Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

41
Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc

Transcript of Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Page 1: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Energy reform in Hungary

László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc

Page 2: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The historical heritage 1990

2

► Serious macroeconomic crisis

► Very low energy efficiency

► Heavy reliance on dirty fuels (coal, fuel oil)

► Lack of faith in market based methods

► A „green„ preception of transition

Page 3: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

GDP Total energy

% 1980=100%

3

Improving energy efficiency with market reforms

Page 4: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The virtue of necessity: drivers for change

Budget crisis Looming capacity shortage SO2 and other environmental

issues Need to substitute from coal

Page 5: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The drivers for change

Privatisaton a means for government objectives

Structural reform is a prerequisite for privatisation

Page 6: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

POWER SECTOR REFORM PATH IN HUNGARY

1945Verticallyintegrated

1992Legal Separation:- generation- transmission- distribution/supply

1897-19451995

Privatization

State-ownedEnterprise

State-ownedCorporation

WholesaleCompetition

Ow

ner

ship

Str

uct

ureScope for Competition

RetailCompetition

SingleBuyer

Monopoly

PrivateCorporation 2003

Competition

1991/92 1995/96 2003Restructuring Privatization Competition

4-5 year s 6-7 years

generators (8) generators (except Nuclear) transmitter (1) distributors/suppliers

distributors/suppliers (6)

Page 7: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The big regulatory trade off

Strong investment guarantees

• Easy privatisation• Modernisation

investment „bankable”• BUT: Rigid

commitments, lack of competitve incentives

Strong competition• „Big bang” structural

reform• Lower inflationary

pressure• BUT: Credit rationing,

lack of investment• After Enron hangover

Page 8: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The first reform of 1995/97

Overriding priority for privatisation Rigid, detailed PPAs Privatisation in a single buyer

modell The state owned single buyer

modell acted as a puffer

Page 9: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Grid Code Business RulesMarket Rules

Business Rules

Power PlantCompanies

Electricitygeneration

Transmission Company

- Single Buyer wholesale - Transmission,- Capacity balance- Export, Import

Distribution/ Supply

Companies

Distribution,Regulated Supply

Consumers

The single buyer model

Import Export

Operationallicences

Operationallicence

Operationallicences

Dispatcher

Page 10: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Electricity and natural gas prices in Euro, 1990=1,00

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

electricity

natural gas

Page 11: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Price of „normal” consumption as a percentage of disposable income

1.0%

1.4%

1.8%

2.2%

2.6%

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

1.0%

1.4%

1.8%

2.2%1000 kwh electricity

400 m3 gas

Page 12: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Consequences of the first reform

Significant investment Improved efficiency, technology

transfer BIG environmental benefits

BUT Cost cutting versus grid quality Political minefield

Page 13: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Expansion of the gas network

500

700

900

1 100

1 300

1 500

1 700

1 900

2 100

2 300

2 500

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

2 200

2 300

2 400

2 500

2 600

2 700

2 800

2 900

3 000thousand settlements, right scale

million consumers, left scale

Page 14: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Employees of the distributors

5000

7500

10000

12500

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Page 15: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Our three most stupid mistakes

• Privatisation before tackling implicit subsidies

• No clear assignment of environmental liabilites

• „Overcontarcing”: Failure to consider demand elasticity

Page 16: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Price elasticity matters: predicted and actual electricity demand

30000

32000

34000

36000

38000

40000

42000

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

predicted

actual

Page 17: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Predicted and actual gas demand

8000

8500

9000

9500

10000

10500

11000

11500

12000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

1995 forecast

actual

Page 18: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The second reform 2001-

Driven by EU accession Gradual transition to a competitive

market Regulated access to the monopoly

infrastructure Constrains from the status quo

Page 19: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Constrains from the status quo

PPAs (stranded costs) Very strong lobby position of the

privatised industry Weak customer representation Political sensitivity

Page 20: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Gradual market opening

Busienss as usual in the captive market

No compulsory renegotiation Independent system operator Optional market opening OTC bilateral + optional pool (if)

Page 21: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Social consequences

Page 22: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Some sad facts

• Characteristics of energy demand

• Energy pricing reform in Hungary

• Experience with social tariffs

Page 23: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Some sad facts 1: energy will have a high relative price in

poor countries• Energy is very capital intensive

• Capital goods have global markets

• Power plants: 40%, network 60% totally independet of local incomes and fuel availability

Page 24: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Some sad facts 2: someone will pay

• Opportunity cost of taxpayers

• Strained budgets

• Current account constrains

• The government must take a lead: implicit subsidies to state owned institutions

Page 25: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

The implicit subsidy mith

• „Subsidized energy benefits the poor”

• Problem 1: even if it were true it would be highly inefficient

• Problem2: it is not even true

Page 26: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Characteristics of energy demand: electricity

• Difficult to subsitute, multiply application

• Perception of „life necessity” and „luxury” consumption

• Appliance penetration and efficiency• Hot water?• It does react to price

Page 27: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

On per capita basis electricity seems to have a high income

elasticityElectricity consumption per head as a function

of income

500

700

900

1100

1300

150000 250000 350000 450000 550000 650000 750000 850000 950000 1050000

Page 28: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

• BUT: Poor families tend to have more dependents, on per familiy basis, income elasticity is much smaller

• +1 child = +25% electricity demand

• Lot of noise– Large families in the countriside– Single pensioners

Page 29: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Appliance penetration

• Usually grows with income

• Society dependent „minimum group”

• Energy efficiency as a luxury

• Some inferior appliances (freezer)

Page 30: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Hot water complications

• Potentially 30-50% of total demand

• Legacy systems

• New housing

• Substitution to gas

Page 31: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Differences between gas and electricity

• Electricification is finished in the 60s

• Very low substitution• Luxury tresholds (air

conditioning, wash up machine)

• Mostly domestic production, costs predictable

• Gas spread at the 90s• Significant groups

without access• Competition with

other fuels• Correlation with

flat/house size• Mostly import, market

volatility

Page 32: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Gas demand characteristics

• Mainly heating

• High correlation with house size (flats versus houses) income-family size

• Price adjustment: marginal users, better insulation, alternative fuels (e=0,5 long term)

• Metering issues

Page 33: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Proportion of families with gas network access as a function of income

40

50

60

70

80

90

500000 700000 900000 1100000 1300000 1500000 1700000 1900000 2100000

Page 34: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Natural gas and unregulated fuel consumption as a function of

income

0

15000

30000

45000

500000 1000000 1500000 2000000

gas

unregulated

Page 35: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Social and political consequences: the Hungarian

experience Kamikaze action

• Ordinary welfare channels

• Special targeted schemes

• Social tariff schemes

Page 36: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Using ordinary welfare channels

• Easy organisation• Ready (?) institutional

framework• Can reach the elderly

and large families• Good incentive

properties

• Overloaded and strained

• Some targeting problems

• Hard to communicate

Page 37: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Special targeted schemes

• Can be targeted• Excellent PR• Tackle credit rationing

• Transaction costs• Transparency,

corruption• Poverty trap• Capture

Page 38: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Social tariffs (Block tariffs)

• Easy organisation• Low transaction costs• Transparency• Good PR

• Income elasticity• Targeting (large

families !)• Fuel substitution• Contrary to cost

structure

Page 39: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Social tariffs (Block tariffs) 2

• Low block limit– Equivalent to a lump

sum payment– Budget transparency– Marginal cost of

consumption: Good efficiency incentives

– Fairness problems

• High block limit– Equivalent to price

subsidy– Marginal cost of

consumption: Bad efficiency incentives

– Fair with high income elasticity

Page 40: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

Some environmental aspects

• 1% increase in the effective marginal cost of electricity consumption saves– 800 tons of SO2

– 70 tons of NOx

– 35000 tons of CO2

• Price subsidy type “high block limit” tariffs are environmentally detrimental

Page 41: Energy reform in Hungary László Varró Chief Economist MOL Plc.

A flat per kwh charge is already a social block tariff

Average price/cost

consumption

Cost structure

Block tariff