Et article-that-sinking-feeling

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HIS IS IT. WE HAVE CASH TILL THE END OF February or early March. If collections do not pick up by then, we will have to shut down." This doomsday scenario is prophesised by Shiv Narain, chief financial officer of Spandana Sphoorty Financial, India's second largest microfinance institution. For each of the last eight years, Spandana reported growth in excess of 100%. Yet, today, it stands pushed to the brink, by the very state that embraced it in the first place: Andhra Pradesh. Half of Spandana's Rs 4,000 crore lending is to borrowers in Andhra. Over the last three months, says Narain, it has not received a penny on about Rs 1,300 crore of those loans. The freeze is the fallout of a state law that was drafted in the wake of borrower suicides, allegedly because of coercive practices of MFIs. The law was intended to check MFI excesses, but it has ended up checking all MFI activity. Micro-loan borrowers, mostly poor women, were already distressed because of a dip in their incomes and the multiple loans they were servicing. Cushioned by the new law, provoked by local politicians and emboldened by the prevailing climate of antipathy towards MFIs, they have stopped repaying. "The industry is based on expectations," says Sanjay Sinha, whose company does credit ratings for MFIs. "When borrowers expect more loans, they will repay. But when they know they won't receive more, they will stop repaying." That's what a majority of borrowers have done in Andhra, pushing a large, profitable, cash- rich MFI like Spandana to the edge. If that's the plight of India's second largest MFI, half of whose portfolio is locked in Andhra, how are smaller MFIs with an equal or larger exposure to the state doing? Even worse. They could tip over anytime. "Our money for repayment of bank loans will run out in January," says Kishore Kumar Puli, managing director, Trident Microfin, 70% of whose Rs 160 crore loan portfolio is in Andhra. "I foresee nothing less than the death of the small MFI," says SC Hassain, president and CEO of Star MicroFin Service Society, whose entire `20 crore loan portfolio is in the state. Judgement day is two days away. January 15 will be three months since Andhra issued the contentious 10-page ordinance. In the lending business, three months is the first threshold of failure — that's when lenders have to start making provisions for bad loans, which reduces their profits. Unless normalcy returns in Andhra, for both MFIs and banks, the signs are ominous. S O FAR, MFIS HAVE BEEN SEEING A shortfall in interest income and cash, since October. A report by credit-rating firm Crisil, released in November, said collec- tions in Andhra had fallen below 20% of the loan amount due, from 99% just before the ordinance was issued. Some MFIs say the collection rate has fallen further. Star MicroFin Society is a small NGO-MFI, with a loan portfolio of Rs 20 crore in Kurnool and Ananthapur districts in Andhra. It has 35,000 borrowers, 100 staff members and 11 branches. "In our 15 years, we always had 100% repayment," says Hassain. "Now, our repayment is down to zero in urban areas and 2% in rural ones." Similarly, Trident has seen its collections in Andhra drop from Rs 22 crore in September to Rs 17 crore in October, to `2 crore in November, to `1.6 crore in December. The income and cash shortfall was the first hit for MFIs, and will show up in their results from the December quarter. January 15 onwards, MFIs will feel the second hit: provisioning. Under the rules set by the Reserve Bank of India, the central bank, if an MFI does not receive interest income for three months, it has to provide for 10% of the loan amount. By a crude calculation, for Spandana, that works out to be about `133 crore - 65% of its net profit for 2009-10. Unless collections resume, Sinha, managing director of Micro-Credit Ratings International Limited (M-Cril), says no microfinance player with operations in Andhra will report profits in the year ended March 2011 —a first for the industry. What's happening in Andhra affects virtually every MFI, in varying degrees. Andhra leads all states in micro-loans, with a share of 35%. Now, it has an ordinance that requires MFIs to take govern- ment approval before granting a loan, bans weekly collection of dues, and stops lenders from collecting instalment from a borrower's house. Basically, it makes it almost impossible for MFIs to do business. A private banker says MFIs have barely given 100 new loans since the ordinance came in. "On November 27, we decided to test the new process and applied for clearance for 162 loans," says MR Rao, CEO of SKS Microfinance. "We heard from the government on December 24, saying that just 29 loans had been approved." B ANKS WILL FEEL THE TRICKLE- down effect of MFI distress, as the three-month provisioning rule applies to them too. According to Nabard, as of March 2010, the banking sector had lent `20,000 crore to MFIs. "When the ordinance was issued, it was `25,000-28,000 crore," says Sinha. "Of this, about 35% is in Andhra." On a base of Rs 25,000 crore, that is `8,750 crore. If only 20% of that is being serviced, as Crisil says, then Rs 7,000 crore is under stress. A 10% provisioning would mean an expenditure of Rs 700 crore by MFIs. For banks, it could be more if MFIs close down. Banks face a tough choice. If they don't re- structure the loans, the MFIs could collapse, saddling banks with huge losses. If they give MFIs additional time to repay, they will have to make big provisions. Plus, unless the freeze in Andhra thaws, they can't be sure if they are throwing good money after bad. On Tuesday, the Indian Banks Association, the nodal industry grouping, asked the RBI to al- low them to reschedule MFI loans without the burden of provisioning. Corporation Bank is one of the rare banks still lending to MFIs. "We have not stopped lending. And the existing loans have not come for renewal," Says RN Pradeep, CMD of Corporation Bank. But several others have stopped. "Banks are not giving us any money at all," says Hassain of Star MicroFin. "Even in the longer term, I do not think they will give any money to smaller MFIs. They will lend only to larger MFIs, who are at the root of all this trouble, with multiple lending and client harassment." "The fund requirement projection of a lot of MFIs is based on high growth paths," says Rakesh Rewari, deputy managing director, Sidbi. "We are asking them to moderate those growth paths." With banks refusing to lend more and collections grinding to a halt, some MFIs are using borrowed funds to repay banks. Not only is this a violation of priority-sector lending norms, sooner rather than later, this will run out. W EEKLY ROTATION OF CASH IS critical to MFI operations — and profitability. Since they are barred from taking cash deposits, MFIs functioning as a non-banking finance company (NBFC) rely on three sources of funds: equity and grants, surplus from past operations, and loans from banks. According to M-Cril's Microfinance Review 2010, bank loans accounted for 71% of MFI funds in 2009-10. An MFI borrows from banks at 11-14% and lends it on, mostly to poor women, at an average lending rate of 28%. Even after accounting for operating expenses, it earns a generous spread. And that's not the only source of its profits. MFIs also profit from rotating the money. MFIs repay banks on a quarterly or half- yearly basis; however, their borrowers repay MFIs on a weekly basis. "The profit comes from the compounding effect, not just by having low distribution costs," says a chartered accountant who has been associat- ed with the industry for 20 years. Say, an MFI borrows `1 lakh from a bank at 10%, with quarterly repayment. The MFI uses the Rs 1 lakh to give 10 micro-loans of Rs 10,000 each, for one year, at an interest rate of 24%. So, it collects `230 as weekly in- stalment from borrowers for 50 weeks — `200 towards principal, `30 towards interest. At the end of the first week, the MFI would have collected `230 each from ten borrowers, or `2,300. But it won't repay the bank for an- other 11 weeks. So, the interest MFI earned in the first week is free capital, which can be lent again. Similarly in the second week, the MFI will not only earn `2,300 from its original borrowers, but also `50 from the `2,300 it had lent from its first week collections. With this cycle of growth disrupt- ed, MFIs are now struggling to repay banks. S ANJAY SINHA, WHO HAS researched poor households, draws on Mughal history to contextualise the current crisis in the MFI industry. Sinha, who claims to have a limited knowledge of history, scopes in on Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor who ruled for half a century, till his death in 1707. About 30 of those 50 years, says Sinha, Aurangzeb spent conquering Golconda, which is near Hyderabad and far away from Delhi, his kingdom's capital. He eventually won Golconda. But while he was waging that wasteful battle, his administration in the hinterland was coming apart, with rebellions in Punjab and other places. At one point of time, his treasury money could not be moved from Delhi to Agra. "The focus on conquering the frontier kingdoms led Aurangzeb to lose the hinterland," says Sinha. "The same thing happened in the microfinance industry, with big lenders chasing growth and expanding aggressively in areas far away from their hin- terland." High growth has its shortcomings, even in a sector that services the poor. "You're bound to acquire garbage when you are driving growth," says Manmath Dalai, managing di- rector of Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank. His company, which operates in two districts in Andhra, has repayment prob- lems in just 1,000 of its 160,000 borrower ac- counts. Unlike most MFIs, which operate as NBFCs, Krishna Bhima operates as a bank. "The poor have respect for the bank tag," he says. "Also, we were collecting repayments on a monthly basis." Most MFIs, though, were dealt a body blow by the ordinance, which effectively barred them from the state. MFIs did not see it coming, as they were focused on growth, with banks willing to lend and private equity (PE) investors ready to invest at generous valuations. Lending to MFIs enabled banks to meet their 40% priority-sector target. Loans given by MFIs to individuals for up to `50,000 qualify as priority-sector lending. So, instead of subscribing to 5-6% bonds issued by Sidbi, which also carries the priority-sector tag, banks preferred lending to MFIs at 11-12%. T Keshava Kumar, deputy general manag- er (credit) with State Bank of Hyderabad (SBH), says banks that lacked a strong presence in Andhra lent to MFIs. SBH's exposure to MFIs, he says, is only Rs 60 crore, that too to the two big ones, SKS and Spandana. Most of its micro-loan portfolio, estimated at around `500 crore, is self- managed or through local area banks, which hasn't seen an upheaval. "If I have direct access to customers and all the other business they will generate over time, why would I go through a third party?" he asks. If banks lent to meet their priority-sector targets, PE funds invested with an over- estimation of market potential. The typical MFI business case says India has 225 million households. About 60%, or 132 million households, don't have access to banking credit. MFIs have reached 25 million households — just one-fifth of the market potential. Sinha of M-Cril says this is an over-estima- tion because MFIs cannot function in many parts of India like the entire northeast, hilly areas, Maoist-affected regions, and some parts of Punjab and Gujarat. "Take those out and the market potential is 50-60 million households," he says. By Sinha's estimation, MFIs have achieved a penetration of 40%. It doesn't merit valuing MFIs at 10 times book value, as PE investors did. "The problems would not have arisen if 35% returns were not promised to PE guys," says Dalai. "Why do you need them if you want to contain growth at the rate at which capital comes in?" Even as MFIs and investors realise this, it might be too late for a small MFI like Star MicroFin, maybe even for medium- sized and large-sized MFIs. With Sangita Mehta That Sinking Feeling THE ECONOMIC TIMES NEW DELHI THURSDAY 13 JANUARY 2011 8 MICROFINANCE CRISIS Since October, MFIs have been seeing a shortfall in interest income and cash. That's the first hit. January 15 onwards, MFIs will feel the second hit: provisioning for bad loans. SOUNDING DEATH KNELL T PORTFOLIO (` CR) COLLECTIONS (%) In AP Elsewhere In AP Elsewhere Impact SKS Microfinance 1,250 3,750 30 99 “Not too bad” Spandana Sphoorty Financial 2,000 2,000 33 99 Risk of closure Trident Microfin 128 32 5 95-99 Bankruptcy by Jan-end SWAWS Credit Corporation 75 25 1 Normal Liquidity risk remains high Star Microfin 20 0 2 Not applicable On the verge of closure Portfolio of SWAWS is as of September 2010; for others, it is current Collections are as a percentage of loans. For SWAWS, it is for November 2010; for others, it is current Source: SWAWS information and impact is from CARE ratings press release; others is from the respective company management Financial institutions Sidbi 3,808.2 421.0 31.7 316.6 State-owned banks Punjab National Bank 1,069.3 3,972.6 0.9 9.4 State Bank of India 876.2 11,733.8 0.3 2.6 IDBI Bank 603.6 1,031.1 2.0 20.5 Syndicate Bank 527.9 814.3 2.3 22.7 Corporation Bank 370.9 1,181.4 1.1 11.0 Private banks HDFC Bank 1,324.0 3,003.7 1.5 15.4 AXIS Bank 1,207.8 2,514.5 1.7 16.8 Yes Bank 397.2 477.7 2.9 29.1 ICICI Bank 371.5 4,670.3 0.3 2.8 Tamilnad Mercantile Bank 236.1 184.5 4.5 44.8 Foreign banks Standard Chartered Bank 253.5 2,127.0 0.4 4.2 RBS 166.6 -104.9 5.6 55.6 BNP Paribas 164.2 180.4 3.2 31.8 Citibank 113.0 860.4 0.5 4.6 Loan figures as of March 2010; net profit for 2009-10 Since RBS posted a loss in 2009-10, the provisioning impact shows accretion to the loss Source: Status of Microfinance in India 2009-10, Nabard; ETIG Database Loan outstanding Net profit Provisioning impact (% of net profit)* (`cr) (`cr) At 10% At 100% Profits and Percentages Assuming a 35% exposure to Andhra, a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the top 15 lenders shows the impact of a 10% provisioning on their 2009-10 net profit will be minimal, of up to 6%. But a 100% provisioning will erode up to 56% of their profit. The situation is especially grim for Sidbi, in both scenarios. The Not Too Bad, The Bad, The Ugly Large MFIs are living on survival instincts, but the medium and small ones are headed for death. TALKING HEADS This is it. We have cash till the end of February or early March. If collections do not pick up by then, we will have to shut down. When borrowers expect more loans, they will repay. But when they know they won't receive more, they will stop repaying. SANJAY SINHA, Managing Director, Micro-Credit Ratings International MFI IMPACT BANK IMPACT SHIV NARAIN, Chief Financial Officer, Spandana Sphoorty Financial Microfinance institutions with a sizeable presence in Andhra Pradesh are on the brink of closure because of the crisis in the sector in the state, report John Samuel Raja D and M Rajshekhar ARINDAM

Transcript of Et article-that-sinking-feeling

Page 1: Et article-that-sinking-feeling

HIS IS IT. WE HAVE CASH TILL THE END OFFebruary or early March. If collections do notpick up by then, we will have to shut down."This doomsday scenario is prophesised byShiv Narain, chief financial officer ofSpandana Sphoorty Financial, India's secondlargest microfinance institution. For each ofthe last eight years, Spandana reportedgrowth in excess of 100%. Yet, today, itstands pushed to the brink, by the very statethat embraced it in the first place: AndhraPradesh.

Half of Spandana's Rs 4,000 crore lendingis to borrowers in Andhra. Over the lastthree months, says Narain, it has notreceived a penny on about Rs 1,300 crore ofthose loans. The freeze is the fallout of a statelaw that was drafted in the wake of borrowersuicides, allegedly because of coercivepractices of MFIs. The law was intended tocheck MFI excesses, but it has ended upchecking all MFI activity.

Micro-loan borrowers, mostly poorwomen, were already distressed because of adip in their incomes and the multiple loansthey were servicing. Cushioned by the newlaw, provoked by local politicians andemboldened by the prevailing climate ofantipathy towards MFIs, they have stoppedrepaying. "The industry is based onexpectations," says Sanjay Sinha, whosecompany does credit ratings for MFIs."When borrowers expect more loans, theywill repay. But when they know they won'treceive more, they will stop repaying." That'swhat a majority of borrowers have done inAndhra, pushing a large, profitable, cash-rich MFI like Spandana to the edge.

If that's the plight of India's second largestMFI, half of whose portfolio is locked inAndhra, how are smaller MFIs with an equalor larger exposure to the state doing? Evenworse. They could tip over anytime. "Ourmoney for repayment of bank loans will runout in January," says Kishore Kumar Puli,managing director, Trident Microfin, 70% ofwhose Rs 160 crore loan portfolio is inAndhra. "I foresee nothing less than thedeath of the small MFI," says SC Hassain,president and CEO of Star MicroFin ServiceSociety, whose entire ̀ 20 crore loanportfolio is in the state.

Judgement day is two days away. January15 will be three months since Andhra issuedthe contentious 10-page ordinance. In thelending business, three months is the firstthreshold of failure — that's when lendershave to start making provisions for badloans, which reduces their profits. Unlessnormalcy returns in Andhra, for both MFIsand banks, the signs are ominous.

SO FAR, MFIS HAVE BEEN SEEING Ashortfall in interest income and cash,since October. A report by credit-rating

firm Crisil, released in November, said collec-tions in Andhra had fallen below 20% of theloan amount due, from 99% just before theordinance was issued. Some MFIs say thecollection rate has fallen further.

Star MicroFin Society is a small NGO-MFI,with a loan portfolio of Rs 20 crore inKurnool and Ananthapur districts inAndhra. It has 35,000 borrowers, 100 staffmembers and 11 branches. "In our 15 years,we always had 100% repayment," saysHassain. "Now, our repayment is down tozero in urban areas and 2% in rural ones."

Similarly, Trident has seen its collections in

Andhra drop from Rs 22 crore in Septemberto Rs 17 crore in October, to ̀ 2 crore inNovember, to ̀ 1.6 crore in December. Theincome and cash shortfall was the first hit forMFIs, and will show up in their results fromthe December quarter.

January 15 onwards, MFIs will feel thesecond hit: provisioning. Under the rules setby the Reserve Bank of India, the centralbank, if an MFI does not receive interestincome for three months, it has to providefor 10% of the loan amount. By a crudecalculation, for Spandana, that works out tobe about ̀ 133 crore - 65% of its net profit for2009-10.

Unless collections resume, Sinha,managing director of Micro-Credit RatingsInternational Limited (M-Cril), says nomicrofinance player with operations inAndhra will report profits in the year endedMarch 2011 —a first for the industry. What'shappening in Andhra affects virtually everyMFI, in varying degrees.

Andhra leads all states in micro-loans,with a share of 35%. Now, it has anordinance that requires MFIs to take govern-ment approval before granting a loan, bansweekly collection of dues, and stops lendersfrom collecting instalment from a borrower'shouse. Basically, it makes it almostimpossible for MFIs to do business.

A private banker says MFIs have barelygiven 100 new loans since the ordinancecame in. "On November 27, we decided totest the new process and applied forclearance for 162 loans," says MR Rao, CEOof SKS Microfinance. "We heard from thegovernment on December 24, saying thatjust 29 loans had been approved."

BANKS WILL FEEL THE TRICKLE-down effect of MFI distress, as thethree-month provisioning rule applies

to them too. According to Nabard, as ofMarch 2010, the banking sector had lent`20,000 crore to MFIs. "When the ordinancewas issued, it was ̀ 25,000-28,000 crore,"says Sinha. "Of this, about 35% is inAndhra."

On a base of Rs 25,000 crore, that is ̀ 8,750crore. If only 20% of that is being serviced, asCrisil says, then Rs 7,000 crore is understress. A 10% provisioning would mean anexpenditure of Rs 700 crore by MFIs. Forbanks, it could be more if MFIs close down.

Banks face a tough choice. If they don't re-structure the loans, the MFIs could collapse,saddling banks with huge losses. If they giveMFIs additional time to repay, they will haveto make big provisions. Plus, unless thefreeze in Andhra thaws, they can't be sure ifthey are throwing good money after bad. OnTuesday, the Indian Banks Association, thenodal industry grouping, asked the RBI to al-low them to reschedule MFI loans withoutthe burden of provisioning.

Corporation Bank is one of the rare banksstill lending to MFIs. "We have not stoppedlending. And the existing loans have notcome for renewal," Says RN Pradeep, CMDof Corporation Bank. But several othershave stopped. "Banks are not giving us anymoney at all," says Hassain of Star MicroFin."Even in the longer term, I do not think theywill give any money to smaller MFIs. Theywill lend only to larger MFIs, who are at theroot of all this trouble, with multiple lendingand client harassment."

"The fund requirement projection of a lot

of MFIs is based on high growth paths," saysRakesh Rewari, deputy managing director,Sidbi. "We are asking them to moderatethose growth paths." With banks refusing tolend more and collections grinding to a halt,some MFIs are using borrowed funds torepay banks. Not only is this a violation ofpriority-sector lending norms, sooner ratherthan later, this will run out.

WEEKLY ROTATION OF CASH IScritical to MFI operations — andprofitability. Since they are barred

from taking cash deposits, MFIs functioningas a non-banking finance company (NBFC)rely on three sources of funds: equity andgrants, surplus from past operations, andloans from banks. According to M-Cril'sMicrofinance Review 2010, bank loansaccounted for 71% of MFI funds in 2009-10.

An MFI borrows from banks at 11-14%and lends it on, mostly to poor women, at anaverage lending rate of 28%. Even afteraccounting for operating expenses, it earns agenerous spread. And that's not the onlysource of its profits.

MFIs also profit from rotating the money.MFIs repay banks on a quarterly or half-yearly basis; however, their borrowers repayMFIs on a weekly basis. "The profit comesfrom the compounding effect, not just by

having low distribution costs," says achartered accountant who has been associat-ed with the industry for 20 years.

Say, an MFI borrows ̀ 1 lakh from a bankat 10%, with quarterly repayment. The MFIuses the Rs 1 lakh to give 10 micro-loans ofRs 10,000 each, for one year, at an interestrate of 24%. So, it collects ̀ 230 as weekly in-stalment from borrowers for 50 weeks —`200 towards principal, ̀ 30 towards interest.

At the end of the first week, the MFI wouldhave collected ̀ 230 each from ten borrowers,or ̀ 2,300. But it won't repay the bank for an-other 11 weeks. So, the interest MFI earnedin the first week is free capital, which can belent again. Similarly in the second week, theMFI will not only earn ̀ 2,300 from itsoriginal borrowers, but also ̀ 50 from the`2,300 it had lent from its first weekcollections. With this cycle of growth disrupt-ed, MFIs are now struggling to repay banks.

SANJAY SINHA, WHO HAS researched poor households, draws onMughal history to contextualise the

current crisis in the MFI industry. Sinha,who claims to have a limited knowledge ofhistory, scopes in on Aurangzeb, the Mughalemperor who ruled for half a century, till hisdeath in 1707. About 30 of those 50 years,says Sinha, Aurangzeb spent conqueringGolconda, which is near Hyderabad and faraway from Delhi, his kingdom's capital.

He eventually won Golconda. But whilehe was waging that wasteful battle, his

administration in the hinterland was comingapart, with rebellions in Punjab and otherplaces. At one point of time, his treasurymoney could not be moved from Delhi toAgra. "The focus on conquering the frontierkingdoms led Aurangzeb to lose thehinterland," says Sinha. "The same thinghappened in the microfinance industry, withbig lenders chasing growth and expandingaggressively in areas far away from their hin-terland."

High growth has its shortcomings, even ina sector that services the poor. "You're boundto acquire garbage when you are drivinggrowth," says Manmath Dalai, managing di-rector of Krishna Bhima Samruddhi LocalArea Bank. His company, which operates intwo districts in Andhra, has repayment prob-lems in just 1,000 of its 160,000 borrower ac-counts. Unlike most MFIs, which operate asNBFCs, Krishna Bhima operates as a bank."The poor have respect for the bank tag," hesays. "Also, we were collecting repaymentson a monthly basis."

Most MFIs, though, were dealt a bodyblow by the ordinance, which effectivelybarred them from the state. MFIs did not seeit coming, as they were focused on growth,with banks willing to lend and private equity(PE) investors ready to invest at generousvaluations.

Lending to MFIs enabled banks to meettheir 40% priority-sector target. Loans givenby MFIs to individuals for up to ̀ 50,000qualify as priority-sector lending. So, insteadof subscribing to 5-6% bonds issued by Sidbi,which also carries the priority-sector tag,banks preferred lending to MFIs at 11-12%.

T Keshava Kumar, deputy general manag-er (credit) with State Bank of Hyderabad(SBH), says banks that lacked a strongpresence in Andhra lent to MFIs. SBH'sexposure to MFIs, he says, is only Rs 60crore, that too to the two big ones, SKS andSpandana. Most of its micro-loan portfolio,estimated at around ̀ 500 crore, is self-managed or through local area banks, whichhasn't seen an upheaval. "If I have directaccess to customers and all the otherbusiness they will generate over time, whywould I go through a third party?" he asks.

If banks lent to meet their priority-sectortargets, PE funds invested with an over-estimation of market potential. The typicalMFI business case says India has 225 millionhouseholds. About 60%, or 132 millionhouseholds, don't have access to bankingcredit. MFIs have reached 25 millionhouseholds — just one-fifth of the marketpotential.

Sinha of M-Cril says this is an over-estima-tion because MFIs cannot function in manyparts of India like the entire northeast, hillyareas, Maoist-affected regions, and someparts of Punjab and Gujarat. "Take those outand the market potential is 50-60 millionhouseholds," he says.

By Sinha's estimation, MFIs have achieveda penetration of 40%. It doesn't merit valuingMFIs at 10 times book value, as PE investorsdid. "The problems would not have arisen if35% returns were not promised to PE guys,"says Dalai. "Why do you need them if youwant to contain growth at the rate at whichcapital comes in?" Even as MFIs and investorsrealise this, it might be too late for a small MFIlike Star MicroFin, maybe even for medium-sized and large-sized MFIs.

With Sangita Mehta

That Sinking Feeling

THE ECONOMIC TIMES NEW DELHI

THURSDAY 13 JANUARY 20118 MICROFINANCE CRISIS

Since October, MFIs have been

seeing a shortfall in interest

income and cash. That's the first

hit. January 15 onwards, MFIs

will feel the second hit:

provisioning for bad loans.

SOUNDING DEATH KNELL

T

PORTFOLIO (` CR) COLLECTIONS (%)

In AP Elsewhere In AP Elsewhere Impact

SKS Microfinance 1,250 3,750 30 99 “Not too bad”

Spandana Sphoorty Financial 2,000 2,000 33 99 Risk of closure

Trident Microfin 128 32 5 95-99 Bankruptcy by Jan-end

SWAWS Credit Corporation 75 25 1 Normal Liquidity risk remains high

Star Microfin 20 0 2 Not applicable On the verge of closure

Portfolio of SWAWS is as of September 2010; for others, it is current Collections are as a percentage of loans. For SWAWS, it is for November 2010; for others, it is currentSource: SWAWS information and impact is from CARE ratings press release; others is from the respective company management

Financial institutions Sidbi 3,808.2 421.0 31.7 316.6

State-owned banksPunjab National Bank 1,069.3 3,972.6 0.9 9.4

State Bank of India 876.2 11,733.8 0.3 2.6

IDBI Bank 603.6 1,031.1 2.0 20.5

Syndicate Bank 527.9 814.3 2.3 22.7

Corporation Bank 370.9 1,181.4 1.1 11.0

Private banks HDFC Bank 1,324.0 3,003.7 1.5 15.4

AXIS Bank 1,207.8 2,514.5 1.7 16.8

Yes Bank 397.2 477.7 2.9 29.1

ICICI Bank 371.5 4,670.3 0.3 2.8

Tamilnad Mercantile Bank 236.1 184.5 4.5 44.8

Foreign banksStandard Chartered Bank 253.5 2,127.0 0.4 4.2

RBS 166.6 -104.9 5.6 55.6

BNP Paribas 164.2 180.4 3.2 31.8

Citibank 113.0 860.4 0.5 4.6

Loan figures as of March 2010; net profit for 2009-10Since RBS posted a loss in 2009-10, the provisioning impact shows accretion to the lossSource: Status of Microfinance in India 2009-10, Nabard; ETIG Database

Loan outstanding Net profit Provisioning impact (% of net profit)*

(`cr) (`cr) At 10% At 100%

Profits and Percentages Assuming a 35% exposure to Andhra, a back-of-the-envelopecalculation for the top 15 lenders shows the impact of a 10% provisioning ontheir 2009-10 net profit will be minimal, of up to 6%. But a 100%provisioning will erode up to 56% of their profit. The situation is especiallygrim for Sidbi, in both scenarios.

The Not Too Bad, The Bad, The Ugly Large MFIs are living on survival instincts, but the medium and small ones are headed for death.

TALKING HEADS

This is it. We have cash till theend of February or early

March. If collections do not pick upby then, we will have to shut down.

When borrowers expect moreloans, they will repay. But

when they know they won't receivemore, they will stop repaying.

SANJAY SINHA, Managing Director, Micro-Credit Ratings International

MFI IMPACT

BANK IMPACT

SHIV NARAIN, Chief Financial Officer,Spandana Sphoorty Financial

Microfinance institutions with a sizeable presence in Andhra Pradesh are on the brink of closure because of the crisis in the sector in the state, report John Samuel Raja D and M Rajshekhar

ARINDAM