European Integration Political Institutions and Processes

8/2/2019 European Integration Political Institutions and Processes

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLITICAL

INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

The Lisbon Process: objectives

versus achievements and the

Agenda 2020

Bryukhanov Yegor

K1156418

4th

January 2012


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1. Introduction.......................................................................................................3

2. Background of the Lisbon Strategy...............................................................3

3. Achievements vs Objectives .............................................................................7

4. Agenda 2020...................................................................................................12

5. Conclusions & Personal Remarks .................................................................. 13

6. References.......................................................................................................15


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1.IntroductionThis paper aims to critically assess and analyze the issues associated with Lisbon Process,

an action and development plan approved in 2000 for the European economy between 2000

and 2010. Rather ambitious goal of Lisbon Strategy was to make Europe "the most

competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable

economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion", according to the

European Council. The top priorities of Lisbon Agenda were identified as job creation and

economic growth stimulation.

As one of the initial goals of European integration was economic and social convergence

between well-developed countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and

Scandinavian countries and less developed member states, an issue of economic growth andprosperity has always been critical for a success of the EU model. In addition, emergence of

technology and know-how resulted into technological progress and innovation being a

prerequisite for escalating prosperity of the economy that employs it. Theories of Joseph

Schumpeter, an Austrian economist and political scientist, about innovation, gave foundation

for European thinkers to employ a set of policies that should have made Europe, by 2010, the

most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world". Such a

broad definition of final goal allowed for ambiguity and speculations around itself. As far as

innovation was very hard to measure quantitatively, a goal of Lisbon Agenda was rather

ideological and proclaimed general direction in which the EU should move in order to

maintain competitiveness.

This paper proposes to approach the topic from a structured perspective. First, it will establish

the foundation and reasons behind specific goals of the Lisbon Strategy as well as assess the

importance of education for successful implementation of Lisbon Strategy. Second, it will

critically analyze factors that influenced the discrepancy between initial objectives and actual

achievements of Lisbon Agenda as well as illustrate the difficulties that occurred in various

sectors of the economy. Finally, this paper will conclude with the presentation of lessons

learnt from the implementation of Lisbon Agenda and how those are accounted for in the new

European socio-economic development strategy, known as Agenda 2020.

2.BackgroundoftheLisbonStrategy

In order to thoroughly understand what exactly the EU executives were trying to achieve, it is

necessary to look at the European economy of 1990s-2000s in context of the global economic


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development. From 1990 to 2000 China grew at annualized rate of roughly 7,5 percent, with

certain periods of estimated GDP growth of over 14%, while European growth rates were

barely above 3-4%. United States, starting in mid 1995 demonstrated significant growth

revival in productivity, which experts largely attribute to Americas effective utilization of

information and communication technology (ICT) in the course of production and

manufacturing (Oliner & Sichel, 2002). Even though in post-war years Europe demonstrated

impressive economic performance and its growth exceeded that of the US in 1970s-1980s, it

was insufficient to trigger convergence between Europe and the US, especially in

manufacturing (Brje Johansson, 2007). The growing debate that Europe is lagging behind

the US and developing countries in terms of its growth rates, consequently economics

prosperity, led to concerns about European socio-economics model being ineffective in

various ways.

Upon the examination of the triggers of growth in the aforementioned economies, it became

clear that countries actively utilize their comparative advantages in order to gain as much

incentive for their economy as they could. In China and India, for example, such factor was

excessive human capital (both countries together comprise roughly 1/3 of the Earths

population) and to a certain extent, R&D expenses, which occurred mostly in India. In the

US, significant improvement in productivity efficiency can be attributed to ICT evolution andto a growing optimism and investment, which is typical for asset bubble periods (Oliner &

Sichel, 2002). As we might recall, Internet bubble burst in early 2000s, leaving a lot of

investors essentially broke. However, companies like Google, Amazon and other technology

companies emerged from the crisis as those with sustainable business models that received a

chance to rise due to the overall market optimism about them, making it easy to attract cheap

financing through both debt, as interest rates were low, and equity.

Large manufacturing and production businesses and companies started actively seeking ways

to improve efficiency of their businesses, relying largely on technological innovations, which

were often products of universities and high-tech enterprises. Moreover, the demand for

people who would implement and operate these innovations was growing, creating jobs and

pushing universities to provide innovative ways of education. In the end, the US became

aware of incentives that implementation and research of ICT allowed for and started to

quickly emerge as the worlds leading economy. A good example of countries that benefited

from R&D, which was then transmitted into ICT is Korea and Japan. The latter became one ofthe largest and one of the most prosperous economies without really having any natural


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resources. To illustrate, Brje Johansson, Charlie Karlsson, Mikaela Backman and Pia Juusola

(2007) suggest that it is useful to compare the number of patents granted and applied between

the EU, Japan and the US as an indicator of knowledge production levels in the beginning of

2000s. As a result, they note that rapid growth of patents granted and applied indicate rising

importance of legal control over new knowledge and its application. In addition, they point

that Japan outperforms EU in patents granted at USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark

Office), thus allowing for the implementation of payments on the US territory, and both US

and Japan match EU in numbers of patents applied at EPO. They conclude that, even though,

EU has higher rates of patent growth, which, perhaps, indicates that it is catching up with

Japan and the US, but it still has many years to go.

European leaders acknowledged that Europe was lagging behind the newly emerging

knowledge economies of competitor countries, where know-how, skills and competencies fuel

growth and become centric in the economic life. Also, leading European thinkers clearly

understood the losing position of the EU in this new global knowledge economy if no actions

and policies are to be implemented. One of the main comparative advantages that Europe

could and should have invested in was its people. They were viewed as the main facilitators

of the knowledge economy, which essentially focused on transferring innovation into goods,

managing that innovation and then distributing it through established infrastructure. Mainfocus of the knowledge economy was on research, innovation and education; the latter was

focused on fields of mathematics, sciences and technology. Competition between educational

institutions, both for the brightest minds and in the fields of research were essential. In

addition, strong ties of universities with businesses and applicability of research findings were

also encouraged. From a point of view of industrial organization, technological advancement

would very often lower or completely erase barriers to entry, which would essentially lead to

increase in the number of players able to enter a specific market, thus creating jobs,

encouraging entrepreneurship and competition (Wim Kok, 2004).

In order to achieve the broad goal, the Lisbon Agenda established a number of sub-goals that

covered myriad of aspects, including even the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases.

However, the most important ones in context of economic development were guidelines on an

increase of R&D spending to 3% of GDP by member states, two thirds of which would come

from private sector (2007). Another major concern outlined by Lisbon Strategy was the

unemployment rate in Europe and low participation rates from women in labor force. It isestimated that in 2000 Europe had 15 million unemployed, but Lisbon Strategy was set to


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create 6 million jobs by 2010 by leveraging the transition to knowledge-based economy. As a

result of such transition, people must have the necessary education and tools to live in the new

economy and to take full advantage of a wide range of communication services. Therefore,

affordable education had to be provided in order to facilitate the successful integration of the

EU citizens and growing generations (Johansson et al, 2007) . Finally, sustaining healthy

economic outlook by applying appropriate macroeconomic policy mix was identified as one

of the main objections along the path of European transformation. The timeframe was

identified as a ten-year period from 2000 to 2010, representing Lisbon Agenda as a doctrine

for mid-term growth rather than long-term sustainable growth model.

One more dimension to the Lisbon Agenda was economic and political convergence that

bound to happen in the EU at some stage of its development, according to the policy-makers.

For that reason, Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was put forward during the Lisbon

summit in 2000. Essentially, OMC is a tool that rests on soft law and works in three stages,

whereby the Council of Ministers Agrees on broad policy goals, which are then translated into

regional guidelines by member states and are implemented and finally, implementation

process and results of these policies are measured against previously agreed benchmarks.

Such evaluation methodology allowed policy makers to adjust the direction with regard to

individual performances of specific countries (ESIB, 2006) . For example, if some memberstates were lagging back in terms of their R&D investments that would be noticed and

specific case would be dealt with. Moreover, such an instrument encourages politicians to

learn from each other and discourages individual decision making, because final outcomes

depends on the performance of all member states involved, rather than individual countries.

Finally, OMC implied a set of indicators and benchmarks fuelling peer pressure making

achievements and failures of member states in certain sectors of Lisbon Agenda more

transparent.

Open Method of Cooperation found one of its main application in the field of education,

which, as it was mentioned above, was in the core of the newly emerging knowledge

economy. Legally, EU executives had no direct influence of education across its member

states, only Articles 149 and 150 of the EC Treaty state the EU should encourage

development of quality education and mobility within member states. However, with

implementation of OMC, European authorities had the ability to advise on possible policies

that ensure positive development member states with regard to overall goals of the Lisbonstrategy. In addition, a number of policy guidelines were employed with a view to make


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academic education and research centric to a success of knowledge economy. European

Research Area was established, where mutual research and knowledge exchange would occur

between leading European institutions. Partnerships and student exchanges were also

encouraged. Moreover, Bologna process, even though it was established before the

announcement of Lisbon Strategy should play an important role, allowing education being

transparent and comparable facilitating benchmarking process (ESIB, 2006).

Now, that the background and overall content of the Lisbon strategy is clear, the next chapter

will provide information and analysis on which exact obstacles prevented the strategy to

succeed within the given timeframe.

3.AchievementsvsObjectivesThis chapter has its aim to analyze what went wrong in terms of implementation of the Lisbon

Agenda as well as which external and internal factors influenced implementation program in a

negative way.

In the midst of 2000-2001 the very existence of the knowledge economy and innovation as

basis of healthy and prosperous economy were questioned after the burst of dot.com bubble.

In the period roughly between 1995 and 2000 exorbitant numbers of Internet companies were

taken public and advertised to investors as the safe bet, making handsome return for

bankers and venture capitalists, which cashed in on overheated IPOs. Majority of those

companies have never made any net profit and went out of business rather quickly, leaving

institutional and individual investors with losses that eventually deeply wounded the US

economy and sent the country into a recession for the next couple of years. On top of that,

terrorist attacks on 9/11 and Enrons fraudulent executive malpractice made international

environment even gloomier than it was before.

Consumer confidence in both the US and EU deteriorated, because people were expecting

severe crisis and lack of liquidity, thereby starting to save more than to consume. A number of

tools were planned by world leaders to shake international trade environment and stimulate

the economy. Trade openings were among such measures, but their implementation into

practice revealed to be quite difficult. In an environment of weak consumption and gloomy

growth prospects, some member states found it difficult to stick to their commitments of

Lisbon.


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However, as Wim Kok notes in his mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy progress, some

member states did not take the task of implementing the measures assigned to them too

seriously. He points out: It must be said, however, on top of that many Member States have

not taken the execution and delivery of the agreed measures seriously enough. Completing the

single market, for example, has not been given the priority it required. Therefore, advocates

of an opinion that in such a globalized world, Lisbon would be successful only in conjunction

with overall economic well-being are not 100% correct.

Another issue that prevented Lisbon from meeting its targets by 2010 was a dramatic increase

in external competition from the third-world developing countries, such as India and China.

We can recall that one of the primary aims of Lisbon Agenda was job creation. Now,

however, with growing dependency ratio and ageing population combined with higher salary

expectations leading European companies were forced to move into low cost locations in

Asia. For example, China, which started industrializing with large stock of foreign direct

investment, had created massive excessive capacity. At the same time, government

regulations and increases in R&D spending lead to barriers to entry being lowered or

completely erased fuelling competition and lowering prices. China and India, however, were

able to offer low cost production, which satisfied European manufacturers. In addition, China

and India fully realized that in order to stay competitive they had to compete on value addedproducts that would allow them to differentiate their products. Having maintained their low

cost position, while competing on value added goods, China was able to flood European and

the US markets causing decrease in market share from European companies. Finally, as

Chinese workers may not be fully literate in English, India provides an enormous pool of

educated and cheap labor, which is available to accumulate outsourcing orders, not from

manufacturing, but rather from leading service provides.

A number of internal factors played significant role in Lisbon strategy not meeting its targets

as well. Even though, we have noted an issue of rapidly changing demographics above, I

propose examining it more in-depth. Europe is facing significant change of paradigm due to

ageing population and increasing life expectancy. Combined with declining birth rates,

experts estimate that by 2050 the working-age population will shrink by 18% compared with

the current one. At the same time the number of people aged over 65 will have increased by a

staggering 60%. This fact will cause a number of problems for the EU. First of all, an increase

in dependency ratio will mean that larger fraction of income of the workforce would go intosupport for the aging citizens. Simultaneously, those over 65 will likely to have increased


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savings by a larger amount in order to ensure comfortable living on retirement. This would

have a profound impact on consumption and demand for various types of goods across many

segments. However, one sector will undoubtedly have a positive gain from this phenomenon.

Healthcare and medicine are likely to receive boost, because of increasing needs of elderly

people in healthcare services. On the other hand, such scenario will impact government

welfare spending and public finances (Wim Kok, 2004). When factoring in the above

evaluation into the process of Lisbon Strategy implementation it becomes evident that one of

the goals, namely an increase in employment may be difficult to attain. However, such

situation indicates that, under the above circumstances investing in people and achieving

comparative advantage by employing knowledge economy principles may be the only way for

Europe to remain competitive.

Weak coordination and lack of focus in policy implementation were brought to attention as

some of the causes of initial program schedule failure. The EU became larger in between

2000 and 2010. This has resulted into overall unemployment rate rise by over 1,5% across the

EU-25, making it even harder to attain Lisbon goals by 2010. Countries, such as Greece,

Romania, Estonia and others showed R&D spending much lower than more developed

countries that were initially in the EU-15. New countries often had lower economic standards

and their education systems were functioning not as effectively as those in the EU-15.Moreover, wealth was usually concentrated among small percentage of the society,

effectively eliminating positive increase in demand, which is typical for developed countries,

where income dispersion is not as profound. In the short and medium term it is highly

unlikely that these countries are to achieve employment and education levels close to those of

the more developed EU countries. However, in the long run, countries, such as Czech

Republic, Poland, Baltic countries, etc will be able to generate high rates of economics

growth, higher than those in the US, Japan and the EU-15, triggering convergence and

leveling out the economic landscape (Wim Kok, 2004). In addition, countries with different

expense requirements will perceive policies promoted by the European Council for the Lisbon

Agenda fulfillment differently. It is nave to think that every single EU-25 member state will

prioritize R&D spending increases over other policies that they view as top priority at the

moment. Therefore, if there was weak coherency and unity among EU-15 states regarding

Lisbon Agenda, then it is feasible to assume that when more countries have joined the EU,

their objectives might not coincide with those of the EU-15.


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Generally, after the mid-term review an overall direction did not change, but rather more

urgent measures had to be implemented in order to achieve any progress. Generally, Lisbon

strategy was not drastically redefined, but know with the EUs enlargement had to account for

different starting positions of the national economies. Before, very broad objectives of the

Lisbon strategy were blanket-like essentially covering the member states as if they had

equivalent starting positions. Now, however, this was bound to change. A definition of

knowledge economy, as a concept, was revamped and directed more clearly. Wim Koks

report explicitly stated that 3% of GDP R&D expenditure is by far not the only indicator. It is

assumed that about 30% of the EU workforce in future will be involved in the creative

industries generating and applying knowledge, however at the moment of that report being

written an overall European knowledge society was far from achieving its aim. Report argued

for more transparency and an open market within the EU, which will be facilitated by specific

legislation and policy guidelines. Wim Koks group has set an overall revamped direction

with clearer guidelines, clarifications and some quantitative targets, which were missing in the

original Lisbon Strategy (Wim Kok, 2004). However, one of the particularly interesting

sections argued for unleashing the potential of financial markets and calling for the EU-level

arrangements in cross country clearing and security settlements. The latter is to be discussed

in the following paragraphs on global financial meltdown, probably, the largest economic

downturn since the Great Depression.

Even though, Lisbon strategy was aimed at defying EUs economic direction in the long run,

none of the leading European thinkers could predict the events that took their start in the US

in 2005-2008. Following the tragic events of 9/11, Alan Greenspan, the former Federal

Reserve chairman insisted on establishing the basic interest rates at historic low, thus

lowering yields on Treasury securities and subsequently risk premiums all over the world.

This led to an excessive liquidity being accumulated in the market and among the households.

Following the Bush administration tax cut policies and presidents encouragement of the

American families to purchase the real estate; people started taking out cheap loans in

massive amounts. PhD level quants, employed by the banks, put mortgages of various grades

together. As a result, mortgages were transferred into in securities that were bought be various

financial institutions that often used massive amounts of debt to facilitate transactions. When

interest rates were lifted and mortgage backed securities started to default due to inability of

households to repay the debt, banks experienced liquidity shortage (as securities were over-

the counter and essentially illiquid) and troubles covering their short-term debt. It was thought

that the European economy would not be harmed by the crisis severely due to assumption that


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the real economy, such as manufacturing and production would thrive on strong

fundamentals. However, with Lehmans default, Bear Stearns taken over, AIG, Fannie Mae

and Freddie Mac nationalized, confidence in the market evaporated completely freezing inter-

bank lending, threatening the well-being of global financial system. With initial easing on

financial markets regulation and the inter-connection of transactions all over the globe, the

crisis snowballed. When putting the Lisbon Strategy in the context of this financial crisis,

open market and milder regulation of financial markets within the EU allowed the crisis to

spread everywhere around Europe in just a matter of days.

As interest rates were lifted and confidence was far from being restored banks were reluctant

to lend, business loans and household demand were hit throwing the European economy into

a severe downturn. Gloomy outlook and negative long-term growth projections have

drastically impacted labor markets, completely erasing the progress made from 2005 under

the flagship of Lisbon Agenda. One of its goals, namely, employment growth, was under

threat. The figure below illustrates the progression of unemployment rates from 2008 until the

forecasted ones in 2010, illustrating negative trends in an unemployment dynamics.

Adapted from David Natali The Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 and the crisis in between

Government expenditure was required in order to boost aggregate demand in an environment,where households and businesses were reluctant to consume, threatening another point among

the those outlined in Lisbon Agenda, the R&D expenditure targets. Governments all over

Europe were focused on actually saving the economy, rather then stimulating their R&D

expenditures, those were cut significantly as well (Natalie, 2010). Many governments among

the member states had to accumulate large amounts of debt in order to stimulate their

economies, because their tax systems were ineffective or the economies of those countries

were uncompetitive or, finally, their public finances were strained due to ageing population

and rise in unemployment. All the aforementioned moves by governments led to the point

where we are now

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To summarize, it can be stated that overall goals and objectives of the Lisbon Agenda were

not achieved. Almost none of the quantitative targets were obtained. There is a number of

reasons to justify the failure, some of which were highlighted above. However, what can be

stated bravely, is that Europe has communicated a vision to the whole world and to its

citizens, a vision that is very ambitious and is vital for the survival of the European social

model. Probably, the initial version of the Strategy was too broad on goals and the revision

narrowed down some of the objectives, but failed to introduce the specific set of policies to

actually push execution. OMC has shown that it is far from being ideal as the universal tool

for policymaking in the EU. Recently, another revamped strategy of the European

performance was outlined and labeled Agenda 2020. The next chapter will briefly address it

and examine whether it accounts for any learning that might occur on the basis of the initial

Lisbon Strategy performance.

4.Agenda2020Following the evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy by the member states and the

acknowledgement of the European Council and its targets will not be achieved, a new strategy

was proposed in March 2010, almost exactly ten years after the Lisbon meeting. The new

Europe 2020 for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth a strategy delivering high levels

of employment, productivity and social cohesion was presented. Contrary to the Lisbon it

outlined only 5 objectives that should be translated, prioritized and implemented on the

national level, however it was proposed to lift the ownership of the strategy to the highest

political level. Essentially, Europe 2020 focuses on five policy targets.

Employment of 75% Research and innovation: target was decided to retain on the levels of 3% of GDP Climate change and energy: 20/20/20 targets that indicated caps on emissions,

indicators for energy efficiency and share of consumption of renewable energy

Education, which was quantified as at least 40% of the younger generation withtertiary education and cutting the share of school leavers to under 10%

Reduction of povertyIt can be safely stated that these targets are quite distinct from those initially outlined by the

Lisbon Strategy, because these are quantifiable and clear. In addition a number of new

monitoring tools is planned to implement on both national and the EU levels (Ramnas

Vilpiauskas, 2010). Moreover, after the economic decline of 2008-2009, special attention


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was put on monitoring fiscal policies, because, due to the interconnected nature of the EU

those can have significant impact on other member states. Overall, the new Strategy seems to

focus more on economic goals, rather than social and it is clear why. The recent events have

indicated serious weaknesses in the European welfare model, surprisingly among both

developed and developing EU-27 nations, justifying serious shift in paradigm towards

economic stability. Finally, the new strategy shows signs of significant learning from the

failures and malpractices of Lisbon, imposing new measures and evaluation mechanisms, but

overall the strategy has not changed significantly. It might alter though, if the recent crisis of

public finances is to occur one more time. It is very difficult to make any projections on the

future success of Agenda 2020, simply because it is so recent and there are important

uncertainties in the global environment that have to be addressed (Ramnas Vilpiauskas,

2010).

5.Conclusions&PersonalRemarksTo summarize, I would like to add some of my personal thoughts and observations, some of

which are grounded into economic theory and material that is relevant for this particular

paper, but some of those are just my own thoughts.

As Communism in the Soviet Union was an idealistic view of how the country consisting of16 distinct republics should function was labeled and essentially was utopist, the same notion

can be applied for the Lisbon Strategy. Upon having read and analyzed several writings of the

leading European academics, policymakers and thinkers, I understood that the Lisbon Agenda

and its proceeds must be viewed only in context, what I tried to achieve in this paper. If the

writings of Carl Marx and Vladimir Lenin were followed blindly as theoretical guideline,

Lisbon strategy has set objectives that were aimed to send the Europe in the direction that it

should go, but at the same time it tried to setup goals and were both strongly pursued but

impossible to achieve.

In 2000, when the Lisbon was adopted the environment was completely different from the

one we all are living in now. Attempts of attaining social cohesion, that was so much

emphasized by the Lisbon Strategy has led to 5 countries being on the edge of default already

costing European taxpayer more than TARP cost to the US citizens in 2009. Greece, Spain,

Ireland and a certain degree Spain have all shown that at this point in time social cohesion is

simple impossible, due to drastic structural differences in the EU. Unless those are addressed

neither social cohesion, nor the full employment will be achieved. It is very nave and


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somewhat wrong to assume that Greece, a country that has almost no fundamental economy

must pay welfare that is one the same level as Germany, the largest, richest and leading

economy of the EU. Europe is playing a very dangerous game of achieving social cohesion

where it is simply should not exist. Maybe, I write so, because I come from a completely

different background. However, I have observed the transition to the knowledge economy

with my own eyes when I enrolled into Helsinki School of Economics, the leading business

school in Scandinavia. What struck me the most was the welfare that students received just

for being students without even paying any tuition fees. However, Finland has effective tax

system, with progressive tax ladder and can cover such dramatic expenses from its own

budget. Why Greece, which barely collects 30% of what it should collect has to pay or even

try to pay on a par. I dont know.

Both Lisbon Strategy and the Agenda 2020 are great tools in outlining the generic direction of

the EU member states, however, I am not sure whether it is really necessary to converge the

economies artificially by the means of policy implementation. Overall, I can state that the

process of writing this paper gave me a lot in terms of the knowledge I received of the new

broad perspectives that I gained.

Bryukhanov Yegor

Kharkiv, Ukraine

4th January 2012


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`6.ReferencesRamnas Vilpiauskas (2010) Does Europe 2020 represent learning from the Lisbon

strategy. Proceeds of the European Union Studies Association Conference 1-45

Brje Johansson, Charlie Karlsson, Mikaela Backman and Pia Juusola. (2007) THE LISBON

AGENDA FROM 2000 TO 2010. Electronic Working Paper Series. Paper 106.

David Natali (2010) The Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 and the crisis in between. The

European Social Observatory.

The Lisbon Strategy for growth and employment (2004). Report from the high level group

chaired by Wim Kok. 1-46

The Lisbon Agenda an introduction (2006). ESIBThe National Unions of Students in

Europe. 1-129

Oliner & Sichel (2002) Information technology and productivity where we are now and

where we are going. 1-30

The Lisbon strategy for growth and

employment

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