Ermita-Malate Hotel v. City of Manila

7/28/2019 Ermita-Malate Hotel v. City of Manila

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ermita-malate-hotel-v-city-of-manila 1/6

Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849)

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following

provisions questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or accepting any

guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o

less than 18 years old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200%

respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and

cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.

There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the

presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement

a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative

body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.



SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning

the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of

preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a

temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while

petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack ofjurisdiction over the subject matter.

Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter

since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a

labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws,

rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore

the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee

among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On

one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted

activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.

1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of

applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative

sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass

leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption

of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are

prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”

and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been

created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil

Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector

Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor

disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ

of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.



Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)

Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the

assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are

unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead

as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military

respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan

did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as

principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who

insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and

to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of

constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to

present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the

Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges againstthem.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to

prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double

jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)

after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court

that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it

violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated,

and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts

merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President

ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken

with due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its

failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and

double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the

account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined

verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered

the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.



Narciso vs. Cruz

Facts:

After a preliminary investigation, Narciso Cruz was charged with the crime of parricide for allegedly

killing his wife. He was thereby detained. He then filed a motion for reinvestigation and to lift warrant of

arrest. Also, Cruz filed an ex-parte motion for bail. The prosecutor made no objection. The motion was

granted on the same day, allowing the accused to post bail at P150,000.Flor Cruz, sister of the deceased

wife, filed a Motion to lift order allowing accused to post bail.

Issue: Is the grant of bail valid?

Ruling:

No. Cruz was charged with parricide which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When the penalty

prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before the bail

can be granted. Without such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave

abuse of discretion. In the case, there was no basis for the granting of the bail. No hearing was

conducted on the application for bail – summary or otherwise. The CA even found that only 10 minutes

had elapsed between the filing of the Motion and the granting of bail. Such lapse of time could not bedeemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. Even if the prosecutor did not

object to the motion, the judge still had no basis to grant the bail. The judge had no reason to presume

that that prosecutor knew what he was doing. It is the judge’s duty first to determine if evidence of guilt

is strong before bail is granted.



SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS:

On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to

desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the

vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the

CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and

supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority

should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,

and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to

engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and

supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an

Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining

order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and

investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:

Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:

No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR.

Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on

complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that it does

not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal

aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not

be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction,

for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the

CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by

the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with

CHR Case No. 90-1580.



Rubi, et al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078. March 7, 1919

Facts:

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial

governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves

on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by

imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end

and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a

very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extend over

an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are

confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the

provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An

application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province,

alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they

had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative

Code, reading: “With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any

province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemednecessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites

on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,” was

challenged.

Issue: Whether or not the said law is not in line with the constitutional provision of freedom of religion.

Held:

No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the

Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term “non -Christian” should not be given

a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization.

The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and

more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, noneof the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government

of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential,

insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare

and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate

exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land

in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and

good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of

the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of

the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the

exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of

Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one

cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the

Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the

Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition

of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be

reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike

to all of a class.”

Ermita-Malate Hotel v. City of Manila

Documents

Transcript of Ermita-Malate Hotel v. City of Manila