confidence. These talks concentrated on improving cooperation in economics, tourism, environmental protection, cultural exchanges and control of organized crime, including terrorism. The previous policy of Greece towards Turkey, which was characterised by national sensitivities and veto-threats, gave way to a dialogue-centred policy on Turkey’s candidacy to the Union. With this change, Greece started to take on a far more rational and less emotional policy towards Turkey, at the same time making it impossible for other EU states to use Greece as a scapegoat to justify a hesitant policy towards Turkey. Also with this policy change, Greece became a true supporter of Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. According to this new rationale, as a candidate country Turkey would have to carry out democratic reforms, change its foreign policy perspectives and would be ready to seek solutions to disputes and problems including its bilateral relations with Greece. The underlying assumption was also that an EU-compatible Turkey would not be a threat to Greece. Thus Greece perceived its main interest to be inclusion of Turkey in the EU following the accession process. According to Dimitris Keridis, it is important to note that there was a political debate in Greece between those who insist on the narrow ethno-centric definition of Greeks’ identity and the isolation of Turkey by all means and at all costs, and those who support reformist demands for full integration of Greece into the international distribution of labour and European structures, the redefinition of Greek identity within the framework of an open, multi-cultural European society, and the supplementing of the existing policy of a strong deterrence of the Turkish threat with a new policy of engagement that would promote the European orientation of Turkey (Keridis, 1999).

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In November 1999, the Greek government presented the Finnish

Presidency a memorandum on the Greek position on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. The memorandum suggested that the unsolved problem of Cyprus should not prevent the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the Union. Greece knew that the EU would inherit the Cyprus problem, if the island acceded to the Union prior to a solution, and that there were circles in the EU against such an inheritance. Greece hoped that by taking the above decision, the Union would rule out a de facto Turkish veto of Cypriot accession, by not agreeing to a solution. Secondly, its suggested that any candidate country must be willing to recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice within a certain time-frame and lastly suggested a real candidate status for Turkey which would comprise a realistic road-map coupled with the rights and duties of all candidates. The December 1999 Helsinki Presidency Council conclusions reflect all of the suggestions of the Greek memorandum and resulted in the successful uploading of Greek national preferences with regard to Turkey to the EU level. As a result, Greece succeeded in transforming many issues of Greek-Turkish dispute into issues in EU-Turkish relations.

Before the decision at Helsinki, the main Greek fear was Turkey

would not choose to conform to any pre-conditions or criteria (Triantaphyllou, 2001). However, with the initiation of the candidate process for Turkey, Turkey not only admitted to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, but the EU also accepted these issues as part of EU-Turkish relations, which would give Greece the opportunity to voice her concerns within the European framework (Reuter, no date). Such a policy was far more advantageous to Greece than the previous policy of seeking concessions from Turkey in return for lifting a Greek veto. Such a move provided Greece with a more sophisticated and “more European” policy of upholding dialogue and support for integration rather than the nationalistic and outmoded policy of threats and vetoes. Greece, by supporting the Turkish candidacy in Helsinki and later in Copenhagen 2002, made use of the process of European integration as a means of overcoming history and a way of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. This can be taken as a new rhetoric in Greek foreign policy, reflecting the adaptation to the EU promoted way of solving disputes by creating dialogue and seeking stability.

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The Greek decision to support the offer of EU candidacy to

Turkey at the December 1999 Helsinki summit reflects a new, strategic approach to the future of relations with Ankara. The Helsinki Summit reversed the deterioration in Turkish relations with Europe that had followed the Luxembourg and Cardiff summits and offered a path toward closer integration of Turkey in Europe. Progress along this path would thus “anchor” Turkey ever more closely to Western institutions, make nationalist approaches less attractive to Ankara, and lend greater stability to Greek-Turkish relations. The Helsinki strategy obliged Europe to pay closer attention to areas and issues (including Cyprus) of concern to Athens and Europeanised the question of policy toward Turkey. Ideally, accelerated Turkish political and economic convergence with Europe will emerge as the key objective for all sides, without prejudging the likelihood of membership as an end state. Indeed, this convergence may be more important to the stability of Greek-Turkish relations over the longer term than the question of Turkish membership per se. However, it should not be forgotten that the current détente is intimately linked to the evolution of the broader Turkish-European relationship. Stagnation or deterioration in relations between Brussels and Ankara would complicate and perhaps threaten the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. This connection is especially close in the context of Cyprus. For this reason, Athens and Ankara have a shared stake in ensuring that Turkey’s EU candidacy does not prove “hollow”(Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, Vlachos, 2001, 21-24)?

4. Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy: A One Way Process?

Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy can be deemed as a result of two different stimuli. One is the need to overcome the problems between Greece and Turkey to become a member of the European Union, as stated at Helsinki European Council Conclusions. The second is the indirect influence of the change of domestic political atmosphere in Turkey due to the perspective of EU membership.

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4.1 The Helsinki Impact: the First Call for Europeanisation

The Helsinki European Council decision stating that all candidate countries should resolve their border disputes or bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice within a reasonable time before becoming members of the Union, meant for Turkey the resolution of the Aegean dispute with Greece. The Helsinki decision also urged Turkey to support the UN Secretary-General’s efforts for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. In case no settlement was reached by the time of the conclusion of accession talks of Cyprus, then the resolution of the dispute would not be a precondition for the accession of Cyprus to the Union. The Council would take account of all relevant factors at the time of the decision. (Presidency Conclusions, 1999, paragraphs 4&9) This was followed by the 2000 and 2003 Accession Partnership Documents for Turkey stating these two issues on the agenda of political relations between the EU and Turkey. So, this first and most apparent change in Turkish foreign policy is a direct outcome of Turkey’s candidacy process to the Union. It is also an outcome of a successful uploading by Greece of its foreign policy issues with respect to Turkey to the EU level.

The feelings of mistrust and threat perception between Turkey

and Greece have long persisted in institutional contexts that should have led to the emergence of shared norms, understandings and a sense of collective identity, paving the way for the peaceful resolution of their disputes. It can be argued that these institutional contexts restrained the two states from full-scale war, but have not succeeded in generating the sense of being part of a security community together. Turkey and Greece have for a long time considered military means a rational and justifiable way to relate to each other.

In 1999 Greek-Turkish relations went from their lowest to highest

ebb in just a few months. As Kemal Kirişçi explains, they hit the bottom when Öcalan was sheltered in the Greek Embassy in Kenya. But quickly thereafter the two countries entered an era of rapprochement initiated by the establishment of committees on low politics issues. This bureaucratic revitalisation of relations was followed by a civil rapprochement after the earthquakes in both

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countries that summer. In a major turnabout, Greece became an advocate of closer relations between Turkey and the EU. In November, the Turkish government's decision to override domestic public opinion and respect the European, Court of Human Rights' call for not executing Öcalan was seen in the EU as a sign of the government's commitment to reform and the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 extended candidate status to Turkey(Kirişçi, 2004; Evin, 2005).

However, it was evident that problems between Greece and

Turkey had to be solved in order for Turkey to accede to the Union. Concerning the disputes in the Aegean, Turkey supported the finding of a solution by bilateral negotiations with Greece. This approach was perceived in Greece as the choice of the powerful side to exert its power in bilateral negotiations. The Greek side perceived itself to be the militarily weaker side, and wished to delegate the solution of the problem to the ICJ. However, Turkey perceived such a delegation of the problem to the ICJ as delegation of sovereignty (Kut, 2004). The issues in the Aegean are all questions of sovereignty for both sides. Since these problems seem to present a zero-sum nature, neither of the sides wishes to be the compromising one. The only legitimate problem in the Aegean, according to Greece, is the issue of the limitation of the continental shelf, and the rest of the issues are claims of Turkey against the sovereign rights of Greece. For Greece, the main problem behind the Kardak/Imia crisis is that Turkey started to question the status quo in the Aegean after this crisis and urged the determination of the sovereignty rights of both sides on the islets in the Aegean. This attempts was perceived by Greece as a new evidence of the revisionist and expansionist aims of Turkey in the Aegean (Kut, 2004). Taking the views of both sides into consideration, the Helsinki European Council Conclusions gave Turkey the opportunity for advancement of political dialogue with Greece over the issues in the Aegean and advised the delegation of the problem to the ICJ by the end of 2004, if still unresolved. This meant that although Turkey was given a chance on paper to prove its case, the Greece side could block a solution until 2004, knowing that the problem would then be delegated to the ICJ.

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4.2 The Domestic Challenge

The second change in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the process of domestic political change stimulated with the EU accession process. With the process of harmonization of Turkish laws according to EU political criteria, the National Security Council also changed its composition and weight in the governmental decision-making (Dağı, 2001, Milliyet, 2003). Prior to the changes made in the Turkish constitution within the candidacy process, the National Security Council (NSC) was the key institution determining Turkish Security Policy, as well as foreign policy issues with security dimensions like Cyprus, relations with Greece, Northern Iraq, Syria and Israel. It gave the armed forces the opportunity to express their position on such issues as well as direct the government’s policies from time to time especially during the Çiller-Erbakan government in mid-1990s. Thus, the 1990s reveal a period in Turkish foreign and security policy as a period where many issues of Turkish foreign policy were directed under military concerns as being of security nature and many issues in Turkish security were accepted without debate(Özcan, 1998). Kirişçi explains that the mid-1990s also saw a major conflict between the secularist establishment in Turkey and a growing virulent political Islam. The role of the military increased as Kurdish and Islamist political parties were banned and supporters repressed. This occurred at a time when European democracies evolved and became increasingly pluralist and sensitive to human rights issues. As a result, Turkey was bitterly criticized, and its "Western" credentials were contested (Kirişçi, 2004).

Although Turkey was finally declared as a candidate country at

Helsinki, the coalition government in Turkey between 1999 and 2002 lacked the cohesion and determination to see through political reforms needed to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria. Powerful opponents to membership in the EU still remained in spite of the wide popular support and strengthened the hand of those who resisted political reforms on the grounds that Turkey's strategic importance should mean an abandonment of political conditions for membership, which was of course not adhered to by the EU.

Since the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government came to power in November 2002, Turkey has covered significant ground in adopting reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. As a single party government it was easier to secure parliamentary

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majority to pass the harmonisation packages. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 acknowledged the determination of the new government to bring Turkey closer to the EU and adopted a decision to consider opening accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2004.

The outcome was a compromise arrangement that introduced the prospects of negotiations starting in 2005, if Turkey could be considered as complying with the political criteria. This left the new government in a weak position at a time when pressure for supporting a U.S. intervention in Iraq was mounting and negotiations to resolve the Cyprus problem were reaching a key stage. The Turkish Parliament's decision to refuse to support the U.S.-led coalition was viewed as a manifestation of greater democracy in Turkey and a weakening of the pro-U.S. military's power as well as signalling a choice for a more Kantian foreign policy than the established Hobbesian view of world politics. Turkey's stand on the Iraqi crisis and its adoption of political reforms has helped to strengthen its relations with the EU(Kirişçi, 2004). The new government also came forward with a powerful commitment to reforms as well as a desire to resolve the conflict over Cyprus and further deepen the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey.

According to Kirişçi, part of this transformation is also reflected in the erosion of the influence that traditional central players in foreign policymaking, such as the military and civilian hardliners, have enjoyed. Elected officials are today more likely to have their views and interests taken into consideration than was the case in the past, as was reflected in the NSC decision on the Cyprus and Annan Plan issue. Furthermore, public opinion and civil society have been able to make their voice heard on foreign policy issues and exercise some degree of influence (Kirişçi, 2004), as can be seen in the increasing voices of especially business and economy oriented NGOs like TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association), IKV (Economic Development Foundation), etc. on foreign policy issues. 5. Two Obvious Cases of Europeanisation 5.1 ESDP

One of the earliest test cases of the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy is the acceptance by Turkey of an arrangement for the necessary EU-NATO deal on the automatic use of NATO assets by the EU for the ESDP, which Turkey vetoed within the NATO

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framework. Turkey was criticised for preventing the operationalisation of ESDP, and thus by not adhering to the ideal of promotion of the EU on the world stage as a candidate country. Since the beginning of the new enlargement process of the EU, Turkey has feared political exclusion from the EU. The EU’s decision of not declaring Turkey a candidate country in December 1997 (Eralp, 2000), coupled with the starting of accession negotiations with Cyprus, which was expected to present a second veto to Turkey’s accession once it became a full member, the inclusion of Cyprus and Aegean problems in the Accession Partnership document (European Commission, 2000) with the final promotion of ESDP in the EU instead of the already agreed ESDI in NATO, were perceived in Turkey as signs of a political will to alienate Turkey from the EU. It was feared that if the accession process broke down, Turkey would revert to being a buffer zone on the edge of Europe (Sanberk 2001). Thus, Turkey perceived its candidacy to the EU and its inclusion in the European political and security frameworks as a matter of security. Secondly, it was also of concern in Turkey that Greece and the Greek Cypriots, once they become members, could use the emergent ESDP against Turkey. Thus, the ESDP was perceived by Turkey as a challenge that could pose a threat, in case Turkey’s membership perspective was not fulfilled.

Turkey perceived the new EU security structure as a new establishment in Europe from which it was excluded. Such an exclusion was announced as contrary to Turkish security interests. Due to the national security character of the ESDP dispute and the concerns about the prospect of the EU-Turkey relations, the Turkish security elite approached the issue from a nationalistic and unilateral perspective. Turkish policy on this issue was shaped by the policy-makers without any input from a domestic public debate. The fact that Turkey reached an understanding with the EU at the EU’s Copenhagen summit in December 2002 does not mean that Turkey’s further democratization along the EU accession process has generated this outcome. Turkish policy change on this issue was not domestically driven. The dispute was solved as a result of negotiations in 2001 and 2002, in which Turkey secured that the new EU security structure would not be used against NATO allies and that Cyprus would not be able to make use of NATO assets and intelligence in case of an EU operation making use of NATO assets. According to Kirişçi, this arrangement reflected a "win-win" outcome that made it possible for EU countries to gain access to NATO facilities while

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Turkey's security concerns were addressed without undermining the European security force's independent decision-making procedures (Kirişçi, 2004). Symbolising the first solution of the disagreement between Turkey and the EU after Turkey’s declaration as a candidate country, the ESDP issue reflected a change of attitude by the Turkish decision-makers towards their EU counterparts. 5.2 Cyprus issue

Another incident to demonstrate Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy is the acceptance of the Annan Plan as a solution to the Cyprus dispute by Turkey. Turkey has long been under pressure to negotiate a settlement for the reunification of the island. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, Turkey was granted candidate status for EU membership with the understanding that Turkey would have to meet the Copenhagen political criteria as well as settle the Cyprus problem to be able to start membership negotiations. In November 2001, the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, launched a comprehensive plan for the reunification of the island. During the course of 2002, negotiations took place between the two parties. However, in March 2003, these talks collapsed when it finally became clear that Rauf Denktaş, the chief negotiator of Turkish Cypriots as the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), would not accept a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan. This opened the way for the Greek-Cypriot side to complete its accession negotiations without the fear of a major opposition from the member states of the time.

National elections in TRNC in December 2003 resulted in a parliament with a slight majority in support of the settlement of the Cyprus problem and membership to the EU. This gave the current Turkish government the possibility to bring the supporters of the status quo in Ankara closer to the idea of seeking a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan. This was also accompanied by tremendous pressure from the EU, which suggested that the likelihood of Turkey receiving a date for membership negotiations would be much greater, if the Cyprus problem could be settled before May 2004.

The Turkish government originally worked under the assumption that any compromise on Cyprus unaccompanied by dramatic progress on EU membership would be political suicide. While many thought this fear could create a vicious circle in which Turkey's Cyprus policy and the EU's Turkish policy mutually reinforced each other to a standstill, in the end a revolutionary change in Turkey's policy on Cyprus came about with the acceptance of the Plan.

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The Turkish government succeeded in January 2004 in receiving acceptance of the National Security Council and subsequently launched an international campaign to have negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan started. The negotiations under the auspices of Kofi Annan started on February 19. Many EU officials and representatives of influential EU member governments had streamed into Ankara signalling that if Turkey continued to support the reunification of Cyprus, Turkey would receive a date for the beginning of accession talks (Kirişçi, 2004).

However, the Greek Cypriots, despite eventual acceptance by the Turkish side, rejected the Annan Plan. Being full members of the EU since May 2004 the Greek Cypriots now have the opportunity to veto Turkey’s start of negotiations or its eventual accession without a settlement on their terms. However, the Helsinki process linking of the solution of the Cyprus problem with Turkey’s candidacy to the EU has born fruit and brought about a major change in Turkish foreign policy. This change can easily be attributed to the unilateral weight the EU carries in the Europeanisation process of candidates and Turkey has fulfilled the Helsinki requirement about the Cyprus problem. Although the solution of the Cyprus problem could have been found on this recipe before the accession of the Greek Cypriots, the Europeanisation theory would suggest that, now that they are full members, the Greek Cypriots will try to upload their policies to the European level in time. The first signal in this direction is the inclusion in the Conclusions of the December 2004 European Council of the pre-condition that Turkey sign the Adaptation Protocol to Ankara Treaty, extending its current association relationship with the EU to the new members before its accession negotiations commence on October 3rd 2005.

The success of the pro-EU and pro-unification CTP (Republican Turkish Party) in Northern Cyprus elections and the eventual election of its president Mehmet Ali Talat as the new President of TRNC also showed the determination of the northern Cypriot public to the settlement of the problem. On the other hand, the signing of the Adaptation Protocol by the Turkish government raised domestic criticism about its possible effect on the non-recognition by Turkey of the Republic of Cyprus.

After the referendum in Cyprus, Turkish-Greek relations brought themselves out of a certain deadlock and the visit of Turkish Prime Minister to Greece in May 2004 was considered an improvement in relations for both sides (Kohen, 2004). The recent crisis on Kardak/

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Imia islet in Spring 2005 during the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey did not lead to a tension in Greek-Turkish relations, showing that some successful steps in mutual confidence building have been taken.

6. New Rhetoric, New Identity: Europeanisation of Foreign Policy and EU Candidates

This comparison of the Europeanisation processes of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey displays the differences and similarities between the Europeanisation experiences in EU member and candidate countries. The striking result of such a comparison is that these processes in member and candidate countries bear more similarities than differences.

The first similarity is that in both cases Europeanisation of foreign policy implies an inclusion (or a process of inclusion) in a new “we” group and thus an identity transformation. A new member country defines its security with respect to EU membership. The seeking of a mutual defence clause by Greece within the EU is the best example. Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy undoubtedly is coupled with a redefinition of Turkish identity and its interests and represents a major transformation. It necessitates the forging of an atmosphere of trust between Turkey and Greece for the solution of their disputes, as well as the building of confidence between the Turkish policy-makers and their counterparts in the EU, ridding themselves of mutual fears (Dağı, 2001).

The Turkish case also shows that the Europeanisation of a candidate country’s foreign policy does not only stem from the need to fulfil the declared criteria, but also from the improved domestic conditions to open foreign and security policy priorities to debate and to make choices out of democratic debates. However, the uncertain prospect of accession for the candidate countries also makes it difficult for both their governments and public to complete the identity and interest transformation as shown by the ESDP dispute between Turkey and the EU and the Cyprus issue.

A second similarity is the downloading of the EU rhetoric of good neighbourly relations and peaceful resolution of disputes by both member and candidate countries in their relations with their neighbours. Greece has recently adopted this rhetoric in its relations with Turkey and it has proved a much more influential interest-driven policy pursuit, whereas Turkey had to adopt this rhetoric as a result of

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EU conditionality and legal requirements stemming from Agenda 2000 and the Amsterdam Treaty.

The main difference between member and candidate countries in the Europeanisation processes of their foreign policies is (lack of) the opportunity to upload their policy priorities to the EU level policies. It was with the Simitis government, that Greece both downloaded the EU rhetoric of cooperation and dialogue to its relations with Turkey and was successful in uploading its policy priorities to EU-Turkish relations. Thus, Greece has changed its policy towards Turkey from foot-dragging on improvement of EU-Turkish relations to one that sets the pace. Exceptionally, Turkey has successfully gained time at the Helsinki Summit with the inclusion of the clause that foresaw some efforts to solve the Aegean disputes with bilateral political dialogue and thus uploaded its preference on the issue to the EU level policy. At this point an explanation may be that the position of the candidate countries resemble those of the small members in the EU decision-making process. Similar to small member states, the EU candidates lack the clout to determine the agenda of European foreign policy. However, by making use of the right arguments and acting appropriately, the candidate countries may make their preferences taken into consideration.

The new security definition of Greece, which foresees an EU-adaptable Turkey as a far better neighbour, provides Turkey with leverage over the Greek foreign policy to grant support to Turkish membership, since the deterioration of EU-Turkish relations could reflect on relations with Greece due to a probable strengthening of hardliners in Turkish foreign and security policy. Additionally, the loss of a clear accession prospect to the EU can result in resentment in both the Turkish public and the government, which can undo the Europeanisation process of Turkish foreign policy. Thus, a candidate country’s Europeanisation process is only durable as long as the accession prospect is clear.

This article shows that the Europeanisation process of foreign policy in candidate countries is much more effective than expected in determining the rhetoric and appropriate behaviour of candidates. However, it should be borne in mind that the Europeanisation process implies also a certain change of mind of both the political and the bureaucratic decision-makers. Thus further research into the practitioners’ view in candidate countries is needed to demonstrate how deep the Europeanisation process of foreign policy in candidate countries goes.

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