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10-2021

Equality, Non-Interference, and Sovereignty: President Ahmadou Equality, Non-Interference, and Sovereignty: President Ahmadou

Ahidjo and the Making of Cameroon-U.S. Relations Ahidjo and the Making of Cameroon-U.S. Relations

Julius A. Amin

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Equality, Non-Interference, and Sovereignty: President Ahmadou Ahidjo and the Making

of Cameroon-U.S. Relations

By Julius A. Amin, University of Dayton

Accepted manuscript of article appearing in African Studies Review, 2021. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2021.75)

Introduction

El Hajj Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned as Cameroon’s president in 1982 and peacefully handed over

power to Paul Biya. During a period when leaders all too often clung to power or were forced out

by political or social violence, Ahidjo’s resignation after twenty-two years as president was an

important example. But in less than a year, relations between Ahidjo and Biya had unraveled.

Accused of masterminding an attempted coup, Ahidjo stood trial in absentia and was sentenced

to death. He left Cameroon in 1983 never to return, dying in 1989 in exile in Senegal. When the

news broke that Ahidjo had died, “Paul Biya breathed a sigh of relief, [and] wished his

predecessor’s soul a speedy journey to hell,” wrote Victor Le Vine (Krieger 2015: 87).

Ahidjo’s regime made an indelible impact on the nation. Despite his role in shaping

Cameroon holistically, scholars have generally focused on domestic policy to the detriment of

his foreign policy accomplishments (DeLancey 2007; Efouba 2018; Johnson 1970; Joseph 1978;

Ngoh 2004; Takougang & Krieger 1998). Scholars routinely portray him as ruthless,

authoritative, and vicious (Eyinga 1978; Bayart 1973). Ahidjo, Jean François Bayart wrote, was

“the source of all power in the state” and ruled in “an active and personal manner” (1978: 66).

Abel Eyinga likened the use of torture by the Ahidjo regime to that of South Africa’s apartheid

government agents, adding that “asphyxiation, hanging, electric shocks, to outright murders”

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were common practices (1978: 109). Yet he rose in stature with and was repeatedly praised by

leaders around the world for his external actions. Yakubu Gowon was grateful for Ahidjo’s role

in mediating the Nigerian Civil War (Torrent 2012). Sammy Kum Buo wrote that Ahidjo was

“widely respected by his colleagues in the Organization of African Unity” (1973: 32). Western

diplomats described him as a “highly intelligent leader” who brought stability and economic

growth to Cameroon (Torrent: 6). The U.S. Department of State affirmed: “most of modern

Cameroon was built and paved under Ahidjo’s reign,” though it added, “under his rule,

Cameroon’s human rights record was dismal.”1 The Ahidjo presidency, like that of Leopold

Senghor and others in the continent, presents a paradox in postcolonial African politics, a subject

of renewed interest to historians of decolonization and independence (Bamba 2016; Durand

2007; Rippert 2021).

A proliferation of studies about the Biya regime has also brought renewed attention to the

Ahidjo presidency (Anyefru 2017; Kamé 2018; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003; Pommerolle and

Heungoup 2017). The recurring question is: How could a nation that started with so much

promise descend so quickly into such significant political, economic, and social problems?2 To

answer this question and others, scholars scoured libraries and archives in search of

correspondence and other official records, previously overlooked. While some focus on domestic

policy (Ngoh 2019), others examine the shaping of Cameroon’s foreign policy, where they

produced work on Cameroon’s relations with France, Britain, China, and Nigeria (Torrent; Tesi

2017). In some respects, the objectives of Ahidjo’s foreign policy were all encompassing —

nonalignment, total liberation of Africa, nonintervention, respect of each nation’s sovereignty,

and promotion of peace through the support of organizations such as the United Nations (Kombi

1996). Present at the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Ahidjo stood by the

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principles of the organization, especially those that dealt with the “total liberation of Africa” and

abiding by territorial boundaries established at the time of independence (Ahidjo 1964).

Cameroon’s 1961 constitution and subsequent amendments gave its president the authority to

make foreign policy, to decide on the nation’s agreements, to ratify treaties, and to determine the

nations with which to establish diplomatic relations.3

Although scholars agree that the nation’s foreign policy trajectory originated with Ahidjo,

many disagree about the effectiveness of methods deployed (Le Vine 1971; Peter and Mbida

Mbida 2015). Scholarship frames Ahidjo’s foreign policy in three distinct ways: weak,

makeshift, and pragmatic. Based on extensive and previously unused archival documents and

interviews relating to Ahidjo’s foreign policy located in Cameroon’s archives in Yaoundé and

Buea, and a variety of published primary and secondary sources, a new perspective emerges in

this scholarly debate: Ahidjo designed Cameroon-U.S. relations as a means to protect his

nation’s sovereignty and promote economic development while simultaneously ensuring his grip

on power. Ahidjo’s approach established the basis of the nation’s foreign policy for decades.

The Post-Colonial Archive of Modern Cameroon

Cameroon’s postcolonial archive is dispersed across the globe and includes repositories

located in Yaoundé and Buea. Previously unused archival materials shed light on the behind-the-

scenes discussions, decisions, and nuances that took place as Ahidjo formulated his policies. The

Ministry of External Relations archives in Yaoundé houses many boxes containing letters,

correspondence, memoranda, reports, and other documents pertaining to Cameroon’s foreign

relations. Many of those boxes remained sealed partly because scholars have not requested them,

and scholars of Cameroon foreign policy have focused on relations with France while ignoring

relations with the U.S. This author and research assistant Pulchérie Irène Pieumi submitted a

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request and gained access to boxes focusing on Cameroon-U.S. relations. The documents

provide a context to better understand Ahidjo’s decisions. For example, a detailed report

submitted on January 2, 1980, by Cameroon’s ambassador in Washington, D.C., to the minister

of external relations in Yaoundé contained information about U.S. global challenges and actions

and Congressional deliberations on aid to developing countries.4 The following year, another

report contained a summary and critique of the new direction of American policy toward Africa.5

Another example included documents showing when Cameroon weighed its options on how to

leverage the importance of its geographical location and bilingualism as the U.S. sought to

expand its products into the countries of Union douanière et économique de l’Afrique centrale

(UDEAC).6 The available reports were irregular and varied in depth and analysis, but taken

together, they show carefully thought-out policies based on the gathering of information supplied

by Cameroonian diplomats in the U.S. The problem of incomplete documents in archives is not

unique to Cameroon. Nana Osei-Opare’s study of worker discontent in Ghana challenges notions

that disparage local archives and argues that those archives are essential in “rethinking and

constructing postcolonial histories from the voices of nonelite persons'' (2021: 64). Problems

such as “limit access to sources, waste researcher’s time, or even destroy documents,” he

continues, “are not unique to African history” (64). Kate Skinner concurs. Skinner’s (2020)

reappraisal of the assassination of Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio, delves into

challenges of working with archives across nations on both sides of the Atlantic and argues that

though the documents were incomplete and scattered in archives across several countries, It is

the researcher’s responsibility to carefully analyze all the available documents and to go “wider

in search of the connections between one fragment and actual, potential, or absent others” (17).

While research for this article encountered similar challeneges, the newly available documents

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confirm the centrality of local archives in the study of the diplomatic history of African nations.

Among other things, those archives enable historians to analyze the political, economic and

socio-cultural contexts in which African leaders created and executed their foreign policies. For

example, documents on Ahidjo’s 1962 visit to the U.S. were scattered in two archives in

Cameroon and at the John F. Kennedy Library, and some events during that visit as shown in the

documents were interpreted differently.

Speeches by Cameroon embassy officials to different communities in the U.S. designed

to promote their country’s image reflected an understanding of the craft of diplomacy in a new

age. Soon after taking office, Kennedy informed his ambassadors that diplomacy entailed going

into the local community to mingle with local people. Cameroonian diplomats in Washington,

D.C., already engaged in such actions.7 This research would show that Kennedy’s creation of the

Peace Corps reflected that thinking. Boxes containing copies of Nouvelles du Cameroun, a

newsletter published intermittently by the Cameroon embassy in Washington, D.C., showcased

Cameroon as a peaceful and stable nation. Taken together, these documents offer a vital new

perspective for revisiting the making of Cameroon foreign relations toward the U.S. At the

National Archives in Yaoundé, director Esther Olembe provided access to recently cataloged

documents. At the Peace Corps Office in Yaoundé, then-country director LaHoma Romocki

provided access to archival materials vital to evaluating the performance of the volunteers. In

addition, interviews and questionnaires pursued lines of questioning that emerged from these

documents.

Between 2008 and 2011, Pulchérie and I conducted interviews of Peace Corps

Volunteers, and their Cameroonian co-workers in seven of the country’s ten regions; we also

interviewed employees at the Peace Corps office in Yaoundé. In the U.S., Freedom of

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Information Act (FOIA) requests furnished documentation pertaining to U.S.-Cameroon policy

and Peace Corps operations, and a declassification process resulted in the new availability of

hundreds of pages. For example, FOIA filings brought to light documents showing tension in

U.S.-Cameroon relations. These documents attest to Ahidjo’s determination to protect

Cameroon’s sovereignty while simultaneously promoting the nation’s development. Assembled

and viewed together, these materials challenge prevailing views that Ahidjo was completely a

“yes man” to the major powers, especially France (Kombi). In addition, new documents and

interviews raise questions about Peace Corps effectiveness in Cameroon. They point to Ahidjo’s

discomfort with racism and with other efforts to encourage African Americans to come to

Cameroon to assist in the nation’s development. In short, they reveal a level of hard-nosed

realism that has been neglected in scholarly treatments of Ahidjo’s foreign policy.

A long overdue reappraisal of Ahidjo’s foreign policy is important and for several

reasons. First, because the United States is a superpower and because its foreign relations matter

globally, its attention to U.S.-Cameroon relations speaks to the significance of Africa in U.S.

calculations. Cameroon’s geographical location at the “Armpit of Africa,” between West and

Central Africa, makes it strategically significant. Serving as a gateway between the former

British and French colonies in the region, the country is known as the “laboratory of African

Unity” because of its official Franco-Anglo bilingualism and bicultural structure. It is often

referred to as “Africa in miniature” or “the microcosm of Africa” as well; from its multiplicity of

ethnicities and languages spoken inside its borders to its diverse climate and geography,

Cameroon has come to represent the many faces of Africa and the continent’s deep complexities.

Repeatedly, those attributes of Cameroon factored into U.S. calculations for the region. In the

1960s the U.S. sought to use Cameroon as an important gateway into UDEAC countries.

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Cameroon’s Commercial Attaché in New York Elias Bah Chamfor noted that the U.S.

considered Cameroon as “most stable and attractive,” adding “the nation had the weight of

UDEAC behind it in addition to the bilingual nature of the country.”8 The U.S. and other major

powers knew well and acknowledged the nation’s importance.

A foreign policy focus also sheds light on wider U.S. regional operations on the African

continent in the early 1960s and the hub-like status of Cameroon. Although the U.S. established

diplomatic relations with oil-rich Equatorial Guinea in 1968, between 1970 and 1981, and 1995

and 2006, the U.S. controlled and monitored its interest in Equatorial Guinea from Yaoundé,

Cameroon’s capital.9 Cameroon, Virocoulon wrote, was and remains an important nation in the

region (2015: 2). In the post-World War II era, the U.S. looked at Africa through the lens of the

Cold War, and its interventions were motivated by defeating communism (Nwaubani 2001;

Mahoney 1983). Given Cameroon’s strategic location and diversity, and the presence of the

Union des Populations Du Cameroun (UPC), the nation easily attracted U.S. interest. Robert

Foulon, who established the first U.S. consulate in Yaoundé stated that the Cold War motivated

America’s interests.10 In addition, the U.S. sought to promote democratic institutions and free-

market systems in Cameroon and the entire West and Central African region.

The archival materials demonstrate Cameroon’s centrality to U.S. security interests in the

West Africa region. The two countries have collaborated militarily at different levels since the

beginning of Cameroon independence.11 U.S.-Cameroon foreign relations helps to unpack the

complexity involved in the analysis of the Ahidjo presidency. While he professed

nonintervention, he did not hesitate to meet with America’s oldest civil rights organization, the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to discuss racism in

America.

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Finally, building on existing work on U.S. diplomacy toward francophone African

nations, a focus on Cameroon adds and contributes to evolving literature in the region. Former

U.S. Ambassador Leland Barrows’ criticism of a preoccupation with Anglophone Africa at the

expense of French-speaking Africa remains valid (1971: 4). Recent scholarship on Franco-

American competition in Africa has drawn attention to the region. Abou Bamba explains that in

the Ivory Coast, the U.S. promoted its interest through economic investment and aid. Relatedly,

Yohann C. Ripert identified measures by which America achieved its post-World War II

objectives in Senegal. Pierre-Michel Durand looks at Franco-American competition in West

Africa. Analyzing Cameroon’s place in this debate is important and speaks to the significance of

francophone Africa in the development of U.S. diplomacy and interests. The newly available

archival materials personalize Cameroon-U.S. diplomacy and point to how relations between

individual African nations and the U.S. are also a product of individuals.

Debating Ahidjo’s Foreign Policy Tactics

Analyses of Ahidjo’s foreign policy are far from unanimous. A decade after independence Le

Vine argued that Cameroon’s foreign policy had few “specific objectives” but rather had “such

vague goals as broader economic, social, and political cooperation” (Le Vine 1971: 174). A

decade later, Ndiva Kofele-Kale described Ahidjo’s foreign policy as weak, makeshift, and

“conservative” (1981, 198-199). Unlike other African leaders, he continued, Ahidjo lacked a

coherent ideology or catchy phrase for his policy like Kwame Nkrumah’s Consciencism and

Pan-Africanism, Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa, or Léopold Senghor’s Négritude (Kofele-Kale 1981,

198-199). Kofele-Kale and Le Vine paved the way for more in-depth analysis of the nation’s

foreign policy. Thierry Virocoulon (2015) supported the makeshift theory, arguing that the

nation’s foreign policy drifted from the beginning because of failures by the president to initiate

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and lead. Cameroon is a “pivotal country” Virocoulon wrote, but its leaders squandered

opportunities to move the nation into a major player in the region (2015, 2). Ada Peter and Remi

Mbida Mbida concurred, arguing that Ahidjo’s approach to foreign policy was “confrontational,”

shortsighted, and naive and “effectively alienated Cameroon from the international community”

(356). His failure to join the British Commonwealth of Nations after reunification while entering

a series of binding cooperation agreements with France, they added, cemented the foundation for

future problems of “political unrest, complaints of marginalization, and the threat of separation

along colonial lines” (356). Anonymous’s (1999) survey of U.S.-Cameroon relations, Peter

Agbor-Tabi’s (1984) overview of U.S. aid to Cameroon, and Narcisse Mouelle Kombi’s (1996)

work on Cameroon’s role in international organizations did not engage in an analysis of the

major components that shaped U.S-Cameroon relations.

While these studies are important, the lack of access to many primary sources in

Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations and related materials in the national archives in

Yaoundé and Buea means they were based on an incomplete picture. Notwithstanding this

omission, they paved the way for new directions in the study of Cameroon foreign policy.

Mélanie Torrent disagreed that Ahidjo’s diplomacy toward France and Britain can be framed as

makeshift and weak. Based on extensive use of archival sources in France, Britain, and

Cameroon, Torrent argues that Ahidjo capitalized on his country’s dual colonial heritage to gain

more leverage and “instilled a strong sense of realism in Cameroonian diplomacy” (6). Ahidjo,

Torrent continued, was aware of the “constraints that limited resources placed” on his foreign

policy actions and as a result remained extremely “cautious and pragmatic” (6). Moses Tesi

agreed, adding Ahidjo navigated complex situations to protect Cameroon’s sovereignty and

promote the nation’s development (2017).

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Building on these observations, newly available archival materials enable scholars to

expand analysis to incorporate Cameroon’s foreign relations toward the United States. In their

focus on Cameroon’s economic, military, and cultural agreements with the United States and

their exploration of the impact of the Peace Corps, the new archival material reveals that Ahidjo

was savvier in foreign policy than previously known. The evidence shows that unlike other

African leaders, Ahidjo did not restrict his policy to specific dogmas. He was flexible and, in

many cases, acted rather than waited. Evidence also shows that in relations with the U.S., Ahidjo

focused on initiatives to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty and promote its development. These

accounts suggest that Ahidjo’s policy directions—specifically the 1960s, when he developed

foundational policies—outlasted him and continued under the Biya regime.

The United States and the Evolution of African Foreign Policy

In the immediate period after World War II, the need for a more coordinated U.S.-African policy

became apparent. Before the start of the Cold War, the United States generally maintained a

hands-off policy on Africa. But the post-World War II ideological conflict changed things, and

the person who championed the creation of an African policy was John F. Kennedy. In the

1950s, he warned of the emerging forces of nationalism in the developing areas and called on

America to adjust. In 1957, Kennedy informed France that “their overseas territories are

eventually going to break free and look with suspicion on Western nations who impeded their

steps to independence.” Though the brickbats were quick to fall, he did not back down, insisting

America’s failure to side with Africa’s nationalist movements was being “exploited by the

Soviets” (Mahoney 1983: 20).

But political calculations also influenced Kennedy’s focus on Africa. His team was aware

of the interactions between Africans and African Americans. Both groups shared a common past

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and a historic relationship. In 1957 prominent African Americans including Ralph Bunche, Rev.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and Asa Philip Randolph attended Ghana’s independence

celebration. Later, Bunche remarked about the relation between both groups: “We embrace you

because we are brothers” (Blyden 2019: 182). In addition, Dr. King’s sermon “The Birth of a

New Nation,” delivered after his trip to Ghana in 1957, linked the colonization of Africa and Jim

Crow practices in America: “Both segregation in America and colonialism in Africa … were

based on the same thing—white supremacy and contempt for life.”12 In 1959, when Sékou

Touré, the first president of Guinea, visited Harlem, he experienced an outpouring of support.

Nemata Amelia Ibitayo Blyden has written that African Americans saw Ghanaian President

Kwame Nkrumah and Touré as a “source of pride … and symbols of black potential” (183). His

pro-Africa message was a calculated move to earn votes from African Americans. Kennedy,

Thomas Noer wrote, “courted black votes …[and] effectively used the Africa issue to appeal to

voters” (1985: 58-59). Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential election translated into a

victory for new directions in U.S.-African policy.

Cameroon and Cold War Diplomacy

The end of World War II ushered in the beginning of the Cold War, and the two superpowers,

the United States and the USSR, struggled to promote their ideologies and expand their zones of

influence, first in Europe and later into developing areas. In 1947, U.S. President Harry S.

Truman responded to a request for help from Greece and Turkey by issuing the Truman

Doctrine, committing America to resist the spread of communism anywhere. Truman’s

successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, developed a policy he called “massive retaliation,” promising

to use America’s bombs to stop the spread of communism. In addition, he expanded the role of

America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from gathering information to conducting

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subversive acts against those he considered to be communist suspects. Patrice Lumumba of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo was among those targeted. CIA Director Allen Dulles

described him as “a Castro or worse” (Noer 1985: 138). Kennedy’s addition to the policy of

containment was the strategy of “flexible response,” which meant America would use any tool in

its arsenal to stop communism (Gaddis 2005).

Washington was determined that Africa not become “aligned with the USSR.” Africa,

Ebere Nwaubani has written, had to be “acculturated into a global setting conducive to United

States national security interest … thereby warding off countervailing influences such as

‘communism’ and non-alignment” (2001: 32). To succeed, America had to confront the legacy

of European colonialism. Kennedy began that process in the 1950s and continued with it through

his presidency. Charles de Gaulle and officials in Paris were livid at Kennedy’s pronouncements.

But Kennedy was not deterred. Repeatedly, he stated: “I want the people in … Africa … to start

to look to America … what the President of the United States is doing, not … Khrushchev or the

Chinese Communists” (Sorenson 1965: 199). Though Kennedy did not intend for America to

take France’s position in Africa, Philip E. Muehlenbeck has argued that he wanted to “compete”

with de Gaulle in the region and requested the establishment of an American embassy in each

Francophone African country (166-67; Durand: 131).

Whatever the rights and wrongs of Franco-American competition in Africa, America’s

involvement in West Africa was consistent with Washington’s thinking. In the Ivory Coast,

Bamba has argued that on the heels of America’s investment came the establishment of a

consulate office in 1956. In 1957, the U.S. State Department sent Foulon to establish a consulate

office in Yaoundé, and he stated Cameroon was important to the U.S. in the “Cold War

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context.”13 He added that working in Yaoundé was challenging because of the pro-communist

UPC activities.

Established in 1948, the UPC stood for reunification of the two Cameroons and full

independence. The party’s leadership—Ruben Um Nyobè, Félix-Roland Moumié, Théodore

Mayi-Matip, Ernest Ouandié, and Abel Kingué—mobilized the masses, secured inroads into

rural areas, and vowed not to rest until they achieved their objectives. Following a strike in 1955,

French officials banned the UPC, and it took its activities underground. In addition to the

uncertainty presented by the UPC, the French perceived Foulon and his team as “intruders” in

the city. Irrespective of the situation, the consulate office formally opened on July 5, 1957, and in

two years, the consulate became a consulate general, placing relations with Ahidjo on good

footing. On March 17, 1959, Ahidjo visited Eisenhower in the White House. Ahidjo was in the

United States to address the United Nations General Assembly and to garner support for

Cameroon’s upcoming independence in 1960. Those two events mortified the UPC leadership,

which asked the major countries to push for a UN-sponsored plebiscite to determine whether

Cameroonians supported France’s independence plan for the territory. They insisted that the

struggle in Cameroon was larger than a “domestic matter within the French community.”

Moumié appealed to Eisenhower to support a plan in which “each state defines its future position

in relation to the African continent” (White: 35-36). Eisenhower dismissed him as “an exiled

communist-influenced politician” and did not respond to his letter (White: 36). On January 1,

1960, French Cameroon obtained independence and became the Republic of Cameroon. In 1961,

the U.S. upgraded the American consular office in Yaoundé to an embassy, and four years later,

an embassy office opened in Douala. Simultaneously, Cameroon created an embassy in

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Washington, D.C., in 1960 and a permanent mission to the UN in New York. During the

Kennedy era, Cameroon-U.S. relations began to become a reality.

The Architecture of Cameroon-U.S. Policy

On January 19, 1961, Ahidjo sent a congratulatory message to Kennedy for his inauguration; in

response, Kennedy praised Ahidjo as a man whose leadership had “won for him the respect of

world leaders.”14 To dramatize the new directions in relations, Kennedy invited Ahidjo to the

U.S. for an official visit. On March 13, 1962, Ahidjo arrived in Washington for a five-day visit to

the United States. Kennedy himself welcomed Ahidjo at the airport. While in the U.S., Ahidjo

met with Kennedy; visited New York; and met with the NAACP, the City Council of the District

of Columbia, the heads of diplomatic missions, and the leaders of the Overseas Press Club.15

Perhaps a most remarkable aspect of Ahidjo’s visit to America was the frank nature of his

conversations with Kennedy. In a single sentence, he articulated the goals of Cameroon policy:

“My country bases its relationships with other nations on the principles of equality, non-

interference, and mutual respect of sovereignty.” Ahidjo also noted that the world should not rest

until all of Africa was liberated from colonial chains. “We feel it is extremely urgent to

accelerate the process of decolonization,” he stated.16 Later in a dinner toast speech, Ahidjo

emphasized his nation’s non-alignment position adding that Cameroon would neither be a

participant nor a “testing ground in the Cold War,” but a place for “genuine relationship.”17

Irrespective of who occupied the White House, Ahidjo’s message was consistent. He focused on

assistance, cooperation, complete liberation of Africa, and peace. Four years later, on October

24, 1967, he told President Lyndon B Johnson: “Cooperation today in our world is a basic

requirement,” adding that it led to the advancement of all.18 In 1982 in Washington DC., a few

months before he resigned as president, he buttressed to President Ronald Reagan the urgent

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need to dismantle South Africa’s apartheid policy and for Reagan to support a “framework of

cooperation between industrialized and developing countries as part of global negotiations to

usher in a new international economic order.”19

In dealings with U.S. leaders, Ahidjo repeatedly sounded globalist causes of peace and

justice. He used his standing within the world’s community to leverage assistance for his

country, and it did not go unnoticed. “British diplomats,” Torrent wrote, lauded “Cameroon’s

essentially realist and pragmatist approach to foreign affairs and diplomacy” (222). Yet few

world leaders paid attention to the brutal regime Ahidjo instituted at home. Given the importance

of Cameroon’s strategic location to peace in the West and Central African region, America and

other major powers focused on the nation’s stability irrespective of the means by which peace

was obtained.

A particularly important topic Ahidjo addressed during his visit to the U.S. was anti-

black racism. According to him, racism was at the root of the debasement of blacks globally. He

wrote in the Contribution to National Construction: “Each time a black man [woman] is

humiliated anywhere in the world, all Negroes the world over are hurt” (1964: 44-45). He met

with the NAACP and praised the organization for its willingness to unite with Africa “in a

world-wide movement to fight against the evils of racial discrimination, injustice, racial

prejudices, and hatred.”20 In addition, he invited them to visit Cameroon.

Economic, Military, and Cultural Relations

From the very inception of Cameroon’s independence, U.S. assistance has played a significant

role in the nation’s economic development. Cameroon emerged from colonialism with very weak

educational and economic systems. The situation was worse in former British Southern

Cameroons, where education, hospitals, and economic establishments were in short supply.

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During most of British trusteeship over Cameroon, Nigeria governed British Southern

Cameroons as a colony, and at the time of independence, almost nothing worked there. The

infrastructure was almost nonexistent, and electric power and water systems were severely

limited (Amaazee 1990). Ahidjo had every reason to request urgent economic assistance for his

country. After his first visit to the former British Southern Cameroons, he expressed disbelief at

the low level of development there (Nfi 2014).

As suggested previously, Ahidjo’s visit with Kennedy was a critically important event.

Yet the context in which discussions between both leaders occurred provided insight into

Ahidjo’s conduct of diplomacy. Documents declassified through FOIA requests show that

relations between both countries were “strained” prior to Ahidjo’s visit. Ahidjo resented the U.S.

for not supporting Cameroon’s position at the UN after British Northern Cameroons voted in a

plebiscite to join Nigeria. Ahidjo protested the results of the plebiscite, but nothing changed. He

was angered that Washington officials were not “favorably impressed by the caliber of

Cameroonian leaders.” The U.S. had asked that Cameroon’s Ambassador in Washington

Raymond Aimé-N’Thepe be recalled because he “threatened a fencing contractor with a gun.”21

A November 18, 1961 memorandum described him “as an anti-white racist and is highly

emotional and unstable when excited or placed under pressure.”22 Also, Ahidjo’s government

was furious that U.S. Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg’s visit to Cameroon was canceled on

a twenty-four notice, and no concrete reason was given. Determined to reset the relations,

Washington officials were eager to repair things and noted that “our invitation to President

Ahidjo has been very well received by him and his government.”23

During the visit, both leaders discussed a variety of political, economic, and educational

assistance packages for Cameroon.24 Ahidjo expressed to Kennedy his concerns over the

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ongoing security threats posed by the UPC in Cameroon, proposing that the United States assist

Cameroon “to fight against ideological influences contrary to our principles and our common

ideals.”25 At a time when Washington’s containment policy made no distinction between

nationalist uprisings for legitimate reforms and communist insurrections, Kennedy easily

accepted Ahidjo’s label of the UPC as a communist organization. In addition, Ahidjo asked

Kennedy for help to neutralize the excessive influence and domination of his country by France.

Ahidjo’s request was a gutsy move. Publicly, Ahidjo praised France’s assistance to Cameroon,

writing that France “has never ceased to give Cameroon proof of her friendship and her concern”

(Ahidjo: 47). Given the role France played in his ascension to power, its assistance to his

country, and the ongoing war against the UPC, Ahidjo’s action revealed his style of diplomacy.

Ahidjo’s desire to curtail France’s influence in his country was not unique. In Senegal, Ripert

has argued that Leopold Senghor sought to use America to “alleviate the power of France’s

economic influence” (5). Houphouët-Boigny, Bamba has argued, applied a similar approach in

the Ivory Coast. In a 1965 oral interview archived at the Kennedy Library, William Attwood,

who served as ambassador during the Kennedy era, stated that African leaders appreciated

Kennedy because he treated them with respect. The Kennedy “legend is very great” in Africa, he

added.

Also, Ahidjo spoke to Kennedy about Cameroon’s twenty-year plan, and indicated he

“would like U.S. aid [to] be adapted to meet long range needs in the plan.”26 Prior to Ahidjo’s

visit, America was already sending aid to Cameroon and Kennedy promised more help through

USAID. The Peace Corps was also available to contribute to the nation’s development. On

December 8, 1961, Cameroon and the United States signed an agreement for economic,

technical, and related assistance.27 In an October 7, 1963, memorandum to McGeorge Bundy at

18

the White House, Benjamin H. Read, executive secretary at the Department of State noted that

“US-Cameroon relations improved noticeably following that visit and they have continued good

since that time.”28 Basking in the positive relations, Ahidjo stated that Kennedy was his “hero”

(Barrows 1971: 11).

Soon after Ahidjo’s visit to Washington, D.C., significant aid began to flow to Cameroon.

In July 1963, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs Mennen Williams visited

Cameroon. His visit “reaffirmed the positive relations which exist between both countries.”29 In

1963, Cameroonians were studying in the United States under the U.S. Educational Exchange

Program and the Afro-American Institute.30 In 1963, USAID provided road equipment to

Cameroon’s Public Works Department (PWD), the agency charged with road development in

West Cameroon. The equipment included Caterpillar tractors, farm-size tractors, front-end

loaders, motor graders, trucks, rear-end dump trucks, low-bed trailers, pneumatic rollers, air

compressors and attachments, and portable crushing and screening plant (Anonymous 1992). A

foundation also formed for collaboration in trade. On October 31, 1964, Frank Coffin, then the

U.S. representative to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development, attended the ceremony to formally launch the construction of the

Trans-Cameroon Railroad. The United States contributed $9.2 million for the project.31 This

marked the beginning of more trade and investment initiatives during the Ahidjo era. Private

organizations, including Operation Crossroads Africa (OCA), also provided developmental aid to

Cameroon.32 On April 18, 1966, Decree No. 65-DF-186 extended to the entire country the

agreement for assistance between Cameroon and Catholic Relief Services, initially signed on

November 28, 1960, by the organization and the Republic of Cameroon.33 The U.S. government

designed and funded the self-help programs to “benefit a large population.”34 Between 1974 and

19

1975, programs received funding in several regions including Nyong et Kele, Sanaga-Maritine,

Bui, Donga-Mantung, Fako, Manyu, Meme, and Ndian.35

Though Washington considered the 1960s as the “Development Decade” for Africa

(Grubbs 2009), progress in the continent remained slow. Cameroon’s economy still depended on

foreign assistance. But the U.S. fulfilled Kennedy’s promise to establish diplomatic relations and

provide aid to each Francophone African nation. By the end of the decade, the United States had

well-established relations with Cameroon, and aid programs to Cameroon included the Peace

Corps, USAID, and several initiatives through non-profit organizations.

In 1971, Cameroon signed an agreement to renovate the Douala seaport and residences

for professors at the Higher School of Agriculture.36 In 1974, Cameroon and the Near East

Foundation organization signed an agreement to improve “poultry production and horticulture

and vegetable production.”37 The same year, the U.S. government allocated $5 million for

development projects in Cameroon to improve health systems, nutrition, water systems,

education, and other initiatives of national interest. In 1982, the Agricultural Education Project in

collaboration with USAID supported the creation a government university in Dschang focusing

on agriculture. The goal of the project was to create a university to “enhance productivity of the

agricultural sector.”38 In the post-Ahidjo years, the United States would expand programs in

Cameroon in a variety of areas, including collaboration with agencies such as the U.S. Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention to prevent the spread of a variety of viruses.39

Though Cameroon needed aid, the leadership frequently sought and received information

about private initiatives toward development prior to inviting them into the country. For

example, in 1973 when the Lutheran World Relief, Inc. requested permission to come to

Cameroon to carry out development projects in the Adamaoua/Benue region, the Cameroon

20

government hesitated because it was a Christian organization attempting to move into an

overwhelmingly Muslim dominated area.40 Along similar lines when the Lang Engineering

Corporation based in Coral Cables, Florida, applied for permission to work in Cameroon, the

Cameroon government requested information about the company from the U.S. embassy.41

Cameroonian officials worked to ensure foreign aid was consistent with national policies.

Trade between Cameroon and the United States grew steadily from 1960. In 1960,

Cameroon’s exports to the United States totaled 1,503 billion FCFA; in 1963, that amount

increased to 2,365 billion FCFA. During the same period, U.S. imports from Cameroon rose

from 833 million FCFA to 1,552 billion FCFA.42 Over 50% of the exports to the United States

were raw materials including cocoa, timber, rubber, and petroleum products.

Ahidjo’s policies created a pathway for the future, and much development took place

after he left office. For example, Cameroon became a member of the African Growth and

Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allowed Cameroonian goods into the American market duty-

free. Many U.S. agencies and companies—including Overseas Private Investment Corporations

(OPIC), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Export-Import Bank of the United States, and

the U.S. Trade and Development Agency—operated in Cameroon. In 2008, the United States

was among the largest foreign direct investors in Cameroon because of its large equity in the

Chad-Cameroonian oil pipeline and power sector.43

Military collaboration has been particularly significant in Cameroon-U.S. relations.

During the Ahidjo era, members of the Cameroon military trained at different institutions in the

United States. In the 1980s, Cameroon became a participant in the Service Academy Foreign

Student Program, whereby qualified Cameroonians gained admission into the U.S. Army, Air

Force, Navy, and Coast Guard academies.44 About 12% of U.S. aid to Cameroon was geared

21

toward national security, with the United States helping Cameroon to better police its borders

and providing biometrics capability for tracking criminals and preventing human trafficking.

Cameroon and the United States have collaborated extensively on a variety of issues

including military, human rights, and refugees and the record shows that the foundation

established during the Ahidjo years remains the guiding framework of the relationship.

Documents at Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations show frequent visits from U.S.

military officers, congressional delegations, and government representatives to Yaoundé, and

that Cameroon remains a valuable U.S. partner in the region.45

Cameroonian Development and the U.S. Peace Corps

Capitalizing on the new relationship with Kennedy, Ahidjo moved quickly to sign an agreement

for U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers to serve in his country. It was a significant move. In 1961, after

French speaking East Cameroon and English speaking British Southern Cameroons (West

Cameroon) reunified to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the nation’s economic and

social institutions were in a sorry state. Reunification ended West Cameroon’s favorable trade

arrangement with the Commonwealth countries, and that aggravated an already desperate

economic situation. Though Cameroon’s first five years plan (1961- 66) prioritized road

construction and educational improvement as most essential for national development, there was

a critical shortage of trained manpower to bring those goals to fruition. At the time of

reunification, there were too few primary and secondary schools in West Cameroon. In addition,

the only technical school in the region, the Government Trade Centre (GTC), located at Ombe,

had closed its doors because its staff, mostly composed of British expatriates left Cameroon. As

was the case with Ombe, primary schools lacked qualified teachers, textbooks, teaching aids, and

adequate classrooms. In 1961, over 60% of the primary school teachers were ill equipped, ill

22

prepared, and uncertified and many were hired on a temporary basis. Classrooms contained the

“barest essentials—wooden desks, benches, and a single blackboard” (Anonymous 1992: 61).

Secondary schools faced similar problems. There was a critical shortage of qualified teaching

staff in those schools. Compounding the problems was that the budget to purchase basic

necessities such as chalk, pens, and books was grossly inadequate (Mengot 1967). Given chronic

shortages of trained personnel, it was no surprise that Ahidjo turned to the Peace Corps, an action

which exemplified his pragmatism.

Created at the height of the Cold War, Peace Corps legislation charged the agency with

assisting developing nations in meeting “their needs for trained manpower, and to help promote a

better understanding of the American people on the part of the peoples served and a better

understanding of other peoples on the part of the American people.”46 During its nearly sixty

years’ presence in Cameroon, the Peace Corps has made a difference in the country’s material

and cultural development. Its impact have been felt in education, agriculture, community

development, small-enterprise development (SED), women empowerment, health care, and

HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention.47 On July 23, 1962, Peace Corps officials signed an

agreement with the Cameroon government, and in September, the first batch of volunteers

arrived. A new group has arrived in the country annually since then bringing the total number of

volunteers to over 3680 since inception.48

Remarkable achievements occurred during the first decade of Peace Corps services in

Cameroon. By 1964, the 77 volunteers in West Cameroon made up 30% of the post-primary

teaching personnel; the previous year, there had been 83 volunteers teaching. In short, West

Cameroon’s educational system depended heavily on the volunteers. By the end of the first year

23

of service, West Cameroon Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha praised the volunteers’ work as

“exemplary and admirable.”49

For all the successes, recruitment and preparation for service in Cameroon included

disturbing aspects. During much of the 1960s, training took place in the United States, and after

that it moved to Cameroon. At training, volunteers learned local languages, cross-cultural skills,

and related issues. But those sessions failed to teach specific skills. Jack Vaughn, the Peace

Corps’s second director, underscored the problem: Volunteers “arrived overseas with an

inadequate knowledge of the host country language, an incomplete appreciation of the host

country culture, and insufficient amount of technical skill” (Schwarz 1991: 51). Fifty years later,

the problems remained. In Post Books and journals, volunteers blamed weaknesses on their

mediocre knowledge of local culture.50 The Peace Corps has yet to transition to the recruitment

of volunteers with specific skills.

Take the area of teaching, for example. The volunteers were unfamiliar with the

educational system. Moreover, the main qualification of many of those assigned to the teaching

English as a foreign language (TEFL) program was that they were native speakers of English,

and that was insufficient. Only a few volunteers majored in English or education, and they

lacked the pedagogical skills to serve as teachers. A 2011 Peace Corps host country impact study

on Cameroon concluded that volunteers lacked “training in pedagogy.” But this was a common

problem with the Peace Corps, as Jonathan Zimmerman concluded: “For many Volunteer

teachers in Africa lesson planning, lecturing, homework assignments, and student discipline all

proved enormous hurdles for Americans” (2006: 143). Associate Peace Corps country director

Sammy Enyong, himself a former student of volunteers, supervised volunteers’ teaching for

almost two decades. Enyong stated that “some of them were not just qualified for the job they

24

came to perform.” Some were in Cameroon “for tourism” and “a 2-year paid vacation,” he

added. Robert Strauss, former Peace Corps country director in Cameroon, concurred: It is “much

less clear what inexperienced Americans have to offer” Cameroonians. Another longtime Peace

Corps employee in Cameroon agreed: “The volunteers who come do not have any experience,

are not qualified, they are very young. Most often, the objectives of these volunteers are not in

line with that of Peace Corps.” Volunteers “have diplomas without experience” and were in

Cameroon “just to improve their academic c.v.,” others stated.51

Making matters worse was a general suspicion during the early years that the Peace

Corps volunteers were members of the CIA. In a 1963 memo, West Cameroon’s assistant chief

of security, P. Bessala, said the Volunteers were “instructed … to be social and amicable” to

locals in order to obtain as much information from them as possible, adding that volunteers’

“activities in the Territory are under observation by all services as it is feared they are doing

ESPIONAGE as ALLEN DULLES, the Director of U.S. Intelligence Service, did in Russia.”52

Given the Cold War and the CIA activities in Africa, those suspicions were widespread.

Nkrumah of Ghana described volunteers as “subversive agents” recruited by the CIA, adding that

the Peace Corps was an “instrument of … Western psychological warfare.” A Peace Corps

evaluator wrote that in Ghana, volunteers were repeatedly asked, “You are not a spy, are you?”

(Richter 1965: 7; Hoffman 1998: 160-161). On a visit to Touré’s Guinea, David Hapgood, a

Peace Corps evaluator, noted immense “cynicism about why the Peace Corps was in Guinea,”

and an angry volunteer told him, “I have gone through hell this past two years. Why did the

Peace Corps do this to me?” (1965: 29). In Nigeria, things erupted following the Margery

Michelmore incident; soon after arrival in Nigeria in 1961, Michelmore wrote a postcard to send

back to family in the United States in which she described the “squalor and absolutely primitive

25

living conditions rampant in the city and in the bush” in Nigeria, but on the way to the post

office, the card fell out of her purse and ended up in the hands of students of the University of

Ibadan. The response was swift. The students were livid and demanded the eviction of the

volunteers from Nigeria, labeling them as “America’s international spies” and the program as a

“scheme designed to foster neo-colonialism” (Rice 1985, 241-42). Eventually a major crisis was

averted. The Peace Corps did not leave Nigeria but learned to be more careful in their criticism

of the host country. The early years of volunteers’ service were fraught with problems.

Those weaknesses and problems did not overshadow the friendship and goodwill shared

between Peace Corps volunteers and locals. In Guinea, after the eviction of volunteers, locals

made it a point to thank and inform them that their problem was the U.S. government and not the

volunteers (Guinea 1966). In Cameroonian villages volunteers were frequently at neighbors’

homes dining and planning future projects. Cameroonians overwhelmingly appreciated

volunteers’ services.53 Peace Corps service and diplomacy imploded previous notions of the

“ugly America” image and replaced it with a lasting goodwill toward the U.S.

Yet Peace Corps service in Cameroon and the rest of Africa must also be judged based on

the organization’s goals. In the agency’s nearly sixty years in Africa, it can justifiably be stated

that the Peace Corps achieved two of its three goals. Volunteers made friends for the United

States and helped to educate locals about American life. However, their performance in the more

important goal of providing “trained manpower” to developing nations remains at best mediocre.

Conclusion

Ahidjo was president of Cameroon for twenty-two years, and by the time he left office, he had

shaped the nation’s foreign policy for generations. Cameroon foreign policy would be conducted

the Ahidjo way. Programs Ahidjo started and that defined the U.S.-Cameroon relationship have

26

remained intact—from the Peace Corps and USAID to military collaboration, nonintervention in

Cameroon’s domestic policy, planned liberalism, and economic development. Ahidjo mastered

the use of foreign policy to leverage his grip on power and divert attention from the brutal

regime he created at home. A protagonist of the policy of nonalignment, Ahidjo developed

friendships with communist and non-communist countries. He visited Washington, Moscow,

Beijing, London, and many other places and formed alliances with leaders who lived in those

capital cities. He effectively leveraged and convinced major powers of the strategic importance

of his country as a gateway to peace and security in the West African and Central African

regions. He did not waver in his crusade against South Africa’s apartheid. His meeting with the

NAACP reminded Africans to seek avenues to collaborate with African Americans. He emerged

as one of the more reputable statesmen in the continent. By the time he left office, Cameroon had

a reputation for stability and peace.

Ahidjo bequeathed to his successor a foreign policy that placed primacy on the nation’s

sovereignty and development. He stood up to France at key moments and resisted attempts by

the U.S. to undermine his country. In 1961, when the U.S. delayed a meeting between

Cameroon’s ambassador in Washington and Kennedy, the Cameroon government informed

Washington that “unless Ambassador N’Thepe is allowed to see President Kennedy to present

his new Letter and say goodbye, the Cameroon Government no longer will receive the American

Ambassasdor.”54 The policy of asserting its authority and sovereignty continued in the post-

Ahidjo years. Repeatedly, Cameroonian officials warned U.S. officials in Yaoundé to steer clear

of Cameroon’s internal politics (Morse 2019). In later years, events such as removing the offices

of USAID from Yaoundé to Accra and the loss of membership in AGOA showed that Cameroon

was willing to pay any price to safeguard its national sovereignty.

27

The Cameroon situation was not unique. Other African nations in the region had acted

alike. When the United States denied selling weapons to Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, he turned

to Russia. When the United States followed France’s pronouncement to deny assistance to

Touré’s Guinea, Touré turned to Russia. When the Western nations placed restrictive conditions

on Africa’s request for assistance, China saw an opening, created the Forum on China-Africa

Cooperation (FOCAC), and easily used slogans of “respect for sovereignty and non-

interference,” and “peace, equality, justice, and freedom” to woo African leaders to its side. And

Cameroon was a member of FOCAC from the beginning. For all Ahidjo’s weaknesses, his

foreign policy earned Cameroon respect around the world.

But those achievements created a false sense of security as Ahidjo increasingly misread

the signs of the times. Like the rabbit in the Brer Rabbit folktales, he overestimated his ability to

navigate complex situations, and a miscalculation ended his political career. “Domestic policy

can only defeat us;” Kennedy often stated, adding “but foreign policy can kill us.” In this case,

that statement held true. For a brief period, it looked as if Ahidjo had gained more independence

from France as he requested when he first met Kennedy. He took the opposite position against

France in the Nigerian Civil War. He pulled Cameroon out of Air Afrique, bought airplanes from

America’s Boeing company instead of the European-based Airbus and was among the first

leaders in Francophone Africa to “Africanize” the country’s civil service. And so, it went.

Eventually, France had enough of him. Apparently tricked by French doctors during a medical

check-up in Paris, Ahidjo hurriedly resigned and handed power to his successor. His abdication

served as a lesson to leaders of Francophone African nations that those who cross France may

not last much longer in power. And France’s allies in the western alliance system would not

28

intervene to assist African leaders irrespective of the cordial relations as was the case with

Ahidjo.

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1 Cameroon: A Tale of Two Presidencies. 2006. Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy. Wikileaks (May 24). [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06YAOUNDE816_a.html,accessed June 15, 2019]

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6 Elias Bah Chamfor, “General Business Conditions in the U.S. at the beginning of 1968,” New York, MERY. 7 Paul Bamela Engo, Address to Rhea Grand Court, Camden, New Jersey, May 6, 1966, MERY; Letter, John F.

Kennedy to Ambassadors, May 29, 1961, Department of State, President’s Letters to Ambassadors, Box 4, National Security Files, The John F. Kennedy Library [hereafter referred to as JFKL], Boston.

8 Chamfor, “General Business Conditions,” MERY.

34

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11 Rappel des donnes Générales sur les Etats-Unis: Direction des Affaires D’Amérique des Caraïbes, MERY 12 Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., 1957 “The Birth of a New Nation,” (April 7).

[https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/birth-new-nation-sermon-delivered-dexter-avenue-baptist-church; accessed May 15, 2021].

13 “Creating Yaoundé’s First Consulate.” 14 JFK Reply to Ambassador Kuoh, Cameroon Security (1961-62), President’s Office Files, Box 112a. JFKL. 15 “Response aux Souhaite de Bienvenue du Président de la Commission des élus du District de Columbia,” mars

1962; A. Ahidjo, Response au discours du maire de New York,” mars 1962, MERY. 16 A. Ahidjo, ‘Speech delivered by his Excellency Sir Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic of

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1962, Cameroon-US Relations, MERY. 18 The American Presidency Project, ‘Toasts of the president and President Ahidjo of Cameroon’, 24 October

1967, [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-president-ahidjo-cameroon; accessed September 15, 2020].

19 Remarks of President Reagan and President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon Following Their Meetings, July 26, 1982.[ https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-president-reagan-and-president-ahmadou-ahidjo-cameroon-following-their; accessed May 15, 2019].

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State, MERY; Memorandum, ‘For JFK’, 13 March 1962, Cameroon, POF, JFKL. 26 Memorandum, ‘For JFK’, JFKL. 27 “Rappel des donnes,” MERY; Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Cameroon (1 May 1966), MERY. 28 Memorandum, Benjamin H. Read to Mr. McGeorge Bundy,,October 7, 1963, POF Cameroon, Cameroon:

Ahidjo Visit 3/62, Documents on Ahidjo’s Visit, March 1962, JFKL. 29 Federal Information Service, Buea, ‘Williams Re-Affirms Friendly Cameroon United States Relations’.

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34 Letter, Embassy of the United States of America, Yaoundé to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yaoundé, 6 November 1974, Cameroon-U.S. Relations, MERY.

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36 Accord de credit de développement (projet portuaire de Douala) entre La République fédérale du Cameroun et L’Association Internationale de développement, 26 février 1970, MERY; Agreement, “Accord de contre-partie No 21 constructions de Logements pour les professeurs de L’École Fédérale supérieure D’agriculture,” Mai 10, 1971; MERY.

37 D.J. Dooley, ‘Delmer J. Dooley to His Excellency Vincent Eson, Minister of Foreign Affairs’, letter, Yaoundé, 21 May 1974, MERY.

38 Final Project Evaluation the Agricultural Education Project No. 631-0031. University Center Dschang. Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development USAID/Cameroon. April 1990. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABK571.pdf; accessed May 20, 2020].

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41 Letter, United States Embassy, Yaoundé, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 22, 1974, MERY. 42 “What Do You Know of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, Information Service,” report, Embassy of

Cameroon, Ottawa, unsigned, undated, MERY, 21. 43 “Cameroon Scensetter for General Ward’s February 21–22, 2008, Visit,” Wikileaks, 20 February 2008,

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letter, Cameroon’s Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defense, 25 July 1995, MERY. 45 “Rappel des donnes,” 4-13, MERY. 46 Kennedy, “Remarks Upon Signing the Peace Corps Bill,” September 1961, Public Papers, 1: 614–15; U.S.

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48 Peace Corps Cameroon. [https://www.peacecorps.gov/cameroon/about/; accessed May 14, 2021] 49 J. N. Foncha, letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 1963, MERY; John Ngu Foncha, “Address by

His Excellency, the Prime Minister at the Cocktail Party on 25//9/63 in Honour of the Second Batch of Peace Corps Volunteers,” Budget-Miscellaneous, 1961-66, Box 1, Peace Corps Documents, Special Collections, Ohio University Library.

50 Post Books were written by Volunteers about communities in which they served. In addition, Volunteers shared their personal documents with the author. Peace Corps Cameroon Training Status Report, 1999-2009.

51 Interviews conduted in Yaounde with Peace Corps staff in July 2010. In addition, they completed author’s questionnaires, and also provided personal papers relevant to the Peace Corps.

52 P. Bessala, memorandum to District of the Federal Surete, Chief of District, Activities of Kennedy’s Peace Corps, 16 August 1963, MERY.

53 Between 2008 and 2011, Pulchérie Irène Pieumi and I conducted interviews and administered questionnaires in communities in several regions in Cameroon including Northwest, Southwest, South, West, Adamawa, Litorral, and North; Press Release, United States Embassy- Yaoundé, Peace Corps launches 50th anniversary celebration, Yaoundé, February 23, 2011; Memorandum, Ministry of External Relations, “Le Peace Corps et le Cameroun,” Yaoundé, March 16, 2011.

54 Battle, memorandum to O’Donnell, papers of President Kennedy, 18 Nov. 1961, President’s Office Files, Cameroon Security 1961–1962, Box 112a, JFKL.