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As a four-year multidisciplinary research project ‘Reconciling Europe with its Citizens through Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (RECONNECT) aims at understanding and providing solutions to challenges faced by the European Union (EU) in relation to democracy and rule of law. This policy brief presents first research results on the profound changes that democracy and the rule of law are undergoing in the EU. It discusses the results of research into the political dynamics related to the European elections of last May and presents some results of a large survey which was conducted in several EU Member States. Our findings underline that European election campaigns should focus much more on European aspects in order to strengthen the link between the European institutions and the EU’s citizens. The policy brief also presents an analysis of the current developments in relation to rule of law backsliding in several EU Member States and provides a comprehensive assessment of the current proposals in the EU toolbox to address this challenge. RECONNECT observes that currently the EU has sufficient political and legal mechanisms to resolve this issue but that it must deploy these mechanisms in a coordinated way. The policy brief ends with a series of recommendations on how to tackle the ongoing democracy and rule of law changes in the EU.

Fundamental Principles under Pressure? – Democracy and Rule of Law Transformations in the European Union

31 August 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EUROPEAN

POLICYBRIEF

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Democracy and the rule of law are foundational values and fundamental principles of the EU. More than anything else, citizens’ expectations and discourses of democratic and rule of law principles are of crucial importance and matter when it comes to legitimizing the EU. And yet, democracy and the rule of law are in a state of transformation on the level of the EU and its Member States. RECONNECT identifies several transformative developments, which potentially feed into citizens’ perceptions in the long run. Emerging RECONNECT research shows that democracy and the rule of law are undergoing profound changes in the EU, yet not always in the same manner and direction. Rule of law backsliding has become a reality in several EU Member States – not only in Poland and Hungary but also beyond. As a consequence, we see EU institutions struggling to find, develop and deploy legal instruments that could limit the spread of rule of law erosion at the Member State level. But which tools exactly could the EU use? Which ones should the EU use more extensively? With regard to democracy – despite a certain rebound of participation in the European elections in May 2019 – the overall voter turnout remains low, with many Member States having witnessed lower levels of turnout than in 2014. A large-scale RECONNECT citizen survey conducted before and after the elections shows that the elections were generally discussed with limited attention to European polity and policy aspects. As a consequence, RECONNECT’s findings underline that national election campaigns would need to focus much more on European aspects in order to strengthen the link between the European Parliament (EP) and the EU’s citizens in the future. RECONNECT also observes developing democratic vulnerabilities in multiple EU Member States – not only related to the lack of citizens participation in democratic processes, but to the emergence of populist discourses and illiberal tendencies.

Global Transformations RECONNECT research begins with a careful tracing of global and regional democracy and rule of law conditions and trajectories based on the best available empirical indicators. Our analysis, in a global context, essentially reveals a sobering, but not catastrophic, picture. Whether RECONNECT examines quantitative data evaluating the number and quality of democracies or qualitative public attitudes towards democracy and authoritarian alternatives, the image that emerges is one of moderate decline from the heights of the "third wave" of global democratization (around 2000-2005), but signifies no outright global democratic recession analogous to those of the 1930's or 1958-1973 period. However, RECONNECT’s findings also provide no cause for celebration or complacency. While we have not experienced a global collapse in the number and fundamental quality of democracies, nor of public preference for democratic governance, there are worrying signs of authoritarian resurgence and weakening confidence in the ability of democracies to deliver on expectations of European citizens. Relatedly, RECONNECT shows that in a historically uniquely interconnected world, the EU and its Member States are hardly isolated islands unaffected by broader regional and global dynamics. External variables will influence both national and supra-national level regime characteristics and political outcomes. The normative foundations of the EU – and the ensuing challenges for the authority and legitimacy of European governance – will be shaped, in multiple ways, by processes and actors beyond EU borders. RECONNECT’s research also underlines that the internal and external dynamics which the EU now faces are substantially different – in some respects dramatically

INTRODUCTION

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

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so – from those assumed by the relevant literature five to ten years ago. A key scientific insight of RECONNECT is, in other words, to adapt the literature that examines "external influence on democracy and the rule of law" to include a new set of questions, focused on the possible pernicious effects of external actors (e.g. Russian deliberate information warfare or elections interference) on intra-EU democratic and rule of law conditions. Transforming Democracy Turning to European dynamics, RECONNECT’s analysis so far suggests that there are significant variations in the quality of (national) democracy in the EU and that some Member States are indeed prone to democratic backsliding. Particularly, the situations in Hungary, Poland and Romania give cause for concern. At the same time, we caution against making all too quick judgments, as democracy remains a complex, multi-dimensional concept. The preliminary analysis of RECONNECT confirms the importance of not assessing the formal institutions of democracy in isolation, but to look at them in interaction with the actual societal behaviour they provoke or constrain. RECONNECT shows that backsliding in democratic institutions will have more severe consequences in societies with weakly developed civil society and a poor level of public debate, than it will in societies that are more democratically resilient. Similar caution is necessary when assessing the democratic merits of new political parties. While many new parties are populist – in the sense that they seek to mobilize the people against the established political elites – this in itself need not make them anti-democratic. Ongoing RECONNECT research focuses on whether these parties advance the level of democratic pluralism – i.e. the openness of the political system towards a diversity of political positions. In general, we find that new parties contribute to the level of democratic pluralism, as long as they also respect the existence of competing positions in their words and deeds. What is more, even if anti-establishment sentiments evolve into anti-democratic positions, new parties are often internally divided and ambiguous in their tolerance of other parties. Whether anti-pluralist inclinations prevail also depends on the way these new parties are conditioned by the context that they encounter: the responses of other parties, their formal access to opportunities within the political system, and the responsiveness of the public sphere to their views. To get a better understanding of the ability of national democracies to accommodate new populist parties, these conditions require further examination. Democratic Practice and Transformations in Electoral Participation To assess developments with regard to democratic participation at the EU level, RECONNECT is analyzing changes in electoral participation. A database recording a number of relevant features foreseen to account for changes in rates of electoral participation has been used to statistically test the impact of these features on: 1) aggregate levels of participation over time and across countries in all the Member States since their accession; 2) changes in these levels of participation. The results so far are only provisional, yet they point toward a number of important determinants of turnout in EP elections. What we have evidenced so far – alongside the effects of various elements of the political culture – is that (1) low turnout in national elections, (2) the proximity in time of the EP elections to the latest national elections and, to a more limited extent, (3) holding elections on a weekday rather than on a weekend are related to lower participation rates. Countries with a higher number of effective political parties also display a higher level of participation, showing that the choice of parties is an important factor to consider. Above all, Central and Eastern EU Member States tend to have higher abstention rates compared to Western EU Member States: a situation that contributes to create a fracture

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between the West and the East, as citizens from the latter are less well represented in the EP. In addition, although we need to incorporate more attitudinal indicators, satisfaction with national and EU democracy also affects turnout. Most parameters that affect electoral turnout are not easy to change. What RECONNECT therefore recommends is to concentrate on parameters that can easily be changed and that have the strongest effects: namely to avoid holding national, regional and even local elections close to EP ones (in order to avoid the so-called voters’ fatigue) or, in contrast, to have other elections (or referendums) precisely organized concomitantly to the EP electoral contest. Holding concurrent elections also decreases the cost of organizing the ballots for Member States. We would therefore suggest that EU Member States should not hold any election or referendum in the three month-period preceding the EP contest and that EU citizens should not go to the polls for national (legislative and/or presidential) elections in the six months preceding the European elections. Another avenue for improving electoral participation at the European level would consist in regrouping all EP elections on the same day, most likely on a Sunday (hence reforming actual rules on EP elections). Of course, the timing and organization of national elections is not an EU competence. However, the EU Member States could be encouraged to coordinate more closely on this matter. Finally, there is a need to devote more of the communication effort to the Eastern Member States, where electoral participatory culture is less developed, and to better target the specific barriers to political participation there. European Elections 2019: Transforming in the Direction of First-Order Elections? RECONNECT has also researched perceptions of European citizens, especially in view of the 2019 European elections. One way to assess the extent to which the 2019 EP elections were perceived by European citizens as first-order contests (i.e. elections that were by and large determined by national, rather than European topics and debates) is to examine whether Europe was a key topic for citizens. In the RECONNECT survey conducted in eight EU Member States, we asked citizens what topics they covered when discussing politics. The research presented respondents with a list of 19 issues – of which two issues related to Europe, namely “European Integration” and “The Euro” – and asked them to select their most discussed issue. The survey was conducted both before the campaign began and then again immediately after the elections. The results, presented in Figure 1 below, suggest that the discussion of these two issues was not dominant, neither before the campaign nor after Election Day: before the campaign began (wave 1), these two issues combined were the most discussed issue amongst less than 2% of respondents in six of the eight countries – only in Italy and Austria did this figure slightly exceed 2%. By Election Day, there is only evidence of a slight increase: around 4% of respondents in Poland and Italy named both issues as important, but in no other country of study were they most discussed by more than 3% of respondents. Hence, despite the especially high salience of European themes during the time period in which the survey was run, Europe itself did not become the dominant topic of conversation amongst its citizens.

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Figure 1: Percentage of respondents mentioning The Euro or European Integration as discussion topics. Note: Question “Which issue among the following did you discuss the most in the past month? Please select one.”

Figure 2 presents the findings of an alternative approach: presenting citizens with a list of potentially discussed EU topics only, including a “did not discuss European politics in the last month” option. The results in Figure 2 reveal that there was no discussion of EU topics for slightly over 50% percent of respondents in Denmark and 25% in Italy before the EP election campaign began (wave 1), with the other countries in the study falling somewhere in between. Figure 2: Percentage of respondents that do not discuss European politics. Note: Question “Now, a few questions on European politics in particular. Which issue among the following did you discuss the most in the past month? Please select one answer.”

In all countries covered by the study (wave 2), the election campaign did not succeed in eradicating this complete lack of discussion of EU topics amongst a sizeable number of respondents, as the light grey bar in Figure 2 shows. Though a larger fraction did discuss an EU topic, it is worth noting that

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this only indicates some level of discussion. Moreover, as the findings of Figure 1 suggest, discussion of EU topics amongst those who did discuss them tend to be ‘squeezed out’ by other issues. Overall, the EP elections were generally discussed with limited focus on European polity and policy aspects. These findings show that national campaigns need to place greater emphasis on European aspects in order to strengthen the link between the EP and the EU citizens. To facilitate this change, we propose the following. First, European party lists should be created, as national parties will have little interest in organizing their electoral campaigns along European aspects. Second, citizens need to have at least a broad understanding of the competences of the EU vis-à-vis Member States in order to know what is at stake in an EP election and what parties and candidates can realistically promise. As education is a national competence, the most obvious solution is a willingness on the side of Member States to provide young citizens with basic training on EU politics in schools as part of basic citizenship classes. Ideally, this effort would also take place in conjunction with independent and nonpartisan television programming to also provide citizens of all ages with a basic overview of how the EU works and its division of competences with Member States. Transforming Rule of Law Rule of law backsliding has become a fundamental problem in the EU and raises questions about the adherence to common values and principles in some EU Member States. To address this problem, RECONNECT conducts an in-depth, comparative and historical analysis of the principles and practices of the rule of law and proposes several recommendations to address the problem. Over the past years we have seen violations of rule of law principles – such as the independence of the judiciary, political checks and balances and the respect for fundamental rights, such as the right to free expression – in several EU Member States. Given that the functioning of rule of law and the functioning of liberal democracy co-exist and are mutually impacting, the EU is seen as not only facing a rule of law crisis per se, but a wider democracy crisis. RECONNECT focuses on the development and use of rule of law principles across EU Member States. Specific attention goes to Hungary and Poland. RECONNECT research shows how political regimes in Hungary and Poland have made use of the concepts of constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism in their drive to consolidate autocracy. RECONNECT’s findings conclude that given the dangers inherent in constitutional pluralism and its susceptibility to abuse, it should be replaced with a more traditional understanding of the primacy of EU law. Moreover, RECONNECT research also focuses on rule of law practices. First, RECONNECT underlines the influence of rule of law standards developed by the Council of Europe and the EU on national legal orders as well as the contribution of national legal systems to the development of these European standards. Second, the research highlights the variety of rule of law practices, both in EU Member States and in the EU. Based on data-gathering and data analysis, specific developments of practical aspects of rule of law issues in the EU and EU Member States are under scrutiny. Moreover, forthcoming research deals with case studies regarding rule of law backsliding in some EU Member States and with the changing understanding and perception of the rule of law amongst citizens according to evolving practices in the EU and its Member States. Furthermore, RECONNECT research shows not only the advent of an emerging rule of law crisis, but also ways how to strengthen the rule of law by actively engaging with the crisis.

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Transformations of the Rule of Law and the EU’s Toolbox With respect to transformations of the rule of law in the EU, RECONNECT research shows that – contrary to what is often claimed – the EU’s toolbox of measures to prevent, address and defeat rule of law is already sufficiently comprehensive and sophisticated (see also Treaty-based instruments in Table 1). If the full set of current instruments is used promptly, forcefully and in a coordinated manner, they should, at the very least, contain rule of law backsliding. The only tool which is arguably missing is an explicit and specific mechanism such as the one proposed by the Commission in May 2018 in its proposal for a regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget. However, the EU already has tools available under the Common Provisions Regulation with which it could suspend the flow of structural funds (see also Table 1 and Pech and Kochenov 2019). Table 1: Overview of Treaty-Based Instruments.

Treaty-Based Instruments Article 7 TEU Article 7 TEU should be used to its full potential to enhance its ‘crystallisation effect’

following its activation. Article 7 should not foresee the participation of a Member State already subjected to the Article 7(1) procedure to another Article 7 procedure involving another Member State.

Article 258 TFEU and Article 279 TFEU

The Commission should continue to further explore the untapped potential of increasing and interconnected infringement actions based on Articles 2, 4(3), and 19(1) TEU to defend judicial independence but also as of yet unexplored provisions, such as Article 325 TFEU, to combat state-sponsored corruption.

Article 259 Increasing the awareness of this provision gives the Member States the opportunity to take action to counteract rule of law backsliding in the EU.

Cooperation and Verification Mechanism

The mechanism has not proven to be as effective as was initially hoped in the absence of direct sanctions in a situation where progress is not achieved. More dialogue is not the way forward. The Article 7 procedure coupled with infringement actions based on Article 4(3) TEU, Article 19(1) TEU and Article 325 TFEU would be a more effective course of action.

Article 70 TFEU On the basis of this article, measures for an objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of Union policies in the area of freedom, security and justice could be created, in order to facilitate the full application of the principle of mutual recognition.

Early RECONNECT findings suggest that the Union’s rule of law ecosystem could be reinforced through (1) revising the mandate of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) to enable it to play a more meaningful role on the rule of law front; (2) creating an EU network of independent experts (to be attached to FRA and/or the Commission); (3) strengthening the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and sharing its findings publicly in situations of deliberate inaction; (4) determining that oversight of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is a prerequisite for access to certain EU funds; (5) ensuring the EU political parties’ commitment to Article 2 TEU values; (6) more systematic involvement of the Venice Commission; (7) greater involvement of national actors, notably national parliaments; and (8) establishing an EU Justice Policy annual event. Moreover, at the intersection of democratic and rule of law practice, the European Commission should combat electoral fraud through infringement actions based on Articles 14(3) TEU and 39(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to tackle electoral legislation biased in favour of the ruling party. The Commission should also consider the feasibility of an EU voting rights act to protect the quality and integrity of electoral acts across the EU. Furthermore, the EU’s rule of law enforcement chain could be improved through (1) systematic EP country visits prior to and after the adoption of rule of law resolutions and (2) increased political and legal support by national governments, e.g. through interventions in relevant pending cases before the European Court of Justice, the initiation of Article 259 TFEU actions in case of

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Commission inaction, or the publication of statements and questions made in the context of ongoing Article 7 TEU procedures. EU institutions should also aim to better coordinate and involve non-EU bodies such as the Council of Europe, while these bodies must do their part to prevent their own capture or infiltration by autocratic elements. At the same time, a rule of law ‘stress test’, similar to the working of the European Banking Authority, could be implemented with the objective to assess the reaction capacities of the EU's multilevel architecture in the face of concrete problems related to the rule of law. Last but not least, the Commission is well advised not to spend its limited time and resources on schemes that not only misdiagnose the problems but also imply that the current EU institutions, including the Commission itself, lack ‘professional independence’. In particular, an overly ambitious revamping of the EU’s rule of law toolbox should not be prioritized at this particular juncture when rule of law backsliding is both worsening and spreading.

The ongoing transformation of democracy and the rule of law in the EU and its Member States is a crucial element of the research conducted by RECONNECT so far. This policy brief presented early preliminary results and drew first conclusions. This section summarizes the main recommendations for the EU, EU institutions and Member States: Democracy

(1) Low voter turnout at European elections should be addressed by European Institutions and Member States through parameters that can easily be changed and that have the strongest effects. These include:

a. Avoid holding national, regional and even local elections close to EP ones; b. Avoid holding any election or referendum in the three month-period preceding the EP

election. EU citizens should not go to the polls for national (legislative and/or presidential) elections in the six months preceding the European election;

c. Organize EP elections on the same day, ideally on a Sunday (hence reforming actual rules on EP elections);

d. Increase communication efforts towards Central and Eastern EU Member States, where the participatory culture is less developed, in order to better target the specific barriers to political participation;

(2) At the level of the EU, creating European party lists should be welcomed, as national parties

will have little interest in organizing their electoral campaigns along European aspects;

(3) European Institutions and Member States should work towards and invest in an increasing citizens’ knowledge of the EU. Citizens need to have at least a broad understanding of the competences of the European Union vis-à-vis the Member States in order to understand what is at stake in EP elections and what parties and candidates can realistically promise to achieve. As education is a national competence, the most obvious solution is a willingness of the Member States to provide young citizens with basic training on EU politics in schools as part of basic citizenship classes.

Rule of Law

(1) The European Union, more specifically the European Commission, should not prioritize an overly ambitious revamping of the EU’s rule of law toolbox, but use the current instruments in the EU toolbox promptly, forcefully and in a coordinated manner;

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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(2) The European Union, more specifically the European Commission, should improve existing instruments and law-making processes with regard to the EU Rule of Law Framework:

a. There should be a period of “dialogue” lasting a maximum of six months before the Rule of Law Opinion is published following the activation of the Rule of Law framework;

b. After the dialogue, a maximum of one Rule of Law Recommendation is to be issued within the next two months;

c. Within the two months following a Recommendation being issued, full compliance will be required by all EU Member States in question;

d. The activation of Article 7 should be officially made the default position in case of non-compliance with the specific recommendations made by the Commission;

e. The Commission should formally welcome and invite submissions from interested parties including civil society organizations and make them available online;

(4) Overall, the EU Justice Scoreboard should be improved as follows: a. The Commission should make explicit where data gaps are the result of the lack of

national authorities’ willingness to contribute to the scoreboard; b. The Commission should take into account the information gathered by reliable

professional associations like the International Bar Association, the European Network of Councils of the Judiciary and the European Judicial Network as well as the Venice Commission;

(5) The European legal ecosystem and the European institutions should enforce mechanisms

and mandates that are able to sanction rule of law backsliding and the reduction of democratic pluralism, and uphold the fundamental values principles based on which the EU is founded. To this end, we advise:

a. Consider a revision of the mandate of the FRA to enable it to play a more meaningful role on the rule of law front;

b. Create an EU network of independent experts (to be attached to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency and/or EU Commission);

c. Strengthen the European Anti-Fraud Office and share its findings publicly in situations of deliberate inaction;

d. Determine that oversight of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is a prerequisite for access to certain EU funds;

e. Ensure the EU political parties’ commitment to Article 2 TEU values; f. Ensure more systematic involvement of the Venice Commission and national actors

including national parliaments; g. Establish an EU Justice Policy annual event; h. Combat electoral fraud through infringement actions based on Articles 14(3) TEU and

39(2) of the Charter in order to tackle electoral legislation biased in favour of the ruling party and consider the feasibility of an EU voting rights act to protect the quality and integrity of electoral acts across the EU;

i. Improve the rule of law enforcement chain through the EP that should systematically organize country visits prior to and after the adoption of a rule of law resolution;

j. Remind national governments to emphasize their political support for the Commission as well as their legal support by intervening in relevant pending cases before the ECJ;

k. Demand that national governments initiate Article 259 TFEU actions when the Commission is not acting and publicize their statements and questions made in the context of ongoing Article 7 procedures;

l. Introduce a rule of law ‘stress test’ in the EU.

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RECONNECT is a four-year multidisciplinary research project on ‘Reconciling Europe with its Citizens through Democracy and the Rule of Law’, aimed at understanding and providing solutions to the recent challenges faced by the European Union (EU). RECONNECT brings together 18 academic partner institutions from 14 countries in and outside the European Union. RECONNECT’s research starts from the assumption that there is growing distrust towards European institutions, which, especially in the context of recent crises, are seen as unable or unwilling to truly respond to the concerns of EU citizens. This has created a disconnect between the Union and its citizens that has become the target of a new wave of populism, which challenges the EU’s authority and legitimacy. The Union is also confronted with the erosion of the foundations of democracy and the rule of law in some Member States, where its core values are called into question. Within this context, RECONNECT’s point of departure is that European governance is (perceived as) legitimate if its core values of democracy and the rule of law embody justice and solidarity. This can be achieved only if EU governance adheres to coherent notions of democracy and the rule of law and ensures that both resonate with the expectations of EU citizens. RECONNECT focuses on the Union’s constitutive values of democracy and the rule of law. Firstly, it seeks to evaluate the coherence within and between democracy and the rule of law, how they are interpreted and applied across the EU and its Member States, and how potential inconsistencies may affect legitimacy in the EU (principles and practices). Secondly, RECONNECT assesses the extent to which democracy and the rule of law fail to resonate with EU citizens, questioning how this may impact upon the legitimacy of the European project (perceptions). To address these questions:

(1) RECONNECT aims at understanding and explaining the EU’s legitimacy crisis, by focusing on the mismatches between the Union’s democratic and rule of law principles and the practices of institutions, as well as on how these are viewed by EU citizens. This citizen-centred approach will shape the analysis of four key policy areas: economic and fiscal governance, counter-terrorism, trade and migration.

(2) RECONNECT provides solutions in the form of new policies that are citizen-focused and consistent with the EU’s principles, more effective and inclusive communications tools, and proposals for Treaty changes, thereby going to the root of the Union’s shortcomings. The aim is to enhance the EU’s legitimacy by ensuring convergence among EU and national principles, institutional practices and citizens’ perceptions and expectations when it comes to democracy and the rule of law.

(3) The ultimate goal of RECONNECT is to create a new narrative for Europe that brings together the project’s findings and expresses a collective vision for the EU’s future, bridging the divide between citizens and the Union. This narrative will seek to inspire and shape future debates on the European integration project.

RECONNECT’s overall research methodology is multi-disciplinary in nature. RECONNECT uses qualitative and quantitative social science research methods, including representative claims analysis and original survey data, as well as qualitative legal interpretative methods. Throughout various Work Packages, RECONNECT researches the contexts, key concepts related to democracy and the rule of law, its principles and practices as well as citizens’ perceptions thereof. Finally, by bringing together all research insights, three final Work Packages address potential policy and Treaty changes, the development of a new narrative for Europe and the dissemination of research findings.

RESEARCH PARAMETERS

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PROJECT NAME Reconciling Europe with its Citizens through Democracy and the Rule of Law

(RECONNECT)

COORDINATOR Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies – GGS – University of Leuven – Leuven, Belgium.

CONSORTIUM Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Middlesex University School of Law Norwegian University of Science and Technology Spanish National Research Council Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law Central European University Institute of Sociological Studies Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Lille Catholic University (ESPOL) University of Münster Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya University of Vienna Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam LUISS Guido Carli University of Gdańsk University of Helsinki University of Cambridge Åbo Akademi University A full list of partners and partner institutions can be found here: https://reconnect-europe.eu/partners/

FUNDING SCHEME Horizon 2020 of the European Union – Collaborative project Activity 3 – Major trends in society and their implications.

DURATION 1 May 2018 – 31 May 2022 (48 months).

BUDGET EU contribution: 4,999,686.25 €.

WEBSITE https://reconnect-europe.eu/

FOR MORE

INFORMATION Contact: Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters (jan.wouters@ggs.kuleuven.be)

PROJECT IDENTITY

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FURTHER READING

D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU: The Pitfalls of Overemphasising Enforcement’, RECONNECT Working Paper No. 1, 2018. L. Pech and D. Kochenov, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law Within the European Union: Diagnoses, Recommendations, and What to Avoid’, RECONNECT Policy Brief, June 2019. K. Lane Scheppele, ‘Is Article 7 Really the EU’s "Nuclear Option"?’, Verfassungsblog, 6 March 2018, https://verfassungsblog.de/is-article-7-really-the-eus-nuclear-option/.

WEBINARS P. Blokker, ‘Populism as a Constitutional Project’, 5 March 2019. D. Kochenov and P. Bard, ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU: The Pitfalls of Overemphasising Enforcement, 17 April 2019. A. Magen, ‘Fighting Terrorism: The Democracy Advantage’, 16 September 2019. L. Pech, ‘Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU: What Is It and What Must Be Done About It?’, 3 April 2019. C. Plescia and J. Wilhelm, ‘EU Citizens and the European Elections: Findings from the RECONNECT Citizens’ Survey’, 7 June 2019. W. Sadurski, ‘Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown’, 25 June 2019. – All webinars are available at: https://reconnect-europe.eu/webinars –

Disclaimer This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research & Innovation programme under Grant Agreement no. 770142. The information in this deliverable reflects only the authors’ views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained there.