Epcs 2011 Submission 102

8/10/2019 Epcs 2011 Submission 102

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EUROPEAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY MEETING 2011

Russian monopolism:

Interconnection between Politics and Economics1Rustem Nureev*

State University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow,Professor, Head of Department of Economics; [email protected] [email protected]

Sergey Shulgin,Academy for National Economy under the Government of Russia, Institute for applied economic studies,

Leading Research Fellow; [email protected]

JEL classification:D72, P26, P 37.

Key words:Political monopolism, Administrative recourse, Elections, Voting Behavior, Focal

points, Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior.

Abstract

In 1990s, in post-Soviet Russia created a "institutional lock-in": the modern Russian market is a

product of weak democracy, but democracy is weak, in turn, becomes the result of non-

competitive market. Political monopolism leads to economical monopolization and vice versa.

Facts about the existence of preferences (tax exemptions and other benefits) indicate that in the

region there is duality rules (in their division outsiders), which leads to restrict economic

competition in the region Indeed, companies using direct support and patronage of the governor

often receive substantial tax release, soft jobs and other forms of financial assistance from the

administration.

1. Problem statement

The subject of the inquiry is the political markets of imperfect competition and their influence on

the formation of the market economy in Russia. The object of the inquiry is the concrete forms

of the coherence between economic and political monopolism in the regions of Russia. It is

widely known that the market we have created derives from the underdeveloped democracy and

this very underdeveloped democracy derives from the market of imperfect competition. But until

now there were no specialized inquiries describing to the study of political and economic

mechanism of coherence between in the regions. The present work is the first trial of analyzing

coherence mechanisms and describing the role of the administrative resource in this process

taking as an example post-soviet Russia from the point of the public choice theory view.

For the above reason we formalize the term administrative resource. In the work we proclaim

that the administrative resource is not only a prerequisite but a consequence of the political

monopolism on the market. On the one hand it restricts political competition and a barrier for

those who want to enter the political market. On the other hand the political market of imperfect

competition is a basis for the formation of the administrative resource (power property). Some

kind of the political and economic trap of the regional monopolism occurs.

It is the first time when considerable data base (regional electoral statistics) is used. In company

with new methods of formal analysis it gives an opportunity to the reader use the supposed

model according to the actual data in the concrete region.

The project has a complex character and includes not only the analysis of the administrativeresource and the factors which define it but also its on the restriction

1Draft for MPSA (Chicago, 2011). Comments are very welcome


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The fact that requires explanation: trend of falling interest in the election and falling turnout is

replaced at the beginning of XXI-th to the rising trend in turnout in federal elections in the first

place in the national republics. Approach in some regions to the summons at the level typical of

the Soviet Union (99.9%)

This is particularly ironic in the reduction of political competition: one-party system, one real

candidate for the presidential elections and appointed by the Governor accompanied by a formal

increase in turnout.

With an elected chief executive officers challenge the candidates to win popularity among thepeople (voters), while appointed by the head should be popular with their superiors.

Hence, the democratic mechanism, in which the elections are a form of control over the power of

citizens reborn into its opposite.

Note the fact that both regions would compete with each other to increase voter turnout 60%,

70%, 80%, 90, 100%. Does this mean that the high voter turnout in the region will become a

kind of signal?

In 1990s, in post-Soviet Russia created a "institutional lock-in": the modern Russian market is a

product of weak democracy, but democracy is weak, in turn, becomes the result of non-

competitive market.Political monopolism leads to economical monopolization, from other hand economic

monopolism leads to political monopolization. Facts about the existence of preferences (tax

exemptions and other benefits) indicate that in the region there is duality rules (in their division

outsiders), which leads to restrict economic competition in the region Indeed, companies using

direct support and patronage of the governor often receive substantial tax release, soft jobs and

other forms of financial assistance from the administration. As result we have Institutional lock-

in.

The subject of the inquiry is the political markets of imperfect competition and their influence on

the formation of the market economy in Russia. The object of the inquiry is the concrete forms

of the coherence between economic and political monopolism in the regions of Russia. It iswidely known that the market we have created derives from the underdeveloped democracy and

this very underdeveloped democracy derives from the market of imperfect competition. But until

now there were no specialized inquiries describing to the study of political and economic

mechanism of coherence between in the regions. The present work is the first trial of analyzing

coherence mechanisms and describing the role of the administrative resource in this process

taking as an example post-soviet Russia from the point of the public choice theory view.

2. Literature review

In the classical literature did not pay enough attention to surrogate forms of democracy. No one

thought that the forms of democracy will be such alived (Path dependence)

Elections in a democratic state - that's the most important means of controlling the state of the

citizens. On the other hand, the state also controls the citizens. D. Madison once observed that "

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither

external nor internal controls on government would be necessary"2. This reciprocal relationship

can draw a simple pattern (Fig. 1).

Citizants control Government

Fig. 1. Elections as an element of mutual control

2Madison J., Federalist, no. 51, 34753, 6 Feb, 1788

Representation

Taxation


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The main features of democracy manifested in the participation in government, the

implementation of constitutional freedoms (of conscience, speech, assembly, press, etc.),

equality of opportunity for development of each individual. All of these basic features of

democracy embodied in the voting, and are usually enshrined in the constitution (see Table 1.).

Table 1

Major features of democracy

1. Participation Representation of citizens in governance

2.Liberty The combination of constitutional rights: Freedom of conscience;

Freedom of speech;

Freedom of assembly;

Freedom of the press;

Freedom of association etc.

3. Equality Equality of opportunities

It should be remembered that in a democratic state coupled with a system of regular elections,

there are other ways to control the state derivatives, such as: separation of powers, independent

judiciary, free press, etc.The problems of regional political monopolism in the economic literature are traditionally

analyzed in connection with the problem of federalism. Investigations made by Tiebout breathed

fresh life into the study of the influence of cross-regional economic competition on the optimal

level of providing local public goods. So as a rule, modern inquiries place special emphasis on

budget (fiscal) federalism (Stiglitz 1988, Watts 1997, Zhuravskaya and Trunin 1999, Mickison

2000, Jacobson 2000) and production and allocation of local public goods. Scientists of post-

soviet Russia also analyse first of all peculiarities of cross-budget relations and the preparation of

the budget reform (Alexeev & Kurliandskaya 1998, Lavrov 2000). Economic basis for political

monopolism has not yet become the central problem. Political monopolism has been studied

from the point of the whole state. One can face with the trial to quantify the administrative

weight in the top-management of the USSR and Russia in the works by S. Kordonsky (2000). It

determines the hierarchy of the administrative resource connecting the weight with the place

taken which consists of the activity level and the form of activity. But such a counting doesnt

show in full measure the importance of particular structural divisions and influence of their

chiefs on the modern market economy as it bases on the approach, which appeared under the

conditions of command economy and kept alive to his mind in post-soviet Russia. It doesnt

reflect in full measure the administrative resource of the 90th, regional leaders and the possibility

to attract political rent. Such a gap is filled with the literature devoted to this problem.

A number of domestic publications connected with the problems of rent-seeking behaviour and

its Russian specific appeared in the 90ths (M. Olson (1995), A. Oslund (1996), L. Polishuk

(1996), A. Zaostrovtsev (2000). They created a basis for analysing the effects connected with thelimitation of the political competition in Russia. A lot of these articles were dedicated to the

problem of corruption in Russian economy: M. Levin, M. Tsirik (1998), V. Polterovich (1998),

V. Radaev (1998). But the majority of all works deals with the problem of rent-seeking ignoring

regional specification.

To be true, a number of empirical investigations of Russian electoral statistics is already exists.

They show the tendencies of social, economic and political development of the different Russian

regions (the publication of the INDEM fund by Mikheeva 1999, Regional Russia, 2000)

Economic factors of the electoral behaviour of the post-soviet Russia are analysed by V. Mau,

O. Kochetkova, S. Zhavoronkov (1999). For example they use regression analysis in order to

explain electoral behaviour through economic variables, indicating socio-economic potential andperspectives of regional development.


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But let alone innumerable domestic investigations in the field of federalism, political rent

seeking and other problems of the public choice theory. Analytical models describing the

interconnection between political and economic monopolism in Russian regions and allowing to

do considerable conclusions in fact do not exist.

The relationship of economic and political monopolies particularly evident at the regional level,

the emergence and growth of the so-called administrative resources - meaning, gradually

perekochevavshem of journalism in the scientific literature. This problem becomes relevant,

because shows the close relationship of Economics and Politics: the impact of economic factorson the political choice, and the reverse effect of political factors on the economy.

In 1990 - s in post-Soviet Russia has emerged kind of a vicious circle: the modern Russian

market is a product of weak democracy, but democracy is weak, in turn, becomes the result of

non-market. The object of the study, therefore, should be a specific form of interaction of

political and economic monopolies in the regions of the Russian Federation. At present, the

greatest interest is the analysis of the relationship between these processes, especially at the level

of subjects of the Russian Federation. Interestingly clarify the role of administrative resources, in

each of the regions in order to map out concrete ways.

Administrative resource - it is, on the one hand, gained political rents (rents political

consequence attribution), and the other - the potential policy, which allows him to receivepolitical rents in the future (a prerequisite of obtaining political rents). Therefore, we can

distinguish between the potential and realized the administrative resource.

3. Factors shaping the administrative resource

Factors shaping the administrative resource shares with the famous conditionality divided

into political and economic (see fig. 2). The administrative resource is the result of incomplete

contract between society and employed by a politician.

Political

factors

Economicfactors

Administrative

Resource

Fig. 2. Factors forming the administrative resource.

Political factors can be seen as a barrier at the entrance political market, restricting

political competition. A political noncompetitive market, in turn, becomes a factor in the

formation of administrative resources (see fig. 2). Each federating entity now governors have set

up companies through which disburse public funds (including in your pocket)

As the input data can be used electoral statistics by region. The objects of analysis are 77

subjects of the Russian Federation. There should be excluded not representative regions (and

those needed for reliable data are not available), such as: Chechnya, Ingushetia, and the ten

autonomous districts.

In order to achieve some illustrative findings emphasis should be on the results of theelections of heads of the executive authorities of subjects of the Russian Federation. It is

advisable to bring to the electoral statistics for the legislative elections subjects of the Russian


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Federation and State Duma for the period 1996-2005. Consider the statistics earlier period (1991

- 1995) is pointless, because old administrative resource was destroyed and the new has not yet

managed to emerge.

4. Adminis trative resource as a signal of the political market imperfections

Administrative resource - the barrier at the entrance political market, a kind of expression

of the degree of monopoly in the political market.

On the political monopoly presents not only the number of candidates nominated, but,

above all, an opportunity to exclude (withdrawal) of the competition most meaningful

competitor, as well as the possibility of postponing the election for the convenience acting Chief

Executive of the time. In order to determine the monopoly Governor (or the candidate supported

by local authorities) must take into account the political orientation of the region, because the

election of a candidate may be not only the result of the efforts of the executive branch, but also

the result of the influence of one or another party in the federation entity. Therefore, it is

necessary to adjust the percentage voted for the current Chief Executive of the region on political

affiliation. All these parameters political monopoly reflected in the table. 1.

Will consider several manifestations of administrative resources on the material he 1996-

2004 elections. Above all, these include:

The possibility of transferring elections and the withdrawal of significant competitor

Pressure on turnout and drive up turnout

Reduce the political competition in elections

Analysis of the candidates withdrawing from the elections shows that since 2000 has

become increasingly power to intervene in regional polling company. If in the election of heads

of the executive from 1996 to 1999. 6 was only lifted significant competitors, the 2000 and 2003

- already 16 (see Fig. 3).

46

10 10 13

44

15 13 13

1 1 3 16 6

2 2

0

10

20

30

40

50

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Total elections Withdrawal of significant candidates

Fig. 3. Elections of heads of executive and withdrawing significant competitors

Source: constructed by cikrf.ru data

A similar trend is observed in the elections of mayors and regional centres. Analysis of

the election of mayors of major cities showed that in the new millennium the cases withdrawing

from the election of candidates - serious applicants for the posts of mayors of major cities.

Between 1995 and 2000, respectively. there were only two cases, and since 2000, more than 6.

In the elections of deputies to the State Duma in 2003, in 20 subjects of the Russian

Federation registered candidates from the pre left the company. The largest percentage of

retirement registered candidates for deputies observed in the Republic of Tyva, the Sakhalinregion, Khabarovsk Territory, the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Chechnya, Adygeya

Republic, the Stavropol territory. The percentage who voted for the party "United Russia" in

these regions amounted to 51.4%, while the average for Russia 39.5%.


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Thus, a marked strengthening of government interference in the elections. During 2000

- 2003. candidates in the elections of governors were shot at the 16 - and polling companies, in

the elections of mayors of major cities - in the 6 - and. Elections to the State Duma 3 - the second

convocation held in 1999, with the increased intervention of the authorities at the time of

registration and cancellation of registration of candidates than the parliamentary elections 4 - the

second convocation in 2003.

Table 2

Regions with significant increase in turnout on presidential election (2000-2004)

Regions

Turnout on president

election 2000 (%)

Turnout on president

election 2004 (%)

Difference in turnout

2004 and 2000

(percentage points)

Republic of North Ossetia - Alania 71.47 88.75 17.28

Republic of Mordovia 79.51 93.80 14.30

Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 69.96 81.24 11.27

Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic 69.94 80.95 11.01

Tyumen Region 66.50 76.62 10.12

Dagestan Republic 83.69 93.79 10.10

Adygeja 65.86 75.50 9.64

Republic of Bashkortostan 79.56 88.61 9.05Kabardin-Balkar Republic 88.65 97.60 8.95


Development of a political monopoly in Russia can be seen in the turnout at the federal

electoral companies to the State Duma and presidential elections Russia. If, in 1991, turnout in

all subjects of the Federation was about the same level. The national republics, it averaged 76%,

79% in the fields and in general in Russia 78%, whereas by 2004 the level of turnout has

undergone significant changes. Against the background of an overall decline of voter

participation, especially highlighted the growth in national republics turnout, which increased

from 72% (1996) to 80% in 2004 This clearly demonstrates the exercise of administrativeresources in the national republics. This trend is particularly evident in some regions. Data shows

that in some regions there has been a significant increase in turnout: more than 8 percentage

points from 2000 to 2004, a detailed analysis of the political monopoly submitted to the Open

Economy Institute's study. The study, using data on voting at the level of territorial election

commissions 1996 2004. Virtually all "irregularities" were in favour of a candidate from the

party of power and particularly pronounced in the national republics.

22

4 410

31

9 7 8 7

30

24

6 63

13

6 6 5 4

8

0

10

20

30

40

50

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Incumbent New

Fig. 4. Reelection of head of regional executives (1996-2004) and appointment in 2005


Administrative resources are linked not only with the imperfections of the political

markets, but, in turn, helps reduce economic competition. Facts about the existence of tax


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exemptions and other privileges mean that in the region there is duality rules (division into its

other people's) - a concrete manifestation of economic monopolies connection with the political,

visual impact of administrative resources to limit economic competition in the region.

Political factors determine only the relative capacity to use part of the available resources.

Absolute values are determined by available indicators of administrative resources available

local budgets (on the basis of their dependence on federal authorities), the level of autonomy the

region, etc.

Fig. 5. Elections of head of regional executives 1996-1998


Fig. 6. Elections of head of regional executives 1999-2004


Reelected New No elections



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Analysis of the election of heads of executive in the year 1996-2004 shows (see Fig. 5-8), that if,

prior to 1999, was the main trend in the change of existing chapters, since 1999, in most cases,

the heads of the executive branch has been able to maintain their position. Before 1999, less than

half (45%) were able to governors renewed for a further term, from 1999 to 2004. two thirds

(66%) of governors retained their posts.

Fig. 7. Elections of head of regional executives 1996-1998 (European part of Russia)


Fig. 8. Elections of head of regional executives 1999-2004 (European part of Russia)





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After the adoption of a new order of elections of governors in 2004, when the candidacy of

Governor proposes president of the Russian Federation and approved by the regional legislature,

overwhelming majority of heads of the executive power (79%), retained the post and stayed

appointed governors.

5. Turnout on Federal Elections

On the political monopoly presents not only the number of candidates nominated, but, above all,

an opportunity to exclude (withdrawal) of the competition most meaningful competitor, as well

as the possibility of postponing the election for the convenience acting Chief Executive of the

time. In order to determine the monopoly Governor (or the candidate supported by local

authorities) must take into account the political orientation of the region, because the election of

a candidate may be not only the result of the efforts of the executive branch, but also the result of

the influence of one or another party in the federation entity. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust

the percentage voted for the current Chief Executive of the region on political affiliation. All

these parameters political monopoly reflected in the table 3.

Table 2 shows a substantial increase in turnout in the elections for the national republics in 2004

compared to 2000 against the backdrop of falling general interest in elections in Russia. While

Russia as a whole, turnout fell from 69% to 64%, the national republics, on the contrary, itincreased from 76% to 80%, see Fig. 9.

Development of a political monopoly in Russia can be seen in the turnout at the federal electoral

companies to the State Duma and presidential elections Russia (see Fig. 9). If, in 1991, turnout in

all subjects of the Federation was about the same level. The national republics, it averaged 76%,

79% in the oblasts (regions) and in general in Russia 78%, whereas by 2004 the level of turnout

has undergone significant changes. Against the background of an overall decline of voter

participation, especially highlighted the growth in national republics turnout, which increased

from 72% (1996) to 80% in 2004 This clearly demonstrates the exercise of administrative

resources in the national republics.

However, these data indicate a different trend, that the elections in a weak democracy canbecome a instrument for demonstrating the loyalty of local authorities vis--vis the central

government.

69%68% 68%

61%

67%

72% 73%

76%

80% 81%

70%

79%

76%

78%

69%70% 69%

64%

50%

60%

70%

80%

1991 96, 1-

96, 2-

2000 2004 2008

Regions Republics Total in Russia

Fig. 9. Turnout on president elections 1991-2008



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The ability to manage the mass consciousness is becoming a signal of reliability of local

authorities and should be rewarded by the center. The extent of the reward depends on the

specific situation and may become a subject of bargaining.

Table 3

Regions with significant increase in turnout on presidential election (2004-2008)

Regions

Turnout on

president election

2004 (%)

Turnout on

president election

2008 (%)

Difference in turnout

2008 and 2004

(percentage points)

Krasnodar 63,25 87,39 24,14The Republic of Mari El 65,09 83,48 18,38Omsk Region 66,78 83,10 16,32

Zabaikalsky Region 55,72 70,50 14,77Khanty-Mansi Autonomous

District - Ugra 64,03 78,57 14,53

Altai Republic 62,58 76,86 14,28

Komi Republic 57,59 71,79 14,20

Tula Region 55,23 68,65 13,43

Irkutsk Region 53,18 64,74 11,57

Yamalo-Nenets AutonomousDistrict 80,84 91,96 11,12Tver Region 54,90 65,90 11,00

Kaluga Region 56,35 67,33 10,98Moscow Region 58,29 69,19 10,91

Karachay-Cherkessia

Republic 81,42 92,20 10,78City of St. Petersburg 57,40 68,10 10,70Amur Region 59,28 69,89 10,61

Murmansk region 57,61 68,00 10,39

Kirov Region 60,05 70,26 10,21Krasnoyarsk Krai 51,10 61,27 10,17Kemerovo Region 71,82 81,95 10,13


Election models of national republics became a example for the other parts of the Russian

Federation. This is evidenced by the shift that occurred from 2004 to 2008.

Elections 2008 demonstrate curious trend, when unopposed elections combined with an increase

in voter turnout.

Total turnout in Russia rose from 64% to 70%, the level of turnout in the Republic remains at the

2004 level (80%). Largest contribution to turnout growth made by the Russian regions (oblasts)

in which the turnout growth from 61% to 67% since 2004 to 2008 (see Fig. 2).

Curiously, the earlier high standard of turnout in the national republics has not changed (on

average about 80%) see Fig. 9.

If in 2004 the main sources of growth in voter turnout have been some national republics (see

figure 10.) then on election 2008 major turnout growth drivers were already other regions (see

Table 3). The movement started from the periphery to the center. A large number of regions

have been able to substantially (by 10 percent or more) to increase voter turnout in presidential

elections.


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71%

80%

70% 70%67%

84%

66%

80%

89%89%

94%

81% 81%

77%

94%

76%

89%

98%

75%

92%

84%

65%

73%

90%93% 92%90%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Republic

of

NorthOsse

tia-

Alania

Republi

cof

Mordovia

SakhaRepu

blic

(Yakutia)

Karachayevo-

Cherkes

s

Republic

TyumenReg

ion

Dages

tan

Republic

Adygeja

Republic

of

Bashkortos

tan

Kabardin-Ba

lkar

Republic

2000

2004

2008

Fig. 10. Shift on turnout on Russian President Elections 2000-2008


Turnout growth wasnt result of votes interest in election and in politics but result of activity of

local bureaucrat, for whom a high turnout is a prerequisite for preserving and strengthening their

own power.

As the heads of the regions shall be appointed from the center and they should work for his

appointment.

Political

monopoly

Economic

monopoly

Administrative

Resource

Fig.11. Interconnection of political and economic monopolism with administrative resource.

The existence of a political monopoly, his explanation of the main reasons for creating the

preconditions for overcoming the political and monopolistic competition (see Fig. 10).


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There is a vicious circle in which a high turnout in the region is the condition of reappointment

and reappointment leads to high turnout in elections. This is reminiscent of the practice of the

Soviet Union, when voter turnout is below 99% was seen as a failure of local authorities and

became the subject of a special investigations and could mean the end of political and

bureaucratic career.

6. Focal points on electionsWe found that exist significant outliers in turnout distribution on round figures (50%, 60%, 70%,

75%, 80%, 90%). This unnatural behavior repeated on every federal election. On 2007/2008

federal elections outliers were more significant then on 2003/2004 elections.

Article discusses peculiarities of turnout behavior. We analyzed official Russian electoral data

(from 95 000 local districts electoral committees) on parliamentary and presidential federal

election on 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2008.

On the president elections these outliers were more significant then on the parliamentary

elections. In our article we discuss the nature of this abnormal behavior. We explain this effect

as focal points spontaneous behavior strategies chosen by different individuals in the same

situation. We suggest that focal points come into existence as result of bureaucratic pressure onturnout.

When authorities will try to stimulate electoral activities, local bureaucrats tend to think in round

figures (50%, 60%, 70%, 75%, etc.). The higher pressure on election makes focal points more

visible and on president elections focal points will be more visible then on the Duma Elections.

What are the reasons for increasing the voter turnout in a virtually non-alternative elections?

Russian electoral statistics date coverers about 95 000 local districts election committees

(Uchastkovaya Izbiratelnaya Comissiya - UIC). We analyzed official Russian electoral data

(from 95 000 local districts electoral committees) on parliamentary and presidential federal

election on 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2008.

What are the form of this distribution should be? Naturally voter does not choose his out

probability of voting. And turnout distribution close to the normal distribution. Analyzing

turnout distribution constructed based on official results.

Figures 12 & 13 show that exist significant outliers in turnout distribution on round

figures (50%, 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 90%).

This unnatural behavior repeated on every federal election. On 2007/2008 federal

elections outliers were more significant then on 2003/2004 elections (Fig. 14 & 15)

Why outliers in turnout distribution ONLY on round figures:

50%

60%

70%

75%

80%

90% ?

If authorities will trying to stimulate electoral activities bureaucrats tend to think in round

figures (50%, 60%, 70%, 75%, etc.)


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Russian Duma Elections, 2003

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

turnout%

NumberofUICs

Fig 12. Turnout distribution on Russian Federal Parliament Election (State Duma), 2003

Source: Central Election Commission of The Russian Federation (http://www.cikrf.ru)

Russian DUMA Elections, 2007

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

turnout%

Num

berofUICs

Fig 13. Turnout distribution on Russian Federal Parliament Election (State Duma), 2007



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Focal point spontaneous behavior strategies chosen by individuals in the same situation.

If bureaucrats responsible for turnout, rationally choose round figures like 50%, 60%, 70%

etc. The more pressure on election makes focal points more visible

On president elections focal points more visible then on the Duma Elections

On the president elections these outliers were more significant then on the parliamentary

elections. In our article we discuss the nature of this abnormal behavior. We explain this effectas focal points spontaneous behavior strategies chosen by different individuals in the same

situation. We suggest that focal points come into existence as result of bureaucratic pressure on

turnout.

When authorities will try to stimulate electoral activities, local bureaucrats tend to think in round

figures (50%, 60%, 70%, 75%, etc.). The higher pressure on election makes focal points more

visible and on president elections focal points will be more visible then on the Duma Elections.

Russian President Elections, 2004

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10turnout%

NumberofUICs

Fig 14. Turnout distribution on Russian President Election, 2004


The reasons for increasing the voter turnout in a virtually non-alternative elections. The

appointment of governors. Competition between the regions for the level of turnout.

In these circumstances the existence of round numbers (60 vs. 59.5, or 70 vs. 69.5 etc.) in turnout

results is an obvious advantage in the eyes of local and central bureaucracies.

The fact of the existence of focal points in voter turnout distribution, shows a significant

modification of the institute of elections in Russia at the regional level.

If the distribution of the appearance was initially close to the normal distribution, it is a

significant change. In part, they relate to the behavior of voters (especially in the national

republics), in part, the activity of local bureaucrat using turnout at elections as a signal of their

loyalty to the federal center.


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Fig 15. Turnout distribution on Russian President Election, 2008

Source: Central Election Commission of The Russian Federation (http://www.cikrf.ru3

In the context of strengthening the vertical of power is becoming an important factor in obtaining

the direct and indirect benefits. Direct, is the maintenance of power - as a result of the majority

of the governors retain their jobs, incomes and privileges. As a result of the election shall cease

to be a monitoring mechanism for the citizens of the authorities turning into a mechanism for

state control over the activities of regional and local bureaucrats, and society as a whole. Hence

the decline of interest among citizens to formal democratic institutions in general and elections

in particular.

Conclusions

Analysis of the election of heads of executive power in the 1996-2004 year of shows that

if, prior to 1999, the main trend has been to change the existing chapters, since 1999, in most

cases, the heads of the executive branch has been able to maintain his post. Before 1999, less

than half (45%) were able to governors election for a new term, from 1999 to 2004, two-thirds

(66%) of governors retained their posts. After the adoption of a new order of gubernatorial

elections in 2004, when the candidate was invited to the Governor and the President of the

Russian Federation approved the regional legislature, acting overwhelming majority of heads of

the executive branch (79%), retained the post of Governor and designated left.

Analysis of the Russian political monopolism reform of the State is also a concern with

the aim of creating a truly competitive environment in the political marketplace. Only if there is

clear constitutional framework of the activities of the state may prevent a regional separatism,

which is a threat to the current hierarchical system.

The absence of functioning legal in Russia and other regulators of their politicians leads

to a further widening of the role of administrative resources. There are features of autocratic

regime where power is concentrated in the hands of one. Establishing the existence of political

monopolies, explaining his reasons for creating the basic preconditions for overcomingmonopolies and the development of real political competition

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Our analysis leads to conclusion that there is a kind of institutional trap, since 2000, a

kind of administrative resource, which is both a cause and a consequence of the increasing

economic and political monopolies in Russia.

Preservation of existing trends related to the strengthening of political and economic

monopolies in the regions. This scenario involves the consolidation of administrative resources

and authoritarian trends.

Another possible scenario for the emergence of elements linked to the political

competition between the old and new power. This can lead a partial renovation of regional elites

and the easing of administrative resources.

Now we could observe modification of formal democratic institutions. Democracy was a

form allowing, under certain institutional conditions, a very different content.

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Epcs 2011 Submission 102

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