Equal Protection Clause [CaseDigest]

Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015

1. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO

227 SCRA 703G.R. No. 105371November 11, 1993

Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

Subject: Title of a Bill, Bicameral Conference

Committee, Enrolled Bill Doctrine, Equal Protection,

Philipipne Postal Corporation

Facts:

RA 7354 was passed which contained a section

withdrawing the franking privileges of the Supreme

Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,

the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial

Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its

Registers of Deeds, along with certain other

government offices. Thus, the constitutionality of this

provision was questioned by the petitioners, all

members of the lower courts, based on three grounds,

namely:

1.The title of the law embraces more than one subject,

without indicating its purpose;

2.The law was passed without undergoing the required

number of readings in both houses of Congress and

copies of the bill were not distributed to its members;

and

3.It encroaches upon judicial functions and

discriminates against the judiciary.

Held:

Title of a Bill

1. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

2. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some

agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the

principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the

creation of a more efficient and effective postal service

system. By virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,

Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the

title of the said law.

Bicameral Conference Committee

3. While it is true that a conference committee is the

mechanism for compromising differences between the

Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction

to settling differences between amendments made by

the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine


4. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court

may not inquire beyond the certification of the

approval of a bill from the presiding officers of

Congress.

5. The Court should decline to look into the charges

that an amendment was made upon the last reading of

the bill that eventually became the law and that copies

thereof in its final form were not distributed among the

members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the

legislative journals certify that the measure was duly

enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of

the Constitution.

6. The Court is bound by the assurances provided by

the enrolled bill and the legislative journals from a

coordinate department of the government, to which we

owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Equal Protection of the Laws

7. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the

concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination

offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has

nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in

Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a

more, specific guaranty against any form of undue

favoritism or hostility from the government.

8. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the

basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act

assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or

prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the

equal protection clause.

9. The equal protection clause does not require the

universal application of the laws on all persons or

things without distinction.

10. However, the unequal application of the law should

be based on substantial distinctions which make fore

real differences, which is not present between the

Judiciary and the other agencies of government which

were also denied franking privileges. In lumping the

Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking

privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed

the courts of justice in a category to which it does not

belong.

Philippine Postal Corporation

11. The Philippine Postal Corporation, as a

government-controlled corporation, was created and is

expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the

public service.

12. While it may have been established primarily for

private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing

certain functions for the benefit of the public in

exchange for the franchise extended to it by the

government and the many advantages it enjoys under

its charter.

2. Philippine Association of Service

Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) vs Drilon (1988)

G.R. No. L-81958 | 1988-06-30

Subject: Police Power is inherent and plenary which

enables the State to promote the general welfare; Valid

delegation of Police Power; The right to travel is subject

to the requirements of public safety as may be

provided by law; Protection to labor does not signify

the promotion of employment alone; The non-

impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to

Government legitimate purpose

Facts:

PASEI, a firm engaged in the recruitment of Filipino

workers for overseas placement challenges the

Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1 of the

DOLE. The Order covers “Guidelines governing the

temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino

Domestic and Household Workers.”

The PASEI argued that the Order discriminates since

that it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to

domestic helpers and females with similar skills and

that it is violative of the right to travel. It also asserted

that the Order is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking

power since police power being legislative and not

executive in character. It also invoked constitutional


provision on worker’s participation in the policy and

decision- making processes since the Order was

passed in the absence of prior consultations. Lastly, it

contended that the Order will be in violation of non-

impairment clause.

The Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary of

Labor invoked the police power of the State in the

issuance of the Department Order.

Held:

Police Power is inherent and plenary which

enables the State to promote

the general welfare

1. Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police

power measure. The concept of police power has been

defined as the state authority to enact legislation that

may interfere with personal liberty or property in order

to promote the general welfare. Its scope is ever-

expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to

anticipate the future where it could be done.

2. Police power is a fundamental attribute of

government that has enabled it to perform the most

vital functions of governance. It may be said to be

inherent and plenary power in the State which enables

it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,

and welfare of society. It may not be exercised

arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, it defeats the

purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance

the public good.

Valid delegation of Police Power

3. It is true that police power is the domain of the

legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority

may not be lawfully delegated. In this case, the Labor

Code itself vests the Department of Labor and

Employment with rulemaking powers in the

enforcement whereof.

Equality before the law does not mean a perfect

identity of rights among men and women but it

admits of classifications

4. The Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female

contract workers," but it does not make an undue

discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that

"equality before the law" under the Constitution does

not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men

and women. It admits ofclassifications, provided that

(i) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;

(ii) they are germane to the purposes of the law;

(iii) they are not confined to existing conditions; and

(iv) they apply equally to all members of the same

class. The classification made-the preference for

female workers rests on substantial distinctions.

5. All the requirements for valid classification are

present in this case. First, insofar as classifications are

concerned, distinction and discrimination are justified

and indeed call for a deployment ban. As a matter of

judicial notice, women domestic workers are being ill-

treated, tortured or raped abroad in massive instances

as confirmed by testimonies of returning workers

abroad. The same, however, cannot be said of our

male workers because there is no evidence that,

except for isolated instances, our men abroad have

been afflicted with an identical predicament.

6. Second, the classification in this case is germane to

the purpose behind the measure. It is the avowed

objective of Department Order No. 1 to enhance the

protection for Filipino female overseas workers

because of the mistreatment Filipina workers have

suffered abroad. A deployment ban will be for their

own good and welfare.

7. Third, the Order does not narrowly apply to existing

conditions but intended to apply indefinitely so long as

those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order

itself that should the authorities arrive at legal

measure of protection impressed with a greater degree

of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. A stop-gap

measure includes bilateral agreements with the

Philippines and mechanisms providing for sufficient

safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of


Filipino workers.

8. Finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to

all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not

apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for

unconstitutionality because what the Constitution

prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group

of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of

such a person or group or resulting in an unfair

advantage to another person or group of persons.

The right to travel is subject to the requirements

of public safety as may be provided by law

9. Department Order No. 1 does not prescribe a total

ban on overseas deployment. From scattered

provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total

ban has not been contemplated. The consequence the

deployment ban has on the right to travel does not

impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among

other things, to the requirements of public safety as

may be provided by law.

10. The Department Order No. 1 is a valid

implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its

basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to

the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making

authority vested in it by the Labor Code.

Protection to labor does not signify the

promotion of employment alone

11. The Constitutional guaranty of worker participation

in policy and decision-making processes affecting their

rights and benefits must be submitted to the demands

and necessities of the State's power of regulation.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of

employment alone. What concerns the Constitution

more paramountly is that such an employment be

above all, decent, just, and humane. The Government

is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates

have adequate protection, personally and

economically, while away from home. In this case, the

Government has evidence of the lack or inadequacy of

such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely

ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution

must yield to Government legitimate purpose

12. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution

must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the

Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like

all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions.

13. This Court understands the grave implications the

questioned Order has on the business of recruitment.

The concern of the Government, however, is not

necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the

ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as

a result of Government regulation. The interest of the

State is to provide a decent living to their citizen which

is the intent of the Department Order.

3. LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]

Facts:

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong

Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank

robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery

andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included

in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a

member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what

actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-

out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the

ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of

investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found

the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review

board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the

indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents

including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein

petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a

reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations


before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only

as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended

informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the

Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They

contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal

accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or

higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or

higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.

However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was

approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by

deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal

accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.

8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall

apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not

begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the

petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection

clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have

been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire

jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-

post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members

of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the

office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the

determination whether the case falls within the

Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of

R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too

shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing

argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every

classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the

party who challenges the law must present proof of

arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary

when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial

distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must

apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which

are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all

cases involving” certain public officials and under the

transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any

court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the

law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng

cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases

which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,

generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249

is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is

not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the

Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties

for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for

their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s

jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,

has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly

a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure

by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly

administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive

application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as

unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to

have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately

connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while

he was in the performance of his official functions. Such

intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is

essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.


However, upon examination of the amended information, there

was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the

victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to

the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,

the amended information does not indicate that the said

accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed

the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that

the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably

indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have

committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations

that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the

discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the

offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder

and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the

Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

4. INT’L SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) v. QUISUMBING

FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent

International School. The school hires both local and

foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more

benefits and higher salary. Respondent says this is

because of dislocation factor and limited tenure.

Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates

between foreign and local hires. They claim that it is

discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial

discrimination.

HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay

for equal work, persons who work with substantially

equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility

under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords the same rank and position, the

presumption is that they perform equal work. Here,

both groups have similar functions which they perform

under similar conditions. There is no evidence that

foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than local

hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly

accorded by the benefits they received.

INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13;

G.R. NO. 128845; 1JUN 2000]

Facts:

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad,

the local-hires of privaterespondent School, mostly Filipinos,

cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paidmore

than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the

point. The point isthat employees should be given equal pay

for work of equal value.

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for

short), pursuant to PresidentialDecree 732, is a domestic

educational institution established primarily for dependents of

foreigndiplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To

enable the School to continue carryingout its educational

program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of

the samedecree authorizes the School to employ its own

teaching and management personnel selectedby it either

locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such

personnel being exemptfrom otherwise applicable laws and

regulations attending their employment, except laws thathave

been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers

as members of its faculty,classifying the same into two: (1)

foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded

local-hires. These includehousing, transportation, shipping

costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-

hiresare also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more

than local-hires. The School justifiesthe difference on two

"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to

endure,namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited

tenure.

Issue:Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to

foreign hires and not to local hiresdiscriminative of their

constitutional right to the equal protection clause.

Held:


The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this

jurisdiction the long honoredlegal truism of "equal pay for equal

work." Persons who work with substantially equalqualifications,

skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should

be paidsimilar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its

"international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence

that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The

Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer

accords employees the same position and rank, the

presumption is thatthese employeesperform equal work. This

presumption is borne by logic and humanexperience. If the

employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for

that employee toexplain why he receives less or why the

others receive more. That would be adding insult toinjury. The

employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the

employer to explainwhy the employee is treated unfairly.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-

hires,salaries should not be usedas an enticement to the

prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same

services asforeign-hires and they ought to be paid the same

salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the"dislocation

factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve

as valid bases for thedistinction in salary rates.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of

workers and promote their welfare,""to afford labor full

protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to

regulate therelations between labor and capital. These

relations are not merely contractual but are soimpressed with

public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining

agreements included,must yield to the common good. Should

such contracts contain stipulations that are contraryto public

policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by

respondent School to justify thedistinction in the salary rates of

foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.

Thereis no reasonable distinction between the services

rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.

Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is

hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and

employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are

herebyreversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the

practice of respondent school of accordingforeign-hires higher

salaries than local-hires.

5. Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)

F: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the

medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp

Catitigan, Davao City was implicated in the

killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the

attempted murder of Bernabe

Machitar. After the informations for murder

and attempted murder were filed w/ the

RTC, the trial court issued an order

suspending petitioner until termination of

the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975,

w/c provides:

Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension

Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a

complaint or information sufficient in form

and substance against a member of the PNP

for grave felonies where the penalty

imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)

day or more, the court shall immediately

suspend the accused from office until the

case is terminated. Such case shall be

subject to continuous trial and shall be

terminated within ninety (90) days from

arraignment of the accused.

Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for

his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807,

that his suspension should be limited to 90

days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB,

and Layno v. SB. The motion and the

subsequent MFR were denied.

Hence, this petition

forcertiorar i andma nda mus.

HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of

merit.


(1) The language of the first sentence is

clear, plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The

second sentence xx providing the trial must

be terminated w/in 90 days from

arraignment does not qualify or limit the

first sentence. The 2 can stand

independently of each other.The first refers

to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals

w/ the time frame w/in w/c the trial should

be finished.

Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the

90day period, should the suspension of

accused be lifted? Certainly no. While the

law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the

phrase "be terminated w/in 90 days,"

there is nothing in the law that suggests that

the preventive suspension of the accused

will be lifted if the trial is not terminated

w/in that period.

But this is w/o prejudice to the

administrative sanctions, and, in appropriate

cases where the facts so warrant, to

criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should

the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the

fault of the accused, he may ask for the

dismissal of the case. Should this be refused,

he can compel itsdismissal bycer tiorari,

prohibition orma nda mus, or secure his

liberty by

(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD

807. A meticulous reading of the section

clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of

the preventive suspension in pending admin.

investigation, not in crim. cases, as

here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states that

the CS law and its implementing rules shall

apply to members of the PNP insofar as the

provisions, rules and regulations are not

inconsistent w/ RA 6975.

(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and

Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019

upon w/c the preventive suspension of the

accused in Layno and Deloso was based was

silent w/ respect to the duration of

the preventive suspension, such that the

suspension of the accused therein for a

prolonged and unreasonable length of time

raised a due process question. Not so in the

instant case. Petitioner is charged w/

murder under the RPC and it is undisputed

that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975

w/c categorically states that

hissuspension shall last until the case is

terminated.

(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral

Conference Committee on National Defense

relative to the bill that became RA 6975

reveal the legislative intent to place on

preventive suspension a member of the

PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the

penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of

imprisonment and w/c suspension continues

until the case against him is terminated.

237 SCRA 538 – Political Law – Constitutional

Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection –

Suspension of PNP Members Charged with

Grave Felonies

Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was

charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the

attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe.

Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was

placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides

that:


Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and

substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the

penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the

court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the

case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and

shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the

accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D.

807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should

be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of

preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service

Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal

protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection

guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is

clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than

that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged

with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or

more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension

cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second

sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be

terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not

qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently

of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The

second deals with the time from within which the trial should be

finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from

the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively

insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is

concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the

law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against

them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is

reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the

witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and

thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in

uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for

over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the

suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of

the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from

arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word

“shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”,

there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive

suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated

within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the

case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to

administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts

so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably

delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his

right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for

the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the

case, the accused can compel its dismissal bycertiorari, prohibition

or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

6. GALLARDO VS PEOPLE GR 142030 21

APRIL 2005

Facts: Public Health Workers of Davao del Sur

filed letter-complaint for alleged refusal to

appropriate in the municipal budget the amount

representing payment of their salaries by the

Municipality of Bansalan headed by Mayor Arturo

Gallardo with the Ombudsman. Probable cause

was found and information was filed stating that

Gallardo caused undue injury to PHW workers.

Gallardo requested for reinvestigation. This was

granted by Sandiganbayan, However

Ombudsman Desierto recommended his

disapproval. Petitioner filed motion to quash on

the ground that they were not accorded equal

protection of the law. They contend that similar

cases were dismissed by Desierto previously ans

should be accorded the same to the case at bar.


Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto

violated equal protection right of the petitioners

on the ground of not uniformly deciding similar

cases?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The equal

protection clause requires that the law operates

uniformly on all persons under similar

circumstances or that all persons are treated in

the same manner, the conditions not being

different, both in privileges conferred and the

liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable

classification. If the classification is characterized

by real and substantial differences, one class may

be treated differently from another. The

Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he

believed there were no sufficient grounds for the

accused therein to undergo trial. On the other

hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate

information against petitioners because there are

ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only

exercising his power and discharging his duty

based upon the constitutional mandate of his

office.

7. Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 (2005)

Facts: Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.

Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine

Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) released its final report of

a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled

“Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking

System.”

It was revealed that of the blood units collected in

1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks,

14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based

blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks ;

showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial

sources of blood. It was further found, among other things, that

blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three

times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or

blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria,

syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/beltran-v-secretary-of-health-476-scra.html

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/beltran-v-secretary-of-health-476-scra.html


Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of

1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act

seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by

promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood

banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act was

the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from

its effectivity.

Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of

Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail

the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others

that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative

power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when

it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a

standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the

performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the

two-year extension period that may be granted by the

Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood

banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the

Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of

legislative power.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719

CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE

POWER

Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire

whether the statute was complete in all its terms and

provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that

nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or

any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as

to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and

regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers

and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a

general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay

down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative

board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary

powers delegated to it.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of

1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the

Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the

health of the people and has mandated several measures to

attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of

commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently

provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary

of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of

public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood

through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has

conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as

to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the

law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act

No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.

Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides

that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be

extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on

the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and

demand and public safety.” This power to ascertain the

existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary

may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be

delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the

power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is

illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the

law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall

be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,

to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first

cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

8. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 190582 APRIL 8, 2010

Facts:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT

Party, an organization composed of men and

women who identify themselves as lesbians,

gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals

(LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds.

In the elevation of the case to the Supreme

Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made

misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies

for registration as party-list.


Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for

registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in

denying petitioner’s application was a violation

of the non-establishment clause laid down in

Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The

proscription by law relative to acts against

morality must be for a secular purpose (that is,

the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed

is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions

upon which depend the existence and progress

of human society"), rather than out of religious

conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate

their allegation that allowing registration to

Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the

exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on

the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of

general application should apply with equal force

to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the

party-list system on the same basis as other

marginalized and under-represented sectors.

Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not

tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any

international laws to which we adhere.

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ

ofpreliminary mandatory injunction, filed by

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against

theResolutions of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First

AssailedResolution) and December 16, 2009 (the

Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228

(PL)(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The

case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to

accredit AngLadlad as a party-list organization

under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise

known as the Party-ListSystem Act.

FACTS:Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued

that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and

transgender)community is a marginalized and

under-represented sector that is particularly

disadvantaged because oftheir sexual orientation

and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of

exclusion, discrimination, andviolence; that

because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are

constrained to hide their sexualorientation; and

that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point

guidelines enunciated by this Court in

AngBagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.

Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out

its nationalmembership base consisting of

individual members and organizational

supporters, and outlined itsplatform of

governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad

filed a Petition for registration with

theCOMELEC.

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the

petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second

Division)dismissed the Petition on moral grounds

that petitioner tolerates immorality which

offends religiousbeliefs, and advocates sexual

immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied

accreditation not only foradvocating immoral

doctrines but likewise for not being truthful

when it said that it “or any of itsnominees/party-

list representatives have not violated or failed to

comply with laws, rules, or regulationsrelating to

the elections.” Furthermore, states COMELEC,

Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to

anenvironment that does not conform to

the teachings of our faith. When Ang

Ladlad soughtreconsideration, COMELEC still,

on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed

Resolution.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition,

praying that the Supreme Court annul the

AssailedResolutions and direct the COMELEC to

grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation.

Ang Ladladalso sought the issuance ex parte of a

preliminary mandatory injunction against the


COMELEC, whichhad previously announced that

it would begin printing the final ballots for the

May 2010 elections byJanuary 25, 2010.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by

COMELEC, violated the constitutional

guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion.

insofar as it justified the exclusion by using

religious dogma.

2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions

contravened the constitutional rights to privacy,

freedomof speech and assembly, and equal

protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as

constitutedviolations of the Philippines’

international obligations against discrimination

based on sexualorientation.

HELD:

1. Our Constitution provides in Article III,

Section 5 that “No law shall be made respecting

anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-

establishment clause calls for is

“government neutrality in religious

matters.” Clearly,“governmental reliance on

religious justification is inconsistent with this

policy of neutrality.” The Supreme Court ruled

that it was grave violation of the non-

establishment clause for theCOMELEC to utilize

the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of

Ang Ladlad. Rather thanrelying on religious

belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions

should depend, instead, onwhether the

COMELEC is able to advance some justification

for its rulings beyond mereconformity to

religious doctrine. The government must act for

secular purposes and in ways thathave primarily

secular effects.

2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified

any specific overt immoral act performed by

AngLadlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor

General agrees that “there should have been a

finding bythe COMELEC that the group’s

members have committed or are committing

immoral acts.” Respondent have failed to

explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why specialprotection is required

for the youth. Under our system of laws, every

group has the right topromote its agenda and

attempt to persuade society of the validity of its

position through normaldemocratic means.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the

essential foundations of ademocratic society, and

this freedom applies not only to those that are

favorably received but alsoto those that offend,

shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state

interest, it is not for theCOMELEC or the

Supreme Court, to impose its views on the

populace. Otherwise stated, theCOMELEC is

certainly not free to interfere with speech for no

better reason than promoting anapproved

message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws

of general application should applywith equal

force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate

in the party-list system on the samebasis as other

marginalized and under-represented sectors.

This is in accord with the country’sinternational

obligations to protect and promote human

rights. The principle of non-discrimination

as it relates to the right to electoral

participation, enunciated in the UDHR and

theICCPR should be recognized. The

Constitution and laws should be applied

uninfluenced bypublic opinion. True democracy

should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous

debate due toconflicting opinions.

The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions

of the Commission on Elections

datedNovember 11, 2009 and December 16,

2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and

theCOMELEC was directed to GRANT

petitioner’s application for party-list

accreditation.


9. BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION (2010)

G.R. No. 192935 and G.R. No. 193036 | 2010-12-07

Subject: Requisites for the exercise of Judicial Review;

Locus Standi (Direct Injury Test and Transcendental

Importance); Power to create a new office is not

included in the power to reorganize; Power to create a

new office is not covered under the President’s power

of control; Executive Powers of the President not

limited to those specifically mentioned in the

Constitution; No appropriation but merely an allotment

of existing funds; Investigative power vs. Adjudicative

power; EO1 violated the equal protection clause by

singling out the Arroyo Administration

Facts: President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1

(EO1) creating the Philippine Truth Commission. The

Truth Commission is an ad hoc body with the power to

investigate reported cases of graft and corruption

involving third level public officials and higher ranking

officials of the Arroyo administration. The investigative

powers of the Truth Commission include fact-finding

and assessment of evidence of graft and corruption

and then making recommendations. However, it does

not have the power to determine whether probable

cause exists as to file an information in court. It also

does not have the powers of a quasi-judicial body, that

is, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or

render awards, nor can it cite people in contempt or

order an arrest.

This case was a consolidation of two cases, one

instituted by Louis Biraogo as a citizen and taxpayer;

while other case was instituted by Edcel Lagman,

Rodolfo Albano, Jr. and Simeon Datumanong, all of

whom are members of the House of Representatives.

The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of

Executive Order No. 1 and the creation of the Truth

Commission on several grounds. It is argued that (1)

the EO1 violates the separation of powers between the

Executive and Legislative Departments regarding the

creation of public offices and allocation of funds, and

(2) that EO1 is unconstitutional for superseding the

quasi-judicial functions of the Ombudsman, and (3)

that EO1 violates the equal protection clause as it

specifically targets graft and corruption reports during

the Arroyo Administration.

The OSG, on the other hand, refuted these arguments

by stating that the creation of the Truth Commission

falls within the President’s executive power and

control, as the creation of a fact-finding body is

necessary in assisting the President in the performance

of his administrative functions to enforce laws. The

OSG further argued that the creation of a fact-finding

commission such as a truth commission is not

legislative per se, rather it is included in the President’s

power to reorganize the Office. Moreover, the OSG

insisted that the Truth Commission does not duplicate

or supersede the quasi-judicial functions of the Office

of the Ombudsman because it is merely a fact-finding

body. The OSG also counter-argued that EO1 does not

violate the equal protection clause because it was

created for “laudable” purposes. The OSG also

questioned the legal standing of the petitioners to

question the Order.

Held:

Requisites for the exercise of Judicial Review

1. The power of judicial review over an act or issuance

may be exercised by the courts when there is a)

an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of

judicial power; b) the person challenging the act must

have standing to question the validity of the act or

issuance, that is, if the person stands to be benefitted

or injured as a result of the enforcement of the law; c)

the question of constitutionality must be raised at

the earliest opportunity; and d) the constitutionality

must be the very lis mota of the case.

Locus Standi (Direct Injury Test and

Transcendental Importance)

2. A person has locus standi to impugn the validity of a

statute upon meeting the “direct injury test”. That


is, a person must have “a personal and substantial

interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will

sustain direct injury as a result.”

3. The Court held that the petitioners have legal

standing. The legislators-petitioners have a legal

standing to “see to it that the prerogative, powers and

privileges vested by the Constitution” to the Congress

are not violated.”

4. Mr. Biraogo was likewise held to have legal standing.

The direct injury test can be relaxed when the matter is

of “transcendental importance, of overreaching

significance to society, or of a paramount public

interest.” A matter is of transcendental importance in

view of its seriousness, novelty and weight.

Power to create a new office is not included in

the power to reorganize

5. The power to create an office is not included in the

power to reorganize. The President’s power to

reorganize is limited to “a) restructuring the internal

organization of the Office of the President by

abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or

transferring functions from one unit or another; b)

transferring any function under the Officer of the

President to any other Department or Agency, or vice

versa; or 3) transferring any agency under the Office of

the President to any other Department/Agency or vice

versa. The power to reorganize includes a modification

of an office that already exists; not a creation of a

completely new office.

Power to create a new office is not covered

under the President’s power of control

6. The power of control is the power to “alter or modify

or nullify or set aside” an act done by a subordinate

officer and substitute the judgment of the person of

power with the judgment of the subordinate. This

power does not contemplate the creation of an office.

Executive Powers of the President not limited to

those specifically mentioned in the Constitution

7. The powers of the President are not limited to those

specifically mentioned in the Constitution. While the

President inherently has the power to reorganize and

the power of control, the power to create offices is not.

Considering that the President has the duty to ensure

that the laws of the land are faithfully executed, thus,

he possesses the necessary powers to fulfill that

duty. The President necessarily has the power to create

ad hoc committees that can aid in the enforcement of

the laws of the land.

No appropriation but merely an allotment of

existing funds

8. The Court held that there will be no appropriation

but merely an allotment of existing funds already

appropriated for the Executive Department.

Investigative power vs. Adjudicative power

9. The Truth Commission is a fact-finding body. It does

not possess quasi-judicial powers, hence, it will not

supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ. It has the power

to investigate, but not the power to adjudicate.

The power to investigate means to explore, inquire

or probe into a specific matter while the power to

adjudicate means to adjudge, decide, resolve, rule on

and settle.

EO1 violated the equal protection clause by

singling out the Arroyo Administration

10. Equal protection does not mean the universal

application of laws on all persons and things. It leaves

room for classification as long as such classification

meets the following: a) the classification rests on

substantial distinctions; b) it is germane to the purpose

of the law; c) it is not limited to existing conditions

only; and d) applies equally to all members of the same

class.

11. The Court held that EO1 violated the equal

protection clause by singling out the Arroyo

Administration. While the Arroyo administration had


differences with other past administrations, the

distinctions are not substantial. Singling out the Arroyo

Administration also violates the third requirement, that

it must apply equally to all members of a similar class.

Equal Protection Clause [CaseDigest]

Documents

Transcript of Equal Protection Clause [CaseDigest]