Eu Imperialism

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The central thesis of this article is that, besides the imperialism ofsome of the EU member countries (national imperialisms), thereexists also imperialism of the EU as a wfiole. The thesis is arguedtheoret ically and i l lustrated by considering the fol lowing: f irst ,relations between the EU ond the Central and Eastern and EuropeanCountr ies; second, the Common Agr icu l tura l Pol icy; th i rd, thecommon military policy; and fourth, the Schengen Syslem (i.e., thecommon immigrat ion pol icy) .

Contradictions of EuropeanIntegrationby Bruno Carchedi and Guglielmo Carchedi

1. IntroductionThe emergence of the EU can be interpreted throug h differenttheoretical perspectives. The m ost influential, now adays, are the(neo)institutionalist and the intergovermentalist. The formerexplains integration basically as the result of a structural necessity:once an institution has been formed, its effects spill over to otherareas of integ ration . The 'spill over' is the basic dynam ic factor.New forms of institutionalism have abandoned the autom atismimplied in the spill over effect and recognise the possibility of setbacks In the process of integration, i.e. the 'spill backs ' due to , forinstance, political factors. The intergovernm entalist approach, onthe other hand, stresses the different states' interests as theprincipal dynamic factor. Within this approach, integrationadvances when the interests ofthe major European states in it aremutually com patible.'While these two approaches differ on many theoretical


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120 Capital & Class #67

to hold their own in world markets. Second, the desire toavoid economic protectionism which was widely thought tohave been one ofth e causes ofthe second wortd war. Third, thedesire to contain the expansion ofth e Soviet Union and ofth eEuropean communist parties.^ And fourth, the desire, especiallyby France , to conta in a possible resurgence of Germanexpansionism by integrating the German economy into aEuropean context. ' '

A third option, based on class analysis, while potentiallymuch more fruitful, has been expelled, for obvious ideologicalreasons, from official and academic discourse. This is ,nevertheless, the perspective to be adopted in this work. From thisperspective, given the imperialist past and nature ofthe countriesfounding the EEC'' (with the exception of Luxembourg), thebody emerging from their integration could not but contain thesame seeds and develop into the same weed. Thus, the argumentconcerning the relatively small size of the European nationshides the expansionary nature of the European project afterdecolonisation ( in the post-war period) reduced Europe 'sinternatio nal weight, and after the weight of the do m ina ntnation , Germany, had been further reduced thro ugh its splittinginto West and East Germany; the thesis concerning the desire toavoid protectionism carefully avoids mentioning the protectionistnature ofthe EEC vis-a-vis the non-EEC (including Third W orld)countries; the view stressing the urge to contain the ex-SovietUnion reveals the desire to destroy it not only for ideological andpolit ical reasons but especially for reasons of economicexpansionism; and the claim that France wished to containGerman expansionism barely disguises France's own expansionistproject, a project which (due to France's insufficient econom icweight) could be realised only within a new context of 'co-operation' with other ex-colonial powers, i.e., within a unitedEurope.

These are so many facets of a process m oved by the in terestsof (inter)national capital^ in which, not by chance, popularparticipation (not to speak of real dem ocratic decision-m akingpower) has been remarkably absen t. This article examines these


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Contradictions ofEuropean Integration 121

2. Aid, enlargements and dependen t development.Traditionally, research on imperialism has centred on the relationbetween the 'm other' countries and their colonies. In this colonialtype of imperialism

the colonies must deliver raw materials to, and im portmanufactured products from, the colonial centre andbecause of this,

the colonies unde rgo little if any capitalist econ om icgrov^rth and diversification.

But there is also a newer type of imperialist relation (holding, forexample, for some South American and Asian countries). In it,the dependent countries can achieve a degree of capitalisteconomic growth and diversification but this is dependentdevelopment and capital accumulation in the sense that

capital in the depe nden t countries adapts its productionand more generally its economic activity to the markets inthe centre, and the centre exports to the dependentcountries what these need (including capital as aid and forinfrastructure) for this process of dependence to continue; the dep ende nt coun tries prod uce what the imperialistcentre needs (wants) through the use of more labourintensive techniques than those in the centre (even thoughthose techniques might be relatively advanced)^ so thatthere is a transfer of value from the dependent to theimperialist countries (see Carchedi, 1991, ch.7); and

given that they cannot compete with the centre on the basisof more advanced technologies, the dependent countriesmust 'save' on labour costs. This means that wages in termsof use values can be relatively high in the centre and(sometimes absolutely) low in the dependent countries.

In the colonialist type of imperialism it was the market of thecolonial countries that was important as an outlet for theimperialist centre . In the dependent development type ofimperialism, it is the market ofthe centre that is important for thedependent countries as an outlet for the latter's production,'com missione d' as it were by the imperialist centre itself. In the


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colonies were destroyed by the imperialist nations.^ In thedepende nt development type of imperialism, some depend entcountries can undergo even a substantial process of capitalistdevelopment but of a dependent type.The EU countries have a colonial type of imperialist relationwith the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) butcould establish a different type of imperialist relation with someofthe Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). But,besides this, the EU as a whole has also a set of imperialistrelations with these two sets of countries. To see this, consider thefollowing. From a class analysis perspective, to say that a countryhas imperialist relations with anothe r country is only a short-cutto indicating that

some capitalist enterprises in the imperialist centre havesuch relations with some other enterprises in thedom inated block and

these relations need a set of national institutions han dingdown a set of legally binding instruments making thoserelations possible.

Nowadays, imper ia l is t re la t ions need a lso internat ionalinstitutions, like the IMF and the W orld Bank. But it would beimproper to refer to these institutions as pursuing their ownimperialist policies because they only mediate the interests ofthemember countries (basically, those ofthe centre). The case isdifferent for the EU. Here, there is both mediation of contra-dictory national interests and a relatively independent formulationof common interests by EU institutions to which the memberstates have relinquished part of their sovereignty. While the EU isnot (yet) a state entity, it has the legal instrum ents to legislate andthus to regulate the (economic) relations ofth e member states asa whole. Thus its imperialism acquires new frontiers. Strictlyspeaking, EU imperialism refers to this latter dimension, to the

imperialist relations between capitalist enterprises (andthus 'between nations') realized and mediated through the legally binding set of

rules handed down by EU inst i tu t ions: the LomeConventions with the ACP countries and the A ssociation


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Contradictions of European Integration 123

imperia l isms bu t th is s i tuat ion is bo un d to change as the processof Europ ean unificat ion proceed s. For the purposes of this wo rk,it is not necessary to distinguish between the separate effects ofthese two aspects of EU imp eria l ism .On ce imp e r i a l i s t r e l a t io n s h av e b een e s t ab l i sh ed in th eindustr ia l sphere (being either colonial is t or depe nd ent develop-ment relations), all other relations can be seen in the same light.Th us, the Co m m on Agricultural Policy emerges as a policy aim edat imp osing on the weaker countr ies outs ide the EU a depe nde nttype of agricul tural development . The Schengen System can beseen as regulating the repro ductio n of EU labour po wer accordingto the need ofthe EU itself. And the Western European U nion canbe seen as an attempt by the EU to develop its own military armin order fully to fulfil its own imperialist urge. These aspects willbe discussed in the following sections. This section deals withEU imperia l ism with the ACP countr ies and the CEEC in theindustr ia l sphere . Let us begin with the AC P co untr ies .

EU trade an d aid relations with the ACP countries are pa rticu-la r ly in te res t ing no t on ly because these count r ies encompassEuro pe's former colonies bu t also because they are the EU's m ostpreferred countries. After three decades of aid and preferentialt reatm ent , one wo uld expect these countr ies to have achieved atleast some measure of economic growth. But th is is far f romb e in g th e ca se . Or ig in a l ly , t h e R o me Trea ty p ro v id ed fo r aunilateral association betw een the EEC (and its m em be r states) an dthe overseas countrie s an d territories which were still colonies. Th e1960s were a pe riod of decolonis ation. T his called for a change inthe relation between the Co m m un ity an d the former colonies. Th eneed for a chan ge was s treng thene d by the UK accession w hichr a i s e d t h e i s su e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e e n l a r g e dCommuni ty and the Commonweal th count r ies . Even tua l ly , there la t ionsh ip be tween the C om m un i ty and i ts fo rmer co lon ieswas inst i tu tional ized by the Lom e Conv ention s. There have beenfour of them, in 1975,1980, 1985 and 1989. The last takes in 69cou ntries, or one third ofth e U N . It covers the 1990-2000 perio d.

A f i r s t fea tu re o f the Lome Convent ions i s ' deve lopment 'a id , basical ly grants , to the ACP countr ies . For the 1995-2000


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'System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings' , aims atcom pensating the ACP countries for the harmful effects of th einstability of export earnings for specified products. Whiledisbursement of Stabex monies under Lome I and II was notsubject to any qualifications, Lome III introduced some measureof conditionality and Lome IV tightens further this conditionality.It rules that p riority must be given to the sector which has beensubject to the loss of earnings. The use of the financial flow isallowed to promote diversification only if the difficulties in thatsector have been overcom e. Given the structural n ature of thosedifficulties, this condition is actually a prohibition to use Stabexfunds for diversification purposes.Sysmin stands for 'System for Stabilizing Minera ls'. It appliesto those ACP countries which are heavily dependent on themining sector and which are experiencing difficulties in thatsector. In this case, Sysmin makesfinancialassistance available tore-establish production at the old level, to rationalize, or todiversify. Sysmin is thus an instrument to continue the productionof colonies' minerals, an extremely important economic input forthe EU. H ere too, diversification is an empty word for the reasonsjust mentioned. Finally, structural adjustment defines a set ofpolicies aiming at reducing imbalances in the economy. Itemphasises long-term developm ent, accelerated growth of outputand employment, economic viability, and social tolerability.Any casual observer of aid and development policies knows thatsome of the money 'donated' by the centre must be used toreduce some of the intolerable consequences of the economicpolicies imposed by the centre upon the dominated block. Lomegrants, then, are crumb s which the EU gives back to the ACP inorder to keep the old colonial relations going. The fact thatgrants are being reduced indicates that the EU is losing interestin this kind of relations.

A second specific feature of the Lome Conventions is thepreferential treatm ent granted by the EU to exports from theACP countries. Practically all ACP exports, most of which areprimary commodities, enter the EU free of tariffs. The importanceof this treatment is revealed by the fact that ACP exports to the EU


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Contradictions o f European Integra tion 125

agricul tural expo rts , for mo re than tw o decades, AC P exports toEur ope have been d isappoin t ing . The i r share o f the EU m arke thas declined from 6.7% in 1976 to 3.4% in 1993, while developingcountr ies which have received less preferent ia l t reatment haveperformed more successful ly (Hewit t and Koning, 1996:63) . In1994 this share had further declined to 2.8 (European Centre forDe velopm ent Policy M ana gem ent , 1996: 21) . 'At the same t ime ,ACP count r ies remain heavi ly depe nden t on the EU marke t andhave failed to diversify their exports away from raw materialssuccessfully ' (H ew itt an d Ko nin g, 1996: 63) . Th ere have bee n afew cases of coun tries m ana ging to increase their share of expo rtsbu t it is dou bt fu l w he the r th is has bee n du e to p re fe ren t ia ltreatment. A first conclusion follows: the preferential system is atbest insufficient an d at w orst an obstac le to even a limited deg reeo f d ep e n d en t d ev e lo p m en t .

Th e case cou ld be different for the CE EC, even thou gh it is tooearly to discern clear an d lasting patte rns of dev elop m ent. U nd erc o l o n i a l i s m , t h e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a r e n e t i m p o r t e r s o fagricul tural goods and raw mater ia ls f rom, and net exporterso f i n d u s t r i a l g o o d s to , t h e d o min a ted co u n t r i e s . T h i s mo d e lcorresponds to a situation in which overproduction characterizeson ly the indus t r ia l sec to rs and no t the agr icu l tu ra l one . Thesi tuat ion exa m ined he re , on the oth er ha nd , is charac ter ized byan EU structural agricul tural surplus together with real izat ionprob lems in the manufac tu r ing sec to rs .

Consider agriculture first. In the 1990-1994 period, the EU haschanged from a net importer (Ecu -lbn in 1990) to a net exporter(Ecu +1.2bn in 1994) of agricul tural and food products . Theonly excep t ion to th is pa t te rn i s Romania . Th is i s due to anunch ange d vo lum e of EU im por ts f rom the CEEC and a t r ip ledvolume of EU expor ts to the CEEC. One cannot bu t wonder'whether the Association Agreements contribute to improving theCEEC food an d agricultural trade, or whethe r they merely protectthe CA P' (Bojnec, 1996: 452 ) . Th e CEEC 's agricul tural sec torseems to have joined the industrial one as functioning as a m arke tabsorb ing EU' s agr icu l tu ra l p roduc ts . On the o ther hand , theclassical pattern (greater imports than exports by the EU) emerges


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of commodities in the developed countries (the EU). This positivetrade balance results from a negative trade balance inmiscellaneous manufactured goods being more than counter-balanced by a greater positive balance in chemical products andmachinery and transport equipment (high technology goods).Moreover, the CEEC penetration of the EU market is due in agrowing measure to outward processing trade (OPT). This isthe processing by com panies in Eastern Europe of intermediateinputs for EU ente rpr ise .' These data would seem to indicate apattern of development based on

both im ports and exports of industrial goods with a netnegative balance of trade for the CEEC, and technologically less advanced production m ethods in thedependent countries.

The specific difference ofth is case is that the CEEC has alreadyachieved a relatively high degree of industrialization under theSoviet system. The question is whether these countries will be ableto retain (or even expand) it, thus undergoing a process ofdependent development, or will undergo a process of de-industrial isation, thus fall ing into some sort of colonialdomination.

Notice that the CEEC's increased exports to the EU are n ot theresult of increased productivity following shock therapy. Rather,they are the result of a re-direction ofthe CEEC exports towardsthe EU instead ofthe former CMEA (Council for MutualEconomic Assistance) countries. This re-direction of trade hasbeen made possible both by the lowering of Cold War tradebarriers in 1990-91, as part ofthe Association Agreementsbetween the EC and the CEEC, and by the disappearance oftheCMEA. This shows that the lack of penetration of CEEC'smanufactured goods into the EC was not due to low quality,poor m arketing, and so on, i.e. to the legacy of 'Com munism ', butto the EC's politically motivated protectionism (Cowan, 1995:21).The result ofthis re-direction of trade is a structural balance oftrade deficit with the EU. The three macroscopic examples arePoland (from Ecu +604m in 1988 to Ecu -1704m in 1994),Rom ania (from Ecu +1620m in 1988 to Ecu -134m in 1994) and


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an d har dsh ips as the examp les of the Mex ican crisis (see Carc hedi,1997) and of the Asian crisis have shown. Second, part of thisinflow is due to privatization receipts and thus no t re current.Third , the CEEC mu st sell domestic bo nds at high interest ratesin order to attract foreign capital. But, these capital intlow s mustbe sterilized in ord er to av oid inflationary pressures. Therefore,the CEEC mu st inv est this foreign exchange in low interestforeign government securities. The loss can be considerable.The subord ination of the CEEC to the EU is therefore ev ident notonly in term s of trade tlow s (large trade deficits expose the CEECto the dictate of the EU and of international organisations like theIMF and the World Bank) but also in terms of capital flow s.The dominant role played by Germany emerges in thiscontext. First, the primary EU trading partner of the CEEC isGermany. S econd, w ith A genda 2000, the Comm ission proposedin 199 7 to start negotiations w ith six of the elev en cou ntriesasking to join the EU. The fact that three of these six, CzechRepublic, Hungary, and Poland, border directly w ith Germanyand that Slovenia borders w ith Germ any's extension, A ustria,indicates the w eight Germ any has also on the new accessions,giv en Germ any's interest in not being the EU bord er n ation tothe East. '

To conclude, since the level of technological developmentof those CEEC countries w hich w ill achieve a measure of grow thand industrialization w ill be consistently less advanced than thatin the leading EU c oun tries, a constan t loss of value w ill beimplied in the sale of the former coun tries' comm odities to theEU, even in the absence of tariff barriers. Due to this structural lossof v alue, the CEEC w ill remain behind in the race tow ards capitalaccum ulation, thus rep roducing its ow n condition of relativeeconom ic and technological backw ardness (Carchedi, 199 1,chs.5 and 7). Therefore, both these countries' exports to andtheir imports from the leading EU countries will be primarilyconditioned by the level of saturation of the marke t of, and thusupon the econom ic cycle in, those EU countries. Their relativebackw ardness w ill call for low w ages. The loss of pu rchasingpow er and thus of consum ption capacity of the CEEC's masses,


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3. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)It is usually claimed that the 1958 Rome Treaty was a delicatebalance between the contrasting national interests of thecontracting parties. More specifically, the following points areemphasised. First, while Germany would have profited fromfree trade in industrial goods because of her higher industrialefficiency, France would have profited from free trade inagricultural goods due to her mo re productive agricultural sector.To level their respective com petitive positions, free trade in bothcategories of goods had to be introduced. Second, in 1958agriculture was a low productivity, low income occupation whichemployed 20% of the working population. Governments hadto aim at maintaining a certain level of stable prices while at thesame time stimulating production and productivity growth.Finally, memories of the famines of the Second World Warplayed a great role in creating the perception that Eu rope had tobecome self-sufficient in food production.

Here too a different reading, based on class analysis, helpsreveal the true nature of the project. As for the first point, theintroduction of agriculture in the com m on econom ic policy hadnoth ing to do with reasons of equity but was a necessary step forthe achievement of an integrated ec on om y.'' Secondly, the wishto provide a minim um income for European farmers was certainlynot mo tivated by reasons of social justice. Rather, the farmingcommunity formed a formidable lobby upon which rested thepower of the European governing parties, especially the ChristianDemocratic and other conservative parties. A certain measure ofguaranteed income (price support) for farmers was a verysensitive and importan t political issue in a political and ideologicalclimate dom inated by the Cold W ar. Finally, the real aim of self-sufficiency in food pro duc tion was not so mu ch the preven tionof famines (an objective valid in exceptional c ircum stances, likea war). Rather, an adequate supply of food, while in itself not afeature of imperialism, was and is an absolute precondition for animperialist policy.These interests shaped the aims of the CAP as set out in article


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a ims . It was only in 1962, wh en the m ark et orga nisa tion forcereals was introduced, that the CAP was started.As of now , price intervention has the following characteristics.

Given that the low level (relative to the European level) oftheworld m arket prices, the income of Euro pean farmers wo uld betoo low if they sold their prod uc ts at wo rld prices. This requiresan intervention price. This is the price which is guaranteed tofarmers. That is, the EU commits itself to buying (through itsinterve ntion offices) the farm ers' prod uc ts if farmers c an no tsell them at a higher price. It is thus the lowest limit at whichfarmers can sell their prod uce and therefore it corre spo nd s to agua ranteed inco m e. Farm ers can sell at a higher price, if dem andis sufficiently strong.

Given that intervent ion pr ices are higher than the worldm arket prices, traders could b uy at world m arket prices and sellwithin the EU at the intervention prices, thus m aking an unlim itedand certain profit at the cost of the agricultural budge t. To av oidthis, a threshold price, higher than the intervention price isneeded . This is the price at which good s can be im ported into theEU an d is equal to the w orld m arket price plus a levy. In this way,EU farmers are protected against foreign com petit ion .

The surplus bought by the intervention offices of the EU isstored and eventually sold on the world market. In this case,the EU incu rs a loss equ a l to the d i f fe rence be tw een theintervention price (which it pays the farmers) and the worldm arket price (at which it sells these prod uc ts) . This is broad lyequal to the import levy. Alternatively, the surplus can be soldabro ad b y the farmers (traders) them selves. In this case the EUpays them an export refund equal to the difference between theinternal market price (which in this case coincides broadly withthe intervention price) and the world m arket price. Given that, in1996, 48% ofthe tota l EU budget went to agr icul tura l pr icesupport, one wonders how the official literature can argue witha straight face that the EU is an an ti-pro tectio nis t organisa tion.''^

In and of itself, pro t ec t ion i sm i s no t an e l emen t o f animperialist policy. It can indeed b e a dep end ent cou ntry 's defenceinstrument against imperialist relat ions. The case of the EU,


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most powerful critic ofthe CAP (as revealed by an analysis ofth eKennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds), protectionism is anelement of the intra-imperialist rivalry within an imperialistcentre structured in a hierarchy of imperialist powers (seeespecially section 4 below).

In the course ofthe years the CAP has gone through differentchanges. These changes have been fuelled basically by fourreasons. First, the costs of financing it have increased over theyears and would become too onerous with the accession oftheCEEC. Second, since 1989, the 'com m unist thre at' has receded ,so that agricultural votes, while still important, have lost theircentrality for conservative parties. Third, the protectionist natureof the C AP, while the lesser of two evils in the first years of theEuropean Com mon Market (see endnote 2 on the interests o ftheUSA in re-building Euro pe's econom ic pow er), has becom e toomuch of an hindrance for foreign competitors, especially forthe USA, now that the EU has becom e a formidable com petitor.And fourth, due to the numerous modifications to the originalprice support and the introduction of experimental and ad hocschemes, the administration ofth e CAP has becom e increasinglycomplex and fraud-ridden.

Due to these reasons, starting from 1992, the interventionprices have been subjected to redu ctions. However, in ord er notto inden t farmers' incomes too drastically, these price reductionsare offset by direct income payments to farmers. For cereals,these paym ents are m ade conditional up on the farmers agreeingto set aside a certain percentage ofthe land on which they wouldotherwise cultivate their arable crops.'^ Set-aside areas may notbe used for the production of either human or animal food.However, other uses are allowed. It has been estimated that by1994-95,12.25% of useful acreage was purposely not cultivated(Tracy, 1996: 2 0) and that prod uctio n had fallen by 6% to 7%relative to the average ofth e three years prior to the reform.

We can now assess briefly the 'rationality' ofthe CAP. A firstadvantage ofthe system, its supporters argue, is that it has greatlystimulated food produc tion and consu m ption. In the last twentyyears, the percentage of househo ld expend iture on foodstuffs has


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imperialist nature of the relations between the EU and other(dominated) food producers. Without high threshold pricesthat percentage w ould have fallen even m ore .

A second cou nter-arg um ent is that the im portation of foodby the EU from the dominated countries implies the use ofthose coun tries' soil for EU food c onsu mption . Conversely, theexportation of food by the EU to the dominated countriesimplies the use of EU soil for those coun tries. If we consider thetrade in grain, rice, potatoes, sugar, and vegetables (EU products)and in citrus fruits, bananas, soya beans, tapioca, molasses,coffee beans, cocoa beans, sunflower seeds, palm oil, cotton, tea,tobacco, groun dnuts, and natural rubber (the products ofth edominated countries), then it has been estimated that the EU uses228,000 km^ ofthe dominated countries' soil for EU foodprod uctio n and that those cou ntries use 97,000 km^ of EU soilfor their food production (Friends ofthe Earth Europe, 1995,table 3.13 of Supplem ent). The EU on the one h and produc esagricultural surpluses (a part of which goes to the dominatedcountries) while on the othe r hand uses a net 130,000 km^ ofth edom inated countries' soil (the size of Greece) for the productionof food for its own consu mption. Th is soil could be (and mostlywas, previously) used for food production in the dominatedcountries.

Second, it is held by the CAP supporters that the CAP hasfostered the ration alisation of agriculture , i.e., bigger farm sizesand thus greater productivity. Moreover, productivity has alsoincreased by 5% to 7% due to the setting aside of the lessproductive land. Again this might be the case. However, inasmuchas the CAP raises prices, it favours the more productive, i.e.,usually the larger, farmers, due to their larger ou tpu t per unit ofcapital invested. Inasmuch as it lowers prices, it hits the lowproductivity farmers more than the more efficient ones, due to theformer's reduced profit margins and thus due to the meagrefinances they can draw upon in case of economic difficulties.Thus, positive price movements favour larger producers morethan smaller ones and negative price movements hit smallerproducers more than larger ones. This results in concentration


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farms (1 to 10 ha) and of middle-sized farms (10 to 50 ha)accompanied by a growth in the number of large farms (largerthan 50 ha). As a result, '75 per cent of all European agriculturalproduce now comes from 25 per cent of its farms' (Middleton,O'Keefe, and Moyo, 1993:127). Rationalisation and high internalfood prices are thus two sides ofth e same coin.

Third, as a result ofthe 1992 reforms, the supporters ofthesystem argue, surpluses have heen substantially reduced: in 1995agricultural stocks were 28,000 tons , less than a week's production,wheat stocks had dropped from 25 million tons in 1990 to 5million tons, and beef stocks had fallen to less than 5% ofproduc tion (European Comm ission, 1996:10). The point whichis usually forgotten is that EU farmers are being paid in orde r no tto produce food w ithin the context of growing poverty within theEU and growing hunger in the w orld.'^

W hat would be mo re obvious than distributing the surplusesto the poor? Yet, this is hardly an option within the capitalistinstitutional context. If surpluses (either actually produced orpotential) were to be distributed freely to the needy within the EU,the demand for these products would decrease thus causingincreasing surpluses and intervention costs. Eor this reason,only a minim al pa rt of agricultural surpluses can be disposed ofin this way. Two figures help put the question in its properperspective. In the nine years since 1987, almost Ecu lb n wo rthof foodstuffs has been distributed to the poor ofthe EU (EuropeanCom mission, 1996: 9). This is less than 2.5% of th e Gu aranteesection ofthe EAGGE (more than Ecu 40 billion) for only oneyear, 1996. Such small quantities do not affect demandsignificantly and have n o effect on in tervention costs.

Surpluses cann ot be given to the po or o fthe world either. Itcould be argued tha t inasm uch as these food staples were givenfor free to the poorest of the world, who have no purchasingpower anyway, world market prices would not, or would onlyminimally, be affected. Why, then, is this option not pursued? Thereason is that it is economically less convenient to give surplusesaway than to sell them on the world m arket. T his loss would becom pound ed by transport and distribution costs in the receiving


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Co ntradictions of Europ ean Integration 133

M oreov er, one has to ask the question of wh o bears the costsof food aid. These are financed through appropriation of valuefrom the EU's citizens, for example through taxation. Thus, tocom e to the rescue of millions of starving people wou ld requ ireactive pursuance of the principle of equitable distribution andsolidarity am ong the world's peoples: the EU would sup port i tsfarmers in order for them to prod uce for the do m inated coun tries,the costs ofthis operation being born e by the EU taxpayers. Butthis would be contrary both to the way the capital ist systemworks, which is based on com petition rather than coo peration, andto the nature o fthe relations between the imperialist centre and thedom inated bloc. W ithin these relations, the centre app ropriatesvalue (including food) from the dominated countries obviouslynot in orde r to give it back to the m . If value flows the oth er w ay,it is because it is either invested o r loaned , no t given away. W ithinthese relations, the centre can give back only a minimal part ofwhat it takes away from the dom inated bloc (e.g. developm ent aid).Only a major chang e in the Europ ean labouring classes' conscious-ness wo uld m ake a massive prog ram of food aid possible.

The CAP is a true child of capitalist rationality. On the oneha nd it rationalises Euro pea n ag riculture, thu s leading to higherproductivity, greater concentration and centralisation (i.e., largerfarm holdings), and higher profi ts for the larger productionunits. On the other hand, it creates abund ance amidst poverty andopulenc e amidst starvation bo th w ithin itself and , mu ch m ore so,vis-a-vis the dom inated coun tries. But, m ore im portantly for thepresent discussion, the CAP is a instrum ent of EU im perialism inthat it forces the food producing countries not only to lose apart ofth e value of those p rodu cts in the process of exchange b utalso to adapt their agricultural production to the EU internalma rket rather than to their own internal needs.

4. The com m on m ilitary policy

While, within the EU, one nation is predominant in economicpow er,'^ the same cann ot be said of military power. On a m ilitary


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i.e., from the first post W.W.II defence treaty. In 1948, theBrussels Treaty was signed establishing the West European Union(WEU). Its members were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, theNether lands , and the Uni ted Kingdom. I t s purpose wascollaboration in economic, social and cultural matters andcollective self-defence: in the case of a member state being theobject of a military attack, the other members would have to'afford the Party so attacked all the m ilitary and o ther aid andassistance in their power' (art.5). Also, in 'recognizing theundesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO' theWEU pledged to rely 'on the appropriate military authoritiesof NATO for information and advice on military matters ' (art.4).The W EU, thus, was born as the European pillar of NA TO.

This was not sufficient for France, which has traditionallybeen the supporter of a European Defence project (relatively)independent from US hegemony. In the 1950-54 period, attentionin France focused on a new project, the European DefenceCommunity (EDC) which was advocated by the Pleven Plan(whose author was Jean Monnet). The proposal provided for aEuropean Army under NATO run by a European Minister ofdefence and the Council of Ministers, with a joint commander,common budget and common arms procurement. AU participantmemb er states, except Germ any, could keep their national forcesapart from the European A rmy for colonial and oth er pu rposes.It was a proposal to rearm Germany (a need dictated by theCold W ar) without re-establishing a German army.

This scheme was contrasted by De Gaulle's vision of 'anintegrated European army retaining a multiplicity of nationalcommands' (Howorth, 1997: 13). In spite of these differences,both plans shared a common feature, the belief that 'Europecould not be Europe without its own army' (op.cit: 12). In theevent, the attempt to set up the EDC was shipwrecked on the 31stof August 1954 as a result of rejection by the French Parliam ent.Consequen tly, Germany joined the WEU in 1954 and N ATO in1955.'^ As for de Gaulle's superpower ambitions, they wereaborted given that they were not shared by other NATOEuropean states.


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pred eces sor, th en , the 1954 Tre aty was only a pale version of theED C and sanctioned de facto N A TO, and thus U S , hegem ony. TheWE U led a dorm ant existence u ntil the early 1980s when interestin it re-awoke partly as a response to the 'E u rom issiles' crisissparked by N A TO 's D ecem ber 1979 dec ision to dep loyinterm ediate nu clear force (IN F) weapons in E u rope. However,as long as the 'Soviet threa t' was present, the short term fear ofweakening N A TO by streng thening the WE U weig hed m ore thanthe long term advantage of having a m ore independent E u ropeanm ilitary arm . With the fall oft he Berlin wall, one shou ld haveexpected a sm aller role for N A TO and a g reater role for the WE U.Yet, as we shall see shortly, this has not been the case.

The declaration ofthe WE U M em ber States at the M aastrichSum m it of 1991 reads as follows: 'The objective is to bu ild u pWE U in stages as the defence com ponent ofthe E u ropean Union.To this end, WE U is prepared, at the requ est of the E u ropeanUnion, to elaborate and im plem ent decisions and actions oftheUnion w hich have defence im pl icat ion s ' . The Petersbergdeclaration of 1992 extends the scope ofthe operations to'hu m anitarian and rescu e tasks; peacem aking tasks; tasks ofcom bat forces in crisis m anag em ent, inclu ding peacem aking ' .This indicates a considerably wider scope for the WEU thansim ply defence. However, as the Maastricht declaration adds, 'Theobjective is to develop WE U as a m eans to streng then theE u ropean pil lar of th e A t lantic A l l iance . . . WE U will act inconform ity with the positions adop ted in the A tlantic A lliance'.The WE U is developing its act, bu t within the lim its of a persistingde facto su bordination to N A TO and thu s to the US. '*

Two factors help explain this persisting weakness. The first isthe division within the WEU itself, i.e. , am ong its m em ber states,concerning the role ofthe WE U and its relation to N A TO . Thekey aspect of this divergence of opinion is British reticence todevelop an au tonom ou s E u ropean m ilitary power. The UK hasalways been for m ili tary co-op eration bu t ag ainst m ili taryinteg ration.'^ There are historical and ideolog ical reasons for this,as for exam ple Britain's fear of losing its national sovereig nty orBritain's 'choice, m ade at the end ofth e Second W orld War, to


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residue of an historical phase when Britain was a great im perialpower. This is an example of how ideologies can survive theeconomic situation which determined them in thefirstplace. Thereason this ideology has survived the imperial age is that itdefended, and still defends, the interests of the weakest sectors ofBritish capital. These are sectors which stand to lose the m ost fromever stricter forms of European economic integration and w hichuse the argument of a loss of national sovereignty as an ideologicalweapon against joining (before 1973) or deepening (after thatdate) the scope of European econom ic integration.

As for Britain' attempt to retain the status of a great power,originally Britain had very specific economic interests first innot joining the EEC and then in joining it in 1973. While,originally, it thought it could gain the m ost from a free trade area,shortly after the formation of EFTA it realised that both tradeflows and capital concentration and centralisation dem andedaccession to the EEC. However, Britain wanted and still wants torestrict the scope of economic integration because full integrationwould be in the interests neither of the less advanced sectors of itsindustrial capital no r of its financial capital. Concerning Britishfinancial capital, consider the EMU. W ithin an EMU the poundwould be absorbed into the Euro, i.e., into a currency m anagedaccording the criteria reflecting, even though in a mediated way,the interests of German oligopoly capitaF" and London wouldhave to play a subordinate role both economically in generaland more specifically in fmancial markets. An independentEuropean military force would be a strong factor pushing towardssome sort of a (federalist) European state and thu s towards a fulleconomic integration of the UK within the EU. This explainsBritain's opposition to making the WEU an incisive militaryforce.^' However, as we shall see in a m om ent, the m om entu mimpressed by the EMU to the process of integration might renderthis policy obsolete.

It is in this light that the negotiations preceding the 1997Amsterdam Treaty (the Intergovernmental Conference) whichtackled the question of the WEU can be seen. The UK was infavour of keeping the WEU under, and as an autonom ous arm of,


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Moreover , the European Par l iament was aga ins t re ta in ing thethree pillars an d wo uld ha ve liked to brin g the CESP (as well as thelustice and H o m e Affairs) un de r the EC. This, it was held, w ou ldhave stimulated the formation of a common foreign policy whichat present is pract ical ly non exis tent (as the recent fa i lure tointervene in ex-Yugoslavia show s). At the same t im e, th is wo uldhave increased the democratic content of EU foreign policy. Theoutcom e ofthe Am sterdam Treaty has been that the W EU has no tbeen in tegrated in to the EU, contrary to the wishes of Francean d G erm any , du e to Britain's op pos ition . It is, how ever, doubtfiilw heth er this policy will be sustain able in the long ru n (see belo w ).

The second reason for the WEU's weakness is the obviouslysuperior US military might. Rather than imposing its will directly,the USA manifests its military superiority through NA TO. NATOwas founded in 1949, officially to contain Soviet expansionism butactually to contribute, through i ts mili tary power, to thedestru ction o ft h e Soviet U nion . In 19 9 1, with the fall anddissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO suddenly found itselfwithout an enemy. It would seem that this would have p rovidedan opportun ity for the WEU do grow in importance. In fact, it canbe reasonably argued that, before the fall of the Soviet Union, suchgrowth would have weakened NA TO, and this was somethingwhich the European nations did not want, given that only the USAhad the m ilitary pow er to face the USSR . Th us , after thedissolution ofth e USSR , one would have expected an increasedinterest in a stronger role for a European military power. Yet,NA TO's influence has increased rather than decreased. There areat least three ways in which the USA can exercise ( thus revealing)its military superiority over the WEU throug h N AT O.

The first s related to the failure of the strategy advocated by theEU and the UN in former Yugoslavia. This strategy was based onnegotiations with all the interested parties and on the deploym entof UN troops, mostly European soldiers. When this strategyfailed, the USA imposed its military option based on air raidson Serb positions and on the imposition ofthe Dayton agreementof Decem ber 15, 19 9 5. Thro ugh the failure of th e Euro peanstrategy, NATO has become the military arm ofthe UN (Lo Stato


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groups have been institutionalised in January, 1994, during theNATO sum mit, and ratified at the Berlin NA TO sum mit of June3,1996. The b reakthrough was that it was agreed that the W EUcountries could carry out military operations decided within theframework of the WEU and the Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE)^^ by using NATO infrastructure(possibly without the participation of the USA). As officialstatements pu t it, the basis has been laid for the development of theEuropean security and defense identity (ESDJ). ^ But it is clear thatEurope's independence remains very limited, given that it isNATO which provides the operational structure and whichmaintains its watching brief over those developments. In terms ofpower relations, the USA can control, and has a veto right on, anymilitary EU initiative.

The second way in which the USA shows its military might overthe WEU derives from the recent agreement between NATO andRussia to start cooperating in the political and military spheres. InMay, 1997, the 'Founding Act on M utual Relations, Cooperationand Security between NATO and the Russian Federation' wassigned. This is not a binding treaty (something Russia had hopedfor) but simply a commitment between heads of state and ofgovernment. Russia and NATO will sit on a permanent jointcommittee but NATO will take decisions on its own in case ofemergency and crisis situations. Clearly, Russia has accepted aposition of subordination relative to NATO. This reduces theinfluence of OSCE, which both Russia and many European stateswould like to see strengthened . The reason, obviously, is that theUSA has greater influence within N ATO than within OSCE.^''Finally, the third way US military superiority, and the WEU'sdependence is revealed, is NATO's policy towards the CEECon the one hand and the Arab countries on the other. ConcerningNA TO 's expansion to the East, Poland, the Czech Republic, andHungary have already become NATO mem bers. Other m embersof CEEC will follow suit. The specific aim of this policy is toextend the US sphere of influence from the military to theeconomic one , thus counter ing the EU's (and especia l lyGermany's) economic ties with these countries. The means


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Co ntradictions of Europ ean Integration 139

to replace the Soviet M ig. A new, colossal, busine ss is thu s b eingopened for the American mili tary-industria l complex, whichalready controls half of the world trade in arm am ents . M oreover,once these weapons have been acquired, more will have to bespent on maintenance, spare parts , and replacements . Giventhat these countries lack the funds for such huge exp end itures,they will have to resort to US credit , thus increasing theireconom ic dependen ce upon the USA (Dinucci , 1998: 26). Thesame will hold for R ussia, as soon as its hug e, 'obsole te' w eapo nryhas to be replaced.

As for the A rab co untrie s, US policies are aimed at oil reservesin the Gulf. Even though the USA is the second oil producerafter Saudi Arabia, it has reserves which, at the present pace ofcon sum ption , are estim ated to last only 10 years. Saudi Arabia'sreserves, on the con trary, can last 80 years and Iraq's 10 years. Butthis is no t the only factor. Ab out 57% of M iddle East oil exp ortsgoes to the Asian cou ntries (of which 25% to Japan) an d 25% toW estern E urope . Thu s control of these reserves is of fundam entalstrategic im portan ce for the US to retain eco nom ic and m ilitaryleadership on all cou ntries, in cludin g its allies (op.cit p.27 ). Thisexplains N A TO 's policies in the M iddle East, including replacing'com m un ism ' with 'Arab fundam entalism' as the new menace toworld peace and dem ocracy.

A s a r e s u l t o f t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s , N A T O ' s p o l i t i c a lconno tation has undergo ne a change. W hile, up to the end ofth e1980s, its basic function was perceived as being o ne of'd efe nc e'against the 'com m un ist th reat ' , with the fall ofthe Soviet Unio nN A TO 's new image is that of prov iding global 'security ' for the' international community ' , including protection against 'Arabfundam entalism'. This includes preventing wars between states,r e i n s t i t u t i n g d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s w h i c h h a v e b e e nover thrown and fac i l i ta t ing the downfa l l o f 'undemocra t icgov ernm ents'. Of course, NA TO itself decides which wars sho uldbe prevented a nd which governm ents are dem ocratic . NA TO isnow b eing projected in the w orld 's collective consciousness as theguaran tor of world d emo cracy, peace, and order. It has emergedin the 1990s stronger than ever. This, together w ith the W EU 'sinner w eakness, are the two elem ents preve nting an y projects, like


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might matches and further propels its economic strength.However, an important factor making for this weakness, i.e.,the reluctance of the UK to proceed towards greater politicaland military integration, is being eroded by economic forcesand might come to an end sooner than one might expect. Forexample, the awareness is growing that no single European stockmarket (including London) is sufficiently large to compete withother, m uch greater, stock exchanges. The following m akes thispoint crystal clear: 'The stock markets of the 11 euro-countriesand Britain were valued at some $5.5 trillion at the end of last year[i.e. 1997, B. and G. C ] , half as big as the entire US market andmore than twice the size of the Japanese market...But thepotential for growth is huge. The European economy is slightlylarger than America 's . . .and EU governments are l ikely toprivatise thou sands of compan ies worth as much as $300 billionin coming years' (Buerkle, 1998).

Consolidation is thus mandatory. It is not by chance thatLondon has sought an alliance with Frankfurt (the financialheart of Germ an capital and , not by chance, the site of the ECB)as a first step tow ards developing a single system for trading thestocks of the largest 300 European companies. Eventually, theother European exchanges will have to join them in what willbecom e a single European equity trading system. Its advantageswill be greater liquidity, possibly lower interest rates, lowertransaction costs, and the elimination of exchange-rate risks forinvestors. The reward will be in terms of commissions andcharges. W ith the introduc tion of the Euro , investments will befacilitated, as fund managers will be able to com pare corp orateearnings statements of enterprises in different countries in termsof just one currency. It is worth noting that the chief executive ofthe London Stock Exchange declared that L ondon 'would evenswitch to quoting stocks in Euros if a majority of its memberssupported such a change' (ibid). This would be an importantfactor p ushing for the introduction of the Euro in the UK. Forsimilar reasons, the UK will sooner or later have to join theEMU . At this point its attitude towards a com mon military forcemight change. This, inasmuch as it would result in an integratedand relatively autonomous m ilitary capability, would m ake of the


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5. Schengen and EU immigration policyImm igration has played a central role in Euro pe's post-W .W .IIeconom ic reco nstruction, basically by supplying cheap labourpower under conditions of vigorous growth. This, it is held,kept wages low and increased profitability, thus spurringeconomic growth and the creation of new jobs. As we shall see,this thesis is mistaken. It is also held that in the early 1970s,due to rising wages, growth subsided and was followed by aperiod of economic depression, crises, and high unemployment;thus, calls for wage con tainm ent and for the (forced) repa triationof imm igrants have grown stron ger. We shall see that this thesistoo is wrong. Unfortunately, w ide strata ofthe European w orkingclass have accepted the argument that (forced) repatriation offoreign labourers would both free more jobs for theauto chth ono us labourers and drive their wages upw ards as wellas the arg um ent that lower wages will increase profitability andinvestment, thus spurring growth and employment. Bothargu m ents are intuitively appealing, given that the basic tenetsof orthod ox economics have been accepted by large num bers ofpeople, but they are nevertheless wrong. Common sense issometimes common nonsense.

Eirst, the repatriation of foreign workers would seem toincrease the possibility for au toch thon ous workers to find jobs.This might be the case for some, but on the whole, given highunemployment rates, repatriation would only decrease thenumber ofthe unemployed without providing a stimulus for thecreation of new jobs. Second, given tha t usually foreign workershold low paid jobs, inasmuch as they would be replaced byautochthonous workers, wages for the latter would fall, ratherthan increase. It could be objected that a lower labour supplywould allow the autochthonous workers to demand higherwages. This might be so, but, and this is the third poin t, there isno au toma tic relationship between lower supply of labour andhigher wages. The simple fact that the areas of out-migrationremain low-wage and relatively underdeveloped (such as theItalian M ezzogiorno ) is sufficient to prove this poin t. Rather, it


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and ideological subordination, a lower labour supply mightleave wages unaffected.

Fourth, and most importantly, even if the wages of theemployed and the jobs for the unemployed autochthonousworkers were initially to increase due to the repatriation offore ign workers , th is shor t- te rm improvement wouldsubsequently disappear. Once the 'positive' effect for the au toch -thon ous workers (higher wages and lower unem ploym ent) w asover, more unemployment would follow due to the innerdynamics of the capitalist economy, i.e., due to its tendencytowards recurring crises. ^ At this point, no t only would there beno foreign w orkers left to blame but also labour's fighting powerwould have been greatly weakened since labour would haveaccepted capital's view of crises and economic reality. In otherwords, labour w ould have accepted capital's view that unemploy-ment and crises are caused either by 'too high wages' or by 'toohigh labour supp ly', thus by labour rather then by capital.

Higher wages increase the masses' purchasing power butdecrease profits, while lower wages have the opposite effect thusultimately reducing profits through lower sales. The level ofwages can only modify the shape of the cycle bu t is neither thecause of crises nor is it their remedy. This conclusion is significantfor foreign labour. If, in neo-classical fashion, low wageswere theway out of crises (via high profitability, investments, growth,and employment), it would make sense to expel foreign labour (inorder to reduce the cost of labour, such as old age pensions,educational and health facilities, etc.) while at the same timeclamping down on wage rates. If, in Keynesian fashion, highwages were the way ou t of crises (via greater purchasing powerand d em and stimu lation), it would make sense to expel foreignlabour (in order to decrease labour supply and increase thenegotiating power ofthe autoch thonous workers) while increasingwage rates. In both cases, one would have found the economicrationale for the expulsion of foreign labour and thus for thecontradictory objective interests between the two sectors ofEuropean labour.If, on the contrary, crises cannot be dealt with by manipulating


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autochthonous workers ( running f rom expul s ion , t o l eve l o fwages, to exi t ing the crisis) is thu s show n to be a m yth b ased ono r t h o d o x e c o n o m i c a n a ly s is . A c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c a n o n s o for thodox economics cannot bu t l ead to the acceptance of then o t i o n t h a t t h e a u t o c h t h o n o u s a n d t h e f o r e i g n s e c t o r s o fEuropean labour have cont radictory interests . This goes a longway in explaining lab ou r ' s s tar t l ing inabi l ity to deve lop i t s ownstrategy.

If this is the case, the ob ject ive rea son s for a policy base d onsol idarity between the different sectors of the Eu rop ean wo rkingclass can be discerned. If repatriation is not (part of) the solution,the au to chth ono us wo rkers ' (and thus l abour ' s ) s tra tegy shouldfocus on f ight ing for more j obs w i t h i n t he con t ex t o f neweconom i c r e l a t i ons r a t he r t han on taking away exi s t ing jobsf rom fore ign wo rkers . I t is by oppo s ing repa t r i a t ion , an d bydeveloping arguments against it , that labour can find the objectivereasons for a pol icy based on sol idari ty and equal i ty . Moralarguments, important as they are, are not sufificient. For Europe'sl abour , rep a t r i a t ion of foreign wor kers i s bo th econ om ica l lyuseless and ideological ly self-defeat ing.Ha ving establ ished b oth th e object ive basis an d the need forsol idari ty between autochthonous and foreign workers within theEU, le t us consider some of the problems speci f ic to foreignlabour wi th in the EU and c onc om i tan t s t ra t eg ies .

A first specific problem concerns the EU's democratic deficit.This is the very restricted decision m aking power o fthe EuropeanParliament, compared to the member states' Parliaments. Inspite of the Amsterdam treaty, decision making power restsbasically with the European Council, the Council of Ministers, andthe Co mmission. Labo ur's ability to influence European laws istherefore far less than (the already restricted) similar powerswithin the member states. This deficit is accentuated for EUimmigrants. Article 8 ofthe Treaty on European Union (TEU)states that every person holding the nationality of a MemberState is a citizen ofthe Un ion. This confers the right to m ove andreside freely within the territory of the Member States,^* theright to vote and to stand in municipal and European Parliament


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language and institutions, and (2), by tbeir partly justified fear touse, or uneasiness in m aking use of, those facilities.

Tbese difficulties are compounded for non-EU immigrants.Tbe TEU excludes from tbe above m ention ed limited rights tbenine m illion legally resident tbird-w orld citizens witbin tbe EU,not to mention illegal immigrants. Tbese bave been called tbeEU's sixteenth Member State. Moreover, tbe TEU makescitizensbip of tbe Union dependent upon holding a MemberState's nationality. It therefore makes the enjoyment of tbeselimited rigbts dependent upon national legislations which arebasically aimed at excluding im migrants from nationality.

Exclusion from labour's organisations and more generallyfrom civil and political rights forces foreign workers intoi l legal i ty . This makes them easy prey for unscrupulousentrepre neurs who can use them to blackmail and w eaken thenegotiating power of the legally resident and autochthonousworkers.^'' Labour should d em and EU citizenship for all legalimm igrants as well as quick and tran sparent procedu res for thelegalisation of illegal immigrants. These demands should beframed within a perspective stressing egalitarianism, solidarity,and self-management.

A second specific problem, concerns tbe immigrants' right toentry into the EU. A policy of closed do ors does not m ean thatimmigration has stopped. W hat it means is that legal immigrationhas drastically fallen while illegal immigration continues dueboth to the push from the desperate masses ofthe less developedcountries and to the pull of those EU enterprises which cansurvive only thanks to higher than norm al rates of surplus value.This holds for all EU countries even if in different degrees.Traditional countries of emigration, like Greece, Portugal, Spain,and Italy, have turned into immigration as well as emigrationcountries. Italy and Spain were estimated in 1995 to host over onemillion workers each from non M emb er States and Greece over500,000 illegal immigran ts (Geddes, 1995: 201).

It was m ention ed earlier that the result of an inflow or of anoutflow of labour on wages and unemployment depends on thepower relations between capital and labour. These relations are


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into the s truggle for jobs and higher wages within a social is tperspective, then not only will the socialist project be furtheredin each m em be r state, no t only will lab ou r be free from capital 'sb l a c k m a i l , b u t a l s o t h i s p o l i c y w i l l h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t ointernational solidarity, thus reinforcing the socialist project inthe host country . Labour should foster a pol icy of open doorsa im ed a t i n t e g ra t in g im m ig ra n t s i n i ts p ro j e c t o f so c i a l i s tdevelopment. This policy implies a wider one, stressing the needt o e l i m i n a t e t h e c a u s e s o f f o r c e d m i g r a t i o n f r o m n o n - E Uco u n t r i e s , su ch a s mass iv e a id p ro g rams fo s t e r in g so c ia l i s tecon om ic g rowth in those count r ies . The conc re te shape tha t apolicy of open doors might take wil l depend on the concreteco nd itio ns un de r which it will be fought for. All tha t can be saidnow is that it might have to be regulated in order to allow the hostco un try to crea te the necessary facilit ies for this policy to be ru naccording to social is t organisat ional pr inciples .

A third specific problem c o n c e r n s t h e criminalisation ofimmigration in the EU. Art ic le 7 o f the Schengen Ag reem entment ions in one b rea th the need to p ro tec t the Member S ta tes'against i l legal immigration and against activities which mightendanger secur i ty ' (Trac ta tenb lad der Koninkr i jk der Neder -landen, 1985). Following the same approach, the TEU deals withasylum, internal migration, and imm igration from third countries,in article K.I, the same art ic le which deals with combating drugad d ic t io n an d t r a f f i ck in g , f r au d o n an in t e rn a t io n a l s ca l e ,t e r r o r i s m , a n d o t h e r s e r i o u s f o r m s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m e .M oreover , the TEU , while forbidding discr iminat ion on gro und sof nat ional i ty (for M em be r States ' nat ion als) in ar t ic le 6 and ongro un ds of sex in ar t ic le 119, doe s not forbid disc r im inat io n onethnic or racial grounds. Even the Social Charter declares in itsp r e a m b l e t h a t ' it is i m p o r t a n t t o c o m b a t e v e r y f o r m o fd isc r im ina t ion ' bu t m ent ion s expl ic i tly on ly ' d i sc r imina t ion ongro un ds of sex, colour, race, op inio ns an d beliefs ' thu s forgettinge t h n ic d i s c r im i n a t i o n ( C o m m i s s i o n o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o m -m unit ie s , 1990) . Th e resul ts of th is app roa ch are disastro us.

Firs t , extensive pol icy measures and instruments have beenand are being developed in order to deal with imm igrat ion (both


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of movement for all nationals ofthe signatory Member States,other Member- States, and th ird countries. At the sam e time , theAgreement aimed at coordinating the fight against crime. TheAgreement w a s an intergovernmental pact which neither requiredparliamentary involvement no r laid down the arrangements an dguarantees for implementation. The latter was the task of theSchengen Convention, signed by the same five States on 19 June1 9 9 0 , which is subject to par l iam en tary ra tification. TheCon vention also amend s the relevant national laws.^'

An im portant part ofthe system of control set out in Schengenis the Schengen Information System (SIS), as codified in articles92 to 119 ofth e Schengen C onven tion. The SIS is centred uponfeeding information into, and retrieving information from, ac e n t r a l c o m p u t e r ( th e 't e c h n i c a l s u p p o r t f u n c t io n ') l o c a te d inStrasbourg. The purpose ofthis is to collect a ll information neededto Strengthen internal control concerning not only, for instance,stolen cars and passp orts, but also personal da ta for each citizenofthe Union committing an offence an d for unwanted foreigners.Art. 94 ofthe Schengen Conven tion accepts the recom mendationofthe Council of Europe (Convention of 28 January 1981 forthe Protection of Individuals with regard to Autom atic Processingof Personal Data) and therefore prohibits the collection of data onreligious conviction, political affiliation, race, and sexual pre-disposition. However, these safeguards are greatly weakened by therecommendation itself which allows for the collection of these dataif necessary for the purposes ofth e inquiry (Bunyan, 1 9 9 3 : 2 6 ) . Atthe same time, control on non-EU immigrants is sharpened,'fuelled perhaps by the increasing severity of certain nationalpolicies towards im migran ts, which in turn may be being pushedby the recent rising levels of xenophobia, if not by extremenationalism' (Convey and Kupiszewski, 1995:942-3).

While the danger exists that autochthonous workers mightaccept heightened b arriers for non -EU citizens in exchange fortheir own greater freedom of movement (the aim indicated byarticle 7 ofthe Schengen A greemen t is the abolition of internalfrontiers and their displacement to the external frontiers), thepoin t is that both this greater freedom of internal m igration and


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Con tradictions of Euro pean Integration 147

capital which defines who is an illegal immigrant. This is notonly the drug dealer and s imilar delinquents but a lso thoseimm igrants who can not be used (any mo re) by capital. In short,capital needs free mobility of people as labour power and thusonly inasmuch as the mov em ent of labour pow er back and forthacross national frontiers is convenient for capital itself ratherthan for (autochthonous and foreign) labour.

Check ing, controlling, and pre venting illegal im m igration isa costly affair. The costs of these repressive measures both forautochthonous and foreign workers have not been estimatedbut they mig ht well exceed whatever expenses the Union m ightwant to bear in order to host immigrants (and it is on thesecosts that argum ents against a policy of open do ors rest). But evenif these expenses were minimal (which is far from being thecase) the fact that control and repression has been chosen insteadof reception and care is a clear indicator that these measuresreflect the freedom that capital needs, not the freedom thatlabour (especially ' illegal ' im m igrants) need s.

M oreover, as Geddes rem arks, if im m igration is construed asa criminal problem , then not only are anti-im m igration policieslegitimated at national and supranational level but also groupsadvocating racis t ideologies are drawn closer to mainstreampolitical debate (G edde s, 1995: 207 -8). This m ight be a factorexplaining why the EU has developed no legal provis ions a tsupran ational level to counter racism and xen oph obia . As for th em em ber states, they have developed only a very limited capacityto deal with these phenomena. In 1995, 'Of the seven treatiesidentified by the Go m m ission . . .as most applicable to co m batracism and xenophobia ' only three had been ra t if ied by al lmember states (Geddes, 1995:199). Also, 'legislative redress forvictims of racial discrim ination d epen ds on national pro visions '(G edd es, 1995: 211). In 1995, oft he fifteen M em ber States, onlyfou r ( the UK, the Ne the r lands , F rance , and Be lg ium) haddeveloped com prehensive anti-racist laws. But even these co untriesshow a lax attitude tow ards racist violence and pro pag and a.

Imm igration an d asylum policies show that, if and when a newEu ropea n state em erges from this comp lex process, it will have


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mechanisms fo r in te rna l con t ro l which wi l l a f fec t the wholecommunity . I t has a l l the hal lmarks of an authori tar ian s ta te inwh ich po w er resides in the han ds of officials with n o dem oc raticor legal m ech ani sm s to call the m to ac co un t ' (B unya n, 1993: 33).Labour shou ld demand the de-c r imina l iza t ion o f immigra t ionand asy lum, the d ismant l ing o f the Schengen Agreement ando ther repress ive appara tuses , and the re formula t ion ( th ro ugh atruly democrat ic process of decis ion making) of entry cr i ter ia .

T o c o n c l u d e , i n a c c e p t i n g c a p i t a l ' s l o g i c a n d p o l i c i e s ,Europe an au toch thon ous labour migh t win a shor t te rm tac tica lv ic to ry bu t wi l l ce r ta in ly loose the s t ra teg ic ba t t le . Europe ' slabour should press for greater representat ive and part ic ipatorypower for foreign workers as a means for labour as a whole toachieve greater representat ive and p art ic ipatory p ow er. Exis t ingbar r ie rs to en t ry shou ld be l i f ted and c r i te r ia fo r admiss ionshould be fo rmula ted as a m ean s to ga in ing mo re , ra ther thanless, pow er for labour. Foreign wo rkers shou ld be seen as entitledto the same r igh ts as those en joyed by au toc h th on ou s w orke rs .Th is and o ther po l ic ies shou ld be f ramed wi th in a perspec t ivestress ing sol idar i ty and equal i ty between these two sectors oflabou r as elem ents of a dem ocra tic system based on p eople 's self-man ag emen t . I n sh o r t , l ab o u r ' s s t r a t eg y sh o u ld b e b a sed o nthe consciousness that there is no such th ing as t ru ly foreignl a b o u r . T h i s , b y d e - l i n k i n g m i g r a t o r y fl ow s a n d t h u s t h er e p r o d u c t i o n o f E u r o p e ' s l a b o u r p o w e r fr o m t h e n e e d s o fEuropean capi ta l , would be a t the same t ime an effect ive ant i-imperia l is t s t ruggle .

Notes 1 . For an assessment ofthese two approaches, see Bieling and Steinhilber, 1997.2. The USA had an interest of its own in, and contributed to, the economicreconstruction of Europe, which it saw as a precondition for Europe toplay the role of anti-Communist bastion.3. This has been a constant of French policy, starting in 1951, when the ECSCwas thought of as a means towards Franco-German reconciliation, up to 1992,when an important motivation in negotiating the TEU (the Maastricht

Treaty) was to contain Germany's economic predom inance after the 1990reunification.


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Con tradictions of European Integration 149

6. Beyen, the Dutch foreign m inister who first prop osed the Comm on M arket'was not an elected politician but a former executive for Philips and directorof Unilever parachuted straight from the IMF straight into the Dutchcabine t ' (Ande rson, 1997: 63) and M onnet, the ' father ' of Europeanintegration was an international banker by profession.

7. This latter option would not be in the interest ofth e centre. The role oftheIMF is that of forcing the dependent countries to compete through lowerlabour costs (wages) while fostering at the same time a depend ent form ofindustrialization.

8. This does not imply that those cou ntries ' fortunes would au tomaticallyimprove if foreign capital aids and investm ents were to stop . The alternativeto capitalist (u nde r)dev elop m ent is a different type, a socialist type, ofdevelopment.

9. 'The sbare of outw ard processing in the total exports of eastern E urope [theCEEC 6, G.C.I to the EU reached 18.5% in 1994, with textile and clothingaccounting for more than 75 per cent of total OPT exports to the Union'{Econom ic Commission for Eu rope, 1995:109).

10. The other two are Cyprus and E stonia.11. Moreover, an analysis of green rates (which canno t be carried out he re for

reasons of space) would reveal that this system favoured G ermany rather thanFrance.

12. In 1992 it was 52%, but this decrease has been due to the set aside systemto be described imm ediately below.

13. This condition does not apply to small produc ers, defined as farmers whoprodu ce up to 92 tons of cereals, who receive compe nsatory paym ents on allareas sown to arable crops.

14. Tbe percentage of food expenditure on family budgets falls as familyincome rises.

15. Basically, the CAP bas had, and continu es to have, negative repercus sionsin at least two major areas: the environm ent and h ung er in tbe world. Forreaso ns of space, only the latter p oint will be dealt witb briefly.

16. Tbis explains why economic integration has taken place under, and thus hastaken up a form functional for, the leadership of Germany, i.e., of thedom inant sector of European capital. This point is illustrated by the EMS andthe EMU. Tbis has been the topic of a previous article in this journal(Carchedi, 1997), to wbich tbe reader is referred.

17. Within the French Parliament, the argum ents against EDC were varied. Someclaimed th at the EDC would s timu late the arm s race, since tbe Soviet Blockwould perceive the EDC as a new m ilitary threat, othe rs were fearful tbat theEDC would provide fewer checks than NATO to a new German militarypower, still others did not wan t to be put on the sam e level of imp ortance astwo defeated nations and three small countries. But, outside France,


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to the effect tha t a first-class Europea n tactical and strategic nuclear pow erwould have cost a united Europe 7% of its GNP but would have forced theSoviet Union to spend 30% of its GNP. This would have destroyed theSoviet economy thus making it impossible to raise its standard of living(Galtung, 1971: 214). This opinion, voiced in 1971, has been a constant ofthe Cold W ar period up to the collapse ofth e USSR.

18. At present, the WEU has ten full European M embe rs, five Observers, threeAssociate Members, and ten associate partners.

19. An indication o fthe weakness ofth e WEU is given by the British readinessto join the WEU bu t hos tility to tbe EDC.

20. Carchedi (1997) argues that it is in tbe interest ofthe advanced capitalsector (the oligopolistic one, under the leadership of German oligopolies) tomak e ofthe Ecu, and then the Eu ro, a strong currency.

21. There are of course differences between the major political players. In the1970s and 1980s, the Conservative Party leaned toward s policies in tun e witbthe Community's restrictive monetary and fiscal policies as the way tostimulate the European economies. The Labour Party, on the other band,leaned more towards import controls, state intervention, and subsidiesfor declining industries (Newman, 1989).

22. The CSCE, or Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, wasstarted at the 1974 Helsinki Conference and bas subsequently beentransformed into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE). In 1992 it was decided to develop the role of tbe OSCE inpeacekeeping, early warning and crisis management. NATO bas offered tomak e its resources and experience available to suppo rt OSCE tasks. WbileOSCE comprises all the countries of Europe, togetber with tbe USA andCanada, in the WEU the CEEC and tbe Baltic states have only a status ofassociate partne rs.

23 . As Howorth points out, 'tbe delightfully equivocal notion of "identity" is asemantic attempt not to tread on any institutional toes' (1997:10).

24. NATO's greater influence has been s trengthe ned by France's realisation th atprogress towards a stronger WEU has been lacking and by ber decision,announced on December 5 1995, to re-enter (at least partially) NATO.France had left NATO in 1966, knowing that an hegemonic project liketbat behind a united Europe necessitated a strong, independent militaryorganisation.

25 . These remarks presupp ose an analysis of tbe economic cycle which canno tbe subm itted here for reasons of space. See Carchedi, 1991.

26. Subject, however, 'to the limitations and cond itions laid dow n in tbis Treatyand by tbe measures adopted to give it effect'.

27. The higher rate of exploitation for non-EU workers can be e ither a consciousor an unconsciou s result of this state policy. In Canada, for exam ple, foreign


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Contradictions of European Integration 15 1

deportation' (Sbarma, 1997: 19). By 1993, 70% of (im)migrant workerswas made up of these tempo rary visa workers. As Sharma argues, 'the re-imposition (or the continuation ) of unfree forms of labour p ow er.. .shouldbe seen within the context of the attempt by the employers to secure (orincrease) their profits and to further weaken the strength ofthe collectiveworking class' (ibid: 29).

2 8 . The precurs ors of Schengen are the Trevi group (set up in 1976 to enableEuropean countries to cooperate on issues of terrorism), and several ad hocgroups (e.g., the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration set up to end abuses byasylum-seekers, ratber than, as one would expect, of asylum seekers bygovernments). The Trevi group 'expended its brief in the mid-1980s toemb race all the policing and security asp ects of free m ovem ent, includingimmigrat ion, visas, asylum-seekers , and border controls ' (Webber ,1993b: 142). Immigration and asylum policies have thus been an aspect ofcriminal (in)justice ever since the Union started being concerned witbthese policies (which it always considered to be a matter for individualstates to regulate). The Trevi group is suppo sed to be succeeded by E uropol(TEU, article K.I) . In its initial stage Europol is intend ed to be an intelligencegathering o peration . On the EU's imm igration policies and asylum policies,o n e o f th e m o s t sh a m e f u l a s p e c t s o f t h e p r o c e s s o f E u r o p e a n i n t e g r a t io n , s e eBunyan, 1 9 9 3 ; W ebber, 1993a; W ebber, 1993b. Tbe trend is for all tbese 'adboc groups un der the umbrella of intergovernmental c oop eration ... to bereplaced by permanent institutions under the auspices ofthe Council ofMinisters' (Bunyan, 1993:15).

2 9 . By 1998, the Convention had been implemented by Germany, France,Belgium, Luxem bourg, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Austria. Denmark,Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland are scheduled t o join too . Britain andIreland are not m emb ers ofth e Schengen system. The Schengen Conventionhas not been incorporated into tbe TEU which has opted to retain theintergovernmen tal system. Art. 131 ofthe Schengen Convention sets up anExecutive Com mittee of ministers for the implem entation ofthe Conventionitself Each of the thirteen Contracting Parties (the fifteen EU MemberStates less Ireland and the UK) has the right to one seat on the Committee.The Committee delegates the day-to-day operations to the Central NegotiatingGroup and to its working parties. Since the Co mm ittee's decisions m ust betaken unanimously (art. 132), tbe procedure is ratber cumbersome. Toovercome tbis drawback, the Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Schengensystem through the 'Protocol Integrating tbe Scbengen Acquis into theframework of the Europ ean Un ion'. Article 1 of the Protocol states th atcooperation concerning the Schengen acquis 'shall be conducted within theinstitutional and legal framework ofthe European Union'. Consequently, theCouncil 'shall substitute itself to tbe Executive Committee' (art.2). The


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Refe rences Anderson , P. (1997) 'Under the Sign ofthe Interim', in P. Anderson and P. Gowan(eds.) The Question of Europe, Verso, London: 51-71.

Anderson, P. and P. Gowan (eds.) (1997) The Question of Europe, Verso,London.

Bieling, H-J. and J. Steinhilber (1977) 'Zur Dynamik der Europaischen Integration:Theorien und Projekte', inZ, No.32, December: 18-30.

Bojnec, S. (1996) 'Integration of Central Europe in the Common AgriculturalPolicy ofthe European Union', in Th e World Economy, Vol. 14, No.4:447-463.

Buerkle, T. (1998) 'London-Fran kfurt Stock Linkup Set', in International HeraldTribune, July 8.

Bunyan, T. (ed.) (1993) Statewatching the New Europ e, Russell Press.Carched i, G. (1991) Frontiers of Political Economy, Verso, London.

(1997) 'The EMU, Monetary Crises and the Single EuropeanCurrency', in Capital & Class 63, Autum n: 85-114.

Chuter, D. (1997) 'The United Kingdom ', in J. Howorth and A. Menon (eds.) TheEuropean Union and National Defence Policy, Routledge.

Commission ofthe European Communities (1990) Community Charter of theFundamental Social Rights of Workers, Office for Official Publications of theEuropean Communities, Luxembourg.

Convey, A. and M. Kupiszewski (1995) 'Keeping up with Schengen: Migrationand Policy in the European Union', in International Migration Review,Vol. XXIX, No.4, Win ter: 939-96 3.

Dinucci, M. (1998) 'La Nuova Strategia della N ato', in L'Ernesto, March-April:26-28.

Economic Comm ission for Europe (1995) Economic Bulletin for Europe, Volume47 , New York and Geneva.

European Centre for Development Policy Management (1996) Beyond Lome IV,Maastricht.

European Commission (1994) 'Agricultural Policy for the 21st century', inEuropean Economy, No.4.

(1996) Hoe Beheert de Europese Unie Landbo uw en Visserij?Office of Official Publications ofthe European Communities, Luxembourg.

Eriends ofthe Earth Europe (1995) Towards a Sustainable Europe, Brussels.Galtung, J. (1971) De EEG als Nieuwe Supermacht, van Gennep.Geddes, A. (1995) 'Imm igrant and ethnic minorities and the EU's "Democratic

Deficit"', m journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol.33, No.2, June: 197-217.Gowan, P. (1995) 'Neo-Liberal theory and practice for Eastern Europe', in New

Left Review, No.213, Septemb er-October: 3-60.Hewitt A. and A. Koning (1966) 'Europe's preferred partners? How the ACP

countries should develop their trade', in The ACP-EU Courier, No. 156,March-A pril: 63-4.

Howorth, J. (1997) 'National Defence and European Security Integration', in


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Sharma, N. R. (1997) 'Birds of Prey or Birds of Passage: TheMovement ofCapital and th e Migration of Labou r', in Labour, Capital and Society, April,Vol.30, No. 1:8-38.

Newman, M. (1989) Britain and theEEC: Effects of Mem bership, EuropeanDossiers Series, PNL Press, Lo ndon.

Tractatenblad der Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1985, Nr.lO2.Tracy, M. (1996) Agricidtural Policy in the European Union, APSAgricultural

Policy Stud ies, La Hutte, B elgium.Treaty on European Union, Office for Official Publications of the European

Com munities, Luxembourg, 1995.Webber, F. (1993a) 'Tbe New Europe: Im migration and Asylum', in T. Bunyan

{ed.) Statewatching the New E urope, Russell Press: 130-141.(1993b) 'European Conventions on Immigration and Asylum', in

T. Bunyan (ed.) Statewatching the New Europe, Russell Press: 142-153.

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