Europe and North Africa:Migration as a common challenge

Ferruccio Pastore(Deputy Director, Centre for International Policy Studies-CeSPI, Rome)

International workshop in the framework of the project “Managing migration in the neighbourhood of the EU and the US. Towards a Transatlantic forum for

comparative research and policy dialogue”

(Academy of Graduate Studies, Tripoli, 18-19 June 2008)

Structure of the presentation

• Europe in the global migration geography• European migration policies: convergences and

divergences • Overall trends: opening to the East, closing to the

South?• Cross-Mediterranean migration: mutual perceptions

(and misperceptions)• Cross-Mediterranean migration: dominant policy

responses• “Externalisation” and “transit migration”• Future outlooks and open questions

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005

World 75.9 81.5 99.8 154.0 174.9 190.6

Africa 9.0 9.9 14.0 16.2 16.3 17.1

Asia 29.3 28.1 32.3 50.0 49.9 53.3

Europe 17.0 21.8 25.4 48.4 56.1 64.1

Lat. Am.+

Carib.

6.0 5.7 6.1 7.0 5.9 6.6

North Am. 12.5 13.0 18.1 27.6 40.8 44.5

The global context (migrant stocks, millions)

Source: UNDESA, Population Division.

The relative weight of Europe and Northern America in the global migration landscape (stocks; 000s).

2000 2005

Global migrant stock 174,781 190,634

Of which Europe (in absolute values and as % of global stock)

56,100

32.1%

64,116

33.6%

Of which EU (in absolute values and as % of global stock)

26,429 (EU-15)

15.1%

39,788 (EU-25)

20.9%

Migrants’ stock in Northern America (in absolute values and as % of global stock)

40,844

23.4%

44,493

23.3%

Of which in the USA (in absolute values and as % of global stock)

34,988

20.0%

38,355

20.1%

The relative weight of Europe and Northern America in the global migration landscape (in terms of net migration;

absolute values are expressed in thousands).

1995-2000 2000-2005

European net migration (average annual)

769 1,083

EU’s net migration 621 (EU-15) 1,178 (EU-25)

Northern America net migration

1,394 1,370

Of which USA net migration

1,250 1,160

Source: CeSPI, based on UN Population Division,International Migration, 2002 and 2006.

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Spain: 378.5

Spain: 427.8

Spain: 649.9

Spain: 738.5

Spain: 610.1

Spain: 652.3

Spain: 636.0

UK: 168.5 Germany: 274.8

Italy: 349.3

Italy: 600.6

Italy: 558.2

Italy: 338.1 France: 160.5

Germany: 167.8

UK: 184.3

Ger.: 218.8

UK: 260.5

UK: 203.6

UK: 196.3 UK: 159.5

Netherlands: 57.0

Portugal: 64.9

UK: 126.4

Ger.: 142.2

France: 105.0

France: 102.9

Italy: 157.0

Italy: 55.2 France: 60.4

Port.: 70.1

Port.: 63.5

Ger.: 81.8 Germany: 98.5

Ireland: 80.0

The largest EU immigration countries (net migration, 000s)

Source: CeSPI based on Eurostat.

Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD countries (inflows, 000s, 2002-4) (source: OECD)*

2002 2003** 2004

Germany: 658.3 Germany: 601.8 Spain: 645.8

Spain: 443.1 Spain: 429.5 Germany: 602.2

UK: 418.2 UK: 406.8 UK: 494.1

Italy: 388.1 France: 135.1 Italy: 319.3

France: 124.8 Austria: 97.2 France: 140.1

* Non harmonised statistics. ** Data for Italy not available.

Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD countries (inflows, 000s, 2003-4) (source: OECD)*

2003** 2004

Germany: 238.4 UK: 266.5

UK: 214.6 Germany: 202.3

France: 173.6 France: 175.2

Italy**: 121.8 Italy: 156.4

Netherlands: 60.8 Austria: 59.6

* Harmonised statistics (long-term only; Spain not included).

** 2002 regularisation not included.

Deep differences in national economic migration policies among EU member states

Heterogeneity of national approaches (out of historical, economic, cultural and demographic reasons)We can group national approaches in a few “families” or blocs:a) “Conservative” continental bloc (France, Germany, Benelux, Scandinavians): closure to low-skilled immigration; narrow and selective opening to high-skilled flows;b) “Liberal” bloc (UK, Ireland): innovative and technocratic admission policy; competitiveness as priority; opening to free mobility of EU8 in 2004 as key component;c) Mediterranean bloc (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain): common challenges (acute ageing, wide underground economy, weak administrations) and similar strategie: frequent regularisations; attempts to manage low-skilled inflows (quota systems/agreements with sending countries);d) Eastern European bloc: heterogeneous; still struggling with institution building and migration transition.

Mediterranean bloc

Liberalbloc

Conservativebloc

Eastern

bloc

“Families” of EU countries according tofundamental characters of admission system

In the long term: persisting differences, but also convergence(% over-65 and over-80 on total pop.; today and in 2050)

North Europe15,9 – 4,424,2 – 9,1

Eastern Europe14,1 – 2,726,6 – 6,9

Western Europe17,8 – 4,7

27,7 – 11,5

South Europe17,8 – 4,5

31,4 – 11,6

MEASURING POLICY DIFFERENCES (AND POLICY OUTCOMES)

(total regularised foreigners; collective schemes, not including individual reg.; 000s, 1973-2008)

Italy 1,431

Greece 1,166

Spain 1,130

France 302

Portugal 249

Belgium 65

TRENDS: IS THE EU OPENING TO THE EAST WHILE CLOSING TO THE SOUTH?

% African-born among total foreign-born pop. in selected EU countries (Source: OECD)

Belgium France Germany NL PRT Spain UK

% North-Africa born

12.7% 39.1% 0.5% 10.1% 0.2% 15.8% 0.5%

% Sub-Sahara-born

9.8% 9.6% 1.2% 7.2% 53.5% 3.6% 16.7%

African nationalities among top 10 nationalities in terms of yearly inflows (main EU receiving countries, 2005, French data NA) - Source: OECD 2007

Receiving country African nationalities among top 10 flows

Ranking Trend compared to average 1990-2004

BELGIUM Morocco 3rd community ↑

ITALY (2004) Morocco 3rd ↓

Tunisia 10th ↓

NETHERLANDS Morocco 7th ↓

PORTUGAL Capo Verde 2nd ↑

Angola 5th ↓

Guinea-Bissau 6th →

Sao Tomé and Principe

9th →

SPAIN Morocco 2nd →

SWEDEN Somalia 9th ↑

UK (2001) South Africa 6th ↑

RELATIVE CLOSURE OF LEGAL IMMIGRATION CHANNELS TO AFRICANS

% of Africans in stocks of legal immigrants(Italy and Spain, selected years)

1991 1996 2000 2003 2006

Spain n.a. 18.3% 29.2% 26.3% 23.5%

Italy 35.0% 28.7% 27.7% 24.0% 23.4%

Sources: Min. of Interior for Italy, Extranjería for Spain.

AFRICANS ARE LITTLE REPRESENTED ALSO IN AMNESTIES

% North-African nationals in subsequent Italian regularisation schemes

1986 1990 1995 1998 2002

Morocco 26.3% 22.4% 14% 11% 7.4%

Tunisia 8.4% 12.1% 4.2% 2.6% /

Egypt 3.8% 3.5% 3.3% 4.4% 2.4%

Algeria / / 3.1% 1.5% /

Source: G. Sciortino based on Italian Min. of Interior.

ASYMMETRIC LIMITS TO AFRICAN MOBILITY?Italian visas for Africans (000s, 1999-2006)

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

N. Afr. & Middle East

110,9 132,6 128,9 106,9 114,6 123,9 128,4 140,2

Sub-Saharan Africa

43,0 58,3 51,1 47,4 50,0 58,7 63,3 63,3

WorldTotal

834,7 1.009,0 947,1 853,5 874,9 983,5 1.076,7 1.198,2

Source: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

INCREASED AFRICAN SHARE IN CLANDESTINE FLOWS% of Africans among irregular migrants apprehended upon (or

before) landing (Italy and Spain-Canary Islands, different years)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

N. Africa 11.9% 17.2% 11.7% n.a. 69.6% 70.52%Sub-Saharan Africa

3.8% 25.0% 41.4% n.a. 24.6% 24.8%

1994-8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Morocco 100% 88.2% 36.%2 32.%5 39.8% 32.6% 9.1%Rest of Africa

0% 11.8% 63.2% 66.2% 58.1% 62.9% 86.8%

Sources: Plan Canario para la Inmigración 2004-2006 for Spain; Min. ofInterior for Italy

Italy

Spain

Irregular migration by sea: relatively small but dominates perceptions (apprehensions, 000s; de Haas)

‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06

Spainmainland

7.0 7.2 12.8 14.4 6.8 9.8 7.2 7.0 6.4

SpainCanary

0 0.9 2.4 4.1 9.9 9.4 8.4 4.7 31.0

ItalySicily

8.8 2.0 2.8 5.5 18.2 14.0 13.6 22.8 21.4

ItalyCalabria

0.9 1.5 5.0 6.1 2.1 0.2 0.02 0.08 0.3

Malta 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.05 1.7 0.5 1.4 1.8 NA

TOT 16.9 11.8 23.0 30.2 38.7 33.9 30.7 36.5 59.2

Intra-African mobility much moreimportant than outbound mobility

Source: Hein de Haas,International MigrationInstitute (IMI), Oxford.

Arrows do not indicate migrationroutes but depict major country-to-country migration flows. Due to lack of reliable data, thedimension of arrows reflectsestimates, not exact size of flows

BUT: the dominantperception…

Perceptions,on the other side

Clandestine crossings dominate the debate also because…(Victims* at wider European borders, 2005-2007, Fortress Europe)

To the Canary Islands2005: 185

2006: 1,0352007 (till 10/25): 444

Sicily channel2005: 4372006: 302

2007 (till 10/28): 529

Aegean Sea2005: 982006: 73

2007 (till 10/22): 138

Adriatic Sea2003: 292004: 28

No reported victims since 2004

* Including missing migrants.

To Southern Spain/Ceuta/Melilla

2005: 1232006: 184

2007 (till 10/22): 37

Cross-Saharan routes1,578 deaths reported since 1996

EU/EEA SCH/FM

Policy responses: spheres of EU institutional openness to human mobility

EU/EEA SCH+FM

EU/EEASCH/FM

EU/EEASCH/FM

TC AA/NO-VISA

TCAA/VISA-FAC

TC AA/VISA

TCNO-AA/NO-VISA

TCNO-AA/VISA

EU=European UnionEEA=European Economic Area

SCH=Schengen zoneFM=Freedom of movement

TC=Third countryAA=Association agreementVISA-FAC=Visa facilitation

Policy responses: the European multi-layered migration control model

1. Sample controls within EUborders (e.g. on workplaces)

2. Sample controls at internal borders

3. Border controls and surveillance strictly defined

4. Patrolling at high sea 5. Privatisation of controls: carriers’ responsibility

6. Visa offices in consulates 7. Outsourcing to third states

Policy responses: the main financial chapters in EU migration policy, millions €, 2007-

2013)

External Borders Fund 1,820

European Return Fund 676

European Refugee Fund 699.3

European Integration Fund 825

Do migration controls work?Evolution of smuggling routes in the Mediterranean (as

consequence of new push factors + international cooperation and law enforcement)

1991-2001

1999-2001

Early 2000sLate 90s

Early1990s-2006

Since late 1990s

Since mid-2000s

From 2006 on

Since 2005

Relative effectiveness of international law enforcement is confirmed by figures on apprehensions upon disembarkment +

rescues by coastal regions (000s, peaks for each line in red - Source: Min. Interior)

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Apuli

a

28.4 46.5 19.0 8.5 3.4 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.06

Sicil

y

8.8 1.9 2.8 5.5 18.2 140 13.6 22.8 21.4 16.6

Calabri

a

0.8 1.5 5.0 6.1 2.1 0.2 0.02 0.08 0.3 2.0

Sardini

a

/ / / / / / / 0.008 0.09 1.5

TO

T

38.1 50.0 26.8 20.1 23.7 14.3 13.6 22.9 22.0 20.1

Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa (different sources)

Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa (logistics and practicalities)

► Until 1973-4: Only formalControls►1973-1985: Unilateral and competitive closure►1985: Schengen agreement►1990: ImplementingConvention►1995: Entry into force in thegreen core ►Italy, Austria, Greece as red “transit belt”

Core and periphery in the European migrationcontrol system: STAGE I

STAGE II: The Southern enlargement of the core

► 1997-8: Full integration of Austria and Italy►2000: Greece is alsoadmitted as part of the core►Eastern Europe emerges as “transitbelt”►Western Balkans, Turkey and North Africastill perceived more as sources

STAGE III: The Northern and Eastern enlargements

► 2001: Scandinavianenlargement (limited impacton irregular migration patterns)►2004: EU-10 accession►2007: EU-2 accession►2007: Schengen Easternenlargement (EU-10 butCyprus) ►Western Balkans, formerCIS, Turkey, N. Africa, etc.in “transit belt” (transit boom)►2005 Ceuta and Melilla; 2006 Lampedusa andCanarias: focus onSub-Saharan A. as source

►July 2006: Rabat EU-Africaconference on M&D►November 2006: TripoliEU-AU+ Conference on M&D►December 2007: Lisbon Africa-EU Summit►Migration Great Gameenlarges to whole Africa:New “candidates” as “transitcountries” (i.e. privileged controlpartners): Senegal, Niger►When transit countries arefailed states, intervention notruled out (Chad)

STAGE IV: The Transit Belt expands further South

Being a “transit country” and performing a control function on behalf of neighbours has

advantages and disadvantages

COSTS BENEFITS

Altering priorities: Neglecting immigration or emigration might be internally destabilising

Access to EU and bilateral targeted aid

Worsening of political/economic relations with poorer neighbours

More bargaining power in negotiations about own emigration (e.g. quotas)

Impact on migrants’ rightsinternational reactions

Overall gain in strategic relevance