Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference – Pisa 6-8 September 2007 Panel: Theorising the relationship between political identity and external images

European Political Identity, EU Foreign Policy and the Others’ Image of the EU:

Reflections on an Under-explored Relationship Sonia Lucarelli

(University of Bologna at Forlì – I. sonia.lucarelli@unibo.it)

- DRAFT -

1. Introduction

Possibly never before had the European intellectual and political elites been engaged in such a harsh

debate on European specificities as an international actor with respect to the US as they have since

2003. Suffice it to think of the echoes in the European press of comments by European (Habermas,

Derrida1) and non-European intellectuals (e.g. Kagan 2003, Rifkin 2004) and politicians (e.g.

Ronald Rumsfeld) on Europe/the EU’s specific characteristics.

Given this degree of interest, it is curious that so little attention is paid in ‘European identity

literature’ to the EU’s foreign policy and external images. Attention tends to be paid to fundamental

elements such as the relationship between national and European identities (Meier and Risse 2003),

comparisons between elites and mass self-identification processes (e.g. InTune -

http://www.intune.it/ ), the role of institutions in the construction of identity (Herrmann, Risse,

Brewer 2004), the role of history and memory (Eder 2005; Giesen 2002), analyses of the existence

and characteristics of a European public sphere, but not the feedback on the political identity of the

EU’s international role. For instance, in the 137 pages of the final report of the IDNET research

project – a useful early investigation into European identity – the word ‘foreign policy’ is mentioned

only once, in the proceedings of a conference, to recognise that a comparison between the EU and

US foreign policy would also be useful for an analysis of European identity (Meier and Risse 2003:

A39). The reason for these gaps in the literature might be that foreign policy is hardly considered an

issue which ignites public debate and mass mobilisation even at the national level. It might be that,

as the public sphere has developed more in the areas in which the EU has more competences - i.e. on

monetary issues, the internal market etc. (Mayer 2007; Cf. Van de Steeg, Risse 2007), scholars have

considered EU foreign policy a less relevant issue in public debate, and hence in the process of self-

identification (which is nourished by and at the same time nourishes public debate).

1 On 31May, Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida issued a joint declaration, ‘After the War: The Rebirth of Europe’ which appeared in the Allgemeine Zeitung and Liberation.

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Equally curious is the fact that the literature that deals with the EU’s distinctive role in world

politics - frequently calling it the ‘EU’s international identity’ (cf. Whitman 1998) - does not pay

any attention to the ‘domestic’ repercussions of the EU’s international stance. Followers of François

Duchêne’s idea of a ‘civilian power Europe’ (1972; 1973) have coined terms such as normative

power (Manners 2002), structural foreign policy (Keukeleire 2000; 2004; Telò 2001: 264),

normative area (Therborn 2001: 85), gentle power (Padoa-Schioppa 2001), and norm-maker

(Björkdahl 2005) to capture the idea of an EU different from ‘traditional powers’ as a result of its

initial telos (peace through integration), history and institutions. This ‘distinctiveness thesis’ has

attracted a lot of attention and has given rise to literature aiming at confuting or supporting the idea

of ‘EU distinctiveness’ by comparing it with empirical evidence (Bicchi 2006; K. Smith 2006;

Panebianco 2006; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; K. Smith 2006; Elgström and Smith 2006) or

evaluating its logical-deductive coherence (Diez 2005; Hyde-Price 2006). These studies are

fundamental in showing the pitfalls of EU foreign policy, but they limit their attention to only one

aspect of the impact of the EU’s foreign policy, while neglecting two other relevant ones: the

impact on the perception that other international actors have of the EU; the impact that both foreign

policy and external images have on the Europeans’ self-identification.

Whatever the reasons for the lack of attention to foreign policy in relation to identity and

legitimacy, the high salience given to foreign policy in European public debates in recent years has

made it clear that the relationship between identity, foreign policy and external images needs to be

explored.

This paper aims to bridge a gap between these branches of literature and to propose a

framework for analysis which, drawing from both Social Identity Theory (SIT) and International

Relations (IR), underlines the relevance of foreign policy and external images for processes of

political identity construction in general and in the EU in particular. It will then go on to analyse the

external image of the EU and to evaluate the extent to which this image is made known to the

European public and, therefore, has a chance of influencing the Europeans’ self-identification

process.

2. Identity, Foreign Policy and External Image: a Few Theoretical Reflections

‘Identity’ is a fuzzy word which deserves further clarification. In the first place, whose identity are

we talking about? Is it possible to treat the political identity of a group as a monolith? Which

identity are we talking about? How does it influence foreign policy? Can we also analyse the

possible feedback from foreign policy to external images and political identity? And, finally, are

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there conditions in which the political identity of a group is more vulnerable to such feedback? I

will touch on these questions one by one with a view to developing an understanding of the

relationship between European political identity, EU legitimacy and EU foreign policy.

(i) Whose Identity? Identity or Identities?

Most of the work on self-identification has been inspired either by Social Identity Theory (SIT -

Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1985; Turner et al. 1987) or by sociological theories of identity such

as that of Berger and Luckmann (1966). If the latter consider all identities to be social (in that they

are socially constructed), in SIT personal and social identity are kept more analytically separated.

This is particularly the case of the branch of SIT known as ‘self-categorisation theory’ (Turner,

1985; Turner et al. 1987). The concept of ‘social categorisation’ refers to a self-representation

which looks particularly at the Self as a participant in a group, more than at his/her personal

qualities. The process of self-categorisation through which an individual locates him/herself in a

particular social group is based both on the subjective perception of similarities with other members

of the group and on the perceived difference with members of other groups. Therefore, social

identity theorists regard the group as a collective of similar persons that see themselves and each

other in similar ways, sharing meanings and norms different to members of other groups (Stets and

Burke 2000). They believe that the key to self-categorisation (here also referred to as the self-

identification of individuals in a group) is that an individual perceives similarities with his/her

group’s ‘prototype’ - a cognitive representation of the meanings and norms associated with group

(Huddy 2001: 134). Social identities can be more or less strong in relation to their salience (Stets

and Burke 2000), to their external recognition (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1985; Taylor 1994),

to the result of a comparison that individuals make between the group to which they belong

(ingroup) and another one (outgroup) (Tajfel 1978)2. In relation to this latter point, it should be

added that in SIT identification with a group is highly facilitated if it has a positive image, related to

an individual’s need for self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and recognition (Taylor 1994). This

assertion, which we will come back to, has been proved valid by several strands of empirical

research (Huddy 2001: 135). In this paper we assume that it is possible to treat political identity as a

form of social identity consisting of an individual’s self-categorisation in a political group.

If self-categorisation/identification is the mechanism that links personal to social identity, can

we claim that an individual has only one identity? Nowadays, it is undisputed that individuals have

multiple identities. What is debated is the relationship among these identities (hierarchical, mutually

exclusive, intersected), the mechanism though which individuals acquire a group identity (acquired

2 For an application of this aspect of SIT to the international organisations’ practices of exporting norms, see Flockhart 2005b.

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or ascribed identities) and the rigidity of identities to change (Huddy 2001), not the simple fact that

individuals have many identities (cf. Taylor 1989; Tajfel 1978; Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987).

According to Huddy (2001), a relevant body of literature has already shown that there are both

individual and group differences in the freedom to acquire identity and that such differences explain

how it happens that the same group identity can mean different things to different peoples. So the

monolithic character of the term ‘political identity’ is challenged both by the each one’s objective

multiplicity of identities and by the different meaning that each member of a group may attribute to

a group’s identity. These findings are confirmed in the EU research on the Europeans’ identity

showing that ‘the various components of an individual’s identity cannot be neatly separated on

different levels … but rather influence, mesh and blend into each other’ like in a marble cake

(Maier and Risse 2003: 3).

Moreover, political identities in a democratic system are by definition largely debated and

shaped in a public sphere (Calhoun 2002; Risse 2007). This implies that where there is a public

sphere we find evidence of a group identity in place and at the same time we observe the very arena

in which such an identity has the chance of being reinterpreted3. Such a fluid environment,

however, should not convey the idea that identities are easily dismissible things4, rather they tend to

be stable around a core set of values which give a meaning to the political community. Should that

set of core values with a specific interpretation become subject to contention in the group’s public

space, then the very identity of that group is undergoing a severe transformation or is at risk of

breaking. This, clearly, does not refer to the ordinary political dialectic among exponents of

different political groups in a democratic system, as they diverge on many things but not on core

political values, as the Heider case in Europe demonstrated (there was a European consensus on

safeguarding a fundamental European value). Fox (1996) demonstrates that what characterises pan-

Hispanic identity in the US the most is not language or shared history, but a shared interpretation of

a set of core values (populist democracy, personal liberty, …).

Summing up, I consider social identity the process of self-identification of individuals in a

group. My focus is, therefore, on group identity.

(ii) Which Identity?

Here I focus attention on political identity as the social identity which is most relevant for political

action. Though with differences, a large part of the literature focuses attention on cultural identity

as the main form of identity behind the role definition of a state. For some authors, political identity 3 In the case of the EU this is made more complicated because we mainly have a network of national public debates, though these are undergoing an increasing process of Europeanisation (with growing references to the EU and to other EU countries) (Meier and Risse 2003). 4 Turner assumes that social identities are highly labile, while other scholars consider them more stable (Huddy 2001: 147-9).

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represents the ‘essence’ of a nation which is pre-given with little possibility of being affected by

politics, including foreign policy (A. Smith 1992). A variant of this position is represented by those

who regard political identity as a phenomenon which is ‘constructed’ (instead of pre-given) but

predominantly through shared cultural experiences rather than through political history (Rudolph

2001). Samuel Huntington takes a similar approach on American identity, when he claims that the

core of this identity is the Anglo-Protestant culture of America’s initial settlers; even the set of

political principles that are usually regarded as constitutive of American identity as a civic identity -

namely liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, laissez-faire (Lipset 1996) - the so-called

‘American Creed’, is but ‘Protestantism without God, the secular credo of a nation with the soul of

a Church’, affirms Huntington (2004: 69). An extreme version of this essentialist position is

represented by Huntington’s reduction of political identity to belonging to a larger civilisation

(Huntington 1996)5.

Others, though more articulated in their treatment of the relationship between political and

cultural identity, tend to attach an ambiguous role to culture. For instance, Jepperson, Wendt and

Katzenstein affirm that ‘cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environments

[…] shape identity’, and then define culture as ‘collective models of nation-state, authority and

identity, represented in customs or laws’ (1996: 52 and 56): i.e. culture is a collective model of

identity and at the same time influences identity. The reasoning seems to go round in circles and

does not contribute to understanding the precise role of culture in the definition of identity.

I agree with those who focus attention on political identity in the first place, on the contrary

regarding political identity as a construction that is not and cannot be derived directly from a

common culture. With Furio Cerutti, I define political identity as ‘the set of social and political

values and principles that we recognise as ours, or in the sharing of which we feel like “us”, like a

political group or entity’ (2003: 27; 2001; 2005). Recognition, recalls Cerutti, ‘unfolds

argumentatively’ - when we read, say, the constitutional texts of our polity - ‘as well as a-logically

or symbolically’ - when we look at national/polity symbols such as the flag or the national currency.

Furthermore, ‘values and principles do not by themselves shape the identity of the citizens as

individuals feeling and acting in their diversity: they need to be interpreted, to be re-read and

translated into the specific language of citizens, generations and communities.’ (2003: 28). Cultural

identity is the framework within which such interpretation takes place. ‘Our’ specific interpretation

of a value/principle is the result of our history (or, better, of the shared meaning attributed to this

history), constitutional and legal practices, and coherence with respect to other shared values.

Michael Walzer (1992) finds in history the crucial difference between the way in which group

identity unfolds in the US and in Europe. Leonie Huddy (2001: 142) quotes studies of the early

5 For the homologation of the concepts of culture and civilisation, see Benhabib (2002: 20-1 of the Italian edition 2005).

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1990s that show how German students experience a historical sense of guilt which makes them

reluctant to endorse a patriotic identity even when their Germany identity is underlined in the

interview question.

Identity of a political group, therefore, is highly influenced by culture, history, legal practices

and institutions as frameworks within which political values are interpreted and thereby assume

meaning. However, one of the most important frameworks in which value interpretation takes place

is policy, including foreign policy. Political behaviour is a sort of communicative act which turns

values into action thereby interpreting them. This communication is immediately visible to the

informed public that is constantly engaged in a process of self-identification (Bloom 1990).

Summing up, my attention is on political identity as the type of group identity which is more

likely to influence (foreign) policy. Political identity is defined around a core set of shared political

values and principles which assume meaning once interpreted in the specific group. Culture can be

regarded as a long-term framework of interpretation, political action as the contingent framework in

which values assume meaning in practice.

(iii) How Does it Influence Foreign Policy?

Current research on foreign policy and international relations is mainly developed in IR. For this

reason, I will allow myself a brief digression into how this literature deals with identity and

foreign/international politics.

Constructivist literature on foreign policy and international relations makes frequent reference

to the concept of identity, but – though with exceptions (Hopf 2002) - demonstrating similar

shortcomings to those that we have seen affect research on the EU’s international distinctive role.

Alexander Wendt (1992) had the merit of drawing the attention of mainstream IR to the issue of

identity by using the concept to challenge a core assumption of Realism on similar grounds

(contrary to the earlier contributions of Nicholas Onuf or Frederich Kratochwil). In Wendt’s view,

identity is a ‘property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioral

dispositions’ (Wendt 1999: 224). It represents a relatively stable (1999: 21) intersubjective structure

within which a state defines its interests, role and expectations about the Self. The state defines its

perception of the Self in interaction with relevant Others. Such a perception of the Self, in turn,

shapes its interests - therefore interests are defined by identity. However, according to Wendt, the

state, which exists prior to interaction, has some interests which are independent from the social

context – physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem (1999:

235ff). A state has a ‘corporate identity’ – ‘the intrinsic qualities that constitute [a state’s]

individuality’ (Wendt 1996: 50) and three other types of ‘social identities’: type, role and collective

identities (1999: 224ff), which only exist in relation to others (taking the Others’ perspective).

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Precisely due to his state-centric approach, though recalling that identities are constituted

through interaction, Wendt ends up treating both states and their identities as given. His

anthropomorphic concept of state, the absence of normativity, the exclusion of domestic processes

of articulation of a state’s identity, his failure to deal with concrete articulations of identity, the

methodological impossibility for Wendt’s constructivist approach to deal with constantly re-shaped

identities, are among the most serious criticisms of Wendt’s approach (Zehfuss 2001; Hopf 2002:

281-294). I believe that the greatest pitfall of Wendt’s approach lies in its absence of reference to

the peoples’ political identity. An anthropomorphic treatment of states and actors with an identity is

by no means Wendt’s prerogative, rather it has for a long time been a somewhat popular practice in

IR, but it is striking that it has also been maintained in social constructivist frameworks (cf.

Rumelili 2004; Manners and Whitman 1998; Nau 1998). The practice is misleading and generates

confusion with respect to the original concept of identity which pertains to individuals, not as

human beings but as members of a society6.

I would refer to what is frequently called ‘state identity’ as state ‘role’ (cf. Holsti 1970;

Walker 1987; Aggestam 1999). Roles refer to patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour and are

determined by both an actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations

of other actors (Elgström and Smith 2006). The role-constructing side of the equation is ultimately

shaped by an actor’s identity and the Others’ expectations (Wendt 1999: 227-8). Ultimately role

conceptions can be regarded as behaviourally related elements of identity (Elgström and Smith

2006). However, as the ‘actor’ in question is a political system in itself (a state, a polity like the

EU), the ‘actor’s identity’ is not monolithic, but pertains to the political identity of the citizens as a

group. This means that the interaction through which a role is defined also involves the ‘domestic’

social level. What is the link between political decision makers and the (political) identity of the

group?

Since political identity is reproduced through a series of habits (Hopf 2002: 10-11),

experiences of ‘everyday life’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 23), norms and roles, it is deeply

rooted in society, shaped through a social interaction process in which policy makers also take part.

Decision makers not only are part of the social game of the production and reproduction of social

identities, but, like each member of the group, are influenced by the meanings that such identities

provide. As a matter of fact, by definition identities have a paramount function in providing

meaning (Hopf 2002: 4-5), by creating a grid of orientation in a sea of complexity.

Decision makers take political decisions on the basis of a social cognitive structure, developed

in the context of socially shaped identities. If we translate it into foreign policy, political identity 6 On the relationship between ontological and social identity, between Men and the social world, see Berger and Luckmann 1966: 50; 61. Social Identity Theory deals with individual and social identity as two poles of a continuum (for a critical stance Huddy 2001)

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counts because it provides the structural context of meaning and norms within which state

representatives and decision makers shape ‘their appreciation of the world, of international politics,

and of the place of their states within the international system’ (Weldes 1999: 9).

The result is a foreign policy which can also be analysed as a framework in which values of

the political group are interpreted. For instance, the analysis of EU foreign policy – in broad terms –

has revealed not only that there is a core set of values that are in place in the EU’s external

relations, but that those values are interpreted in a specific EUropean manner, as a result of several

processes (historical, institutional etc.) (Lucarelli 2006; Lucarelli and Manners 2006b).

Summing up, foreign policy is one of the main frameworks in which values are interpreted,

they can be observed as ‘values at work’. This means that foreign policy is both an objectivisation

of political identity and a source for further debate on the political identity of the group, as we will

see below.

(iv) Can we Conceptualise the Feedback from Foreign Policy to External Images and Political

Identity?

Political debate can be easily generated around the political decisions of a group (a state, the EU,

…) towards other groups, both pre- and post-action. As the same time, policy is the framework

within which the legitimacy of the political entity that took the decision for the group is put to the

test both for the procedures adopted (legal or input legitimacy), their efficacy (output legitimacy)

and for their compliance with the group’s core values. It should be underlined, however, that

political decisions have different prospects of entering the public debate and possibly constitute part

of the self-identification process depending on the degree of salience of the issue. The degree of

salience might depend on the type of identity (e.g. decisions regarding importing meat in a Muslim

country) or/and on specific external circumstances (such as in the case of the rising salience of

decisions regarding global warming in the last few years). As not all issues are equally salient

(Huddy 2001), not all political decisions have the same relevance for the group’s identity.

Alongside this direct feedback from politics to identity, there is indirect feedback which

passes through the relationship between the group and outside groups – the so-called ‘Others’. In IR

Others are usually associated to other states or groups of states. However, Others may also refer to

other categories of referents, such as our own past. Ole Wæver (1998) underlines how in the case of

the European Union, for instance, the internal coherence of the process rests on the positive

affirmation of a set of values whose political aim is to avoid a return to Europe’s precedent history –

Europe’s real Other, by means of admission of a growing number of ‘Others’ into the realm of ‘us’.

The re-elaboration of a group’s memory, for instance, is a key component of a self-identification

process. Interesting in this respect are the analyses of Neumann (1996a) and Hopf (2002) on

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Russia’s identity developed also in relation to a physical Other (Europe – according to Neumann)

and a cognitive one (its own past and current role – according to Hopf 2002).

The relevance of ‘Others’ (particularly of physical others – other individuals, other states, …)

is largely appreciated in both socio-psychological literature (Taylor 1994; Turner et al. 1987) and in

IR literature (cf. Rumelili 2004; Neumann 1996b) but mainly tends to be treated in oppositional

terms.

Others are treated as relevant for the self-categorisation/ identification process in several

respects:

• Distinctiveness and Otherness: Self-categorisation theory finds a key psychological

motivation for an individual’s endorsement of group affiliation in his/her need ‘to differentiate

[his/her] own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity’ (Turner et al. 1987:

42). Such differentiation is not necessarily oppositional but entails assuming that one’s group is

positively distinctive with respect to comparable others. A similar understanding of the role of

Others in shaping identity is contained in Iver Neumann’s analysis of the role of Russia’s main

Other – Europe – in the shaping of Russia’s identity (Neumann 1996a). As for European political

identity, who are Europe’s Others? Do Europe’s Others differ from the EU’s Others? Relevant

Others are not simply those that are not me, but those who I consider to be relevant with respect to

me. With respect to whom are the Europeans and EU institutions underlining their distinctiveness?

It is rather easy to claim today that in addition to the traditional differentiation from non-Western

countries, in the past few years the US has also emerged as a relevant external Other with respect to

whom Europe/the EU’s positive distinctiveness has been affirmed. This emerges clearly both from

the opinion polls7 and from the analysis of the press debates as we will see (§ 4). Moreover, such a

distinctiveness (EU-US) is also underlined by other external observers, as will be shown below (§

3).

Though not being necessarily oppositional, differentiation is frequently regarded as being

related to conflict. Part of sociological and IR literature underlines how antagonism creates or

reinforces group cohesiveness. Here it is enough to recall the importance of conflict and boundaries

in Simmel’s understanding of groups’ cohesion (cf. Cederman and Daase 2003: 16-7) or the famous

idea that war contributes to a stronger sense of national cohesion in foreign policy analysis (Mueller

1973). In IR, critical constructivists contend that identity always forms in contrast to Others, and

that there is a relationship between identities and counter-identities (Campbell 1992).

7 According to Standard Eurobarometer 63, EU citizens believe that the EU has a more positive role with comparison to the US in peacemaking (63% vs. 25% who believe the US has a positive role), environmental protection (62% vs. 18%), the fight against terrorism (60% vs. 43%), global economic growth (50% vs. 38%), and the fight against world poverty (49% vs. 20%).

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As far as the EU is concerned, some scholars have pointed to a modern mode of

differentiation based on a net juxtaposition with respect to external Others (Neumann 1998, 1999),

while others have pointed to a post-modern mode of differentiation, grounded in the fear of disunity

rather than fear of the Others (Wæver 1998; Schimmelfennig 2001). Bahar Rumelili argues that in

reality the EU uses both modes of differentiation according to the specific Other it is dealing with:

‘[The] EU’s interactions with Morocco, Turkey, and states in Central and Eastern Europe are

situated differently on the dimensions of difference, social distance, response of other, and hence

exemplify different kinds of self/other relationships.’ (2004: 29-30). I find Rumelili’s analysis very

penetrating and I am convinced by a clear indication which emerges from it: Self-Other relations do

not always entail Othering practices (practices of conflictual differentiation).

• Recognition: The term ‘politics of recognition’, introduced to the debate by Charles

Taylor (1994), clarifies the relationship between the Others’ recognition and identity in these terms:

The demand for recognition ... is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the mis-recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.’ ( Taylor 1992: 25)

Taylor’s treatment of recognition is part of a normative theory of multiculturalism, however his

description of recognition is also useful for our purposes. Translating it into the relationship among

groups, we can affirm that Others are not relevant only as inactive objects of our comparisons (as in

the previous function), but also as active actors engaged in a process of (mis)recognition or

(mis)representation of a group to which group members are sensitive. In order for this feedback

from external recognition and representation to self-categorisation to take place, group members

need to acknowledge the Others’ images of them. This gives rise to complex dynamics of mutual

(though frequently asymmetrical) influence on self-categorisation processes. Below (§4) I have

attempted to verify the degree of information that the Europeans get on the Others’ image of the EU

in a set of specific circumstances. A wider research project would include an interactive dimension.

• External labelling, boundaries and meaning: The likelihood that a group member

internalises group identity depends both on ‘less permeable group boundaries and higher incidence

of external labelling’ (Huddy 2001: 140). Others’ labelling is an important element in that it creates

cognitive boundaries between members of a group and outsiders. Labelling is more or less difficult

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depending on the main criteria adopted, which can be more or less subject to ascription (e.g.

labelling based on the colour of skin is easier than labelling based on the political orientation).

The role of boundaries for identity formation is debated in several branches of literature from

the socio-psychological literature mentioned above, to sociology (e.g. Shmuel Eisenstadt; George

Simmel, Bernhard Giesen), from political science (e.g. Albert Hirshmann), to anthropology

(Frederik Barth) (for an overview, Cederman 2001). In a SIT perspective, boundaries are both

created by the members of a group as a by-product of self-categorisation processes, and imagined

by outside Others. Moreover, they can be seen as identifying the contour of a group of people either

sharing some similarities (e.g. having a European passport) or having internalised the meaning of

group membership (e.g. the difference between having a European citizenship and having a

European identity). Boundaries as meanings are what count more for the processes of identity

formation. The Others can influence internal debate on meaning perhaps even by expressing a

different view of what meaning is attached to belonging to the ‘in-group’. This can generate

significant interaction between the Others’ views and internal processes of identity construction.

Summing up, foreign policy can be relevant for the process of political self-identification of the

individual in a group, not only because it is one of the important frameworks within which core

values and principles of a political group are interpreted (assume a specific meaning around which

political identity can be articulated and legitimisation processes can take place), but also because it is

the main context in which the group interacts with external Others. Others are both passive and

active actors in the self-categorisation process. Malgré eux they are a term of comparison to state

distinctiveness (in more or less oppositional terms); as active players, they reproduce an image of

ourselves which we can compare our self-representation to, particularly if those Others are relevant

sources of our self-esteem from whom we demand recognition. Figure 1 below synthesises the

identity-foreign policy-external image circle.

Fig. 1 The identity - foreign policy - external image circle8

Political identity role conception foreign policy (role performance)

Interests Others

8 The arrows do not indicate causality but only influence.

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(v) Are there Conditions in which the Political Identity of a Group is more Vulnerable to such Feedback?

Each process of self-identification is sensitive to the acknowledgement of group performance and to

its relationship with relevant Others, but the degree of this sensitivity is contingent upon: (a) the

salience of the issue area in which the performance takes place; (b) the degree of consolidation /

cohesiveness of the group's political identity.

Salience refers to the fact that decisions in some areas might put core values of the political

group under strain and therefore cause the group to re-evaluate a fundamental element of its group

identity and the legitimacy attributed to the institutions of reference. This, for instance, was the case

behind the EU’s response to the ‘Haider case’ in 2000. Salience becomes particularly high in cases

of ‘ideational shocks’ i.e. severe challenges to a group’s core beliefs in a certain area, likely to

undermine beliefs in other sectors and, ultimately, impose an internal debate on the basic elements

of a group’s identity (cf. Marcussen 2000; Flockhart 2001, 2005a). The extent to which a situation

is perceived as an ideational shock depends on the identity of the group, both in terms of ‘content’

(core values) and ‘cohesion’ (the extent to which a threat to such values challenges the cohesion of

the group). Moreover, salience may change over time as a response to ideational shocks. This has

been the case for food protection since mad cow disease (Acuti 2008), or for global warming since

the media started to underline the relationship between this phenomenon and a series of

environmental catastrophes that have taken place over the past few years.

Cohesion or maturity of the group’s identity is a key element of its sensitivity to policy

acknowledgement. This is an important element in the analysis of identity transformation,

something which is usually neglected in literature. In the case of a political identity in-the-making

like the EU, the process of construction of self-identification is particularly sensitive to the image

that the political group gives of itself through its politics and policy, also including foreign policy,

as it is in principle sensitive to its relationship with external Others.

Summing up, there are conditions (salience of the issue and lack of maturity of the group’s

political identity) which make a group more vulnerable to feedback from foreign policy and

external images. One of these conditions (early stage of political identity) is shared by the EU.

Having conceptualised the relationship between political identity, foreign policy and external

images, what considerations can we make as to how this framework applies to the EU? As is well

known, the EU is a complex animal where decisions are the result of a multilevel system of

governance with different shares of power and competences according to the issue areas. Political

loyalty largely remains confined to the national level, but the literature has already identified an

emerging European level of affiliation and identification. Moreover, in some areas the primary

12

competence of the Commission makes the EU a powerful institutional actor which EU citizens look

to with appreciation and hope.

Another specificity of the EU with respect to the framework drawn above is the fact that EU

self-representation tends to be dominated by the distinctiveness rhetoric. This rhetoric underlines

the good qualities of the EU as an international actor: a norm exporter, a peace supporter and a

developmental actor. In the rest of this paper I will deal with the following to questions: (a) how is

the EU actually perceived outside its borders, by relevant Others? (b) is this external perception

known to the European public, thereby having the chance to influence the self-identification process

of the Europeans as a political group?

3. Viewed from the Outside: the External Perceptions of the EU

Who are Europe/the EU’s Others? As already said, the most obvious ‘relevant Other’ to Europe

nowadays is the US. However, as a lot has already been written on the US, in a survey on the

external image of the EU that I coordinated, I decided to focus attention on less explored but

relevant countries, either with consolidated economies or emerging ones: Australia, Brazil, Canada

China, Egypt, Japan, India and South Africa9. For each country report, attention was focussed on

four target groups: political elites, public opinion, the press and organised civil society. Information

was gathered from the following sources: (i) the very limited academic literature available (Chaban,

Holland. 2005; Elgström 2006; Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006; Ortega 2004); (ii) the open sources

available, with particular attention to analysis of the press, institutional websites and official

documents.

What information can we draw from this survey in terms of (i) perception of the EU’s

distinctiveness, (ii) recognition, and (iii) labelling?

In the first place two results should be underlined: the EU is not a widely known and debated

actor for public opinion and the media outside Europe. Moreover, most people would not make a

qualitative difference between the EU as a political actor and a more vague ‘Europe’ as a

geographical area with cultural and political similarities. Few people have an idea of what the EU is

and even fewer of what it stands for. Though very much dependent on levels of education and

societal position, a low level of knowledge of the EU is common to the different countries and

continents. In 2001, 23% of the Chinese had an opinion about the EU (World Values Survey 2001), 9 The analysis contained in this section is mainly based on data produced in the survey on The External Image of the EU coordinated by myself at the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Florence) in the framework of Jerp 5.2.1. of the Network of Excellence Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: the Role of the EU - GARNET (EU 6th Framework Programme 2005-2010; call identifier: FP6-2002-Citizens-3). I acknowledge financial support from Garnet (Jerp 5.2.1.) and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The results are available in: Lucarelli 2007a, 2007b.

13

while the percentages were 45% in South Africa (Afrobarometer 2002) and 43% in Brazil

(Latinobarometro 1995-2004; Lagos 2005).

In the second place, the image of ‘Europe’ which emerges from the surveys is undoubtedly

influenced by historical relations with some (or one) European country in the past. This is

particularly the case of the post-colonial countries in our sample, particularly India.

Given these general results, let me introduce what can be gained from the survey in terms of

external acknowledgement of EU distinctiveness, recognition of the EU and how it is labelled.

(i) The EU’s Distinctiveness

There are four areas in which the EU’s distinctiveness is largely (if not universally) recognised: its

integration experience, its multilateral attitude, its global environmental policy and its conflict

management policies.

In the first place, and indeed universally (at least in our sample), the EU is still regarded as a

model of integration to be imitated. There are a significant amount of political speeches and official

documents that focus on the example set by the EU as the first successful case of regional

integration (e.g. in India, Brazil and South Africa). In this regard, it must be noted that the political

elites of most of these countries indeed have specific interests in supporting regional integration

processes in their own geographic spheres of influence (particularly Brazil and South Africa, but

also India). In the case of Egypt, the experience of European integration is often presented in the

press ‘as an exemplary experience of integration and as the most reasonable and realistic alternative

to the failing pan-Arab projects’ (Bayoumi 2007). In the case of Japan, an analysis of the press

(2004 - 2006) revealed that by far the largest number of news articles regarding the EU deal with

European internal affairs (145 out of 371 articles reviewed) and most of them highlighted the EU’s

enlargement as a positive example of the peaceful benefits of regional cooperation and, perhaps, an

example to follow in Asia (Chaban and Kauffmann 2007).

A second result of our research is that the EU is recognised as a champion of multilateralism.

This particular trait of the EU is widely recognised by political and social elites abroad (though far

less by the wider public). Political elites often view the EU as a key player in a future multipolar

(referring to the number of powers) world and frequently also as a champion of ‘multilateralism’.

Among others, this is particularly evident in the official discourse of the Indian, Brazilian and

Chinese political elites. In the latter case, reference to multilateralism as a shared concern of the EU

and China is frequent. The same element is recurrent in the case of India and Brazil but with more

emphasis on ‘multipolarism’. Interestingly, this perception is shared across the political spectrum. It

must be noted that the whole issue of ‘multipolarism’ and ‘multilateralism’ is often presented in

response to an international system currently dominated by the US. This kind of discourse (which is

14

particularly recurrent in the public statements regarding the Strategic Partnerships with China, India

and Japan) is definitely permeated by rhetoric. Moreover, what ‘multilateralism’ is understood to be

is affected by political culture.

In the third place, the EU tends to be presented, particularly in the press, as a model of (global)

environmental protection. This image, though less widespread than others, is worth mentioning as it

is rapidly growing, particularly as a reaction to the EU’s activism in pursuing the Kyoto Protocol on

climate change. It is particularly the case of better-off countries (like Canada, Australia, Japan, but

also India). However, among NGOs worldwide the EU is also criticised for adopting neo-liberal

policies which de facto compromise sustainable development. The results of the survey point to a

rapidly growing expectation that the EU will play a leading role in the protection of the global

environment, in particular in tackling global warming.

Finally, a distinguishing trait that emerges from our analysis is that the EU is often associated

with peace-making processes and security concerns. For instance, an Internet opinion poll

conducted in 2005 regarding the main expectations that Egyptians have of the Euro-Mediterranean

partnership showed that the majority of respondents believed that the partnership will positively

affect the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. The view seems to be shared by the national

newspaper Al Ahram (Bayoumi 2007). Evidence of recognition of an EU role, whether real or

potential, in conflict management is also to be found in the Indian, South African and Canadian

press. Moreover, this is also the case of political party debate in Egypt. Finally, it is interesting that

the Japanese media highlights similarities between the EU and Japan’s approaches to conflict

prevention and democracy promotion in Iraq, by somehow making a distinction from US strategy in

the area (Chaban and Kauffmann 2001). This more positive view in the media can also be observed

in less pro-European countries such as India. However, the degree of recognition of relevant EU

distinctiveness in democracy promotion has proved to be less than could be expected on the basis of

the existent ‘distinctiveness literature’.

Moreover, the EU is not less perceived as a distinctive world actor in a number of sectors

which are very relevant particularly in developed and emerging economies. In the first place, the

EU is regarded as a trade giant with interests and policies which do not differ substantially from

those of the US. As we will see below, it is largely perceived as a neo-liberal power which is

protectionist of its own economy.

(ii) Recognition

The EU tends to be largely appreciated, particularly in the areas where distinctiveness emerges.

Opinion polls also reveal that the majority of citizens also hold a positive view with regard to

15

stronger cooperation between their country and the EU / Europe (74% of the sample, with Japan

scoring the least at 46% and China scoring the highest at 96%) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2006).

However, only a small portion of the population perceives the EU as a world power (with an

average of 13% in Brazil, India, China and Japan, and 24% among US citizens). And the picture

given in response to the question to rank the EU 14 years down the line is not much brighter: only

about 15% of the population in the first group of countries would place the EU among the world

powers, with the figure remaining at 24% for the US (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2006). Moreover,

respondents also doubt the effectiveness or credibility of EU foreign policy. For instance, in South

Africa only 15% of citizens believe that the EU is an effective actor (Afrobarometer 2002).

Similarly, when asked to assess the contribution of global actors towards democracy, development,

peace and free trade, only a small minority of Brazilian citizens (ranging between 12% in the case

of ‘development’, and 22% in the case of ‘democracy’) believe the EU is the most effective actor,

judging the US as slightly more effective (the only exception is in promoting peace, where the EU

is ranked top by 22% of citizens vis-à-vis 17% for the US) (Lagos 2005). Interestingly, percentages

improve in the case of people with higher levels of education (i.e. with a university degree).

The greatest impediment to EU credibility, however, appears to be its international trade

policy. The EU is regarded in the first place as a trade giant (see below). In this function, however,

it is not considered to be different from the US in its ‘neo-liberal attitude’. Reference to the EU as a

neo-liberal power is frequent among civil society organisations in the Southern countries (i.e. in

Brazil, India and South Africa). In the EU’s case, this neo-liberal image comes in for particular

criticism as it appears a contradiction to its social stance ‘at home’ and its self-protectionist attitude.

In this regard, the main target for criticism is the EU’s common agricultural policy and the various

non-tariff trade barriers that, in the eyes of many non-European countries, distort international trade

and bring about negative consequences for emerging markets. Though the EU social model is not

quoted as one might expect (reference to the European social model is mostly confined to

occasional speeches by politicians and civil society groups in developing countries, with no

evidence in the media and public opinion polls), politicians and civil society organisations

(particularly in Southern countries) denounce the contradiction between the EU as a neo-liberal

actor in its foreign policy and as a social actor within its borders.

(iii) Labelling and Bordering

If the EU is not labelled a ‘world power’ then what is it called? How are its borders drawn?

By and large, the main image the EU casts of itself is one of a trade giant and a source of foreign

direct investments, especially in fast-growing or developing economies. For Indian, Chinese, South

African and Brazilian elites, the EU is a strategic opportunity for development and economic

16

growth and is mainly described as a trade partner and the biggest market in the world. Likewise,

economic linkages between these countries and the EU are by far the most common issues

presented by the media (this is particularly the case in Brazil and South Africa). In the case of the

Japanese media, the EU is mainly described as a commercial actor, with the recent enlargement

presented as an important trade opportunity for the country (Chaban and Kauffman 2007). In the

words of the former Secretary General for External Relations of Brazil, de Seixas Correias, ‘the

partnership with the EU is of primary importance. Its fifteen members, together, represent the

largest market for Brazilian exports and the main source of foreign direct investment in Brazil’

(quoted in Poletti, Peruzzi and Zhang 2007). For the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, the

EU is ‘not only India’s largest trading partner, but also our largest source of foreign direct

investment’ (http://www.hindu.com/2004/11/08/stories/ 2004110806810100.html). Such a positive

image of the EU as an economic power, however, is very frequently accompanied by criticism for

being a neo-liberal power, yet protectionist at home.

The analysis in the survey reveals another label which appears frequently in the press: that of

a possible counterbalance to US hegemony. A 2004 survey of more than 23,000 people in 23

countries found that citizens in 20 states would see it as mainly positive if Europe became more

influential than the United States in world affairs (Globescan 2004). Of all the countries included in

this article, the survey was conducted in Australia (where 62% saw the perspective of the EU

becoming more powerful than the US as positive vs. 23% against), Brazil (53% vs. 28%), Canada

(63% vs. 26%), China (66% vs. 16%), Japan (35% vs. 13%) and South Africa (35% vs. 25%). The

only exception is India (35% vs. 38%) (Globescan 2004), which remains a country deeply

influenced by American culture, where the bulk of Indian students look to the US to further their

studies and professional careers (Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006: 25). Analogously, the image of the

EU as a possible counterbalance to the US appears in public discourse and in the media. According

to an Egyptian analyst, the ‘EU ranks second in volume of coverage after the US, but the tone is

definitely more positive in the national and opposition press’. (Ebeid 2006)

As for borders, the survey indicates that the borders of Europe are mainly drawn on a cultural-

political basis rather than on a geographic and institutional basis. The image which emerges more

clearly is one of a ‘divided West’: though similar to the US in several respects, a European

distinctiveness is recognised. In terms of geographic borders, great attention has been paid in the

external press to the process of enlargement and the normative transformation of Central and

Eastern European countries, in both cases for reasons of self-interest (what type of economic

implications will this have for us?). For instance, the Japanese press followed the 2004 enlargement

of the EU closely, adopting ‘a tone of admiration in many news texts’, ‘yet, enlargement’s

economic consequences were contemplated in terms of possible economic threats to Japan’ (Chaban

17

and Kauffmann 2007: 9, 12). EU enlargement was also the most prominent media news item in

Australia (Stats 2007).

Summing up, though overall there is a rather positive image of the EU, there is a certain gap

between EU self-representation, particularly as far as countries from the global South and

worldwide NGOs are concerned. Frequently what is called into question is the EU’s representation

of itself as a solidaristic actor. Not only is the EU accused of damaging the less developed

countries, but it is also given no reward for all its efforts in the development cooperation field, as

these are not mentioned in the press coverage of public debates in the recipient countries.

Moreover, we could not find much evidence of the EU being widely seen as a ‘normative power’

exporting universal values of democracy and human rights (this image seems to be confined only to

a small segment of organised civil society, particularly in the South of the world). Furthermore,

rather surprisingly, the EU no longer seems to be regarded as a social model to be imitated.

All these elements have the potential to influence the self-identification process of the

Europeans as a political group, however, it should be underlined that the likelihood is no more than

potential. What really counts for self-categorisation in relation to the Others is the interaction

between these external images and the ‘domestic’ constituencies. Distinctiveness, recognition and

labelling count to the extent that they produce effects in the internal domestic debate about who we

are and what we stand for. For this reason, a complete analysis of the Others’ role in the European

self-identification process should include a close analysis of the domestic public debate with a view

to analysing its interaction with relevant Others. Having recognised that this would be the optimal

approach, in the rest of the paper I undertake a more basic search of the degree of awareness of the

Others’ images of the EU in the European press10.

4. Is There Feedback on the Europeans’ Political Identity?

The external image of the EU is relevant for the self-identification process of the Europeans only as

far as it influences the public debate within Europe. As we have seen, if an issue has not become

part of the public debate (mainly driven by the media), it hardly becomes a concern around which

identities can be shaped and reinterpreted. For this reason I have decided to focus attention on a

powerful medium, the written press, to assess if and how external images of the EU have entered

the European public debate.

10 A more refined version of this analysis is contained in Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2008.

18

Operationally, I selected a sample of newspapers (and magazines)11 from Britain, France,

Germany, Italy and Spain according to specific timelines, so as to cover six crucial international

events during which the global images of the EU were more likely to be discussed:

- the WTO talks in Doha (time span analysed 6-20 November 2001);

- the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (time span analysed 23

August to 11 September 2002);

- the World Social Forum 2001 in Porto Alegre (time span analysed 22 January to 6 February

2001);

- the World Social Forum 2002 in Porto Alegre (time span analysed 28 January to 12

February 2002);

- the Global Summit of Women in Cairo (time span analysed 7-19 June 2006);

- the UN Climate Change Conference in Nairobi (time span analysed 3-24 November 2006).

The purpose of this press review is to analyse if and how the role played by the EU during these

events was assessed and, more importantly, whether ‘external views’ on the EU’s role in trade,

development, human rights and environmental protection (relevant aspects of external images) were

reported by the European press.

The result is that the European press paid limited attention to the role of Europe/the EU in the six

international gatherings mentioned above, but frequently reported outside criticisms addressed to

the EU by external actors.

Within the sample, the number of articles dealing with the EU/Europe in a significant way is

rather low. This is particularly true as far the Cairo Global Summit of Women is concerned, which

went virtually unanalysed in the European press, and regarding the two World Social Forums

(WSF) in Porto Alegre in 2001 and 2002. In the latter case, some papers paid only marginal

attention to the role of Europe/the EU: in the 2001 WSF, the EU/Europe’s role did not occupy

central stage in any of the (only) nine articles mentioning the EU/Europe. In the second WSF,

despite a larger number of articles (34 against 9), no particular emphasis was placed on the

EU/Europe. In reality, the only case in which we found more articles dealing with the gathering and

Europe/the EU in a substantial way was the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in

Johannesburg in 2002.

11 The Guardian; The Times (along with The Sunday Times); Le Figaro; Libération; Die Welt; Süddeutsche Zeitung; Der Spiegel; La Stampa; Il Sole 24 Ore; El Mundo; El Pais. All the newspapers were accessed though the Lexis-Nexis Database.

19

In terms of external images transmitted in the European debate, of particular relevance are the

analyses of the EU’s role in the Doha round negotiations made by The Times and The Guardian, by

far the most critical newspapers. If the EU is reported to be ‘under fire from developing nations for

its agricultural subsidies, which they say are barring open trade’ (The Times, 12 November 2001), it

is also directly accused of protectionism and an inward-looking attitude: ‘But it does not take much

imagination - or scientific knowledge - to appreciate why poor countries see this [European attitude]

as protectionism, almost undisguised.’ (The Times, 9 November 2001). Also displaying much

attention to the critical inconsistency between the EU’s agricultural protectionism and its

willingness to contribute to free trade and development is The Guardian. According to the British

newspaper: ‘The EU is isolated over agriculture, with the US, the Cairns group of agricultural free

traders and poor countries, many of which depend on agriculture for export revenue, all backing the

call for eliminating subsidies.’ (The Guardian, 14 November 2001). The quotations from NGO

leaders are frequently more critical than those from third world representatives. This critical stance

on the EU’s protectionism and its effects on developing countries is again proposed by the British

press in the case of news on the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development when,

however, another image of the EU appears as well: that of a global actor sensitive to environmental

issues and a counterbalance to the US (The Guardian, 24 August 2002). This positive view,

however, takes a downturn four years later, on the occasion of the Nairobi UN Climate Change

Conference, when the two British newspapers, contrary to the rest of the European press, take a

substantially negative stance on the EU who not only ‘created [the] carbon problem in the first

place’, but also ‘create[d] a complex, flawed emissions trading scheme that achieves nothing’ (The

Times, 15 November 2006) and ‘is falling woefully short of its targets for cutting greenhouse gas

emissions’ (The Guardian Weekly, 3 November 2006).

On the contrary, Le Figaro tends to assume a largely positive stance towards Europe/the EU,

de facto defending it – and France – from external criticism of selfishness: ‘Europe wants to protect

its agriculture against the most neo-liberal countries and expects that environmental protection as

well as the respect of certain social norms are taken into account in the negotiations.’ (Le Figaro, 9

November 2001). The newspaper also presents a rather positive assessment of the EU in the

aftermath of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and presents the EU

as a ‘different’ power vis-à-vis the US: open to dialogue, multilateral, respectful of international

legality and united. On the basis of these strengths Le Figaro believes that ‘it is essential that

Europe, with the support of France, becomes the champion of new North-South dialogue’ (Le

Figaro, 4 September 2002). Whether such a positive stance on the EU’s role on the environment

survived in time is not possible to evaluate on the basis of our research since the journal does not

20

deal with the EU in the very few (5) articles on the Nairobi UN Climate Change Conference of

2006.

The other French newspaper analysed here, Liberation, has a slightly more negative stance

with regard to the EU. Its overall position remains ambiguous: if the EU is accused of protectionism

and hypocrisy in not being able to match facts with deeds, it recognises that the EU, contrary to the

US, is multilateral and attentive to the environment. This position is voiced with respect to the

WSSD (where the articles are split among these two positions) and in the five articles regarding the

Nairobi conference which report the criticisms from the NGOs.

As for the Italian newspapers, both La Stampa and Il Sole 24 Ore provide the image of an

actor whose main weakness lies in its internal lack of cohesion, and whose main international

counterpart is the US (as an international actor with a ‘different’ understanding of world politics).

The views of developing societies and poor countries are also present, particularly through

references to the injustices caused by the EU agricultural policy: ‘A European cow gets in subsidies

one and a half as much as the salary of a peasant in the Third World. According to the African and

Asian delegates, this is the main cause of their poverty.’ (La Stampa, 28 August 2002)

In conclusion, it could be said that except for a few cases (especially articles published in El

Pais and The Guardian) the image of a global actor promoting multilateralism and rules-based

international politics is not very common among the newspapers analysed in this section. The

traditional criticisms from the global South, regarding EU protectionism and hollow development

rhetoric, tends to be more frequently reported as the position of international NGOs and less

frequently as the opinion of third countries. Furthermore, the image of a largely solidaristic trade

partner does not emerge from the press. The Others’ (particularly third world countries) criticisms

are frequently reported in the press either with explicit reference to the critics of third countries or

as criticism from international NGOs or in direct criticism of the EU along the same lines. On the

whole, the EU’s role is evaluated in more positive terms in the case of its contribution to global

environmental issues rather than with respect to international trade and third world development.

This leads me to believe that the Others’ view is somehow known among the European public,

possibly as a result of the role of internal forces in giving international complaints central stage in

domestic debates. However, these forces are mainly NGOs and journalists, rather than policy

makers and political parties, who are still too focused on their domestic (national, at least European)

agendas.

5. The EU’s External Image and the Europeans’ Identity: Summing Up and the Way Ahead

21

The literature on the distinctiveness of the EU as an international actor has produced a lively debate

but has largely missed the opportunity to develop a fully-fledged research programme aiming at

investigating not just why and how the EU behaves differently because of its different

configuration, but also if and how this distinctiveness is likely to feed back into the EU’s internal

and international credibility, and possibly also into the self-identification of the Europeans as a

political group. The aim of this paper was to contribute to this research project by making some

conceptual clarifications and assessing if and how the EU is actually perceived as a distinctive

international actor and of what type; finally its intention was to evaluate if the external perception of

the EU feeds back into the European public debate and thereby may influence the Europeans’

perception of the EU and ultimately their political identity.

On the basis of the research undertaken here, we can conclude that the external image of the

EU is only partially one of distinctiveness, with the exception of a few areas such as the integration

experience (the EU as a model of regional integration). Elements of distinctiveness also emerge as

far as the EU’s approach to crisis management is concerned, but this is always accompanied by

criticism of the EU’s weaknesses and the call for ‘more EU’ in this field. Calls for a growing EU

role also emerge in the field of global environmental policy. Such expectations, but also criticism of

the EU’s substantial lack of solidarity in its trade policy, tend to be reported by the European press

and, therefore, are known to the European public. These are likely to leak into the European public

debate. This implies that the EU’s foreign policy and external images should be seriously

considered as an important component in the Europeans’ self-identification process. This should

warn EU institutions against an expectations-performance gap which could have serious negative

consequences on the overall construction of the EU as a fully-fledged political actor.

In terms of research, in order to develop this project further, the analysis of the press should be

combined with other sources on the European public debate (TV news and parliamentary debates

for instance) and a diachronic analysis of the European public opinion so as to evaluate if it is

influenced by exposure to external criticism.

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