Ethics and the Ethics and the Treatment of AnimalsTreatment of Animals

Copyright © 2004 by Donald C. Hubin

2006 Revised by Makoto Suzuki

Moral Problems About The Treatment of Animals: Examples

The Moral Status of Cruel Treatments of Animals for fun (bullfights, cockfights, and perhaps trainings in circuses)

The Moral Status of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO: AKA factory farming)

The Moral Status of Eating Meats (esp. meats made through CAFO)

The Moral Status of Selling and Buying Furs The Moral Status of Animal Experimentations The Moral Status of Hunting, Fishing etc. The Moral Status of Euthanasia for Strays

Changing Western Conceptions of Changing Western Conceptions of our Relation to the Rest of Natureour Relation to the Rest of Nature

Man’s Dominion Classical Cartesianism The Great Chain of Being “Scientific” Conceptions

““Man’s DominionMan’s Dominion”(Singer, 289-91) Genesis Quote

Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.”

-Genesis 1:26

““Man’s DominionMan’s Dominion” Genesis Quote

– Two Interpretations:Unrestrained (Proprietary) RightsStewardship

Unrestrained (Proprietary) RightsUnrestrained (Proprietary) Rights

No limitations on how we treat nonhuman animals except that we must not treat animals in a way that harms other humans.

Nonhuman animals are of no intrinsic moral significance.

Unrestrained (Proprietary) RightsUnrestrained (Proprietary) Rights

“It matters not how a man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man’s power.”

St. Thomas Aquinas1225 - 1274

Saint Thomas Aquinas:

Stewardship (Singer, 292; Stewardship (Singer, 292; Callicott, 340)Callicott, 340)

The fruits of the Earth (including nonhuman animals) are entrusted to us for our gentle usage for our benefit.

StewardshipStewardship

Proverbs: “The righteous man regardeth the life of his beast.”

1181 - 1226

St. Francis of Assisi

Classical Cartesianism (Singer, 285)Classical Cartesianism (Singer, 285)

Consciousness is a property of immaterial soul.

Unlike humans, non-human animals have no immaterial soul.

————— Therefore, nonhuman

animals are not conscious.

1569-1650

Doubts about Cartesian ArgumentDoubts about Cartesian Argument About premise 1 (“Consciousness is a property of

immaterial soul.”): unless a certain part of brain functions, people lack consciousness.

About premise 2 (“Unlike humans, non-human animals have no immaterial soul.”): no scientific evidence; not even universal religious support (e.g., Eastern Religions)

About conclusion (“Non-human animals are not conscious.”): this seems to conflict with evidence of animal suffering. (Singer, 285)– Behavioral similarity with humans– Physiological similarity with humans

Remember that animals experiments provide insights about human physiology and medicine precisely because the experimented animals are physiologically similar.

The Great Chain of Being The Great Chain of Being (Singer, 291-2)(Singer, 291-2)

Humans are the highest creatures in the worldly “pecking order”.– Either

the “Crown of Creation” (the Creationist World Order) or

the “Culmination of Evolution” (Scientific Phylogeny)

The Great Chain of BeingThe Great Chain of Being

Implications for our Use of Animals– What is an evil to nonhuman animals

may be justified by serving the interests of “higher” beings. (That would be us.) This is for the greater overall good.

Problems for the Great Problems for the Great Chain of Being ViewChain of Being View

1. The idea of higher and lower beings fits best (maybe only) with a creationist conception.

2. It is not necessarily true that humans are the highest beings in the chain. If not, would it be permissible for higher beings to use us?

Scientific ConceptionsScientific Conceptions All living species are equally

“evolved” Our “higher” faculties are those that

we prize, perhaps justifiably, but they are “selected” by evolution only because they have survival value—just as with the teeth of sharks.

Changing Scientific ConceptionsChanging Scientific Conceptions Reasoning: Ability to Solve Problems

– Not unique to humans; chimps solve puzzles to get suspended bananas.

Tool Making and Using– Not unique to humans

Emotions:– Physiological similarity (the existence of the brain

part called diencephalon) and behavioral similarity to humans in response to certain stimuli suggest that mammals and birds have basic emotions (anger, fear, disgust, sadness etc.) or at least their prototypes. (See, for example, Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 1995.)

Animal Tool Use

Other Examples– Chimpanzee Stone Tool

s– Bonobo Chimpanzee St

one Tools– More on the Bonobo Ch

imps Stone Tools– Chimpanzee Stick Tools

Chimpanzees making stick tools to extract insects from their nests.

Changing Scientific Changing Scientific ConceptionsConceptions

Language Use– Perhaps not unique to humans (See

Singer, 301-2; a matter of serious debate.)

Prostitution– Not unique to humans

Nonhuman Animal Language?

Clever Hans, the Wonder Horse Serious Contenders:

– Koko—and more about Koko– Washoe– Kanzi

General Articles– “Primate Use of Language” – “The Question of Animal Language”

Grounds for Concern about the Grounds for Concern about the Treatment of AnimalsTreatment of Animals Religious Ecological Moral

– Indirect: based on effects on humans– Direct: based directly on the effects

on nonhuman animals

Religious GroundsReligious Grounds

Examples:– Hindu Prohibition on Killing Cows– Stewardship Conception of our

Relation to the Earth

Ecological GroundsEcological Grounds

Misuse of nonhuman animal resources causes destruction to the environment and reduction in the bio-diversity of the planet.

Indirect Moral GroundsIndirect Moral Grounds

Effects on HumansEffects on Humans

– Ecological effects of harming nonhuman Ecological effects of harming nonhuman animals will harm humans.animals will harm humans.

– The “Spillover Effect” of cruelty on The “Spillover Effect” of cruelty on humans: Kant and Aquinas (Singer, 292-humans: Kant and Aquinas (Singer, 292-3)3)

Direct Moral GroundsDirect Moral Grounds

Nonhuman Animals have “Moral Nonhuman Animals have “Moral Standing”Standing”– The treatment of nonhuman Animals The treatment of nonhuman Animals

is of is of direct (direct (or or intrinsic) intrinsic) moral moral significance.significance.

The Thought ExperimentThe Thought Experiment Imagine:Imagine:

– No deityNo deity– No adverse ecological effectsNo adverse ecological effects– No adverse effects on other humansNo adverse effects on other humans– Complete secrecyComplete secrecy

Does it then matter morally whether a Does it then matter morally whether a person slowly tortures a dog because it person slowly tortures a dog because it entertains him?entertains him?

Justifying Direct Moral Concern Justifying Direct Moral Concern for Nonhuman Animalsfor Nonhuman Animals

Difficulty of proving that non-human animals have moral standings.– Well, it is also hard to “prove” that humans

have moral standings. Strategy for establishing the moral standing

of non-human animals: demonstrate the inadequacy of attempts to show that they do not morally matter.

Justifying The Exclusive Justifying The Exclusive Importance of HumansImportance of Humans

This is usually done by appeal to some special abilities and characteristics that humans have.

Appeals to Special AbilitiesAppeals to Special Abilities

Only humans have moral standings because they have special abilities or characteristics.

Suggested Special Abilities:– Intelligence, self-awareness, capacity

to communicate, capacity to morally evaluate actions

Appeals to Special AbilitiesAppeals to Special Abilities

Often seems morally irrelevant– Bentham Quote

“The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”

1748-1832

Appeals to Special AbilitiesAppeals to Special Abilities

Always too narrow or too broad (or both) to include all humans and exclude all non-humans. (Singer, 294)– Too Narrow

Example: “Ability to reason”, or “ability to use language,” would leave out human infants and some severely retarded humans.

– Too Broad Example: “Consciousness of environment” would

include many non-human animals.

Analysis of “Breadth” ProblemAnalysis of “Breadth” Problem

Level of S, the“Special Ability”

humans

nonhumans

Special Abilities, Special Abilities, Thought ExperimentThought Experiment

Imagine that you, or someone you love, loses the capacity that you have identified as the “special ability” necessary for moral standing. Does it then not matter morally how you, or your loved one, is treated?– Example: Experimenting on your brain-

damaged child.

Is it OK to Kill Non-Human Animals Painlessly? (Singer, 300-4)

If it is established that non-human animals have moral standings, then there is something intrinsically bad about inflicting pain or suffering on non-human animals.

But it does not follow that (1) nonhuman animals have moral rights to life, or that (2) it’s wrong to kill them painlessly. (Singer, 304)

If you support the notion of moral rights to life, consider whether (1) is true, i.e., whether some non-human animals pass the correct criterion of moral personhood.

Singer’s View (296-4, and 318n38) If you are skeptical of the notion of moral rights, ignore the

dispute about whether (1) nonhuman animals have moral rights to life.

You should then, as Singer does, think directly about whether (2) it’s wrong to kill them painlessly.

One plausible approach is to consider whether what makes killing a man (normally) wrong exists in killing of some non-human animals.

Singer thinks the wrongness consists in (a) frustrating his desire to continue his life as well as (b) other fellow beings’ fear and anxiety over the prospect of being killed as he is.

Singer thinks as for some primates, whales and dolphins, both (a) and (b) occur. This makes killing them (for food or experiment) normally wrong!