Ethics in Politics* Functional measurement in the field of · Claudia Pineda Marín Jean-Jaurès...

| Universitas Psychologica | Colombia | V. 15 | No. 3 | Julio-Septiembre | 2016 | ISSN 1657-9267 |

**Institute of Advanced Studies (EPHE), Paris,France. E-mail: [email protected]

***Editor in chief. E-mail: [email protected]

Functional measurement in the field ofEthics in Politics*

Medición funcional en el campo de la Ética en Política

Received: 10 March 2016 | Accepted: 20 June 2016

Etienne MulletInstitute of Advanced Studies (EPHE), France

**

Wilson López LópezPontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia

***

Lonzozou KpanakeOpen University of Quebec at Montreal (TelUQ),

Canada

Immaculée MukashemaUniversity of Rwanda, Rwanda

Roseline ArmangeInstitute of Advanced Studies (EPHE), France

Shanmukh KambleUniversity of Karnataka, India

Ana Gabriela GuédezJean-Jaurès University, France

Claudia Pineda MarínJean-Jaurès University, France

María Teresa Muñoz SastreJean-Jaurès University, France

Paul C. SorumAlbany Medical College, USA

Félix NetoUniversity of Oporto, Portugal

ABSTRACTWe present, in a synthetic way, some of the main findings from tenstudies that were conducted in the field of ethics in politics, usingthe Functional Measurement framework. These studies were about(a) Angolan and Mozambican people’s views about the legitimacy ofmilitary-humanitarian interventions, (b) French people’s perspectivesregarding the government’s responsibility for the health of consumers ofillicit substances, (c) Togolese people’s views about the acceptability ofpolitical amnesties in a time of political transition, (d) the perspective ofvictims of the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda regarding the attributionof guilt by association to offspring of perpetrators, (e) slave descendants’views about the acceptability of national policies on reparations forslavery, (f) Colombian people’s willingness to forgive perpetrators ofviolence who harmed family members during the civil war, (g) theattitudes of French and Colombian people about national drug controlpolicies, (h) Indian students’ views about the appropriateness of the deathpenalty for murder or rape, (i) Colombian people’s perspectives regardingcorruption, and finally (j) Venezuelan people’s conceptualization ofhuman rights. The main findings are discussed in reference to six of thefoundations of Moral Foundations Theory.

Etienne Mullet, Wilson López López, Lonzozou Kpanake, Immaculée Mukashema, Et al.

| Universitas Psychologica | V. 15 | No. 3 | Julio-Septiembre | 2016 |

KeywordsInformation Integration Theory, Ethic in Politics, International.

RESUMENEste texto presenta, de forma resumida, algunos de losprincipales resultados de diez estudios que se realizaronen el campo de la ética y la política, en el marco de laMedición Funcional. Estos estudios trataron de: (a) lospuntos de vista de la gente de Angola y Mozambique sobrela legitimidad de las intervenciones militares-humanitaria;(b) las perspectivas de los franceses con respecto ala responsabilidad del gobierno con la salud de losconsumidores de sustancias ilícitas; (c) las perspectivasde las personas de Togo acerca de la aceptabilidad deamnistías políticas en un momento de transición política;(d) las perspectivas de las víctimas del genocidio de losTutsis en Ruanda en cuanto a la atribución de culpabilidada los descendientes de los perpetradores de violencia;(e) los puntos de vista de los descendientes de esclavosacerca de la aceptabilidad de las políticas nacionalesde reparaciones por la esclavitud; (f) la disposición delos colombianos a perdonar autores de la violencia quecausaron daño a miembros de la familia durante elconflicto armado interno; (g) las actitudes de los francesesy colombianos acerca de las políticas nacionales de controlde drogas; (h) los puntos de vista de los estudiantesindios acerca de la idoneidad de la pena de muertepor asesinato o violación; (i) las perspectivas de loscolombianos con respecto a la corrupción, y, finalmente,(j) la conceptualización de los derechos humanos enla población venezolana. Los principales resultados sediscuten en relación con seis de los fundamentos de laTeoría de los Fundamentos Morales.Palabras claveTeoría de integración de la información, ética en política,Internacional.

Para citar este artículo: Mullet, E., LópezLópez, W., Kpanake, L., Mukashema, I.,Armange, R., Kamble, S., … Neto, F. (2016).Functional measurement in the field of ethics inpolitics. Universitas Psychologica, 15 (3), http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.upsy15-3.fmf

Functional measurement in the field ofethics in politics

According to Aristotle (-350, 2004), ethics isthe determination —in each concrete set ofcircumstances encountered in daily life— ofwhat constitutes the more acceptable conduct or,in no few cases, the less unacceptable conduct.

The aim of the present article is to report, ina synthetic way, a series of empirical studieson ethics which, using Functional Measurement(Anderson, 1981, 1982, see also Anderson inthis special issue), have been conducted in thespecific field of ethics in politics.

These studies are listed in Table 1. In thistable, the six domains suggested in Haidt’s(2013) Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) —care, fairness, authority, loyalty, disgust, andalso liberty— have been used as a convenientframework for classification. For example,the first study to be reported, which bearson the acceptability of military-humanitarianinterventions, has been classified into the MFT’scare domain because protecting endangeredpeople is, for evident reasons, exemplary of whatis intended by care and protection.

Table 1Classification of the Nine Reported Studies intoSix of the Foundations of Moral FoundationsTheory

Source: own work

Also, the spirit in which these studies wereconducted is fully consistent with MFT’s stanceregarding the nature of human thinking about

Functional measurement in the field of Ethics in Politics*


moral issues. In daily life, moral thinkingexpresses itself through moral judgment, that is,the ability to react quickly to daily situationsinvolving moral issues. Moral judgement canbe defined as an implicit cognitive process thatcorresponds to what cognitive psychologists callSystem 1 (Kahneman, 2011). It is grounded inhuman evolution and probably goes back to latemammals’ development.

Our focus on moral judgment is not a denialof moral reasoning. Moral reasoning refersto the ability to deliberate consciously aboutmoral behaviour, that is, to weigh the prosand cons of complex situations involving moralissues (Gibbs, 2010). Moral reasoning is anexplicit, relatively slow, cognitive process thatcorresponds to what cognitive psychologists callSystem 2 (Kahneman, 2011). Moral reasoningis, however, largely the province of moralphilosophers. In ordinary people’s daily life,moral reasoning occurs only in particularcircumstances, for example, when they are askedto justify their views publicly. “Intuitions comefirst, strategic reasoning second” (Haidt, 2013,p.14), if the latter comes at all.

The studies synthesised in this review havea common methodological and theoreticalframework: Information Integration Theory(IIT, Anderson, 2008). They are the heirsof the many studies on moral developmentconducted in this framework (see Anderson,2015 for a review). The oldest of thesestudies, published at the end of the 1970s,had largely anticipated MFT’s stand. Whereastypical developmental psychologists at this timeexamined moral development by presentingtheir young participants with moral dilemmas,psychologists working in the framework of IITalready used realistic scenarios, grounded onchildren’s and adolescents’ real life, and theirconclusions regarding the structure of moraldevelopment were severely at variance withthe reigning view (e.g., Surber, 1977). Also,like MFT, they explored a large set of moralissues, including blame, punishment, and legaljudgment (e.g., Hommers, 1988); deserving,equity, and fairness/unfairness (e.g., Farkas &

Anderson, 1979); lies and deceit; and gratitudeand forgiveness (e.g., Girard & Mullet, 1997).

Problems of ethics arise most often insituations that can be considered as complex,indeed as emotionally charged, in situations inwhich certain elements point in one direction andother elements in the opposite direction. In otherwords, multiple factors are most often in play,and they are likely to contribute in a complexway to the final judgment relating to conformitywith ethics. It is, therefore, not surprising thatwe have found in Information Integration Theory—a theory of human judgment in daily life– aconvenient tool for examining the way peopleintuitively balance the pros and the cons in suchcircumstances when determining whether it isfair to attribute guilt to offspring of perpetratorsof a genocide;, whether it is, in time of civil war,a betrayal to forgive the perpetrators of violenceagainst family members; or whether rape is sodisgusting that serial rapists deserve the deathpenalty.

An interesting feature of the studies that arereported here is their international character.They were conducted in many countries:Angola, Colombia, France (metropolitan, butalso Martinique), India, Lebanon, Mozambique,Rwanda, and Venezuela. Participants wereusually people who were more or less directlyinvolved in political troubles and violence,such as victims of the genocide in Rwandaor citizens affected by governmental instabilityin Venezuela. The extremely flexible characterof the IIT methodology allowed us to gathermeaningful data from people usually untrainedin psychological experiments without havingto spend disproportionate amounts of time andmoney (see Mullet , Morales, Makris, Rogé, &Muñoz Sastre, 2012). The key feature of thismethodology resides, in our view, in the use ofrealistic scenarios, of the kind of stories any onecan listen to when waiting at the hairdresser.Everybody can make sense of them, and respondin a way that is both strictly personal and fullyreasonable.



Care vs. harm: The legitimacy ofhumanitarian military interventions

Neto et al. (2013) examined (a) the extent towhich educated people living in two Africancountries with much internal conflict in thepast, but with contrasting experiences regardingUN interventions - Angola and Mozambique -agreed with the idea that humanitarian militaryinterventions by UN forces can be legitimate,and (b) the contextual factors that may impact ontheir level of acceptance of these interventions.

Protecting vulnerable people from state-orchestrated abuses, forced displacement, andother forms of violence, not to speak of masskilling, is undisputedly a noble objective, likelyto rally public opinion, at least in Westerncountries. Humanitarian military interventions,however, remain controversial as they involvethe use of force, are conducted in disregard ofstate sovereignty, and are not always regarded assuccessful or exempt from second thoughts.

At the time of the study, nothing was knownabout public opinion in non-Western countriesregarding such interventions. This lack wasunfortunate because the very success of ahumanitarian intervention depends heavily onthe way the people who are likely to benefit fromit conceive of it: Success depends directly onthe collaboration between the military and thestate-victimized people the military is supposedto help.

In the study by Neto et al. (2013), 201university students from the areas of Luandaand Maputo, aged 18-40 were presented with48 realistic vignettes composed by orthogonallycrossing the levels of five factors, partly takenfrom Chirot and Seligman (2001):

a) the economic-political situation in thecountry (good versus in constantdegradation);

b) the political project of the government(forced acculturation of the minority,forced displacement of the minority andrelocation to poorer areas, or physicalelimination);

c) the degree of isolation of the country(completely isolated country versus notparticularly isolated country);

d) the number of ethnic groups in thecountry (two groups versus multiplegroups); and

e) the level of contact between the majoritygroup and the other group(s) (no contactand no intermarriage versus frequentcontacts and frequent intermarriage).

An example of scenario is the following:

Hizrah is a very isolated country that is far fromthe main international communication axes.Two ethnic groups live there: the Wayas (themajority) and the Cingas (a minority). There arevery few contacts between the members of thetwo groups. For example, a Waya would nevermarry a Cinga and vice versa. The economicsituation of Hizrah is constantly deteriorating.In addition, this country has never experiencedpolitical stability. The new government in place,in the hands of the Wayas (the majority),tends to sympathize with extreme views, namelythe complete elimination of the Cingas whoare considered as responsible for the currentdifficulties in the country and who are feared bythe majority. It would seem that, from time totime, limited killings have been perpetrated. Thecurrent situation is not well understood becausethe information coming from this country is ofpoor quality, and the international media doesnot usually devote much interest to this part ofthe world.

The question was, “To what extent do youbelieve that, in such a case, a humanitarianmilitary intervention of UN forces would belegitimate even in the case where the officialgovernment opposes it?” As many differentattitudes were expected, a cluster analysiswas applied to the raw data (Hofmans &Mullet, 2013). A four-cluster solution wasretained, and the corresponding four “attitudeprofiles” (Anderson, 2008, p. 181) are shown inFigure 1.



Figure 1Patterns of results corresponding to thefour clusters: Always Legitimate, MainlyDepending on Political Project, MainlyDepending on Economic-Political Situation ,and Undetermined

In each panel, (a) the mean legitimacyjudgments are on the y-axis, (b) the three

levels of political project are on the x-axis,and (c) the two curves correspond to the

two levels of economic-political situationSource: own work

The first position was called AlwaysLegitimate because all acceptability ratingswere high, irrespective of the situation. Thesecond position was called Mainly Dependingon Political Project because the factor with,by far, the largest effect was the politicalproject: An intervention was considered asmore legitimate when the project involved thephysical elimination of the minority than whenthe project involved forced displacement orforced acculturation. The third position wascalled Mainly Depending on Economic-PoliticalSituation . An intervention was judged moreacceptable when the economic-political situationof the country was deteriorating than whenit was stable. Finally, the fourth cluster wascalled Undetermined because all acceptabilityratings were close to the middle of the responsescale, irrespective of the situation. Overall,the Mozambicans supported interventions moreoften than did the Angolans.

For the participants as a whole, preventingthe massacre of a population represented a justcause that was sufficient to legitimize a UNintervention. In addition, participants living ina country in which a full-scale UN intervention

had taken place in the past (Mozambique)were more supportive of UN interventions thanparticipants living in a country where such anintervention had not taken place (Angola).

This type of intervention was probablyconsidered by participants as very likely tohave positive humanitarian outcome since it isdifficult to consider the saving of thousands ofhuman lives as negative or even neutral, andthe UN was considered as the right authority.Educated people in Angola and Mozambiquewould have been likely, therefore, to view aslegitimate the UN-mandated interventions inCambodia, Rwanda, and possibly East-Timor.

In other, less dramatic cases —in particularwhen the economic-political situation was stable— the participants as a whole did not approve ofmilitary humanitarian interventions. They likelysaw military interventions in these cases asout of proportion with the actual threat to theminority group. Educated people in Angola andMozambique would probably, therefore, haveconsidered as only mildly legitimate the UN-mandated military interventions in Afghanistanand possibly in Iraq.

Care vs. harm: Addictive substances,users’ health, and the Government’sresponsibility

Camus et al. (2016) examined the extent towhich people consider that the governmentof their country is directly implicated eachtime an addictive substance user’s healthdeteriorates, and whether this possible attributionof responsibility depends on political orientation.Addictive substances have bad health effectson users and bad social effects. Governmentpolicies about these substances mediate, affect,and sometimes cause these undesirable effects:Different policies have different combinations ofbenefits and detriments.

If people, in general, tend to attribute ahigh level of responsibility to the governmenteach time someone in the country dies fromthe consequences of tobacco, alcohol, orother substance consumption, then governments’



reluctance to implement more liberal policies, forexample, to extend the range of licit psychoactivesubstances, can be considered as relatively wellgrounded. If people tend to think that substanceusers are mainly responsible for their resultingbad health and that the government’s share ofresponsibility is low, governments may feel lesspressured by public opinion and more open tochanges in policy based on scientific evidence.

In the study by Camus et al. (2016), 236participants, aged 18-86 were presented with 80realistic vignettes composed by the orthogonalcrossing of five factors:

a) the scientific evidence availableregarding the dangerousness of thesubstance (available evidence vs. simplesuspicion);

b) the length of time since the first concernsabout the substance’s dangerousness (30years vs. 5 years);

c) the level of personal susceptibility(everybody vs. some people);

d) the level of consumption (moderate vs.immoderate); and

e) the current state policy regarding thesubstance: no information campaign andfree market; no information campaignand regulation by the state; informationcampaigns and free market; informationcampaigns and regulation by the state;information campaigns and completeprohibition.

An example of a story is the following:

Mr. Smith is currently suffering from a severeillness, and he is going to die in few weeksor in few months. This illness is due tothe consumption of a substance. It has beenscientifically proved, for more than thirty yearsthat the type of substance that Mr. Smith usedto consume induces, in certain persons with aparticular sensitivity, this kind of illness. Thegovernment has not, until now, launched anyinformation campaign informing the public ofthe potential dangerousness of the substance. Itis sold freely, in specialized shops. Mr. Smithconsumed the substances in a way that can becalled immoderate.

The question was, “To what extent do youthink that the government is partly responsiblefor what has happened to Mr. Smith”? Figure 2shows the main findings. The effect of the typeof policy was strong. Mean responsibility ratingswere about 10.50 (out of 15) when the sale ofthe substance was regulated by the state (statemonopoly) and the public was not informed, 10when the sale was not regulated by the stateand the public was not informed, 8 when thesale was not regulated by the state and thepublic was not informed, 7 when the sale wasnot regulated by the state and the public wasinformed, and only 1.50 when the sale of thesubstance was strictly prohibited and the publicwas informed. More responsibility was attributedwhen scientific evidence was available thanwhen it was not, and the two effects interacted.The effect of level of consumption (and of thetwo remaining factors) was weaker.

Figure 2Perceived government’s responsibility as afunction of current policy, available scientificevidence, and participants’ political orientation

Responsibility ratings are on the vertical axis.Current policy is on the horizontal axis (SM= No information campaigns and Regulationby the state; FM = No information campaignsand Free market; SM + Inform = Informationcampaigns and Regulation by the state; FM +

Inform = Information campaigns and Free market;and Prohibition = Information campaigns andProhibition). Each curve corresponds to onelevel of the scientific evidence factor. Each

panel corresponds to one level of consumption.Source: own work

Political orientation had a non-negligibleimpact on responsibility attribution: Left wingersattributed more responsibility to the governmentthan centrists or right wingers. Also, the effect of



scientific evidence was stronger among rightiststhan among centrists or leftists, and the effectof state policy was stronger among leftists thanamong centrists or rightists.

It was only in the case of total prohibitionthat governments were perceived as relievedof any responsibility. In addition, perceivedresponsibility was only slightly attenuatedwhen systematic information campaigns existed,scientific evidence was not strong, andthe persons’ levels of consumption wereimmoderate. Governments, either conservativeor liberal, have, therefore, well-groundedpolitical reasons to maintain and defendprohibitive policies regarding certain addictivesubstances.

People must realize, therefore, that no perfectsubstance policy can exist because policing ofsubstances, like many issues in politics, has thestructure of a dilemma: (a) Either governmentslegalize additional psychoactive substances (e.g.,cannabis) and they will be held responsible eachtime a user’s health is endangered as a result ofconsumption of this newly legalized substance,or (b) governments stick to prohibitive viewsregarding these additional substances and theywill be held responsible for the violence, healthconsequences (e.g. the propagation of viruses),and enforcement costs engendered by the policyitself, not only at the national but also at theinternational level.

Governments’ position can only safely evolvefrom strict prohibitive views to regulatoryviews if some conditions are fulfilled. Insome countries, people, especially leftists, havethe tendency to attribute responsibility to thegovernment every time anything goes wrongin society. Before a change in policy canbe envisioned, people must stop thinking thatgovernments are automatically fully responsibleevery time someone’s health deterioratesbecause of the use of illegal substances.

A change would, furthermore, be moreacceptable if people would not focus exclusivelyon the local impact of permitting drug use anddealing, but would also take into the accountthe national and international consequences ofprohibiting them. One of them is the elevated

level of criminal violence drug trade generatesin affected countries, without mentioningcorruption at all levels of these societies (DávilaCervantes & Pardo Montaño, 2014). Drawingpeople’s attention from local-scale concerns toworld-scale concerns might make them moredemanding towards their governments. A policycan only be sustainable, at least for any lengthof time, if it balances the many factors involvedincluding public opinion, public health, andnational and international order (Fetherston &Lenton, 2005). Responsibility is a commonburden. Governments have responsibility fortheir citizens’ health but not to the point thatcitizens can feel relieved of any responsibility.Governments have responsibility for theircitizens’ health but not to the point that theyshould feel relieved of responsibility for foreignpeople’s health and safety.

Fairness vs. unfairness: Politicalamnesties during political transition

Kpanake and Mullet (2011) examined theextent to which Togolese people judge politicalamnesties to be acceptable. Amnesties are oftensystematically granted by transitional regimesto former perpetrators of violence as a way ofachieving the shift to democracy. Amnesties,however, have a price: They may be viewedby both victims and the populace in generalas basically unjust, immoral, economically andsocially inappropriate and even viewed by thevictims and populace as politically dangerous.

At the time of the study, Togo wasexperiencing a political transition after yearsof presidential dictatorship. In 2008, the newpresident officially announced the creation of aTruth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission.National consultations were launched, and allcitizens were invited to contribute to theimplementation of the commission. As a result,citizens were sensitized to the issue of politicalamnesties.

In the study by Kpanake and Mullet (2011),351 people aged 18 to 78 were presented with48 realistic vignettes that were composed by



orthogonally crossing the levels of five factorspartly taken from Gibson (2002):

a) the quality and quantity of theinformation that the amnesty applicantwas willing to reveal (very importantrevelations, some true information,doubtful information);

b) the presence-absence of sincereapologies (sincere apologies anddemonstration of remorse, no apologyand no expression of concern for thevictims);

c) the opportunity given to the victims totell their story during the process (fullopportunity, no real opportunity);

d) the level of compensation for theharm done (reasonable compensation,virtually no compensation); and

e) the level of punishment of the amnestyapplicant (loss of job and separationfrom the family, status quo).

An example scenario is the following:

“Paul was the local chief of police and amember of the party in power. He was accusedof personally executing two opponents of theregime. In addition, he was also accused ofhaving encouraged the people working for himto use violence against anyone deemed a threatto the power. Paul asked to testify in front of theTruth Commission to receive the amnesty thatthe new government had promised to personswho agreed to testify openly in front of thecommission.

Paul revealed some facts - unknown untilnow - on police activity in his sector and theresponsibilities of his direct superiors. Thesefacts have been verified, and they helped moveforward the investigation. During the publichearings, Paul presented his apologies to thevictim’s families and all the population of hissector. He was very moved, and his apologiesseemed to be sincere. It even appeared as if Paulhimself may have been another victim of theoppressive regime.

During the public hearings, the victim’sfamilies were able to express their sufferingopenly and the way(s) that the loss of twoof their family members had affected their

lives. The president of the commission gavethem enough time to express themselves, andthe commission showed them respect withoutever doubting their sincerity. Victims’ familiesreceived considerable financial compensation.They were given the assurance that the basiceducation of the victims’ children wouldbe supported by the government and theinternational non-profit organizations. Theyeven found a stable employment for thewidow of one of the victims. Paul is withoutemployment at the present time. His closefamily left him when they learned of his pastconduct. He is a broken man. Furthermore, hehad to return all of the possessions he hadstolen in the course of his career to their rightfulowners.”

The question was, “To what extent doyou believe that the amnesty was acceptablein this case?” Figure 3 illustrates the mainfindings. When no apologies were present, theeffects of revealing information and opportunityto tell one’s story (as well as the effectsof victim’s compensation and the amnestyapplicant’s suffering) were virtually nil. Whenabsolutely no truth was revealed, the effectsof opportunity to tell one’s story (as well asvictim’s compensation and amnesty applicant’ssuffering) were weaker than when the full truthwas revealed.



Figure 3Effect of revealing the truth, perpetrator’sapologies and victim’s voice on theacceptability of amnesties. In each panel, (a)the mean acceptability judgments are on they- axis, (b) the three levels of information/truth revealed are on the x-axis, and (c) the twocurves correspond to the two levels of apologies

Each panel corresponds to onelevel of the victims’ voice factor

Source: own work

Overall, in only five cases (out of 48)acceptability ratings were clearly higher than themid-point of the acceptability scale (>8). Forthe amnesty to be judged acceptable, (a) sincereapologies must be present, that is, applicants areexpected to demonstrate that they have realizedthat their political conduct was wrong; (b) veryimportant facts must have been revealed, that is,applicants are expected to show their willingnessto contribute to the truth seeking process; and (c)at least two of the other three factors must havea positive value (e.g., applicants have personallysuffered as a result of their misconduct andvictims have been compensated). The followingformula summarizes the overall findings:

Acceptability = (Truth x Apologies)(Procedure + Compensation + Punishment)

The message that was conveyed by theTogolese participants was that full compensationto the victim is not enough for amnesties to beviewed as fair. The only acceptable amnestiesare the ones that are granted to truly cooperativeand remorseful applicants, with the additionalrequirement that the victims be properly if not

fully compensated. The implications of thesefindings are straightforward. Each time amnestyis granted to former members of undemocraticregimes who are perceived by the people asunrepentant murderers who still feel justifiedin behaving the way they did, the amnestyprocess is bound to be perceived as unacceptable(Wilson, 2001).

Of course, most people can understand thatan amnesty process can ease political transitionbecause powerful members of the old regimeare often able to block indefinitely the processto democracy if they have no strong assurancesthat their fortune and their freedom will beuntouched (Gibson, 2004). As a result, peoplecan, at least temporarily, agree with an amnestyprocess because they perceive it as a politicalnecessity. In the long run, however, once thepower of the amnestied person has faded, thelegitimacy of the amnesty process is in danger ofbeing strongly questioned.

Fairness vs. unfairness: Attribution ofguilt to offspring of perpetrators of thegenocide against Tutsi

Mukashema and Mullet (2015) examined theattribution of guilt to offspring of people whowere directly involved in the genocide againstthe Tutsi in Rwanda: To what extent canthe son or grandson of a small farmer whoparticipated in the genocide be considered asguilty of his father’s or grandfather’s deeds? Thisquestion is an important one because it has manyimplications for daily life in Rwanda and forthe future of the country. In this tiny country,former victims and victims’ offspring and formerperpetrators and perpetrators’ offspring live andwork in the same villages or in the sameboroughs. Many of them know each other verywell, they go to the same markets and theyattend the same religious celebrations in the samechurches. If guilt were to be attributed on anassociative basis, all victims would be entitledto consider all the members of the group thatperpetrated the genocide — elderly people, adultpeople, adolescents, child, infants, and even



babies to be born— as guilty. At least someof them would feel justified in taking revengeon these young people. The situation wouldprobably be untenable.

In the study by Mukashema and Mullet(2015), 55 participants aged 18 to 61, allof them coming from the group targeted bythe genocide, were presented with 24 realisticvignettes composed by orthogonally crossing thelevels of two factors:

a) the target for the attribution of guilt(either the actor or the actor’s son), and

b) the level of involvement in the genocide(state official who planned the genocideand killing; state official who plannedthe genocide but did not participate;officer organizing the massacres locallyand killing people as a matterof example; civil servant willinglykilling family members; small farmerkilling family members under officers’supervision; small farmer killing otherpeople than family members; smallfarmer hurting people; truck driverinforming the killers; supporter ofthe genocide living abroad; supporterwho did not participate; opponent whoremained a passive bystander; opponentwho actively saved lives and was hurt).


Rafayire M. was born in 1990. His father wasa small farmer. His father was not a supporterof the government because he disagreed withthe discrimination and the invitation to violence.He refused to take part in the killings. He,however, never interposed himself betweenkillers and victims. Rafayire’s father did notpublicly condemn the genocide, and he did nottry to hide or help the persons targeted. Heremained a passive bystander.

The question was, “What is, from yourpersonal viewpoint, the level of guilt that mustbe attributed to this person?” As we wantedto separate neatly the participants who wouldattribute guilt from the others, we performed acluster analysis. Figure 4 shows the two-cluster

solution that was retained. The first cluster wascalled Some Intergenerational Transmission ofGuilt because the ratings of guilt attributed tooffspring were higher than zero, and depended onlevel of father’s involvement. The level of guiltattributed (a) to people who participated in thekillings, simply supported the idea of genocide,or did nothing to help the victims was alwaysvery high, ranging from approximately 8 to 10,and (b) to opponents who saved lives was nil.

The second, majority cluster was called NoIntergenerational Transmission of Guilt becausethe ratings of guilt attributed to offspring werealways close to zero. The level of guilt attributed(a) to people who participated in the killingseither directly or indirectly (e.g. informers) wasvery high, ranging from approximately 8 to 10;(b) to people who did not kill (e.g., simply hurtwithout killing or supported the genocide) washigh, ranging from approximately 6 to 7.5; (c) topassive bystanders was relatively low, althoughnot nil (approximately 3); and (d) to opponentswho saved lives was nil.



Figure 4Patterns of results corresponding to the twoclusters: Some Transmission of Guilt and NoTransmission of Guilt

In each panel, the mean guilt judgments are onthe y-axis, the levels of involvement are on the x-axis, and the target of judgments corresponds tothe two curves. AO = opponent of the genocide

who actively saved lives and was hurt; PO =opponent who remained a passive bystander;Supp. = supporter who did not participate; SA= supporter of the genocide living abroad; I&B= truck driver who informed the killers; FH =

small farmer who hurt people; FK = small farmerwho killed other people than family members;

FKF = small farmer who killed family membersunder officers’ supervision; CVKF = civil servant

who willingly killed family members; O&K= officer who organized the massacres locallyand killed people as a matter of example; Plan= state official who planned the genocide butdid not participate; P&K = state official who

planned the genocide and participated in killingsSource: own work

The majority position was, therefore, thatoffspring, owing to their non-participation in thegenocide, were totally free of guilt. This positionhas been incorporated in most penal codesaround the world, and it is, logically, the officialposition of Rwanda’s government at least sincethe end of the genocide. The minority positionwas that perpetrators’ offspring inherited at leastpart of their genitors’ guilt, especially if theirfathers were state officials who deliberatelyplanned the genocide. No guilt was, however,transferred if the father or the grandfather didnot kill anybody. The existence of only a smallcluster of participants sharing the transmission

of guilt view was consistent with most previousfield studies showing that feeling or expressionof collective guilt is not a frequent phenomenon(Leach, Bou Zeineddine, & #ehaji#-Clancy,2012).

Non-attribution of guilt to offspring ofperpetrators was, in our view, not simply legalistthinking, but also adaptive thinking. From anhistorical perspective, we are all currently alivebecause we are survivors of previous conflicts.We have survived because our direct ancestorswere able successfully to attack and despoilother people, and/or because our ancestors wereable to resist, through bloody fights, othergroups’ attacks, and/or because our ancestorspreferred not to take sides in conflicts in whichother people were victimized. If guilt had tobe attributed not only on an individual basis(“objective” guilt) but also on an associativebasis, all of us would be, by intergenerationaltransmission, guilty of thousands of previouscrimes and injustices committed by our directancestors since the dawn of Homo sapiens.

Exonerating perpetrators’ offspring ofpersonal guilt is certainly the most reasonablething to do, even if it may be shockingfrom a moral perspective centered on thehere and now. It allows all of us to livewithout the unbearable burden of culpabilitythat would be associated with humanity’sstruggle for life since time immemorial and,at the same time, it denies the possibilitythat revenge can legitimately be exacted (orworse, should be exacted) on perpetrators’offspring. It does not dispense us, however,from acknowledging (a) that wrongs have beencommitted, (b) that perpetrators’ offspring havea special duty towards people their ancestorshave recently wronged, and (c) that everybody– victims’ offspring, perpetrators’ offspring, andbystanders – must work to prevent such wrongsfrom reoccurring in the future.

Trying to persuade people that, whether theylike it or not, they share their ancestor’s guilt islikely to make most of them feel more defensiveand less collaborative. Leading people to thinkthat, although there is no basis for holding thempersonally guilty, they should do something to



repair what has been done by their ancestors islikely to make most of them feel less defensiveand more collaborative.

Fairness vs. unfairness: Slavedescendants’ views regarding nationalpolicies on reparation

Armange and Mullet (2016) examined theacceptability to people whose families had beendirectly affected by slavery of possible nationalpolicies on reparations for slavery. For fourcenturies, African people living in West Africawere regularly transported as cargo by Europeantraders to South America, the Caribbean Islands,and North America . It is estimated that at leasttwelve million people were purchased from localleaders in Western Africa and shipped throughthe Atlantic (Quirk, 2014). Although slaverywas abolished during the nineteenth century,reparation for slavery is still a debated issue.Slave owners were compensated for the lossof their slaves. For example, when the decreeof abolition was passed in 1833, the Britishgovernment disbursed the equivalent of $125billion (current value in 2016) to compensate3,000 slave-owning families. In contrast, slaveworkers have, until now, never been materiallycompensated, even though the program of“affirmative action” launched in 1961 under thepresidency of John Kennedy in the US could,according to some authors (McWhorter, 2001),be seen as a form of compensation.

The study by Armange and Mullet (2016)focused on French slave descendants’ views, andfive possible national policies were considered:

a) a policy of full acknowledgement bythe state’s government of the tragedy ofslavery and formal apologies offered byelected officials to the victims of slavery,

b) a policy of material compensationof the victims of slavery withoutacknowledgment by the government ofthe tragedy of slavery and withoutformal apologies,

c) a policy combining (a) and (b),d) a policy of complete amnesia, and

e) a policy of exaltation of thecountry’s colonial past, associated withpublic declarations about the positivecontribution of former colonists.

Two hundred ninety-eight participants, livingon the French island of Martinique, aged 18-80,were presented with a set of 40 vignettescomposed by orthogonally crossing the levels offour factors:

a) the percentage of slave descendantscurrently living in the country affectedby the policy (20% vs. 1%)

b) the percentage of slave descendantscurrently living in the country affectedby the policy (20% vs. 1%);

c) the level of their current economicintegration (not well integrated vs. wellintegrated);

d) the level of their current socialintegration (not well integrated vs. wellintegrated); and

e) the current state policy regarding pastcolonization and slavery in the country(see above).

An example of a vignette is the following:

During the 17th and 18th centuries, richlandowners in the country acquired slavescoming from Western Africa. These slaves

were freed during the 19th century. Mostof them stayed and made their living inthe country. Nowadays, their descendants areseveral thousand people. They represent aboutone percent of the population in the country.Economically speaking, they are now wellintegrated into the production system. Theirstandard of living is, on average, similar tothat of the other inhabitants. They are vibrantand they have access to education and healthcare to the same extent as the other citizens.Socially speaking, they have never mixed withthe rest of the population. They have not hadincentives to do so. Few mixed marriages havebeen recorded. They live in their community.

The country’s government hasacknowledged the responsibility of the stateregarding the colonial past of the country andthe tragedy of slavery. Public apologies have



been publicly offered to slave descendants. Inaddition, this colonial past is not, in the mediaor at school, presented in a positive light to theyoung generations.

The question was “To what extent doyou consider that such a national policy inacceptable?” Figure 5 shows the main resultscorresponding to the three clusters that werefound.

Figure 5Acceptability of national policy as a function oftype of national policy and social integration

The three panels correspond to the three clusters:Skeptics, Reparationists, and Undetermined . In

each panel, the mean acceptability judgmentsare on the y-axis, the types of policy are onthe x-axis, and the four levels formed by thetwo integration factors correspond to the four

curves. Exalt. = Exaltation of the colonialpast; Amnes = Political Amnesia; Repar. =

Reparations without acknowledgment; Ackn= Acknowledgment without reparations; andA & R = Acknowledgment and reparations.

Source: own work

The first cluster was called Skeptics becausethe overall mean rating was notably andsignificantly lower than the middle of theresponse scale. It is only when full integrationwas achieved that the two acknowledgementpolicies were considered as tolerable if notfully acceptable: The two means were close tothe middle of the response scale. The secondcluster was called Reparationists because ratingswere distributed all over the response scale, andthe national policy factor had a stronger effectthan in the other two clusters. In particular,

acceptability was the highest when the state’spolicy was one of full acknowledgement andreparation (about 10). It was progressively lowerwhen the policy was acknowledgment withno attempt at reparation (about 8), reparationwithout full acknowledgment (about 5), amnesia(about 3) or presentation of the colonial past ina positive light (about 2.50). In addition, wheneconomic and social integration was achieved,the effect of national policy was stronger thanwhen they were not achieved. The third clusterwas called Undetermined because the responseswere always close to the center of the responsescale and the effects of the factors were weak.Participants with only primary or secondaryeducation, and who were regular attendees atchurch were more frequently members of thisthird cluster and less frequently members of theother two clusters than other participants were.The existence of such an undetermined positionis consistent with findings from previous studieson complex societal issues that allowed people toexpress an absence of position (see Neto et al.,2013).

Although slave descendants living onMartinique differed considerably in their viewsabout the relevance and/or acceptability ofnational policies of reparation for slavery, theyagreed on one important point: For a nationalpolicy to be acceptable, or at least tolerable,it must involve public acknowledgment of pastwrongs. For some people (35% in the presentsample), a national policy that includes publicacknowledgment of past wrongs was consideredas acceptable, whether it is accompanied bya policy of material compensation or not, andmore so if socio-economic integration has beenachieved. For others (28%), a national policy thatincludes public acknowledgment of past wrongswas considered as tolerable if it is accompaniedby material compensation and provided thatsocio-economic integration has been achieved.In no case was a policy of material compensationnot accompanied by public acknowledgment ofpast wrongs considered as acceptable, even if fullsocio-economic integration has been achieved.



Loyalty vs. betrayal: Forgiving knownperpetrators of violence towards familymembers

López López et al. (2012) examined Colombianpeople’s positions regarding the granting offorgiveness to persons who have been moreor less actively involved in the violence thatravaged the country during the past 60 years.More specifically, they examined whether, asmember of a family that has been directlyaffected by violence, it was viewed as acceptableto forgive, under a set of different conditions, aknown perpetrator.

In the aftermath of civil wars, countriesface the daunting task of rebuilding themselveson better foundations. They must rebuild notonly their material infrastructure but alsotheir societal and psychological infrastructure.Although reestablishing trust and cooperationbetween former enemies may sometimes seemimpossible, it is, nevertheless, a necessaryobjective. The spirit of revenge, enduringresentment, and lasting dissensions betweengroups can only generate a deleterious socialclimate, a climate that is certainly not propitiousto innovation, economic development, andprosperity (Cotte Poveda, 2012).

The study by López López et al.(2012) focused on the considerable individualdifferences in willingness to forgive alreadyreported in previous literature and on the impactof concrete circumstances such as the presenceof apologies from the perpetrator. Four hundredparticipants living in Bogota, aged 18-55, werepresented with 48 scenarios composed by theorthogonal crossing of three factors:

a) the level of involvement in theviolence (organizer, executor, or passivebystander);

b) the level of severity of the negativeact committed (murder, kidnapping,destruction of property or torture orthreat, and theft);

c) the level of apologies offered bythe perpetrator (no apology atall, acknowledgment of responsibility,

begging forgiveness, and beggingforgiveness and offering reparation).

A between-subject factor was also introducedin the study: the actors’ identity (member of theguerilla, paramilitary, military, and drug dealer).An example of a scenario is the following:

Luis Ramos is a former member of theguerrillas. He was the author of severalviolent acts. He killed a total of five persons,including Enrique Garciía, an ordinary citizen.These violent acts had been planned by Luis’superiors. He only obeyed orders. Currently,Luis wishes to reintegrate himself to civilsociety. He has, however, never presentedhimself to the Garcia family with the intentionof begging forgiveness. (López López et al.,2012)

The question was: “If you were a memberof the Garcia family, to what extent wouldyou be willing to forgive him?” A four-clustersolution was retained. Figure 6 shows themain findings. The majority position was called“Never Forgive”. Overall, willingness to forgivewas low irrespective of the circumstances. Thisstrictly unforgiving attitude was shared by amajority of participants from the wealthiestsocial class, and by more than forty percentof the participants from the other classes, withthe exception of the poorest one. It was alsomuch more frequently observed in the guerilla,military, and drug dealer conditions than inthe paramilitary condition. Until recently, thisno-forgiveness position was the government’sofficial position towards the guerillas and theirassociates (Borja Orozco, Barreto, Sabucedo, &López López, 2008).



Figure 6Main results for each of the four clusters:Never Forgive, Hesitant, Depending onCircumstances, and Always forgive

In each panel, the mean willingness to forgivejudgments is on the y-axis, the perpetrator’s

behaviors are on the x-axis, and the fourcurves correspond to the severity of thenegative acts. Resp = Acknowledgmentof responsibility; Apolog. = Presence of

sincere apologies; A&C = Presence of sincereapologies and offering of compensation.

Source: own work

The second position was called “Hesitantto forgive”. Overall, willingness to forgivewas somewhat higher than in the first cluster.For these participants, fully forgiving wouldbe difficult. The effects of responsibility,severity, and apologies were weak. This hesitantattitude was more frequent among people fromthe middle-class than among others. Severalparticipants stated, after having responded to allthe scenarios, that personally they thought that, atleast in some cases, forgiveness could be granted,but that, as this view conflicted with the oneadvocated by the authorities, they were veryhesitant about the issue.

The third position was called “Dependingon Circumstances”. Overall, willingness toforgive was relatively high, and the effectsof responsibility, severity, and apologies werestrong and interacted, which indicates that thejudgment process was a complex one. Thiscomplex attitude was more frequent amongpeople from the poorest classes than among thosefrom the wealthiest classes. It was also much

more frequent in the paramilitary condition thanin the others.

The fourth position was called “Alwaysforgive”. Overall, willingness to forgive wasvery high. The effects of responsibility, severity,and apologies were weak. This forgivingattitude, like the preceding one, was morefrequently observed among people from thepoorest classes than among those from thewealthiest classes.

A large segment of the Colombian society(about 30%) seems to be undecided about theproper conduct towards ex-members of thegroups responsible for violence. If nationalreconciliation truly becomes an element of thenation’s political agenda, it is probable that thesepersons would shift their attitude and adoptthe “Depending on circumstances” position. Ifthis were the case, a majority of the peoplein Colombia would be of the view that, undersome circumstances, the members of the groupsthat were responsible for violence could beforgiven. Such a shift could considerably easereconciliation (and reinsertion).

Authority vs. subversion: Citizens’positions regarding national policiesabout illicit drugs

Camus, Muñoz Sastre, Sorum, & Mullet (2014)examined French people’s positions regardingactual and potential national drug policies.Goode (1998, p. 19) identified five “high-profile” views about drug policies, which areendorsed by different groups of people he called:“cultural conservatives, free trade libertarians,radical constructionists, progressive legalizers,and progressive prohibitionists”. In the past,the free trade libertarian view dominated drugpolicies in most countries. In the US until1914, for example, the drug market was notregulated, and a non-negligible segment of thepopulation used opium and heroin. Currently, itis the cultural conservative, prohibitionist viewthat dictates drug policies in the US as wellas in most countries. The current drug policyin the Netherlands is, however, consistent with



the progressive legalizers´ view. Since 1976,soft drugs (e.g., marijuana) are sold and can beconsumed in coffee shops all around the country.Hard drugs are illegal but drug abusers are notharshly prosecuted. Furthermore, the drug policysince 1991 in Switzerland is consistent with theprogressive prohibitionists´ view. Soft drugs arestill illegal but their consumption is de factotolerated, and treatment-resistant heroin addictsare provided with controlled prescriptions ofheroin or maintenance substances. Mexicoadopted a similar policy in 2009.

Knowing people’s views about drug policies(current and alternative) is important for severalreasons. Most people are voters; they cansupport or not support candidates and politicalparties as a function, among other things, ofthe drug policy advocated by these candidatesand political parties. In addition, many peopleare potential drug consumers, and as such theymay decide to respect current laws or breakthem as a function of their views regarding thelaws’ perceived appropriateness. Finally, somepeople are in between the law and the consumers(policemen, judges, lawyers). If they stronglyagree with the current drug policy, they willtend to pursue lawbreakers actively and sentencethem according to the provisions of laws. Ifthey do not completely agree with the currentpolicy, they will tend to be lenient and looksystematically for extenuating circumstances.

In the study by Camus et al. (2014), 200participants, aged 18-81, were presented with24 vignettes that were composed according to athree within-subject orthogonal factor design:

a) the demand for drugs in the country (lowvs. high);

b) the information campaigns regarding thedangerousness of drugs (existent vs.absent);

c) the current state policy regarding softand hard drugs (“laissez-faire” policyfor both soft and hard drugs; strictprohibition of both soft and hard drugs;regulation of both soft and hard drugs;regulation of soft drugs and strict

prohibition of hard drugs; and threeintermediate policies).


South-Calgony is a small republic of 10million inhabitants. In South-Calgony, as inthe neighboring countries, there is a certaindomestic demand for soft drugs and for harddrugs. The State has, many times in the past,launched campaigns to warn people aboutthe dangers associated with using drugs. Theteaching of the risks associated with drugconsumption has been made compulsory in allschools and public institutions. On the onehand, the State has decided to regulate the saleof soft drugs and to ensure their productionand distribution. On the other hand, the Statehas decided to prohibit completely the saleof hard drugs and to prosecute traffickers. Asa result, soft drugs are sold correctly packedup, with exact dosages, in stores controlled bythe State. Their price is certainly high but notprohibitive, so much so that the traffickers havehad to give up this market. Hard drugs, incontrast, are sold clandestinely. Their price isprohibitive and the associated profits generatea certain level of corruption at the very heartof the state and a level of homicides thatremains fortunately moderate. The quality ofsoft drugs is guaranteed. The quality of harddrugs is highly variable, and many accidents(accidental overdoses) are reported each year.(López López et al. 2012)

The question was “To what extent do youthink that, in these circumstances, the positionof the State is politically acceptable?” A three-cluster solution was found. Figure 7 showsthe main findings. The first position wascalled “Radical Constructionists” because therewas no drug policy that was considered astruly acceptable,; that is, the mean ratings ofacceptability were all very low.



Figure 7Acceptability of policy as a function of typeof drug policy and the presence-absence ofinformation campaigns about the dangers ofdrugs

In each panel, the mean acceptability judgmentsare on the y-axis, the types of policy are on the

x-axis, and the two curves correspond to thepresence/absence of information campaigns.LF = “laissez faire” policy; R = Regulate; P= Prohibit; S = Soft drugs; H = Hard drugs

Source: own work

The second position was called“Prohibitionists” because the only acceptablepolicy was complete prohibition with thecondition that information campaigns about thedangers of drugs would be conducted. Theeffect of the drug policy factor was strong; thehighest acceptability values were observed forComplete Prohibition (about 6), Prohibition ofHard Drugs and Regulation of Soft Drugs (about4), and Prohibition of Hard drugs (about 3). Theeffect of the information factor was also strong;when information campaigns were conducted, allacceptability responses were higher (especiallyin the case of complete prohibition) than whenno information campaigns were conducted.

The third position was called “Regulationists”because the only acceptable drug policy wasComplete Regulation with the condition thatinformation campaigns about the dangers ofdrugs would be conducted. As in the precedingcase, the effect of the drug policy factorwas strong; the highest acceptability valueswere observed for Complete Regulation (about

7), Regulation of Hard Drugs (about 5), andProhibition of Hard drugs and Regulation of SoftDrugs (about 5). The effect of the informationfactor was also strong.

Unexpectedly, participants did not seem tomake strong distinctions between policies forsoft and hard drugs. They judged either completeregulation or complete prohibition as the mostacceptable policy, and they never considered“mixed” policies (e.g., regulation of soft drugsassociated with prohibition of hard drugs) asmore acceptable than policies that treated softand hard drugs in the same way. In otherwords, both views reflected global attitudesabout drugs: Accordingly, one should expectthat (a) people who believe strongly that harddrugs should be prohibited will not be persuadedeasily that soft drugs should not be prohibited,and b) people who believe strongly that softdrugs should be regulated, rather than prohibited,will not be persuaded easily that hard drugsshould be prohibited rather than regulated. Also,even if prohibitionists as well as regulationistswere sensitive to the importance of informationcampaigns about the dangers of using drugs, theirpositions did not seem to be influenced by thesize of the current drug market in the depictedcountry.

The present study has implications fordecision-makers. It shows that, in France, theremay be a large segment of the population thatwould, under certain conditions, favor a changein current legislation about drugs. As decision-makers are, understandably, always reluctantto propose radical changes regarding sensitiveissues fearing being disavowed by their votersor blamed for future problems (UK Drug PolicyCommission, 2012, see also Camus et al., 2016above), this finding may be of interest. Inaddition, the study shows that another segmentof the population tends to think that the issue isnot about policing (radical constructionists). If,however, convincing evidence-based proposalswere presented, these people could adopt theview that, although there are undoubtedlybiological, psychological, and societal factorsimplied in drug use, policing is still an importantissue.



The main findings from this study have beenreplicated by López López et al. (2016b) on asample of Colombian adults: The five positionsadvocated by Goode (1998) were empiricallyfound,; that is, a free trade libertarian positionand a progressive prohibitionist position werefound in addition to the three positions found byCamus et al. (2014).

Disgust vs. purity: Rape, murder,recidivism, and the appropriateness ofthe death penalty

Kamble and Mullet (2016) examined thepersonal positions of Indian students regardingthe appropriateness of the death penalty overalland the importance of various circumstanceswhen judging its appropriateness. The deathpenalty is the legal process by which a defendantis put to death by an official court of justice.About sixty per cent of the world's population,among them the citizens of China, India,Indonesia, and the USA, live in countries wherethe death penalty is part of the law and executionstake place. In 2013, it was estimated that about500 persons have been sentenced to death inIndia, among them 60 in the state of Karnataka,the state with the highest percentage of convictson death row in the Union. The types of criminalsthat, according to the Supreme Court of India,can be sentenced to death are (a) large scaledrug traffickers who are recidivists; (b) armedrebels fighting against the Union, terrorists,and mutineers; (c) persons who have assistednon-autonomous persons to kill themselves; (d)rapists whose victims are left in a vegetativestate; (e) gang robbers indirectly involved inkillings; and (f) murderers (including peoplehaving committed an honor killing or policemenwho have committed encounter killings).

In the study by Kamble and Mullet (2016),430 unpaid students from the Hindu community,aged about 22-23 and enrolled at KarnatakUniversity, were presented with 48 vignettes thatwere composed by orthogonally crossing thelevels of five factors:

a) the type of crime imputed to thedefendant (burglary, rape, or homicide);

b) whether culpability has been fullydemonstrated or not;

c) whether the defendant showed signs ofempathy/compassion for the victim orthe victim’s relatives;

d) whether the defendant was a recidivist ornot; and

e) the level of criminality in the area (lowvs. high).

An example of a scenario is the following:

Miten Badigera has been arrested for rape bythe police. Rape is a relatively frequent offensein this state. The statistics are alarming. Itis the second time that Miten Badigera hasbeen arrested for rape. He has already beenincarcerated. Miten Badigera’s culpability hasnot, in this case, been fully established. Duringthe trial, the defendant neither showed anyindication of empathy with/compassion for thevictim’s relatives nor expressed any form ofrepentance.

The question was: To what extend do youconsider that the death penalty would be anappropriate penalty in such a case?” A six-clustersolution was found. The first cluster (20%)was called “Type of Crime” because this factorwas clearly the dominant one: Appropriatenesswas judged much higher in the case of rape(about 8) or homicide (about 6.5), than in thecase of burglary (about 2.5). Overall, the deathpenalty was judged fully appropriate (ratinghigher than 8) only in cases of rape whenculpability was demonstrated and the defendantwas a recidivist. The second cluster (21%)was called “Culpability”: the death penalty wasjudged more appropriate when culpability wasfully demonstrated (about 8) than when it wasnot (about 4.5). Overall, the death penalty wasjudged fully appropriate in no less than 15 outof the 48 scenarios, namely (a) in cases of rapewhen culpability was demonstrated; (b) in casesof murder when culpability was demonstratedand empathy was absent; (c) in cases of murderwhen culpability was demonstrated and thedefendant was a recidivist; and (d) in cases



of burglary when culpability was demonstrated,empathy was absent, the defendant was arecidivist, and the local statistics of criminalitywere high.

The third cluster, the relative majoritycluster (31%), was called “Type of Crimeand Culpability” because it combined featuresfrom the first two clusters. Overall, the deathpenalty was judged fully appropriate in fivescenarios, namely (a) in cases of rape or murderwhen culpability was demonstrated, empathywas absent, and the defendant was a recidivist;and (b) in cases of murder when culpability wasdemonstrated, empathy was absent, and the localstatistics of criminality were high.

The fourth cluster (8%) was called “Empathy/Compassion”: the death penalty was judgedmore appropriate when no empathy/compassionin the defendant was perceptible (about 6) thanwhen it was perceptible (about 3). Overall,the death penalty was judged fully appropriatein only one scenario, namely in the case ofmurder when culpability was demonstrated,empathy was not perceptible, the defendant wasa recidivist, and the local statistics of criminalitywere high.

The fifth cluster (5%) was called“Recidivism”: The death penalty was judgedmore appropriate when the defendant was arecidivist (about 8) than when he was not (about3.5). Overall, the death penalty was judged fullyappropriate in eleven scenarios, namely (a) inthe case of murder or rape when culpabilitywas demonstrated and the defendant was arecidivist; (b) in the case of murder or rape whenno empathy was perceptible and the defendantwas a recidivist; and (c) in cases of burglarywhen culpability was demonstrated, empathywas absent, and the defendant was a recidivist,the local statistics of criminality were high.

Finally, the sixth cluster (15%) was called“Almost Always Appropriate” because meanratings were much higher than in the otherclusters (about 7.5). In fact, the death penaltywas judged fully appropriate in no less than 20scenarios, namely (a) in cases of rape or murderwhen culpability was demonstrated; (b) in casesof rape or murder when culpability was not fully

demonstrated but the defendant was a recidivist;and (c) in cases of burglary when culpabilitywas demonstrated, empathy was absent, and thedefendant was a recidivist.

Overall, (a) females’ ratings were higher thanmales’ ratings but this difference was limited tothe case of rape; (b) physical science students’ratings were higher than social science students’ratings; and (c) culpability had more impactand empathy/compassion less impact on ratingsamong physical science students than amongsocial science students.

Support for the death penalty was relativelyhigh, which was consistent with findingsfrom previous studies (Lambert, Pasupuleti,Jiang, Jaishankar, & Bhimarasetty, 2008). Mostuniversity students from Karnataka do not appearto be opposed systematically to the death penalty,and the most important factors for judging theappropriateness of the death penalty were type ofcrime, culpability, and recidivism. The relativeimportance of these factors did not vary much asa function of gender or of previous experience ofvictimization but varied as a function of field ofstudy.

If students largely agreed with the viewthat the death penalty is in some situationsan appropriate punishment, they differedconsiderably in the extent of these situations.For a relative majority of them, for thedeath penalty to be considered appropriate, thedefendant’s culpability must be demonstratedand the defendant is a recidivist who is unableto demonstrate any empathy. By contrast, for aminority of them, death penalty was viewed asappropriate even in cases where culpability hasnot been fully demonstrated.

Disgust vs. purity: Threat, bribery,and the illicit sharing of confidentialinformation

López López et al. (2016a) examined Colombianlay persons’ views regarding a number ofbehaviors of officials, entrepreneurs, or ordinarycitizens that are usually considered as corrupt.Among Colombians, and especially among



people living in Bogota, corruption recentlybecame an increasing concern. In 2011, it rankedthird after violence and unemployment (LatinAmerica Public Opinion Project, Colombia,2011). In Bogota, 20% of people identifiedcorruption as the highest concern in the country.

As shown in previous studies (e.g., Gong& Wang, 2013), most people most of thetime express intolerance to corruption when theconsequences of corruption are perceived assevere (e.g., vote-buying by politicians duringelections). As has also been found, however, aminority of people in a minority of situationsexpress surprisingly high levels of tolerance tocorruption, above all when the consequences areperceived as not very severe (e.g., using one’snetwork of political connections to help a friendto find a job).

To fully understand this phenomenon andthe diversity of reactions it produces amongpeople, it is useful to frame it in the largercontext of humanization,; that is, to see it as theresult of a conflict between two kinds of ethicsthat separately developed as human became“civilized”, each one based on its own rationale:tribal ethics and modern ethics (Fox, 2011).Tribal ethics is defined in terms of the tribe’ssurvival and growth; it demands that powerfulpeople take more care of their relatives – theextended family – than of unknown people. Inmost cases, perceived corruption results whentribal ethics has been applied (e.g., recruiting arelative) in cases in which most people expectmodern ethics to be applied (e.g., organizinga public contest, Newell, 2008). The inverseis also true. There are no few cases in whichthe application of modern ethics (e.g., signalingcases of abuses by the police, providing healthcare to foreigners) is denounced as severe lackof solidarity with colleagues or with countrymen(the loyalty foundation in MFT), or as politicalweakness by people who consider that only tribalethics is appropriate in those cases (Ivkovi# &Sauerman, 2015).

In the study by López López et al. (2016a), 413participants, aged 18-69, and living in differentareas of the city of Bogota, were presented with a

set of 24 vignettes composed according to a threewithin-subject orthogonal factor design:

a) the current status or position in societyof the person who behaved in a corruptway (politician, judge, entrepreneur, orordinary citizen);

b) the motive behind the act of corruption(nepotism or monetary gain); and

c) the means used for obtaining theunderserved benefit (threatening theperson, bribery, or illicitly sharing ofconfidential information).

An example of a scenario is the following:

“Herman is a senator. He wishes his nephewto get a civil servant position in the Ministryof Health. His nephew has currently beenunemployed for two years. Fifty candidateshave already been pre-selected for this position.As Herman has a good friend among thepeople in the Ministry responsible for thefinal examination, he has been able to obtaininformation regarding the questionnaires thatare going to be used during the process ofselection. Herman decides to communicate thisinformation to his nephew. His nephew uses theinformation, succeeds in the competition, andgets the position.”

The question was “To what extent do youthink that, in these circumstances, the senator’sbehavior is tolerable?” A four-cluster solutionwas found, and its main results are shown inFigure 8.



Figure 8Judged tolerability of behavior as a functionof current status or position in society of theperson who behaved in a corrupt way andmeans used for obtaining the underservedbenefit

In each panel, the mean tolerability judgments areon the y-axis, and the three levels of severity of

the negative act are on the x-axis. The four curvescorrespond to the social position of the person

Source: own work

The first cluster was called Zero Tolerancebecause in absolutely all cases, the ratings wereextremely close to the left end of the responsescale. The second cluster was called Never VeryTolerable because the ratings, although alwayscloser to the left end than to the right endof the response scale, varied as a function ofthe means used: Threat and bribery (about 1.5)were considered as more intolerable than useof information (about 3). The third cluster wascalled Depends on Means because, as in thepreceding case, the ratings were, to a largeextent, affected by the means used: Illicit useof information was even considered as rathertolerable (about 7). Finally, the very small fourthcluster was called Always Tolerable . Youngerparticipants were, more frequently than olderones, members of the Depends on Means clusterand were less frequently members of the AlwaysIntolerable cluster . They were also the onlymembers of the Always Tolerable cluster.

A majority of participants adopted a zerotolerance position,; that is, they clearlyrepudiated tribal ethics. In contrast, only two

participants expressed views that were fullyconsistent with tribal ethics. Both were male,young, relatively poor, less educated, andpolitically unengaged. After the survey wascompleted, one of them spontaneously declared,“Everything in society can be bought. Whenyou pay the price, you get looked after beforeeveryone else. You always can obtain what youwant”.

In addition, two groups of participants (secondand third clusters) expressed a conflict in ethics.In the first one, although none of the behaviorsdescribed in the scenarios were consideredas really tolerable, participants discriminatedamong them: Some behaviors were viewedas black (threatening a person), other wereconsidered dark grey (offering money), andsome behaviors were seen just grey (usinginformation). They recognized that modernethics must always prevail in the situationsdescribed in the scenarios, but they could notprevent themselves from expressing, at the sametime, the repressed although not suppresseddemands of tribal ethics.

In the second group, illicit use of informationwas clearly considered as tolerable, but notbribes and threats, which indicates that for theseparticipants the domain of validity of tribalethics is one in which consequences can beseen as benign and/or when deviations from thedictates of modern ethics are not easily traceable.Although, only 7% of participants agreed withthis last view, this small minority, in additionto the very small minority of people who thinkthat corruption is always tolerable, is probablyenough to create a climate of suspicion in anycountry.

Liberty vs. oppression: The indivisibilityof human rights

Guédez Soares and Mullet (2014) examinedthe extent to which people living in Venezuelaconsider that human rights are indivisible rights:Do people perceive human rights as a simplecollection of more or less independent rights oras a bundle of interdependent and related rights?



The Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR) was adopted by the United NationsGeneral Assembly at the end of 1948. It consistedof 30 articles that affirmed the representatives’belief “in fundamental human rights, in thedignity and worth of the human person and inthe equal rights of men and women”. Diaz-Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs (1995)examined the psychological structure of thesearticles and showed that US college students’endorsement of them structured themselvesinto four relatively independent factors: Socialsecurity (e.g., “Everyone has the right toan adequate standard of living”);, Civilianconstraint (e.g., “There are times when peopleshould be kept from expressing their opinions”);,Equality (e.g., “Women and men should haveequal rights in divorce”);, and Privacy (e.g., “Aperson’s home is his castle and should not beinterfered with by others”).

The UDHR included a great variety of rightsbecause its writers postulated that these rightscannot successfully exist except in combinationwith each other. “The ideal of free humanbeings enjoying civil and political freedom, andfreedom from fear can only be achieved ifconditions are created whereby everyone mayenjoy his civil and political rights, as well as hissocial, economic, and cultural rights”. In otherwords, the authors of the UNDHR consideredthat the right to privacy and the right to expressone’s opinion cannot be fully experienced apartfrom a context that provides social protection andgender equality. Conversely, they consideredthat racial equality and economic security cannotbe fully appreciated apart from a context offeringpersonal rights.

In the study by Guédez Soares and Mullet(2014), 80 participants living in Caracas,Barquisimeto, or Maracaibo, aged 18-65, werepresented with 36 vignettes composed byorthogonally crossing of the level of four factors:

a) the degree to which the state offers socialprotection to the citizens (not at all,intermediate, or complete);

b) the level of respect for civil libertiesin the country (no respect, intermediate,full respect);

c) the level of civil equality betweencitizens (inequality of rights vs. equalityof rights); and

d) the level of respect for the private life ofthe citizens (no respect for private life vs.full respect for private life).


The republic of Birania guarantees the socialprotection of the citizens. The State ensuresthat all citizens have enough income to enjoya decent way of life and the means to maintainthemselves in good health. Working conditionsare protected. People with handicaps receiveadequate support. Civil liberties are guaranteed.All the people have the right to express theiropinions freely in any circumstance. The mediaare free. The citizens cannot be arrested withouta good reason, and those arrested are entitled tolegal aid. Equality between citizens is formallyguaranteed. Men and women have the samerights. Social minorities are not a target ofany particular discrimination. Religious libertyis guaranteed. All citizens, according to theirmeans, are entitled to own property. In businessthe rule is to pay all workers in an equal way.Finally, private life is fully respected. Thereis not wiretapping. The mail is not opened. Aperson’s home cannot be violated without agood reason. Nobody has the right to intrude onpeople's sexual life. (Guédez Soares and Mullet,2014)

The question was: To what extent do youthink that, in this country, human rights arerespected? Figure 9 shows the main findings.Unsurprisingly, the level of respect for humanrights was considered higher (a) when privatelife was respected in the country than when itwas not; (b) when citizens had equal rights thanwhen they did not; (c) when civil liberty waspresent than when it was absent (M = 1.98); and(not shown) (d) when the social protection of thepopulation was instituted than when it was not.The impact of the social protection factor was,however, weaker than the impact of the otherfactors. The interesting and new finding was that



all these factors interacted. The judgment modelcan, tentatively, be written:

Judged Respect for HR = Privacy x CivilLiberties x Equality x Social Protection

Figure 9Patterns of results observed on the wholesample

In each panel, (a) the mean respect for humanrights judgments are on the y-axis; (b) the three

levels of respect for civil liberties are on thex-axis; and (c) the two curves correspond to

the two levels of respect for private life. Eachpanel corresponds to one level of equality

Source: own work

Lay people in Venezuela considered that (a)enjoying one basic right (e.g., enjoying freedomof speech) is better than enjoying no right atall, that enjoying two basic rights is better thanenjoying just one, and so on; (b) enjoying anyright at an intermediate level (e.g., enjoyingsome civil liberty) is not very different fromnot enjoying this right, although it is better; and(c) only the complete enjoyment of all basicrights can be considered as truly enjoyment ofhuman rights. Lay people in Venezuela endorse,to a reasonable extent, the view that humanrights cannot be divided, in accordance withthe UNDHR (1996) preamble quoted above.They did not consider, however, that incompleteenjoyment of rights has no value at all.

The seemingly lower impact of socialprotection as compared with other basic rightsmay be explained by the fact that in relativelypoor countries, some rights are easier toimplement than others. Even in a very poor

country, equality between genders or equalitybetween ethnic groups can be instituted by law,even if not easily realized. Even in a very poorcountry, the state and the police can respect theright of all people to privacy, at least to a largeextent. In contrast, building a system of socialprotection supposes adequate funding, whichmany states cannot afford or cannot fully afford.This may explain why, from the viewpoint ofpeople living in a country that is rich but stilldeveloping, this basic right is not considered asfundamental in the same way as the others.

In summary

Regarding the domain of care, there was a largeconsensus among participants from Angola,Mozambique and France that the moral duty ofthe powerful is to protect the weak. Powerfulstates were expected (a) to prevent mass killingsat the hands of sociopathic governments infragile countries, and (b) to care for theircitizens’ health, even against their citizens’will (e.g., illicit substance consumers). Therewere, however, limits as regards the meansused for protection. Protective measures mustbe proportional to the real threat. Protectivemeasures should not lead people to think they candispense with taking care of themselves.

As for the domain of fairness, there wasalso a large consensus among participants fromTogo, Rwanda, and Martinique on the ideathat the moral duty of the powerful is, first ofall, to acknowledge publicly the harm that hasbeen inflicted on the weak, even if this harmwas inflicted by the powerful. Fairness cannotbe achieved by monetary compensation alone:Distributive justice without restorative justice isnot fairness. Fairness can also not be achievedby designating as culpable by association thosepeople who were not born at the time the harmwas inflicted,; that is, the powerful must alsoprotect the weak from such misattribution ofguilt.

There was also a large consensus amongpeople from Bogota that unconditionallyforgiving the perpetrator of violence against a



family member during a civil war is nothingelse than betrayal. To remain loyal to this familymember’s memory implies fulfilling a seriesof conditions, namely that the perpetrator hasrealized he did a terrible thing and that he wasnot involved in the decision process leading tothe crime.

French and Colombian participants did nothesitate to express views that were at variancewith official policies on the control of the sale ofdrugs. In fact, only a minority of them endorsedthe complete prohibition policy instituted bytheir democratically elected government. Thisdoes not mean that these participants had norespect for political authorities. A majority ofthe French, in particular, were in agreement withpolicies established in the neighboring states ofthe Netherlands and Switzerland.

Unsurprisingly, disgusting acts such as rapeor murder, as well as corrupt behaviors fromthe part of powerful people, were consideredas intolerable and severely punishable by avery huge majority of participants in India andColombia. In some places, the level of disgust issuch that the death penalty was approved by alarge majority of people.

Finally, very clear views were expressed byVenezuelan participants about the indivisibilityof human rights. They asserted that liberty cannotbe attributed bit by bit, and that one kind of rightcannot be fully enjoyed in separation from otherhuman rights. Participants were, however, wiseenough to consider that having incomplete rightsis better than having no rights at all.

Our hope is that the set of societal issuesthat have been explored so far using the IITframework will be extended by the many youngpeople who attend the Biennial InternationalConference on Information Integration Theory.Issues such as social security (the care domain);institutional racism and institutional sexism(the fairness domain); whistle blowing (theloyalty domain); violence, non-violence andresistance to oppression (the authority domain);prostitution and torture (the disgust domain);or civil disobedience (the liberty domain);should profitably be explored. The present setof studies illustrates the potential usefulness

of a complementary way to investigate publicopinion, a way that focuses on opinion structure—by using multiple structured inputs, withoutneglecting opinion diversity— by using clusteranalysis. IIT and cluster analysis potentiatetheir usefulness: Cluster analysis helps IITdetermine the level of individual differences inpublic opinion while IIT increases the level ofresolution at which clusters (public’s variouspositions) may be interpreted.

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Notes

* Research article. This paper was writtenin colaboration with Prof. Wilson López-López, Editor in Chief of UniversitasPsychologica . Regular double-blind peerreview was held by guest editors. Noconflicts of interest declared.

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