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ESSENCE (ESSENTIA)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Essence (Essentia)

The substances we see around us are not simple but are composed of two principles:

essence and act of being, the former being related to esse as a potency, and the latter being

related to essentia as act. Essence (essentia) is the proper potency of the act of being (esse) and

together with this act constitutes the substance (substantia). Essence confers upon this substance

a specific manner of being and is defined as that by which a thing is what it is. It is that through

which and in which a being has its act of being (esse).1 Essence pertains truly and properly to

substance while it pertains to accidents only in a qualified sense. Aquinas writes: Just as the

term ens is applied in the absolute and proper sense only to substance, and to accidents in a

secondary, derived way, essence truly and properly pertains to the substance, and to the accidents

only in a certain way, and from a certain point of view.2 Therefore, when we refer to the

essence of something without qualification we refer to the essence of its substance, not to the

essence of its accidents.

Essence as Nature, Quiddity, and the Universal

Essence is often times referred to as a nature, a quiddity, or as a universal. Why is this

so? Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that as the specification of the mode of being of a

thing, the essence gives rise to a series of basic properties which give us a better understanding

of essence. These properties themselves give rise to a set of terms which refer to one and the

same reality, while differing with respect to the aspect of that reality which is considered. They

are, however, sometimes employed in an undifferentiated way in common usage.3

Essence as Nature. As the principle of operations, essence is called nature. Nature is

essence from the viewpoint of its proper activity. Nature is essence considered as the ultimate

principle of operations in a being; nature signifies the ultimate principle by which and in

accordance with which anything acts in the way that it does (while the suppositum signifies the

very thing itself to which these activities are referred). Nature is the essence considered as the

root principle of the activities of a being. It expresses the dynamic character of being. A horse,

for example, acts in one way and not in another because it has being in a determinate way,

conditioned by its essence. Thus, each nature has a corresponding type of specific operations.

Trotting, galloping, eating grass and neighing, for example, are natural to the horse because they

are operations which arise from horse nature or horseness itself. Every being explains

Dougherty, has certain powers or faculties which dispose it to act in a certain way, such as the

faculty to know, the faculty to hear, the powers of a plant for photosynthesis. No finite being acts

immediately but rather mediately through certain powers for certain acts. Yet the powers or

faculties of a being for acting are not adequate to explain a beings activities. Uniform and stable

1 De Ente et Essentia, chapter 1.

2 De Ente et Essentia, chapter 2. 3 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sina-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 90.

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patterns of activities are proper to a species because of a basic determination for such uniform

and proper activities in the very nature of the species. It is grounded in their very essence or

nature.4

Essence as Quiddity. Insofar as essence is signified by a definition, it is called quiddity or

whatness. Quiddity is a term derived from the Latin word quidditas, which is the technical

noun fashioned from quid (Latin for what). The reason is obvious observes Bittle. When we

desire to know what a particular thing really is, we ask the question What is it? And in answer

to this question we obtain a knowledge of its whatness; because, in being told what it is that

makes this thing to be just this being and not another, we find out its essential elements (essence)

in the definition given.5

A definition signifies the essence of something by means of its proximate genus and

specific difference. It gives an answer to the question What is it? The definition of man, for

example, would be rational animal. This is the metaphysical essence of man. Animal would

be the proximate genus and rationality the specific difference that separates him from all other

animals.

Essence as the Universal. Insofar as essence is known, it is possible for it to be referred

to many individuals, and for this reason it is called the universal. The essence is really present

only in individual things. However, our understanding, setting aside the characteristics which

belong to each singular thing, considers the essence as something universal, which can be

attributed to all individuals having the same mode of being. In accordance with the way of being

which the essence of this horse has in the human mind, it becomes a universal which is

applicable to all horses. This logical consideration of the essence, that is, the essence as a

universal, is what is called secondary substance.6

Essence and Esse. Though capable of being utilized in these various senses, essence

nevertheless stresses its relationship with esse, it being the principle in which the esse of a thing

4 K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, p. 119. 5 C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, p. 117. Christian Ferraro writes:

Quidditas una parola inventata dagli scolastici per indicare il significato della risposta alla domanda quid est?.

Dal latino passata allitaliano per translitterazione. Letteralmente allora la quiddit sarebbe la cheit (Washeit)

o coseit della cosa, il che cosa della cosa. Siccome per ci che risponde a quella domanda la ratio

significata dal nome, e questa ratio si esprime nella definizione, allora si d il nome di quiddit allessenza stessa

della cosa, in quanto significata dalla definizione(C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press,

Vatican City, 2013, p. 124). 6 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 91. Owens writes: The essence can exist in reality and in

the human intellect. In reality it exists in individuals, as humanity exists in millions of men. The same essence,

humanity, is found separately in every one of these many individuals. It is common to them all. The same essence,

moreover, can exist in your intellect or in the intellect of anyone else who thinks of it. In this cognitional existence it

is no longer individual but specific. It is the universal species man, or human nature in its universality. As a

universal, it represents all individual men in the one concept. It has a unity of its own as universal, just as in any

particular man it has a unity that is individual(J. OWENS, op. cit., p. 133). Ferraro writes: In quanto riferibile a

molti individui, lessenza detta universale. Infatti, nelle cose che troviamo nellambito dellesperienza, lessenza

si trova effettivamente realizzata, singolare; nellintelletto invece si trova allo stato di universalit, perch la

species risulta nellintelletto possibile come effetto dellazione astraente dalle condizioni individuali del fantasma,

operata dallintelletto agente. Luniversale esprime perci lessenza delle cose ma secondo lo stato chessa acquista

nella mente(C. FERRARO, op. cit., p. 124).

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is received and by which it is restricted to a determinate form; essence is so called insofar as a

thing has esse in it and through it. Thus, essence has a meaning over and above that contained in

nature, quiddity, and universal as it directs our attention to that which makes things be, namely,

the act of being (esse): Essence means that through which and in which a being has its act of

being (esse).7

The Essence of Material Beings

Regarding the essence (essentia) of material (corporeal) beings (corporeal beings that are

like finite pure spirits in that they are also composed of essence and act of being [esse as actus

essendi] and also have a composition of substance and accidents, but are unlike finite pure spirits

[also called separate substances in a restricted sense] in that their essences have a composition of

prime matter and substantial form), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain: The definition of

every corruptible thing connotes a material element and a formal element. A kind of animal or

plant, for instance, cannot be defined without referring to both its matter and its form, since the

hylomorphic composition, which is studied in Philosophy of Nature, is necessarily present in this

kind of substance.

It can be easily seen for instance, that any definition of man which would fail to mention

either his matter or his form, that is, either his body or his soul, would disfigure his true nature. It

would be an error to define man as a soul (as Plato did), or to deny the reality of his substantial

form by saying that he is pure matter.

Of course, matter and form, which are contained in the definition of essence, do not

encompass the special characteristics present in each individual. The definition of man does not

connote the height, weight, or color of the body of the individual person, but only indicates that

every man has a soul and a body endowed with features similar to those of other persons.

Form: the Act of the Matter. The two constituent elements of the essence, namely,

matter and form, are related to one another as potency and act, respectively. This level of

composition is characteristic of all material beings, which can undergo generation and corruption

profound changes by which a being ceases to be what it was, and becomes another thing. The

subject of these changes is a potency which participated, at first, in act, and then came to

participate in another. Not any kind of act is involved here, but an act which makes it a new kind

of thing or a new individual within the same species (e.g., a man, a horse, an individual piece of

iron). The subject is prime matter, which has a corresponding first act, called substantial form

(in this context, the substantial form is called the first act in contrast to operations, which are

secondary acts, and to the act of being, which, as we shall see, is the ultimate act of a being).

Prime matter is pure passive potency, a mere capacity to receive an act. It is not

supported by any prior act (as, for instance, the power of locomotion is supported by the

substantial form, which is first act), but only by the act which it receives, namely, the

substantial form. For this reason, matter devoid of every substantial form whatsoever could never

exist. Since all reality is in some way or other through an act, a pure potency not united to an

actual principle would be a non-existent potency; it would be nothing.

7 De Ente et Essentia, chapter 1.

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As pure capacity for act, matter is of itself indeterminate. All its actuality and

determinateness accrues to it from the form, and for this reason, it acquires a distinct way of

being when it receives a new substantial form. Thus, matter which composes the human body

(flesh and bones) has a different configuration in a living man and in a lifeless body.

The form is the first act which affects matter so as to constitute the substance. Through

the substantial form, matter exists and forms part of one or another type of substance. Matter and

form do not exist separately. Without the form, matter would be nothing. Likewise, in the case of

bodily or corporeal substances, form cannot be without matter, since its degree of perfection does

not allow it to subsist independently, but requires a potency, a subject which supports it.

Matter and form are not themselves beings, but only principles of things. Hence, only

the composite of matter and form (the essence) is what subsists, when it is actualized by the act

of being (esse).

The Primacy of Form over Matter. The more important of the two constituent elements

of the essence of corporeal beings is the form, since matter, of itself, is pure potency and is for

the sake of the substantial form, which is act. The determining element of the essence, which

gives it a particular essence and not another, is the form, which determines matter to be this type

of matter (a human body, a plant, a mineral) with certain specific qualities.

So far we have been saying that being is restricted by the essence to a determinate way

of being. Now, we can give a more exact meaning of this truth as far as material substances are

concerned. The substantial form, as the determining principle of the essence, is what limits or

restricts the act of being. For its part, matter restricts the form to certain determinate conditions

and can, in this sense, also be considered as restricting the act of being.

The form is the principle of being (esse) of a thing (ens): forma est principium essendi,

or forma dat esse.8 Matter shares in esse by means of the form, inasmuch as it is made actual by

the form. Therefore, since generation is the acquisition of a new act of being (via ad esse) and

corruption is the loss of the act of being (via ad non-esse), composites of matter and form are

corrupted when they lose the (substantial) form from which act of being results,9 and they are

engendered when they receive a new form. Living beings, for instance, decompose when their

souls are separated from their respective bodies.

It is important to note, however, that in corporeal substances, the form does not have the

act of being in itself, but only insofar as it gives actuality to matter. The complete essence,

composed of matter and form, is what has the act of being (esse), not the isolated constituent

principles. Thus, the horse is, and not its form or its matter separately.

The case of mans substantial form is different. Being spiritual, the human soul has esse

as something of its own. Whereas in bodily beings esse only belongs to the composite, to which

it comes through the form, in man esse belongs to the soul, which lets matter share in it.

8 Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 27. 9 Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima, q. 14.

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Unity of the Essence. The relationship of matter to form as potency to act explains why

the essence of composite beings is one, even though it is made up of two elements. The union of

potency with its corresponding act forms a metaphysical unity which is of a higher degree than

that formed by mere aggregation. The latter is a unity made up of a number of things already in

act, related to one another in some way. The intrinsic unity of an animal, for instance, is stronger

than that of an artifact. For this reason, the metaphysical principles which essentially constitute

an animal cannot be separated without giving rise to corruption, which is a change in nature. In

contrast, the component parts of an aggregated unity can be separated without destroying either

the nature or the whole or that of the parts.

It is the form which gives unity to the essence, since it is an act which overcomes the

indeterminate condition of matter. It does so by giving the latter a determinate degree of being,

through which all of its parts remain bound together. The various elements which form an

organic body, for instance, are united insofar as they form part of a greater unity (that of an

animal or plant) which stems from the form. Consequently, when this form is separated from

them during corruption or death, the body breaks apart and loses its unity.

Furthermore, the composite has only one substantial form. The degree of being of each

thing is determined by the substantial form. If one and the same thing would have more than one

substantial form, then it would belong simultaneously to different species. The single substantial

form confers on the composite all its perfections on the substantial level. By virtue of one and the

same substantial form, for instance, man has a body, he is a living being, and a man. If we were

to grant a plurality of subordinate substantial forms, we would destroy the substantial unity of the

composite. In man, for instance, besides the human person, there would also be a body (which

would already be a substance) and an animal. The alternative would be to assume that only the

first of these forms would give a substantial degree of being to matter and that the others would

only affect it in an accidental way.10

But if this were true, then the difference between plants and

animals, and among different species within these genera, would be no more than accidental

differences.

There is no medium or intermediary by which matter and form are united to one

another. Their union is an immediate union of potency with its own act.11

The unity of the

essence is compromised when this union is conceived in a mediate fashion, as when matter is

understood, not as pure potency, but as a certain reality which is already in act. In mans case,

this error leads to considering the body and the soul as two distinct, independent, and hardly

interacting substances.12

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Under the influence of the Arab-Jewish philosopher Avicebron, some philosophers of the Middle Ages (of the

Augustinian School) maintained the doctrine of multiple substantial forms in one and the same being. 11

Leibniz, following the teachings of decadent Scholasticism, held the theory of a substantial link that unites body

and soul (Cf. C. D. Boehm, Le vinculum substantiale chez Leibniz, Paris, 1938). 12 Prominent philosophers who taught dualism in man (i.e., no substantial union between body and soul) were Plato

(Cf. Gorgias, 492 e; Phaedo, 83 b-e) and Descartes (Cf. Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, VI). Cartesian dualism

had a deep influence on modern and contemporary philosophy. 13

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 91-96.

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Essence in Finite Pure Spirits

Finite pure spirits (also called separated substances14

[in the restricted sense] or angels)

are beings that have a composition of essence (essentia) and act of being (esse as actus essendi),

a composition of substance and accidents, but do not have a composition in their essence of

matter15

and form. Concerning the essence in these finite pure spirits or angels, Alvira, Clavell

and Melendo write: The primacy of form over matter as principium essendi makes us

understand why there can be some types of forms which subsist without matter (spiritual

substances), whereas no matter can exist independently of a substantial form. Matter is for the

sake of the form, not the other way around.

We know by faith that apart from the human soul, whose operations reveal its

spirituality even though it is by nature ordered towards a body, there are completely spiritual

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San Tommaso le chiama, queste sostanze, sostanze separate e anche talvolta, seguendo gli arabi,

intelligenze. Le sostanze separate sidentificano con gli enti spirituali personali che, attendendo alla loro funzione

di messaggeri inviati da Dio, nella nostra fede cattolica ricevono genericamente il nome di angeli(C. FERRARO,

op. cit., p. 130). 15

Giving a critique of the universal hylomorphism advocacy of so-called spiritual matter in finite pure spirits,

Ferraro writes: Certi autori, tra i quali san Bonaventura, hanno contestato questa verit, rivendicando anche alle

sostanze separate la composizione di materia e forma. Questa dottrina si chiama ilemorfismo universale. Le

principali argomentazioni a favore della medesima girano fondamentalmente attorno a tre affermazioni: il principio

di mutabilit la materia, il principio del patire la materia, il principio dellappartenenza a un genere e quindi della

definibilit la materia (Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum in Angelo sit compositio ex diversis naturis, scilicet ex

materia et forma. Et quod sic, ostenditur [tra altri motivi]: Per rationem mutationis (). 2. Per rationem actionis et

passionis (). 4. Per naturam essentialis compositionis[S. BONAVENTURA, In II Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1; in

Opere, ed. Quarachi, propre Florentiam 1885, 89-90]. Sono molti gli autori che tuttora difendono una simile

dottrina). Questa materia non sarebbe una materia quantitativa, come corrisponde allente corporeo, bens una

materia sottile, propria degli spiriti.

C nel fondo di questa tesi una grande verit: un qualcosa, in quanto in atto non pu essere in potenza; cos,

una forma, proprio in quanto in atto, non pu essere soggetto. Il problema la conclusione che si tira fuori a partire

da questo fondo di verit, motivata da una superficiale comprensione della natura propria delloperazione intellettiva

nonch della materia stessa e da una interpretazione unilaterale dellessere soggetto.

Riguardo alla materia, una distinzione fra materia sottile e materia quantificata impossibile e improcedente.

Infatti, tutte le cose che includono materia nella propria composizione devono convenire nella materia per il

semplice motivo che, di per s, la materia non ha nessuna determinazione. Ora, evidentemente impossibile che una

medesima materia riceva due forme opposte, come sono quella spirituale e quella corporale, a meno che non le

riceva in diverse parti. Ma le parti nella materia suppongono la divisibilit e questo richiede le dimensioni, vale a

dire la quantit: e allora sarebbe anche quantificata la materia delle sostanze spirituali le quali non sarebbero gi

spirituali bens corporee.

Riguardo allintelletto, chiaro che lintelletto non riceve le forme delle cose come le riceve la materia.

Quando una forma ricevuta in una materia, risulta concretizzata, si rende particolare; quando una forma invece

ricevuta nellintelletto, allora risulta astratta, si rende universale. Mentre la materia contrae, lintelletto amplifica.

Questo vuol dire non solo che lintelletto un recettore distinto dalla materia ma, molto pi ancora, che

diametralmente opposto alla materia. La operazione intellettiva positivamente e totalmente immateriale. Pertanto

impossibile che una sostanza totalmente intellettiva sia materiale.

Riguardo poi alla definizione, evidente lerrore del parallelismo gnoseologico lerrore cio di trasferire

direttamente sul piano del reale le strutture delle nostre rappresentazioni. Non detto infatti che ad ogni

composizione mentale o nozionale corrisponda direttamente una composizione reale nella cosa. Per esempio:

quando dico colore bianco, non c nella cosa una composizione fra il colore e il bianco. C composizione

mentale, ma non reale. Pertanto il mero fatto di definire richiamandosi alla struttura nozionale di genere e differenza

non permette di fare il passaggio ulteriore didentificare il genere con la materia e la differenza con la forma(C.

FERRARO, op. cit., pp. 128-129).

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creatures, namely, the angels.16

The essence of a purely spiritual substance is simple, being

identical to its form, which receives the act of being in itself as something of its own.

The lack of composition in their essence does not, however, imply that spiritual

creatures are totally simple, since only God is absolutely simple. Just like everything created, the

pure spirits are composed at least of essence and the act of being, since they have a limited mode

of being. They are creatures, and if they were to lack this composition they would be identical

with the Subsistent Esse, whose essence is his very act of being. St. Thomas explained: If there

are some forms not received in matter, each one of them will certainly be simple inasmuch as it

lacks matter. However, since any form restricts or limits the very act of being, no one of them is

the act of being; rather, each of them is something which has the act of being (esse).17

Besides, all angels perform operations (knowledge and love) which are really distinct

from their act of being and from their substance. Consequently, there is also a composition of

substance and accidents in them.18

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The existence of angels is part of divine Revelation; nevertheless, it has been a belief of other people outside the

Judeo-Christian tradition. For instance, Aristotle, in his explanations about the universe, affirmed the existence of

spiritual beings acting as intermediate movers between the Prime Mover and the world (Cf. Metaphysica, book XII,

ch. 8). 17 In Boethium de Hebdomadibus, lect. 2. 18

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 96-97.