Germany: __ - - - A New History

. " _-

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r d cambridge, ~ a s a c h u w u

University hndm, England

Press

i

beliewd that things could hardly get worse. Hitler's cons

backers took an optimistic view of the future, They we= cr i

that Hitler was "hemmed in" with c~nservative cabinet minis 1 i

would keep him in linc. Papen told one of his friends, W h a I

worried about? I have Hindenburg's full confidence. In two

wc'll have Hitler backed into a corner and whimpering.''

In order to understand the tenor of such remarks in re

one must keep in mind that in assessing the National Socialist

in 1933 Hider's coritemporaries had no experience to

Second World War and Auschwitz were still covered by the

time, and the few pop le who had read Mein Kamp!: Hitle

nouncement of his futurc program, tended not to take it s

Experience had shown that in general there was a large gap he

ideological declarations of principle and practical political

Furthermore the reversion to an authoritarian regime did n

as a shock. From 1930 on Germans became inured to the i

parliamentary control over political developments was tenu

best, and if they looked around the rest of Europe, things di

pear all that different elsewhere. Governments were headed b

tors in most countries, and where that was not the case, last analysis he had only one goal:

popular front government in France, domestic political unres rld dominance for a

such a that i t hardly servcd as an advertisement fo rd "superior lace" over the dead bod-

There wa3 a ~ i d e s ~ r c a d perception that the Great Depressi ors."Hr never took , - xie;en,iiic iir"&g~ a: whc, p-

hausted democratic go\:ernmenu, and that the immediate fut E.s bha,8w knotlomi Iiis eyes off this aim, although he

longed to thc strong men of every countr? I ~bn, and io-raim a n form often kept it concealed behind a t i~i: imp?i$ 11- faumrc. Anyme

Mussolini in Italy was a prime example, a dictator wh lo w,o he b ~ ~ d mr 01 veil of tactical maneu~ers. I k r e , the kev ih c p n s ihe

received openly admiring commentary even from libera To reach it, Hitler first had to

dor Wolff, editor-in-chief of the Berlina Tagieblotc, and socialis =iwaokne%. b iwi l i and mer" lHit establish Kationaf Socialist rule ir-

Kurt Hiller. If Hitler was totally mi judged by the public, reversibly and makc the party a

cause he was in fact not an ordinary politician but an ide ominant presence eveq-where in thc country What is usually re-

natic and revolutionary. The traditional concepts of Europe ferred to as the "seizure of power"was in reality a process that took a

were foreign to him; they meant nothing to him in any c a r and a half to complete. 'The first step consisted of eliminating the

246 German Megolomania German Megolomanio 247

mained for nonconforn~ing w ~ i t -

ers and artists until the outbrcak C C ~ Y O) -mcer' ex&ted, Of WJI.

The battle for hearts and minds

continued. At the universities, m-

5 b.4 ~oi iona! j o c i n i ; ~ ~ je congenial prokssors and faci~lty lone d k h h d i m i a n r ond 0-4 Ge:mnr prsesed lhe .rm

members wcre dismissed and of- hot endd ihcn lo rule ihe ten folred out of the ct)unti-):

vho lea calkd M oompioa ,mn,, ruc;ol while no small nuinbcr of their iecde-itscommandad cr~lleagues hastened to place the H:mmlei, Himm!ei guve h15

:i .ha oddsoral name of institutions of higher learning, ( m o w b i k o d ahowed which had once existed far from

1s for "pnrilive" the tumult of day-to-day politic.,

at thc disposal of the new rulers in

broiir, shirts. Similar devclopmellb occurred within the churches. In

Lutheran Church the German Christian movcment flourished,

ich took its orientation from the racist-nationalist ideology and

ircr-principle of the Nazis. At the Barmen Synod held in May i 934

opponents formed the Confessing Church, whose members

.lc:-cly attacked the National Socialis~s despite government repri-

'iiitl arrests. Sympathy for the new regimc was not lacking among

e Catholic clera, especially after the concortlat signctl with the

tican on July 20, 1933. Yet resistance also increased within thc Ro-

an Catholic Chui-ch as news spread of the Nazis' euthanasia plans,

its height with issuance of thc papal encyclical Mir brenncridcr

rge (With deep anxiety) in 1937.

Where attempts to silence intellectual leaders did not suffice, state

rror set in. It is associated ahove all with thc names Heinrich

or music declared "un-German" and attacked a? "degene lmler and Reinhard Heydrich, and with the SS (Schurasraffel, de- ter). From September 1933 on, cultural life in Germany enst: Formation); this elite Natioiial Socialist "security unit" became

manipulated and made to serve the needs of the Nation e supreme police force of the Third Reich, an all-powerful inswu- state by Joseph Goehbels, minister of propaganda, through nt for punishing, terrori~,in% and purging the population of unde- created National Chamber of Culture, although some latitn Sirable elements. Its headquarters on Prince Albrecht Sweet in Berlin

252 Gsrmon Megolomania

housed adn~inistrative ofEces and ~crlabohnl in the~ermun

turture chambers, the main ofice 19"'

Pions lor suprhijhwqr be of the Gestapo (the shortened A~~,,,, n,odai d-1

form of CEheime STAuuPOlizei, Se- ie0" weirmr con~n~c!~on of he Brt t uuiobu

cret State Police), and the hcad to run lrom amb burg lo ~a uor inlerrupld ay (ha Greo

office of Keich Security. The cam- ihe Nuiionoi Social,sxr, ,h,,of

paign against enemies of the re- P " ~ S Osc'n p r d d conrl turned them alo a speooculur

gilne was managed from Prince p,q(iiam in 1936 O S ~ U 120.

iylbrecht ~ t ~ ~ . ~ t : political, ideo. we* e" 'p lvd on pqm. and visors p ~ , ~ a s h / d i r p l n k wwil

logical, and racial enemies, mean- in cedar e giw wen mere ,no mtltlory lind drclqic voiue of ih

inp first and foremost Jews. TIC SS lo ili3 srnoil, i,,

spread its nets all over the country, '930s the om*dnlol s i n s conrliuclion woa red&. 30 Ihal

rrom police (lepartments to the h,, .,j ,, m,,w io! sc.ou id be in

sinister world of tlie concentratio~l indualiy

camps. The SS also contained a sprxial unit at the personal disposa

the Fiihrer that latrr formed the core of the wartime ivg (Armed SS) and maintained tics with the Race anil Kesettl

I leadquarters, the lmreaucratic division formed to carry out

racial policies.

The muddletl Manichean racial rluc~-ine of National So

quired as a foil for "Aryans," thc bringers of light and redc

group of people who merely by belonging to a particular "ra

hodicd everything evil, bad, and deviant. The National Social'

no difficulty in identifying a group to occupy the position of o

givcn Europe's thousand-yea= t~ndition in this rcspect: It

Je.u,s. The persecution of the Jews was not planned and prepar

in advance; it depended on circumstances both abroad and w

country, but it always constituted one of the regime's ul aching fevcr pitch with the Keichskrinallnochc, the night of shattered

logical aims. The campaign madc use of terror and propa glass, on Noven~ber 9, 1938. tions designed by the party to appear as if they had erupted s In alternation with such tactic-5, the government imposed new laws

ously from the population, "from below:'beginning with th from above." Among the very first was the Law for Restoration of the

of Jewish merchants organized by Gocbbels on April 1, 19 rofcssional Civil Service, which empowered the government to dis-

. . . . . . ,.

254 Germon Megalomania , .." ,:&

miss Jewish officials, followed by the l)di:nse Law of May 21 ayl)(:als to tradition played a major role in this success, on occasions

excluding Jr:ws from military service. The remaining rights of je,., sc;:h as I'otsdam Day on kpril2 1,1933, when the governing coalition

were greatly recluad with the proclalnation of thc Nu~~emberg L ~ > ~ ~ 1)ctwcen revolutionary National Socialists and Yrussian-cot~servative

on September 15, 1935, which made proof of Aryan descel~t Gernian Nationalists was ccle1)rated by a manipulatory but effective

requisite ibr exercising the rights of citizens or holding elective invocation of the spirit of Frederick the Great, ox- when the annual

they deprived J<:tr,s of full citizenship, and prohilited ma t,arvest thanksgiving was celebrated on the Biickeberg in Wesq>halia

tween Jews and non-Jews. These measures, a twisted perve ,?.ith splendid tributes to old agricultural customs that helped bind

the rule oflaw, created a juridical foundation for permanent d the loyalties of the agrarian middle class to the new state.

nation and persecution of German Jows. The staging of political events, the transformation of slogans into

Persecution and violence were one side of the regime, en magnificent theater, and the insertion of potent symbolism into ev-

and fascination the other. It began with the fact that hardly pryday l i f c r h e s e were techniques the government had perfected as

group, political interest, or collective hope existed that the N never before in German history. From the Olyorpic Games in Berlin

Soaalists dirl not promote or furnish with some benefit. Blue in 1936 to the annual party rallies in Nurcmberg, the National Social-

workers were impressed by spectacular job-a-eation program ist regime celebrated the gi-andeor of the nation and the indissoluble

the construction of the autobahns, improvements in workers' hen hands of comrnuniq- with precisely choreographed mass parades,

fits, and frre-time activities provided hy the party's own rccreat ceremonies reminiscent of religious services, and magic rituals of re-

department, whose slogan was Kroji u'urch Frende, strength througl dcmption that affected the participants deeply. Not even the British

joyment. Retail mcrchants profited from the fact that their co ambassador Sir Nevile Henclerson could resist their spell completely;

tion, the despised big departmcnt stores, were required to pay hc reported from Nuremherg that he found one performance "both

taxes, and rnrmhers of the skilled trades appreciated the s solemn and beautiful,"anrl the cfkct ol'thc: light show " \as something

measul-es limiting the o u m b ? ~ of new master's licenses that m likc being inside a cathedral of ice."

issncd. Farmers welcomed protcctivc tariffs and domestic price 'She "cathedral of ice'created with dozens of antiaircdt spotlights

ports, whilc industrialists were grateful for the abolition of workers' revealed, more than any other symbol, the dual character of the Nwi

pal-ticipaticm in decision-making, the absence of conflicts with labor appeal to the emotions: the last word in modern technology coupled

unions over wages, and d ~ e rising number ot'p>~cmment con ~ i i t h archaic ritual. This contrast was typical or the way the Third

particularly in the arrnarnents industry. Muchthe same applie Reich presented itself, with autobalins, the Silver Arrow model Mer-

tually cl,ery profession, class, and type of organization. Almo cedes Benz, the first inexpensive radio receiver, the affoi-dahle Volks-

"member of the national community" benefited in some way, n wagen, and the world's first jet-propelled plane, on the one hand, and

materially, hut-what was perhaps more important-in ter Germanic sagas, castles of the Teutonic knights where the Nazi elite

ideals a111 a sense of solidarit).. was educated, and solstice celebrations on the other. The newest in-

The latter lay at the heart of the National Socialists' succ ventions and invocatio~~ of the spirits of thc dead flowed together.

the country. Unlike democracy, which had been perceived as austere The undeniable approval felt by the majority of die population for

and rationalistic, the dictatorship satidicd pcople's emotions. Skillfill the Hidcr regime was increased by its successes in foreign affairs, a

f the Reichrwel~r that his policy woukl be "conquest of new Lcbenrroum

,he East and its ruthless Germanization": unfortunatelv we know

rg about how the generals responded. In a tactically cle

signaled German \\,illingncss to seek rapprochement

:ver move

with for-

,ign powers; this muted the hostile responsc to his sei7.ure of power in

the Western democracies, while all the time he was pushing forward

111 a plebiscite on January 13, 1935, the inhabitants of the Saar dis-

voted to rejoin the Reich, and on June 18 a British-German

asreement on the size of their respective na~ral fleets was signed; both

tIa.se events tcnded to show Hider $1 the light of a su(r~essfu1 politi-

cian, while the western powers appeared willing to retreat. Rounding

li' this impression was Hider's announcement on Mal-ch 16 that

compu1x)ry military service would bc rcintraduced in Germany in

conjunction with rearmament, in violation of thc Treaty of Versaillcs.

\,car latcr the army, now renamed the Wohrinacht, occupied the

Rilineland, and Britain ancl France offcrcd no more than formal pro-

tests. That same year the Rome-Berlin Ads was created and the

Antj-Cornintcrn I'act signed with Japan, both of then1 alliances with

an t,xpressly anti-Soviet thrust. Youth Serve$ the Fohier

sharp contrast from the record of ;KM'~<, C U '9391 IIitlcr leiled to achieve the desirctl rapprochement wit11 Brit- T 4 HiibrYo.lh, which war pr

its unfortunate democratic prede- olhcGl .r.;.le organirot air?, however, first of all because Joachim von Ribhcntrop, ihe Ger-

cessors. ~h~ general Public failed clew+ exploited the on(jngs o mall ambassador in London and later foreign minister, was pursuing dien and yomg pepk ia occ

to recognize the broader aims Hit- group rind ianoa.ic mmpli:e ex pcnly anti-English policies, and sca~nd becausc the German-Japa-

ler was his fOreip :" I940 membe:rhip in he Hibc Yo nest: alliance thrcatcned British interests in the Far Eart. Relations mr,erponding Aaiacioi.c~~ d &man

policy, however: From his first k c m e mondoioy liitle: expbined coaled still further after Germany intervened in d1c Spanish Civil $ion d the Hide You* 01 !he pa

day as chancellor he wanted wa,; ,935: .h vill ,hejung \Val; where it could test the prq~aredness of its air force, the Lufrwafi.

&rough he intended not Folk7 codeir uili w!e: the H: A t the same time the German Foreign Office noted with interest the t l q wi i rew, for dury in he

only to reverse the results of the .,d the graupJ ~d he SA egrec to which the British seemed anxious to avoid being drawn into

?ieaty ill^^ but to expand men *"I1 d d ~ Y'epO"'a onflia on the Continent. Hitlcr had reason to assume he would C q r . cnd in lese ocganirosoni thw

the borders of Germany and estab- mobre into r?'dien of we pope." ave a largcly free hand in carrying out his plans to expand Germany's

lish world dominance for the Aryan race. Only four day5 after his a ,,. ., .,,

pointment he announced with co~nplete candor to the comma$ By 1936 prcparatiom for the coming war were in full wing. Hitler

258 German Megolemonio Germon Megalamanio 259

,...ene. The German populatiort I-cacted with jul)ilation to the an-

of Austria, and so did the majority of Austrians. The separa-

of 1866 hall heen overcome; Great Germany, the goal that both

liberals in the German il'ational Assembly of 1848 and the Soda1

emocrab of the 1919 National Assembly in Weimar had supported,

s now a reality. The nightmarish character of this reality was per-

d at first only by a minority of Austrian Jews, liberals, commit-

d Catholics, and sot:ialists who had failed to leave the country in

~ c ; they were swiftly rounded up in unannounced raids and ar-

The success of the ;lnschh$ showed Hider that he had Iittlc t o fear

om the Westcrn powers, and so only two weeks later, on March 28,

he made the deasion to annex Czechoslovakia as well. Two days after

Grorlh d Nazi Pa? Mem he sent orders to the U'chrmocht to preparc to crush C~echoslo\,a- wrote a memorandum creating l91%l945 a; the date of the iuwasion was set for October 1, 1938. Once again a bur-year plan, saying that the

o,,he ?stern rcsistanrr was we& and limited to diplomatic protests in a

German economy must be ready 0150 i l the qu-her ring in Munich on Septemhel- 29, Britain, France, and Italy ac-

ted German annexation of the Sudetenland-a ring-shaped terri-

i n c r c a i i ~ rlawtya'ier '928. or tor) complising virtually the entire Crech-German border region,

tion were s~~borclinated to this and ecol;>nic ciisa wrrsned. o hich had a large German-speaking population--in order to avoid sesirly oiler lte Nciir come to goal. Yet in a meeting with the for- iC33, ihr ornDalon ar. A British-Gcrman nonaggression pact signetl the next day hy

British I'rirnc Minister Neville Chamberlain and Hider strengthened the armed forces on November 5, .,< ,,, hYod SV i945 a c gencral conviction in the Western countries that Hider would be I 937, a of which is con- cdul: Gcc~onf -0s 0 renbe, ontcnt with a compromise and accept an offer of "colonial appease-

tained in thc "Mossbach Protocol: Hitlcr's plans for expa ent" meaning restoration to Germany of its former colonies. Europe ran into resistance. The fore@ minister, Baron It was the furthest thing from Hitlcr's mind. ;it the same time he

von Neurah, pointed to the international risks, and Baro as ~fiscussin~ peace with Chamherlain, the ''2 plan" was being de- von Fritsch, commander-in-chief oC the army, doubted loped to Luikl up a fleet to attack England. On March 15, 1939,

he Wehrmachr occupied tlle ''1-ump Czech state:' dcmonstratiug the

take extensive military operations. A year later both critics thlessness of diplomatic agreements between the Western de- [>laced by mure accommodating men. ocracies and the Hitler dictatorship. Only now did ~ r i t a i n rousc it-

On March 12, 1938, the German Pi4hchrmochr marclled into if to take counter-measures hy guaranteeing Polislr independence after assurances had been received that Britain and Italy wo d beyond that attempting to revive the old preu,ar British-Russian

260 Germon Megolomania German Megolomonia 261

li!ri,o Bnuac f4urenbeig, S!J:mei Verlog ' 936) Paris for German Soldiers Nelioaal Socio'iit antSemitisn wor mwe i:ble ior we?; ieo~cr:ure of he moderr v gbml t h o eoiliei loins: idlgious I.oilrlb! to made h m :ed onxious. Fo: .his iec

almost reached his goal. He could On m e 22, lG4C. the Geimn b!i:zkriw

ward Jews a: 'ear: adni:led ihe pubil ih. o! c:crd. Jews hod .o 0+ "~pcrmted 1.0 F , ~ ~ ~ ~ vros bi, on crrrisice, not conceive of the possibility that ccnvenion, and c;ilwol horiil,iy the psibiiity vian comn.nihj ' :he Nozj ske f-r o;iei FnrceGerrnan am- d assimilation. Hiilcii o?l6emit:im, hy cq- rrer I"Pne Qorm Trcopei*j s p c r m , d o the Western powers would pre-

y%ri mrlie. in the io:eit of Cam- !,asi, riigno;izeo an enhs grcup on the borts wri ic~orly bmcl mo primilive form e!n F,cnce ond i h b r e l w vent him &om carving up Poland of usotleiob;e dorocterrliis: A v n e w b ~ i e Lmi!ic o.opcgaodo: its pistishers in ei wsie picceri er:der Germon niii. foieoeom had p c l k e d Judaism .emoined :nes &ig hiwght oo: on i!luur~& e d k dmiirlltra~io2, ~ c d he again. According to report of copcrk*; a jmu, and !he obiect cf hoz i i p-3- w:ided Ticv ke'neii Fuchr od arbn of F.ancs \vur ywemed by o ncld deluriau. 'iil!er imogned thd jewi ,+,ere :&:ern Jud bi s e f m €id! VTiiit ro i o ~

the Carl Jacob Burckhardt, High lnco odnroiriioho~ wdrr ivlasihal

ai w,rk evey~ lere undemi.ing !he lai i lc- gee" heali. ono no Je-u on h;s wtn"]. ,?. iih/ ,,I polis, u n d e r ~ m a n Conimissioner of the League of tiorr d ~ ~ i e b ond he consciered.bvs iesoon. cmmand, p o d u olrodive D Nations in Danzig, in a meeting on

idizrs t1.01 $!rid regulo~ionr had lo

sued to i:mr virits by members ol the August 1 1 , 1939, Hitler spoke to alliance. However, Hitler got the jump on them. Foreign Minis e him openly about his purpose in all Ribbentrop and Stalin signed an agreement creating a Nazi is: 411 he wanted was to subject Russia. But if the West was too nonaggression pact on .4ugust 23. In a secret protocol Hitler an lix~cllcrl to support him, he would make terms with Russia, defeat the lin divided eastern Europe into two spheres of influence; the li Vat, and attack the Soviet Union afterward. demarcation ran through the middle of Poland. Hitler believed h On September 1, 1939, German troops marched into Poland, and

262 German Megalomonio German Megolomonio 263

.O ~aord for NSDAP Announcwnentr. German v i c t o ~ over Poland, re in Aparhenf Hourer and

aided by the Soviet in~zasion, was ,,me on ti?, 01- iF331 achieved in only five weeks. Ger-

Gemoy ).he seie. the pan/, ond xopla rupaoreo te lev ood be many and the Soxpiet union di-

m.. fie ? ' f l f a u n d ' T % e re& vided Poland along the Bug River, ddrwr +a enhre paa'olioa. In fhs 1039 he Nazi P ~ Y divided ~ecnon., and while the SS and Gestapo and

the Soviet NKVD (the People's >e Ipcpcser, to iephce he ircdi~ooal

nO pr9,in- Bslow b &ue. the Commissariat for Internal Affairs) .,hi o:gonimjian war subdivided info dir.

crL,, established control in their respec- vsl 'b!ockr,' to which filh, houss tive the ~ ~ j ~ h turned

o:!e~ bd i ~ v e d i i i i c ~ . ~ ob-oining its military might ag.?inst wester~i o w n on he p;ivate l ib 6 amv Europc. Reginning on itpril 9,

n llleir n w : hq could keep on eyr ~oaulo,on'i lovullv ihs iegirne art? 1940, Gcl.man troops bcgan occu-

ticipating British and French plans

o scud n.oops to thcir defense; this sccured Germany's northern

ank frorn attack and gave dic Germans direct access to the Atlantic.

n atttack on the Ketherlands, Belgium, and France follo\\,ed on May seventeen days later the Red Arnly crossed the R~lish border 10. lb the surprise of military experts, including the lradcrs of the east. In contrast to 1914, the rnood ofthe German public, an Cl;chrmnch~, thc western campaign proved a triumph for Hitlcr's saat- the Reichsiog delcgates in their Nazi Party uniiorms, was soln gj-, This success not only placed him at the peak of his in of them belicved that this military a d v c n t u ~ wonid end we Germany l>nt also silenccd opposition within the army officers' corps. War-y to Ijitler's expectations, the Western po\vcrs did n c had pined unlimited authority in military affairs, and whatever back but dedal-ed war on Gcrmany instead. The Second W esistance to the regime still existed xithin Germany bccame dis- had begun, intentionally provoked by Ilitler's desire for con

triggered hy Stalin's compliaty, and aided by the West's failure to The next goal of the war was conquest of Great Britain. Hitler sis( German aggression until it was too late. Despitc all dle a ,ontinued to hope that the Britishu.ould fall into line, and it I\GJ.S with and war crimes committed in the following years by all par reluctance that he gax8c the order to begin the Battle of Britain, which it is necessary to keep in mind that decisive responsibility for the out- d not end in the triumph for the German Lgtwafc that its com- break of war lay with German leadership, and to a much lesser ander-in-chief, Herinann Gbring, had promised his Fiihrer. Yet Hit- with Soviet leaders, while the Western powers engaged in j r's main goal remained the war against the Soviet Union, as he de- self-derensc. dared to the leaders of the Wehrmocht on July 31, 1940. Utlable to

Wall," a line of defense that would run from Archangelsk to

pian Sea, he intended to seal ofrhis huge realm from .Anglo-A

attack through bastions in the Middle East and northwest Afi

German Megolomonio 267

In western Europe, military occupation ibllowcd tllr classic orcetl to spend time together in bomb shelters. All these factors

a large extent, although the Gestapo and Security Service ded to wear down class distinctions, and the population grew

dienstFHeydrich's intelligence organization-comrnitte ore homogeneous, as millions of people listened to the same slo-

tacks against the civilian population, contrary to interna I p n s from the ndio, stood in line for rationed goods, and took in the

their pursuit of partisans and also in actions to round up insipid entertainment off~:red on the radio and in movie theatcrs as a

gypsies. In the east the SS left the population in no dou stnction from the xZat What remained for individuals was remeat

what it could expect in thc event of a German victory. Poland offere, om the private sphere, while they avoided contact with the outside

an opportunity to convert racist ideolugy into decds. The Polish, rld as much as possible and concentrated on the most urgent task:

per classes were systematically killed and millions of Jews d nding ways to surlive.

from their homes to malie room for ethnic Gerlxans fi-o Meanwhile, the regime was making pians for the futul-e. A massive!.

Europe. Migration on a huge scale was set in motion, prec project to rel~uilrl the capital of the Reich was undrrtaken in thc

of 1945. Similar events took place in the occupied port midst of the war, in preparation for the final victory: A gigantic world

viet Union. Behind the German lines, the Wehrnrnch capital city, Germania, would arise on thc site of the old Berlin. con^

sorted to tactics prohibited by international conventions far structioil of a broad-gauge railway network was begun in Europe that

ten than it did in the west; it also bad the support of the was to stretch to the Llrals arid make thc PI-evious railroads looL like

Servim. The latter executed Soviet pcditical officials (con1 toga. SS architects created plans for gargantuan monuments io the

without any pretense of formalities and systematically bunt dead that woilld also serve as "border foruessesnin Africa and on the

Jews. Russian prisoners of war were crammed into camps whe

ditions wcrc designed to give the vast majority no chance of sur .ff~e regime's main plans, howe\,er, concentrated on systematic

For the German population in hese years thc u-ar elimination of its declared enemy, the Jews of Europe. Hitler had al-

widespread hunger, as had been the case in the First World y a ~ n o u ~ ~ c r d on January 30, 1939, that a world war u,ould result

1944 no serious food shortages existed, for the occupicd 11 "the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe." His war was not a

we1.e ruthlessly stripped of tbdr own resources. But th battle for hegemony of thc type Enropc had known from time imme-

tensified the tendencies of the totalitarian state, bringing \. morial; it was a racial war. Hitier believed only select, hon~ogencons

militarization of public life, increasing organization of the p~:oples were capable of establishing a lasting empire, and that the

private sphere, and social leveling. When rationing w ryan race was hindered in its pursuit of one through the divisive and

the government understood how to exploit envy and dars diffe corrupting nature of its age-old adversary, thc Jews. The Weimar Re-

for its own purposes. There were appeals to solidarity withi ublic and We$tern democracies, he was convinced, had in large

"commnnity of the people"; party and state organizations easure succumbed to this "rot" (Zersetzungl, which broke down

ated that included virtually every citizen in the cnd; block ealthy racial communities the way bacteria attacked a healthy body.

kept an eye on their neighborhoods, and neighbors were enc e S o ~ e t Union had the first go\.ernment supposedly permeated by

to spy on one another. When the Allicd air raids began, peopl ewish influence, representing a source of infection for the rest of the

270 German Megolomania

aorld. In Hitler's sick logic it folhnved incscapahiy that the Jews must

bc removed from the healthy German racial community, the "body of

d ~ c people," and that tlic Germans must seek Lehcnsraum in the wide

expanses of eastern Europe, space to which their superiority entitled

them. There they would play the role of masters, while the Slavs, an-

other allegedly inferior race, would take the pnrt of colonial slaves.

The world war had to be Sought, according to this demented logic, in

order to exterminate the Jews.

The German leadership thus dk! not see revision of the outcome of

thc First World War as its primary goal in this war, as many of Hitleri

nservative political allies helirvcd and as a number of people still

bic1icr.e today. Nor was the goal political dominance in the sense of

classic European C<.rreign policy, conquest of territo11)- representing

addit.ional economic resources and larger markets, or release of inter-

nai tensions in military undertakings. None of the rationales foor war

own iu thc history of Europe up to that point apjilics to German ac-

us in World War [I. Instead thc goal was, in Nit1i.l-'s own ~:ords ,

"initiation of the final stage of battle against thc mortal cncmy of

Jc~vish-Bolshevisln" in the Eurasian dominions or National Socialism. . ~ Ihe whole war effort prior to the campaign against the Soviet

Union had therefore amounted tn nothing more than tactical pvepara-

cs. The attack on Poland was designed to create a styirig area for

the JVehmmucht's march to the east; the invasion of Francc was intended

eliminate the danger of attack fron~ the rear, as were Hitler's ef-

Group of W e e

l is ix hussbount, 19441

orts to reach accommodation with Great Britain by dividing up the

vorld. As soon as Poland was conquered, the Germans had begun

rounding up millions of Jews and confining them to ghettos in the ma- iriendi helpd iiz artis Felix Nusrbovm yellow rlorlewr wan icrced ia w a l iBO4:94J! oh-! his bm ib s hide in ih~r woman I X I X , ~ ~ lhem h o iiswe d ior Polish cities. iust as thev had earlier com~elled lews within their - poinling he hos 6eoictd himself as on o.:hc imp. ihs N c s b u m r ' tdirg place war ie duxlwr. wih a prqei shad ond yarwike; he pared. o d ,hey were deported to Auahwi!z own country to wear ident~fyin~ badges But all these measures werc riondr belore a cop o, ,which the cnurs d on jub 31. 1944, in he 10.i iionrporl d arir erely preliminary, a preparation for the next step undertaken in di- the Luu~an fmnf has been iloced, w:lh o hosd m e i s to reach the camp. n~ .ere killec raised ar if to war* aii o +irerr~. The txy in ih snot:ty before he rrmp adrr inlraj tr Z I ~ ~ F F ~ ct conjunction with the war on the Soviet Union: the deliberate and foreground is sl j& ng :he +Is 6 penec~- garring pnwnes in O&r 194 emorseless extermination of the Jews as a prerequisite for the estab-

l d m e n t of German world dommation

The Nazis had already acquired some experience in rhc ea7t was knoxm, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers on

the euthanasia program had gone into operation in Oct leave from tile Russian kont talker1 about mass shootings. At

the course of which some 80,000 people with mental , least the general had to have some suspidons of

been shot, gasscd, or givr.11 fatal injections. The procedure was no,, hat was but habitual defense mechanisms and falls-

be extended to the Jcws. It is thought that FIitler gave th us justifications pro\*ed strongcr than consciousness of guilt and re-

the "linal solution" to thc "Jewish question" in the surnmc

The exact timing is a matter of controversy, for Hitler ten

on criminal directives orally, avoiding their inclusion

ords that mnld later betray him

After about six months of technical and administrat

tions, the heads of the agencies involved inct at a villa by th

a lake in Berlin, the Wnnnsee, on January 20, 1942, to make tl

arrangements. Organized inass murder had already been unde

for somc time, however. Security Servicc unit? (SD-Einsutzgr

Russia had been carrying out mas exrcutions by firing sq

Lhe Germans had conquered the territory, and the first euth

peru arrived at the Cllelrnuo concentration camp in

to provide "special treatment" to 100,000 ]ews deemed inc

forced labor. Murder began at the Relzrc camp in Octobet

gassing at Auschwitz in January 1942.

The entire orgzanization of the mass-murder industry was

camouflage and deception from the stal-t; after the

had protested against the euthanasia program, the re

its most heinous crimes in secret. Nevcrthcless, the genocid

European Jews would not have been possible without the dire

direct participation of numerous government agenci

and departments, that is to say, a large number of people. Ev

extent of the extermination of the Jews, and the details of i

tion, did not become known during the war, there were enon

ences t o it and information about it to make the existence of

termination campaign a matter of publichowledge within G e m a

The dcportations took place in full public view; the transport

274 Germon Megolomania