. Assignment Cover Sheet

Student name: Rohan Dutt

Student number: 18279623

Unit name and number: Professional Practice and Communication

Tutorial group:

Tutorial day and time:

Lecturer/Tutor: Dr Rhys Tague

Title of assignment: Ethical Report

Length:

Date due: 23.10.2015

Date submitted: 23.10.2015

Campus enrolment: Penrith

Declaration: I hold a copy of this assignment if the original is lost or damaged I hereby certify that no part of this assignment or product has been copied from any other student’s work or from any other source except where due acknowledgement is made in the assignment No part of the assignment/product has been written/produced for me by any other person except where collaboration has been authorised by the subject lecturer/tutor concerned I am aware that this work will be reproduced and submitted to plagiarism detection software programs for the purpose of detecting possible plagiarism (which may retain a copy on its database for future plagiarism checking)

Note: An examiner or lecturer/tutor has the right to not mark this assignment if the above declaration has not been signed.

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Rohan Dutt18279623

10/23/2015

ETHICAL REPORT

ABSTRACT

The aim of this report is to investigate “The Collapse of Hyatt Regency Walkway”, Hyatt Regency Kansas

City in Kansas City, Missouri, United States. On July 17, 1981, Hyatt Hotel hosted a tea party in the

Hotel’s multi-story lobby which was attended by more than 1500 people. Little did they know that the

events that were about to occur in a few moments will leave them shaken and scarred for life.

Construction difficulties in the making of that hotel had resulted in a faulty design which led to the

loosening of the suspension rods holding a walkway. The collapse of this walkway resulted in another

collapse of another walkway. This whole incident left 114 people dead and over 200 people injured. In

this report we will discuss the structural and ethical aspects of this horrific incident. Also, we will discuss

about the railway accident that occurred on 18th January 1977 at Granville, Sydney, Australia. The

incident took place on a busy Tuesday morning at 08:10 when this crowded passenger train was

approaching the Granville station.

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ContentsINTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................................1

IN-DEPTH STUDY..........................................................................................................................................3

Construction Aspect................................................................................................................................3

Structural Aspect.....................................................................................................................................4

The proposed design...........................................................................................................................4

The actual design.................................................................................................................................5

Aftermath................................................................................................................................................6

GRANVILLE RAIL DISASTER...........................................................................................................................7

Introduction.............................................................................................................................................7

Background..............................................................................................................................................7

Aftermath................................................................................................................................................8

CONCLUSION...............................................................................................................................................9

BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................................................................................10

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INTRODUCTIONHyatt is one of the most prestigious, well-know and grand hotel in the world. Hyatt has built famous

hotels across the globe and is well known for its first class costumer service. Hyatt is also named as the

World’s Best Multinational Workplaces by Great Place to Work by the Fortune Magazine (Tullier, 2015).

Hyatt Hotels Corporation was formed in Sept, 1957. After 8 months and 20 years, they started the

construction of the Hyatt Regency Hotel on May, 1978 (Mays, 2006).

On October 14, 1979, due to lack of inspection by the structural engineers, Gallium-Colaco Inc. (G.C.E.),

(due to the fact that the owner, Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation, did not allow it to cut

expenses), more than 29000 m3 atrium roof made entirely of glass collapsed. Fortunately no one was

injured and the incident was subdued by the authorities (Mays, 2006). The Hotel opened after one year

of this incident.

The structure of the 40 story Hyatt Regency hotel was designed by Gallium-Colaco Inc. (G.C.E.). The hotel

was divided into three main sections: a high-rise tower section, a function block, and a connecting open

atrium area. The main attraction of the hotel was the atrium lobby spanned by three walkways at the

2nd floor, 3rd floor and 4th floor hanging by the roof. The walkways were considered to be a great

location to watch any event happening in the atrium below. On 17th July, a tea dance party, with 1940s

era theme, was hosted by the Hotel at the lobby and over 1500 people were invited. Mostly families

attended the party as this was a family and friends function for those who were regular customers or

were member of the hotel’s club. The dinner feast, buffet was also organized and was being held in the

adjacent atrium. The party started at 1800hrs. After an hour, when the tea and snacks had been

consumed and many guests had retired either for a smoke or for dinner, the remaining guests started

dancing and singing. Many guests of the hotel gathered on the skywalks to watch, enjoy and even to

dance on the 2nd and the 4th floor skywalks. (Marshall, et al., 1982)

Due to many people on the skywalks, it overloaded as result of overloading of the connectors supporting

the ceiling rod holding both the walkways. These walkways were walkways were made of steel, concrete

and glass and weighed 29000kg. These two vertically deadly walkways collapsed onto the first floor

atrium below where approximately 1500 people were gathered for the event leaving 111 people dead

and 219 injured. Three deaths were added later for people who succumbed to death later in the

hospital. The orientation of these walkways was from north-west to south-east. The orientation of the

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other two walkways on the 4rd and the 5th floor was completely opposite and it was hanging separately

from the atrium roof trusses. (Marshall, et al., 1982)

Within minutes of the collapse, the emergency services reached the location and so did the press. The

rescue operation went on for at least 14 hours and was being supervised by the chief of emergency

medical system Dr. Joseph Waeckerle. The rescue operation was carried out by more than 100

emergency workers, which included crews from EMS units, fire fighters and doctors. The construction

workers from the Children’s Macy School were about to finish their shifts when they heard the loud

explosion of the crash. They rushed to the hotel to find the ground floor covered in debris. They were

the first to start clearing the area and helping people. Also, volunteers from the building-supply stores,

and the Kansas City’s natural disaster response team were also a part of the rescue team. Hotel’s

driveway and front lawn was used as a triage area for helping the wounded that needed the greatest

medical care. Dead Bodies were dismembered using chain saw to reach out the survivors among the

wreckage and many victims were amputated on the spot. The greatest challenge during the rescue

operation was the hotel’s severed sprinkler system by the debris, which flooded the lobby as it was

trapped by the front door, endangering the life of trapped survivors by drowning. The water pipes were

linked directly to the water tanks and not to a public supply and to stop the flow a bulldozer was used to

smash through the front door which redirected the water out of the atrium lobby. The power was cut

immediately to avoid any fire making the rescue operation complicated. (Marshall, et al., 1982)

Mark William, the last survivor of the Hyatt Skywalk disaster, was stuck beneath the lowermost beam

from the 3rd skywalk. He was nearly drowned in the water from the sprinklers. The bulldozer crashed the

front gate just in time and he survived the first hurdle. Next, he lost both his legs out of the sockets and

spent 10 hours under the 5000kg slab of concrete (McGuire, 1989). The Author cited here is herself a

survivor and lost her two sons in this horrific incident. The deaths included 18 pairs of husbands and

wives.

This was the most destructive and deadliest structural collapse ever to take place in the history of

United States of America until the collapse of WTC in 2001. (Swift, 2005).

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IN-DEPTH STUDYFirst we will study the organizations involved in the construction and the design of the Atrium and the

Hotel to understand the Structural Aspects more carefully.

Construction Aspect

The Hyatt Regency Hotel venture was a 750-room hotel started by the owner Crown Center

Redevelopment Corporation. Gallium-Colaco Inc. (G.C.E.) were the engineering firm who built the entire

structure and layout while the Havens Steel Company were the fabricators who were manufacturing the

materials as and when required for the project. Jack D. Gillum and Daniel M. Duncan were the state

licensed structural engineers. PBNDML Architects, Planners, Inc. was the architect and they made the

entire bulk of over 600 drawings to be used in the constructions. The construction included a high-rise

40 story tower which contained the rooms built with 28 standard rooms on each from floors 1 st to 20th

floor, 15 Deluxe rooms on each floor from 21st to 30th floor and 4 superior suits on each floor from 31st

to 40th floor. It also contained a function block connected by a centrally located open concept atrium.

The atrium had three walkways that joined the hotel to the other facilities on second floor, third floor

and fourth floor. The atrium was 145 feet long, 117 feet wide and 50 feet high. While the hotel was

under construction an accident in October, 1979 happened when 2,700 square feet of the atrium roof

had fallen due to the failure of one of the connectors at its northern end, and as directed by the

investigation committee G.C.E vowed that they had reviewed the design and all the connections in the

atrium. Despite of all the delays hotel was officially opened for business in July, 1980.

At the time of collapse, 4th floor walkway held 40 people and 2nd floor walkway approximately 100

people jumping, standing and swaying as they watched the dance contest, even though as per the

Kansan city building codes the upper limit was of 16. This further weakened the connectors as the

weight bared by the connectors was almost double the capacity. On 17 th July 1981 at 7:05pm the

connectors between the fourth and second floor walkway support beams and tie rods failed as they

could not the handle the burden of both the walkways, and the fourth floor walkway collapsed on the

second floor walkway and they both further fell on the crowded atrium lobby floor below.

The crash of the walkway was not a result of an inventive design or a construction failure or use of poor

quality of material but it was mainly due to the lack of proper communication and management

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miscalculation between the fabricator and structural engineers. Both the parties were equally

responsible for the disaster as they overlooked the building code of Kansas City. (Heausler, 2003)

Next, we will study the structural aspects of the collapse as this would help us investigate further into

what happened and who is to blame for all the bodies cut in half, broken necks, broken backs, severed

limbs and shattered lives. This is also necessary as to avoid such situation in the future.

Structural Aspect

The proposed design of the walkways was:

(Piotr&

Taylor, 2000)

A box beam made of two C-Sections rests on two wide flanged beams on either side of the walkway. Both were made of Hot-Rolled Steel

A clip connects the two top flanges of the C-Sections using welded-bolted connection

Welded Gusset Plate and a sliding bearing supported each ends of the walkway

Each box beam of the walkway was supported by a washer and nut which was threaded onto the supporting rod.

The supporting/suspension rods were drilled through the channels for the support

The box beam consisted of two 8 x 8.5 MC channels

Due to several events and disputed conversation between engineering firm and fabricator and

construction difficulties, the walkway was re-design from a one hanger-rod to a two hanger-rod,

because the fabricator didn’t want to work on the rod that long at the risk of it getting damaged in the

shipment or installation and also wanted to avoid the expenses and difficulty of using non standard

parts while installing the nuts. It then looked like an adequate solution, making the design easier for

fabrication and installation and assumed as the same size rod were being installed for both fourth and

second floor walkways, rods would be able to carry the load though it did not calculate the amount of

load that would be placed upon the nuts on the bottom side of the upper walkway’s beams (Piotr &

Taylor, 2000).

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The actual design consisted of:

(Piotr&

Taylor, 2000)

Two different suspension rods were tied to the box due to inaccuracy in the construction

The bottom end of the rod coming from the top was fixed at the bottom flange of the box section and the other way around for the rod coming from below

Another rod was added for support, the load on the connectors (nuts) which was connecting the fourth

floor walkway segments increased as it was now carrying the load of both fourth floor and second floor

walkways.

Firstly, as per the design calculations the design capacity of the rods was 90kN but the new method used

to avoid the extra work which would have to be done in order to fix it increase the load to more than

double load than was intended.

Secondly, in addition to the surplus load, the two holes that were drilled so close to each other in order

to make the rods pas through greatly broke the uniformity of the section. The small amount of steel in

between those holes was subjected to a large shear force when large load was applied.

Lastly, the poor communication and the small feuds between the Havens and G.C.E acted as fuel in the

already weakened section. If it were for good communication skills, this problem would have been

caught and brought about before the disaster. The drawings prepared by structural engineers were not

finalized and the G.C.E constructed the steel sections without the shop drawings assuming fabricator

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would work out the details of the design but Havens interpreted it to be the final drawing and acted

upon it. Another blunder was of G.C.E. was it failed to assess the final design before stamping it which

would have helped them to identify the mistake which added up the load on the connectors (Piotr &

Taylor, 2000).

Aftermath

The Missouri State licensing board convicted the structural engineering firm Gallium-Colaco Inc. (G.C.E.)

and their civil engineers who approved the final drawings without reviewing for gross negligence,

unprofessionalism, misconduct in following the engineering standards and failure to adhere to the

building codes. The engineering license and the membership with American Society of Civil Engineering

(ASCE) were cancelled permanently. (G.C.E.) which was also booked under criminal negligence was

discharged of the charges but their accreditation to be an engineering firm was permanently revoked in

the state of Missouri and Texas. In both settlements and judgments following the civil lawsuits an

estimated amount $140 million was given to the victims and their families.

After the disaster, Kansas City took some major measures to refurbish their building regulations and

instructed that a state appointed engineer approval is must before the approval of the city. Even ASCE

changed some of their codes and rules and stated that when any building plan is stamped and approved

by an engineer, it is their direct duty to ensure that the approved plans are flawless, effective meeting

the building codes and the details in the blueprints are followed in the course of with what is actually

built.

The Hyatt Regency in Kansas City is still in business, was renamed and renovated several times since the

collapse. They retained the same layout and design of the lobby with walkways supported by columns

rather than hanging from the ceiling.

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GRANVILLE RAIL DISASTERIntroduction

This reports talks about the railway accident that occurred on 18th January 1977 at Granville, Sydney,

Australia. The incident took place on a busy Tuesday morning at 08:10 when this crowded passenger

train was approaching the Granville station. The train derailed while taking a left-hand curve near the

station and ran into the steel pillar supporters of a road bridge above. The bridge collapsed on two of

the runway carriages leaving 83 people dead and more than 200 injured. This was considered to be the

Australia’s worse train disaster and led to a significant increase in the budget of rail-safety and

maintenance (BOMAN , 1979).

Background

Like any normal day the eight carriage passenger train hauled by an electric engine No. 4620, loaded

with the commuters left mount Victoria station in Blue Mountains on 18th Jan’77 at 06:08am for

Granville Station in western Sydney. The train was running at the highest speed allowed on that railway

track. At approximately 08:10am, 25min away from the destination the train while passing a left hand

curve before the Granville station derailed and the engine crashed into one of the supporting pillars of

the Bold Street Bridge above. The first carriage carrying 73 passengers was dragged along with the

engine collided with the mast and both stopped at a point beyond the bridge and fell on its right side.

The second carriage carrying 64 passengers carried along with the first one came to rest safely against

the wall some distance behind the first one leaving no serious injuries to the passengers but the vehicle.

The remaining six carriages remained on the tracks and stopped with leaving rear of third and front of

fourth carriage with 77 and 64 passengers respectively underneath the weakened bridge. As the pillar

of the estimated 600 tons bridge was hit with a great force the bridge was not steady and bridge along

with the cars and other vehicles crashed onto the third and fourth carriages under it. More than half of

the passengers travelling in these two carriages were crushed and died instantly.

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The rescue work proceeded immediately. The biggest challenge was to remove the debris and rescue

the injured from carriage third and fourth without compromising the steadiness of what remained of the

bridge endangering the life of rescuers and survivors. The rescue team began by cutting the road bed or

bridge deck which had completely collapsed on the carriage in one piece and could not be moved using

the cranes. The survivors trapped under the concrete were amputated by the rescue team; priests were

called on the site to perform the last rituals for the victims (Lundin , 2006) (Watson, 2015).

In addition to the crash another danger soon became evident, The LPG cylinders – carried round the

year in the train to provided heating in winters. The gas started leaking from the cylinders and damaged

pipes. The risk of gas explosion prevented the use of cutting and other rescue machines as they were

producing sparks. To avoid the explosion the gas was dispersed using ventilating equipment’s and water

being sprayed constantly on the site. The rescue operation went on for 2 days and ended on Thursday

morning at 06:00 (BOMAN , 1979).

Aftermath

A team of experts were appointment to find the root cause of the disaster. According to the inquiry

team the main cause was the bad condition of permanent way and poor fastening of the track due to

the lack of timely maintenance and inspection. It was also found that the tracks was too wide causing it

to spread and letting the left wheel of the engine to derail. Also the rim on the front wheel of the engine

was already in bad shape by the immoderate exertion, and same was the case with the tracks. (BOMAN ,

1979)

Further another factor numbered was the structure and design of the bridge. It is said that the bridge

was found to be 1metre lower than the road while it was being built. To cover up concrete was added

on the top to level the surface up with the road. It was concluded that this extra load added to the

obliteration of the train carriages. No evidence could hold the train driver responsible for the disaster

and was vindicated by the inquiry. As a consequence this accident resulted in significant increase in the

rail-maintenance budget (BOMAN , 1979).

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CONCLUSION

The Hyatt Regency Hotel, Kansas city collapsed was largely because of the flaw in design which involved

the hanger rods holding the structure in place. The connectors holding these rods failed. The inspection

committee concluded that this disaster was result of a pure negligence on the end of the engineering

team. In the proposed design there was a miscalculation of the weight of the walkways and the capacity

of the nuts to bear them. As per the investigation the walkways failed to meet the requirements of

Kansas City building codes and would have eventually failed.

Accidents like this can be prevented as this was a case of total negligence from both the Engineering

Firm and fabricators involved in the construction of the Hotel. The work of civil engineers typically

doesn’t end with the completion of construction documents but has to be involved throughout the

construction process to avoid any such disasters. Fabricators are non-engineering professionals with

construction experience but can’t calculate the effect of the changes in the design or structure of a

building. Had the G.C.E engineers responsible for this design completed their job this accident could

have easily been avoided.

Further another factor numbered was the structure and design of the bridge. It is said that the bridge

was found to be 1metre lower than the road while it was being built. To cover up concrete was added

on the top to level the surface up with the road. It was concluded that this extra load added to the

obliteration of the train carriages. No evidence could hold the train driver responsible for the disaster

and was vindicated by the inquiry. As a consequence this accident resulted in significant increase in the

rail-maintenance budget.

As we can see in both the cases the only cause of the disasters are the negligence and

miscommunication from the end of engineers. This is not only ethical and morally wrong but also illegal.

When a structural engineer is handled the responsibility of designing and analysis of a structure, he is

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also given the responsibility of public safety. Keep general feuds aside, all the organizations involved in

both the scenarios are held responsible, as it is their responsibility for good communication between

their colleagues and their working organizations. When we take the implicit social contract between

engineers and society, the issue of public risk and informed consent, and codes of ethics of professional

societies into account, it seems clear that the engineer must assume this responsibility when any change

in design involving public safety carries a licensed engineer's seal.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBOMAN , B., 1979. BEHAVIOURAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE GRANVILLE TRAIN DISASTER AND THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF STRESS FOR PSYCHIATRY. Pergamon Press Ltd, Volume 13A, pp. 463-471.

Heausler, T. F., 2003. The 1981 Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse, A Disaster, But Not a Tragedy, s.l.: s.n.

Lundin , T., 2006. In: Train disaster survivors: Long-term effects on mental health and well-being. Sydney:

John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, pp. 12-20.

Marshall, R. D. et al., 1982. Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse,

Washington: National Bureau of Standards Building Science Series 143.

Mays, B., 2006. Introduction to the Case. Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse, Issue 2006.

McGuire, D., 1989. 20 years later: Fatal disaster remains impossible to forget. CITY IN SHOCK, pp. 1-5.

Piotr, M. D. & Taylor, R. K., 2000. ENGINEERING PROCESS FAILURE—HYATT WALKWAY COLLAPSE.

JOURNAL OF PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES, 14(2), pp. 46-50.

Swift, B., 2005. Man-Made Disasters. 911-Research, pp. 1-5.

Tullier, D., 2015. newsroom. [Online]

Available at: https://www.google.com.au/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-

8#safe=active&q=accessed%20meaning

[Accessed 16 10 2015].

Watson, V., 2015. Granville train disaster book's 'new evidence'. [Online]

Available at: http://www.parramattasun.com.au/story/2810581/granville-train-disaster-books-new-

evidence/

[Accessed 12 January 2015].

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