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E P J E P W B

V. 3, N. 2 (5), 53-73, O 2011

European Political Elites’

Discourses on the Accession of

Turkey to the EU: Discussing Europe

through Turkish Spectacles?

Luis Bouza Garcia1

ABSTRACT

Debates about the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU) are often

analysed from an internal politics perspective by putting emphasis on the

manipulation of the fears of public about immigration and cultural diversity.

This article analyses discourses by leaders of 3 member states, the United

Kingdom, Spain and France, in order to understand how positions towards

Turkish accession are justified by political elites. The analysis suggests that

positions towards Turkey do not depend primarily on considerations on Tur-key per se but rather on how political actors perceive the position of their

country within the European Union . Although the validity of this conclusion

could be challenged by pointing out that obviously Turkey’s cultural differ-

ence does play a role in the construction of public opinion in some countries

such as the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, the article argues that the

positions of political elites in these countries are still formed depending on

their positions of these actors in the EU field. Although the analysis does

not reveal a pan European debate as there is no common framing, it appears

that the result of Turkey’s membership application does not essentially de-

pend on the negative attitudes of some public opinions but rather on its

perception within the EU political field.

KEYWORDS

Discourse analysis, European political field, Turkish accession to the EU,

European public opinion

1 CORRESSPONDENCE ADDRESS: Luis Bouza Garcia, Aberdeen Business School, Garthdee Road

AB10 7QE, Aberdeen, United Kingdom, e-mail: [email protected].

ISSN 1855-7694 © 2011 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)


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I

Te history o the relations between the European Union (EU) and urkey

is already a long one. Tis simple remark must be borne in mind when

addressing the many paradoxes o this relation: the EU and urkey have

undergone massive change since the signature o the Ankara Agreement

back in the 1960s. Tis can partly explain the evolution o the European

public opinion and political elites on the question o the urkish acces-

sion: whereas the economic benets o urkey joining the EU are generally

perceived positively, the EU is no longer perceived as an economic project.

Tus, this application is a source o political contention.

Tis article addresses the question o how EU leaders orm their positions

towards the accession o urkey to the EU. Te article argues that political

elites’ positions are inuenced by their conceptions o the nature o the

European integration project and their position in the EU political eld

rather than by the need to satisy national public opinions.

Te rst section outlines the unctions that discourses about urkey ul-

l within the European political eld and discusses the methodological

approach ollowed throughout this analysis. Te second section discusses

the importance o the contexts under which discourses were produced asa way to consider the discursive strategies o the actors. Te third section

presents the essential aspects o the three actors’ discourses on the urkish

accession, by considering both the internal structure o these as well as

the reerences to other aspects o European integration that are useul to

understand their positions on urkey. Te last section beore the conclu-

sion discusses the possible inuence o the cases selection method on the

ndings.

D T, E? A

Tis article addresses the way in which EU leaders speak about the ac-cession o urkey to the EU in order to contribute to the analysis o the

reasons why the urkish application has become a contentious issue in EU

politics. Tis approach is coherent with some recent sociological studies

considering the role o political actors in the construction o the urkish

application (ekin 2008, Visier 2009). Tis approach assumes that there

are no “natural reasons” or the process to become contentious. Tis article

takes an institutionalist approach and hypothesises that the positions o


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EU: D E T S?

EU member states’ leaders on urkey are a consequence o their positionand their role within the EU political eld, which is itsel dependent to a

large extent to that o their country.

a. Elites’ discourse about the Turkish accession

Te article builds on an analysis o discourses on the accession o urkey

to the EU by Nicolas Sarkozy (France), José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero

(Spain) and David Miliband (United Kingdom - UK). Tese are speech-

es, texts in critical discourse analysis terminology (Fairlough 2003) by

3 EU member states key political actors, produced in different contexts.

Reerence to the context in which the discourse is produced is an impor-

tant piece o inormation that could be ignored by ocusing exclusively

on the transcripts o speeches. Te actors whose discourses are analysed

here come rom France, Spain and Britain. Te choice o these countries

corresponds both to a methodological and practical rationale. Te meth-

odological rationale is that the positions o the actors are very different,

both concerning the position towards the urkish accession as concern-

ing the kinds o discourses and the actors’ position in the EU eld. Tis

allows a comparison and analysis o how divergences in positions in the

eld inuence the stakes’ taking on urkish accession. Te three politicalactors whose discourse is analysed seem today to be pretty much on the

decay: David Miliband is no longer the UK’s oreign minister, José Luis

Rodríguez Zapatero will cease his mandate as Spanish President no later

than March 2012 and Nicolas Sarkozy’s popularity is much weaker than

on the day o his election. However, these texts remain equally interest-

ing in themselves and in particular in relation to each other. Tey were

all produced in the period going rom 2007 to 2009, when the debate

on the accession o urkey to the EU was certainly at its highest point.

Additionally, the interesting thing is that they provide an interesting case

o study o the unctioning o an elite public, in that these leaders’ dis-

courses are, the article argues, essentially aimed at other political lead-ers and elites. In this sense, although they do not reect the most recent

evolutions o the debate on urkey in these countries or the EU overall,

they provide both suffi cient distance rom the concrete events and a very

clear case or analysing them as a whole. Regarding the practical ration-

ale, these discourses are produced in languages spoken by the author and

they can thus be analysed in depth.


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Te discourses by Nicolas Sarkozy that are considered here are his speechon the Mediterranean Union delivered in oulon in February 2007 (Sarkozy

2007 a) and his speech on the uture o Europe delivered in Nîmes in May

2009 (Sarkozy 2009). None o these is a speech specically on urkey, al-

though they elaborate Sarkozy’s position about urkey. It is thus notice-

able that Sarkozy’s positions on urkey are elaborated as part o a wider

political or geopolitical vision, in the rst case on a project or the uture o

the Mediterranean and in the second on the vision o Europe. In general,

Sarkozy’s position on urkey is said to be a cultural one: urkey is pre-

sented as either not a European country or incompatible with European

identity, which is largely Christian (Sarkozy 2009). However, the analysis

below demonstrates that considering the place o urkey within the rame

o these specic speeches allows considering alternative discursive strat-

egies motivated by a vision o the EU and his own position within that

eld. Quite importantly, these discourses are pronounced in a context o

high political salience and symbolism. Tis could play or an interpreta-

tion pointing out that Sarkozy is playing internal politics on this issue.

However, it must be considered that the discourse uttered in these circum-

stances is addressed as well to other political actors, including those out-

side the French political eld.

On the contrary José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero discourse about urkishmembership has never been made through a speech on the uture o Europe

but rather on the occasion o bilateral meetings, particularly concerning

the “Alliance o civilisations” project. Te study ocuses on 4 speeches by

Rodríguez Zapatero on the occasion o a meeting o urkish and Spanish

businessmen (Rodríguez Zapatero 2008), at the opening o the Academic

Year at Bahçesehir University (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2009 b), at a meeting

with AKP offi cials or the diner at the end o the Ramadan (Rodríguez

Zapatero 2009 c) and at a bilateral conerence in Istanbul (Rodríguez

Zapatero 2009 a). Te Spanish President argues that his position in avour

o urkey joining the EU derives o his pro-European attitude and his con-

cern or the stability o the Mediterranean and the role o the EU in theworld.

Te UK is usually considered a pro-enlargement country, both because

its ree trade tradition but also as a way to counterbalance the deepening

o European integration. Te case o the UK’s political elite is interesting

both by their strong support o urkey and on the other hand the small

relevance o the issue. In act, there were very ew reerences by Gordon


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Brown to the urkish application, and the strongest support came romhis Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, whose speeches are considered

here. Tree speeches by David Miliband will be analysed. Te rst is a

speech at the opening o the Academic Year at the College o Europe in

November 2007 (Miliband 2007), the second a press conerence afer a bi-

lateral meeting between Miliband and the then urkish Foreign Affairs

Minister Babacan in November 2008 (Miliband 2008) and the third is

a press conerence delivered afer a recent offi cial visit to urkey in May

2009 (2009). Te context o these speeches is similar to those by Rodríguez

Zapatero. Tey were delivered on the occasion o bilateral meetings or in

an academic context, although in the latter case, the speech concerns the

uture o the European Union, rather than bilateral relations.

b. Analysing discourses about Turkey as a way to take affi rm posi-

tions in the EU political field

According to Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), discourse has become a ash-

ionable term. Tis obliges analysts to be clear as to what they mean by this

notion. Discourse is understood here as “a particular way o talking about

and understanding [...] an aspect o the world” (Jorgensen and Phillips

2002) that operates as “means or different orces to advance their interestsand projects” (Howarth 2000). Statements and texts about the urkish ac-

cession to the European Union are extremely rich and very diverse. Tose

analysed here are a small, though airly coherent, sample, which suggests

that they belong to the same “discursive ormation” (Jorgensen and Phillips

2002: 12) or “order o discourse” (Fairclough 2003: 24).

According to the institutionalist approach mentioned, this article relies on

eld theory (Martin 2003) and particularly on Pierre Bourdieu’s concep-

tion o the political eld (Bourdieu 2002), discourse will be approached in

a dualist analytical way akin to that o Norman Fairclough’s (2003). In this

sense, positions towards urkey are not considered as exclusively discur-sive, since discourses are decisively inuenced by the position o the ac-

tors within their social structure. Te article considers the positions about

urkey as an expression o a competition over a suffi ciently relevant stake

or the EU level political eld to take part in it.

Te article intends to test the hypothesis that top EU political actors’

discourses about the accession o urkey to the EU are a way to affi rm a


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position within the EU political eld. Tis eld is considered as a spaceo positions which is structured by the struggle between the actors over

these positions. Te actors’ position depend o their own political capital

endowment, their relative location “vis à vis” the other actors o the eld

and towards the elds issues at stake. Tus, discourses about urkey must

be analysed in relation to the actors’ position in the struggle or power in

the EU, rather as a result o an ideological perspective on the specics o

urkey as large Muslim country in the southern ank o the EU. In this

sense, the decisive actors or actors’ position taking are the views on the

uture o the EU and secondly the position, both their own and o their

country, in the EU’s power eld.

Without going as ar as saying that public opinion does not exist (Bourdieu

2002: 222-235), there is a disconnection between general publics’ and elites

discourses on the EU in general and in particular regarding the acces-

sion o urkey. Whether the disconnection o different publics is typical

o the European Union’s public sphere (Eriksen 2007), in the case o the

debate about the accession o urkey it may be tempting to point out that

in this case the rejection o the urkish application by some EU leaders

corresponds to their electorates concerns about the integration o a large

Muslim country into the EU (ekin 2008).

However, this article adopts the opposite argument: it is elite discourses

that shape public opinions’ attitudes towards the accession o urkey. Te

evidence or supporting this point is that in some countries, such as Spain

or the UK, public opinion is either relatively less interested than the politi-

cal elite or only partially in agreement, as it is the case in the Netherlands

or Germany. Te case o Angela Merkel is a good example: although her

personal position coincides with that o France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, that is,

that urkey should be offered a special partnership but no ull EU mem-

bership, the offi cial position o the German chancellor is that urkey’s ap-

plication could result in ull membership as result o the principle “ pacta

sunt servanda” (European Stability Initiative 2006 b). Tis is the conse-quence o Germany’s oreign policy tendency to be the product o a general

consensus between the various political orces o the country 2.

Te ollowing section analyses these discourses paying particular atten-

tion to specic sections o the texts which are quoted here in the original

2 I’m grateul to Dr. Senem Aydin Düzgit or raising that point during the debate in the International

Workshop in Istanbul in October 2009.


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languages. ranslations into English or these short quotes by Sarkozy andZapatero are included in the ootnotes.

A E T

c. Nicolas Sarkozy – France

In his speeches Sarkozy rejects the urkish application by arguing that it

does not qualiy or EU membership or substantial reasons. In his dis-

course o oulon, as in other circumstances, Sarkozy argues that urkey

“is not a European country”. In particular, Sarkozy has used a geographi-

cal argument in many occasions, and argued that every school child

knows that urkey is not in Europe but in Asia Minor (Sarkozy 2007b).

Additionally, in his discourse in Nîmes, Sarkozy argues that the EU should

be proud o its Christian heritage3, thus closing any possible enlargement

to urkey.

However, the main arguments o the French president are these “cultural-

ist” opinions. In both discourses, Sarkozy uses the French word “vocation”,

similar to German’s “beru” in that it applies to what a person is destined tobecome. Te use o this notion makes Sarkozy’s discourse more nuanced,

as in his view the EU should reject urkey both or identity reasons but

more importantly, and somehow typical o French political approach to

identity since Ernest Renan, because urkey cannot be reconciled with the

EU’s common project and vision o the world. Sarkozy does deliberately

not elaborate on that so as to let the audience come to its own conclusions

on why urkey does not share this project. Tat said, Sarkozy’s discourse

offers many revealing aspects as to the reasons why urkey does not t into

the project.

Firstly, as mentioned earlier, in Sarkozy’s speeches urkey appears in thecontext o a broader discussion. In both speeches urkey’s application

is ramed as part o a strategy seeking to weaken Europe by denying its

specic identity. Moreover, the rejection o urkey is made in parallel to

the call or strengthening Europe’s will, that is, govern, steer and oster its

3 Sarkozy (2009) says that Europe must not repent o its Christian heritage in the oral perormance o

the Nîmes speech, at 21:59, video available at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x97cyo_discours-

nicolas-sarkozy-nimes-6-ma_news consulted last on 07/08/2010.


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unity. Consequently, urkey is associated with Europe losing control overitsel and its application is rejected or the sake o a stronger European

unity. Tis view is synthetically but clearly stated in his speech in oulon,

still as candidate to France’s presidency:

«L’Europe ne peut pas s’étendre indéniment. L’Europe si elle veut avoirune identité doit avoir des rontières et donc des limites. L’Europe si elle veut avoir une puissance ne peut pas se diluer sans cesse. L’Europe si elle veut pouvoir onctionner ne peut pas s’élargir sans arrêt. »4

Tis section does t well into the general rame elaborated in the introduc-

tion o the speech which denounces that the political elite has been deeat-

ist or a long time, letting social situations be degraded and France’s role

diminished. Sarkozy argues that times are come or action, and even blunt

action where necessary.

Te speech delivered in Nîmes at the beginning o the EU 2009 election

campaign elaborates more on this view. Te speech is build around a no-

tion that structures the whole discourse, the reinorcement o Europe’s

will, which needs that some structural conditions be met. Tis notion

appears at the beginning o the section where the urkish application

is addressed, so as to point out that having clear borders is necessary

to have a strong political will. Te relation between enlargement andEurope’s weakening is put bluntly in this section: “Europe is diluted

in an endless enlargement” (Sarkozy 2009). Europe’s identity and will

to act depend on setting a clear border and riendly relations with the

neighbours.

Sarkozy argues that his vision o Europe is not that o a closed or-

tress, and argues that Europe´s openness is demonstrated by overseas

Commonwealths and America and the Mediterranean, as well as, remark-

ably, the universal heritage o Greece, Rome and Christianity (Sarkozy

2009). Te last word is stressed. Diversity is the reason why France wants

to create the Union or the Mediterranean. However, diversity cannot beused to dilute Europe’s will and unity. Te paragraph elaborates on the

consequences o these divergent views. All that justies the opposition to

any urther enlargement in the ollowing paragraph, since EU institutions

are already too ineffi cient due to increased membership:

4 Sarkozy (2007): “Europe cannot extend itsel endlessly. I Europe wants to have an identity, it must

have borders and thus limits. I Europe wants to have power it must stopping diluting itsel endlessly.

I Europe wants to be able to operate it cannot enlarge without stop.”


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« Pour que l’Europe veuille quelque chose, il aut aussi qu’elle puisse êtregouvernée. Il aut que ses procédures, que ses institutions ne la réduisentpas à l’impuissance. C’est pourquoi la France a voulu sortir de la criseouverte par le rejet de la Constitution Européenne. Il allait débloquerl’Europe. »5

So in Sarkozy’s discourse urkey is rejected not because it is absolutely

different, as a rst reading would imply, but because letting it join the EU

would mean more diversity and thus a reduction o the ability to govern

Europe (see Goulard 2004 and Winkler 2007 or the elaboration o this

point, or Nicolaïdis 2007 or the opposing view). Tis association with

France’s will to carry out the Lisbon reaty leaves the ollowing conclu-sion ready or the “bon entendeur”: urther enlargement, let alone to a

country so big as urkey, risks to undermine France’s role and power in

Europe.

Most interestingly, Sarkozy, as other opponents o urkey’s EU accession

in France (ekin 2008), argues that he is a good riend o urkey and this

is why he is voicing his opposition rankly. In his own words:

« Ce n’est pas respecter ses amis que de leur aire des promesses que l’onne tiendra jamais. »6

Sarkozy is saying that the EU, collectively, is not going to uphold its

promises. In this sense, Sarkozy is introducing the ollowing theme:

most EU leaders are opposed to urkish membership but do not say it,

as they hope urkey will give up at a certain point. So by saying that he

is telling the uncomortable truth he builds his position on the EU eld:

he offers a possible alternative (union or the Mediterranean) and can

point out that the position o other actors is less responsible or realist

than his own.

In this sense, Sarkozy’s arguments can be clearly put in the context not only

o his vision and project or the European Union, but on his own stancewithin the EU political eld. In this sense, Sarkozy stands or a Europe with

a more active role but where at the same time, states keep control o the

agenda and more decisions are taken in intergovernmental eatures. In this

5 Sarkozy (2009): “For Europe to want something, it is necessary that it can be governed. Its procedures,

its institutions must not make it powerless. Tat’s why France wanted to get out o the crisis open by

the rejection o the European Constitution. De-blocking Europe was necessary”6 Sarkozy (2009), “Making promises that you will never uphold is not to respect your riends.”


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view, large member states have a main role to play. Tis view is clearly setin the Lisbon reaty: the European Council acquires an increased role via

the nomination o a president and oreign affairs “non-minister” and large

member states have a bigger voting power in the Council o Ministers. In

this sense, Sarkozy directly claims authorship or this “working Europe”.

Enlargement in his view displaces the efforts o the EU to integrate more

diversity, which in turn makes the EU more diffi cult to govern. So in this

sense, urkey is a paramount obstacle: not only it encompasses extreme

diversity (Muslim, poorer, largely agriculture oriented and turned towards

the Mediterranean and the Middle East) but it is a large member state that

could actually totally change EU politics.

So by rejecting urkish application Sarkozy is reusing to share decision

making power and seeks to deend his own role as a promoter o a orm o

a “core Europe” more integrated EU.

d. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero - Spain

For the Spanish president (Spanish constitutional term or Prime

Minister), the application o urkey is advantageous or both sides, in

economic and strategic terms. Moreover, he considers that the EU mustaccept urkey’s application out o respect or some o its own values such

as peace, international cooperation and cultural diversity. A detailed

analysis o Zapatero’s discourse reveals that together with these, Spain’s

own economic interests and strategic considerations are key aspects o

his position.

Firstly, contrary to Sarkozy, he considers that it is possible to stand or

more European integration and urther enlargement. urkey would not

only enrich the European Union, but it would be an essential eature or a

stronger Europe in the world. Firstly, urkey is an important regional actor

in military and diplomatic terms. But most importantly, Zapatero consid-ers that urkish membership o the EU would be a working example o

how to solve some o the embedded world conicts.

When it comes to values, Zapatero considers that these are not given, but

that they are rstly shared by populations and elites and then implemented

in long, and sometimes harsh, accession negotiations. He proposes the ex-

ample o the Spanish accession to the EU as evidence or this.


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So, as in the case o Sarkozy, Zapatero’s position on urkey derives directlyo his vision o the European project. As or Sarkozy, his discourse must

be understood in the context o his and Spain’s position in the EU political

eld. So he does not rerain rom saying that urkey and Spain share some

regional interests and that urkey’s membership would serve the Spanish

national interest directly and indirectly:

“Para España, urquía es un país de importancia estratégica en nuestrasrelaciones, no sólo por la amistad que nos une, sino por intereses compar-tidos. Somos países mediterráneos, sensibles a la estabilidad y prosperi-dad de esta región y a la promoción del proceso de paz en Oriente Medio.España reconoce en urquía a un actor regional de primer orden y valorasu contribución a las iniciativas multilaterales.”7

Tis is particularly clear when it comes to bilateral trade and investment

ows.

“urquía es un país estratégico para nuestras relaciones económicas. ElGobierno de España considera que una política exterior para nuestro paísha de contar, de manera singular, con lo que representa urquía y, de man-era singular, en el ámbito económico y de servicio a las empresas.Adelante, hagan negocios.”8

In the case o the strategic orientation, Zapatero considers that the con-tribution by urkey may be particularly relevant to Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP). However, it is in the eld o intercultural under-

standing where he considers that the EU needs urkey the most. In this

sense, urkish membership could be a good example or the Mediterranean

and Middle East region. Tis is clearly expressed by the project o an

Alliance o civilisations.

Occasionally, Zapatero insists that the accession process presents su-

cient saeguards to ensure that urkey will only join afer complying

with EU values and political standards. Te question o an alternative to

7 Rodríguez Zapatero (2009 c) “urkey is a country o strategic importance or Spain in our relations,

not only because o the riendship that unites us, but because o our shared interests. We are

Mediterranean countries, sensitive to the stability and prosperity o this region and to the promotion

o the peace process in the Middle East. Spain nds in urkey a regional actor o prime importance

and appreciates its contribution to regional initiatives.”8 Rodríguez Zapatero (2008), “urkey is a strategic country or our economic relationships. Te

Spanish Government considers that our country’s oreign policy must take into consideration what

urkey represents today, and particularly in the domains o economy and services to companies. Let’s

go, make business.”


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enlargement is not given thought, as urkey is considered to be ready orenlargement since it is ollowing a ast modernisation track and shares

EU values.

urkey appears in Zapatero’s discourse as a strategic and business oppor-

tunity that additionally can contribute to appease relations between the

EU and the Muslim world. Tis goes in hand with Zapatero’s and Spain

role in the EU: a peripheral actor seeking to use the EU to maximise its role

in the region. Moreover, supporting urkey’s application is coherent with

the way in which Zapatero has sought to build his prole as a European

leader and international actor, that o an actor seeking to mediate between

cultures and trying to avoid conrontations.

e. David Miliband – United Kingdom

Finally, David Miliband’s speeches are very interesting and strongly reect

British preerences or European integration. Te discourse on urkey is

thus characterised by two aspects: the rst is the support to urkish ac-

cession in that it reinorces the preerred version o EU integration or the

UK and the second is an effort to “normalise” the issue and to ocus on the

importance o the process.

In the speeches chosen David Miliband reerences to urkey are always

associated to the UK’s traditional pro-enlargement attitudes. raditionally

the UK has supported enlargement as a way to balance what it sees as

ederalist tendencies. Tus, reerring to Margaret Tatcher’s ears on the

emergence o a European superstate, Mr Miliband argues that:

“Open markets, subsidiarity, better regulation and enlargement are nowar more part o the conventional vocabulary o European debate than aUnited States o Europe, centralised taxation or a common industrial pol-icy. Te truth is that the EU has enlarged, remodelled and opened up. It is

not and is not going to become a superstate.”9

Te UK supports enlargement not only by its inherent benets (see below)

but particularly because it shapes the EU in the sense the UK preers. Te

previous quote associates enlargement with economic liberalisation and

openness to the world. In act, contrary to Nicolas Sarkozy, Mr Miliband

9 Miliband 2007


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does not see a need to dene Europe’s borders. He does rather support aprocess where the distinction between EU members and non members is

increasingly blurred.

“Te goal must be a multilateral ree-trade zone around our periphery – a version o the European Free rade Association that could gradually bringthe countries o the Mahgreb, the Middle-East and Eastern Europe in linewith the single-market, not as an alternative to membership, but poten-tially as a step towards it.”10

Tus urkish membership appears just as an epitome o this openness

towards the neighbours able to end in enlargement. Te reerence to the

European Free rade Association, EFA, launched by the UK in the 60s as

a way to counterbalance the then EEC is remarkable in this sense.

Te UK does not just support enlargement as a way to shape the EU. It sees

inherent benets in the process:

“It’s right or us and it is right or you and it is right or Europe. I think thatthe benets will be political and cultural as well as economic.”11

For Miliband the EU needs to be open in order to be successul in a global

world, and accepting urkey as a member is an example o the necessary

openness.

“I think that the economic and social changes that we’ve seen around theworld […] reinorce the case or Europe being open and Europe look-ing outwards, and I think they reinorce the case or the shared vision ourkey as a ull and equal member o the European Union.”12

In the last quote the reerence to urkey as an equal member is irrelevant,

in that no reerences to inequality appear in the discourse, i one does not

understand it in the context o a debate about a possible “special partner-

ship”, proposed by Merkel and Sarkozy.

Among the political benets, one appears particularly relevant to David

Miliband: the accession o urkey to the EU would be a bridge between

Europe and the Muslim world.

10 Miliband 200711 Miliband 200912 Miliband 2009


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“I we ail to keep our promises to urkey, it will signal a deep and danger-ous divide between east and west.”13

Te second dimension o the discourse o David Miliband on urkey seeks

to address the problems raised by the urkish application. It is interesting

to note that in doing so he proceeds by avoiding the political objections

related to urkey’s identity and instead pointing out that the EU’s enlarge-

ment process offers ways to address any eventual shortcoming.

“I think it’s very important that we send a loud message that now is animportant time or imagination and condence, not or hesitation andblame.”14

In this sense, Miliband is trying to “normalise” the application and say

that the only criteria that urkey has to comply with is successul internal

reorm in agreement with the Copenhagen criteria and successul achieve-

ment o the accession negotiations. Tus keeping the ongoing process open

appears as the best way to solve existing problems, including the Cyprus

controversy.

“Beyond that, we must keep the door open, retaining the incentive orchange that the prospect o membership provides.Being part o Europe should be about abiding by the shared rules – the

acquis – that embody our shared values by respecting our separate identi-ties and traditions.”15

Finally, David Miliband does not explicitly speak about the implications

o the application o urkey to the European Union. However, in his dis-

course it appears that rejecting urkey would have as a consequence that

EU identity would be a closed one.

“[…] the message to the people o urkey is that there are people in theEuropean Union committed to make sure that we are not an inward-look-ing, closed club.”16

All in all, David Miliband’s discourse is that o a relatively isolated actor.

Although he engages in arguments opposed to those o the other actors,

he is not directly involved in the same eld as Zapatero or Sarkozy. In

this sense, the act that the Prime Minister is not directly involved in the

13 Miliband, 200714 Miliband, 200915 Miliband 200716 Miliband 2008


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issue implies that it is not perceived as a major power issue by the UK, al-though it could mean that the UK does not want to overpoliticise the issue.

Secondly, the discourse on urkey is somehow isolated in that it remains

deeply rooted in the UK’s preerences, which are those o a peripheral ac-

tor, preerring a reduced level o integration but the largest possible exten-

sion o the borders or economic and geopolitical reasons.

f. Public opinion matters, doesn’t it? The cases of the Netherlands,

Germany and the Armenian Genocide legislation in France

Te analysis outlined above could be criticised by pointing out a bias in the

act that only one country where public opinion polls indicate strong op-

position to the accession o urkey to the European Union has been con-

sidered, that is France (Barysch 2007), and that in other countries such as

Germany or the Netherlands political elites discourses on the accession

o urkey are decisively inuenced by public opinions. Tis criticism will

be addressed in a double way. Firstly, the situation in the two countries

mentioned above will be considered in order to analyse whether political

elites position taking ollows public opinion, although as said in section 2

the authors’ linguistic skills impedes going. It will be argued that as it is the

case in the 3 countries analysed above, even in the case o countries with very strong opposition the discourse o political elites remains relatively

independent rom the considerations among public opinions. Secondly,

the case o France will be reconsidered, with particular reerence to this

country’s elites’ attitudes towards the Armenian genocide. It will be ar-

gued that the rst aim o the debates on this matter is not to satisy this

country’s large Armenian community, but to dene particular standards

or urkey’s accession to the EU.

In the Netherlands, the approach o political parties is typical o the con-

sociational system o the country. Positions by political parties concerning

the urkish application process are elaborated in a low prole environmentand treated as a subject relating to different policies and inuenced by a

long tradition o support or enlargement. Along these lines, political par-

ties seem to take sides along the lines o their traditional positions towards

enlargement and the EU (European Stability Initiative 2006 a), rather

than on the issue o internal identity considerations, contrary to the issues

raised by some populist parties. Te participation o a party in consulta-

tions on oreign policy seems to be the key actor explaining avourable


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positions o its elites towards urkey’s EU accession. In this sense, thereseems to be a strong pressure rom the eld to adapt behaviours by the

agents. Interestingly, the most notable sceptical attitude among the “main

parties” is the ormer Dutch Commissioner Bolkenstein. His position in

Brussels trying to gain a voice rom outside the Dutch political eld may

be an explanation o this attitude.

Te picture in Germany is that o a still more important divide between

government and the rest o the elite. In this sense it is notable that the

Chancellor hersel has been against urkish accession, but accepted to

continue the negotiation process because o a sense o responsibility to-

wards the government’s oreign policy. It must be noted that this position

is not that o the majority in her party. Tis position does not seem to have

changed afer the government agreement with the liberals.

Finally, the case o France deserves particular attention. Te scepticism o

French elites concerning the accession o urkey to the EU is quite sali-

ent. It has been used by some actors such as Giscard d’Estaing, who have

sought to politicise European integration (Visier 2009), in particular in the

context o the reerendum on the European constitution, which has been

related the banalisation o extreme right discourses (ekin 2008). Another

maniestation o this politicisation would be France’s legislation recognis-ing the crimes against the Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Te latter mat-

ter could be considered as evidence or the act that French elites are using

the urkish accession as a matter o internal politics, in particular or sat-

isying the Armenian community.

However, this matter can be analysed with the same grid taken in the pre-

vious section. o start with, France’s recognition o the Armenian geno-

cide is not limited to internal politics. Indeed, French elites have sought

to establish the recognition by urkey o the 1915 vents as a genocide as

an additional condition or urkey’s accession to the EU. In this sense,

Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy, as well as Michel Barnier, ormer ForeignAffairs minister and serving EU Commissioner, have put orward that

urkey would have to recognise the Armenian genocide in order to join the

EU. By adding a sort o 4th post Copenhagen criterion, French elites have

sought to create a rame justiying the rejection o the urkish accession.

Tis is clear when the time rame is considered: it was not until urkey was

recognised as a candidate in Helsinki in 1999 that the Armenian geno-

cide was recognised in France in 2001, and subsequently turned into an


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EU: D E T S?

additional accession criterion. Discursively, these actors have sought to justiy this position in European terms, by pointing out that, inasmuch as

it would have been impossible to proceed with European integration in the

50s had Germany not recognised its responsibilities in the Second World

War, it would be impossible or urkey to contribute to the EU without

ullling its “memory duties”.

Although it is impossible to extend the analysis urther, it seems that both in

the case o France as in the Netherlands and Germany, elite positions on the

accession o urkey to the EU are relatively independent rom those o the

public opinion, and do rather depend on the actors’ position in the political

eld and their role in the ormulation o their countries European policies.

C

Te analysis above shows that, contrary to what is suggested in some de-

bates, the ears o national public opinions (LaGro and Jørgensen 2007,

ekin 2008) are not the systematic reason behind the ormation o the po-

litical elites’ positions towards the urkish application but rather depends

on the position o political actors in the EU political eld. Te analysis

carried out seems to conrm this or the three cases analysed in detail.Tis is not to say that these discourses are not addressed to national public

opinions. Although EU leaders behave according to their situation on the

EU eld when making their attitudes towards the accession o urkey, this

is ar rom meaning that there is a European debate on the issue, although

it appears that in some cases EU leaders reply to each others arguments.

National public opinion remains the main addressees o the discourses.

However, this does not mean that leaders are using urkey as a way to take

positions on internal issues like immigration or multiculturalism (LaGro

and Jørgensen 2007, ekin 2008). Tey are rather using discourses about

urkey as a way to put orward their view on the uture o the EU to their

national publics (Visier 2009). So the EU leaders’ discourses about urkeyare a way to promote visions o the EU that are coherent with their posi-

tions in the EU political eld.

Concerning the cases o the Netherlands and Germany, the position o

political elites in the European political eld seems to play an indirect in-

uence, via an effect on the preerences retained by the actors in internal

decisions. Consequently, it is the internal conguration o the political


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eld which seems decisive there, although previous compromises and tra-ditional policy preerences seem important or triggering the logic o ap-

propriateness among the actors.

Te motivations behind elites discourses revealed by this analysis are quite

telling about the structure o the emerging European public sphere. On the

one hand, positions on the accession o urkey to the EU are essentially

motivated by the political capital endowment o actors at the national level.

In this sense, it is their position within the national political eld and their

interpretation o their country’s European policies that inuence their po-

sitions against or in avour o the accession o urkey to the EU. On the

other hand, it appears quite clearly that the 3 discourses on the accession o

urkey to the EU that have been analysed in detail here are European dis-

courses in the sense that they put orward 3 different visions o the uture

o the EU and how the urkish accession would affect them.

Does that correspond to any orm o trans-European debate? It appears that

the actors considered are challenging each others arguments, although this

is only a minor part o their discourse. However, although the discourses

are European, in that one could agree with any o them without sharing

the nationality o the speaker and that they correspond to visions o the

EU, they are not addressed to a pan European general public. In this sense,none o these discourses, with the possible exception o Sarkozy’s, aims to

create a pan-European debate that would serve the actor to advance his

preerences. However, this does not mean that elite discourses on urkey

are made only or their peers in European elds. Even i these discourses

do not contribute to the emergence o a European public space, they do

contribute to the Europeanisation o national debates, as discourses on

urkey convey a number o messages on the EU. In this sense the politisa-

tion o the urkish candidacy (Visier 2009) provides a series o rames or

the political interpretation o the EU by the general public.

However, it must be asked to what extent this division between elite andpublic views is sustainable in a democratic Union. Without implying that

elites should change their discourse to encompass general public’s ears, it

is up to political scientists to research why in the particular case o urkey

this drif seems so diffi cult to overcome.

Te conclusion o this analysis may be that despite the evolution o pub-

lic opinions, European elites do still consider the urkish application on


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its own merits, rather than on the grounds o identity politics. Tis im-plies that there is a margin or breakthroughs in the accession process,

and that the argument o public opinion scepticism which is used by both

parts to slow down the process is not as substantial as it seems on the rst

view. Discouraging as it may be rom the point o view o a supporter o

the emergence o a pan-European public space, the matter o the acces-

sion o urkey to the EU is still largely a matter or elites and diplomats to

discuss.

REFERENCES

Books and articles

Barysch, K. (2007) “What Europeans think about Turkey and why”, London: Center

for European Reform, available online at:

http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_barysch_25sept07.pdf

Bourdieu, P. (2002) Questions de sociologie, Paris: Les éditions de minuit

Eriksen, E. O. (2007) “Conceptualising European public spheres. General, seg-

mented and strong publics” in Fossum, J. E. and Schlesinger, P. (eds) (2007) The

European Union and the Public Sphere. A communicative space in the making?

London: Routledge

European Stability Initiative (2006 a) “Beyond enlargement fatigue? The Dutch de-

bate on Turkish accession” 24 April 2006, available online at:

http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=329, consulted last on 29-10-2009

European Stability Initiative (2006b) “The German Turkey Debate under the Grand

Coalition – State of the debate” October 2006, available at:

http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_germany_grand_coalition.pdf

Fairclough, N. (2003) Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research.

Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Goulard, S. (2004) Le Grand Turc et la République de Venise, Paris: Fayard

Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse, Buckingham: Open University Press

Jorgensen, M. W. and Phillips, L.J. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method

(London: SAGE

LaGro, E. and Jørgensen, K. E. (eds) (2007) Turkey and the European Union. Prospects

for a Diffi cult Encounter , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

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Nicolaïdis, K. (2007) “Les fins de l’Europe” in Geremek, B. and Picht, R. (dir) (2007)Visions d’Europe, Paris : Odile Jacob, 275-297.

Tekin, B. Ç. (2008) “The construction of Turkey’s possible EU membership in French

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Visier, C. (2009) “La Turquie : instrument de politisation, objet de politisation” in

European Journal of Turkish Studies, nº9

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une puissance globale? Plaidoyer pour un réalisme européen” in Geremek, B.

and Picht, R. (dir) Visions d’Europe, Paris: Odile Jacob, 249-258

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Miliband, D. (2007) “Europe 2030: Model Power not Superpower”, 15/11/2007, avail-

able from: http://www.coleurop.be/events/909 (consulted last on 27/10/2009)

Miliband, D (2008) “Press conference with Turkish Foreign Minister”, 07/11/2008,

available from:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=8796870

(consulted last on 28/10/2009)

Miliband, D. (2009) “Foreign Secretary visit to Turkey” 28/05/2009, available from:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=18401681

(consulted last on 28/10/2009)

Sarkozy, N. (2007a) “Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy”, 07/02/2007, available from thefollowing website: www.sarkozy.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=7fevrie

r2007_Toulon_DiscoursNS.pdf

Sarkozy N (2007 b) “Interview de Nicolas Sarkozy donnée conjointement à Radio

Vatican (RV), à l’Osservatore Romano (OR) et au CTV.”, 20/12/2007, availa-

ble from (consulted last on 27/10/2009): http://www.radiovaticana.org/fr1/

Articolo.asp?c=175307

Sarkozy, N. (2009) « La France et l’Europe. Discours de M. le président de la

République - Réunion républicaine à Nîmes (Gard). », 05/05/2009, available

from the following website :

http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2009/la-france-et-l-

europe.5716.html

Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2008) “Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno en el Foro

empresarial hispano-turco” 14/01/08, available from http://www.la-moncloa.

es/Presidente/Intervenciones/Discursos/prdi200801142.htm

Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2009 a) “Intervención de Rodríguez Zapatero en la rueda

de prensa”, 05/04/2009, video available from (consulted last on 27/10/2009):

http://www.la-moncloa.es/ActualidadHome/2009/050409RAN.htm


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Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (2009 b) “Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno en lainauguración del curso académico en la Universidad turca de Bahçesehir”,

15/09/2009, available from (consulted last on 27/10/2009):

http://www.la-moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/Discursos/pr-

di200809151.htm)

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cena de celebración del fin del ayuno diario del Ramadán” 15/09/2009 available

from (consulted last on 27/10/2009):

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