Enabling Command and Control - Mission Command at Vicksburg

8/12/2019 Enabling Command and Control - Mission Command at Vicksburg

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Enabling Command and Control - Mission Command at Vicksburg

FOR SUBMISSION TO

Military Review

Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Hayes, USA

Lieutenant Commander Robert K. Smith, USN

Major James A. Stevens, USAF

Joint Forces Staff College

Joint and Combined Warfighting School

Class 13-3

August 19, 2013

Faculty Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel Greg McGuire, USA

Seminar #10

A submission to the Faculty of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in partial satisfaction

of the requirements for Joint Professional Military Education Phase II. The contents of this

submission reflect our writing teams original views and are not necessarily endorsed by theJoint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.


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Lieutenant Colonel Paul Hayes, USA. LTC Hayes currently serves as a Deployable Team

Leader and Observer / Trainer for the Joint Public Affairs Support Element, Joint Enabling

Capabilities Command, USTRANSCOM, Norfolk, VA. He has a Bachelorsof Science degreein History from the United States Military Academy at West Point and a Masters degree in

Public Relations from Iona College, New York. LTC Hayes has over 19 years of Armor and

Public Affairs assignments at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Lieutenant Commander Robert Ken Smith, USN. LCDR Smith is currently serving as the

Executive Officer for the J2 at USTRANSCOM, Scott AFB, IL. He was commissioned through

Officer Candidate School at Pensacola, FL in 1998. LCDR Smith earned a Bachelor of Sciencein Business Administration (Finance) from the University of Florida in 1997. Prior to his current

assignment, LCDR Smith was assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA

where he earned a Master of Arts in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, Pacific). LCDR

Smith has over 15 years of experience in Intelligence assignments at the strategic, operational,and tactical levels.

Major James Jamie Stevens, USAF. Maj Stevens is currently serving as Branch Chief, SpecialTechnical Operations Plans for USSTRATCOM JFCC Global Strike, Offutt AFB, NE. He

earned a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology from East Carolina University in 1999. Prior to his

current assignment Maj Stevens was a Strategic Planner at USCENTCOM, Theater Planning and

Synchronization Element. Maj Stevens has over 14 years of B-52, Information Operations, andCyber experience.


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Introduction

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign.

The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. Therenever was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any

of hissubordinates that was not promptly complied with. Personal Memoirsof U.S. Grant

One hundred fifty years have passed since General U.S. Grant and Admiral David Porter

collaborated to achieve victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and the crafting of General

Dempseys Mission Command White Paper. While the joint function of command and control

and concept of mission command have only recently been defined, Union joint operations at

Vicksburg and the respective senior service commanders provide excellent examples of these

principles in action. The purpose of this paper is to examine joint Union operations as well as

the actions of General Grant and Admiral Porter at Vicksburg through the modern-day lenses of

command and control and mission command. The Union campaign at Vicksburg highlights how

challenges of command and control were overcome by Union service commanders. Both

General Grant and Admiral Porter enabled success by reflecting the principles outlined in the

Chairmans White Paper on Mission Command.

Early examples of joint operations in the Civil War

The Union conducted multiple operations using both naval and army units to varying degrees

of success prior to the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863. General Winfield Scotts Anaconda Plan

is the first example of attempted joint operations. Scotts plan was to harness the Unions Army

and Navy to divide and suffocate the Confederacy through control of the Mississippi and coastal

ports [See Figure 1]1.

This plans first tangible success was the capture of New Orleans by Admiral David Farragut.

Initially, Farragut did not work in direct concert with ground forces. In fact, Farragut was able to

1Scott Stucky,Joint Operations in the Civil War, JFQ Winter 1994-95, p 94.


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accept the surrender of the city on April 25, 1862 with only 250 marines. However, this

operation could be considered joint because he eventually required the arrival of 5,000 Union

soldiers under General Benjamin Butler on May 1, 1862 to occupy the city.2

Another small-scale example of Army and Navy collaboration was the capture of Forts

Henry and Donelson in 1862. General Grants Union forces, working in close coordination with

Flag Officer Andrew Foote, were able to use the firepower, maneuver, and transportation

potential of naval gunboats coupled with Union ground forces to secure the two critical positions

2Robert Bellitto, Vicksburg: Prologue to Joint Operations, p 4.

Figure 1Union Army and Navy implement the Anaconda Plan. (Griess 1986)


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on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.3 While these early examples of joint operations were

successful, they lacked the scale and coordination reflected in the Vicksburg Campaign.

Vicksburg Overview

Vicksburg was the largest joint operation undertaken in the Civil War to date. Re-opening

the Mississippi had been a key Union objective and President Lincoln himself viewed its capture

as a potential

crushing blow

(if not deadly

one) to hopes

of

Confederate

nationhood.4

The campaign

began with

Grants first

order to

Sherman on December 8, 1862 and ended with the surrender of Confederate Forces in Vicksburg

on July 4, 1863[See Figure 2]5. The campaign lasted some 208 days, involved over 100,000

combatants, touched 4 states, and cost over 8,000 casualties.6 For the Union, the Army brought

considerable ground force capability with over 90,000 soldiers available for employment at their

3Stucky, pp 94-99.

4Christopher Gabel, Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863, p 69.

5Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of US Grant, p 223.

6James B. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire, p 332.

Figure 2 - Vicksburg Campaign Overview March - July 1863 (Service n.d.)


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peak troop strength levels.7 Union Naval forces (The Mississippi Squadron) under the command

of Admiral Porter included some 60 combat vessels of which 33 participated in the Vicksburg

Campaign at one time or another.8 Primary roles for these vessels included providing indirect

fires, transportation of troops and supplies, riverine security, and in several cases giving up their

own armaments for utilization as siege mortars.9 In the end, Union forces on ground and water

had collaborated to re-open the Mississippi River. Just as Lincoln envisioned, on July 16, 1863

the first commercial steamboat traveled unmolested from St Louis to the Gulf of Mexico.

Thanks to the large joint operation, Lincoln was able to pronounce, the Father of Waters

again goes unvexed to the sea.

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Challenges of Command and Control

As defined in Joint Publication 3-0, command and control is the joint function which,

encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and

attached forces to accomplish the mission.11

Furthermore, JP 3-0 states command and control

allows the joint force commander to provide operational vision, guidance, and direction to the

joint force.12

In late 1862 and early 1863, the function of command and control in the Western

Theater was at bestdysfunctional. Commanders of Union forces were many times

independent-minded, politically appointed, and ambitious.13

In one example, Major General

John McClernand solicited a plan in 1862 to march south along the Mississippi directly to

Lincoln, had it approved, began raising troops, and deployed them to Memphis and Helenaall

7Gabel, p. 80.

8Ibid, p. 15.

9Ibid. pp. 18-20.

10McPherson, p. 332.

11Department of Defense,Joint Publication 3.0 Joint Operations, p xiv.

12Ibid.

13Thomas Griess, The American Civil War, p. 70.


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without ever informing his commander, U.S. Grant.14

Modern doctrine suggests the first task a

joint force commander must do under the C2 function is to establish, organize, and operate a

joint force headquarters.15

Today, the Joint Force HQ staff is the critical enabler to this task

the commander cannot do it alone. In 1862, staff organizations and their ability to execute

command and control was merely in its infancy. As opposed to today, staffs of the early civil

war were organized as their commanders saw fitor desired. For example, Grants staff may

have retained a chief of artillery, ordnance, and quartermaster at any given time. His

subordinates, however, may not have retained these positions on their staffs. Thus, coordination

over a range of joint functions took place not between staffs at different levels, but between

commanders. In a sense, the nature of warfare and range of joint functions during the civil war

had not overwhelmed the span of control for a single commander.16

Another task within the C2 function is for the joint force commander to establish appropriate

command authorities among subordinate commanders.17

From the beginning, Grant recognized

the challenge this task would provide him. In a letter to Halleck in October 1862, Grant

struggled with the task of establishing command authorities:

You have never suggested to me any plan of operations in thisdepartment, and as I do not know anything of those commanders to my

right or left I have none therefore that is not independent of all other

forces than those under my immediate command.18

Grant also wrestled with coordinating and controlling the employment of joint lethal and

nonlethal capabilities, in particular his C2 of naval forces operating in his area. In 1862, Union

Naval command on the Mississippi was divided between Admirals Farragut (Gulf Squadron) and

14Ibid, p. 72.

15DoD, p. xiv.

16Gabel, p. 8.

17Department of Defense, p.III-2.

18Griess, p 70.


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Porter (Mississippi Squadron). Adding to the confusion was the fact that each of these

commanders reported independently to the Navy Department in Washington and neither was

required to coordinate

with Grant.

Eventually,

coordinating and

controlling

employment of lethal

capabilities was never

formalized, but

achieved through the

cooperation and

congenial spirits of

both commanders.19

The final challenge

to the Union joint

operation came in the form of communication. JP 3-0 states joint force commands must

communicate and maintain the status of information to enable success.20

The terrain and limits

of technology served as large impediments to this task. The Mississippi River provided a daily

impediment to communication. Rains, bayous, flooding, tributaries, swift currents, and steep

banks all conspired daily to prevent communication between Union elements [See Figure 3].

19Gabel, p. 73.

20Department of Defense, p III-2.

Figure 3 - Terrain and River vicinity Vicksburg (Service n.d.)


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The Navy, with its shallow-draft craft and river access helped alleviate some of the challenges,

but were limited in numbers. In addition to terrain, no telegraph units were used by Grant during

the campaign. This limited strategic and operational communications to boat and messenger on

horseback. Memphis, the closest Union telegraph hub was two days by steamboat from

Vicksburg.21

Even that communications option was not reliable. Connections north from

Memphis were often interdicted by guerilla fighters. The Mississippi River also challenged

communications efforts. Forces operating on either side of the river could not talk to each other.

Couriers on horseback were often reliant on the availability of naval transport to deliver

dispatches through swamps and across rivers at the tactical level.

22

With all the challenges to executing the vital tasks of command and control, it is a wonder

the Union prevailed during the campaign. How did the Union prevail when most of the critical

tasks of command and control were not accomplished? In the end, it was the efforts of both

Grant and Porterthe senior service commandersto carry the day. Even though the Union

attempted and ultimately failed to implement many of the command and control tasks seen in JP

3-0, it was the personalities and spirit of joint cooperation which overcame these challenges and

ultimately led to success.

The naval contribution to mission commandAdmiral Porter

Admiral David Dixon Porter was born into a family with an extensive naval tradition. He

was the son of Commodore David Porter, a naval legend of the War of 1812, and the foster

brother of David Glasgow Farragut. Born in Chester, Pennsylvania in 1813, Porter sailed to the

West Indies with his father at the age of ten on the frigate USSJohn Adams. Throughout the

remainder of his life, Porter was in some fashion associated with the sea and invariably served

21Gabel, p. 60.

22Ibid, p 62.


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Figure 4 - Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter

(National Park Service, U.S. Department of the

Interior)

under joint conditions.23

Porter received his

formal education as well as learned the

principals of seamanship in two naviesthe

Mexican Navy, commanded by his father, and

the U.S. Navy, which had begun in 1829.24

PorterHis joint experience

Porters joint experience arguably began

during the contributions he made while serving

in the Mexican War in the attack on the fort at

the City of Vera Cruz. His joint operations and

interactions between the Navy and Army

continued at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 onboard the USS Powhatan during the battle

at Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens. It was at these historic battle grounds where Secretary of State

William H. Seward, Captain Montgomery C. Meigs of the U.S. Army, and Admiral Porter

devised a plan for the relief of Fort Pickens. The principal element of their plan required the use

of the USS Powhatan, which was commanded by Porter carrying reinforcements to the fort from

New York. Ultimately, this joint execution disrupted the initiative to relieve the garrison at Fort

Pickens, leading to its fall.25

Porters true test in carrying out effective joint operations came about after he was advanced

to the rank of acting Rear Admiral in command of the Mississippi River Squadron. Beyond the

required close cooperation between the Army and the Navy, it was Porters tight relationship

with his Army contemporary, Major General Ulysses S. Grant, that ultimately proved vital to the

23James Russell Soley,Admiral Porter, p. 3.

24Ronald Scott Mangum, The Vicksburg Campaign: A Study in Joint Operations, p.78.

25Chester G. Hearn,Admiral David Dixon Porter: The Civil War Years, pp. 37-40.


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success of the siege of Vicksburg. The most significant contribution to the campaign was the

passage of the batteries at Vicksburg and Grand Gulf by the majority of the Mississippi River

Squadron [See

Figure 5].

Grant had

asked merely for a

few gunboats to

protect his

infantry, but

Porter convinced him to use more than half of his fleet. With this additional support, the fleet

was successful in moving past the batteries. Less than one week later, a similar run past the

batteries gave Grant the transports required to cross the river.26

Once south of Vicksburg, Grant

initially attempted to attack the Rebels at Grand Gulf, and requested Porter to destroy the

batteries before his men would be sent across. Porters gunboats spent most of the day

bombarding two Confederate forts; however, only one was silenced. Grant decided to call off

the attack and moved downstream to Bruinsburg, where he was successful in crossing the river.27

Despite the fleet under Porter making no major offensive contributions to the campaign after

Grand Gulf, the Navy remained critical in its secondary role of maintaining the blockage against

the city. When Vicksburg fell, its containment was arguably made complete by the Navys

control of the Mississippi and the Yazoo rivers.

Porterhis reputation

So how did Admiral Porter reflect General Martin Dempseys vision of Mission Command? The

26Hearn,Admiral David Dixon Porter: pp. 209-219.

27Ibid., pp. 223-225.

Figure 5 - Porters Fleet Running the Vicksburg Batteries (National Park Service,

U.S. Department of the Interior)


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evidence suggests Porters actions as a Union service commander lived up to the Chairmans

standards. More, however, could have been done. The first evidence to support this position is

seen in an evaluation of Admiral Porters reputation. Within his own family, Porter had large

shoes to fill, as his father was a Commodore. Unfortunately, his father eventually lost much of

this notoriety due to a dispute with the Secretary of the Navy. This event ultimately had a

profound effect on the son as David Dixon Porter not only inherited his fathers disdain for

politicians, but also created a resolute desire to clear his familys reputation. Needless to say, his

superiors had a less than admirable view of him. Even during his final years, during which he

made Second Admiral, controversy provoked by his many enemies surrounded him. Among

them were several very powerful politicians, including some of the political generals he had

contended with in the war.28

Another example which epitomizes his character flaws as viewed by

superiors is illustrated by a diary excerpt by Secretary of the Navy Welles:

Porter is but a Commander. He has, however, stirring and positive

qualities, is fertile in resources, has great energy, excessive and

sometimes not over-scrupulous ambition, is impressed with and boastful ofhis own powers, given to exaggeration in relation to himself, - a Porter

infirmity, - is not generous to older and superior living officers, whom he

is too ready to traduce, but is kind and patronizing to favorites who arejuniors, and generally to official inferiors.

29

Even the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton wrote that Porter revealed he was to display

many times: he belittled a superior officer [Charles H. Poor]. He often heaped undue praise upon

a subordinate, but rarely could find much to admire in a superior.30

However, despite the above perspectives, Porters peers and subordinates had quite another

view on his character as a military leader. Many of his contemporaries, to include Major General

28Richard S. West, Jr., The Second Admiral, pp. 327-334.

29Gideon Welles, The Diary of Gideon Welles, vol. 1, p. 157.

30Ibid., p. 157.


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William T. Sherman, looked quite favorably towards Porter and viewed him as a prominent

figure in the Union military. In fact, no one showed more empathy towards Porter than Major

General Ulysses S. Grant. The characterization of Porter and his proficiency as a joint

warfighter is portrayed best by highlighting the following personal memoir of Grant: The

Navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. The most perfect harmony

reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that I am aware

of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates that was not promptly complied with.31

Another peer testimony which attests to Porters exceptional attributes as a credible joint officer

is evident by the words of his adopted brother, David Farragut. In his letter to Welles he writes:

It gives me great pleasure to say that nothing could exceed

[Porters] perseverance in getting to the scene of his labors, or the

steadiness with which his officers and men have carried on his work ofdemolition. Porters service has been hard upon his officers and crew, but

they have performed it well, willingly, and unflinchingly.32

Farragut stressed Porter always praised his officers, giving them credit for standing in the face of

battle under all conditions.

Porter himself fully believed in his men and was eager to compliment them on their earnest

and untiring devotion to their duties despite an occasional non-compliance to the rules of the

service which he too was often to be blamed. He knew his sailors were willing to go the extra

mile and as such he was prepared to stand up for the rights of his men.33

Porter was a

professional who saw both sailoring or soldiering as an honorable calling, not as a means to gain

personal recognition.34

PorterHis mission command structure

31Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Chapter XXXIX.

32Chester G. Hearn, The Civil War Years, p. 133.

33Ibid., p. 133.

34Ronald Scott Mangum, The Vicksburg Campaign: A Study in Joint Operations, p.79.


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One way Porter enabled success at Vicksburg was that he practiced the basic principles of

mission command, particularly decentralized execution. At lower levels of command,

coordination was achieved by directive from above to obey a specific commander of one service

or another. Porter frequently gave orders to his subordinates to obey the orders of Grant and

Sherman the same as if they came from himself. For instance, during the Steeles Bayou

expedition, Sherman ordered General Smith to report to Porter for orders. Upon arrival, Porter

turned over the entire fleets Marine forceto Smith to operate under his command.35

But even

more than decentralization, flexibility and cooperation between Porter and Grant enabled

success. Porter noted after Vicksburg it is only through the high courtesy bred in a purely

military school that so perfect an understanding was achieved,36

but it was also through the

close friendship and high mutual regard that flourished between these two esteemed leaders.

Shortly after the Vicksburg campaign, Porters flagship became the temporary headquarters of

the joint command, with Grant and his subordinates arriving daily for meetings. Porter wrote,

Grant and Sherman are on board almost every day. Dine and tea with me often; we agree on

everything.37Porter unquestionably empowered his subordinate leaders and worked extremely

close with his peers to attain effective mission command. Had this not have been the case, the

outcome of the campaign could have been remarkably different. Thus, planners cannot assume

commanders in the future will have the traits to make war successful. Instead, leaders must rely

on a completely authentic joint service planning and operating structure.38

While General

Dempsey would have been extremely proud of Grant and Porters accomplishments within the

campaign, in reality his expectations for future leaders are much higher.

35Ibid., p. 79.

36Ibid., p. 79.

37Ibid., p. 79.

38Ibid., p. 85.


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Figure 6Major General Ulysses S. Grant,

Cold Harbor 1864 (Catton 1969)

Grantthe Army component of the joint operation

Ulysses S. Grant is often credited as winning the war for the Union and was arguably the

greatest Civil War General. Grant was not

born of a family with military lineage.

Tannery was the source of his familys

livelihood. Aware that Grant was not likely

to join the family tannery business, his father

sought educational opportunities for him,

securing an appointment to the Military

Academy at West Point; however, Grant did

not expect to graduate nor did he have

aspirations or intentions of remaining in the

Army.39

Grants reputation was mixed but also

misconstrued. Some mistook his calm, deliberate manner, and rare display of emotion as a lack

of concern for his troops or the outcome of a battle. His more widely known and positive

reputation was his willingness to accept risk and take action at a time when other commanders

appeared reluctant to do so; a great force of will.40

Grant was a fighting General whoearned

the respect, admiration, and constant support of President Lincoln. While Grant never read a

book on military tactics or history in his entire lifetime, his experiences, successes and failures

as a leader afforded him the opportunity to learn mission command.41

Grant would prove to

39Robert P. Broadwater, Ulysses S. Grant a Biography; p. 13

40Harry S. Laver,A General Who Will Fight; p. 6

41Robert P. Broadwater, Ulysses S. Grant a Biography; p. 13


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himself and others his ability to lead and is the first commander known in history to deal

successfully with an army of a million in size.42

Vicksburg was the ultimate test.

Grant - learned behaviors and key attributes

Command and control is not a new concept nor is mission command. It would take time for

Grant to gain the confidence necessary to apply the key attributes of General Dempseys Mission

Command White Paper: understanding, intent, and trust. Mission command is fundamentally a

learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of the profession of arms.43

Of the issues of command and control, at that time there was heavy reliance on telegraph,

letters, and face-to-face correspondence when possible. Grant faced a major setback when his

headquarters at Holly Springs was completely destroyed by Confederate General Van Dorn. He

was cut off from all communication for more than a week.44

There were orders being issued and

carried-out without his knowledge. Upon regaining communications, Grant immediately

reinforced his position of command and issued orders to his subordinates. Grant was a firm

believer in unified command as well as de-centralized execution. Grant wrote to his

Commanding General, Halleck: all of the Western departments really ought to be combined

under one head45

He realized the simplification and effectiveness of a single commander

providing clear guidance to his subordinates.

Grant learned mission command solely through experience without the opportunity for

continued education and training available to todays commanders. Two key events provided

opportunities for Grant to build his foundation formission command. The first example was his

attack against Tom Harriss irregulars in Missouri. Faced with anxiety and fear of battle, Grant

42A.L. Conger, The Rise of U.S. Grant, p. 349

43Martin Dempsey, Mission Command White Paper, p. 6

44Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, p. 229

45Ibid., 375


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In todays operational design construct, Vicksburg could have been viewed as the

Confederates center of gravity in the west. Grant wrote: Vicksburg was important to the

enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below Memphis. So

long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. Hence its

importance.50

Understanding its importance, Grant sought early on to take Vicksburg. He also

understood the challenges which were key to his foresight in developing three potential courses

of action: attack from the north - face Pemberton and his forces directly; attack from the east

Union forces in the deep south and vulnerable to attack; or attack from the westcross the

Mississippi River prior to any attack.

Vicksburg serves as an early example of a commander framing and reframing an

environment of ill-structured problems.51

Grant attempted to maintain a lengthy supply line

while moving against Vicksburg but his supply base at Holly Springs was destroyed; Grant then

determined he did not need the supply line as the local economy and farms could provide the

needed support. A direct attack against Vicksburg was attempted but failed due to heavier than

expected fortifications and challenging terrain. Four more attempts were made to secure

positions below and take Vicksburg via unnavigable waterways; these attempts were also

unsuccessful. Grant again reframed and worked out a new plan, from which grew one of the,

most dazzling campaigns of the war.52

Grant - his vision

In the mission command context, intent fuses understanding, assigned mission, and

direction to subordinates.53

Grants meetings with General Sherman and Admiral Porter are



52Bruce Catton, U.S. Grant and the American Military Tradition, p. 97



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two key examples of Grant relaying his intent and trusting his subordinates in execution. First,

Grant met with General Sherman, his right wing commander at Memphis. Grant talked over his

general plans and ordered Sherman to join him with two divisions via the Mississippi Central

Railroad if able. Grant not only provided clear face-to-face guidance but also intent and

empowerment to operate as he saw fit to achieve his objectives. It was clear Grant had trust in

Sherman. After providing his commanders intent, Grant allowed Sherman wide latitude to

execute in a decentralized fashion. The following excerpt demonstrates this trust:

Sherman, who was always prompt was up by the 29th

to Cottage Hill,

ten miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions, leaving a garrison

of only four regiments of infantry, a couple pieces of artillery, and a smalldetachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their way

from the north to Memphis.54

Next Grant met with Admiral Porter. His initial operational design relied primarily upon land

forces but he soon realized the co-operation of the Navy was absolutely essential to the success

of such an enterprise.55

His intent was for troops to move to and operate from a point below

Vicksburg. While Porter was not under his command, Grant stressed to him that the navy was

the only viable escort and protection for the steamers transporting his troops.

Grants orders for the Army in the Field,56

analogous to todays operational plan, provided the

understanding, assigned mission, and direction necessary to execute the plan [See Fig. 7].57

Grant - inspiring trust

An essential element of mission command as referenced by the Chairman is trust. Trust

informs the execution of intent.58

Subordinates at all levels should trust the commander

54Leonard Fulenkamp, Stephen Bowman, & Jay Luvaas, Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign, p. 29


56Ibid., p. 248

57Ibid.



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Figure 7Final Order for Troop Movement

provided he has fostered such a climate. Conversely, subordinates must prove to their

commanders they are trustworthy by mission execution. Should a subordinate fail, it is vital for

the commander to reinforce expectations and react as necessary including removal and

replacement of the subordinate. At the decisive moment when Grant determined sending forces

down the Mississippi River to Vicksburg was required, he wanted a competent commander in

charge59

and sent Sherman back to Memphis to assume command. Grants orders to Sherman

were for him to assume command of the forces in Memphis and proceed to Vicksburg based on

the situation and his own judgment. Grant also made clear he would make whatever

transportation, forces, and supplies available for use at his discretion. Grant only requested

Sherman notify him of his timeline for movement and to leave Memphis in the command of an



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efficient officer60

. Grant not only trusted Shermans ability as a leader but also his judgment

in executing his plan as Sherman saw fit. Grant wrote in his memoirs:

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself

that our movements were to be cooperative. It was my intention, and sounderstood by Sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fallback I would follow him even to the gates of Vicksburg.

61

It is evident Grant made his intentions known, expecting his subordinate leaders understood and

trusted there would be no problems in execution.

Tomorrows leaderscan glean invaluable lessons from General Grant. During a time when

current technology to assist in command and control of forces was not available, Grant did so

effectively through his understanding, clearly relaying his intent, and gaining the trust of his

subordinates. General Grant overcame personal and operational adversity to learn and apply

mission command. In addition to the key attributes prescribed by General Dempsey

understanding, intent, and trustGrant also learned initiative and decisiveness. Vicksburg was

an ill-structured problem. Grant understood its importance and remained engaged in every

aspect of the campaign. He ensured this understanding flowed from him to both his superiors

and subordinates. Most importantly, Grant recognized the need for and displayed mission

command during joint operations.

Conclusion

Many of the command and control challenges seen during the Vicksburg Campaign are seen

on todays battlefields. Terrain, technology, headquarters design, and weather can conspire

today, much as they did 150 years ago, to degrade a commanders ability to lead a joint force.

Limitations to command and control posed by poor roads in Afghanistan, lack of

communications infrastructure in Africa, torrential rains and floods in Haiti for example, can be

60Ibid., p.228

61Ibid., p.229


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overcome by adaptable, decentralized, and intent focused leadership. Just as Grant and Porter

overcame the challenges of their campaign, so too will commanders in the future. By

embodying the principles of mission command as outlined by the CJCS General Dempsey,

commanders in the future can be highly successful joint force commanders.

The basic principles of mission command commanders intent,mission type orders and decentralized execution are not new concepts.

They are part of current joint and service doctrine. But this is not enough;

we will ask more of our leaders in the future. Conduct of mission

command requires adaptable leaders at every echelon. MissionCommand White Paper, April 3, 2012, GEN Martin Dempsey


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West, Richard S. Jr. The Second Admiral: A Life of David Dixon Porter.New York: Coward

McCann, 1937.

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Enabling Command and Control - Mission Command at Vicksburg

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Transcript of Enabling Command and Control - Mission Command at Vicksburg