Environmental Security K

1NC Cards

1NC ShellThe 1AC marries environmental degradation with a securitized logic. Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 588] NISH

The theory of securitization argues that there are no objective threats, waiting to be discovered. Instead, various issues can be transformed into security issues if a political community constructs them as such through a successful speech act that transforms the way of dealing with them. Security in this perspective is

not a value or a condition but a form of social practice. That is to say, if an issue succeeds in being labelled as a security issue, the

method of handling it will be transformed. The consideration of the discursive formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse. First, it allows an investigation of the political process behind the selections of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others . Second, it suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in defining and transforming political communities and their identities, since the process creates new ideas about who deserves to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke (2000, 91) points out, securitization can open the space for a ‘genuinely political’ constitutive and formative struggle through which political structures (including the practices associated with security) are contested and re-established. However, for the Copenhagen School, securitization has

problematic consequences. The label security brings with it a set of practices and a way of dealing with a problem that characterizes an issue as a security issue. The word security entails a specific logic or rationality, independent of the context or the intentions of the speakers. Security is about survival, urgency and emergency. It allows for exceptional measures, the breaking of otherwise binding rules and governance by decrees rather than by democratic decisions. Moreover security implies a ‘decisionist’ attitude which emphasizes the importance of reactive, emergency measures. This set of

practices is not necessarily codified nor can it be identified by specific rules. Instead it is more a form of rationality, a way of framing and dealing with an issue, or ‘a generic structure of meaning which organizes dispositions, social relations, and politics

according to a rationality of security’ (Huysmans 2006, 24–25). This mindset, once activated, is not open to negotiation. Although it is possible to decide whether or not to securitize an issue—and securitization, as a social process, is determined by a political community rather than by individuals—once an issue is securitized the logic of security necessarily follows.

Their threat discourses uphold security’s ontological precepts which causes mass war and violenceBurke, 7 ( Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am

arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the

pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come , against

everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reaso n . Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility,

is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframin g , argues Heidegger, 'does not

simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of

political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention , geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being . Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities , and humans suffer and die . Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses , however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy . They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older

Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.9 0 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge

human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice

only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable ? 91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence ? Will our thought?

The alternative is to rethink security. This is vital to an emancipatory understanding of state-centric politics that can prevent ecological collapse.Dalby, 92 (Simon, Department of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter, pp. 95-134, JSTOR)

Rethinking security along these lines requires a refusal of the metaphysics of domination and control. Even more than in the case of military matters, neither economic or ecological security can ultimately be ensured by violence, nor can they be ensured by the unilateral actions of a single state. Instead, they require international cooperation and a participatory politics. "Security is increasingly attained through the difficult process of global cooperation to create mechanisms for non-violent dispute settlement and establish environmental alliances."131 In the longer term, what all this suggests is the possibility of a drastic rethinking of political structures. Transforming states, hard though it probably will be in the face of the resistance of powerful vested interests, must be an important part of reformulating security.132 The military understanding of security is one of force and imposed solutions, secrecy, power, and surveillance. It is a logocentric metaphysical model that privileges certainty and stability over the possibilities of change, and political order over the messy uncertainties of democratic practice. Conventional security discourse is trapped within the metaphysics and structures of Western philosophy and the will to dominate and control. A politics, and the related technology, that asserts ever greater power over things, tends to undermine the basis of that power by generating indirect responses, usually in terms of single states attempting to maximize security by increasing power, and so triggering arms race phenomena - the so-called security dilemma phenomenon. A similar dynamic works in ecological matters. The metaphysics of domination is linked in environmentalist discourse to the theme of the domination of nature.133 Technology and industry exploit nature and remake it according to their demands. Ecology is reduced to matters of natural resources management, the administration of nature by a technologically sophisticated state system. The diversity of species and the complex interconnections of ecosystems are here reduced to matters of either commodities or worthless extraneous materials. In the case of so-called renewable resources, the crucial conception is one of sustainable yield, as though forest or fish stocks were cultivated fields.134 As the case of the Amazon so clearly reveals, development projects that attempt to force ever larger production from sensitive environments by the use of technological power usually lead to ecological disruption.135 Insofar as states premise their security policies on these projects leading to societal development, then insecurity returns to haunt the search for security in terms of certainty, control, and order. This suggests that the masculine and Western metaphysical understandings of power in terms of domination of nature, which environmentalist discourse criticizes, and control over territorial states, which antigeopolitical thinking challenges, are not the appropriate ones for rethinking security. Much more needed are approaches that focus on caring and cooperation, recognition of mutual vulnerabilities, and the necessity to forge consensus and agreement in the face of mutual insecurity.136 But these approaches involve political input by grassroots groups and a democratization of both development and security that flies in the face of conventional state-organized versions of both.137 Needed, too, are ecological metaphors of security - seeing strength in diversity, conservation, interdependence, interconnectedness, and adaptation rather than imposed physical power. Likewise, the gender to reform states and shift from "resourcism" to ecological modes of society.138 Further still may be the necessity to distance philosophical

understanding of natural phenomena from purely instrumentalist perspectives, recognizing that ecological relationships are better grounded in a metaphysics of a "re-enchanted" nature.139 Ken Booth's ambitious attempt to rethink security for the 1990s reverses the theme of security as domination and force. He reinterprets security in terms of emancipation, meaning both political liberty and the economic capacity to render that liberty meaningful.140 He also distances security from the monopoly of states. Security is here understood as security primarily for citizens; in doing this, Booth strips away the central assumption that states do necessarily provide security. This point is crucial. Radically rethinking security inevitably has to deal with the role of states, because the conventional discourse of security is all about states as the providers of security. So long as security discourse remains intimately and uncritically entangled with state politics, the more innovative possibilities for rethinking human community in the aftermath of the Cold War and in the face of global ecological peril will be unnecessarily limited. Booth's suggestion for rethinking security in terms of emancipation is an interesting possibility precisely because it directly links a reformulated security with challenges to imposed and authoritarian power. To rethink security, then, is to insist on exposing the power relations involved, both in the practical operations of politics and the metaphysical underpinnings of modernist ontology. It involves challenging the use of security as ideology by asking, "security specifically for whom?" in the face of assurances of security for everyone. It must insist that ecological security is not about arranging resources to maintain the existing state system, a form of natural resources management writ large.141 Rather, alternative conceptions of security must focus on reforming the state system to ensure the survival of planetary ecology. International equity and the consequent reformulation of international economic arrangements are an essential part of a common security that can sustain the ecosystem.

Vote negative to use the ballot as an individual act of non-cooperation with the environmentally bankrupt actions of the plan. This move can disempower the securitizing hierarchies that hold environmental policy hostage. Carter, 4 (Alan, Department of Philosophy @ University of Colorado @ Boulder, “Some theoretical foundations for radical green politics,” Environmental Values, Vol. 13. No. 3, August, pp. 305-328, JSTOR)

Hence, if the state is empowered not only by its coercive forces but also to a large degree by the compliance of its people, then an increasing

perception that it is irrational to maintain that support could provide an answer to the environmentally hazardous dynamic. In other words, widespread individual non-cooperation with the state, undertaken as a response to

the growing need to take action against the increasingly threatening environmental crises the state seems to be

centrally implicated in , could conceivably disempower it. In short, the extent of the environmental problems that we appear to

face could provide the rationale and motivation for the disempowering of the state through non-cooperation. And this could begin to

undermine any environmentally hazardous dynamic we might currently be imprisoned within . In which case,

the disempowerment of the state by non-violent civil disobedience, and the correlative empowerment of those practising it, seems the most promising place to start undermining the environmentally hazardous dynamic. And 'the velvet revolutions' of Eastern Europe certainly suggest that widespread non-cooperation with the state can be an effective strategy for radical transformation.

Thesis CardsThesis/FYITrombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 586] NISH

Environmental security initially appeared to be a good idea, as it was ‘meant to alarm traditional security analysts about the issues that “really” matter’ (de Wilde 2001, 2) and to increase the relevance of environmental problems in the political agenda. Buzan emphasized that ‘[e]nvironmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend’ (1991, 19–20). Others welcomed the concept since it ‘plays down the values traditionally associated with the nation-state—identity, territoriality, sovereignty—and implies a different set of values associated with environmental change—ecology, globality, and governance’ (Dyer 2001, 68). Yet others argued that ‘environmental security ... is all about solidarity’ (Thompson 1999, 137). On analytical grounds, it seemed a way to provide a better account of new typologies of vulnerability as well

as the potential for conflict and violence with which these vulnerabilities could be associated. Opponents were quick to warn that the term ‘security’ evokes a set of confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should be kept apart from the environmental debate (Deudney 1990). Concerns included the possibilities of creating new competencies for the military—militarizing the environment rather than greening security (Ka¨ko¨nen 1994)—or the rise of nationalistic attitudes in order to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466–468). Deudney

argued that not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental problems, but security can also introduce a zero-sum rationality to the environmental debate that can create winners and losers, and undermine the cooperative efforts required by environmental problems. Similar objections came from a southern perspective:

environmental security was perceived as a discourse about the security of northern countries, their access to resources and the protection of their patterns of consumption (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). Although the debate waxed and waned, the concept slowly gained popularity. In April 2007 the security implications of climate change were discussed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council but the state representatives remained divided over the opportunity of considering climate change and, more generally, environmental degradation as a security issue (United Nations Security Council 2007). The

divide between those who oppose the use of the term environmental security by arguing that the logic of security is fixed and inflexible and those who support it by suggesting that the logic of security should be changed2 distracts

attention away from the question of whether practices associated with providing security have been transformed by environmental security discourses. In the literature there is a debate about whether and how security language transforms the method of dealing with an issue—the debate focuses ‘on the implications of using security

language for the definition and governance of migration and the environment’ (Huysmans 2006, 16)—but there is little on the reverse process or on the implications of using environmental language for the definition and governance of security.3 This article is an attempt to develop the latter type of analysis by exploring the meaning and function of environmental and climate security. The purpose is to consider how the use of a word in different contexts challenges and transforms the practices and meanings associated with it. It aims to explore ‘what the practices of definition and usage do to a concept, and what the concept in turndoesto the world into which it is inscribed’ (Bartelson 2000, 182). To undertake this analysis it is necessary to explore how different discourses about environmental and climate security have developed and ‘conditioned the possibility of thought and action’ (181).

Links

Environment ImpactsThe need to address environmental issues is the root cause of environmental securitized discourseTrombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 591-592] NISH

The emergence of global environmental problems, such as global warming and ozone depletion, resulted in one of the first attempts to securitize the environment on a global scale. The Brandt Report (1980)

suggested that ‘few threats to peace and survival of the human community are greater than those posed by the prospects of cumulative and irreversible degradation of the biosphere on which human life depends’ (quoted in Brauch 2003, 81). These new threats suggested the need to redefine the nature of security in an interdependent world facing new challenges. In the post-Cold War era, the environmental security discourse opened the window for debating a common approach to security affairs. For instance, at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988, Gorbachev stressed: ‘The relationship between man and the environment has become menacing . . . [t]he threat from the sky is no longer missiles but global warming’ (quoted in Norman Myers 1993, 11). He also promoted the creation of an Ecological Security Council.6 As a result of

these appeals to security, several initiatives were launched during the early post-Cold War era. Alarming concerns for the hole in the ozone layer transformed the problem into a threat to human health and promoted fairly successful agreements to deal with the issue at an international level. Concerns for climate change not only led to the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)7 to assess scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of human impact on climate change but also to the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio in 1992 (United Nations 1992). However, negotiations on climate change proved to be more problematic than those on the ozone because acting on climate change would require the transformation

of much of the existing economic structure and way of life. Hence climate change was marginalized in the environmental security discourse. Despite the initial momentum and the broad scope of environmental security discourses, the debate was captured by discussions about environmentally induced conflicts. This helped both to frame environmental threats in more familiar terms to national security experts and to consider the environment as a legitimate threat. The academic discussion was largely shaped by the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon and a series of well-funded research projects, which aimed to study the relationships between environmental degradation and violent conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994). Although Homer-Dixon was cautious in suggesting a straightforward connection between environmental degradation and conflict, his argument was

popularized by Kaplan’s article ‘The coming anarchy’ (1994), which drew a grim picture of a future of human misery, migrations and violent conflict, suggesting that the environment would be the ‘national-security issue of the early twenty-first century’ (58).

WarmingWarming impacts ensure maintenance of the climate for human survival rather than the security of the climate itself – it is used as a scare tactic to justify securitization. Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 595] NISH

Climate security suggests a concern for the security of the climate which is understood as the maintenance of stable climatic conditions as a prerequisite of all human enterprises, rather than the security of the climate itself. Climate security is evoked to secure people and societies that depend on it. As in the case of environmental security, climate security is about ‘the maintenance of achieved levels of civilization’ (Buzan et al 1998, 76). In this sense, as de Wilde (2008) highlights, climate security captures a paradox because it is the contemporary way of life that is causing environmental problems. Yet to maintain the existing way of life, it is necessary to change many present global structures. The dilemma then becomes one of whether the existing structures should be changed voluntarily or whether it is preferable to wait until ‘structural change will be enforced violently and randomly by environmental crises’ (595). The problem is even more pressing because action on climate change requires long-term measures: power plants that are built today would last for decades and innovation in the transport system takes time. This touches the core of the problem and identifies two contrasting approaches to security provisions. The first—the reliance on emergency measures—suggests that it is impossible to be prepared for all potential threats and it is preferable to deal with emergencies as they occur; the second—the development of preventive ones—warns of potential catastrophic impacts. In this sense securitization is about moving from one position to the other. This transformation is evident in the debate on the kind of threats that are posed by climate change and in its recent transformation.

Warming impacts operate through the lens of securitization.Diez and Grauvogel 11(Thomas Diez is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Institute for Political Science, University of Tübingen, Julia Grauvogel- Since 2012: Research Fellow at GIGA Institute of African Affairs in the research project "Ineffective Sanctions?: External Sanctions and the Persistence of Autocratic Regimes" funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation 2010 - 2011: Research Assistant at the Chair of Political Science and International Relations, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen 2008 - 2011: Internship experiences include the Committee for Economic Cooperation and Development of the German Parliament, Berlin (2008) and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (2011) Education: Bachelor of Arts "International Relations" at Dresden University of Technology; Master of Science "Peace Research and International Politics" at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen Scholarship holder of the Evangelischen Studienwerks Villigst e. V. (2008 - 2011), The Securitisation of Climate Change – Actors, Processes, Consequences, Univeristat Tubingen, page 5 July 2011)

The link between climate change and conflict is not confined to the academic literature, but is also reflected in the political debate. U nited N ations Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon underlined that global warming is likely to “become a major driver for war and conflict” (UN News Centre 2007). On 17 April 2007 the UN Security Council held its first ever session on climate change. The United Kingdom had initiated the debate to discuss the security implications of global warming, suggesting in a background paper that climate change has the potential to threaten international peace

and security by exacerbating border disputes, resource shortages, migration and humanitarian crisis (UN

Security Council 2007a). During the debate, Margaret Beckett, the then British Foreign Secretary, suggested that global warming influences the states’ collective security (UN Security Council 2007b). This characterisation of climate change at the international level has not remained unchallenged. Not global warming itself, but the “economic model which drives growth, and the profligate consumption in rich nations that goes with it” is

identified as the true threat by the United National Development Program in the 2007/2008 report Fighting Climate Change (UNDP 2007/2008: 15). There were also attempts to securitise climate change on the regional and national level . In the US, a study by an influential group of retired US generals entitled National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (CAN 2007) was inter alia referred to possibility that extremists could exploit unstable conditions created by climate change. Two US Governments reports point into the same direction, suggesting “while climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world” (US

Government 2010a, cp. also US Government 2010b). The European Commission describes climate change more cautiously as a threat multiplier (European Commission 2008). Think tanks and NGOs are important actors in this debate. A study by International Alert published in 2007 (Smith and Vivekanada 2007) compiles a list of 46 countries that face a high risk of violent conflict as a consequence of climate change. However, the study

does not provide convincing evidence for the figures cited – a weakness it shares with a study by the Global Humanitarian Forum (2009) claiming that climate change is already killing 300,000 people annually. Moreover, advisory bodies installed by governments also shaped the debate on climate change. Another important study was An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security (Schwartz and Randall 2003), which assesses the

implications of a climate-induced collapse of the Gulf Stream. The Stern Review (2006), which focuses on the economic consequences on climate change but also considers its security implications in that context, and the report on Climate Change as a Security Risk by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale

Umweltfragen, WBGU) have been highly influential reports. The possible link between global warming and conflicts has renewed the interest in the environmental security debate . Nevertheless, a systematic account of these diverse securitising moves

is missing. Trombetta (2008) considers the emerging discourse on climate security as an example of how the securitisation of non-traditional sectors may transform security practices. Brauch (2008) notes that climate change has increasingly been regarded as an urgent political issue and has gradually been securitised in the 21st century. He distinguishes between human, national and international security concerns discussed in relation to climate change but merely illustrates these with examples (Brauch 2002). Scott (2008) focuses on the legal implication of securitising climate change but does not specifically address security issues in that context. Herbeck and Flitner (2010) provide a short review on the discussion on potential security implications without engaging in a systematic analysis of different actors and discursive frames.

Apocalyptic RhetoricApocalypse allows violence disguised as security.Coviello 2k (Peter, Queer Frontiers, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of Africana Studies – Bowdoin College, p. 40-41)

But to claim that American culture is at present decisively post-nuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I

began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the post-

nuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion , threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished " general population :' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now

On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because , as an element in a vast economy of power , it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-

through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and

through the bodies of a particular population . No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of

his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive , less life-

threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;'

however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern powe r must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means . For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone :' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of

modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population :'8 For a state that would arm

itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life , the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Impacts

War/ConflictSecuritizing the environment spills over to militarization that causes war. Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 599] NISH

The possibility of transforming into a threat something that has not yet materialized and allowing it to bring about the practices suggested by the Copenhagen School in the case of securitization presents a grim perspective. The possible adoption of a precautionary approach to security issues has been criticized on the grounds that it can justify preventive military actions, extensive surveillance measures, the inversion of the burden of proof or actions decided on the worst case scenario (Aradau and van Munster 2007).

In the case of the environment, it is possible that the securitization of climate change would result in confrontational politics, with states adopting politics to protect their territory against sea-level rising and immigration; with the Security Council adopting resolutions to impose emission targets, and even military action against polluting factories; and surveillance systems to monitor individual emissions. This possibility, however, depends on taking for granted a security logic based on enemies and extraordinary measures . What is at stake in the climate security discourse is the possibility of introducing mechanisms to prevent emergencies within a system that tends to rely, on the one hand, on governing through emergencies and, on the other hand, on insurance and

compensation. The securitization of climate is an attempt to evoke the symbolic power of an environmental discourse based on interdepen- dence and prevention to establish a framework for security and energy governance at the global level. It is about renegotiating the spaces in which risk management and

market mechanisms prevail, and those in which intervention and regulations are legitimated. Securitization remains a very political moment. Its implications largely depend on what is securitized and what means are employed to provide security.

Environmental securitization leads to global violence and war.Dabelko, Lonergan, and Matthew 2k (Geoffrey Dabelko, Director, Environmental Change and Security Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, USA; Dr. Steve Lonergan, Department of Geography, University of Victoria, Canada; Dr. Richard Matthew, School of Social Ecology, University of California at Irvine, USA; “State-of-the-Art Review of Environment, Security, and Development Co-operation”, p.9, February 2000, RJ)

Security is being linked to environmental change. There is growing consensus that environmental degradation can , and does, trigger, amplify or cause conflict and instability, and a growing concern that environmentally-induced conflict might increase. Today, security institutions are being called upon to protect access to environmental resources in other countries as well as in the global commons, and to provide support for humanitarian operations, many of

which have significant environmental roots. In the future, force may be used in response to transboundary pollution, or to enforce international environmental law. But security specialists recognise that conflict can be a constructive force, signalling the need for institutional change or capacity building. The pressures placed on institutions by environmental

degradation and resource scarcity might be just such a signal. And, in an era of highly destructive weaponry, most would prefer that force be used as a last resort, and that all possible efforts be made to bolster and adapt institutions so that they are able to manage conflict effectively, before it escalates to widespread violence and war. In many cases, reducing poverty, strengthening the state and civil society, and promoting human rights will do more to enhance security and help countries adapt to changing environmental conditions than applying force will achieve. These are objectives clearly enunciated in the DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and shared by a growing number of security specialists.

Forming environmental concerns as a national security threat leads to a loss of soft power and global war.Deudeny 99 (Daniel Deudney Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, “Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics” Chapter 8, pp.75-76; State University of the New York press Albany, Apr 23, 1999, RJ)

Many are attracted to conceptualizing environmental concerns as a national security threat because they anticipate that environmental scarcities and change will stimulate conflict, violence, and interstate war. States often fight over what they value, particularly if related to security. If states begin to be much more concerned with resource and environmental degradation, particularly if they think environmental decay is a threat to their national security, then states may wage wars over resources and pollution. Much of the recent literature on the impacts of climate change upon world politics predicts conflict and violence.37 As Arthur Westing has asserted: "Global deficiencies and degradation of natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, coupled with the uneven distribution of these raw materials, can lead to unlikely-and thus unstable-alliances, to national rivalries, and, of course, to war."38 In emphasizing such outcomes, environmental security analysts join realist international relations theorists in characterizing international political life as particularly prone to conflict and violence. To analyze fully the prospects for violent outcomes is a vast and uncertain undertaking.39 Because there are nearly two hundred independent states, and because resource and environmental problems are diverse and not fully understood, generalizations are hazardous and are likely to have important exceptions. To assess the prospects for resource and pollution wars, I will first make several general points about the methodological weaknesses of recent studies on environmental conflict, consider several overall features of contemporary world politics that make such conflict unlikely, and then examine more closely the six major scenarios for environmental conflict most discussed by environmental security analysts.

Policy FailureSecuritizing the environment promotes realist notions of sovereignty that must be rejected to solve ecological disaster.Dalby, 92 (Simon, Department of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter, pp. 95-134, JSTOR)

To a large extent, those who currently benefit from the existing modes of development and political order are those least likely to take environmental arguments seriously or to wish to initiate dramatic changes.109 They are also those most likely to construct political arguments in terms of environmentalists as a security threat when suggestions of limitation on resource uses or wasteful lifestyles are advocated.110 And to a large extent they are those capable of using military force to maintain the status quo. In the case of the Sudan, clearly the state has been used by the rich and powerful to suppress the poor, whose plight is aggravated by the industrial agriculture "development" model that has dispossessed many people of the means of their livelihood.111 Here, as Matthias Finger argues, military action puts the preservation of the state above any concerns for environmental stability or even the survival of large numbers of the state's population.112 There is also the danger of "them" and "us" geopolitical understandings reimposing themselves to suggest that underdeveloped states are a threat to the developed world due to their restrictions on supplies of resources or their lack of environmental policies demanded by the developed states.113 The environmentalist discourse challenges the most basic political values of contemporary Western capitalism: the assumptions of resources in nature as available for exploitation, ever-enlarging consumption, and that affluence is intrinsically superior to any other forms of society, as well as faith in "the market" Environmental issues are also not easily amenable to the standard political processes of Western states. They cannot be dealt with easily by either the logic of realpolitik or linear thinking dealing with issues singly or in the short term. Environmental politics involves dealing with matters in all their synergistic complexity.114 It also requires thinking and operating in longer time spans than conventional political arrangements usually accommodate.115 At the forefront of the struggle for new understandings of security are the critical social movements, often focused on local issues but sensitive to the wider connections of their activities. They also raise fundamentally important issues concerning the possibilities of reimagining political community and revisioning world politics in ways that promote themes of a just world peace and hence reinterpret security in ways that do not allow for the easy articulation of geopolitical themes.116 Increasingly nongovernmental organizations are acting in ways that transcend the boundaries of blocs and states, working to promote international collaboration and cooperation irrespective of state policies. The peace movement suggests the possibility that initiatives for security will also gradually slip from states.117 This is not to argue that states are redundant or that they are about to wither away. However, it does suggest that the creative energy for reformulating security comes from outside the entrenched bureaucratic structures of states with their primary objective of self-preservation. It also clearly shows that security is no longer the singular preserve of the security intellectuals and analysts. With the notable exception of times when hostilities are actually occurring or immediately imminent, their political domination of these matters is increasingly challenged. Separating security from state security opens up space for constructive interactions between peoples across boundaries, eroding the possibilities of constructing security in terms of exclusionist identity.118 The emergence of a global civic

culture with its multiplicity of nongovernmental organizations and transboundary contacts suggests the possibilities of enlarging informal decisionmaking.119 International environmental groups often operate this way, as do "development" organizations.120 Ecological threats are no respecter of political boundaries, as the old epithet has it. They require solutions that transcend boundaries in many cases, and yet many have locally based origins that are amenable to local interventions. International cooperation is the order of the day in environmental politics. This, in turn, has led to further questioning of the basis of state sovereignty and the recognition that sovereignty is not necessarily easily related to security nor to geographically defined political communities.121 Pat Mische has gone so far as to call for a complete rejection of sovereignty based on narrowly considered human claims to control over parts of the Earth, and called for basing sovereignty on ecological principles.122 This is interesting - not least for its explicit rejection of the assumption that political community, Western style, is the ultimate value. This decenters the discourse of sovereignty but, without answering them, raises all the questions of who determines ecological carrying capacity and how decisions are taken in the absence of sovereign states.

Military securitization stops us from actually helping the environment Jakarta 10 [Mu'adz D'Fahmi- graduate student at the School of International Affairs, Australian National University, Securitization of environmental Degradation, The Jakarta Post, 1-25-2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/25/securitization-environmental-degradation.html]-DaveD.

The consequences of environmental degradation may increase state expenses to provide public services, such as education and public infrastructures, including water resources, as well as decreasing national revenue. ¶ And, laxity in food resources and dwelling-places due to environmental crises could increase migration. ¶ However, environmental degradation will not pose human insecurity in isolation from other important social factors — it does not trigger violent conflict, but rather affects the parameters that are sometimes important in generating conflict.¶ The other key issue in the securitization of environmental degradation is its implications. There is an opinion the securitization of environmental degradation is disadvantageous. The purpose of environmental security is primarily to reveal the insufficiency of militarized practices of security and ultimately to trade-off the first for the latter. ¶ Nevertheless, the result is not

as expected. Environmental degradation has been militarized and the focus has been altered . Instead of being perceived as an issue of human insecurity, environmental deterioration is treated as a cause of violent conflict that needs a military solution.

Accordingly, the securitization of environmental destruction poses the risk of making it militarized.¶

MilitarismEnvironmental securitization builds the military industrial complex.Dalby, 92 (Simon, Department of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter, pp. 95-134, JSTOR)

Many recent writings, both from environmentalists and in the more conventional policy and academic literature, have suggested

the necessity of extending the conventional understandings of the concept of security to include matters of economics,

resources, and even broader ecological factors.85 These themes are not new - they were clearly articulated in the United States in

the 1970s in response to the first oil crisis.86 Resource issues are often linked easily to security issues in terms of the question of access to them internationally.87 The very survival of the United States and, to a lesser extent, all industrial economies, depends on

the availability of both renewable and nonrenewable resources. But many writers who have attempted to enlarge the concept of

national security are still caught largely in the ambit of realist considerations of the national security of single states, and

their discourse operates to perpetuate existing political arrangements. Sorenson's recent argument in the journal Foreign Affairs is an attempt to invoke economics and ecology as a national emergency to justify developing a national industrial policy which has so far been precluded by US ideological predilections for government noninterference in the economy.88 But tying this theme to national security has the advantage, in the US polity, of legitimating government involvement in the normally sacrosanct private sector. As has long been

noted, US military investment has functioned as a surrogate for industrial planning in a political climate where such things could be justified only in terms of providing for national security .89 Here security links to matters of geopolitics in terms of the increasing percentage of industrial activity involved in international trade and the availability of raw

materials from underdeveloped countries. The argument can be further extended to link security with the maintenance of a defense industry within the bounds of a state in the face of globalization of industrial production.9

Impact Framing

DepoliticizationApplying the logic of security to the environment depoliticizes ecology. Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 588] NISH

This logic is borrowed from the Schmittian understanding of the political.5 For Carl Schmitt (1996 [1932], 37) the political is about the friend-

enemy distinction and successfully evoking security brings about that distinction. The logic of security is the logic of war; this suggests an extreme form of antagonism and a zero-sum understanding of security. With the codification and institutionalization of a national security discourse this rationality has been narrowed down to a specific context. Attempts to broaden the security agenda result in the spreading of this rationality to other contexts from which it had been excluded (Buzan and Waever 1998). The Copenhagen School warns about the risk of securitization and distinguishes between securitization—‘meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’—and politicization—‘meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations’ (Buzan et al 1998, 23–24). The School warns that ‘when considering securitizing moves such as “environmental security” ... one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization’ (29) and Waever’s normative suggestion

is: ‘less security, more politics!’ (Waever 1995, 56). In the case of the environment this suggestion is problematic. It can lead to the depoliticization and marginalization of urgent and serious issues, while leaving the practices associated with security unchallenged. Many appeals to environmental security have been made not only with the intent of prioritizing issues but also with that of transforming the logic of security and the practices associated with it.

Value to LifeThe logic proposed by security destroys VTLDillon 96 (Michael, Politics of Security, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, p. 26) KD

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species ; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount

to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of

constructing that oplitical arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to require. Yet,

the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom , inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the dehumanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability

itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further – the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found its paradigmatic expression for example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up

to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. The logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse- even if the details have changed.

Alternative

Risk ManagementThe alt is to reject securitized discourse, and embrace risk management Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 589-590] NISH

The emergence of new threats such as environmental problems has suggested that reactive measures and an antagonist understanding of security are not the best ways to deal with these issues . Instead preventive measures appear to be more effective and new means are required. In this context, the growing awareness of the complexity and uncertainty of contemporary threats has suggested to some scholars and policy makers the use of the concept of risk to conceptualize contemporary security dynamics. Themes like risk management and preventive approaches have become more relevant in security discussions. In this context, Beck’s analysis of risk society has been used as ‘a means to conceptualise and

understand the transformation of Western security policies’ (Rasmussen 2001, 285). Beck’s analysis of risk society, which has been

largely inspired by his analysis of environmental problems and ecological catastrophes, suggests that what he defines as ‘risk society’ is characterized by a greater number of risks ( such as those produced by more complex and dangerous technologies) with new characteristics. Contemporary risks are unbounded and potentially catastrophic. They may affect parts of the globe distant from the place where they originated. For example, nuclear, chemical and genetic technologies have the potential to bring destruction

on such a large scale that no remedial action or insurance can be appropriate to compensate for them. The security dream of first modernity was based on the scientific utopia of making the unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions ever more controllable; accidents could occur, as long as and because they were considered as compensable. (Beck 2006, 334) In a risk society instead ‘the logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by the principle of precaution through prevention’ (334). According to

Beck, a risk society undermines the credibility of institutions and practices dedicated to security provision. First, Beck suggests that it is impossible to disentangle oneself from a web of risk. Contemporary risks affect everybody and it is impossible to create barriers and distance oneself from them—the enemy. For the Copenhagen School security is about the inscription of enemies and the logic of war. On the other hand, Beck

points out that ‘[t]he concept of “enemy” is the strongest possible antithesis to the concept of security’ since ‘enemy stereotypes empower’ as they create ‘the relationships and the behavioural logic of attack and defence, pro and contra, which first kill the question and then the people’ (1997, 82). Second, Beck challenges the very possibility of having a security logic based on evoking and governing through emergencies. Beck is suggesting that contemporary threats are beyond insurability and ‘[m]aybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of

emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them’ (Agamben 2002, 24). The first consideration targets the antagonistic understanding of security described by the Copenhagen School, whereas the second challenges the neoliberal discourse of risk. This discourse relies on more sophisticated techniques to try to insure even catastrophic risk by shifting it to the capital market. In the case of the environment this discourse is problematic because it can also paradoxically contribute ‘to continually generate the condition of emergent

catastrophe, in order to profit from it’ (Cooper 2004, 8). Risk society challenges the logic of violence, antagonism and war suggested by securitization. This suggests a set of security practices—based on risk manage- ment and on prevention—which are rather different from those suggested by the Copenhagen School. Are appeals to security stuck in fixed problematic practices that the latter suggests? This article claims that through the securitization of nontraditional sectors like the environment, different logics of security can be brought into being. Securitization—broadly understood as the social construction of an issue as a security issue—can be considered as a reflexive process that is not only ‘rule-directed’ but also ‘rule altering’ (Beck 1997, 134). Securitization is not about applying

a fixed meaning of security as exceptionality that inscribes enemies in a context. Rather, it is ‘an always (situated and iterative) process of

generating meaning’ (Stritzel 2007, 366). By securitizing nontraditional issues, the incongruence of a specific logic of security appears while different practices are applied. In this framework, the construction of both threats and rules by which security is carried out are open to a process of social construction and transformation. The following sections explore this process, analysing the development of environmental security and climate security discourses.

2NC

AT: Perm

FailsYou can’t green security discourse – complete change is key. Dalby, 92 (Simon, Department of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter, pp. 95-134, JSTOR)

Suggestions such as Sorensen's to extend US national security thinking to encompass economic security are vulnerable to this kind of critique. They perpetuate the system of global disparities and keep the growing populations of poor people in conditions of anything but security. A political strategy to transform the current patterns of resource exploitation and the structural violence that goes with the contemporary forms of development must be part of a discussion of alternative formulations of security. Security for many requires a transformation of international economic structures. Yet this is precisely the kind of transformation resisted by conventional Western uses of the term security, when it is used to ensure the Western model of development and the continued uninterrupted flow of resources and access to international markets. The contradictions in the use of the term are clear and persistent. Any political strategy using the term security will need to be cautious, given the potential for cooptation and the difficulties inherent in using a term that is widely used with decidedly unprogressive overtones. Simply tacking on "ecological" or "common" or "sustainable" may not be enough to shift the focus away from neorealist assumptions and the practices of security as imposed force. Neither, as R. B. J. Walker argues, is a global polity as yet easy to conceptualize in political terms whatever the hopes of the prophets of "biosphere politics."149 Reformulating security drastically, as Booth's "emancipation" ideas suggest, requires a complete change of the discourse on international security - a political project of very large scope indeed, albeit one that could draw on popular common sense meanings of the term security to subvert the institutionalized definitions.

CooptedA constant criticism of security is vital. The perm gets coopted. Vote to acknowledge the environmental security dilemma. Dalby, 92 (Simon, Department of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter, pp. 95-134, JSTOR)

By way of a conclusion, this article offers a modest proposal: a loose rhetorical and conceptual strategy that straddles these difficulties without greatly oversimplifying the issues discussed at length above. Many of these political difficulties with the environmental security discourse can be incorporated in a formulation of the environment and security problematic in terms of an environmental security dilemma or dilemmas. Just as the attempt to attain national security by unilateral military preparation is thwarted by actions of other states, so does global economic "development" to provide material plenty for all, premised on the ever- expanding use of resources, run into its limits as environmental despoliation undercuts the viability of such an economy. Because of the recognized dangers of continued military confrontation, states are increasingly looking to common security frameworks and international cooperation. Likewise, attempts to sustain the existing patterns of state use of resources, even by intensifying the resource management approach to environmental issues, are becoming constrained by numerous ecological limits. All this points to the necessity to focus attention on changing the type of society away from a "growth" mentality and toward an ecological ethic emphasizing sustainability. Like the necessity of moving away from realist models in international politics, the environmental crisis suggests the necessity of moving away from resource consumption models of "development." These analogies are not perfect; neither are they intended as exact models for transferring the security debate neatly from one sphere to another. They simply emphasize the similarities and the limits of the metaphysics of domination in both spheres. But if they are at all useful it is in framing security in terms of political choices rather than in terms of a preset diagnosis and consequent (centralized, technological) remedy. They are also useful in that they suggest that new policies are needed and new political actors are important. The focus on environmental security dilemmas also maintains the critical interrogative edge to security discourse, refusing to allow its meaning to be appropriated or steadily fixed as was so often the case with the Cold War discourse on security. By leaving the discourse in this form, the closures of the binary metaphysics and the geopolitical discourses that result from these patterns of reasoning are also put into question. Dilemmas refer to hard choices and ongoing difficulties rather than to simple solutions. Hence, the crucial political question of "whose security?" remains in circulation constantly, allowing the interrogation of concepts that effect a closure in favor of the status quo. Dilemmas suggest the perpetuation of difficulty and uncertainty, rather than the assumption that there is a finite solution to a security problem. This may not be a very elegant solution to the political difficulties posed by the environmental security problematic. The phrase "environmental security dilemma" is clumsy, and its meaning is not immediately self-evident. This may limit its popularization. But neither is it vulnerable to easy cooptation. The nexus of issues called into debate by the juxtaposition of security and environment is not easy to encapsulate either, so the term also reflects that political difficulty. The politics of the end of the Cold War are very clearly visible in these debates over the term "security." Precisely because security is a contested term, its meaning is stretched to encompass competing political agendas. This is

the case both in policy discussions and in more academic treatments. Security is both a term of Cold War discourse and a term that environmentalists and others would reformulate to shift political agendas. Security must now be constantly interrogated to reveal exactly who or what political order is being rendered secure. Security can no longer be so easily taken for granted as was the case at the height of the Cold War. Its ambiguities and contested nature are now unmistakable and unavoidable. The neorealists can no longer contain its multiple meanings in their modernist schemes. Perhaps some comfort can be taken in this situation; the world has changed, and so has the language of international politics. But the threats to humanity's future continue to loom large; this is no time for conceptual confusion, nor simple solutions imposed by states or international technocratic fiat on the part of those who wish to tackle the planet's pressing problems. Keeping the security question open by phrasing it in terms of dilemmas offers an avenue to maintain a critical yet engaged stance in the coming debates.

State DAEngagement with the state ensures dominant power hierarchies. Carter, 4 (Alan, Department of Philosophy @ University of Colorado @ Boulder, “Some theoretical foundations for radical green politics,” Environmental Values, Vol. 13. No. 3, August, pp. 305-328, JSTOR)

But this opens up the possibility of a new way of theorising epochal transitions. Put in the briefest terms, states (political institutions) will tend to select those economic relations which best develop the productive forces (principally technology), for the

development of the productive forces is functional for the further development of the state's military capacity. Given the key explanatory role played by the state in such a theory, an appropriate name for it is 'the State-Primacy Theory'. To flesh out the theory in a little more detail, we might claim that those in control of a society's political relations (leading state actors)22 select for stabilisation those economic relations that best develop the society's productive forces (which are, of course, economic forces), for that is functional for the development of

the society's political forces (which constitute its 'defensive' capacity). Those in control of the political relations seem to have an interest in so acting, for it is how they are able to retain power. But those who are so located within the structure of economic relations that they are in direct control of the society's productive forces (the dominant economic class) clearly have an interest in supporting the state when it stabilises the economic relations which they, in particular, benefit from. In a word, individual members of the dominant economic class have an interest in sup- porting the state when it stabilises the economic relations that enable them to enrich themselves.

Moreover, those agents within the society's political forces (principally the military and the police) who operate its means of coercion (for example, its weaponry) would appear to have an interest in supporting those in control of the

society's political relations in so far as the latter manage the extraction of wealth from the economy (usually through

taxation). For it is precisely this extracted wealth which finances the political forces (in other words, which pays the wages of, for

example, military personnel and which funds the development of their weaponry). And it is these political forces which can be employed to stabilise the economic relations which are selected because they are functional for the state. (The State-Primacy Theory is represented diagrammatically in Figure l.)23

State reform causes a militaristic coup – radical change is the only way to solve.Carter, 4 (Alan, Department of Philosophy @ University of Colorado @ Boulder, “Some theoretical foundations for radical green politics,” Environmental Values, Vol. 13. No. 3, August, pp. 305-328, JSTOR)

Clearly, at the very least, some feature of the dynamic would need to be transformed. The dynamic as described comprises four key elements:

the political relations, the political forces, the economic forces, and the economic relations. Consider a change within the political relations. It might be thought that all that would be required in order to escape from an environmentally hazardous dynamic would be a change of government - from one which is prepared to stabilise an environmentally destructive economy to one which isn't. Indeed,

many of those who consider themselves green political theorists seem to think that governmental change would be adequate for dealing with any environmental crisis. But if a government, in order to reduce significantly its society's

environmental impact, chose no longer to stabilise the most productive of economies, it would be threatening the budget of its

political forces. Indeed, it would be so threatening the interests of its military that it would risk facing a military coup.24 But a military coup would most likely put an end to all such environmental policies. Furthermore, the heightened

role of any state's military would surely present an increased threat to neighbouring states. And the most likely outcome would be a perceived need on their part to increase their military expenditure, thus leading to an acceleration of the environmentally hazardous dynamic. To be certain of avoiding any such eventuality, it would seem that even a genuinely environmentally-aware government would need to placate its military. But that would involve its remaining firmly within the dynamic. In short,

merely changing the government would appear to be a singularly ineffective strategy.

Discourse Matters

Discourse = FluidSecuritization is fluid – the context of the 1AC defines its threat construction. Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 599- 600] NISH

The recognition and constitution of a problem as a threat implies the identification of the political community that deserves protection, the legitimization of the means to provide security and eventually their institutionalization . Some of these aspects are more settled and consolidated than others, as are the different

logics of security, such as the antagonistic, emergency-based one evoked by the Copenhagen School. These developed because,

within a particular context, they were the most effective response against a specific representation of threats.

This, however, does not mean that they are not open to negotiation when challenged by a new environment and threats. Climate change poses threats that are largely uncertain, diffuse, difficult to quantify and yet potentially catastrophic. This reflects the logic of a risk society portrayed by Beck. This article has explored how the practices associated with security are challenged by the attempts to transform environmental crises and climate change into a security issue, and has shown how appeals to security have emphasized the relevance of preventive, nonconfrontational measures and the importance of other actors than states in providing security. A potentially nonessentialist approach like securitization, which focuses on the social process that specifies

threats, can be relevant in studying how various environmental issues gain priority and mobilize social action. However, the Copenhagen School identifies the ‘securityness’ of security with a specific logic determined by the realist tradition. In this way the School has imposed a problematic fixity that tends to essentialize an historical- and sector-specific understanding of security and

the practices legitimized by it. Even if this logic is still relevant, the analysis of environmental security discourses and the securitization of climate change have shown that transforming an issue like climate change into a security issue is not about applying a fixed meaning of security and the practices associated with it. Rather, it is a reflexive and contextualized process that generates meanings and practices.

AT: Policy Focus GoodPolicy-focus crowds out critical questioning – causes serial policy failureBiswas 7 [Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 12-1-2007, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/36/1/117.full.pdf]-DaveD

The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’ , he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘ impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power . 17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold

War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of

ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised . In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘ intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions , that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

AT: War

NO Env. Conflicts/WarTheir conflict studies are based on flawed methodology. Environmental decline would encourage cooperation.Deudeny 99 (Daniel Deudney Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, “Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics” Chapter 8, pp.75-76; State University of the New York press Albany, Apr 23, 1999, RJ)

In general I argue that studies on environmental conflict are deeply flawed in their methodology , that important features of world politics make interstate violence and war much less likely than environmental security analysts suggest, and that these doubts are supported by a balanced consideration of the most frequently discussed scenarios. Most of the recent works on environmental conflict and violent change suffer from important methodological problems which cast serious doubt on their disturbing conclusions. Many studies on environmental conflict purport to have found trends in the frequency with which environmental scarcities produce conflict. However, it is only possible to find a trend after comparing the historical frequency of conflict against the possible cases of

environmental scarcities, making a similar calculation for the present, and then comparing past with present frequency. Unfortunately, most studies on environmental conflict and change do not make historical assessments, and even more alarmingly, fail to consider or even profile the entire set of contemporary cases of environmental scarcity and change to ascertain how many of them have resulted in violent conflict. A second methodological problem is that analysts of environmental conflict do not systematically consider the ways in which environmental scarcity or change can stimulate cooperation. This lacuna is particularly glaring because analysts typically advocate more cooperation as a response to the scarcities and changes they identify or foresee. Many studies also do not control for other sources of conduct. Another major limitation of most studies on environmental conflict is that they rarely consider the character of the overall international system in assessing the prospects for conflict and violence. Of course, it is impossible to analyze everything at once, but conclusions about conflictual outcomes are premature until the main features of the world political system are factored in. The frequency with which environmental scarcity and conflict will produce violent conflict, particularly interstate wars, is profoundly shaped by six features of contemporary world politics: (1) the prevalance of capitalism and the extent of international trade; (2) the existence of numerous functional international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and epistemic communities; (3) highly developed state-system institutions; and (4) the existence of nuclear weapons; (5) the widespread diffusion of conventional weaponry; and (6) the influence of a hegemonic coalition of liberal constitutional democracies. These deeply rooted material and institutional features of the contemporary world order greatly reduce the likelihood that environmental scarcities and change will lead to interstate violence (see figure 8.1).

Claims that environmental security is necessary to manage conflicts are lies built by the military industrial complex.Deudeny and Matthews 99 (Daniel Deudney Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, Richard A. Matthews Professor of Planning, Policy & Design and Political Science, Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics (chapter 8), State University of the New York press Albany, Apr 23, 1999, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/political_science/shared/political_science/1857/Deudney.pdf, A.G)

Because the institutions and ideologies of nation-state and interstate conflict are so hegemonic in both world politics and

international relations theory, and because violence has historically occurred over competition for environmental scarcities there is a natural tendency for people to think about environmental problems in terms of national security. Initial moves to connect security and national security with environmental issues were made by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch

Institute in 1977.2 More broadly, Richard Ullman pro- posed "redefining security" to encompass a wide array of threats, ranging from earthquakes to environmental degradation . Arthur Westing pointed to the destruction of the

environment caused by war and hypothesized that interstate war and other forms of violence would result from resource scarcity and environmental degradation.

Patricia Mische proposed to "re-conceptualize sovereignty" in order to focus on "ecological security ."5 Most of the pioneering conceptual work on environmental security was done by advocates of greater environmental awareness. Such concepts were advanced to prevent an excessive focus on military threats during the renewed Cold War tensions and heightened "national security" concerns of the late 1970s and early 1980s. They also were extrapolations from the fears of re- source wars that had been widely discussed in the wake of the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, the formation of commodity cartels, and rapid price rises of oil and other earth minerals during the 1970s.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s environmental security became a broad movement, had generated an empirical research agenda, and had begun to shape policy. Numerous environmental advocates, including (but not limited to) Michael Renner, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Norman Myers, and Gwyn Prins, wrote in favor of redefining national security to encompass resource and environmental threats. @ Due to the interest and support of several major foundations in the United States, numerous conferences were held, and large numbers of researchers began addressing issues of environmental security. A major research effort, headed by Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto and partially sponsored by the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, has explored more systematically the links between environmental degradation, renewable

resource scarcity, and violent conflict. As the Cold War waned in the the late 1980s, environmental security began to attract the interest and support of many associated with military organizations who saw environmental missions as a means to maintain financial support and organizational significance. Others saw environmental deterioration, particularly in Third World countries, as part of an ominous new threat to Western interests and world order. This new security fear was catalyzed by Robert Kaplan's horrific travelogue, "The Coming Anarchy," and his widely cited conclusion that "the environment is the national security issue of the 21st century. With apocalyptic speculations of about chaos in the Third World, environmental

security became a contender in the United States' effort to formulate a new post-Cold War foreign policy. The U.S. Congress established and funded several environmental security initiatives to begin addressing military sources of environmental degradation, and the U.S. Department of Defense launched several environmental security initiatives and organizational changes Initially the environmental security paradigm and agenda seemed straightforward and noncontroversial. But in the early 1990s, a range of objections and doubts were raised by this author, 1° Mattias F'inger,

Simon Dalby, Ken Conca, and Marc Levy,ll all of whom are strongly sympathetic to environmental concerns. Since these debates were &st joined, extensive research has been undertaken, and heated debates about environmental security have occurred in many policy and academic fora.* this chapter revisits, refines, and extends the arguments against the environmental security

paradigm and program. Overall, skepticism is not only still warranted, but confirmed and strengthened. Specifically, I make three claims. First, it is analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat because the traditional focus of national security- interstate violence has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions. Second, the effort to harness the emotive power of nationalism to help mobilize environmental awareness and action may prove counterproductive by undermining globalist political sensibility. And third, environmental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate wars.

AT: We Mobilize

Fails & => WarPerceiving the environment as a security problem leads to international war and fails to mobilize the public. Deudeny 99 (Daniel Deudney Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, Richard A. Matthews Professor of Planning, Policy & Design and Political Science, “Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics” Chapter 8, pp.75-76; State University of the New York press Albany, Apr 23, 1999, RJ)

This motivational strategy is neither original nor unique to the environmental cause. The effort to establish what William James called a "moral equivalent to war" has long been the goal of social reformers. But channeling the energies behind war into constructive directions by this kind of rhetorical linkage has not been particularly successful. In the United States this kind of strategy has been widely tried, as political leaders and their speech writers have launched a War

on Poverty," a War on Crime," and a War on Drugs." But these social problems-like the environment have little in common with the pursuit of national security from violence, and they have proven deeply intractable. As

Ken Conca and others have observed, the discourse of national security has a set of powerful associations that cannot simply be redirected . 22 An even more serious problem with this motivational strategy is that it might have adverse side-effects to the extent that it is effective. Enhanced concern for the environment because it is perceived as a security problem might alter environmental politics in very negative ways. National security claims are politically potent because they have been connected to state institutions, national identities, and international war. It is improbable that these potent forces can be tapped for environmental efforts without bringing into environmental politics the conflictual, parochial, and zero-sum assumptions, norms, practices, and institutions that currently predominate in the domain of national security In short, there is a danger, as Jyrki Kakonen puts it, of inadvertently producing a "militarized environment" rather than "green security”.23

Scare Tactics FailEngaging in this kind of rhetoric deters solutionsNordhaus and Shellenberger 4/8 (Ted Nordhaus is the chairman and Michael Shellenberger is the president of The Breakthrough Institute, an environmental research organization. “Global Warming Scare Tactics”. New York Times. April 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/opinion/global-warming-scare-tactics.html. Nyy)

IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than the forthcoming nine-part series on climate change and natural disasters, starting this Sunday on Showtime. A trailer for “Years of Living Dangerously” is terrifying, replete with images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods. “I don’t think scary is the right word,” intones one voice. “Dangerous, definitely.” Showtime’s producers undoubtedly have

the best of intentions. There are serious long-term risks associated with rising greenhouse gas emissions, ranging from ocean acidification to sea-level rise to decreasing agricultural output. But there is every reason to believe that efforts to raise public concern about climate change by linking it to natural disasters will backfire. More than a decade’s worth of research suggests that fear-based appeals about climate change inspire denial, fatalism and polarization. For instance, Al Gore’s 2006 documentary, “An Inconvenient Truth,” popularized the idea that today’s natural disasters are increasing in severity and frequency because of

human-caused global warming. It also contributed to public backlash and division. Since 2006, the number of Americans telling Gallup that the media was exaggerating global warming grew to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, the gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether global warming is caused by humans rose to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. Other factors contributed. Some conservatives and fossil-fuel interests questioned the link between carbon emissions and global warming. And beginning in 2007, as the country was falling into recession, public support for environmental protection declined. Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at the Frameworks Institute studied public attitudes for its report “How to Talk About Global Warming.” Messages focused on extreme weather events, they found, made many Americans more likely to view climate change as an act of God — something to be weathered, not prevented. Some people, the report noted, “are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” for example, rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. Since then, evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. A frequently cited 2009 study in the journal Science Communication summed up the scholarly consensus.

“ Although shocking, catastrophic, and large-scale representations of the impacts of climate change may well act as an initial hook for people’s attention and concern,” the researchers wrote, “they clearly do not motivate a sense of personal engagement with the issue and indeed may act to trigger barriers to engagement such as denial. ” In a controlled laboratory experiment published in Psychological Science in 2010, researchers were able to use “dire messages” about global warming to increase skepticism about the problem. Many climate advocates ignore these findings, arguing that they have an obligation to convey the alarming facts. But claims linking the latest blizzard, drought or hurricane to global warming simply can’t be supported by the science. Our warming world is, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, increasing heat waves and intense precipitation in some places, and is likely to bring more extreme weather in the future. But the panel also said there is little evidence that this warming is increasing the loss of life or the economic costs of natural disasters. “Economic growth, including greater concentrations of people and wealth in periled areas and rising insurance penetration,” the climate panel noted, “is the most important driver of increasing losses.” Claims that current disasters are connected to climate change do seem to motivate many liberals to support action. But they alienate conservatives in roughly equal measure. What works, say environmental pollsters and researchers, is focusing on popular solutions. Climate advocates often do this, arguing that solar and wind can reduce emissions while strengthening the economy. But when renewable energy technologies are offered as solutions to the exclusion of other low-carbon alternatives, they polarize rather than unite. One recent study, published by Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project, found that conservatives become less skeptical about global warming if they first read articles suggesting nuclear energy or geoengineering as solutions. Another study, in the journal Nature Climate Change in 2012, concluded that “communication should focus on how mitigation efforts can promote a better society” rather than “on the reality of climate change and averting its risks.” Nonetheless, virtually every major national environmental organization continues to reject nuclear energy, even after four leading climate

scientists wrote them an open letter last fall, imploring them to embrace the technology as a key climate solution. Together with catastrophic rhetoric ,

the rejection of technologies like nuclear and natural gas by environmental groups is most likely feeding the perception among many

that climate change is being exaggerated. After all, if climate change is a planetary emergency, why take nuclear and natural gas off the table? While the urgency that motivates exaggerated claims is understandable, turning down the rhetoric and embracing solutions like nuclear energy will better serve efforts to slow global warming.

Causes Hollow SolutionsSecuritization of the environment creates quick fix hollow solutions that are counterproductive. Hayes and Knox-Hayes 14 (Jarrod Hayes is an assistant professor of international relations in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2009, he received his PhD from the University of Southern California in politics and international relations. Currently his research focuses on the role of identity in the construction of security within democracies. His work appears in the European Journal of International Affairs, Global Environmental Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, and Security Studies. In 2013, Cambridge University Press published his first book, Constructing National Security: US Relations with India and China. Janelle Knox-Hayes is an assistant professor of environmental policy in the School of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2009 she received her PhD from the University of Oxford in economic geography. Her research currently focuses on energy security and environmental finance. Her work has appeared in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Journal of Economic Geography, and Global Environmental Change. She has a book entitled The Culture of Markets: The Political Economy of Climate Change under contract with Oxford University Press. “Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy”. Global Environmental Politics, Volume 14, Number 2, May 2014. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v014/14.2.hayes.html. Nyy)

Securitization theory —which posits that political speech creates security issues 18 — provides a useful analytical approach for exploring gaps in the literature. The essence of security is the securitizing move: a securitizing actor (an individual with sufficient socio-political credibility) makes the claim that a referent object (intersubjectively agreed to be worth preserving) faces an existential threat . If the target audience accepts both the claim of threat and the valuation of the referent object, normal debate and contestation are marginalized and political power is centralized to enable response to the existential threat. [End Page 84] Successful securitization does not produce a theoretically pre-defined outcome, but instead empowers political actors to breach the boundaries of normal politics. As a negotiation between securitizing actor and audience, what constitutes “security” varies across time and socio-political space. Agency and structure shape variation in the actors vested with authority and in security practices, as actors initiate and perpetuate securitizing moves. Changes in social structures also produce shifts, although usually at a much slower pace. Analyzing security discourses across polities brings differences in social structures and the decisions actors make into sharp relief. Through the

marginalization of normal political processes and concentration of decision-making authority, securitization has tremendous implications for policy outcomes. Securitization involves the manifestation of both agency and structure. Political agents use security to achieve political objectives, for example, to delegitimize opposition or to access the power-centralizing aspect of securitization. Weber and Stern point to the importance of framing in climate

change policies.19 However, securitization takes place within a social space that gives it power. For example, the

EU is not constituted as an actor that can “speak” security. Conversely, the US president is an actor clearly constituted to speak security, and “very important” issues are discursively constructed as security, making the issues worthy of concentrated political attention. Differences in discourse are a product of how Americans assign meaning to important issues as compared to Europeans. Neither agency nor structure alone explains the emergence of security discourses. Instead they interact to create both the space in which security exists and how security is used.20 Here, we

emphasize the agential aspects of securitization as a means of exposing the structural factors that shape policy. Securitization theory also highlights structural problems, in that securitization may enable action on environmental problems without producing beneficial outcomes. Securitization of development policy has decreased aid to Africa,21 and securitization of HIV/AIDS has increased the authority of traditional security actors vis-à-vis civil society.22 In the US, there are indications that a similar empowerment of the military has taken place.23 The US military has also been an important securitizing and responding actor to climate change.24 Given the pervasiveness of the economic activities that generate climate change, the traditional beneficiaries of securitization may be least capable of dealing with the issue.25

Relying on securitization, with its logic of imminent threat and immediate response, to generate action may result in short-term [End Page 85] policies that lack long-term public support . Because of the power

centralizing and debate marginalizing characteristics of security, securitization has the potential to disempower skeptics as well as many members of Congress to speak on climate change. Securitizing climate change also sheds light on socio-political differences between states. Scholars have highlighted the dangers securitization poses to democracies , 26 so understanding how states approach issues like climate change has the potential to increase our understanding of the adaptability and health of modern democracies as they confront increasingly globalized

problems.27 Specifically, securitization of climate change can impede the collective action required to address the issue through a focus on immediate action and self-survival irrespective of others. Successful securitization might divorce the US from coordinated efforts in the UN to alter economic activity on a sustainable and equitable basis. It might

also distort policy-making to focus on obvious policy action at the expense of critical structural changes.

Ethics

AT: Util GoodUtil creates arbitrary ethicsMcCarthy 07 [David- Professor of Theology at Saint Mary’s, Moral Theology in Catholic Perspective, Grand Rapids: Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, ?-?-2007, http://theophilogue.com/2009/11/19/utilitarianism-what-is-it-why-does-it-not-work/]-DaveD.

1) The Inevitability of Arbitrariness—It has no way to objectively determine the nature, importance, and value of consequences. To put it another way: How do we know what are “good” and “bad” consequences ? What consequences count most ? Whose opinion of what are “good” consequences and what are “bad” consequences counts most? Failure to give coherent and rational criterion for answering such questions spells decisive defeat for the whole theory of exclusive utilitarianism . It seems to need something else to help it out. That is why I personally think that the utilitarian factor is legitimate when considered as part of the picture, but exclusive utilitarianism always leads to arbitrary judgment of consequences, and therefore arbitrary ethics.

Util undermines our conscience and goes against common senseMcCarthy 07 [David- Professor of Theology at Saint Mary’s, Moral Theology in Catholic Perspective, Grand Rapids: Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, ?-?-2007, http://theophilogue.com/2009/11/19/utilitarianism-what-is-it-why-does-it-not-work/]-DaveD.

2) The Contrary Intuition—It often undermines our common sense and moral intuitions, often demanding certain actions that rub our conscience the wrong way . For example, what if I knew I could cheat on my wife with my female boss without her ever finding out in order to get a raise, which would have “good” consequences for my family (less financial stress, my wife could cut back to part time to spend more time with the kids, the kids

could benefit from more parental care, I could save more money for the kids for college, etc.)? My gut tells me: Don’t do this, it is wrong, wrong, wrong. But utilitarianism tells me it’s like a math problem (good consequences = good action).

Util is impossible- can’t know consequencesMcCarthy 07 [David- Professor of Theology at Saint Mary’s, Moral Theology in Catholic Perspective, Grand Rapids: Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, ?-?-2007, http://theophilogue.com/2009/11/19/utilitarianism-what-is-it-why-does-it-not-work/]-DaveD.

3) The Omniscience Requirement—Sometimes it is impossible to know the totality of the potential (much less the actual) consequences of one’s actions. Sometimes what looks to us to be a disaster turns out to be a blessing in disguise. We get fired only to later realize that the new job we attain as a consequence pays better and is more enjoyable. On the flip side, sometimes we think something is going to turn out great, but in the end is a big let down . If these small scale experiences in the lives of ordinary people demonstrate how difficult it is to know the consequences of certain actions— how much more difficult must it be for people whose decisions effect a n entire nation (e.g. the President) to judge the full weight of the consequences of their decisions?

AFFIRMATIVE

Link Defense

Securitization JustifiedViewing the environment in terms of security is justified- threats go beyond degeneration Jakarta 10 [Mu'adz D'Fahmi- graduate student at the School of International Affairs, Australian National University, Securitization of environmental Degradation, The Jakarta Post, 1-25-2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/25/securitization-environmental-degradation.html]-DaveD.

Environmental degradation draws the attention of world politics because it is a threat to global security .¶

The UN secretary-general’s report on the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility

(2004), declared a slogan “toward a new security consensus”.¶ It contended there were bigger security threats that go far beyond the dreadfulness of vicious war among states, including environmental degeneration. This report reveals the international awareness of the imposing danger of environmental deterioration. ¶ Experts have shown there are connections between environmental degradation and security issues . Lorraine Elliott (2007) suggests several propositions in which environmental degradation is a security concern, including the issue of scarcity and abundance of natural resources.¶ Problems of resource availability as an impact on environmental degradation and climate change could be the most classic way to link the issue with security concerns. Resource availability means there is scarcity of natural resources in one place and an abundance of resources in another. Yet, which one is the actual driving force for conflict: scarcity or abundance?

Our Reps = TrueBiodiversity Loss is a Real ThreatKnight 12 (Matthew Knight is a journalist for CNN, “Extinction threat 'a call to world leaders' at Rio Earth Summit”, Cable News Network. 6/20/12 http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/19/world/rio-red-list-extinction-species/index.html?iref=allsearch. Nyy)

Serving as a timely reminder to delegates convening for the Rio +20 Earth Summit, the International Union for Conservation of Nature ( IUCN ) has published its latest Red List detailing the ongoing threats to biodiversity on the planet. The IUCN assessed a total of 63,837 plant and animal species around the globe which revealed 19,817 of that number are currently threatened with extinction , with 3,947 described as "critically endangered" -- the final classification prior to extinction . A further 5,766 are "endangered ," while more than 10,000 species are listed as " vulnerable ." " Sustainability is a matter of life and death for people on the planet. A sustainable future cannot be achieved without conserving bio logical diversity ... not only for nature itself but also for all seven billion people who depend on it," Julia Marton-Lefevre, IUCN director general, said in a statement. "(The latest report) is a clarion call to world leaders gathering in Rio to secure the web of life," Marton-Lefevre added. See Also: Can Rio +20 solve world's environmental problems? Amphibious creatures like frogs, toads and newts are the most endangered group with 41% facing extinction. A quarter of all mammals and 13% of bird species are heading towards a similar

fate. Ocean biodiversity is continuing its decline with a third of all reef-building corals threatened by extinction which could cause potentially catastrophic consequences for humans. More than 275 million people are dependent on coral reefs for food, coastal protection and their livelihoods, according to the IUCN. The reef fishing industry is worth $6.8 billion annually but overfishing is now affecting more than half the world's reefs. "The services and economic value that species provide are irreplaceable and essential to our well being," Jon Paul Rodríguez, deputy chair, IUCN Species Survival Commission, said in a statement. "Unless we live within the limits set by nature, and manage our natural resources sustainably, more and more species will be

driven towards extinction. If we ignore our responsibility we will compromise our own survival," he added. Plants

also continue to face severe threats. Two species (Acalypha dikuluwensis and Basananthe cupricola) were officially declared extinct in 2012 and 30% of conifers are under threat. "Recent work on plant assessments suggests that around one in five plants are threatened with extinction," says professor Stephen Hopper, director (CEO and chief scientist), Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, England. "Three quarters of the world's population depends directly on plants for their primary health care. Eighty percent of our calorie intake comes from 12 plant species. If we care about the food we eat, and the medicines we use, we must act to conserve our medicinal plants and our crop wild relatives," he added. Paul Smith, Head of the Millennium Seed Bank at the Royal Botanic Gardens says that every plant

extinction makes it more challenging for humans to adapt to change. "You look at all the big environmental problems -- food security, water scarcity, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation -- the fact is we need to adapt and innovate ," Smith said. "We have always adapted and innovated -- 10,000 years ago we innovated with agriculture. But we can only innovate if we have access to a full range of plant diversity," he added. The seed bank at Kew, the largest of its kind in the world, currently stores 11% (around 31,000 specimens) of the world's plant species. Smith says the plant extinctions that have occurred since the first Earth Summit in 1992 have all been entirely avoidable. "There is no technological reason why a plant species should become extinct. To collect and preserve an entire species which we can keep in the seed bank here for 200 years costs

about £2,000," he said. Smith says the failures to forge ahead with environmental action in recent years have been down to lack of political will. "I think because people are incapable of thinking in the long term -- particularly politicians and our leaders. There hasn't been either priority or resource given to these tasks," he said. But he remains upbeat about Rio +20. "You've always got to be optimistic," Smith said. "The problem with any consensual approach is that it takes a very long time. It has become highly politicized and dominated by lawyers. That's the problem with any multilateral consensual system." But others, like Jim Leape, director general of WWF is deeply concerned that Rio +20 talks will stall. In a statement released by WWF on Tuesday, Leape said the summit is "doomed to ridicule" unless world leaders "get serious about sustainable development." Leape laments the revisions to the Rio +20 negotiating text made by diplomats over recent days which have swapped "weak

words for toothless language," he argues. "They've added some positive actions around oceans protection. But the text has lots of words that 'commit' parties to nothing -- such as 'commit to promote' and 'commit to

systematically consider,'" Leape said. "World leaders 'recognized' problems 20 years ago, and they've done little about them since. How long are we going to accept 'we'll look into it' as a solution?" he added

AT: Warming = LieClimate Change Deniers are a threat to progressLiptak 6/14 (Kevin Liptak is a CNN White House Producer, “Climate change deniers ‘serious threat’ to future, Obama says”, Cable News Network, 6/14/14, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/14/climate-change-deniers-serious-threat-to-future-obama-says/ nyy)

Describing lawmakers and pundits who deny manmade climate change as a “fairly serious threat to everybody’s future ,” President Obama on Saturday called for less debate and more action in combating warming trends. Delivering the address at University of California Irvine’s commencement, Obama underscored the view of some

scientists that the effects of climate change are already being felt nationwide and said he was allocating new funds for communities recovering from natural disasters. Speaking at Angel Stadium in Anaheim, Obama compared the scientific problem of curbing climate change to that of putting a man on the moon. And while skeptics in the 1960s may have made a case against the mission, Obama said he couldn’t remember “saying the moon wasn’t there, or that it was made of cheese.” “ Today’s Congress, though, is full of folks who stubbornly and automatically reject the scientific evidence about climate change ,” he said. “They’ll tell you it’s a hoax, or a fad.” Obama said Republicans had a long history of supporting environmental causes, naming Teddy Roosevelt, Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush as examples of past presidents who did more than current GOP politicians. “ People are thinking about politics instead of thinking about what’s good for the next generation, ” he added later. The White House has taken on climate change as a top issue for Obama’s second term, announcing at the beginning of the month proposed new restrictions on power plants that would reduce emissions by 30% from 2005 levels by 2030. On Saturday Obama announced a $1 billion fund for towns and cities recovering from disasters. About $130 million is reserved for places affected by 2012’s Superstorm Sandy; the rest will be distributed nationwide. Opponents of Obama’s actions on climate change— some of whom deny humans are responsible for climate change — say the rules will kill jobs and increase the cost of energy. On Saturday Obama reserved his harshest criticism for politicians who he said avoid questions about climate by claiming a lack of knowledge — and a press he says ignores the issue. Climate change deniers, he said, at least “have the brass to say what they actually think.” Others, he said,

duck questions about climate change by saying, “Hey, I’m not a scientist.” “Let me translate: what that means is, ‘I accept that manmade climate change is real, but if I admit it, I’ll be run out of town by a radical fringe that thinks climate science is a liberal plot,’” he said.

The Threat of Global Warming is RealWang 13 (Fen Wang is the Co-founder and Executive Chair at GreenEarthCitizen (GEC). GEC is an ENGO initiated by Fen Wang and a group of visionary leaders with expertise in environmental governance, sustainable development, business administration and etc., which was founded at Linkoping University (Sweden). “Climate Change is Real, Why?” Green Earth Citizen. 7/2/13. http://greenearthcitizen.org/climate-change-and-global-biogeochemistry-system-the-ghgs-for-the-carbon-and-nitrogen-ghgs-in-the-atmosphere/ nyy)

Given the fact that global warming is caused by the increasing concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, the Earth has a buffering system (e.g. Ocean) that could sustain a certain amount of extra CO2 and other greenhouse gases. However, this buffering system also has a certain capacity limit. Therefore, once the buffering capacity is surpassed the trend to run into the irreversible circle will be unstoppable, then the more and more serious negative consequences will just naturally come. Since all these would-be possible consequences are caused by the increasing concentration of the GHG:s , therefore the only possible way to solve the global warming problems is to make the concentration of these gases get back to its original normal level which means mankind

needs to cut down all the extra GHG:s that are beyond the normal level. According to most recent studies, the concentration of CO2 has already surpassed the danger line 390 ppm, thus the implem e ntation of mitigation strategies can only postpone the disaster’s coming but cannot stop them from occurring. It means the disasters will come, no one can stop them. Things people can do is only to get ready to combat the disasters. According to the thoughts from Lao Tze that all things are in the process of rising and returning such as, plants come to blossom, but only to

return to the root (Laotse, Tao Te Ching, referred by Lama Anagarika Govinda, 1981). Originally, the Earth doesn’t have the buried coal and oil, but change and transformation is a natural process, so after billions of years, numerous tons of coal, oil and gases containing lots of carbon have been formed. Just in the last century, mankind has released most of these carbon containing substances into the atmosphere , which actually supports the thought that everything is in the process of rising and returning, now they come back to where they were from in the first place, just imagine what the atmosphere looked like billions of years ago, the time almost no species can survive. Here is the scenario, when mankind finally digs all the carbon containing coal, oil and gases out, and all the carbon will return back to the atmosphere like billions of years ago. Constantly increasing greenhouse gases would make the temperature rise up to 5 degrees (the

climate is very sensitive to the temperature according to studies from IPCC). Then, the disasters will beyond the control of mankind, mankind is originally from the nature and must go back to the nature, a harmonious relationship between man and nature is the key solution; Otherwise what will meet the humans will be melting and disappearing glaciers, rising sea levels, floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, more and more frequent natural disasters, etc. There is only one opportunity for humans to combat the climate change, i.e. unity of people, believe in people power and people action, and ordinary people can be the change and the change must be fundamental. Only through the collective forces of all nation-states under the

leadership of the United Nations can humans combat the climate change, the most dangerous threat that has ever confronted humans. Denman et al., 2007:511) indicates that ‘‘CO2 is removed from the atmosphere through weathering by silicate rocks and through burial in marine sediments of carbon fixed by marine plants”. ”Burning fossil fuels returns carbon captured by plants in Earth’s geological history to the atmosphere. New ice core records show that the earth system has not experienced current atmospheric concentrations of CO2, or indeed of CH4, for at least 650 kyr – six glacial-interglacial cycles” (Denman et al., 2007).

Alternative

Rad. Approaches FailRadical environmentalism fail – they are still caught in the existing ideology.Kidner 2k (David, Senior Lecturer in Social Theory in the School of Arts and Humanities at Nottingham Trent University, UK, member of the editorial board of the journal Environmental Ethics, "Nature and Psyche: Radical Environmentalism and the Politics of Subjectivity" pg. 1-2) jml

The rise of environmental awareness over the past few decades, and the emergence of an environmental movement containing various shades of green and transcending the tired polarizations of left- and right-wing, has been one of the most remarkable features of modern political life. Every politician today, whatever their position within the political spectrum, needs to be able to demonstrate some degree of environmental awareness, however superficial and reactive the resulting policies might be. Nevertheless, in spite of some notable successes in heading off attempts by industry or governments to convert what remains of the natural world into material "wealth," the green movement, at a deeper, shares modern industrial society's puzzlement as to ultimate goals, finding its voice most effectively through protest against existing or planned activities rather than putting forward its own lucid agenda for the future . In a sense, this puzzlement is more profound within radical variants of greenery, since these openly admit the need for a new vision of our relation to the rest of the natural world, in contrast to reformist verities that merely try to make existing political and commercial processes less obviously damaging, and so ultimately still believe in, or try to convince themselves that they believe in, the basic soundness of these processes. "Deeper" greens, perceiving the ultimate unworkability and destructiveness of the technological- economic system, are forced to confront the need for a radically different approach. Unfortunately, deep ecology, ecofeminism, and other "radical" approaches, as I will argue below, often incorporate many of the features of existing ideology, and so are bound within the same epistemological, moral, and experiential universe as the structures they attempt to challenge. The result is an environmentalism that is at its most effective when challenging the details of our affluent lifestyles----ozone-damaging refrigerants, mahogany furniture, a road centered transport policy--- but that suffered from an acute sense of impotence and puzzlement over how to alter the direction of industrialism. This is one of the fundamental predicaments addressed by this book: the psychological, social, and epistemological foundations of the green movement's critique of modern industrialism are often the same foundations on which industrialism itself is built. Building on this recognition, I attempt to show how a reconfigured social/environmental theory can transcend the deadening grasp of industrialist assumptions, and point toward a revitalized relation between ourselves and the rest of the natural world that is both realistic and healthy.

Framework

Plan Focus GoodEpistemic focus bad our specific truth claims outweigh.Owen, 2 [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653]-DaveD.

The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and /or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments . Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/ or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR —what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical

approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right , namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Offense

Permutation

Perm SolvesPerm – Do the plan and <insert alt>. Environmental security is flexible enough to incorporate their insights, while preventing conflict and degradation. Graegar 96 (Nina, political scientist, IR scholar, researcher and politician, cand.polit. (equivalent to MPhil) in political science at the University of Oslo, doctorate in political science, head of the Department of International Politics, "Environmental Security", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 109-116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/425137) jml

It seems virtually impossible to agree on an unambigious definition of environmental security - or, indeed, whether it is a fruitful concept at all. There are, however, at least four clear reasons for making a theoretical and operational linkage between security and changes in the environment caused by human activity. First, environmental degradation is in itself a severe threat to human security and all life on earth . Air and water pollution, deforestation, soil erosion, etc., resulting from civilian and military activities can and do change our living conditions dramatically. This is why many definitions of environmental security have focused on sustainable utilization and protection of the human environment (see e.g. Westing, 1989, p. 7). Nature is no longer the opponent of society, against which humanity must struggle to survive: it is something that we must protect from the negative consequences of our own activities. Second, environmental degradation or change can be both cause and consequence of violent conflict. Environmental degradation, but also poor respect for environmentally attuned resource management, may lead to disputes within countries and between otherwise friendly countries. General theories for the circumstances under which environmental degradation becomes intol- erable and generates violent conflict are not far advanced, neither are theories for when environmental degradation leads to migration from the environmentally devastated area instead of conflict. This must be determined empirically, on a case-by-case basis. When environmental degradation is a consequence of intentional acts of warfare, it often escalates the conflict. Environmental degradation may also exacerbate a conflict that originated for other reasons, e.g. ethnic or religious tension or socio-economic inequalities. Regular non-warfare military activity may also have a negative impact on the environment in terms of pollution and resource use as well as the more severe threats implied by nuclear testing, accidents in nuclear-powered submarines or ice-breakers, dumping of radioactive material in the ocean, and so on. Military preparations represent a potential threat to the environment and to individuals even if they may not represent a threat to state security in the traditional sense of the word. Discussions about the use of military means to protect the rainforest, and to protect fish stocks in the Barents Sea from illegal fishing, possibly through Russian- Norwegian cooperation, are examples of positive linkages between the military sector and the environment. Third, predictability and control are essential elements of military security considerations, and these are also important elements in the safeguarding of the environment. According to Sverre Lodgaard (1990, p. 17), there is 'a conceptual kinship which makes it natural to speak of "security" in both connections'. Under certain circumstances, irreparable environmental degradation or ecological systems in dramatic change may increase the likelihood of violent conflict erupting. Lodgaard's definition of environmental security includes not only sustainable utilization and protection of the environment but also minimization of risk - or rather of the probability for experiencing negative consequences of environmental change (Lodgaard, 1992, p. 20). This, in turn, may be related to industrial activities and technology where there is a potential for major damage to the environment. Establishing close political links with Russia and the former Communist countries in Europe is one means of preventing such damage, or at least of ensuring greater predictability and early warning systems

which can facilitate rapid action and reduce vulnerabilities if prevention fails. The reliability of such predictions is, of course, a major challenge in ensuring environmental security. The improved political climate in East/West relations in Europe has also resulted in co- operation in environmental matters. Focusing on the interactions between political and envi- ronmental security and how they may be conducive to comprehensive human security, Westing also claims that environmental security, by way of its international confidence-building effects and by alleviating some causes of military insecurity, may lead to improvements in political security, citing environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea region as an example (Westing, 1989, p. 117). Thus, solving environmental problems may promote cooperation and therefore may be seen as security policy or peace-building. Environmental security may then be defined as a normative linkage designed to cope with the negative linkages between the environment and human activities (Brock, 1991, p. 407). It is also vital to be able to predict and control wide-scale spontaneous migration or dis- placement of huge population masses from environmentally devastated areas into neighbouring regions. So-called environmental migration may cause social tension and political instability that leads to violent conflict within a state or between two or more states. Migration may be an alternative to violent conflict - fight or flight - or an intervening variable; it comes about because of environmental degradation and then strains further the resources of the recipient region or state (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994). Finally, a cognitive linkage between the environment and security has been established. It has become legitimate for mainstream politicians to speak out in favour of an environmentally responsible security policy. Environmental security may still be mostly a politically attractive slogan, but environmental sustainability has indeed become part of the 'high politics' sphere in several Western countries.

Dalby, 92 (Simon, Department of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter, pp. 95-134, JSTOR)

And yet, it may be necessary to use the language of realpolitik and national security to gain a necessary audience for ecological concerns in some quarters of the world's political elites.143 Despite the difficulties of reinterpretation of environment in the geopolitical terms outlined above, this may be necessary to initiate at least some of the changes that are needed. In the United States, Senator Al Gore suggests using the language of national security to convey the urgent necessity for US policies to deal with global warming.144 But he does not suggest militarizing the research he advocates. Ironically, linking a multiplicity of nonmilitary threats to the theme of security might have some potential as a political strategy to democratize the state by broadening the ambit of security to prevent its appropriation by secrecy-bound state military structures. Nonetheless, the alternative prospect of the militarization of activities like the disposal of toxic wastes looms over such reflections.145 This does not bode well for democratizing security

Environmental security doesn’t lead to militarism and can coexist with new thoughtMagalhaes 12 [Bruno- Fellow at International Relations Institute, WHAT TO THINK OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY?, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio (PUC-Rio), ?-?-2012,

http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/8/1/2/5/pages381257/p381257-1.php]-DaveD.

The linkage between environmental degradation and security is today a piece of ¶ virtually indisputable common sense. Despite the growing consensus on its disruptive ¶ effects , however, the security framing of environmental problems is not always ¶ welcomed . For those in favor of the environmental security speech, the

presentation of ¶ environmental degradation as a security matter has a mobilizing efect that can gain ¶ more attention to the problem. For those against it, the security framing imports a ¶ conflictive mindset, hindering the efforts to cope with the problem. This analysis aims ¶ to break with such deadlock by defending a more constructivist understanding of the ¶ process of environmental conversion into a security matter. I suggest that the way the ¶ topic has been approached so far imposes a false stalemate between using the ¶ environmental security speech as a rhetorical device or avoiding its “security rationale” and the resulting import of the militarist mindset.

Mobilizes ChangeOur securitization is good – it mobilizes environmental change and avoids their impact.Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 589] NISH

And yet, when applied to environmental issues, the process of securitization does not seem to be analytically accurate. The Copenhagen School, in its empirically driven analysis of various sectors in Security: a new framework for analysis, has identified several peculiarities in the environmental sector (Buzan et

al 1998, 71–94). Amongst these peculiarities the most noticeable is that few appeals to environmental security have mobilized exceptional measures or inscribed enemies in any context. The Copenhagen School has suggested that when the environment is involved, ‘“emergency measures” are still designed and developed in the realm of ordinary policy debates’ (83). This

suggests that issues can be politicized through an appeal to security, a problematic development for the

Copenhagen School, which argues that ‘transcending a security problem by politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms’ (Waever 1995, 56). Even if the School

tends to dismiss these as failed securitizations, this seems to show that the transformation of an issue into a security issue can follow different modalities and different logics, which eschew the confrontational logic of the national security model suggested by the School. Through the appeal to security, other logics, which characterize different contexts, can be brought into existence and new actors can gain relevance in security policies. Securitization, as de Wilde has argued, ‘triggers two debates: one about the underlying risk

assessment, one about the strategic answer to it’ (2008, 596). Successful appeals to security require developing security policies, identifying appropriate strategies and means to deal with the problem. These developments are largely sector dependent and reflect different values, priorities and practices. As Williams has noted, ‘[s]peech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security perceptions both within and between states’ (2003, 523).

Even if security has negative implications, it’s the only way to spur cooperation that is key to ACTUALLY HELP the environment Jakarta 10 [Mu'adz D'Fahmi- graduate student at the School of International Affairs, Australian National University, Securitization of environmental

Degradation, The Jakarta Post, 1-25-2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/25/securitization-environmental-degradation.html]-DaveD.

Yet, in spite of its negative implication , environmental security may have some benefits . By applying the concept of security, environmental degradation can be better understood . It explains danger much better than concepts like sustainability, vulnerability or adaptation, and it offers a framework in which danger can be recast as widespread risks to welfare and (in the case of small island states) sovereignty .¶

The other advantage is that security can also serve as an integrative concept that links local and global levels of political response for environmental degradation. The securitization of environmental degradation promotes understanding that environmental insecurity is a combination of local problems

that require global cooperation.¶ The problem of illegal logging in Indonesia, for example, entails intricate relations among those who support and benefits from the activity, involving indigenous people, regional government officers and law enforcers, local brokers and foreign traders. This case demonstrates local as well as global problems.¶ From a local perspective, indigenous people often lack education, the breakdown of law enforcement, corrupt practices and the wicked mindset of local brokers are also factors. From a global perspective, foreign traders are less controlled in their trading activities and the importing states are not strict enough or even reluctant to formulate, apply and enforce rules on imported goods. Hence, there are local problems in the issue of deforestation in Indonesia, but the solution cannot merely be local.¶ Indonesia may deal with the local problems by itself.¶ Yet, it needs pressures from the international community to tackle problems such as corrupt practices.¶ It also needs help from neighboring countries to discipline their traders, because even though local problems can be tackled, the ongoing deforestation in Indonesia will never stop if other countries still accept illicitly logged trees from Indonesia.¶ In brief, environmental degradation as a security threat is a complicated problem. It draws serious awareness to world politics.

Apoc. Rhetoric K2 EnvironmentalismApocalyptic Rhetoric is necessary for environmental movements.Salvador and Norton 11 (Michael Salvador - Michael Salvador is an Associate Professor in the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State University and Todd Norton - Todd Norton is an Assistant Professor in the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State University, “The Flood Myth in the Age of Global Climate Change,” Environmental Communication Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2011, pp 45-61 , 2/18/11, nyy)

Apocalyptic narratives and the jeremiad are well established in rhetorical and environmental studies (Brummett, 1984; Carpenter, I978; Johannesen, I985; Killingsworth 8: Palmer, 1996; Murphy, l990; Opie & Elliot, 1996; Ritter, 1980; Wolfe,

2008). Apocalyptic rhetoric centers on the idea of a looming catastrophe that threatens all humankind. In Christian versions, the apocalypse-Armageddon-is inevitable and welcomed as it precedes the return of God and the millennial era, God's

thousand- year reign on Earth (Brummett, 1984). In contrast, the secular apocalyptic narrative leaves open the possibility for human intervention to avoid the potential catastrophe . Rather than awaiting the return of God, secular

apocalyptic discourse advances a vision of an approaching disaster that is avoidable (Killingsworth 8: Palmer, 1996). The jeremiad narrative structure dates back to Puritan sermons of the 1600s and is closely related to apocalyptic discourse. Once again, early versions were linked to biblical scriptures (Opie 8: Elliot, 1996). According to Johannesen (1985), the jeremiad includes four key elements: (1) a chosen people has failed to keep covenant with key values or principles, (2) the people will suffer calamity as a result of this misbehavior, (3) such calamity will be avoided by a return to specified righteous action, and (4) through proper action the chosen people shall recapture their

favored status and avoid ruin. Importantly, secular versions of the jeremiad operate on the principle that collective human intervention can alter the course of events leading to a cataclysmic future, thus offering "a means by which the audience could insure its continued well-being and ultimate salvation " (Carpenter, 1978, p. 110). In separate comprehensive reviews of American speakers and writers, both apocalyptic discourse and jeremiad narratives have been identified as central to the history of environmental advocacy. Killingsworth and Palmer (I996) examined three decades of

writings-from the 1960s through the 1990s-and posited that the apocalyptic framework was central to contemporary environmentalism . Beginning with Puritan sermons of the 1600s and examining works up to Al Gore's (1992) book Earth in the Balance, Opie and Elliot (1996) concluded that the jeremiad has served as a recurrent rhetorical foundation for environmental advocates. Our concern in this essay is not to determine which rhetorical form, the apocalyptic or the jeremiad, has been most influential in US environmentalism, but rather to note the commonalities between these two sweeping reviews of environmental rhetoric. Both analyses adopted a dialectical reading

of rhetorical form. For Killingsworth and Palmer (1996), use of apocalyptic rhetoric has shifted in response to the changing relationship between the prevailing paradigm of human domination over nature-limitless American progress through technology and economic development-and the oppositional environmental paradigm of humans as subject to nature and in need of ecologically sustainable practices. When this prevailing paradigm was at its zenith, stronger apocalyptic visions were advanced , as in Rachel Carson's (1962) Silent Spring. As environmental activism took hold in the public consciousness, less threatening visions of the Earth's future were offered, as in

Barry Commoner's (I971) The Closing Circle. Thus, apocalyptic rhetoric served as a malleable framework for discussing environmental problems, allowing those concerned to transform growing awareness of environmental problems "into acceptance of action toward a solution by prefacing the solution with a future scenario of what could happen if action is not taken, if the problem goes untreated" (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1996, p. 22).

Human SecurityThey misunderstand our rhetoric; We employ human security NOT state centric – the alternative is worse.Hayes and Knox-Hayes 14 (Jarrod Hayes is an assistant professor of international relations in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2009, he received his PhD from the University of Southern California in politics and international relations. Currently his research focuses on the role of identity in the construction of security within democracies. His work appears in the European Journal of International Affairs, Global Environmental Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, and Security Studies. In 2013, Cambridge University Press published his first book, Constructing National Security: US Relations with India and China. Janelle Knox-Hayes is an assistant professor of environmental policy in the School of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2009 she received her PhD from the University of Oxford in economic geography. Her research currently focuses on energy security and environmental finance. Her work has appeared in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Journal of Economic Geography, and Global Environmental Change. She has a book entitled The Culture of Markets: The Political Economy of Climate Change under contract with Oxford University Press. “Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy”. Global Environmental Politics, Volume 14, Number 2, May 2014. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v014/14.2.hayes.html. Nyy)

Scholarship has begun to draw on securitization theory and apply it to environmental problems. Detraz and Betsill use a discursive approach to examine security and climate change discourse in the UN and find an emphasis on discourses of environmental security as climate change degrades human welfare . 28

In a separate piece, Detraz highlights the potential costs of empowering state security over human security, because understanding climate change as a matter of human security presents the best possibility of enacting policies designed to address vulnerability to climate change.29 Trombetta argues that the securitization of climate change is moving the concept away from the state and exceptional measures and toward prevention and human security . 30 Finally, Floyd challenges securitization theory through the prism of US environmental policy and argues that securitization can be morally beneficial or detrimental depending on outcome, while desecuritization can be morally unacceptable if it results in depoliticization of important issues . 31 Our approach contributes to the application of securitization theory to climate change. We are principally focused on a comparative and domestic perspective, seeking to understand how climate change securitizing moves do or do not play out and to what end. This approach compliments Detraz and Betsill’s more systemic level focus, and shares Floyd’s attention to outcomes

and the intentions of securitizing actors. However, in interpreting the significance of securitization we are closer to the

original Copenhagen framework. We also draw attention to the ways in which socio-political structures shape securitization, a [End Page 86] significant gap in the broader securitization literature. Finally, we probe various roles of security in different socio-political contexts, an agenda that furthers Trombetta’s arguments and deepens the original Copenhagen framework.

Env Impacts Solve SecurityFocusing on environmental impacts challenges state-centric notions of security. Davion, 4 (Victoria, professor, department head, ethics and environment editor @ University of Georgia, “The Earth Charter and Militarism: An Ecological Feminist Analysis,” Worldviews, vol. 8, no. 1, 112-125)

Taking the interests of non-human beings at all seriously would challenge our whole vision of what “national security” means. The “collective selves” that such beings have interests in preserving are not

states or countries, they are habitats and ecological systems. Taking such “selves” seriously is a very different matter from protecting a particular government or nation. As I stated earlier, ecological feminists have called for a

reconceptualization of what it means to be “human” as opposed to “animal” or “human” as opposed to “nature.” It also suggests a rethinking of what it means to be a “self ” at all. Hence, the Earth Charter’s implicit challenge to the notion that nation states are the most important “selves” needing protection is right in line with the most important ecological feminists insights.

DeliberationImpact Scenarios are key to deliberation of an issue. Larsen and Ostling 9 (Katarina Larsen, a KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy and History of Technology, Division of History of Science and Technology, Ulrika Gunnarsson-Östling, KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Planning and Environment, Division of Environmental Strategies Research, “Climate change scenarios and citizen-participation: Mitigation and adaptation perspectives in constructing sustainable futures,” Volume 33, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 260–266, Science Direct nyy)

In constructing normative scenarios a set of images are generated illustrating future ways of living, travelling and consuming products and services where certain goal such as a reduced climate impact is fulfilled. These are not predictions of the future, but can be used as a way to act in accordance to achieving a desired future development. They can also be a contribution to the general debate or foundations for policy decisions. These scenarios also often include an account of changes in terms of consumption patterns and behavioural change. In this sense, these scenarios are extended beyond socio-economic predictions and relations to environmental load dealt

within other field, such as climate change predictions in the work of IPCC. The scenarios in focus here build on some predictive elements, but in addition the sustainability focus when including behavioural change also includes some normative elements as how to achieve a sustainable society in the future. In essence, this also means that images of behavioural change are included, but not necessary including explanations on how these changes came about (Larsen & Höjer, 2007). The behavioural change is there formulated by describing level of

acceptance (of introducing a new environmental tax) or new behaviour in daily travel patterns (new modes of transport). However, even though scenario construction is often a creative process including a range of participants demanding change, trust is built and ideas exchanged, these processes are seldom analyzed as deliberative processes . Deliberation takes places in communicative processes where participants with diverse opinions, but open to preference shifts, are seen as equal (see Hendriks, Dryzek, & Hunold, 2007). Process values such as learning and mutual understanding are created in addition to outputs such as policies . Experiences from exploring transition pathways towards sustainability distinguish between process management aspects of learning (learns how?), learning about policy options and the context in which decisions take place (learns what?), the subjects of learning (who learns?), and the results of learning (Van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005: 735). Especially questions such as who takes part in the process and whom these participants are to represent become important since the scenarios often expect great behavioural changes. Is it legitimate to expect all people to change even if they did not feel as they were represented? It is important to keep in mind that scenario making processes are not set up only to share ideas and create mutual understanding, they aim at solving specific targets such as minimizing climate change. Some writers (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2007) underline the importance of deliberative processes being open and diverse and do not put as much attention to the outcome.

Understanding the importance of legitimacy we see the process as crucial, but aiming for goals such as minimized climate change both the content and the impact of the output are also critical. Thus, we agree with Connelly and Richardson (in press) seeing effective deliberation as a process where stakeholders are engaged and the primary assessment should be regarding the process' “effectiveness in delivering an intended policy” . They also underline that governance as a whole should be assessed regarding its possibilities to take action and achieve

legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as “the recognised right to make policy” (Connelly & Richardson, in press). There are thus three dimensions Connelly and Richardson (in press) find important: content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy. We believe those dimensions are also important for participatory processes generating scenarios aiming at mitigation as well as adaptation to climate change, otherwise they will not have any strong (and legitimate) impact on development. Hendriks et al. (2007) make an important distinction between partisan and non-partisan forums. We believe this distinction is important also when analyzing scenario generating processes since it affects the legitimacy of the outcome. Partisans can be activists or belong to interest groups, organisations or associations, which strive for particular matters. Partisans are thus committed to certain agendas and are therefore often seen as poor deliberators (Hendriks et al., 2007:

362). However, from a democracy perspective they are seen as important since they legitimate processes by

making sure that particular stakes are represented. While partisan forums are made up to represent interest groups in society, non-partisan forums consist of randomly selected citizens, which ideally have rather open preferences. When exploring one partisan and one non-partisan process Hendriks et al. (2007) found that contrary to common expectations, partisan forums can have substantial legitimacy and impact problems. They also found that non-partisan forums might be favourable in deliberative capacity but they might fall short in external legitimacy and policy impact. The fact was that partisan participants accepted that deliberation means that you must be willing to adjust preferences, but they failed to do so (Hendriks et al., 2007: 370). Both the partisan and non-partisan forums included participants who stuck to their positions, but non-partisan participants had greater autonomy “so their deliberative capacity can be judged superior to that of partisan forums” (Hendriks et al., 2007: 371). In the study by Hendriks et al. (2007: 372) legitimacy is defined and operationalized as: “the extent to which key-actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure and its outcomes.” In other words, the legitimacy (as defined in that study) is grounded on actors largely outside the forums active in the deliberation processes. This study also showed (by interviews of experts themselves) that the deliberation by citizens and capacity of lay people was questioned by some experts (Hendriks et al., 2007: 373–374). In addition to this distinction of external legitimacy, the concept of legitimacy is in the literature largely divided in strategic and institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 572). The strategic tradition stresses the managerial standpoint in how organisations making legitimate strategies resulting in manipulating to gain societal support. Hence, rather than emphasizing participatory processes (and the inherent process

values), these values and the participatory process can be by-passed by e.g. “astroturfing”1 or other strategic options adopted. The branch of institutional studies of legitimacy, instead, emphasizes the “normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower the organizational actors” as described in Suchman (1995: 571) examining the two approaches. The conclusion of this examination of the two parallel domains of research on legitimacy concludes three categories: pragmatic (based on audience self-interest), moral (based on normative approval) and cognitive (based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness). In practical cases one of these categories can be more protruding or legitimacy being a blend of these three. The external legitimacy category, discussed previously, share some common traits with the audience self-interest category (labelled pragmatic) in the sense that actors external to the deliberative process (the audience consisting of experts and media) has a strong saying in the

legitimate value of the outcome. The constellations of forums and involvement of stakeholders in governance processes is also featured in studies recognised as communicative planning theory (Healey, 1996) and the question also becomes relevant when implementing future-oriented development in European metropolitan regions (Healey, 2000). Campbell (2006) underlines that conceptualization of justice in contemporary planning theory is

much about procedural concerns. However, individual liberties may be in conflict or as Campbell (2006: 95) puts it: “ In relation to planning matters, the nature of interests is often complex and problematic ; for example, individuals generally both desire clean air and to be able to drive their car(s) freely. Our preferences are therefore often inconsistent and overlapping.” Also the previous work with Swedish futures studies construction in the 1960–1970s having aims at democratic scenario construction by proposing a “particular responsibility to society's weakest groups” (Andersson, 2006: 288). At that time these groups were discussed in terms of the “weakest groups” (including the poor, elderly, unemployed and the disabled). Other examples of relevance when discussing communication among actors can be found in game theory (Sally, 1995). Conditions where reciprocity and trust can help overcome self-interests are built by “cheap talk”. As we will see, content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy are intimately connected. Findings from studies of collective actions frequently find that “when the users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on them” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). Common-pool resources are in this case understood as “natural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person's consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). The explanation from game theory is that individuals obtain results that are “better than rational” when they are allowed to communicate, or do “cheap talk” as some

economists call it (see e.g. Ostrom, 1998). In other words, communicative approaches can make collaboration work better since people have the possibility to bond with each other. From this reasoning we conclude that in a process where participants are active, open to preference shifts and are allowed to actually influence the result, both the content sustainability and the capacity to act might increase. However, similar reasoning about legitimacy of these processes suggests that people who are not allowed (by some reason) to take part in the process might not experience the result as legitimate. Thus, the external legitimacy might be low. The deliberative approach to scenario construction raises several questions about involvement of different types of groups and at what points in time (once or repetitive stakeholder participation) the

process is opened up to citizens affected by mitigation or adaptation measures introduced to face climate change. Also the involvement of lay people besides scientific experts in increasingly complex questions (involving trade-offs synergies and inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation strategies) give renewed urgency to find ways to incorporate views from diverse stakeholder groups or non-partisan forums to ensure the development of robust strategies and socio-economic models. It is also a question if the lay people

participating in the process are invited to primarily learn during the process, or actually influence the outcome of the process. Here the planning tradition of stakeholder participation can also benefit from previous work in the area of participatory science and technology studies, discussed in the following section of this paper. Furthermore, the following section also brings

attention to other central concepts based on previous literature when examining the adaptation and mitigation interface.

Impact Turns

Env. Security solves WarEnvironmental security k2 stabilityIES, 4 (The Institute for Environmental Security (IES) is an international non-profit non-governmental organisation established in 2002 in The Hague, in order to increase political attention to environmental security as a means to help safeguard essential conditions for peace and sustainable development., no date, http://www.envirosecurity.org/activities/What_is_Environmental_Security.pdf) KD

Environmental security is central to national security, comprising the dynamics and interconnections among the natural

resource base, the social fabric of the state, and the economic engine for local and regional stability ; and that, while the

precise roles of the environment in peace, conflict, destabilization and human insecurity may differ from situation to situation and as such are still being debated in relation to other security and conflict variables, there are growing indications that it is

increasingly an underlying cause of instability, conflict and unrest. Another important aspect in the relationship between

environment and security is the impact of conflict on the environment. Violent conflict, war, displaced persons, etc.

may lead to a decrease of environmental security and spiral up a vicious circle of scarcity and further conflict.

Militarism Turn

Rev => MilitarismRevolutionary acts result in increased militarism – turns the K.Carter, 4 (Alan, Department of Philosophy @ University of Colorado @ Boulder, “Some theoretical foundations for radical green politics,” Environmental Values, Vol. 13. No. 3, August, pp. 305-328, JSTOR)

For these reasons, it can be argued that periods of revolutionary epochal change are most likely to lead to increasing militarisation. Most importantly, then, a revolution thus seems to require any revolutionary state to concentrate upon its military requirements and to stabilise whichever economic relations are appropriate for supporting its military needs. In

other words, it is during revolutionary periods that the State-Primacy Theory is most likely to apply. But, surely,

such periods are precisely those which shape the economic and political structure of the ensuing epoch. Consequently,

the State-Primacy Theory is likely to be the most appropriate theory to employ when seeking to understand precisely those periods which it most needs to explain: namely, those periods that determine the shape of the ensuing epoch.

Realism

Hierarchy of ThreatsOur realist model puts threats on a sliding scale – we can pick and choose which are included.Trombetta 9 [Maria Julia, expert of critical security studies and energy and environmental governance @ University of Nottingham, “Environmental security and climate change: analyzing the discourse”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, January 26, 2009, pg 587] NISH

Realism—traditionally the mainstream approach in security (or rather strategic studies)—adopts a narrow definition of security that has the state as referent and takes security to be achieved through the menace or use of force. Realists tend to consider environmental problems as belonging to the realm of ‘low’ politics rather than an issue of ‘high’ politics, such as security. In this way, as Lacy (2005) has

outlined, realists tend to create a hierarchy of threats, distinguishing between threats that can be legitimately included in the security agenda and those that cannot.4

PermRealism solves the K better- the aff ignores it’s inherent critical theory dimensionsMorgenthau 08 [Hans- Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of International Relations, Reclaiming the critical dimension of realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the ethics of scholarship, Review of International Studies, 1-10-2008,

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=1642496&jid=RIS&volumeId=34&issueId=01&aid=1642492&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=]-DaveD.

This article concentrates on Morgenthau’s views on the ethics of scholarship and argues that all his works must be read in the light of his central goal: speaking truth to power. Morgenthau wrote at length, and held very specific views about, the role and function of scholars in society. It is therefore legitimate to claim that, as a scholar himself, Morgenthau attempted to live up to his very demanding definition of scholarly activity, and his assertion that scholars have the moral responsibility to speak truth to power informed all his major works. While Morgenthau’s conception of the ethics of scholarship is generally ignored or neglected, it is, however,¶ * I am grateful to Dr Natalie Bormann, Dr Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Dr Ve ronique Pin-Fat for their insightful comments upon the first draft of this article. I also thank the people from ́the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, for their feedback on the final draft, and Professor Richard Ned Lebow who kindly read the paper. I also wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.¶

1 Morgenthau, quoted in Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau – An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana University Press, 2001), p.

158.¶ 5¶ 6 Murielle Cozette¶ indispensable to take it into account when approaching his writings. Indeed, it demonstrates that for Morgenthau, a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions , which are intrinsically linked : it is supposed to explain international relations, but it is also , fundamentally, a normative and critical project which questions the existing status quo .¶ While the explanatory dimension of realism is usually discussed at great length, its critical side is consistently – and conveniently – forgotten or underestimated by the more recent, self-named ‘critical’ approaches . However diverse these recent approaches may

be in their arguments, what unites them all is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. The interpretation they provide of realism is well known, and rarely questioned . Although it is beyond the scope of this article to review it at length, it is worth stressing some of the main features which are constantly emphasised.¶ First then, realism is a state-centric approach, by which is meant that it stresses the importance of anarchy and the struggle for power among states. From this, most critical approaches jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore strikingly ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where the state is increasingly regarded as outdated and/or dangerous, because it stands in the path of different, more emancipatory modes of political organisation. Realism, it is also argued, pretends to be objective and to depict ‘things as they are’: but this cannot obscure the fact that theories are never value-neutral and constitute the very ‘reality’ they pretend to ‘describe’. This leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism: it is portrayed as the voice of (great) powers, with the effect of reifying (and therefore legitimising) the existing international order. This explains why Rothstein can confidently argue that realism ‘is . . . implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo’, and that it is a ‘deceptive and dangerous’ theory, not least because it ‘has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist

criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to outwit or to dupe domestic dissenters’.2 Such views represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the realist project, but are nonetheless widely accepted as commonsense in the discipline. ¶ A typical example of this is the success of Cox’s famous distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory. Unsurprisingly, realism is the archetypal example of a problem-solving theory for Cox. His account of the realist tradition sweepingly equates Morgenthau and Waltz, who are described as ‘American scholars who transformed realism into a form of problem-solving theory’.3 Thereafter in his famous article ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Cox refers to the works of both scholars by using the term ‘neo-realism’. Problem solving theory (and therefore realism) ‘takes the world as it finds it . . . as the given framework for action’, while by contrast, the distinctive trait of ‘critical theory’ is to ‘stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about’.4 Problem-solving theory, says Cox, ‘serves particular national sectional or class interests, which are¶ 2 Robert L. Rothstein, ‘On the Costs of Realism’, Political Science Quarterly, 87:3 (1972), p. 359.¶ 3 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its¶ Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 211. Later, Cox acknowledges that talking about realism without distinguishing between Morgenthau and Waltz is problematic, and simply makes it clear that his main target is Waltz.¶ 4 Ibid., p. 208.¶ Reclaiming the critical dimension of realism 7¶ comfortable within the given order’, which therefore means that its purpose is ‘conservative’.5 Problem-solving theory also pretends to be ‘value free’, while Cox is keen to remind his reader that it contains some ‘latent normative elements’, and that its ‘non normative quality is however, only superficial’.6 By contrast to what Cox presents as a problem-solving theory, being ‘critical’ in IR means being openly normative, challenging the status quo, and seeking to advance human emancipa- tion(s), however this

concept is to be defined.7 The picture Cox proposes is therefore simple: critical theory is named as such because of its commitment to ‘bringing about an alternative order’ and because of its openly normative stance, while realism, by contrast, is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and ‘sustain[s] the existing order’.8¶ To be fair, not all critical theorists promote such a simplistic vision o f what realism stands for – Cox himself, in some of his later works, recognised that classical realism possesses an undeniable critical dimension. In 1992, providing a more nuanced analysis of the school, he thus accepted that ‘classical realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power’ .9 He did not, however, investigate the critical dimension of realism in much depth, and failed to identify its emancipatory dimension. Other critical theorists demonstrate an awareness of the richness and subtlety of Morgenthau’s ideas. The best example remains Ashley’s famous piece on the poverty of neorealism, where he justly argues that the triumph of the latter has obscured the insights provided by classical realism. Ashley’s analysis remains, however, problematic as his interpretation of Morgenthau does not identify all the critical dimensions of his writings, and ultimately continues to present classical realism as the ‘ideological apparatus’ of one particular ruling group, that of statesmen, which remains essentially incapable of realising its own limitations. As he writes:¶ It is a tradition whose silences and omissions, and failures of self critical nerve join it in secret complicity with an order of domination that reproduces the expectation of inequality as a motivating force, and insecurity as an integrating principle. As the ‘organic intellectuality of the world wide public sphere of bourgeois society, classical realism honors the silences of the tradition it interprets and participates in exempting the ‘private sphere’

from public responsibility.10 (emphasis added)¶ The ‘picture’ of classical realism which is provided by Ashley therefore does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension , as it ultimately presents it as reproducing the existing order and silencing dissent.¶ Cox’s distinction clearly echoes the now classic one between ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ approaches (a label broad enough to include the self-named Critical Theory, Feminism, Normative theory, Constructivism and Post-Structuralism). The diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially, what allows them¶ 5 Ibid., p. 209.¶ 6 Ibid., p. 212.¶ 7 Ibid., p. 210.¶ 8 Ibid., p. 210.¶

9 Robert Cox, with Tim Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University¶ Press, 1996), p. 505.¶ 10 Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization, 38:2 (1984), p. 281.¶ 8 Murielle Cozette¶ to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological (usually ‘post-positivist’) or ontological assumptions they may share. It is also, fundamen- tally, the image they think lies in the mirror when they turn it to realism. In most cases then, it seems to be enough to oppose a simplistic picture of realism like that provided by Cox to deserve the much coveted label ‘critical’. This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a realist scholar and critical, as the two adjectives are implicitly presented as antithetical.¶ This clearly amounts to an insidious high-jacking of the very adjective ‘critical’, which more often than not merely signals that one does not adopt a realist approach. The meaning of the adjective is therefore presented as self-evident, and realism is denied any critical dimension. This is highly problematic as this reinforces a typical ‘self-righteousness’ from these ‘critical’ approaches, which tend to rely on a truncated and misleading picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists’ arguments. The fact that Waltz is always the primary target of these approaches is no coincidence: this article demonstrates that realism as expressed by Morgenthau is at its very core a critical project.¶ In order to challenge the use of the adjective ‘critical’ by some who tend to think of themselves as such simply by virtue of opposing what they mistakenly present as a conservative theoretical project, the article highlights the central normative and critical dimensions underlying Morgenthau’s works. It does so by assessing his views about the ethics of scholarship. The article is divided into two parts. First, it investigates Morgenthau’s ideal of the scholarly activity, which rests upon a specific understanding of the relationship between truth and power. Second, it focuses on some features which, for Morgenthau, constitute a ‘betrayal’ of this ideal (a term he borrowed from Julien Benda).¶ The article demonstrates that contrary to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order, Morgenthau’s formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a subversive force, which should ‘stir up the conscience of society’, and in doing so, challenge the status quo. For Morgenthau, IR scholars have the responsibility to seek truth, against power if needed, and then to speak this truth to power even though power may try to silence or distort the scholar’s voice.11 Giving up this responsibility leads to ideology and blind support for power, which is something that Morgenthau always saw as dangerous, and consist- ently opposed. His commitment to truth in turn explains why, according to him, political science is always, by definition, a revolutionary force whose

main purpose is to bring about ‘change through action’. In complete contrast to what ‘critical approaches’ consistently claim, the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers -that-be.