EOA 6: Moltke and the Franco-Prussian War

General Moltke’s Elements of Operational Design

End state: Prussian supremacy in Germany Condition: Coordination with Bismarck was good. Political and military leaders together on the camp.COG: The French ArmyOP Approach: Direct, offensive movement into France and her territories/allies.Decisive Points: mobilization planning, quick maneuver through restricted terrain, mutual support of 3 armies against the French force.LOO/LOE: The early engagements that each Prussian army had, allowed for the later concentration of the entire force.OP Reach: Railways and telegraph got each army the frontier faster than in past. Tempo: Prussians moved before the French could react. (allowed Ps to have initiative. Simultaneity/Depth: realized as 2nd army struck French right flank.Phasing/Transitions: Mobilization, penetration of frontier, large scale battle, rapid pursuit. Culmination Design of the campaign and modern technology allowed Prussians to stay on the offensive.Risk: Some challenges using available tech, a rider coordinated the movement of 2nd army at the vital point.

Timeline

EOA 6: Battle of Koniggratz, Moltke and the Franco-Prussian WarGeneral Benadek’s Elements of Operational Design

End state: Initially wanted to invade Prussia, ended up loosing initiative because of Prussian action. Knew he had to defeat Prussian army. Restore the earlier status quo-Austrian led confederation-as well as adding Silesia to Austria as an industrial center for the Austrians.Condition: Prussian forces in Austria defeated and returned to Prussia: Restore the earlier status quo-Austrian led confederation.COG: Prussian Army(Operational) and Berlin (strategic)OP Approach: Direct: Initially offensive(into Prussia), then to use interior lines to defeat the separate Prussian armiesDecisive Points: Destroy one army at a time as they came through the Alps. Should have been at least one of the passage points of the Prussian army, ended up being his right flank…inability to control IV and II corps cost the battle and eventually the campaignLOO/LOE: LOOs based on rails and rivers from Vienna. Battles at the defiles failed to be converted into any successful follow on action.OP Reach: little compared to Prussians. Dependent on use of Prussian rail if they are able to get through Alps.Tempo: Failed to move as fast as the Prussian, or to successfully disrupt their operations IOT seize the initiative at any point.Austrians tempo was deliberate and slow (not missing and opportunity) so that they could mass near border (while Prussians would exhaust themselves as they extended their LOOs from Berlin) and then schwack the Prussians coming out of the passes and then launch their attackSimultaneity/Depth: very poor, since the campaign took place in Austria there is no reason his forces could not have prevented at least one of the three wings from being involved at the main battlePhasing/Transitions: Poor shaping efforts prior to the battle. PH1: Mobilize & Mass, PH2: Initiation, PH3: Passage-never gets to this...Culmination: Proper describing and directing of his battle plan would have prevented the culmination from defense to retreat.Risk: Excellent use of his cav to cover his withdraw…did not visualize that one defeat (was not even that bad…) would cost the war. Only one rail line leading to Berlin. U: Change in understanding with SilesiaV: 28 June-Attack Prussians @ the defilesD: Benedek never describes operational plan to subordinates-even at the war council the night before LDD: Inability to Direct in a timely manner; Benedek never in position to C2 during Battle and never developed Situational Awareness.

1860 Moltke first starts planning for a war with Austria 27 June Nachod & Trautenau15 June 1866 Prussians declare war on Hannover and Saxony 28 June Skalitz & Soor22 June first troops cross the Bohemian Border 29 June Gitschin 3 July Koniggratz

Timeline

General Moltke’s Elements of Operational Design

End state: Prussian supremacy in Germany Condition: Coordination with Bismarck was good . Political and military leaders together on the camp.COG: The Austrian ArmyOP Approach: Direct, offensive movement into Austria.Decisive Points: mobilization planning, quick maneuver through restricted terrain, mutual support of 3 armies against the Austrian force.LOO/LOE: The early engagements that each Prussian army had, allowed for the later concentration of the entire force.OP Reach: Railways and telegraph got each army the frontier faster than in past. Tempo: Prussians moved before the Austrians could react. (allowed Ps to have initiative. Simultaneity/Depth: realized as 2nd army struck Austrian right flank.Phasing/Transitions: Mobilization, penetration of frontier, large scale battle, rapid pursuit. Culmination Design of the campaign and modern tech allowed P to stay on the offensive.Risk: Some challenges using available tech, a rider coordinated the mvt of 2nd army at the vital point.

1860 Moltke first starts planning for a war with Austria 27 June Nachod & Trautenau15 June 1866 Prussians declare war on Hannover and Saxony 28 June Skalitz & Soor22 June first troops cross the Bohemian Border 29 June Gitschin 3 July Koniggratz

EOA 6: Battle of Koniggratz, Moltke and the Franco-Prussian War