1

Engendering Economic Recovery:

Modelling Alternatives to Austerity in Europe

By

Hannah Bargawi, SOAS, University of London, UK

and

Giovanni Cozzi, FEPS, Brussels, Belgium

ABSTRACT1

This article explores a gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario for Europe as an

alternative to the current direction of austerity policies over the medium to long-term. Using a

macroeconomic forecasting model we demonstrate that the dual aim of economic growth and

increases in both male and female employment can be achieved via the adoption of gender-

sensitive expansionary macroeconomic policies and by overturning austerity policies.

Projections for our gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario suggest that an

additional 14 million jobs, of which 9 million are for women, could be created by 2030 in the

Eurozone and the United Kingdom by reversing austerity policies and marshalling

government expenditure and investment towards female and male employment. We also

show that these positive results are not achieved at the expense of high levels of debts and

fiscal deficits. The main recommendation is for Europe to roll back austerity policies and to

embark on a new gender-focused economic trajectory.

KEYWORDS

Europe, austerity measures, recovery, gendered macroeconomic policies.

1 This work has been made possible by generous financial support from FEPS, Brussels and SOAS, University of London. The

authors received helpful comments from participants of the ‘Beyond Austerity, Towards Employment: A Gender Aware Framework’ seminar, held in Brussels in February 2014. Thanks also to Lorena Lombardozzi for excellent research assistance and to Terry McKinley to comments on an earlier draft.

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1. Introduction

Job creation for both men and women should be a high priority for European policy makers

given the unsustainable high levels of unemployment rate in the aftermath of the financial

crisis and the persistent employment gap between men and women across Europe. Instead,

economic policies to date have overwhelmingly focused on attempts to cut both government

debt and deficit by adopting a series of austerity measure with negative consequences for job

creation and growth.

This paper explores a gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario for Europe as

an alternative to the current direction of austerity policies. This alternative scenario focuses

on the need to generate higher growth, to create jobs across Europe, and to narrow the gap

between female and male employment rates in Europe. We base our assumption on existing

empirical evidence which shows that policies focusing on employment generation and

investment are one of the best strategies for stimulating future growth and, crucially, for

reducing government debt in the medium to long term (see e.g. Terry McKinley and

Giovanni Cozzi, 2011, Stephanie Griffith-Jones, Matthias Kollatz-Ahnen, Lars Andersen and

Signe Hansen 2012 and Terry McKinley, Giovanni Cozzi, Jo Michell, and Hannah Bargawi

2013a, among others).

Using a detailed macroeconomic model in this paper we complement the existing

empirical evidence by developing a gendered perspective on employment-based economic

recovery. This is of particular importance in light of increased evidence that current austerity

policies in Europe are likely to disproportionately disadvantage women via their roles in the

labor market (see e.g. Maria Karamessini and Jill Rubery 2013 and Francesca Bettio et al.

2013).

In order to achieve this objective, our paper compares and contrasts two alternative

scenarios for Europe: an austerity scenario and a gendered expansionary macroeconomic

scenario. In the austerity scenario we assume that the current fundamental direction of

austerity policies is maintained to 2030 while in our gendered expansionary macroeconomic

scenario we use government spending and investment, and private investment to reach

specific targets for female and male employment. In other words, we assume that

governments do not drastically cut public investment and expenditure and that private

investment significantly increases in an effort to generate the economic momentum required

to substantially raise employment levels for both men and women.

The focus of this paper is on the Eurozone and the United Kingdom. We divide the

Eurozone into two blocs: Core Eurozone (Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Luxemburg

and The Netherlands) and Eurozone Periphery (Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece).

Eurozone countries have been aggregated on the basis of similar macroeconomic conditions.

Further, we keep the Eurozone Periphery as an individual bloc as it exhibits much lower rates

of female employment compared to the Core Eurozone.

Results generated by the CAM model for the gendered expansionary macroeconomic

scenario project significantly higher levels of both male and female employment than the

austerity scenario and thus lead to a significant reduction in the employment gap between

men and women. The reduction in the employment gap between men and women in our

alternative scenario also has positive effects on both labor productivity and on the available

amount of government spending per dependent. In addition, the combination of higher levels

of growth and increased government revenue lead to a significant reduction in both

government debt and fiscal deficits in our scenario. As such the gendered expansionary

macroeconomic scenario cannot be dismissed on the basis of fiscal profligacy or for

generating excessive government debt.

Thus, we conclude by arguing that a gender-aware expansionary macroeconomic

framework for Europe is indeed economically viable and it provides significantly better

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perspectives not only in terms of job creation for women and men but also in terms of debt

reduction and fiscal balances.

While there is a growing literature on the impact of austerity on men and women, and

alternative proposals to narrow the employment gap between men and women this paper

makes an original contribution in that it is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to quantify and

assess the overall economic feasibility of a gender-sensitive expansionary macroeconomic

strategy for Europe.

2. What do we know about the impact of the crisis and austerity policies on men and

women in Europe’s labor market?

Initially, the global financial crisis led to a decline in domestic and global demand in male-

dominated manufacturing, construction, and financial sectors. However, as crisis turned to

recession across Europe, secondary impacts via private sector demand have been less gender-

specific, affecting a range of industries and leading to job cuts, wage freezes and increased

job insecurity for both men and women (Stephanie Seguino 2010; Karamessini and Rubery

2013). A further dimension to these first and second-round job cuts is pointed out by Seguino

(2010), making use of results from latest round of the World Values Survey. In developed as

well as developing countries gender norms around who has a greater right to a job often

persist, so that ‘women are frequently fired first, because men are perceived to be the

legitimate jobholders when jobs are scarce.’ (Seguino 2010: 181)

Examples from Italy (Alina Verashchagina and Marina Capparucci 2013), Spain (Elvira

Gago and Marcelo Kirzner 2013), and Greece (Maria Karamessini 2013), while

demonstrating the variety in the channels and intensity of impacts of the crisis, also highlight

a number of trends and commonalities regarding gender aspects. In general, the crisis has

stalled progress towards gender equality, both in terms of pay and conditions as well as

reducing the absolute number of women in formal employment. Where a narrowing of gender

equality has taken place this has, unfortunately, been achieved ‘through the deterioration of

employment and social conditions for both men and women.’ (Karamessini 2013: 183)

Despite the significant deterioration in employment opportunities for both men and

women as a result of the global crisis and recession, policy responses across Europe,

following temporary, piece-meal and early attempts at fiscal stimulus, have focused on fiscal

containment and debt reduction rather than promoting growth and job creation (Bettio et al

2013: 120). The preoccupation with fiscal deficits and government debts has led governments

to implement harsh austerity policies in order to significantly reduce government

expenditures, with negative repercussions on public sector employment, welfare and public

investment. Isabel Ortiz and Matthew Cummins (2013) conduct a review of austerity

measures across 181 countries, relying on IMF country reports published since 2010 to

document policies across the following seven categories: i) eliminating or reducing subsidies;

ii) cutting or capping the wage bill; iii) increasing consumption and sales taxes; iv)

reforming old age pension, usually to increase the age of eligibility for men and women; v)

rationalising safety nets; vi) healthcare systems reform; vii) labor flexibilization reform (e.g.

removal or minimum wages). Table 1 summarizes their results.

INSERT Table 1: Review of austerity measures across Europe

Missing from Ortiz and Cummins (2013a) original analysis is an assessment of how

policies under the above categories affect different groups of people within each country,

including women as opposed to men. However, an updated study by the authors (2013b),

does highlight the ways in which vulnerable groups are impacted by each of the above

categories within developing countries. They conclude as follows.

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“The adverse effects of the main austerity measures being adopted were also likely

to be disproportionately felt by children and women: wage bill reductions can

hamper the delivery and quality of essential health, nutrition, and education goods

and services, especially in rural areas; subsidy reversals can make food, transport,

and other basic goods unaffordable; and rationalizing social protection schemes,

including pension benefits, runs a high risk of exclusion at a time when children

and women are most in need.” (Isabel Ortiz and Matthew Cummins 2013b: 73)

There has been a gradual recognition among gender experts that such policies are

significantly shifting the burden of debt and budget deficit adjustment on to women in both

developed and developing countries (Seguino 2010; Zita Gurmai 2013; Karamessini and

Rubery 2013; UNISON 2014). The European Women’s Lobby (EWL) (2012) has detailed

the ways in which women across Europe have been acutely affected by such austerity policies

both inside and outside the labor market. In many instances cut-backs to state-provided care

services are seeing women return to their traditional gender roles, stepping out of formal

employment to take over caring responsibilities no longer funded by the state. The EWL

(2012) report also highlights the increasing precariousness of lone mothers and female

pensioners, due to their heightened reliance on state-funded services, currently under threat

from cut-backs.

Beyond the direct impacts via the labor market, there are a number of ways in which

women are impacted by austerity policies indirectly as well. Increases in the retirement age,

the removal of or tightening of criteria relating to certain benefits (e.g. housing benefit), and

the rise in out-of-pocket health spending are all additional examples of ways in which

expenditure cuts are hitting households, and women in particular, outside of the labor market.

For example, current pension reforms in the case of Greece (Karamessini 2013) demonstrate

the way in which women are penalised as a result of having shorter and irregular work

histories.

The focus on this paper in on assessing the impact of austerity policies on men and

women via the labor market, in particular, and on demonstrating what an alternative

framework for Europe might look like. We therefore focus the following discussion of

gendered labor market impacts under two main headings (i) direct public sector employment

impacts, and ii) indirect public spending effects, before identifying the roots of an alternative

framework that moves away from austerity economics.

Public sector employment impacts

Cuts in government expenditure have led to a further reduction in female-dominated public

sector jobs and pay. Even early indications from a study conducted in 2010-11 in four

countries in Europe, indicated that public sector job cuts have been a widespread feature of

austerity policies, with women disproportionately affected (European Federation of Public

Service Unions 2011). Recruitment freezes or job cuts have also resulted in increased

working intensity (longer hours, fewer holidays, and less family-friendly shift patterns) for

those remaining in employment. Women have been disproportionately affected by such

changes. (see Gago and Kirzner 2013 for examples of this in the Spanish context).

A brief glance at more recent EUROSTAT data reveals the opposing trends regarding

male and female public sector employment across the Eurozone. In the Core Eurozone male

full-time public sector employment (MFTPSE) has declined moderately since 2010. In 2013

levels were 97% of the pre-austerity levels of 2010. In the Eurozone Periphery the falls in

MFTPSE have been more dramatic, reaching just 92% of 2010 levels in 2013. However,

across both regions part-time public sector employment has increased for males. In the Core

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Eurozone the increase in male part-time public sector employment (MPTPSE) has been

moderate but in the South Eurozone such as increase has been particularly relevant, rising to

above 120% of 2010 levels in 2013.

Of interest to us, are the different trajectories followed by female counterparts in the

Core and Periphery Eurozone. While female full-time public sector employment (FFTPSE)

has remained stable in the Core Eurozone, FFTPSE in the Eurozone Periphery has declined

almost as sharply as for men. However, in contrast to the situation for men, female part-time

public sector employment (FPTPSE) has not risen in the same way as for men in this region.

Instead levels of FPTPSE have only witnessed a marginal increase.

INSERT Figure 1: Public sector employment in the Eurozone (2010-2013)

The above data suggests a sharp gender contrast in public sector employment in the

Eurozone Periphery. While male full-time employment in the public sector has declined, part-

time employment has made up for some of these falls. It would appear that, however, such

part-time employment in the public sector has not played the same role for women laid off

from full-time employment in the public sector in the Eurozone Periphery.

Considering trends in the public sector gender pay gap can help us further understand

the gender dimension to public sector cuts. The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents

the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female

paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. As

such a reduction in the GPG represents progress towards equal pay between men and women.

Table 2 below highlights the progress achieved regarding the GPG in the public sector since

2008 (in this instance the health and education sectors in countries for which such data is

available). Across all countries (with the exception of Spain), the GPG in the public sector

has been on the decline. A closer look, however, reveals that such progress has stalled since

austerity measures were adopted in 2010. A simple average reveals that progress towards

equal pay is in jeopardy in both the Eurozone Periphery and Core, with countries such as

Ireland, Spain and France showing particularly worrying trends.

INSERT Table 2: The gender pay gap in the public sector in Europe (2008-2012)

Public spending effects

Cuts in care-related spending or increased eligibility criteria for receiving support towards

(child and/or elderly) care costs and family benefits have hit women in the labor market in

particular. Many have reduced their work commitments or have left the labor market entirely

as a result of such an increase in costs (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). Eurostat data

indicates a general reduction in public spending across the Eurozone countries and the UK,

with Eurozone Periphery countries witnessing stronger reductions in public expenditure since

2010. This picture can be broken down further.

Spending on old-age services has remained relatively stable across all countries.

Similarly spending on health services, in general has remained around 14%-16% of GDP

across Eurozone countries (Eurostat 2014). However, once data on spending per person are

considered different trajectories emerge in the Periphery and Core Eurozone. While in the

Core Eurozone health spending per person per annum has increased from an average of

€2730 in 2010 to €2900 in 2012, in the Eurozone Periphery there has been an average

reduction of health spending per person from €1730 in 2010 to €1560 in 2012.

Spending on children’s services and education has followed a similar trajectory. While

spending on family and child services has remained relatively stable over the last few years,

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education spending per child has been reduced by a significant margin in Eurozone Periphery

countries. While in the Eurozone Core average public education spending per child (under

15) per annum has increased marginally year on year since 2008, in the Eurozone Periphery

countries such spending has, on average, been reduced from €7540 in 2010 to €6760 in 2012

per child per annum.

The impacts of such a reduction in spending on essential public services on female

employment can be seen in the data on discouraged workers. In the Eurozone periphery

female workers have been particularly discouraged from (re)entering the jobs market since

2010. While in 2010 the percentage of discouraged workers in the Eurozone Periphery

represented around 5.6% of the total active population, by 2013 that figure had reached 7.2%.

INSERT Table 3: Female discouraged workers2 as a % of total active population

(2008-2012)

The overall picture that emerges from the above consultation of recent literature and data is

an unambiguous one. Austerity policies are beginning to expose clear gender divisions,

especially in the Eurozone Periphery. Women are feeling the impact of such policies both

directly, via their reduced employment in the public sector but also indirectly via the

reduction of public sector spending on crucial care, health and education services that have,

in the past, supported working women. Given this status-quo it is crucial that we highlight the

nature and content of a gendered alternative to austerity economics.

Developing alternative policies further from a gender-perspective

A significant discussion on alternative policy proposals for economic recovery has recently

emerged from a number of different arenas. These proposals are based on the recognition that

austerity policies are detrimental for Europe and that jobs and growth are created only with

the adoption of an expansionary macroeconomic framework (see Nitika Bagaria, Dawn

Holland and John Van Reenen 2012; Michael Dauderstaedt and Ernst Hillebrandt 2013;

McKinley et al. 2013a; Griffith-Jones et al. 2012; and McKinley and Cozzi 2011). A

particularly illuminating aspect of this research have been attempts, using the CAM as well as

other macroeconomic models, to demonstrate the medium to long-term desirability of

adopting alternative macroeconomic policies in Europe, for growth and job creation in

general. However, currently missing from the above studies, have been attempts to estimate

the potential gender impacts of different policy scenarios.

Concurrently to the above research agenda, a number of feminist scholars have begun

to demonstrate what a progressive, feminist alternative to continued austerity might constitute

in concrete policy terms (Claire Annesley 2014; Diane Perrons and Ania Plomien 2013;

Women’s Budget Group 2012). In the UK, the Women’s Budget Group (2012) has devised a

so-called F-Plan. This alternative, feminist plan for recovery outlines policies that stimulates

job creation by putting money in the hands of poorer and middle-income people and invests

in social as well as physical infrastructure. The F-plan covers tangible measures to reverse

current and planned expenditure cuts of the UK government by reintroducing important

benefits, such as child care allowances and pensioner benefits. The F-plan also outlines

important progressive revenue-raising policies, supporting an international financial

transaction tax and raising taxes from higher income earners. Finally, the F-plan details how

financial and investment policies can be made more gender-equitable, for example via the

rebalancing of investments towards social and human infrastructure as well as physical

infrastructure. These concrete proposals are an important addition to current debates around

2 Discouraged workers are identified as persons available to work but not seeking work.

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the impact of the financial crisis and austerity policies on men and women in Europe. Such

policy proposals also fill the gender-gap identified among those working on macroeconomic

policies for broad-based recovery in Europe.

Finally, it is important to note the progress made regarding the engendering of

macroeconomic models among feminist scholars. Recent works by Elissa Braunstein, Irene

Van Staveren and Daniela Tavani (2011) and Marzia Fontana (2014) demonstrate the limits

of traditional macroeconomic models of the economy and the limits to investigating gender

as merely an add-on to traditional categories of analysis. Braunstein, Van Staveren and

Tavani (2011) offer an important addition to the literature in this field by formally modelling

the unpaid care sector as part of the economic system. In general, attempts to engender

macroeconomic models have remained within the realm of the short to medium term.

Therefore very little can be said on the basis of this (mostly theoretical) work about concrete

changes in policies and gendered outcomes in the longer-term. This article, by making use of

a non-conventional macroeconomic model, hopes to add to this research by providing a

longer-term perspective.

This article intends to borrow from the different strands of research discussed above, and

build on the research and policy status quo. The intention is to investigate the engendering of

the general macroeconomic alternatives to continued austerity, by implementing the measures

and policies emerging from feminist scholarship. As such, the article is able to demonstrate

the economic feasibility of a gender-equitable macroeconomic scenario that puts long-term

growth and job creation at its heart.

3. The Cambridge-Alphametrics model (CAM)

In section 2 we presented some of the gendered impacts of current austerity policies via labor

market outcomes in the short to medium-term, relying on currently available Eurostat data

and evidence from secondary literature. But what are the broader, long-term consequences of

continued austerity versus alternative policy measures? We hope to answer this question by

making use of a global macroeconomic model that allows us to compare and contrast

opposing policy scenarios. While this model does not allow us to consider the long-term

gender outcomes in specific sectors, it does allow us to investigate the impacts of different

policies on men and women in the labor market and on broader economic variables in each of

our countries of interest.

The Cambridge-Alphametrics Model (CAM) of the world economy is a non-conventional

global macroeconomic model that is primarily used to make medium- to long-term

projections of historical trends of the global economy, blocs of countries, and major

individual countries. This macro-model does not have any single, well-defined equilibrium

path to which the world economy tends to return in the medium or long-term. Being an open

disequilibrium system, a wide variety of outcomes may be simulated with different growth

rates and end points (Francis Cripps 2014).3

CAM projections draw on continuous historical data from 1970 to the most current year

available for model variables (2012 for this exercise). The databank holds series in US dollar

values and other units disseminated by UN organizations.

In CAM the world economy is regarded as an integrated system in which the behaviour

of different countries and blocs differs and changes progressively through time because of

their specific situation in terms of geography, level of development, financial position, and so

forth. The macro-model has a common set of identities and behavioural equations for all

blocs to reflect the notion that they are part of the same world economy. This common

3 This section draws expensively from Cripps (2014).

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schema allows for panel estimation methods, which are advantageous when there is

considerable variation in the accuracy of series from different groups of countries and time

periods (Cripps 2014).

Behavioural equations are specified with functional forms that make it possible for

responses in different parts of the world and at different levels of development to be modelled

with common structural parameters with explicit identifications of the main reasons for

differences between blocs. Techniques that facilitate use of the common schema include bloc

specific intercepts and error variances, error-correction dynamics, and transformation and

scaling of variables (Cripps 2014).

Unless behavioural constraints are introduced into the model, aggregate demand and

technical progress are the principal drivers of economic growth. Thus, growth rate is best

understood as reflecting growth of aggregate investment and government spending in the

world as a whole. These variables in turn reflect confidence and expectations on the one hand

(private investment) and policy on the other (government spending) (Cripps 2014).

The model structure is implemented by equations fixing the value of a large number of

macro-economic variables for each bloc and year, some of which are identities (i.e. the

equation must always hold exactly) and other behavioural in nature with residual terms that

represent departures from normal regular behaviours specified by constants and explanatory

variables with structural coefficients determined by panel estimation (Cripps 2014).

Below we report some of the core variables and equations of the CAM model which

form the basis of the scenarios built in this paper.

Income and expenditure

Gross national income Y is distributed and spent by government and the private sector. The

source of gross national income are output (GDP), net receipts of income and transfers from

other countries and additions to or subtractions from domestic purchasing power arising from

changes in the external terms of trade.

Private disposable income is defined as national income not absorbed by the government:

(1) 𝑌𝑝 = 𝑌 − 𝑌𝑔

Private consumption expenditure is determined by income and savings behaviour:

(2) 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑝 − 𝑆𝑝

The saving rate responds to changes in income Yp and wealth Wp and is influenced by

inflation and short-term interest rate.

Private fixed investment shows a standard accelerator pattern responding to the rate of growth

of GDP dlog(V) and financial conditions such as the rate of bank lending, ILN, and the real

bond rate, irm:

(3) 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐼𝑝

𝑉−1 − 0.05⁄ ) = 𝑓(− log(𝐼𝑃−1/𝑉−2 −

0.5), +𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉), +𝐼𝐿𝑁−1

𝑉−1⁄ , −𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑎𝑏 , 𝑒𝑏 )

The symbols ab and eb denote the bloc-specific intercepts (long-run values) and disturbances.

Government accounts

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Changes in government debt Lg depend on the balance between government spending and

revenue and on asset transactions and write-offs and holding gains and losses. Government

income Yg (revenue less subsidies, transfers and interest payments), is limited to 40% or less

of prior year national income Y-1 and responds positively to increases in national income Y,

especially in the first year. Other factors influencing government income in the long run are

the inherited stock of debt LG/Y and cost of financing the debt including the impact of real

bond rates irm:

(4) −𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (0.4 𝑌−1

𝑌𝑔 − 1⁄ ) = 𝑓(+ log (0.4𝑌−2

𝑌𝑔−1 − 1⁄ ) , +𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌), −𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−1),

+ log (𝐿𝐺−1

𝑌−1⁄ ) , −𝑖𝑟𝑚−1

𝐿𝑔−1𝑌−1

⁄ , 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏)

Government spending on goods and services G responds to the level and rate of change of

government income Yg and tends to rise with population N. Government spending is also

adjusted in response to the inherited debt burden LG-1/Y-1, and the external current account

CA$-1/Y$-1:

(5) 𝑑 log(𝐺) =

𝑓(− log 𝐺−1), +𝑑 log(𝑌𝑔), + 𝑌𝑔−1

𝑌−1⁄ , + log( 𝑁−1), − log(

𝐿𝐺−1𝑌−1

⁄ ), + 𝐶𝐴$−1

𝑌$−1⁄ , 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏

The financial balance or ‘net lending’ of government NLg = Yg – G represents the difference

between income and spending on goods and services.

Population and employment

Employment of women NEF and men NEM is a function of potential labor supply represented

by population aged 15 -64 (NWP) and fluctuations in GDP growth dlog(V) with an elasticity

that increases with relative per capita income YR. Other factors are the size of the child

population NCP and the degree of urbanization NUR affecting female and male employment,

respectively4. A transformation is applied to ensure that the proportion of employed lies

within a range of 15-70% for women and 49-95% for men:

(6) 𝑑(𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑓) =

𝑓(−𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑓−1 , − log (𝑁𝐶𝑃−1

𝑁−1⁄ ), + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log 𝑉 , + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log(𝑉−1), 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏

(7) 𝑑(𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑚) =

𝑓(−𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑚−1 , − log (𝑁𝑈𝑅−1

𝑁−1⁄ ), + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log 𝑉 , + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log(𝑉−1), 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏

Where 𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑥 = log 𝑁𝐸𝑥 (⁄ 𝑁𝑊𝑃𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛)/(𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 1)

Natural increases in population up to 2030 are treated as predetermined (using UN Population

Division median estimates). Population projections are however affected by net migration

NIM which responds to relative per capita income YR and employment growth dlog(NE) with

considerable momentum implied by the lagged dlog term:

4 For a full explanation of the determinants of male and female employment, see Cripps 2014.

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(8) 𝑑 log(1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑁𝐸−1) = 𝑓(− log 1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑀−1 𝑁𝐸−2), +𝑑 log(⁄ 1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑀−1 𝑁𝐸−2⁄ ), + 𝑌𝑅−1 ,

+ 𝑑 log(𝑁𝐸), 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏⁄

Migration projections, like other international exchanges, are adjusted to make sure that net

migration is zero for the world as a whole (Cripps 2014).

4. Scenario assumptions and specifications

This paper compares and contrasts two alternatives for Europe for the period to 2030. The

first scenario assumes the continuation of past trends and current austerity policies without

any significant innovation in European politics (Austerity scenario). This scenario is then

contrasted with a Gendered Expansionary Macroeconomic scenario which assumes a

rollback of current austerity policies and that gendered reflationary fiscal policies together

with private investment are the key drivers for stimulating future growth and creating jobs for

men and women in Europe. We now review the core assumptions underpinning the two

scenarios under investigation.

Austerity scenario In the austerity scenario we assume that governments in the Eurozone and in the United

Kingdom will continue to cut expenditures in an attempt to reduce budget deficits and bring

their debt-to-GDP ratio down to 60%, in line with the Growth and Stability Pact. In order to

achieve this, we impose targets for the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GV) for the

Core Eurozone, Eurozone Periphery, and for the United Kingdom (Table 4).

INSERT Table 4: Target government expenditure5 as percentage of GDP under austerity

and historical values

The 2030 targets for government expenditure to GDP are 21% for the Core Eurozone,

20% for the United Kingdom, and 19% for the Eurozone Periphery. This represents a

reduction in government expenditure from the period 2012 to 2030 of 13% for the Core

Eurozone, 20% for the United Kingdom and of 24% for the Eurozone Periphery.

In addition to cuts in government expenditure, and in order to further decrease fiscal

deficits, we also assume modest increases in government revenue in the Eurozone Periphery

and in the United Kingdom.

INSERT Table 5: Target government income as percentage of GDP under austerity

and historical values

The 2030 targets for the ratio of government net income to GDP (YgV) are 20% for the

Eurozone Periphery and 19% for the United Kingdom, up from 18% in 2014 in both blocs..

5 Government expenditure excludes transfer payments such as social security and pensions. Thus the ratios shown are considerably smaller

than the gross figure usually quoted.

11

The 2030 target of government net income to GDP for the Core Eurozone is 20% and the

starting level in 2012 is also 20%6.

In the austerity scenario we also assume that private investment will continue its

historical trend into the future and thus remains subdued in the face of sluggish GDP growth

and depressed expectations of profitability. As such, we do not programme for any specific

target (boost) for private investment as percentage of GPD (IpV) by 2030 and instead we

project the historical trends into the future for all the blocs under investigation.

Gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario In our gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario we assume that government

investment and expenditure together with private investment are the key drivers for

stimulating future growth and for generating jobs for both men and women. Thus, in this

scenario we roll back austerity policies, maintain or even increase government investment, as

government expenditure is not drastically cut as in the austerity scenario, and we also assume

increased private investment. Government expenditure and investment, together with private

investment, are then marshalled towards employment generation for both women and men.

The key target variable in this scenario is the ratio of the employed to working-age

population (NERW). We calibrate the size of investment and fiscal stimulus in order to

achieve a desirable, but also feasible, level of this ratio for the three blocs. Table 6 shows the

2030 target, the intermediate 2020 target (to allow comparison with the EU 2020 strategy

targets) and the historical values, for employed to working-age population for the Core

Eurozone, the Eurozone Periphery, and the United Kingdom.

6 The slight increases in government new income in the Eurozone Periphery and the United Kingdom are assumed to originate from

clamping down on tax evasion and tax fraud, and from the introduction or increases in indirect taxation, such as VAT. See Ortiz and

Cummins 2013a for the full range of policies across these countries. However, we do not assume any increase in government net income to

GDP for the Core Eurozone as its fiscal position is viable at the beginning of the period under investigation. .

12

INSERT Table 6: Employment as percentage of working-age-population: targets and

historical levels

In case of the Core Eurozone and the United Kingdom the employment targets for 2030

are 79% and 77% respectively. The intermediate 2020 target is 73% for both the Core

Eurozone and the United Kingdom. This intermediate target for the Core Eurozone is in in

line with the European Commission Europe 2020 estimated EU target of 73-74% (European

Commission 2013). The United Kingdom has not set up any employment target for 2020.

However, we use the 2020 target for the Core Eurozone as a proxy for establishing the

intermediate target for this country.

The 2030 employment target for the Eurozone Periphery is 71% and the intermediate

target in 2020 is 64%. The intermediate target for this bloc is lower than the Europe 2020

employment target. The European Commission estimates an average employment target for

this bloc of 71% in 2020 (European Commission 2013). However, given the persistent

recessionary conditions in the Eurozone Periphery, the low expectations of profitability under

continued austerity policies, and the historical trend of the past decade, we believe that the

target set up by the European Commission for this bloc in 2020 is far too optimistic.

In addition, in our gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario, we programme for a

disproportionate increase in female employment vis-à-vis male employment. In other words,

we assume that government spending and investment is directed more towards the creation of

jobs for women than men. Thus, the assumed growth rate of the ratio of female employment

to female working-age population (NERFW) is higher than the growth rate of male

employment to male working-age population (NERMW). Table 7 shows the targets for

female employment as a percentage of female working-age population and for male

employment as a percentage of male working-age population.

13

INSERT Table 7: female and male employment targets

These employment targets are achieved through a combination of reflationary fiscal policies

(maintaining or even increasing government spending and investment levels) and a

significant rise in private investment. On the one hand, with regards to government spending,

we let the model determine the required level to meet the employment targets. In other words,

rather than setting specific targets for government expenditure as percentage of GDP (GV)

we let the model identify the required level of government expenditure needed to reach the

assumed employment targets7.

For private investment, on the other hand, we assume exogenous increases to counter the

declining historical trends.

We believe that private investment will have to significantly increase from the woefully

low levels to which it is has fallen following the financial crisis in order spearhead economic

recovery and create jobs. Thus, we programme increases in private investments as a ratio to

GDP (IpV) in the three blocs in order to bring them back to early 2000s levels. Table 8 shows

the private investment targets and the historical values for the Core Eurozone, the Eurozone

Periphery and the United Kingdom.

INSERT Table 8: private investment targets and historical values

With regards to the financing of private investment we assume that increases in private

investment could be financed through enhanced lending from the European Investment Bank

(EIB) and by a better allocation of EU structural funds and the European Social Fund. These

funds could be used for financing economically sustainable projects and activities, support

the growth of both existing and new competitive enterprises, and especially those that provide

skills upgrading and training for both women and men and provide family friendly working

patters and child care.

We believe that such a combination of reflationary fiscal policies together with increases

in private investment should help expand the productive capacity of an economy in addition

to stimulating aggregate demand. Further, by disproportionately redirecting government

investment and expenditure towards supporting female employment we assume that women

will benefit the most from the expansion of productive capacity. That is, we assume that part

of this government expenditure and investment will be redirected towards enhancing physical

and human capital for women, enabling them to (re)enter the labor market.

Finally, in order to contain possible fiscal deficits that might result from the

implementation of reflationary policies we also assume a boost in government revenue as

percentage of GDP (YgV). For all the blocs government revenue is assumed to increase to

22% of GDP. Increases for the Eurozone Periphery and the United Kingdom are more

significant compared to the Core Eurozone. This is because the level of fiscal deficit for the

Eurozone Periphery and the United Kingdom is higher than in the Core Eurozone. However,

7 Given that the targets for female employment are substantially higher than their initial level, compared to the male employment targets for

all blocs, we assume that government spending will be channelled towards the creation of jobs for women to a greater degree than towards

the creation of jobs for men. We rest this assumption on the existing empirical literature which makes the case for significant increases in

both human and capital investment towards generating new and better employment opportunities for women across all economic sectors.

Governments may do this by providing appropriate training and skills upgrading for women, and supporting industries that offer family

friendly working patters and child care (see Karamessini and Rubery 2013; Women’s Budget Group 2012; Perrons and Plomien 2013; and

Ozlem Onaran 2013 among others).

14

we believe that these are feasible targets as they are not above historical peaks (22% for the

Eurozone Periphery in 2007 and 23% for the United Kingdom in 2000).8

5. Results and Analysis

In this section we present the projections produced by the CAM under the assumptions

described for each of the two scenarios.

Employment, welfare and economic growth

The targets on employment to working age population (including our specific target on

female employment to female working age population) are met in our gendered expansionary

macroeconomic scenario. We are now interested in assessing how these targets translate into

job creation for men and women in the Eurozone.

The gendered employment-led economic recovery scenario achieves important gains

both in terms of increases in total female and male compared to the austerity scenario. Table

9 shows the total number of jobs created under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic

scenario (alternative) and under the austerity scenario for the three blocs and the historical

values.

INSERT Table 9: Total employment (millions of persons)

Under the austerity scenario total employment is projected to stagnate in both the

Eurozone Periphery and in the United Kingdom and to decline by 1.5 million units from 2012

to 2030 in the Core Eurozone. On the other hand, significant employment gains are achieved

under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario. By 2030, an additional 4.5

million jobs could be created in the Core Eurozone, whereas in the Eurozone Periphery

additional jobs could amount to 8.4 million by 2030. Finally, in the United Kingdom a

gendered expansionary macroeconomic framework could lead to the creation of an additional

1.3 million jobs for women and men. Thus, we argue that the combination of private

investment boost and reflationary fiscal policies in Eurozone could lead to significant job

creation for women and men.

We are now interested in assessing the effects of marshalling government expenditure

and investment disproportionately towards supporting female employment. In other words,

we identify how many jobs for women are created out of the increases in total employment.

Table 10 shows total female employment under the two scenarios for the Eurozone (Core and

Periphery) and the United Kingdom.

8 Compared with the austerity scenario, the implicit assumption behind raising government net income in this scenario, is the introduction of

progressive tax measures (see Women’s Budget Group 2012) as compared to the regressive measures currently proposed or already

introduced across Europe (see Ortiz and Cummins 2013a).

15

INSERT Table 10: Total female employment (in millions)

In the Eurozone Periphery, where the female employment rate is initially much lower,

compared to the North Eurozone, an additional 3.2 million jobs are created for women by

2020, and this addition could reach 5.8 million jobs by 20309. In the Core Eurozone a total of

0.9 million jobs for women could be created by 2020 and this could reach 2.7 million in

2030. Finally, in the United Kingdom the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario

could generate an additional 0.8 million jobs for women by 2030. These results are in stark

contrast with the austerity scenario where female employment is projected to remain stable in

the Eurozone Periphery and in the United Kingdom and even decline in the Core Eurozone.

Overall, by redirecting government expenditure towards female employment, in the Eurozone

Periphery 70% of new jobs created are for women and in the United Kingdom and in the

Core Eurozone 60% of new jobs will be for women.

Increases in female employment under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic

scenario also lead to a significant increase in the ratio of female employment to male

employment, in particular in the Eurozone Periphery. In this bloc, female employment as

percentage of male employment increases from 73.8% in 2012 to 83.7% in 2030 (Table 11).

On the other hand, female employment as percentage of male employment under the austerity

scenario declines to 71.6% thus widening further the employment gap between men and

women. In the United Kingdom the ratio of female employment to male employment

declined to 85% by 2030 under the austerity scenario whereas it remains above 86% under

the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario. Finally, in the Core Eurozone, where

the ratio of female employment to male employment is already much higher than the other

two blocs, the ratio further improve under the alternative scenario and it reaches 93.3% by

2030.

INSERT Table 11: Female employment as % of male employment

Under the expansionary gendered economic scenario significant gains are also made in

terms of GDP growth. Table 12 summarizes the projected growth rates for each scenario.

Growth rates for the austerity scenario are much lower than the gendered expansionary

macroeconomic scenario. In the Eurozone periphery growth rates under the gendered

expansionary (alternative) scenario reach an average of 3.4% during the period 2019-2024

and 3% in the period 2025-2030. These rates are much higher than the austerity scenario

where the growth rate is projected to remain below 1% for the whole period. Growth rates for

the Core Eurozone and the United Kingdom, under the alternative scenario are more modest

in comparison to those achieved by the Eurozone Periphery. However, both blocs perform

better, in terms of economic growth, compared to the austerity scenario.

INSERT Table 12: Average GDP growth (%)

Further, under our alternative scenario government spending in all blocs would increase

faster than the number of economic dependents (young, elderly, or working age). Table 13

shows government spending per dependent measured in PPP$ for the three blocs10.

9 The Eurozone Periphery is a major recipient of migrants from within outside the EU. The figures quoted above therefore include the inflow

of migrants in to the working age population.

10 See appendix I for more information regarding the results for labour productivity.

16

INSERT Table 13: Government spending per dependent at PPP$ rates

In the Eurozone Periphery, for example government spending per dependent would rise

from 10,439 PPP$ to 18,471 PPP$ under the alternative scenario. On the other hand,

spending per dependent significantly declines under the austerity scenario. In the United

Kingdom the corresponding increase would be from 15,149 PPP$ in 2012 to 17,858 PPP$ in

2020 and in the Core Eurozone government spending per dependent would increase by

almost 5,000 PPP$ by 2030. Thus, governments would improve their capacity to provide

social protection and benefits to dependents under our alternative scenario. This is a crucial

gender-aspect of our alternative scenario. Not only are jobs disproportionately created for

women via this scenario, but, in addition, via the boost in targeted government spending,

male and female dependents are further supported. The CAM does not provide a break-down

of such spending by area but this may cover additional spending on care for children and

elderly dependents as well as boosting allowances for non-working partners. The boost to

such services inevitably also leads to the creation of further jobs for men and women within

these sectors. This lends further support to our alternative scenario, compared to the business-

as-usual case.

Government balances

The gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario assumes that both private investment

and government expenditure are marshalled to target significant increases in both female and

male employment. Whilst changes in private investment are determined exogenously on the

basis of historical data, government expenditure is estimated by the model. Table 14 shows

the projected government spending as percentage of GDP to 2030 and the historical trends for

the three blocs.

INSERT Table 14: Government spending as % of GDP

Under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic (alternative) framework government

spending as percentage of GDP for the Core Eurozone slightly declines from 24.6% to 23.1%

in 2030. In the United Kingdom the reduction of government spending to GDP is more

moderate compared to the austerity scenario where it reaches 19.5% by 2030. In the

Eurozone Periphery government expenditure increases to 25.8% by 2020 and subsequently

declines by one percentage point by 2030. Overall, the gendered expansionary

macroeconomic framework cannot be dismissed on the basis of fiscal profligacy. Instead a

slower pace fiscal consolidation, especially in the Eurozone Periphery, could lead to higher

levels of growth and more jobs for both women and men (see Appendix II for the longer-term

implications for government debt).

Overall, the comparison of the austerity scenario with a gendered expansionary

macroeconomic scenario reveals that the continuation of austerity policies, which translate in

to significant cuts in government spending and investment, might lead to further stagnation in

private investment, low growth rates across Europe, and more importantly it will impair job

creation for both men and women. Further, continued austerity policies could lead to a

stagnation of female employment and to a further deterioration of the ratio of female

employment to male employment, thus further widening the employment gap. In contrast, a

strategy of combining reflationary fiscal policies, increases in private investment, and

carefully redirecting a significant part of government spending and investment towards the

17

creation of jobs for women could have strong positive effects both in terms of employment

generation and economic growth.

6. Concluding remarks and ways forward

It is increasingly evident that continued austerity policies are doing more harm than good for

the economies and societies of Europe. However, the impact on gender equality is still to be

fully understood. In particular, the multitude of channels and mechanisms through which

women and men continue to be impacted by fiscal retrenchment makes drawing firm

conclusions on the direction and severity of impacts difficult to determine.

This policy brief intended to make a modest contribution to this debate by tackling the

impact of current austerity policies on employment in two Eurozone blocs, and by

highlighting the economic implications of an alternative gender-focused employment-led

policy approach.

Crucially, the analysis presented here shows that the aims of economic growth and

increased employment targeted at women can be achieved via the adoption of gender-

sensitive expansionary macroeconomic policies. Such a macroeconomic strategy is

economically feasible, leading to substantial gains in terms of job creation for both women

and men, as well as accelerated growth and debt reduction. Thus, the recommendation that

stems from this analysis is to roll back current austerity policies and embark on a new gender-

sensitive expansionary economic trajectory.

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Appendix I: Results and analysis of labor productivity

In addition to analysing employment and economic growth outcomes, we also compare

increases in employment to increases in labor productivity. It is indeed desirable that

economic policies produce a significant expansion in employment but not at the costs of

losses in labor productivity. The ideal situation would be an improvement in both (McKinley

et al. 2013a). Table A1 shows labor productivity, measured as GDP per person employed at

PPP rates.

INSERT Table A1: Labor productivity, GDP per person employed at PPP rates

Under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario labor productivity

significantly rises. The most dramatic increases would occur in the Core Eurozone and in the

Eurozone Periphery where GDP per person employed would reach 100,317 PPP$ and 95,867

PPP$ respectively by 2030. Also the United Kingdom records significant increases its labor

productivity. By 2030 GDP per person employed in the United Kingdom wold reach 94,237

PPP$. Thus, the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario achieves important gains

not only in terms of job creation but also in terms of labor productivity.

21

Appendix II: Results and analysis of government debt

In order to contain future government deficits our gendered expansionary

macroeconomic scenario also assumes a boost in government income, in conjunction with the

projected trend of government expenditure. For the three blocs we assume that net

government income as a ratio to GDP rises to 22% by 2030. Table A2 shows the fiscal

balance as percentage of GDP for the three blocs under the two scenarios considered.

INSERT Table A2: Fiscal balance as % of GDP

The combination of higher levels of growth and increases in government revenue in the

gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario leads to an improvement in the government

deficit, to around -3% of GDP in the Eurozone Periphery, and -1% in the Core Eurozone and

in the United Kingdom by 2030. The improvement in the Eurozone Periphery is much more

modest than the austerity scenario, where fiscal deficit is eliminated by 2030. However, the

latter is achieved at the expense of lower GDP growth and less employment.

As a result of the trends in government expenditure and revenue, as well as the increases in

GDP growth, government debt as a percentage of GDP declines more sharply in the gendered

alternative scenario than in the austerity scenario for all the blocs (Table A3).

INSERT Table A3: Government debt as % of GDP

In the South Eurozone government debt sharply declines to 82% of GDP by 2030 under

the alternative scenario compared to 106.8% of GDP under the austerity scenario. Thus, we

argue that a scenario of continued austerity in the South Eurozone would not only lead to

stagnation of employment and inadequate growth rates, but would also fail to significantly

reduce government debt. This is the case also for the United Kingdom where the debt to GDP

ratio, under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario, declines from 100% in

2012 to 62.5% in 2030. In the Core Eurozone, under the austerity scenario, debt to GDP ratio

increase to 71% by 2030 whilst under the alternative scenario it remains below 60%.

22

Tables and Figures - Engendering Economic Recovery:

Modelling Alternatives to Austerity in Europe

Table 1: Review of austerity measures across Europe

Half-page table

Source: adapted from Ortiz and Cummins (2003a)

Country Reducing subsidies

Wage bill cuts/caps

Increasing consumption

taxes

Pension Rationalising

and targeting

safety nets

Health Labour Reform

reform reform

Eurozone Periphery

Greece x x x x x x x

Italy x x x x x x x

Ireland x x x x x x x

Portugal x x x x x x x

Spain x x x x x x x

Central Eurozone

Austria x

x

x

Belgium x x x x x x x

France

x x x x x x

Germany

x x x x

Luxembourg

x x x x x

Netherlands x x x x x x x

UK x x x x

23

Figure 1: Public sector employment in the Eurozone (2010-2013)

See excel file – fig 1

Full page figure

Source: EUROSTAT 2014 ‘Full-time and part-time

employment by sex and economic activity’.

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

2010 2011 2012 2013

Male Full-time Public Sector Employment (as prop. of 2010 figures)

EZ Periphery

EZ Core

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

2010 2011 2012 2013

Female Full-time Public Sector Employment (as prop. of 2010 figures)

EZ Periphery

EZ Core

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

2010 2011 2012 2013

Male PT Public Sector Employment (as proportion of 2010 figures)

EZ Periphery

EZ Core

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

2010 2011 2012 2013

Female PT Public Sector Employment (as proportion of 2010 figures)

EZ Periphery

EZ Core

24

Table 2: The gender pay gap in the public sector in Europe (2008-2012)

Half-page table

Source: EUROSTAT 2014 ‘Structure of Earnings Survey’

GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Ireland 24.9 23.7 21.1 19.6 23.3

Greece na na na na na

Spain 17.1 17.8 17.4 18.2 18.2

Italy na na na na na

Portugal 24.3 25.3 24.2 23.3 20.7

United Kingdom 24.6 25.1 23.8 23.8 23.4

Belgium 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.1 6

Germany 18.6 17.8 17.1 17 16.4

France 17.2 15.9 16.1 14.8 16.4

Luxembourg 9.1 7.5 6 6 5.2

Netherlands 19.7 19.4 18.9 17.9 17

Austria na na na na na

EZ Periphery simple average 22.1 22.2 20.9 20.3 20.7

EZ Core (and UK) simple

average

15.9 15.3 14.7 14.2 14

Table 3: Female discouraged workers11 as % of total active population (2008-2012)

Half-page table

Source: EUROSTAT 2014 ‘Full-time and part-time employment by sex and economic

activity’. GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Ireland 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6

Greece 1.7 2 2 2.3 2.9 3.3

Spain 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.7 7.2

Italy 16.8 15.9 16.6 16.8 17.2 17.5

Portugal 1.7 1.6 1.8 4 5.2 6.2

United

Kingdom

2.7 2.9 3 2.8 2.9 2.7

Belgium 1 0.9 0.9 2.5 2.2 2.3

11 Discouraged workers are identified as persons available to work but not seeking work.

25

Germany 2 2.2 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6

France 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 na

Luxembourg 0.7 7.1 6.6 7.3 7.3 8.3

Netherlands 3.4 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.8 4.3

Austria 4.1 4.2 4 3.7 3.7 3.7

EZ Periphery 5.3 5.4 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.2

EZ Core and

UK

2.2 3.2 3 3.3 3.3 3.8

26

Table 4: Target government expenditure12 as percentage of GDP under austerity and

historical values

Half-page table

Historical 2030 Target: government

expenditure (GV)

Values (Austerity scenario)

2000 2008 2012

Core Eurozone

22% 23% 25% 21%

Eurozone Periphery

20% 23% 25% 19%

United Kingdom

19% 25% 26% 20%

Table 5: Target government income as percentage of GDP under austerity and historical

values

Half-page table

Historical 2030 Target: government income (Yg)

Values (Austerity scenario)

2000 2008 2012

Core Eurozone 22.5 22 20 20%

Eurozone Periphery

19.4 18.8 16.1 20%

United Kingdom

22.9 19.2 15.6 19%

12 Government expenditure excludes transfer payments such as social security and pensions. Thus the ratios shown are considerably smaller than the gross figure usually quoted.

27

Table 6: Employment as percentage of working-age-population: targets and historical levels

See excel file – tab 6

Half-page table

Historical Targets:

Values ratio of employed to working age

population (NERW)

(Gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario)

2000 2008 2012

2020

2030 (Intermediate

target)

Core Eurozone

64% 69% 69% 73% 79%

Eurozone Periphery

57% 62% 58% 64% 71%

United Kingdom

71% 72% 70% 73% 77%

Table 7: Female and male employment targets

Half-page table

Female employment as percentage of female working age population (NERFW)

Historical Targets:

Values

2000 2008 2012 2030

Core EZ 57% 64% 65% 77%

EZ Periphery

43% 52% 50% 67%

UK 65% 66% 65% 73%

Male employment as percentage of male working age population (NERMW)

Historical Targets:

Values

2000 2008 2012 2030

Core EZ 72% 74% 74% 81%

EZ Periphery

71% 73% 67% 76%

UK 78% 78% 75% 81%

28

Table 8: Private investment targets and historical values

Half-page table

Historical Targets:

Values Private investment as % of GDP

(Gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario)

2000 2008 2012 2030

Core Eurozone

19% 18% 16% 20%

Eurozone Periphery

20% 20% 14% 20%

United Kingdom

16% 14% 11% 16%

Table 9: Total employment (millions of persons)

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2020 2025 2030

Core Eurozone

Historical 79.08 86.29 86.29

Austerity

87.63 86.65 84.79

Alternative

89.36 89.59 89.26

Difference 1.72 2.95 4.48

Eurozone Periphery

Historical 47.72 55.81 52.8

Austerity

52.43 52.49 52.51

Alternative

56.86 59.2 60.86

Difference 4.42 6.72 8.35

United Kingdom

Historical 27.29 29.22 28.91

austerity

29.13 29.09 29.14

alternative

29.86 30.15 30.47

difference 0.73 1.06 1.33

29

Table 10: Total female employment (in millions)

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2020 2025 2030

Core Eurozone

Historical 34.8 39.49 40.16

Austerity

41.43 41.19 40.33

Alternative

42.33 42.87 43.08

Difference 0.9 1.68 2.75

Eurozone Periphery

Historical 18.02 23.11 22.43

Austerity

21.95 21.89 21.91

Alternative

25.16 26.6 27.74

Difference 3.21 4.71 5.82

United Kingdom

Historical 12.48 13.45 13.47

Austerity

13.54 13.45 13.38

Alternative

13.91 14.04 14.17

Difference 0.37 0.59 0.79

Table 11: Female employment as % of male employment

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2020 2030

Core Eurozone Historical 78.6 85.6 87.1

Austerity

89.7 90.7

Alternative 90 93.3

Eurozone Periphery Historical 60.7 70.7 73.8

Austerity

72 71.6

Alternative 79.4 83.7

United Kingdom Historical 84.3 85.3 86.9

Austerity

86.8 84.9

Alternative 87.2 86.9

Table 12: Average GDP growth (%)

Half-page table

2001-2006

2007-2012

2013-2018

2019-2024

2025-2030

Core Eurozone

Historical 1.6 -0.7

Austerity

1.6 1.1 0.5

Alternative 2.1 1.9 1.7

Eurozone Periphery

Historical 2.3 -0.7

Austerity

0 0.7 0.7

Alternative 2.4 3.4 3

United Kingdom

Historical 2.9 0.2

Austerity

1 1.2 1.4

Alternative 1.8 2 2.2

30

Table 13: Government spending per dependent at PPP$ rates

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2020 2030

Core Eurozone Historical 11,888 13,981 14,802

Austerity

14,868 14,780

Alternative 16,488 19,737

Eurozone Periphery Historical 8,400 11,042 10,439

Austerity

9,036 8,395

Alternative 13,712 18,471

United Kingdom Historical 10,464 15,550 15,149

Austerity

13,580 12,832

Alternative 15,570 17,854

Table 14: Government spending as % of GDP

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2015 2020 2030

Core Eurozone

Historical 22.4 23.1 24.6

Austerity

21.7 21.6 21

Alternative 24.1 23.3 23.1

Eurozone Periphery

Historical 20.3 23.3 25.4

Austerity

22.4 19.9 18.5

Alternative 25.1 25.8 24.8

United Kingdom

Historical 19.7 24.7 26

Austerity

22.5 20.9 19.5

Alternative 24.8 23.8 22.8

Table A1: Labor productivity, GDP per person employed at PPP rates

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2020 2030

Core Eurozone Historical 69,477 73,313 73,562

Austerity

81,735 90,527

Alternative 84,211 100,317

Eurozone Periphery Historical 66,349 66,377 65,739

Austerity

66,831 71,483

Alternative 75,626 95,867

United Kingdom Historical 61,126 69,387 69,122

Austerity

74,470 84,844

Alternative 77,665 94,237

31

Table A2: Fiscal balance as % of GDP

Half-page table

2000 2008 2012 2020 2030

Core Eurozone Historical 0.1 -1.1 -5.1

Austerity

-2.3 -1

Alternative -1.7 -1.1

Eurozone Periphery Historical -0.8 -4.5 -9.3

Austerity

-1.9 1.5

Alternative -4.8 -2.9

United Kingdom Historical 3.2 -5.4 -10.3

Austerity

-3.7 -0.5

Alternative -3.5 -1.1

Table A3: Government debt as % of GDP

Half-page table

2000 2008 2010 2011 2012 2020 2030

Core Eurozone Historical 52.1 51.4 61.3 61.8 63.3

Austerity

70.1 71.6

Alternative

56.6 54.4

Eurozone Periphery Historical 84.1 69.7 91.2 93.4 100.3

Austerity

129.7 106.8

Alternative 92.5 82

United Kingdom Historical 46.6 51.6 96.4 100.2 100.5

Austerity

122 107.7

Alternative 79 62.5