“How to Fight Savage Tribes”: The Global War on Terror in Historical Perspective1

Erik Ringmar, NCTU

abstract: The Bush administration’s “Global War on Terror” has, by both defenders

and critics, been characterized as unique. However, as this article shows, there is a

long tradition, both in the United States and in Europe, of fighting wars against

“savage tribes” ― against enemies who fail to make a distinction between soldiers

and civilians, and who use terror as a weapon. The problem of how to fight such

groups was much discussed in the legal literature of the nineteenth-century. This is

a discussion from which it is possible to learn contemporary lessons.

“The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our

country,” president George W. Bush declared on September 12, 2001, “were more

than acts of terror. They were acts of war. ... The American people need to know

we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced.”2 During the subsequent

“Global War on Terror,” as it was semi-officially known, the Bush administration

authorized methods which broke with international conventions as well as with

domestic laws.3 Between 2001 and 2008, the American government held suspects

indefinitely without trial, tortured prisoners and subjected them to degrading

treatment, or, in a practice known as “extraordinary rendition,” subcontracted the

interrogations to assorted unsavory regimes.4 These techniques, said Vice

President Dick Cheney, constitute “a tougher program, for tougher customers.”5

For a country such as the United States, with a long tradition of both defining

and defending the statutes of international law, this policy, and the statements

1

backing it up, would seem to constitute a radical break with past practices.

Contrasting this legalistic legacy with the policy of the Bush administration, many

Americans ― especially those of a liberal and internationalist bent ― declared

themselves horrified. For these critics, Barack Obama’s first acts in office came as

a great relief. On January 22, 2009, the new president signed an executive order

banning torture and extraordinary rendition and dismantling the clandestine

network of prisons operated by the CIA. “We are not,” Obama insisted, “going to

continue with the false choice between our safety and our ideals.”6 "We intend to

win this fight. We are going to win it on our own terms."

Yet there is something wrong with this historiography. The United States has

indeed been a staunch defender of international law, but at the same time Bush’s

war on terror is not all that exceptional. In fact, extraordinary, and illegal,

measures have always been employed by the United States in fighting some of its

wars. Indeed, the same extraordinary, illegal, methods have often been employed

by European powers. This contradiction ― between a strict adherence to the law in

some cases and a routine flaunting of it in others ― can be reconciled if only we

draw a distinction between wars fought against “civilized” and against “uncivilized”

opponents. From the nineteenth-century onwards, the ethical and legal framework

which regulates warfare has been a two-tier system with different standards for

combating “civilized” and “uncivilized” enemies. It is against civilized enemies that

the laws of war should be adhered to, and in wars against uncivilized enemies that

they may be broken.7 The very same soldiers who displayed their humanitarian

instincts on the battlefields of Europe turned into barbarians in the colonies.

Understanding this distinction puts the Global War on Terror into a much

needed historical context.8 The Bush administration made exactly the same choice

of policies, and of rationales backing them up, which many previous administrations

made, and which European governments repeatedly have been making. Indeed,

there is nothing unique, and hence nothing necessarily reassuring, about president

2

Obama’s insistence on sticking to the letter of the law. Several previous American

presidents have given much the same assurances. The Global War on Terror may

be over in its Bushian incarnation, but the problem of “how to make war on savage

tribes” has not, and will not, go away.

the laws of civilized warfare

Wars in medieval and early modern Europe were at the same time limited in scope

and distinctly barbarian.9 More than anything the limits were set by logistical

concerns and organizational factors ― by the size of the armies or problems in

transporting and supplying them, or by the inaccuracy and limited range of the

weapons used. At the same time wars were barbarian since the aim of the soldiers

invariably was to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. Whenever the

opportunity presented itself nothing but expediency stopped the stronger party

from having its way with the weaker. “Everything is permitted in relation to

enemies,” early writers on international law, such as Cornelius van Bynkershoek

and Christian Wolff, explained; “victory in a war gives the victor complete power

over the vanquished.”10

Beginning in the eighteenth-century, legal scholars, statesmen, and even

some generals, began to consider the question of jus in bello: how, and to what

extent, legal provisions could make warfare more humane.11 Despite differences,

there was, by the mid-nineteenth-century, a reasonable degree of consensus on

basic principles. One such principle was that wars should be fought between states

and not between individuals.12 Another principle was that only such actions are

allowed which directly help further the goal of winning the war.“13 No use of force

is lawful,” as the American jurist Henry Wheaton put it in 1836, “except so far as it

is necessary.”14 And, as a corollary, enemy property should be respected unless it

too is directly relevant to the war effort.

A number of practical consequences can be deduced from these general

3

notions. If wars are fought between states and not between individuals, the rights

of individuals should be respected, and only soldiers can be considered as

legitimate targets of military action.15 To make war on civilians is to commit a war

crime. Neither is it permissible to attack the foundations of civilian life: to destroy

civil institutions, industrial machinery, crops, or to cut down trees or slaughter

livestock. Rape is a crime of war as well as a crime of peace. And once a soldier

reverts back to civilian status, or is held as a prisoner of war, he should be given

the same respect as other civilians.16 Soldiers put hors de combat cannot be

injured or killed, and prisoners of war cannot be tortured. It is not permissible to

assassinate individual soldiers, to take them hostage, or to put prize-money on

their heads.17

Consider the actions permitted, and not permitted, to occupying powers.

Above all, an occupier should respect the property of private individuals.18 And

while armies have the right to provision for themselves in enemy territory, to set up

camp and to requisition horses or motor vehicles, they should always pay a fair

price for what they take.19 Under no circumstances is looting or wanton destruction

of private property permissible.20 The only property to which an occupying army

has automatic access is the property of the opposing state, but even here there are

limitations.21 State archives cannot, for example, be seized or destroyed since it

disproportionately would inconvenience individuals. Similarly it is not permissible

to carry off entire libraries or museums, or to destroy buildings of national or

historical importance, universities or scientific academies.22 The only exceptions to

these prohibitions are constituted by “considerations of military necessity.”

However, wary of making this last clause into a carte blanche for military

expediency, the nineteenth-century lawyers insisted that the military benefit of any

exceptions be immediate, overwhelming, and easily demonstrable.23

The writings of individual law professors were soon followed by international

agreements. From the mid-nineteenth-century onward a growing number of

4

conventions, signed by a growing number of states, came to regulate which acts of

war that were permissible and which impermissible. These conventions constituted

a body of international law sanctified by official proclamations and high-minded

speeches.24 In 1856, following the Crimean War, all major European states met in

Paris to sign a convention dealing with privateering in war; in 1864, they met in

Geneva to improve the treatment of wounded soldiers, and in 1868 in St.

Petersburg to outlaw certain particularly cruel weapons.25 In 1899 a first Hague

Conference was held at which a number of agreements were reached regarding the

“laws and customs of war on land” and the “pacific settlement of disputes.” In

1907 a second Hague Conference was convened which expanded on the previous

conventions. There were further meetings in Geneva in 1929 and 1949 at which

agreements were concluded ― the famous “Geneva Conventions” ― on the

treatment of prisoners of war, on the protection of civilians, and on the treatment

of wounded soldiers. Protection for the cultural heritage of mankind was agreed on

through declarations signed in Washington in 1935 and the Hague in 1956.26

Hopelessly idealistic though some of these principles may appear, they did

undoubtedly influence actual cases of warfare. Increasingly, military manuals

incorporated considerations regarding international law, and the conduct of

individual soldiers was judged in their terms. The “Lieber Code” of 1863, which

provided rules of engagement for the soldiers of the Northern states in the

American Civil War, is an early, celebrated, example, but the British, German and

French armies soon adopted similar, legally inspired, regulations.27 As a

consequence, warfare was gradually becoming more civilized.28 Already during the

Napoleonic Wars did the British army pay for the provisions they requisitioned in

enemy territory, and they did the same during the Crimean War. Prisoners of war

were no longer tortured or treated inhumanely. Pillaging and looting were punished

in all European armies, and the cultural and architectural treasures of enemies were

generally respected.

5

Exceptions to these rules, and the near universal cries of “barbarism” they

evoked, demonstrate the relevance of the new conventions. Napoleon, famously,

looted art collections in the various countries he occupied, but after his defeat in

1815, the artifacts were quickly returned and even the French had to admit that

their actions constituted war crimes.29 Similarly, public opinion was outraged when

British troops in 1814 burned down government buildings in Washington, including

the president’s residence, in retaliation for actions committed by American troops in

Canada.30 “The British,” President Madison pointed out,

wantonly destroyed the public edifices, having no relation in their structure to operations of war nor used at the time for military annoyance, some of these edifices being also costly monuments of taste and of the arts, and other depositories of the public archives, not only precious to the nation as the memorials of its origin and its early transactions, but interesting to all nations as contributions to the general stock of historical instruction and political science.31

In Britain the issue of the conduct of the troops in North America was discussed in

the House of Commons, and although the ministers responsible strongly defended

themselves, they were forced to admit that their actions radically departed from the

normal conventions of warfare.32

It is perhaps worth noting that despite this progressive humanization of

warfare, the rapid development of military technology in the nineteenth-century

made armed conflicts increasingly bloody. The sheer fire-power of weapons like the

machine gun allowed for killings to take place on a far wider, next-to industrial,

scale; and technologies like aerial bombardments could not easily distinguish

military from civilian targets.33 The high-minded stipulations regarding jus in bello

were powerless to stop these developments. This is a reversal of the pre-modern

pattern of barbarian but limited wars: although increasingly civilized, twentieth-

century wars became ever more deadly.

“how to fight savage tribes”

It is important to remember that the new laws of war were developed within a very

6

narrow cultural and historical context. The new rules were set up by European,

Christian, and “civilized,” states for managing their wartime relationships.34 For

centuries already, the European continent had constituted a state-system held

together by mutual, and well-founded, expectations regarding reciprocity.35 Within

this common setting, a certain set of rules could easily be insisted on, and any

breaches could be condemned from the point of view of a shared normative

framework. The question, however, was what would happen when the Europeans

made war on others, on people who were external to their state-system ― on the

non-European, the non-Christian, and the “uncivilized.”36 This, in the nineteenth-

century, was known as the problem of “small wars” ― of “les petites guerres,” or

“las guerrillas.”37 Or, as Elbridge Colby put it in 1927, it was the problem of “how

to fight savage tribes.”38

As Colby went on to explain, in these conflicts the Europeans ― including their

North American descendants ― encountered an enemy of an entirely different ilk.39

Non-European warriors, he argued, lack decency and a tradition of chivalry. They

consequently have no respect for the stipulations of jus in bello. Instead they

routinely capture, scalpel and torture their enemies; they fight with the help of

poison, gingal balls, and hired assassins; they disregard cease-fires and flags of

truce, act treacherously and employ underhanded tactics. Most strikingly, they

make no distinction between soldiers and civilians.40 To a savage, everyone is a

warrior ― including women and children ― and consequently they never hesitate to

attack the women and children of their enemies. All the barbarism of the guerrilla

war stems from this lack of a separation between combatants and non-

combatants.41 These may be “small wars,” but they are exceptionally cruel.

The problem, however, was not entirely new. In Europe too there had been

assorted brigands, francs-tireurs and rebels ― the Italian wars of unification in the

1850s provided a contemporary illustration ― who had taken up arms without

official sanction or without representing a state.42 And the great war which broke

7

out in North America in the 1860s was not a confrontation between sovereign

governments, but a civil war fought between an established government and a

group of secessionists. Wars of this kind were clearly more difficult to regulate:

Small wars ... leave a larger place to the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals, to the arbitrary and to the passions. They are more easily transformed into brigandage or into illicit violence. They overexcite, by the uncertainty which is their consequence, the spirit of anger and vengeance on the part of the threatened troops, and provoke cruel retaliations.43

Attempting to include also these irregular troops under the stipulations of the law,

legal scholars generally acknowledged that not all troops, and not all wars, were of

the traditional kind. For the letter of the law to be applicable also to these non-

standard cases, the soldiers had to prove that they were guided by other than

purely private motives; that they could be distinguished from civilians through

uniforms or some other external signs; that they fought in hierarchical, military,

units, and that they themselves respected the laws of warfare.44 If not, there was

no difference between guerrilla fighters and ordinary criminals.

Clearly, most enemies encountered outside of Europe did not live up to these

requirements, and the question for the Europeans was how they should respond to

this fact. One alternative ― the “civilized option” ― was to stick to the moral high-

ground and fight colonial wars much as wars by this time were being fought in

Europe. The other alternative ― the “savage option” ― was to fight with the

methods which one’s new enemies seemed to be employing. As Elbridge Colby

explained, only the savage option had any chance of success. When fighting an

uncivilized enemy, “commanders must attack their problems in entirely different

ways from those in which they proceed against Western peoples.”45 “The normal

rules of international law”

do not apply in wars with uncivilized States and tribes, where their place is taken by the discretion of the commander and such rules of justice and humanity as recommended themselves in the particular circumstances of the case.46

The main responsibility of the commander is towards his troops, Colby continued,

8

and his main aim is military victory. Winning wars while protecting his men in a

non-European setting is not possible if the commander follows European rules of

engagement. Although this does not mean that he should let go of all moral

constraints, there is no doubt that small wars, in practice, are more ruthless.

“Excessive humanitarian ideas should not prevent harshness against those who use

harsh methods, for in being over-kind to one's enemies, a commander is simply

being unkind to his own people.”47

Colby was not alone in drawing these conclusions. All nineteenth-century

writers on international law made a sharp distinction between wars fought in

Europe and in the colonies. “International law,” said Jesse R. Reeves, law professor

at the University of Michigan, “is not applicable to uncivilized peoples and could

have no influence upon them. It is merely a body of rules and customs that have

grown up among nations more or less similar for use among themselves.”48 “In

small wars against uncivilized nations,” said the British military theorist J.F.C.

Fuller, “the form of warfare to be adopted must tone with the shade of culture

existing in the land, by which I mean that, against peoples possessing a low

civilization, war must be more brutal in type.”49 Or, in the words of the British

military manual of 1907:

the rules of International Law apply only to warfare between civilized nations, where both parties understand them and are prepared to carry them out. They do not apply in wars with uncivilized States and tribes, where their place is taken by the discretion of the commander and such rules of justice and humanity as recommended themselves in the particular circumstances of the case.50

Yet savageries carried out by Europeans were never merely an alternative military

strategy. Instead whatever harsh methods they employed should have a

pedagogical dimension. The aim should be, all authors insisted, “to teach lessons,”

and to this end retaliation was a particularly useful tool. By striking back, using

superior force, the savages were to be taught that the Europeans are their masters.

"When at war with a ferocious nation which observes no rules,” as already Emerich

9

de Vattel had argued, “they may be chastised in the persons of those of them who

may be taken” and “by this rigor the attempt may be made of bringing them to a

sense of the laws of humanity."51 Or as Colby insisted:

If a few "non-combatants" ― if there be any such in native folk of such character ― are killed, the loss of life is probably far less than might have been sustained in prolonged operations of a more polite character. The inhuman act thus becomes actually humane, for it shortens the conflict and prevents the shelling of more excessive quantities of blood.52

There is an obvious moral issue at stake here, but also a question of identity. By

the middle of the nineteenth-century, civilized and forward-looking states in Europe

and North America defined their civilization and their progressiveness, inter alia, by

the way they adhered to the rules of international law. To break those rules

imposed severe costs on the enemy, but also on the self. After all, if we too

commit atrocities, what is the difference between us and the savages? The result,

even if the small war eventually is won, is likely to be a crisis of self-confidence.

Warning about such a possibility, some writers on international law, the Swiss law

professor Johannes Bluntschli among them, insisted that retaliation only be

authorized “in case of absolute necessity.”53 And that

the barbarian conduct of the enemy does not authorize similar actions against him. If the savages torture their prisoners and put them to death, civilized troops can at most shoot their prisoners, and under no circumstances torture them.

In the middle of the nineteenth-century, Bluntschli was an influential writer, but,

one could argue, not influential enough.

“le système Bugeaud” in Algeria

Algeria was invaded by France in 1830, but the country soon proved difficult to

govern.54 The French army, and a large group of settlers, were harassed by Arab

guerrilla fighters led by the legendary Abd al-Qadir. At the Treaty of Tafna, 1837,

Abd al-Qadir was granted control over 2/3 of Algerian territory. Ignoring the

10

treaty, the French occupied eastern parts of the country, and the following year the

war recommenced. Looking for a more effective way to fight the Arabs, general

Thomas Robert Bugeaud, the Governor-General of the colony, developed a new

method of warfare ― le système Bugeaud ― which he argued was more suitable to

African conditions. A main feature of this système was the razzia: raids on all

resources that supported the lives of the Arab community, such as their crops,

orchards and cattle.55 Only by declaring war on civilians, Bugeaud argued, and by

terrorizing and starving them, could the enemy be brought under control. Yet, the

general insisted, there was nothing barbarian about such methods. “Gentlemen,”

as he explained to the French parliament, “war is not made philanthropically; he

who wills the end wills the means.”56

By sanctioning such measures, Bugeaud granted tacit approval for his

subordinates to undertake further acts of aggression. Discipline was impossible to

maintain when soldiers were allowed to burn and pillage, and Arab civilians were

repeatedly tortured, raped or slaughtered outright.57 In June 1845, Colonel

Aimable Pélissier trapped a group of natives in the caves of Dahra in the coastal

mountains north of Chélif.58 After perfunctory negotiations, he ordered a fire to be

built in the mouth of the cave, and five hundred men, women, and children were

asphyxiated.59 "All populations which do not accept our conditions must be

despoiled,” as Lucien de Montagnac, another French officer, explained in letters

home to his sister, “Everything must be seized, devastated, without age or sex

distinction: grass must not grow any more where the French army has put the

foot.”

We have established ourselves in the center of the country ... burning killing, pillaging everything. The Kabyles, who until recently were very quiet .. were terrified of our way of acting, and wasted no time accepting all the conditions we imposed on them. Still, a few tribes put up resistance, but we tracked them down on all sides, and took their women, their children, their animals. I don’t think they can hold up against such a regime for very long.60

In the end the razzia and the associated brutal methods were successful. One by

11

one Abd al-Qadir's strongholds fell to the French, and his commanders were killed

or captured. By 1843, the Muslim state finally collapsed, and in 1847 Abd al-Qadir

himself surrendered.

The conquest of Algeria was much debated in France at the time. Some

defended the système Bugeaud and even the actions of commanders such as

Pélissier. After all, wrote the Journal des débats on July 22, 1845, how else are we

going to win over the Arabs?61 The razzia is cruel but not necessarily more cruel

than other terrible things that happen in war. Actions like Pélissier's inspire a

“terreur salutaire” in the locals, and destroy their self-confidence. The sooner they

are subjugated, the more lives will be spared, and the better both for them and for

us. Soon they will turn to more peaceful occupations; “it is better, politically and

for the sake of humanity, to hit hard once than to hit often.”62 However, when

Pélissier's report, describing the atrocity he had committed in lurid and self-

congratulatory terms, was publicly released, many Frenchmen were horrified.63

the Indian uprising of 1857

In May 1857 a mutiny began among native soldiers in the army of the British East

India Company.64 The rebels captured large parts of the northern plains of the

subcontinent, including the province of Oudh and the city of Delhi, where they

installed the Mughal king as their ruler. Rather than engaging in European-style

battles, the war was characterized by sieges: of Cawnpore, (Kanpur), Lucknow, and

Delhi. The war was also characterized by great cruelty on both sides. The first

reports to reach Britain spoke in graphic detail about the barbarism of the natives.

In June 1857, the rebels laid a siege on the British settlement at Cawnpore, but

after three weeks, with little food left, the settlers accepted an offer of a safe

passage. As they made themselves ready to depart, however, the men were all

butchered, and while women and children first were spared, they were later hacked

to death and their bodies thrown into a well ― the notorious “well of Cawnpore” ―

12

which, the story goes, “filled up to within 6 feet of the top.”65

The siege at Lucknow ended better for the British. In a legendary rescue

operation, the army relieved the two thousand soldiers and civilians who were held

captive by native troops. As news of the success eventually reached Britain there

was great jubilation, and one of the commanders, Henry Havelock, was turned into

a national hero.66 At the siege of Delhi, the roles had switched ― the British were

now besieging the rebels ― and here too the British were victorious. On

September 21, 1857, they captured the city. After this date the rebels never

constituted a significant threat, although it took most of the following year before

they were completely crushed.

The acts of retribution meted out by the British army were every bit as

savage as anything committed by the rebels themselves. After Cawnpore was

relieved, the British commanders ordered entire villages to be burned and the

villagers to be killed on the suspicion of harboring pro-rebel sympathies.67 And

after the fall of Delhi, the city was thoroughly sacked by British troops. “The house

is beautifully furnished,” as Edward Vibart, a 19-year old British officer, noted

regarding a Delhi palace he visited; there are “chandeliers, large mirrors, couches,

&c.” Yet

most of the mirrors were smashed by our troops, the Sikhs, I believe, when we first came in; it was a great pity, but there is no preventing the men committing all kinds of devastation.68

Everybody was helping themselves, and those who failed to do so regretted it

afterward.69 Once the city was taken a large number of people were summarily

executed, and although, as Vibart admitted, not all of them were guilty, “a severe

example was undoubtedly necessary to instill terror into the minds of the wavering

and those still bent on defying our authority.”70 A favorite method of execution was

to tie the rebels to the mouths of cannons and to blow them to pieces. As Charles

Dickens’ weekly, Household Words, assured its readers in a graphic account of this

practice, this way of punishing mutineers “is one of the institutions of Hindustan.”

13

While it may seem barbarian to us, it is in fact “one of the easiest methods of

passing into eternity.”

To men of keen sensibilities the few minutes preceding the execution must appear like cycles of torture; but to brutes ― like the savages of Cawnpore and Delhi ― they can have few terrors.71

As Household Words explained, “the times demanded that a terrible example

should be made.72

There is no doubt that the British public gave an overwhelming support to

such measures. Many felt betrayed by the mutineers who, an important strand of

opinion argued, always had been benevolently treated by the East India Company.

And clearly media coverage of the uprising played a crucial role in shaping the

public reaction.73 In general ― and as newspaper proprietors soon discovered ―

the British public loved reading about atrocities committed against their

countrymen. The gorier the details, the more titillating; and a particular favorite

were accounts of fair English maidens being raped by low-browed, brown, men.74

Given these heinous crimes, the justice of the British cause was never in doubt:

And England, now avenged their wrongs by vengeance deep and dire

Cut this canker with sword, and burn it out with fire

Destroy those traitor regions, hang every pariah hound

And hunt them down to death, in all hills and cities ‘round.75

the north China campaign of 1860

In the spring of 1860, a joint Anglo-French army was dispatched to China in order

to force a ratification of the Treaty of Tianjin signed two years earlier.76 Once the

allies captured the fortresses at Dagu, guarding access to Beijing from the sea, the

Chinese seemed ready for a settlement, but the negotiations soon stalled. “I fear,”

said Lord Elgin, leader of the British mission, that “a little more bullying will be

necessary before we bring this stupid Government up to the mark.”77 Boldly, he

decided to march on the capital.78 On September 18, a group of thirty-six French

and British soldiers was ambushed and captured by the Chinese.79 The Chinese

14

authorities insisted that the hostages would be returned only once a final

settlement had been negotiated.

When they arrived in Beijing, the allies went straight to the Yuanmingyuan,

the imperial compound in the north-western suburbs, which served as the de facto

residence of the emperors.80 The Yuanmingyuan was a large pleasure garden filled

with palaces, villas, temples, pagodas, lakes, man-made mountains, flowers and

trees; it was also the location of an imperial archive and library, and the place

where the emperors stored the tributary gifts presented to them by visiting foreign

delegations. The Yuanmingyuan was the secluded playground of the Chinese

rulers; it was “the garden of gardens” and “a vision of paradise.”

On October 7 and 8, this remarkable place was thoroughly sacked by French

troops.81 “During two days,” wrote the French soldier Armand Lucy in a letter to his

father, “I have walked on more than thirty million francs of silks, jewelry, porcelain,

bronzes, sculptures, of treasure. I don’t think anyone has seen a similar thing

since this sacking of Rome by the barbarians.”82 The British commanders, fearing

the demoralizing effect which a rampage would have on the discipline of the troops,

strictly forbade their soldiers from participate in the looting. So as not to make

them too envious of their French counterparts, however, the commanders

organized an auction at which the British part of the loot was sold off to the highest

bidder and the proceeds distributed to the soldiers.83

Just as the Yuanmingyuan was being looted, the first of the Allied soldiers

were returned. Most of them were in a pitiable state, telling tales of horrific

treatment at the hands of the Chinese, and showing visible signs of torture.84

Eventually, only half the captives were returned alive. “It is,” Lord Elgin concluded,

“an atrocious crime, which, not for vengeance, but for future security, ought to be

severely dealt with.”85 And the punishment should be “at once severe and swift.”86

After some deliberation, he singled out the Yuanmingyuan.87 “It was the Emperor's

favourite residence, and its destruction could not fail to be a blow to his pride as

15

well as to his feelings.” The army would go there “not to pillage, but to mark, by a

solemn act of retribution, the horror and indignation with which we were inspired by

the perpetration of a great crime.”88 On October 18, the deed was done and soon a

cloud of thick smoke covered Beijing’s north-western suburbs.89

In this way the Brits came to involve themselves in hypocrisy and in

contradiction. They regarded China as a, at best, “semi-barbarian” country to

which they were going to bring the “gifts of civilization.” Yet their actions were

themselves nothing short of barbarian. “I don't know whether I shall be justified at

home for committing this,” wrote general Hope Grant to Sidney Herbert, the

Minister of War, “what may be called barbaric act.”90 And although Elgin expanded

on the rationale for the destruction at great length in official letters, it is striking

that he says nothing about it in the letters home to his wife. Maybe he was

ashamed of what he had done.91 In any event the British government strongly

supported the action. “I am heartily glad that Elgin and Grant determined to burn

down the Summer Palace,” wrote Prime Minister Palmerston.

It was absolutely necessary to stamp by some such permanent record our indignation at the treachery and brutality of these Tartars .... I should have been equally well pleased if the Pekin palace had shared the same fate.92

“I trust,” wrote Herbert to general Hope Grant, Jan 10, 1861, “that the severity of

the lesson, the appearance of a hostile force in Pekin, and the rapidity and

completeness of the campaign, may produce a lasting effect.”93

Americans and savages

American society was always, even before independence, constituted in relation to

a frontier, the other side of which was inhabited by “savages.” The English settlers

in Virginia and New England in the early 1600s had to contend with native

inhabitants who, the English were convinced, were deficient both in religion and

civility. Yet the official view, propounded by religious leaders and by the official

16

spokesmen of the English state, was not necessarily dismissive. As they repeatedly

affirmed, the Indians had a lot of potential: if only treated with respect and

generosity, it should be possible to convert them both to Christianity and to an

English way of life.94

Yet this is not what happened. Disputes over land and resources soon

brought natives and settlers into conflict with each other. Moreover, the people

who actually inhabited the new colonies were often less than high-minded.95 They

were men not looking for a new Jerusalem as much as for opportunities to make a

fortune for themselves. Often brought up fighting “savages” in Ireland, they were

convinced that Christian virtues played no role in conflicts of this kind. The Indians

were cruel, to be sure, and they attacked and assassinated settlers and their

families, yet fighting back, the invaders more than matched their savagery. One

example is the Pequot War in Connecticut in 1636, where the settlers encircled, and

set fire to, a village in which 400 Indians, mainly women and children, died.96

Another example is King Philip’s War, 1675-76, in which a coalition of Native

Americans for a while seriously threatened the entire British settlement in New

England.97 Learning to “fight like Indians,” the settlers formed raiding parties and

attacked crops and fishing places. Once a native village was captured, it was

pillaged and burned, and bounties were set on all captives. The Indians who

survived were sold as slaves or exiled to tribes further west.

And yet this was, in Europe too, how wars tended to be fought in the

seventeenth-century.98 Two hundred years later, however, wars between civilized

states were governed by legal norms. The 157 paragraphs of the Instructions for

the Government of Armies of the United States, in the Field, published as “General

Order, no. 100,” in April 1863, provided military commanders in the Civil War with an

convenient manual to consult when in legal doubt.99 The war was not always fought

according to the rule-book to be sure, yet it was precisely since the rules were so clear

that actions, such as general William Sherman’s scorched earth tactics in Georgia and

17

South Carolina in 1864-65, easily could be identified as transgressions. These legal

provisions did not, of course, stop the American Civil War from being enormously bloody

― some 373,000 soldiers were killed, as were at least an equal number of civilians ―

but the vast majority of these victims died in an orderly and legal fashion.

Contrast the legalism of the Civil War with the legal terra nullius which existed

in relations with native Americans. Even a mild-mannered jurist like Francis Lieber

repeatedly contrasted “modern regular wars of the Europeans, and their

descendants in other portions of the globe,” with wars “fought by barbarians.”100

And more severe critics talked about “the almost universal brutality of the red-

skinned fighters,” which means that in relation to them “there can be little though

of international law.”101 Against such people “it is not only perfectly proper, it is

even necessary, to take rigorous measures.”102

And rigorous measures were taken ― against the Cheyennes in 1864, 1878-

79; the Apaches in 1864-86; the Commanches in 1867-75; the Sioux in 1862,

1866, 1876-77, and finally in 1890. At the Sand Creek Massacre in November

1864, for example, some 150 Cheyennes ― men, women and children ― were

killed by the U.S. Army. “When thirst for blood was satiated,” the New York Times

reported the story, “the troops marched back to their homes, boasting of their

fiendish achievements, and carrying with them Indian scalps, and other trophies

still more horrible.”103 At Wounded Knee in December 1890, in the last showdown

between Indians and settlers, these atrocities were repeated.104

Ten years later, when the western frontier moved into Asia as a result of the

Spanish-American War, a new set of savages were encountered. In September

1901, forty U.S. soldiers were ambushed and brutally killed by Philippine guerrilla

fighters at Balangiga, on the island of Samar.105 In retaliation, the commander-in-

chief, Brigadier-General Jacob H. Smith, ordered that "the interior of Samar must

be made a howling wilderness”; that no prisoners should be taken; and that all men

over 10 years of age ― everyone capable of bearing arms ― should be

18

annihilated.106 Although his subordinates never took the order literally, several

thousands of innocent Filipinos died in the subsequent army raids. General Smith’s

attitude also provided an official sanction of various harsh measures committed by

his subordinates. A popular interrogation method of American officers was the

“water cure” whereby prisoners were forced to drink water until they experienced a

sensation of drowning.107

These atrocities met with vocal protests back in the United States. A number

of prominent Americans ― including William Jennings Bryan, Mark Twain and

Andrew Carnegie ― spoke out against the annexation of the Philippines and the

subsequent war, and the “water cure” was viewed as a particular embarrassment.

To these critics, the fact that such interrogation techniques never could be practiced

in the United States itself demonstrated the immorality and cowardice of the

policy.108 To give additional force to these arguments, an American Anti-Imperialist

League was set up in 1901, with Twain is its Vice President. As they argued in a

“Fourth of July message” that year:

When this country denies to millions of men the rights which we have ever claimed, not only for ourselves but for all men, its policy is suicidal. ... No man can defend despotic methods abroad and long retain his loyalty to democracy at home. ... We cannot have citizens and subjects under the same flag.109

war, civilization and savages

The distinction between “civilized nations” and “savages” does not, in itself, provide

an explanation for all atrocities committed in times of war. Wars fought in Europe

too ― World War II, the war in ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s ― have often flaunted

moral considerations.110 Equally, there are other explanations for many of the

atrocities committed in colonial settings. It surely made a difference, for example,

that most small wars were fought sufficiently far away to be impossible for

European governments to directly control.111 Military commanders acted largely on

their own, and the men surely often felt that the extra-European environment

19

provided them with a license to act irresponsibly ― as if they were on a vacation

from the tenets of ordinary morality.112 What the distinction between civilized

nations and savages does illustrate, however, is a certain European attitude. In

wars between civilized nations rules regarding jus in bello applied, even if

occasionally broken; in wars with savages, the same rules did explicitly not apply.

Instead moral rules could be made up on the spot; military commanders, and

occasionally soldiers too, had the right to improvise.

The small wars discussed above share a number of characteristics. They took

place in a relatively short time period ― roughly 1840 to 1890 ― when the rules of

jus in bello also were codified. They took place in a similar geopolitical location: a

European or an American army ― with is superior firepower, organization and

economic resources ― invaded a far poorer, more underdeveloped, country in

Africa or Asia. Another similarity was the nature of the enemy: they were made up

of informal forces, fighting without consideration for the laws of war, and since they

made no distinction between soldiers and civilians, their methods were easily

identified as “barbarian.” A third similarity concerns a sudden change in tactics:

after initially employing civilized methods of warfare, the Europeans quickly

switched to what they took to be indigenous methods. Thus the razzia in Algeria,

being shot by cannons in India, “looting” in China and “water cures” in the

Philippines, were all taken to be well-established, local, practices.113 A fourth

similarity concerns the pedagogical use of violence: the Europeans employed their

savagery to “teach lessons,” above all regarding their own superiority and the

futility of further resistance. A last similarity concerns the public reactions back

home: disclosure of the methods employed in the war started debates regarding

whether it was worth compromising one’s ideals in order to achieve victory.

From this historical perspective, Bush’s “Global War on Terror” was just

another case of a small war. The methods employed were, arguably, not as

brazenly immoral as some nineteenth-century colonial conflicts, and initially, at

20

least, Bush's war enjoyed a measure of support among the occupied population.

Yet the similarities are nevertheless striking. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda

targeted New York in a terrorist attack which made no distinction between soldiers

and civilians and in which some 3,000 innocent people died. The subsequent

American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were meant to “shock and awe” the

Muslim world and to teach all terrorists ― actual as well as potential ― that they

picked a fight with the United States at their own peril.114 The Americans too were

going to spread the blessings of civilization. When the initial hopes regarding an

easy victory were dashed, U.S. commanders turned to savage methods, committing

crimes against the laws of war. In the end, they killed far more innocent civilians

than ever the initial Al Qaeda attack.115 The subsequent debate in the United

States, just as in the wake of other small wars, concerned whether irregular armies

best are defeated through legal or illegal means, and what impact, if any, the war

has on America’s self-image and position in the world.

If there was nothing extraordinary about Bush’s war, there is also nothing

extraordinary about Obama’s repudiation of it. Already in 1814, James Monroe,

insisted that his government “owes it to itself, to the principles which it has ever

held sacred, to disavow, as justly chargeable to it, any such wanton, cruel, and

unjustifiable warfare.”116 And president Theodore Roosevelt, when reviewing the

case of the massacres in the Philippines, reminded his generals that it was up to

them to set a good example for their subordinates, especially in small wars where

they are likely to be severely provoked. Only in this way can commanding officers

“keep a moral check over any acts of an improper character by their

subordinates.”117

Reflecting on Bush’s Global War on Terror from this historical perspective, we

can conclude that the question of whether it is worth compromising one’s ideals in

order to achieve victory, actually has an answer ― and the answer is “no.” This, at

least, is true as far as the verdicts of public opinion, and most historians, are

21

concerned. Small wars, fought by savage methods, are won at too high a cost.

The French war in Algeria in the 1830s and 40s, the British suppression of the

Indian uprising of 1857, the Anglo-French destruction of the Yuanmingyuan,

American atrocities against native Americans and Filipinos, are today generally

regarded as great embarrassments for which the writers of history textbooks

continuously have felt the need to apologize. Surely not all of these wars were

necessary, or they could have been won in far more civilized ways. This is not to

say, however, that the problem of “how to fight savage tribes” has gone away.

There are still plenty of poor, desperate, humiliated, and recently invaded countries

were men, and some women, decide to turn themselves into guerrilla fighters. And

the temptation is still there for both Europeans and Americans to follow what they

regard as their example.

22

1 I am grateful to François Gemmene, Vilho Harle, Yana Zuo, three anonymous reviewers, and audiences at Sciences-Po, France, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, and the University of Tampere, Finland, for comments on a previous version.

2 “Text of Bush's Act of War Statement,” BBC, September 12, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1540544.stm.

3 Various memoranda pertaining to interrogation techniques are available at “Bush Administration Documents on Interrogation,” Washington Post, June 23, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62516-2004Jun22.html.

4 On the direct involvement of the president and his leading officials in this policy, see John McCain and Carl Levin, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Washington D.C.: Senate Armed Services Committee , December 11, 2008). On “extraordinary rendition,” see Amnesty International, Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and 'Disappearance', April 5, 2006, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/051/2006

5 Quoted in David Stout and Scott Shane, “Cheney Defends Use of Harsh Interrogations,” The New York Times, February 7, 2008.

6 Scott Shane, “Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed,” The New York Times, January 23, 2009.

7 This distinction has not of course always been adhered to in practice. Not all European wars ― World War II is a striking example ― were legally restrained, and not all non-European wars were scenes of atrocities. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two kinds of war is clearly drawn by all nineteenth-century writers.

8 The historical cases to be discussed below all took place within a relatively brief time period – 1830s to 1880 – which also is the time when the discipline of international law was codified in Europe and North America. By picking these cases, it is possible to demonstrate the limits of legal reasoning when applied to colonial wars. Other cases drawn from this period would have lent support to much the same interpretation. The focus on Britain and France is motivated by the fact that they were the leading colonial powers in Europe at the time. The American case shows that even a self-declared “anti-colonial” country struggled with the same dilemma.

9 The total nature of pre-modern warfare was often stressed by nineteenth-century reformers. See, among others, Henry Sumner Maine, International Law: A Series of Lectures Delivered Before the University of Cambridge, 1887 (New York: Holt, 1888), 8. On the historical development of war see Raymond C. Kelly, Warless Societies and the Origin of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

10 See Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Le droit international codifié (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1874) §568, 319; Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, [1836] (Boston: Little, Brown, 1855) §2, 416. Bynkershoek and Wolff are discussed in A. Pillet, ed., Les fondateurs du droit international: leur oeuvres: leurs doctrines (Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1904), 383-446, 447-80.

11 On the development of the laws of war in relation to warfare in North America see Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850 (London: Anchor, 2004), 182-188.

12 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §511, 289; §569, 319; §644, 360. Cf. John B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Volume 7 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 172-73; Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States, in the Field (New York: D. van Nostrand, 1863) §§21-23, 8. Compare the enormously influential Henri Dunant, Un Souvenir de Solferino (Paris: Fick, 1862).

13 Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities: On the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1863), §65, 124-25. Bluntschli quotes the Russian general Milutin to this effect. Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §558, 314.

14 Wheaton, (see note 9 above), §2, 417.15 Ibid, §2, 417; Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §554, 311.16 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §585, 328; §§601-626, 343-52.17 Ibid, §561, 316; §562, 316; §§574, 575, 324; Lieber, (see note 11 above), §16, 7.18 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §652, 365-66. The Lieber Code stipulated that soldiers

lawfully could be shot on the spot if they disobeyed an order to stop looting. Lieber, (see note 11 above), §44, 14. Compare Moore, (see note 11 above), 198. Twiss agrees, but only when a city has not been taken “by storm.” Twiss, (see note 12 above), §64, 124.

19 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §§653-657, 366-69.20 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899, quoted

in Moore, (see note 11 above), 198.21 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §644, 360.22 Twiss, (see note 12 above), §67, 128-29. Lieber, (see note 11 above), §§34-36, 11-12. Cf. Moore,

(see note 11 above), 204. Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §577, 325; §§648-650, 362-64. Although it is not against international law to remove individuals works of art, “today’s public opinion disapproves of the sale or donation of such objects by a victor during a war.” Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §650, 363.

23 Lieber provides an example: “Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” Lieber, (see note 11 above), §14, 4. Cf. Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §549, 309; Cf. Moore, (see note 11 above), 178; Wheaton, (see note 9 above), §6, 421.

24 For a collection of the main agreements, see Conventions and Declarations Between the Powers Concerning War, Arbitration and Neutrality (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1915).

25 On the St. Petersburg conference, see Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §558, 314-15.26 On the so called “Pax Cultura” agreement ― or the “Roerich Pact” ― see Nicholas Roerich,

The Roerich Pact And The Banner Of Peace (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2006).27 Lieber, (see note 11 above). The British field manual of 1907 reprints all international agreements

regarding the laws of war. See War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1907), 222-256. On German manuals, see George W. Scott, The German War Code Contrasted with the War Manuals of the United States, Great Britain, and France (Washington, 1918).

28 Admittedly, respect for legal prohibitions are not always easy to tell apart from questions of expediency. To pay for provisions may be the only way in which provisions can be obtained, and a prohibition on looting does not only express respect for enemy property but it also assures that military discipline is maintained. To this extent it can be said that international law merely codified changes which already were occurring. See Elbridge Colby, “How to Fight Savage Tribes,” The American Journal of International Law 21, no. 2 (April 1927):286.

29 Twiss, (see note 12 above), §68, 129-130.30 Compare the resolution taken by the U.S. Congress on 10 July, 1776, that “any cruelties

committed by British forces or their allies in North America would be viewed as being done on George III's instructions.” Colley, (see note 10), 220.

31 President Madison's proclamation of Sept. 1, 1814, quoted in Moore, (see note 11 above), 200.

32 Twiss, (see note 12 above), §69, 133-134. Cf. Moore, (see note 11 above), 202. Warfare in the twentieth-century ― such as the Allied bombings of Germany ― offers even more obvious exceptions to the established norms. For a discussion, see Michael Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2006), chapter 16.

33 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §560, 315.34 The terms “civilized” and “savage” as employed throughout this paper echo contemporary

European and American uses. In the nineteenth-century legal discourse on war, “civilized nations” are those that respect the distinction between soldiers and civilians while “barbarian” or “savage” nations are those that do not. The distinction is revealing regarding the need to alleviate the tension between the way the Europeans and Americans conducted their wars and the moral and religious principles which they professed. For an alternative perspective, compare the critical contribution of Islamic scholarship to the development of European international law. See Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).

35 Compare the development of an intra-European system of shared norms, discussed in Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1988); Adda B. Bozeman,

Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancient Near East to the Opening of the Modern Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

36 On the origins of the European idea of the “barbarian” see Thomas Harrison, ed., Greeks and Barbarians (London: Routledge, 2001); Tzvetan Todorov, La peur des barbares: Au-delà du choc des civilisations (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2008).

37 As Lieber explained: “The term guerrilla is the diminutive of the Spanish word guerra, war, and means petty war, that is, war carried on by detached parties; generally in the mountains.” Francis Lieber, “Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War,” [1862], in The Miscellaneous Writings of Francis Lieber, Volume 2 (London: Lippincott & Co., 1881), 278. The term “guerrilla” was first introduced in other European languages through references to the partisans harassing French troops during the Spanish War of Independence, 1807-14.

38 Colby, (see note 27 above), 279-288. See also Elbridge Colby, “The Progressive Character of War,” The American Political Science Review 18, no. 2 (May 1924): 366-373; Elbridge Colby, “War Crimes,” Michigan Law Review 23, no. 6 (April 1925): 606-634. Compare Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 34-35, 38.

39 In what follows, the term “European” will always be taken to include the inhabitants of the settlement of Europeans in North America and their subsequently independent states.

40 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §512, 290, on how the laws of war do not apply in such cases.41 Ibid, §573, 323.42 See Lieber, (see note 11 above), 275-92. On the francs-tireurs employed by France in 1870

during the Franco-German war, see Rupert Ticehurst, “The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross, no. 317 (April 30, 1997): 125-134. Further cases are provided by the resistance movements against German occupation during World World II.

43 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §570 bis, 321.44 The issue is now regulated to this effect in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. See

“International Humanitarian Law - Third 1949 Geneva Convention” (International Committee of the Red Cross, August 12, 1949), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590006I?OpenDocument. For nineteenth-century discussions, see Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §570 bis, 321; Lieber, (see note 11 above), 286-92;Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction of the Study of International Law: Designed as an Aid in Teaching and in Historical Studies (New York: C. Scriber, 1864), 299.

45 Colby, (see note 27 above), 279.46 Ibid.47 Ibid.48 Quoted in ibid, 280.49 Ibid.50 War Office, (see note 26 above), 456.51 Quoted in Moore, (see note 11 above), 207.52 Colby, (see note 27 above), 287.53 Bluntschli, (see note 9 above), §567, 318. Compare Moore, (see note 11 above), 146.54 Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in

Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Oxford University Press, 1986), 378. See, among other sources, Delfraissy, Colonisation de l'Algérie par le système du général Bugeaud (Alger: V. Aillaud, 1871); J.-P. Krémer, Projet de colonisation de l'Algérie (Paris: M. Duracq, 1848).

55 This way of making war, on private property rather than on soldiers, was, according to Bugeaud, how wars usually were conducted in North Africa. Porch, (see note 53 above), 400.

56 Henri Ideville, Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud, from His Private Correspondence and Original Documents, 1784-1849 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1884), 299-300. Compare the next-to identical comments by Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu in Gillo Pontecorvo, La battaglia di Algeri (Rialto Pictures, 1966), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0058946/.

57 Jardin and Andre-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction 1815-1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 162.

58 “L'Akhbar d'Alger raconte en ces termes un terrible épisode ...,” Journal des débats politiques et littéraires, July 11, 1845, 2.

59 "We're smoking them out,” as president Bush put it in November 2001, in relation to Bin Laden and Al Queda, who at the time were hiding in caves in eastern Afghanistan. Although the president is unlikely to have seen this historical parallel, many people in Algeria surely made the connection. See “Bush: 'We're Smoking Them Out',” CNN.com, November 26, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/26/gen.war.against.terror/

60 François Joseph Lucien de Montagnac, Lettres d'un soldat: neuf années de campagnes en Afrique (Paris: Plon, 1885), 311.

61 “Le Moniteur algérien du 15 juillet contient l'article suivant ...,” Journal des débats politiques et littéraires, July 22, 1845, 2.

62 Ibid.63 Tudesq, (see note 56 above), 162.64 Two contemporary overviews are John W. Kaye, History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8,

Volumes 1-4 (London: Longmans, 1910); George B. Malleson, The Indian Mutiny of 1857 (London: Seeley & Co., 1891).

65 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities (London: Routledge, 1994), 96-97. The historiography of the uprising is discussed in Patrick Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 199-224.

66 And given a position on one of the plinths in Trafalgar Square. On the discussion in the year 2000 regarding removing him, see Paul Keiso, “Mayor Attacks Generals in Battle of Trafalgar Square,” The Guardian, October 20, 2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/oct/20/london.politicalnews.

67 Dawson, (see note 64 above), 96-97.68 Edward Vibart, The Sepoy Mutiny as Seen by a Subaltern: From Delhi to Lucknow (London:

Smith, Elder & Co., 1898), 143.69 Vibart: “it has ever remained a matter of regret to me that I did not take advantage of such an

excellent opportunity to select something of greater value!” Ibid, 153.70 Ibid, 150.71 “Blown Away,” Household Words, March 27, 1858: 348.72 Ibid, 349.73 Brantinger, (see note 64 above), 199-224.74 Colley, referring to North America, talks about “the pornography of real or invented Indian

violence.” Colley, (see note 10 above), 177.75 The English poet Martin Tupper quoted in Sashi Bhusan Chaudhuri, English Historical Writings

on the Indian Mutiny 1857-1859 (New Delhi: World Press, 1979), 259.76 A general overview of the war is provided by Henri Cordier, L'Expédition de Chine de 1860,

histoire diplomatique, notes et documents (Paris: F. Alcan, 1906). On the conduct of the Europeans, see James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); John Newsinger, “Elgin in China,” New Left Review (June 15, 2002): 119-40; Erik Ringmar, “Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime: The European Destruction of the Emperor's Summer Palace,” Millennium 34, no. 3 (2006): 917-33.

77 Theodore Walrond, Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin (London: John Murray, 1872), 349.

78 Arthur H. Lord Stanmore, ed., Sidney Herbert, Lord Herbert of Lea: A Memoir, Volume 2 (London: John Murray, 1906), 341.

79 Ibid, 344.80 The classical account is by a Jesuit priest: Francois Attiret, A Particular Account of the

Emperor of China's Gardens Near Pekin: In a Letter from F. Attiret, a French Missionary, Now Employ'd by That Emperor to Paint the Apartments in Those Gardens, to His Friend at Paris, M. Cooper. (London: 1752). For a historical overview, see Carroll Brown Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace under the Ch'ing Dynasty (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1934).

81 French soldiers have provided vivid accounts. See, for example, Adolphe Armand, Lettres de l’expédition de Chine et de Cochinchine (Paris: Thunot, 1864); Hérisson, Journal d'un interprète en Chine (Paris: Paul Ollendorf, 1886); Armand Lucy, Lettres intimes sur la campagne de Chine (Marseille: Jules Barile, 1861).

82 Lucy, (see note 80 above), 96.83 Hope Grant to Herbert, Oct 9, in Stanmore, (see note 77 above), 345. On the fate of the loot,

see Hevia, (see note 75 above), 74-118.84 See the first-hand accounts of Stanislas D'Escayrac de Lauture, “Récit de la captivité de M. le

comte d'Escayrac de Lauture par les Chinois, fait par lui-même,” in Nouvelles annales des voyages, de la géographie et de l'histoire, tome 2, vol. 182, 6 (Paris: Gide, 1864); Henry Brougham Loch, Personal Narrative of Occurrences During Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China, 1860 (London: John Murray, 1869).

85 Quoted in Walrond, (see note 76 above), 14 October, 365.86 Ibid.87 In letters back to Herbert, general Hope Grant takes responsibility ― “with the full

concurrence of Lord Elgin” ― for the destruction of the imperial compound. Stanmore, (see note 77 above), 349.

88 Quoted in Walrond, (see note 76 above), 366.89 For two lively accounts, see Robert McGhee, How We Got to Pekin (Adamant Media

Corporation, 2001); Robert Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860: Containing Personal Experiences of Chinese Character, and of the Moral and Social Condition of the Country; Together with a Description of the Interior of Pekin (London: Smith, Elder and Co, 1861).

90 Stanmore, (see note 77 above), 349.91 The French commanders, for their part, refused to participate in the action, partly for reasons

of expediency, but also since they regarded it as unnecessary act of vandalism. See Baron de Bazancourt, Les Expéditions de Chine et de Cochinchine, tome 2 (Paris: Amyot, 1862), 300-01.

92 Palmerston to Herbert, Dec 20, 1860, quoted in Stanmore, (see note 77 above), 350.93 Ibid, 351.94 Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585-

1685 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 87-88.95 Ibid. 96 Ibid, 109-11. 97 Ibid, 155-73. The savagery of this war is vividly described in Jill Lepore, The Name of War:

King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Vintage, 1999).98 Colley, (see note 10 above), 143. In 1631, during the Thirty Years War, when the city of

Magdeburg was sacked, some 25,000 inhabitants lost their lives.99 Lieber, (see note 11 above). Wrote General Halleck: “I think the No. 100 will do honour to our

country. ... It is a contribution by the U.S. to the stock of common civilization.” Quoted in Brainerd Dyer, “Francis Lieber and the American Civil War,” The Huntington Library Quarterly 2, no. 4 (July 1939), 456.

100 Lieber, (see note 11 above), 24, 25.101 Colby, (see note 27 above), 284.102 Quoted in ibid, 285.103 “The Massacre of the Cheyennes,” New York Times, July 1, 1867,104 See “Indians Tell Their Story: A Pathetic Recital of the Killing of Women and Children,” New

York Times, February 12, 1891, An inquiry into the Wounded Knee Massacre was ordered by president McKinley, but the commanding officer was found to have acted correctly. See “Col. Forsyth Exonerated; His Action at Wounded Knee Justified,” New York Times, February 13, 1891.

105 See “Filipinos Kill 48 Americans; Company of Infantry Almost Wiped Out in Samar,” New York Times, September 30, 1901; “Chaffee Sends News of the Massacre,” New York Times, October 5, 1901.

106 Quoted in Moore, (see note 11 above), 187. See “Major Waller Testifies; Says Gen. Smith

Instructed Him to Kill and Burn,” New York Times, April 9, 1902. General Smith was a veteran both of the Civil War and the American Indian wars.

107 “The Water Cure Described; Discharged Soldier Tells Senate Committee How and Why the Torture Was Inflicted,” New York Times, May 4, 1902. American soldiers insisted that the “water cure” was an ancient Spanish way of dealing with Filipino prisoners.

108 L. Benson, “Comment on the 'Water Cure',” New York Times, July 7, 1902, 109 “Anti-Imperialists' July 4 Manifesto; America's Course Declared an Example of National

Perfidy,” New York Times, July 4, 1901.110 This has particularly been the case, it seems, when the very survival of a state has been at

stake. Compare the Allied bombings of Germany during World War II, discussed in Walzer (see note 31), chapter 16; or the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 in which some 8,000 civilians were killed. See Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35—the Fall of Srebrenica (New York: United Nations, November 15, 1999).

111 The lines of communication were improved only with the arrival of the telegraph ― linking Europe and North America in 1866 and England and India in 1870. See John Munro, Heroes of the Telegraph (New York: Religious Tract Society, 1891).

112 Colley (see note 10 above), 179; Ringmar (see note 75 above). The lack of official declarations of war may also have contributed to making colonial wars less bound by legal precepts.

113 Several of these “well-established, local, practices” were clearly invented by the Europeans. As was the use of gas. Compare Winston Churchill: “I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum.” Winston Churchill, “War Office Memorandum,” May 12, 1919, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Churchill%27s_1919_War_Office_Memorandum.

114 The term “shock and awe,” was first advanced in Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, D.C: National Defense University, 1996). The term was popularized after the bombing of Baghdad by American troops in March, 2003.

115 The number of civilians killed during the Iraq War is notoriously contested. In January 2008, a study by the Iraqi Health Ministry, reported 400,000 excess Iraqi deaths as a result of the invasion, with 151,000 being violence-related deaths. “New Study Says 151,000 Iraqi Dead,” BBC, January 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7180055.stm.

116 Mr. Monroe to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, Sept. 6, 1814, quoted in Moore, (see note 11 above), 185.117 Ibid. See also “President Retires Gen. Jacob H. Smith: Philippine Officer Reprimanded for 'Kill

and Burn' Order,” New York Times, July 17, 1902.