Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives.

by Andrei P. Tsygankov

Publication Information: Article Title: Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives. Contributors: Andrei P. Tsygankov - author. Journal Title: East European Quarterly. Volume: 32. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 1998. Page Number: 315+. COPYRIGHT 1998 East European Quarterly; COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

INTRODUCTION The 1990s brought a new international relations perspective to Russia and the former Soviet region. The New Political Thinking associated with Soviet reformer Michael Gorbachev and his reform-minded advisors--i.e., a Russian of Western interdependence theory --has passed away. The era of hope stimulated by the end of the Soviet-West confrontation, the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet hegemony, reunification of Germany, and the liberal ideas of a Common European Home have disappeared. Russia's domestic and international political agenda have gone through substantial changes.(1) The attention of those living in the former Soviet region has shifted to new, much more alarming issues. Among them are the break-up of the Soviet Union and the dangers of disintegration of Russia itself; military conflicts in the Russian periphery and within Russia (Chechnya); semi hostile attitude of some of the former Soviet republics towards Russia and Russian native speakers, who happen to live in these republics; military conflict in Balkans; and a threat of the NATO expansion. All these changes have stimulated sharp criticism of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking and its assumptions as utopian, impractical, and unrealistic and have encouraged the rethinking of post-cold war international relations. A variety of approaches are emerging which are highly critical of New Thinking. One of them is Eurasianism,(2) a new intellectual movement which is looking for a geopolitical rethinking of post cold war international relations and Russia's place in the post cold war era. Having emerged in late the 1980s and early the 1990s, Eurasianism contributed to changes in Russian foreign policy and has been gaining influence among both politicians and intellectuals since the December 1993 parliamentary elections. The purpose of this paper is to contribute an understanding of the phenomena of Eurasianism. As an intellectual and political movement, Eurasianism has been studied from different angles. Scholars analyzed intellectual and historical roots of its emergence,(3) its inherent political agenda and the reasons why it has gained influence over Russian foreign policy.(4) This paper seeks to be original by focusing on a hard-line version of Eurasianism,(5) the one that is not a part of mainstream foreign policy discourse and, therefore, has received relatively little scholars' attention. I will refer to this version as the hard-line one, because politically, it presents itself as "irreconcilable opposition" to the regime of Boris Yeltsin. The other label it uses for self-characterization is a "spiritual opposition" that is the opposition armed with a significant intellectual capital for resisting current political regime.(6) In attempts to reveal possible "spiritual" capital of Russian hard-liners, I devote most of the paper to philosophical assumptions and epistemological presses of hard-line Eurasianism. Accordingly, in this paper I treat Eurasianism not so much as a political but as an intellectual movement, and I use

 

Den,' (Day) and Elementi (Elements), a hard-line publications as a source of new ideas, new ways of rethinking the directions in which the world is moving. Such an attention to ideas and the "metaphysical" dimension of Eurasianism will help to answer two of the following questions. First, it will help to clarify the political agenda of Eurasianists and of Russia to the extend the latter is influenced by the four. Second, it will help to go beyond the common consideration of hard-line Eurasianists as a relatively homogeneous intellectual group(7) and identify different currents within it. In this paper, I shall argue that at least two different schools of thought--I shall call them Modernizers and Expansionists--can be identified within hard-line version of contemporary Russian Eurasianism. While carrying some similarities and sharing a general philosophy of Eurasianism, Modernizers and Expansionists are different in terms of their intellectual roots and reality-defining assumptions. As a result, their policy prescriptions carry a lot of differences too. For example, while Modernizers offer moderate expansion in the former Soviet Union territory, Expansionists are hungry for immediate and wide-spread territorial expansion much beyond the former Soviet borders. My method of analyzing Eurasianism will be both descriptive and comparative. In addition to describing its emergence and intellectual roots, I will distinguish between two schools of hard-line Eurasianism and compare them to each other. I will also make comparisons of major assumptions and arguments of the Eurasianist group with those of Western international relations theory, particularly with Western realism, when it is appropriate. The paper is organized in the following way. The first section describes the emergence and intellectual roots of the hard-line Eurasianism, and it analyses the Eurasianism's geopolitical assumptions as commonly held by all Eurasianists and as compared to those of Western realism. The second section makes a distinction between two different schools of Eurasianist thought, and is devoted to the analysis of the inner dialectic of hard-line Eurasianism. In particular, it distinguishes between Modernizers' and Expansionists' intellectual sources and epistemological premises. Finally, the third section considers Eurasianist strategies for Russia in a post cold war era as determined by its major epistemological assumptions. I conclude with a summary table and possible policy implications of the analysis of hard-line Eurasianism. HARD-LINE EURASIANISM: THE EMERGENCE, ASSUMPTIONS, INTELLECTUAL ROOTS The emergence and assumptions Hard-line Eurasianism emerged at the end of the 1980s as a reaction of conservative-minded intellectuals to domestic and foreign policy reform launched by Michael Gorbachev. After the establishment of a highly conservative weekly Den' (Day)(8) in 1990, Eurasianists began to express themselves through the promotion of an idea of the new Eurasian empire located between the West and Asia, and distinguished from the Soviet empire. A geopolitical journal Elementi (Elements) has became another major journal for hard-line Eurasianists. A new (and probably the major) stimulus for Eurasinists' activity has been the collapse of the Soviet Union. This event contributed tremendously to Eurasianism's profile and served to distinguish it from traditional conservatives (Communists and Nationalists). Unlike Communists, whose dream is to restore the Soviet Union, and Nationalists who see the attainment of a Greater Russia as their ideal, hard-line Eurasianists put forward the idea of the "Eurasian empire" distinguished from both Russian and Soviet empires, and established by the means of the strengthening of geopolitical power and the forming of the united Slav-

Turkish community.(9) In their criticism of the Gorbachev's New Thinking, hard-line Eurasianism proceed from certain set of assumptions about international politics. While not being made explicitly, these assumptions might be deconstructed from the Eurasianists' writings. In so doing, I adopt the framework used by Robert Keohane in his analysis of Western political realism.(10) Realism was defined by Keohane as based on three key assumptions (1) states are the key units of action; (2) they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) the behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.(11) Power as a foreign policy end Eurasianist conception of power is similar with the one of Western realists. Both Western realists and Eurasianists emphasize control, domination, and conflict as aspects of power(12) and deemphasize the element of cooperation and regeneration which are also aspects of international relation.(13) It is drive for power and strength Eurasianists argue that is predominant factors in world politics. "We have to be strong, says Shamil' Sultanov in his article "The Spirit of a Eurasianist," since the principle "down with the weak" is in this world as it has always done."(14) Therefore, in achieving domestic and foreign policy goals, one needs to rely only upon one's own values and interests instead of trusting to the West's good intentions. The outside world, especially the United States, is only looking for an opportunity to weaken Russia and then to take an advantages of its weakness. It is not in [the U.S.] interest to see a powerful Eurasian giant, who has kept his unique spiritual capacity, hi unique ideal of the Good, his formula of social justice [...] It is not the first time in a history when we need to rely upon ourselves, upon our historical experience, and physical and moral capacities [...].(15) Empires as key players of international politics Unlike Western realists who emphasize nation-states as key players of international politics,(16) Eurasianists argue in favor of empires as the key units action. For them, international politics is and will always be a place of struggle between different empires for power and resources, struggle for three main goals--security, stability, and development. The history of civilizations is considered to be a drama of a birth, decline, and rebirth of empires. Empires are defined as continental multinational units that represent an alternative to nation-states and to illusions of a creation of the unified world political community.(17) Culture and identity as motives of international behavior Eurasianists argue that the Western notion of rationality is limited in explaining state and empire interests and behavior.(18) In order to capture these interests one has to pay attention to such non-rational phenomenon as "social feelings and national pride, national memory and what the national blood demands (zov krovi)."(19) In attempts to overcome this limitation, Eurasianists include cultural and ethnic factors in their explanations of motives of state behavior. Intellectual sources Hard-line Eurasianism has drawn on several Western and domestic intellectual sources. As far as the Western sources are concerned, Eurasianism is inspired by geopolitically-oriented Western sources. The most notable of them are French and Belgian new right (Alan Benua, Jan Tiriar, Robert Stoykers) and the German

school of Geopolitics (specifically, Karl Haushofer, Karl Schmitt, Alfred Mahan). From the former, Eurasianists borrow the idea of a Russo-European alliance against the United States; from the latter, the basic arguments of classical geopolitical thought applied to the analysis of contemporary international relations.(20) Eurasianism, then, unlike Gorbachev's foreign policy analysts, is inclined toward European, rather than toward American thought.(21) Although Eurasianist "realists" obviously borrow from American literature,(22) it is difficult to identify any possible links here, since they would never recognize those links explicitly. One suspects the reason for this is their great animosity towards the United States as a challenger to the Eurasian region. Unlike New Political Thinking,(23) Eurasianism heavily relied on a rich domestic intellectual tradition. At least, three sources deserve mention here. First, is the Russian religious philosophy and its belief in Russia as a power with a unique geopolitical location and a unique mix of different ethnic groups which makes Russia a bearer of a unique geopolitical mission: to mediate and reconcile military conflicts on its periphery. Konstantin Leontyev was probably the first to urge Russians to forget about their unity With Slav nations and to turn to the Asian continent for understanding Russian geographic and cultural similarity with Asian nations.(24) Second, of course, is the "classical" Eurasianism of the Russian emigre intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s, whose cultural heritage is rather diverse, from the ethno-linguistic studies of prince Nikolai Trubetskoi to the historical tracts of Vernadski and geographic works of Petr Savitsky.(25) Contemporary Eurasianists derive from them a sense of meaningfulness and uniqueness of Russian culture and the task of resisting Western influence. Another important part of the classic Eurasianists' writings is their sense of continuity between the formation of the Stalin's Soviet Union and prior Russian history. Contemporary Eurasianists adopt the same view on Eurasia--as a bridge between different cultures and civilizations--as a unit that may exist in different forms--Great Russian empire, the Soviet Union, or a post-Soviet Eurasian power. The third source of Eurasianist writings are the works of Nikolay Gumilev.(26) A geographer by training and a follower of Petr Savitsky, Gumilev, who died in 1990, influenced hard-line Eurasianists with his concept of "ethnogenesis," which he described in a few books published illegally and semi-legally in the Soviet era. Two components are particularly important for understanding Gumilev's concept--the idea of geographic determinants of ethnic development and the necessity that Eurasia as a unique civilization, be isolated from the West. According to Gumilev, Western European and Russian ethnic groups are not only different, they are opposite and can never be mixed. "It would have been the greatest mistake he argued to think that the result of the construction of the "Common European Home" would be a mutual victory of common human values. Entering the alien Supraethnic group always means denial of one's own ethnically dominant component and its replacement by a dominant belief-system of a new Supraethnic group."(27) For contemporary Eurasians Gumilev's ideas served as an ethnic justification of the possibility and desirability of creating a new Eurasian community, a supra-ethnic group in Gumilev's terms, composed of Russians, Turks, and other ethnic groups. INNER DIALECTIC OF EURASIANISM "MODERNIZERS" AND "EXPANSIONISTS" Hard-line Eurasianists, therefore, are united in the following way: by their

hostility to the New Thinking, their promotion of a Eurasianist empire, and their protectiveness of Russian values and beliefs as different from those of the West. But in spite of these commonalties, two distinct schools of thought can be seen within the Eurasianist approach. I shall call them "Modernizers" and "Expansionists,"(28) because although sharing similar ideas and beliefs, they differ in that they place more value either on importance of modernization and development, or on immediate geopolitical expansion.(29) As it will be seen below, their epistemological assumptions are somewhat different too. Modernizers Modernizers, the first school, are usually older and have a certain nostalgia about the demise of the Soviet Union. They have learned very few lessons from the Soviet collapse, and their criticism of the Soviet empire is typically limited to the criticism of the personal qualities of Soviet leaders.(30) Modernizers realize that to go back to the USSR would be impossible, but their main agenda is to accelerate economic development and military technologies in order to revive an empire in a different form and within more or less the same borders.(31) As one of the prominent Eurasianist writers put it, The double-headed eagle of the Russian Empire manifestly expressed the main geopolitical and geohistorical essence of the country: its inner Eurasian character [...]. Geopolitically the Soviet Union represented a natural continuation and development of Russia's Eurasianist character [...]. As a Eurasian historical and geopolitical subject, our country was defined and is still defined in space by the boundaries of the Soviet Union.(32) Modernizers are influenced by Western realist approaches to analysis of international relations and, like Western realists, have a nostalgia about stable bipolar Cold War world.(33) They are very much concerned with power, accumulation of military and economic resources, and geopolitical stability. "Each society, argues Sultanov, must pursue three basic values--security, stability, and development."(34) In another article Eurasianists, very much like Western realists, argue that security is a major component of the national power. Their definition of security is also similar with that of Hans Morgenthau.(35) One can also trace their adherence to Western theories of modernization, to those which particularly stressed the role of the state as initiator of modernization.(36) Their advocacy of the technological development of the former Soviet Union and strong authoritarian power capable of conducting technological transformation in order to compete with the West(37) is very much in line with theories of late and late, late modernization.(38) The most prominent advocators of this view are Alexander Prokhanov and Shamil' Sultanov, editor-in-chief and the first deputy editor of Den'-Zavtra. Modernizers' major assumptions about international politics can be deconstructed in the following way. * Self-sufficient empires as key units of action. Therefore, while considering empires as key players of international politics, Modernizers are inclined to view empires, particularly the Soviet one, as self-sufficient, self-developing and geopolitically stable territories.(39) * Power as a means to protect. Being strong supporters of technological development and economic modernization, Modernizers consider power primarily as a means to protect the empire from its collapse as resulted from either internal or external influences.(40)

* Moderate aggressiveness and rational behavior. Modernizers are relatively rational in their explanations of the necessity to establish the Eurasian empire. They view this empire as a continuation of the Soviet Union which in its turn, was brought together by economic and security reasons. Accordingly, Modernizers offer the restoration of the Soviet Union under the name of the Eurasian empire to maintain geopolitical balance and international stability.(41) Modernizers' explanation of international behavior, however, is not limited to egoistic self-interests. In addition to those, they promote cultural (religion, ethnicity, tradition, etc.) explanations. Thus, the necessity to revive the Soviet Union and revive the Eurasian empire is determined, among other factors, by the historical traditions of Russian unity with other nations on Russia's periphery and the closeness of cultural and language ties among them.(42) Expansionists As compared to Modernizers, Expansionists are much younger and have no respect for the Soviet Union. They argue that the Soviet Union was too fearful of geopolitical expansion and, therefore, too conservative to survive as an empire.(43) Unlike Modernizers who portray themselves as adherent to conservative beliefs such as culture, religion and social stability,(44) Expansionists advocate, as their general concept, the notion of a "conservative revolution."(45) They argue that to be conservative is not enough. Dugin explains this in the following way: Conservative revolutionaries support in principle the ideal and "positive" side of the Right--that is, the ideas of tradition. hierarchy, statism, nationalism, the intimate bond with native soil [pochvennost], spirituality, and so forth. Conservative revolutionaries, on the other hand, aspire to restore the entirety of right-wing values in their full scope, because they are not satisfied with compromises and palliative measures. That is why they are revolutionaries.(46) As revolutionaries, Expansionists advocate a further imperial expansion of Russia much beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. They claim that a future Eurasian empire should include all those who live in between Dublin and Vladivost Jan Tiriar Claimed in Den,' such "European nationalism,"--the forming of an "imperial republic united by a political necessity"--will help to block the pressure of the U.S. imperial nationalism and to resolve European and world problems. This notion is driven by the idea that Russia can no longer be a Great Power while being isolated from European powers.(47) Expansionists' main theoretical inspiration is old geopolitical theories, both Western and domestic. Unlike Modernizers, they are not so much concerned about economic and technological development, and claim to be ready to do whatever is necessary to expand beyond Russia's Western and Eastern borders and to resist the United States as an embodiment of all possible evils.(48) The most prominent Expansionist is Alexander Dugin, the editor-in-chief of the geopolitical journal Elementi and a frequent contributor to weekly Den.' Another distinction of Expansionists from Modernizers is an explicit presence of a strong war rhetoric in their writings. One example of it is Dugin's article on Jan Tiriar.(49) The purpose of the article was to say good-bye to the strongest advocator of European empire "from Dublin to Vladivostok" who died in November 1992. Dugin who considers himself one of Tiriar's supporters and followers reveals his own outlook in a very clear way. Language is a key for such a revealing. Glorifying Jan Tiriar, Dugin uses metaphors of a "hero" and "knight,"

who "fought" and "fall down as a hero, in the middle of a battle, in a fire and smoke of a great skirmish." Talking about Europe after World War II being under the U.S. influence Dugin calls it "anti-Europe" and compares it with a "prisoner, locked in a firm political, economic, and geopolitical fetters." Finally, talking about future "Eurasian liberation," the author calls to establish a "front of European liberation" in order to fight against "oversees invaders" and "to rise out of ashes and ruins." While sharing some commonalties with Modernizers, the Expansionists base their arguments on assumptions that are actually different from those of Modernizers. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that their interpretation of power as a foreign policy goal, empires as a key units of action, and non-rational behavior as a motivation for action can be distinguished from those of Modernizers. * Constantly expanding empires as key units of action. While Modernizers interpret empires as generally self-sufficient and geopolitically stable territories, Expansionists argue in favor of constant expansion whenever possible as the only way to survive in this fierce world. For example, Alexander Dugin, the prominent Expansionist, sees the logic of world history as a result of a struggle for geopolitical domination between two opposite forces. These forces, he believes, can be characterized not so much by their belonging to a certain organizations, nations or states, but "by their radical difference in geopolitical orientations" which "stand beyond national, political, ideological, and religious differences and are capable of uniting groups of people of different outlooks and beliefs."(50) Arguing in a geopolitical terms, Dugin identifies two major transnational actors--the Eurasianists and the Atlanticists.(51) According to him, the Eurasianist orientation is the one expressed by Russia and Germany, two strong continental powers whose geopolitical and economic interests and world outlook are the opposite of the interests of England and the United States. He reminds us that classic geopolitical theorists, notably Karl Haushofer, as well as Russian Eurasianists of the "White" emigration such as Nikolay Trubetskoi, Piotr Savitski, Georgi Florovski insisted on the necessity of a geopolitical alliance between Russia-Germany-Japan against the Atlanticist policy. * Power as a means to expand and conclude geopolitical alliances. In accordance with this view, Expansionists treat power as a means to expand. Unlike Modernizers, who are more inclined to isolated development, Eurasianist Expansionists place deal of value upon the importance of geopolitical alliances as long as they serve to resist the United States. They believe that Eurasia must unite and replace states as international actors with state-continents such as the Roman empire and the Russian empire in order to overcome a Pan American "new world order."(52) Geopolitically the Eurasianist alliance is justified as an alliance of Land power against See power. Regarding the resistance to the United States, Russian Eurasianists agree with French and Belgian Eurasianists who claim that a geopolitical power, embodied in the United States of America is currently the main and the only enemy of all those people who want to keep their unique national life, ethnic and national culture.(53) * Aggressiveness and irrationalism. Expansionists are particularly aggressive when pursuing culturally and geopolitically-based explanations of international behavior. For example, Dugin in his article on Serbia claims that Serbian "awakening" based upon ideas of "nation, religion, and freedom."(54) In still another article he suggests moving beyond traditional nationalism, and he promotes Eurasianism as a last and a highest stage of Russian nationalism and as a

rationale for pursuing territorial expansion. He believes that Russian nationalism is well suited to became a Eurasianism, because unlike some other types of nationalism it is not based upon ethnic principles. Instead, it includes religion, connection with territorial, imperial inclination, and communitarianism as its components. These are Eurasianist values, Dugin believes, which Eurasianism has to advocate and pursue throughout the world.(55) Another example is an article by Nikolay Lysenko who believes in pursuing the idea of nation. Nation is always a great idea of universal scope giving a motivation to millions; it is always a great sacrifice without requiring any gratitude and great struggle without knowing a rest or moving backward. "Everything or nothing!", "Victory of death!"--here are eternal slogans of nations which have never been understood or naturally accepted by the other nations. It was this non-acceptance and non-understanding that directed the strength of nations united by a single spiritual passion and their spiritual dominance over people who never had that kind universal victorious power.(56) Even though these motives of behavior make sense to Eurasianists, they test the boundaries of rationality according to Western standards and it is not accidental that for a long time they have been ignored by the mainstream international relations' theories in the West.(57) HARD-LINERS' STRATEGIES FOR RUSSIA IN A POST-COLD WAR ERA(58) Generally, hard-line Eurasianists treat Russia as the last hope and the last pillar of a future Eurasian empire. Today, they argue, only Russia has all necessary preconditions to become an alternative to the New World Order meaning American hegemony.(59) However, while sharing similar beliefs in Russia as Eurasian power and Eurasian cultural and geopolitical uniqueness, Modernizers and Expansionists see the post-Cold War world differently and favor different Russia's strategies to pursue their main goals. Modernizers Modernizers' image of the Post-Cold War world is based upon a firm belief in the economic and geopolitical decline of two previously strong superpowers. Here is a sample of strategic thinking and policy recommendation to Russia in a post-cold war era that is quite typical of Modernizers' (1) The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the weakness of Russia as a world power. Lacking strong charismatic leadership, the Soviet empire was doomed to collapse. This is the reason why the United States managed to impose its own rules of the game on the Soviet Union and, therefore, to win this battle.(60) (2) However, the paradox is that the post-Cold War world is accompanied by the decline of two previously strong superpowers, and in the near future, the United States is also doomed to decline. Without an enemy American civilization cannot exist. America was (and still is) a global economic empire with a rigid hierarchical structure from top to bottom (U.S.--OECD--NIC--countries-resource suppliers) which was cemented by the presence of a common enemy. Now that the enemy is gone the whole structure is shaking, and Washington is desperately searching for a new enemy. However, its decline is inevitable, because of the cyclical development of world politics. According to one Modernizer, world politics is currently going through the sixth cycle of its development, and very soon the U.S. will face the awakening of Chinese, Japanese, German, Indian, Iranian, and

Turkish traditional imperial ambitions. As a result the U.S. will lose control of former spheres of influence. Huntington's article on the "clash of civilizations" was one of the notable signs of this.(61) (3) The weakening of the previous balance of power is leading to the establishment and acceleration of what is called the "Eurasian arch."(62) The "Eurasian arch" is a geopolitical space laid out between the Russian Far East and the Balkans. Balkan conflict, Kurdistan, and a civil war in Afghanistan are only the few danger spots which might lead to further escalation of conflicts. These spots are signs of the beginning of a coming re-division of the world.(63) (4) Such a division can only come as a result of World War III. This process of re-division of the world through world wars is quite deterministic--all previous re-divisions of the world were accompanied by regional or world wars. Such cases were Napoleonic wars which were the predecessors of the Vienna Congress of 1815. Such were World War I and World War II which ended with the formation of new geopolitical structures. We are facing World War III, and this war, Modernizers argue, has already begun.(64) This war is developing slowly and will have to go through a number of stages until it reaches a possible nuclear clash. There are several signs that it has begun. (a) Acceleration of the struggle for control over different regions in the former Soviet Union, Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. (b) Active formation of the German sphere of influence which means a reproduction of the geopolitical model of the Holy Roman empire. (c) The rise of terrorism as a non-controllable factor of world politics. (d) The appearance of new regional conflicts which cannot be resolved by traditional military means. Iraq, Somali, and Chechnya are examples of the failure of what used to be great powers. To take all these into account, Russia cannot afford to involve itself in global military conflicts. Modernizers argue that it is temporarily weak, and it is in Western interests to get Russia involved in military confrontation with the Muslim world or China in order to complete a world re-division and to form the new world order at the expense of Russia.(65) Instead, Russia should concentrate its resources on an economic and technological breakthrough.(66) Expansionists Unlike Modernizers, the Expansionist are in favor of Russia's immediate and wide-spread geopolitical expansion, in particular the expansion into China and the Muslim world,(67) they are not worried about Russia's economic and technological weakness. Today Russia is weak, but as Tiriar argues, it will restore its status of a Great Power as it creates a new geopolitical empire.(68) Here is how it is expressed in the language of Expansionists themselves. From a purely strategic point of view Russia is equal to Eurasia itself. To prove it, it is enough to say that Russian lands, Russian population and Russian industrial-technological development have a potential strong enough to become a base for continental independence, autarky and to serve as a base for complete continental integration [...]. Russia is the "Pivot of History [...] only continental integration of Eurasia with Russia as a center can guarantee to all its people and states genuine sovereignty as well as full-scale political and economic autarky.(69) Geopolitics, then, is the only key to explaining change in the modem world, and geopolitics teaches, Expansionists argue, that the US Atlanticists are still geopolitically powerful enough to control most of the world. Unlike Modernizers,

who predict future disintegration of the world as a result of the decline of superpowers,(70) Expansionists continue to see a future world as essentially bipolar, divided by the conflict of major geopolitical rivals--Eurasianists and Atlanticists.(71) For the Eurasianist Expansionists the picture of the world is also different as a result of their specific outlook and "metaphysical" assumptions. The world is seen as a much less rational, in even more pessimistic and gloomy tones than it is for Modernizers and Western realists. While the latter tend to see the world politics as a cycle with a regular repetition of similar stages and an inherent craving for an equilibrium,(72) the Expansionists see the possibility of getting through these cycles to a radically new world, "kingdom" "beyond this world" as Alexander Dugin states.(73) They argue in favor of revolutionary breakthrough and claim themselves to be followers of Communism and Fascism. However, unlike those "proletarian" revolutions, the Eurasianist revolution is going to be a "conservative" one, the revolution against progress and liberal ideals, the revolution against Modernity. Accordingly, a geopolitical strategy of the "Pax Evrasiatica" is proposed. The "Pax Evrasiatica" is defined as a "strategic unity of Eurasian geopolitical and geoeconomic organisms, a community with characteristics of neo-totalitarianism."(74) One is necessary to absorb France, Germany, China, India, and the "Muslim world" into the borders of such an empire(75) which is seen as the only way to save Russia as an independent state. The argument again is that the geopolitical vacuum of the post cold war has to be filled out by Russia before it is filled by a hostile power. If Russia chooses any other way but the "way of gathering an empire," Eurasianists argue, continental responsibility for the Heartland will be taken by other powers and alliances. Only power, territorial motives, and strategic advantages act in the sphere of geopolitical struggle. The very fact of any hesitation on the issue of the "gathering of empire" can be considered a justification for invasion of Russia's territories by alternative Big Units. Therefore, the absence of action is an action in itself, and the price for slowing down the "gathering of empire" will inevitably lead to Eurasian bloodshed. To support the argument, the Balkan event is given as a fearful example of what may happen to Russia in a much larger territory."(76) CONCLUSION In this paper, I have offered an analysis of the phenomenon of hard-line Eurasianism, an intellectual movement that emerged as a reaction to the Gorbachev's New Thinking and the events that have eventually led to the end of the cold war and the break-up of the USSR. I have argued that hard-line Eurasianists are far from being homogeneous in terms of their intellectual roots and reality-defining assumptions, and, as a result, they offer different strategies for a post cold war world. Modernizers are influenced by Western modernization theories and the power school in international relations, while Expansionists are particularly fascinated by Western and Russian geopolitical theories. Modernizers and Expansionists also proceed from different definitions of power, key units of action, and motives of behavior in the world politics which lead them to defending different strategies for Russia in a post-cold war era. Modernizers argue in favor of economic and technological development, rational accumulation of power, and Russia's moderate expansion in the former Soviet Union territory. On the contrary Expansionists are hungry for immediate expansion and what they call "conservative revolution." While these two approaches are united by the loose title

`Eurasianists' and share some basic assumptions, their differences are quite remarkable (See the Table 1) and unlikely to disappear in the near future. TABLE 1: MODERNIZERS VS. EXPANSIONISTS: INTELLECTUAL SOURCES, ASSUMPTIONS, STRATEGIES

Modernizers

Geopolitics Main intellectual Western realism sources Theories of modernization

Deconstructed assumptions

Power Power as a means to protect

Key units Self-sufficient empires

Motives of Rational interests and behavior cultural values

Power accumulation Strategies through abstention from for post cold war global military conflicts; world economic and techno- logical development, moderate expansion

Expansionists

Main intellectual Geopolitics sources

Deconstructed assumptions

Power Power as a means to expand and conclude geopolitical alliances

Key units Constantly expanding empires

Motives of Cultural and behavior geopolitical values

Strategies Immediate and for post cold war wide-spread expansion world to fill out geopolitical vacuum

  The arguments made in this paper allow us to formulate the following two policy implications. 1. The more influence hard-line Eurasianism as intellectual movement has on Russia's foreign policy course, the less likely that Russia will evolve in a liberal society and adopt a liberal foreign policy towards Europe and the former Soviet republics. The political agenda of hard-line Eurasianism is a strong authoritarian empire and not a liberal democracy. Therefore, the better are

the chances of hard-line Eurasianism in influencing Russian foreign policy the more aggressive and assertive Russia is likely to become and the more difficult will be to continue a dialogue between Russia and the West. 2. However, even if hard-line Eurasianism becomes a mainstream attitude of Russian foreign policy makers which currently is still far from being the case, such a dialogue would be possible, given substantial differences between Modernizers and Expansionists. One can suppose that such a dialogue will still be possible to conduct with Modernizers who are less inclined to geopolitical expansion and using a violent methods for the pursuit of their goals. Such a dialogue, however, would be impossible with Expansionists. Their discourse is a discourse of war. NOTES (1.) See Aleksei Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security, 18 (1993); Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (1994), No. 18; David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," Europe-Asia Studies, 47 (1995), No. 6; Oleg Kovalev, "Russian `Realism': Theory and Policy Preferences" (University of Delaware, 1996). (2.) "Eurasianism," the result of the belief of its supporters in a special geopolitical role for Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia. (3.) See Nickolas Riasanovsky, The Emergence of Eurasianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). (4.) See Alexander Rahr, "`Atlanticists' versus `Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, 22 (1992), No. 1; Hans Timmerman, "Rossiiskaia vneshnaia politika: poiski novoi identichnosti," Mirovaia ekonomika I mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia, 2 (1994); Kerr, "The New Eurasianism...." (5.) It is worth noting that the Eurasianism as an intellectual movement is extremely diverse and includes supporter of very different political views, some of which can be considered fairly liberal or moderate, while others imperialist and anti-Western. Those interested in the liberal version of Eurasianism, see, for example: Aleksandr Panarin, "Mezhdu atlantizmom i evraziistvom," Svobodnaia misl', 11 (1993); Aleksandr Panarin, "Zapadniki I Ievraziitsi," Obschestvenniie nauki i sovremennost', 11 (1993); Aleksandr Panarin, "Rossiia v evrasii: geopoliticheskiie vizovi I tsivilizatsionniie otveti," Voprosi filosofii, 12 (1994); Dmitrii Samuilov, "Mezh-tsivilizatsionnii podhod," Nezavisimaia gazeta, April 29, 1994; Dmitrii Samuilov, "Neizbezhno li stolknoveniie tsivilizatsii," SshA, 1-2 (1995). This version would probably be somewhat closer to the Western liberals, since liberal Eurasianists have their respect to democracy and human rights. This paper, for the above-described reasons, will focus exclusively on the phenomenon of a hard-line Eurasianism and, therefore, use the labels "Eurasianists" and "hard-line Eurasianists" interchangeably. (6.) The subtitle of one of the major publications of hard-line Eurasianists, the newspaper Den' (Day) reads "the newspaper of spiritual opposition." (7.) See for example Rahr, "Atlanticists..."; Timmerman, "Rossiiskaia .... " (8.) After the October 1993 crisis, the weekly began to appear under the title "Zavtra" (Tomorrow). The reason being that during the October crisis the weekly fiercely challenged the Yeltsin decision to dissolve parliament and as a result was banned by Yeltsin's decree. (9.) See Shamil' Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista," Nash Sovremennik, 7 (1992); Aleksandr Dugin, Aleksandr, "Krim prinadlezhit Evrazii," Zavtra, 6 (1994);

"Rossiiskaia natsiia na poroge tret'ego tisiacheletiia," Kentavr, 2 (1993); Anatolii Glivakovskii, "Rossiiskaia natsionalnaia bezopasnost i geopolitika," Kentavr, 5 (1991). (10.) Applying Western concepts, such as "realists," or "rationalists," to a non-Western empirical reality has of course its cost. This application should be treated as an analytical exercise for the purpose of classifying Russian foreign policy schools in a systematic way, and, therefore, it will not always be able to capture what is culturally specific and never what is culturally unique for Russia. (11.) Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 7. (12.) For Western realists, "power has to be defined in terms of distribution of capabilities," specifically, "military, economic, and technological capabilities." See for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 192; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13. (13.) See for example, Ann J. Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism," in James Der-Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 59. (14.) Shamil' Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista"; see similar claims in: Leonid Abalkin, "O Rossiiskikh natsionalno-gosudarstvennih interesah," Voprosi ekonomiki, 2 (1994); El'giz Pozdniakov, "Natsiia, gosudarstvo, natsionalniie interesi, Rossiia," Voprosi ekonomiki, 2 (1994). (15.) Shamil' Sultanov and Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Izmenitsia chtobi vizhit'," Den', 6 (1991). (16.) See for example Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Gilpin, War and Change, p. 26. (17.) Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista." (18.) Along with assumptions of power as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and states as the key units of actions, the assumption of rational behavior is an essential components of the Western realism (Keohane makes this point in Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 7). These assumptions were inherited from classical realists such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. (19.) Abalkin, "O Rossiiskikh ...." (20.) The first issue of Elementi was specifically devoted to intellectual sources of modem Eurasianism. See: Elementi, 1 (1992). (21.) The "New Thinking" was heavily influenced by American neoliberal interdependence theories. Gorbachev's and Yakovlev's foreign policy advisors such as Nikolay Kosolapov and Georgi Shakhnazarov read Joseph Nye and Robert O. Keohane Transnational Relations and World Politics (1972) and applied its basic assumptions in designing the foreign policy speeches of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. After Gorbachev came to power, Nye was one of the first non-Marxist international relations' theorists to publish a few of his article in the leading Russian journal MEiMO. (22.) One is struck by the similarity of their reflection on the balance of power with Morgenthau's writings and on what used to be the stability of bipolar world with the famous Kenneth Waltz's lines. See as an example Shamil' Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia voina uzhe nachalas'," Zavtra, 18 (1995). (23.) Except Andrei Sakharov's works on the World Coexistence, Progress, and Intellectual Freedom and Vernadski's work on Noosphera, it is hard to recall any other domestic sources of Gorbachev's international thinking.

(24.) As cited in: Aleksandr Dugin, "Velikaia voina kontinentov," Den', 4, 5 (1992). (25.) See on this subject: Riasanovsky, op. cit.; Igor Torbakov, "The `Statists' and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism," RFE/RL Research Report, 1, No. 49 (1992). (26.) Nikolai Gumilev, Ot Rusi k Rossii (Moskva: Politizdat, 1992); Nikolai Gumilev, Etnogenez I biosfera zemli (Sankt-Peterburg: Gidrometeoizdat, 1990); Nikolai Gumilev, "Ritmi Evrazii," Nash Sovremennik, 4 (1993). (27.) As cited in: Igor Shishkin, "Obscheievropeiski dom: vot bog, a vot porog," Zavtra, 45 (1994). (28.) I am grateful to Martha Little for suggesting these labels. (29.) These labels are by no means comprehensive. Modernizers are also in favor of territorial expansion, at least, within the former Soviet Union, while Expansionists realize the importance of technological development as long as it serves to the purpose off the geopolitical expansion. Yet I find these labels appropriate to characterize the key priorities of two wing within Eurasianism. (30.) See for example Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista"; Sergei Kurginian, "Esli ne imperiia, to nichto," Zavtra (1994). (31.) Different means can be selected for achieving this goal. One way, as Oleg Shirgazin suggests, is to support the Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev's initiative to perform the economic and political integration of the major former Soviet republics and thus form a Eurasian Union. See for example, Oleg Shirgazin, "Imperativ Evraziistva," Zavtra, 36 (1994). (32.) Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista" (33.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia ...." (34.) Shamil' Sultanov, "Vizov imperii," Den', 33 (1992). (35.) They flesh out physical, cultural, religious, economic, territorial, and futurological components of national security (Sultanov, Prohkanov, "Izmenitsia chtobi vizhit'..."; Abalkin, "Rossiiskiie natsionalno-godudarstvenniie interesi...")--compare with Morgenthau's geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, national character, etc. as elements of national power (Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). Eurasianist language and arguments of interdependence between negligence to components of national security and growing conflicts (Sultanov, "Vizor imperii ...") are also similar with Morganthau's interdependence between personal insecurity and social disintegration (Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 122-123). (36.) Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). (37.) Prokhanov, Sultanov, "Izmenitsia, chtobi..."; Oleg Sergeiev, "Backward Forever?" Den', 33 (1992). (38.) Jack Snyder and Peter Gourevich provide good overview of theories of late and late, late modernization (See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambition [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991], p. 5658); Peter Gourevich, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, 32, Winter (1977). (39.) Aleksandr Prokhanov, "`Tretii Rim' ili `Respubblika Rus'," Zavtra, 22 (1995). (40.) Sultanov, Prokhanov, "Izmenitsia, chtobi .... "

(41.) El'giz Pozdniakov, ed. Geopolitika: teoriia i praktika (Moskva: IMEMO, 1993). (42.) El'giz Pozdniakov, "Geopoliticheskii kollaps I Rossiia," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', 8-9 (1992).; Prokhanov, "`Tretii Rim' ili.... " (43.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Serbiia: konservativnaia revolutsiia," Den', 44 (1992). (44.) Sergei Kurginian, "Tseli I tsennosti," Den', 24 (1991). (45.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Konservativnaia revolutsiia. Kratkaia istoriia ideologii tret'ego puti," Elementi, 1 (1992); Dugin, Serbiia...; Vadim Shtepa, "Zametki neokonservatora," Nash sovremennik, 5 (1992); Vadim Shtepa, "Departiizatsiia," Nash sovremennik, 8 (1992). (46.) As cited in: Torbakov, "The `Statists' and ...."p. 1. (47.) Jan Tiriar, "Evropa do Vladivostoka," Den', 34 (1992); Jan Tiriar, "Tezisi," Elementi, 1 (1992). (48.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," Elementi, 4 (1993). (49.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Sumerki geroiev. Pominaia Zhana Tiriara," Den', 3 (1993). (50.) Dugin, "Velikaia voina kontinentov .... " (51.) See also Anatolii Glivakovski, "Okno v Evropu cherez svalku," Den', 16 (1993). (52.) "Evraziiskoie soprotivleniie," Den', 2 (1992). (53.) "Evraziiskoie soprotivleniie..."; see also Jan Tiriar, Yegor Ligachev, "Poka voina prodolzhaietsia, voina ne proigrana," Den' 37 (1992). (54.) Dugin, "Serbiia: konservativnaia revolutsiia...." (55.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Apologiia natsionalizma," Den', 38 (1993). (56.) Nikolai Lysenko, "Tsel' - velikaia imperiia," Den', 17 (1993). (57.) See on this subject, George J. Demko and William B Wood, Reordering the World. Geopolitical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 8; Andrew Linklater, "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 250. (58.) This section is based on the part of my paper "Between Liberal Internationalism and Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia" (forthcoming). (59.) Andrei Karagodin, "Otkroveniia mondialistov," Zavtra, 36 (1994). (60.) Sultanov, "Vizov imperii ...." (61.) Karagodin, "Otkroveniia mondialistov ...." (62.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia voina...." (63.) See Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia..."; Pozdnyakov, "Geopoliticheskii kollaps .... " (64.) See "Ievraziiskoie soprotivleniie..."; Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia ...." (65.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia...." (66.) Sultanov, Prokhanov, "Izmenitsia, chtobi vizhit'...." (67.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," Elementi, 3 (199), p. 33. (68.) Tiriar, "Ievropa do Vladivostoka...." (69.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," pp. 31-32. (70.) See Abalkin, "O Rossiiskikh ...." pp. 12-14; Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia..."; Pozdniakov, "Geopoliticheskii kollaps..."; Pozdniakov, Geopolitka .... (71.) See the polemic between Dugin and Sultanov in: "Ievraziiskoie soprotivleniie .... "

(72.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia..."; Gilpin, War and Change .... (73.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Potomu chto mi liubim tebia, revolutsiia," Den', 19 (1993). (74.) "Evraziiskoie soprotivlenie..." (75.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," p. 33. (76.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," pp. 33-34.

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Publication Information: Article Title: Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives. Contributors: Andrei P. Tsygankov - author. Journal Title: East European Quarterly. Volume: 32. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 1998. Page Number: 315+. COPYRIGHT 1998 East European Quarterly; COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group