Empowerment Model forSustainable ResidentialReconstruction inLéogâne, Haiti, afterthe January 2010EarthquakeTRACY KIJEWSKI-CORREA, PH.D., A.M.ASCE;

ALEXANDROS A. TAFLANIDIS, PH.D., A.M.ASCE;

DUSTIN MIX; AND RYAN KAVANAGH

ABSTRACT: It is estimated that more than 300,000 people were killed in the January2010 earthquake in Haiti, hundreds of thousands more were injured, and approximately1.3 million people were left homeless due to the failure of the building stock. This levelof devastation can largely be attributed to political and economic issues includingstruggles with education, government oversight of civil works, and general lack ofresources that historically prohibited the establishment of reliable civil infrastructure.Any reconstruction effort needs to understand the significant constraints these conditionscreate in order to provide truly empowering solutions that build genuine local capacity.This paper reviews our experiences during trips to Léogâne, Haiti, and the formulationof an empowerment model that evaluates the resiliency, feasibility, sustainability, andviability of potential solutions to reconstruction of urban housing. We discuss the resultsof an assessment of common construction systems in Haiti and present an alternatehousing system compliant with the empowerment model to serve low-income displacedpopulations in Léogâne.

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On January 12, 2010, at 4:53 p.m.local time, a moment magnitude7.0 earthquake struck the Republicof Haiti. The epicenter of the earth-quake was 25 km southwest ofthe capital, Port-au-Prince (U.S.

Geological Survey 2010), close to the city of Léogâne.While Haiti has experienced repeated severe hurricaneand tropical storm disasters in recent years, this earth-quake dwarfed these earlier events. It is estimated thatmore than 300,000 people were killed, hundreds ofthousands more were injured, and approximately1.3 million people were left homeless due to the fail-ure of most of the building stock in the affected re-gions (Government of the Republic of Haiti 2010).In particular, Léogâne, a city of 130,000 peopleand one of Haiti’s 140 communes, was completelydevastated by the earthquake; an estimated 93% ofits buildings were damaged, most of which collapsed(Eberhard et al. 2010). According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the earthquake wasthe most destructive event any country has experi-enced in modern times when measured in termsof the people killed as a percentage of the country’spopulation (Cavallo et al. 2010).

As shown in Fig. 1, two years after the earthquake,despite the millions of dollars pledged through foreignaid and the well-intended efforts of the internationalcommunity, the sad reality is that the most familiesdisplaced due to the earthquake (more than600,000 Haitians; Phillips 2011) are still waitingin transitory shelters, without a clear road map towardsafe permanent housing that they will be able to callhome. While their environment deteriorated furtherunder heavy seasonal rains, hurricanes, and the cholera

outbreaks of late 2010 (Farmer 2011), they faced anew fear over forced evictions with no access topermanent housing options (Phillips 2011). Recentsurveys have found that 34% of Haitians reportedleaving the internally displaced persons (IDP) campsbecause they were forcibly evicted and have beenunable to find sustainable housing, forcing theminto even worse living conditions (InternationalOrganization for Migration 2011). Unfortunately,their plight creates a considerable risk that well-intentioned aid and recovery will pose greater harmthan good, similar to trends observed in Africa, aspressure to meet immediate human needs often leadsto imported resources and infrastructure that cannotbe sustained after nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) withdraw their aid (Moyo 2009).

While many agree that sustainable redevelopmentand self-reliance are essential for Haiti, few appreciatehow they can be practically achieved, particularly inthe domain of urban residential redevelopment. Haitiis the poorest Western nation, with high import taxesand severe deforestation (Farmer 2011), and construc-tion practices cannot rely on the many engineered ma-terials that are required in traditional code-compliantdesigns used in other seismically active regions andeven other parts of the developing world due to thelack of affordable local inventory. The preexistingeconomic desperation and inaccessibility of financingfor homes in Haiti have perpetuated many practicesthat enhance structural vulnerability. For example,most homes can be classified as nonengineered con-struction (Lang and Marshall 2011; Marshall et al.2011; Mix et al. 2011), executed in the absence ofany formal building code, that unfolds in incrementalstages over many years as savings are accumulated,

Figure 1. Transitory sheltering for families in Léogâne (left), whose hand-painted addresses on customized shelters (center)suggest an understanding of the long path to a permanent home, while others remain in informal shelters more than 2 yearsafter the earthquake (right)

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resulting in high variability in materials and work-manship. Due to the lack of affordable construction-grade wood, for use either as formwork or as a buildingmaterial, and the high cost of steel, Haitians useconstruction with heavy masonry walls made ofhand-pressed concrete masonry units (CMUs) andlightly reinforced, undersized concrete columns(Fig. 2), frequently with no beams, leading to systemswith inadequate strength and ductility. This combi-nation creates systems that perform well under thestrong winds common in the Caribbean but thatproved to be extremely vulnerable to an earthquake,failing through brittle collapse modes (Mix et al.2011). These factors create what may be the mostdifficult reconstruction effort following any major dis-aster, requiring thoughtful policies and incentivescapable of effecting long-term enhancement of localcapacity (Kijewski-Correa and Taflanidis 2012).

The writers’ attempt to contribute to this recoveryhas included four trips to Léogâne over the last 2 years(more information on these trips may be foundat http://www.engineering2empower.org/). The firsttrip (March 2010) focused on postquake reconnais-sance and identification of the vulnerabilities thatcontributed to the extensive structural collapses; thesecond (August 2010) focused on a survey of culturalpreferences in urban housing and local constructionmaterials and practices; the third (March 2011) wasdevoted to a Community Planning Workshop forLéogâne, discussed later in this paper; and the fourth(December 2011) was dedicated to gathering laborand material pricing and surveying cultural prefer-ences to support the new housing paradigms discussedin the last section of this paper. These experiences havereminded us of the legitimate danger that necessityand desperation will lead to a reliance on heavily

subsidized and imported engineered designs thatare well beyond the financial reach of most families.This danger results from the common engineeringapproach of tweaking existing construction practicesand design code provisions based on observed vulner-abilities after catastrophic events (Youd et al. 2000;Uzarski and Arnold 2001; Jain et al. 2002). However,the lack of education, codification, and oversight toregulate construction processes in Haiti providesimmense challenges and precludes the approaches ofsimply refining or expanding the body of knowledge.The challenges in Haiti have been dismissed, due tolack of understanding of the constraints, under theassumption that resilience could be achieved by sim-ply importing and enforcing U.S. or internationalbuilding codes and established systems; some havespeculated that building code adoption and strictenforcement are the solution to the Haitian urbanhousing dilemma (Lindell 2010). This belief has alsocontributed to well-intentioned efforts to educate ma-sons, architects, and engineers to facilitate Haitian-ledmasonry reconstruction, which may eventually lead, inthe absence of donor funds and oversight, to the reem-ployment of the same building systems that proveddeadly in the 2010 earthquake, as demonstrated inFig. 2 (Kijewski-Correa and Taflanidis 2012). Thescenario depicted in Fig. 2 unfortunately demonstratesthe inadequacies and even dangers of well-intendedefforts to facilitate the reconstruction of the residentialhousing stock in Haiti without a holistic understand-ing of the problem.

This paper reviews the writers’ experiences in offer-ing alternatives to these practices, focusing on lessonslearned when operating in unique resource-constrainedenvironments (compared to recent disasters in more de-veloped areas of the world). This discussion begins with

Figure 2. Time lapse of home that experienced a pancake collapse in Léogâne instigated by insufficient columns and heavypartitioning (left, documented in March 2010), undergoing reconstruction in August 2010 following re-education ofthe head mason with expressed concern over how to cast floor slabs (center, documented in August 2010), and continuingto a second floor with the same principles that created the original vulnerabilities (right, documented December 2011)

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the definition of an empowerment model and a rationalapproach to evaluating potential solutions in recon-struction against this model, including the proposalof alternative technologies and the processes thatsupport them.

EMPOWERMENT MODEL FOR POSTQUAKERECONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING IN HAITI

For many in the civil and earthquake engineeringcommunity, the field reconnaissance in Haiti follow-ing the January 2010 earthquake was a soberingreminder that while the causes of failures were easyto identify, practical remedies proved far more elusive(Kijewski-Correa and Taflanidis 2012). In such set-tings, where basic human needs were often unmeteven before the disaster, the understandable responsewould be to import immediate solutions. Certainly theimportation of transitory solutions by NGOs, includ-ing shelters, was a necessary and important measure inpostquake Haiti. However, the writers recognized thatthese solutions were transitory at best and that with-out the equally necessary and important step of intro-ducing practical options for affordable permanenthousing, many Haitians would be left indefinitelyin these transitory shelters (see Fig. 1) or would revertto the failed construction practices of old (see Fig. 2).Ultimately, if any solution seeks to be a real optionfor the people of Haiti, it must avoid importation,imposition by foreign entities, or heavy subsidizationand instead contribute to self-reliance. The writers setforth to formalize these requirements as an empower-ment model for the postquake reconstruction of hous-ing in Haiti.

Ultimately, an empowerment model seeks to shiftpractices in such a way that they can be sustainedwithout intervention by foreign entities. To do sowithin the context of permanent housing, the empow-erment model relies on four key tenets, visualizedin Fig. 3:

1. Resiliency ensures life safety and protectionagainst natural disasters and other environmen-tal factors; it requires an understanding ofhazards and vulnerabilities.

2. Feasibility ensures practical implementationusing locally available technologies, capabilities,and materials; it requires an understanding ofcapacity constraints.

3. Sustainability ensures indefinite support usinglocal resources (economic and natural), technol-ogies, and skill sets of the community and can

adapt with their evolving needs; it requires anunderstanding of market constraints.

4. Viability ensures the support of most localstakeholders as culturally appropriate so thatideas are not just accepted, but embraced andpromoted; it requires an understanding ofcultural context.

Although, from an engineering perspective, resil-iency (safety) and feasibility (constructability) maybe considered the most important, all four tenetsmust be simultaneously addressed if the solutioncan be hoped to have a lasting impact. Sustainabilityis especially important; the solution must be accessibleto the target population without dependence onforeign aid. The following sections discuss each ofthe four tenets through the lens of our experiences inpostquake Haiti and describe how they guidedthe development of an assessment tool to evaluatethe compliance of solutions with the empowermentmodel.

Resiliency: Identifying Vulnerabilities inMultihazard SettingsAlthough situated in a seismically active region, be-fore the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti had notexperienced a significant seismic event since 1846.Due to this long period of seismic inactivity, Haitianswere not cognizant of the possibility of major earth-quakes. Haitian citizens, engineers, and constructioncrews openly admitted this during the writers’ firstvisit (Mix et al. 2011). Haitian housing trends beforethe quake were predicated on environmental require-ments (tropical climate) and cultural preferences forprivacy (individual living spaces) and security, subjectto practical constraints related to lack of native resour-ces, income, education, and government oversight.The high-resistance requirements against rain, strong

Figure 3. Schematic for the empowerment model illustrat-ing the four tenets of resiliency, feasibility, sustainability,and viability

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winds, and flooding from the frequent tropical stormsand hurricanes justified the established heavy concreteand masonry construction. Furthermore, the culturalpreferences for privacy and security played a pivotalrole in highly partitioned residential housing designand the common practice of either vented decorativeconcrete bricks or iron bars for windows. Unfortu-nately, these practices resulted in significantly greaterseismic mass during the earthquake and thereby gen-erated larger forces.

Updated assessments of the seismic hazard suggestthat there is substantial earthquake risk throughoutHaiti, with locations such as Port-au-Prince andthe Enriquillo Valley (the epicenter of recent seismicactivity) demonstrating increased vulnerability due topotential site amplification phenomena (Frankel et al.2010). Because these revised seismic hazard forecastsare significantly greater than previous estimates(Shedlock 1999), permanent housing introduced inthe coming years must present resilient solutionsagainst both earthquakes and hurricanes. With thehazards well understood, it is thus important tocharacterize the vulnerabilities created by theestablished Haitian housing trends, beginning firstwith some unique attributes of the structural systemsused.

Due to lack of resources, most housing in urbanareas in Haiti uses a combination of reinforced con-crete columns, often without beams, and unreinforcedmasonry walls made of CMUs as their primary struc-tural system (Lang and Marshall 2011; Marshall et al.2011; Mix et al. 2011). The high cost of importedsteel implies that the amount of reinforcement usedin this style of construction is often compromised.This basic structural system is then adapted basedon the resources of the family to one of three homeclasses shown in Fig. 4; lower-income homes are singlestory, without any ring beam to tie the system, andtopped with a wood-framed, corrugated metal roof;middle- and higher-income homes use a larger and

potentially higher quality implementation of thesystem with a concrete slab roof to afford the provisionto add floors later (see also Fig. 2). These slabs can beconsidered flat plates, devoid of beams to tie the lateralsystem and without the presence of column capitalsor drop panels that would increase the shear andmoment resistance of the system.

Bearing this in mind, the writers’ reconnaissanceidentified several recurring failure mechanisms inthe January 2010 earthquake, as shown in Fig. 5(Mix et al. 2011):

• Shear failures: Rigid exterior and interior wallsconstructed with lower-quality CMUs are suffi-ciently stiff to attract seismic forces but haveinsufficient strength to resist them, transferringsignificant shear forces to adjacent columns onfailure.

• Flexible diaphragms and punching shear failures:Flat slabs (serving as both floors and roofs) lackedsufficient diaphragm action to engage columnsand form an effective lateral system in homes withelongated floor plans, lack of beams, and inappro-priately reinforced column–plate connections.

The following factors contributed to these failuremechanisms:

• Undersized or underreinforced columns: Columns werenot sized for strength but for constructability(match depth of CMU walls implemented first inconstruction sequence) and/or were inadequatelydetailed or confined due to complete lack of designand construction provisions and the high cost ofsteel (high import taxes).

• Excessive mass: Reinforced concrete was used for floor/roof systems and CMUs for all partitions.

• Poor materials: Concrete was mixed on the groundfrom smooth river rock and beach sands, large ag-gregates often separated from the mix in casting,weak CMU blocks were used for masonry walls,

Figure 4. Photos of existing structural systems in Haiti across the resource spectrum: low-income, middle-income, andhigh-income houses (left to right)

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and in some cases smooth reinforcing steel was usedin columns.

• Incremental construction: Houses were constructed overan extended period of time, causing significantvariation in material quality and worker skill.

These vulnerabilities and constraints constitutecritical considerations for any resilient rebuildingeffort.

Feasibility: Understanding and Leveraging LocalCapacityIn order to achieve the ultimate goal of empoweringHaiti to rebuild with the proper knowledge and train-ing to avoid similar devastation in future earthquakes,all recommendations must operate within the existingmodalities of building material production, construc-tion, and crew organization. With respect to buildingmaterial production, there are three staples of Haitianconstruction—cement, reinforcing steel (fè in Kreyòl),and CMU (bloc in Kreyòl). Cement and reinforcingsteel are imported from the Dominican Republic,and CMUs were traditionally hand pressed locally

using sand and cement, with wide-ranging (typicallylow) quality [Fig. 6(a)], although mechanically proc-essed CMUs are now being produced in Léogâne. Notonly have CMUs become a critical element for parti-tioning to achieve security and privacy, but they alsoserve an important role in the construction sequence.Due to deforestation, the availability of wood for form-work is limited; therefore, erecting CMU walls firstadjacent to rebar cages anchored into the slab or foun-dation has an important practical implication: It effec-tively provides formwork for up to two sides of acolumn. The formwork for the remaining sides ofthe column is planked with available scrap wood[Fig. 6(b)]. Due to this construction practice, it isfairly common for the size of the CMU blocks to dic-tate the size of the concrete columns used, regardlessof the lateral or even gravity demands of the struc-ture, explaining one of the common vulnerabilitiesnoted in the previous section (Mix et al. 2011).Admittedly, this construction sequence does resem-ble that of confined masonry, common for aseis-mic design throughout the developing world(Coburn and Robin 2002); however, Haitian

Figure 6. (a) Concrete masonry unit (CMU) production at a roadside stand; (b) casting of end column followingconstruction of CMU wall; (c) plywood formwork for casting of concrete slab

Figure 5. Typical middle-income home still under construction at the time of the earthquake showing shear failure ofconcrete masonry unit wall propagated into adjacent column (left); pancake collapse of high-income home (right) demon-strating failure of undersized columns without sufficient engagement against lateral forces over larger floor plan

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prequake construction practices were lacking severalessential elements of this system, including properkeying of the block at the column interface, reinforce-ment through the CMUs, and adequate-strengthblock (Lang and Marshall 2011; Mix et al. 2011).For middle- and high-income homes, once all theCMU walls are constructed and concrete columns cast,plywood sheets are shored up to create a formwork forthe concrete slabs generally cast of CMUs, embeddedin concrete with mild reinforcement [Fig. 6(c)]. Con-crete is mixed on site, often by shovel on the groundusing water from adjacent shallow wells, and whilesuperior materials are available, cost often drives theuse of more affordable smooth river rocks and cheaperfine aggregates, such as beach sand, which containssalts that reduce concrete durability.

With respect to crew organization, the writers wereable to document three models for construction teams(Mix et al. 2011). The first is the skilled foremanmodel, in which one person has formal training froma university and instructs the rest of the team. Thismodel works well; however, because of the valueplaced on such expertise, these construction teamsare often too costly for most residential constructionand are mostly used in larger commercial projects.The second model is an apprentice model, in whichthe trade is passed down through generations of a fam-ily. This model was more evident in the high-incomeresidential construction in Léogâne. It is customary forcrews in this category to be employed over short terms,and only when they have proved their skills do theyreceive longer employment contracts. Finally, the lastmodel employs a master builder, one person in a com-munity who helps everyone build their homes. Thiswas the most prominent model for low-income hous-ing. Master builders are rarely formally trained buthave some idea of construction techniques through ei-ther their own experience or experience passed downby family and friends. Particularly with respect to res-idential construction, the latter two models are mostprevalent. While builders in all three models have ac-cumulated considerable formal or informal expertise inconcrete and masonry construction, they still must op-erate within the constraints created by lack of financialresources, which explains not only the aforementionedconstruction sequence, but also the underuse of steeland many other questionable construction practices.

Understanding these issues of feasibility leadsto a very important realization: Lack of standardsand oversight means that any housing alternativeneeds to establish means for incorporating qualitycontrol within the construction sequence. Otherwise,

economic desperation will lead to continued question-able practices that can ultimately manifest as seismicvulnerabilities.

Sustainability: Finding Solutions Accessible to theBottom of the PyramidAs discussed previously, there is no shortage of masonsand crews with skilled or apprentice bosses to lead thereconstruction of homes in Léogâne (and in Haiti ingeneral); however, there is a shortage of resources toprocure their services. Interviews with one of theleading construction companies in Léogâne indicatedthat the upper-, middle-, and lower-income homesshown in Fig. 4 retail for US$50,000, $25,000, and$10,000, respectively. But before the January 2010earthquake, the estimated average annual income ofa Haitian was US$250–400 (Central IntelligenceAgency 2010). With 80% of the population livingunder the poverty line and 54% living in what istermed “abject” poverty, most Haitians cannot evenafford quality materials, let alone the services ofprofessional construction teams. Haiti is also 95% de-forested and has high import taxes on constructionmaterials, implying that the general population can-not rely heavily on imported materials, includingstructural steel, aluminum, wood, and manufacturedbuilding materials. This lack of resources has contrib-uted significantly to the vulnerabilities and capacityconstraints identified in the previous sections. It alsocreates an environment in which permanent housingoptions must be derived from materials currentlyavailable in the local free market: cement and aggre-gate, with judicious reliance on more expensive mate-rials like reinforcing steel and wood.

Sadly, this situation has been only deepened bythe earthquake: Cash flow for families living inIDP camps has been reduced and has become sporadic[see Fig. 7(a)], whereas the increased demand forhousing due to the extensive collapses has escalatedthe prices of construction materials and land. This in-tersection of circumstances has made up-front financ-ing for permanent homes even less accessible for mostdisplaced families and drives a number of unsafe prac-tices, such as the harvesting of yielded reinforcementfrom rubble [Fig. 7(b)].

These grave economic conditions will dramaticallyconstrain the abilities of most Haitians to safelyimprove their current housing systems. Ultimately,improved housing will require higher-quality aggre-gate, more cement and more steel, or the formalintroduction of confined masonry, any of which willlead to a significant increase in cost. These materials

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simply will not be affordable for the families living inIDP camps, who belong to the bottom of the eco-nomic pyramid. At the same time, any alternativehousing model will have to deliver safety, but giventhe extreme poverty in Haiti, the model will have tocompete in the open market with the preexistingmasonry construction with respect to cost andconstruction time. Therefore, to avoid tragedy inthe next earthquake, the poorest of Haitian familiesneed to be presented with alternate affordablehousing models with the tenet of sustainability atthe forefront.

Viability: Creating Mechanisms for CommunityEngagementWhile in previous field work in Léogâne, the writersremained conscious of the functional needs and ex-pectations local families had regarding permanenthousing, the writers sought a more systematic solici-tation of attitudes, expectations, beliefs, and experien-ces to guide reconstruction during a RebuildingLéogâne Community Planning Workshop held

March 15–18, 2011, in Léogâne at the Faculté des Sci-ences Infirmières (Nursing School) and the Universityof Notre Dame’s Residence Filariose (Rebuild Léogâne2011). Organized by the University of Notre Dame,200 attendees from a consortium of universities,NGOs, and private developers from the United Statesand citizens and representatives from governmentagencies and NGOs in Léogâne were divided intoeight focus groups: Culture, Planning and Zoning,Infrastructure, Public Services, Education, Health,Economic Development, and Housing; the writersled this last focus group.

One of the initial exercises at the workshop,a small-group visioning exercise with citizens ofLéogâne, proved that independent discussions consis-tently converged to a short list of top priorities: health,education, zoning, and infrastructure. According tothe citizens, all these themes have met recurring chal-lenges posed by bureaucracy; lack of coordinationbetween NGOs, the government, and the communityof Léogâne; and still unresolved land tenure issues.In the subsequent days, each focus group set fortha different agenda and activities, although daily

Figure 7. (a) Storefronts created out of tents to reestablish businesses lost in the earthquake; (b) young man onbicycle dragging mangled steel scavenged from rubble for reuse in postquake construction

Figure 8. (a) First author and translator (not shown in photo) presenting housing focus group recommendations tothe audience of the Community Planning Workshop in English and Kreyòl; (b) third author and local translator interview-ing internally displaced persons in Léogâne

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reporting and interaction between groups ensured thatthe outcomes of their discussions could guide the ac-tivities of groups with interdependent issues (Fig. 8).The resulting workshop report provided recommenda-tions in each of the eight focus areas for both short-and long-term recovery (Rebuild Léogâne 2011).

The engagement of the community on matters re-lated to permanent housing revealed stigmas attachedto multifamily housing (apartments) and materialslike bamboo, recycled aggregates, and plywood parti-tioning that left most homeowners heavily invested inwhat they perceived as secure and familiar—concreteand CMU construction. Because of the persistentconcerns regarding security in urban zones likeLéogâne and the preference for the modern appearanceof finished bloc for a proper home, displaced familiesdesired homes with all the security, flexibility, andfunctionality that CMU homes afforded but withoutthe vulnerabilities they tragically witnessed. Whilethe participation of Léogâne’s citizens was encourag-ing, it became evident that representation from IDPswas lacking. As a result, the writers’ focus groupexecuted Kreyòl-language field surveys with two localtranslators in the neighborhood of Ka Boulos(18°31.097 0N, 72°38.049 0W) to document the atti-tudes and expectations of Léogâne’s most vulnerabledisplaced populations. Most (80%) of those surveyedin this camp did not own the land they had previouslyoccupied, and many renters were indefinitely dis-placed because their landlords did not repair or rebuildthe properties. These surveys, along with the inter-views conducted with citizens attending the work-shop, confirmed that families desired single-family(76% in favor) and single-story (94% in favor) homesthat they could own outright (73% opposed renting).These homes must be able to accommodate an averageof 4.35 persons within an average of 3.29 rooms. Theseresults are consistent with practices throughout the re-gion, where even the most modest of homes are gen-erally divided into two bedrooms and at least onecommon area, with an external area for cooking anda nearby well and latrine. Throughout the spring of2012, these same translators continued a modifiedversion of this pilot survey among residents of Léogâneliving in transitory shelters to further the writers’understanding of displaced family demographics andtheir experiences, perceptions, preferences, and expect-ations surrounding permanent housing [Fig. 8(b)].

The spring 2011 pilot surveys conducted duringthe workshop also revealed the displaced families’understanding of collapse mechanisms; 76% indicatedthat concrete block homes are safe and that it is the

concrete slab roofs that are vulnerable. Thus, whilethe understanding of the dangers posed by heavy roofslabs was evident, an understanding of the role thatCMU walls and undersized columns played in thesefailure mechanisms was considerably lacking. Pastanthropological research and interactions with theworkshop participants suggest that because Haitians’understanding and communication of concepts consis-tently deal in tangible and experiential modes, any ed-ucational programming about the vulnerability of pastpractices and the potential advantages of new practiceswill be viable only if they show an appreciation for thecultural context and use physical specimens, publicdemonstrations, and prototypes.

ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THEEMPOWERMENT MODEL

Although it is clear that the four tenets of the empow-erment model are important to identify, they are reallyonly pragmatic if they can be used as a tool to evaluateproposed solutions. Such evaluations show that thefailure of many proposals to carefully consider andsatisfy one or more of the four tenets of this modelexplains why they have not provided lasting solutionsto the Haitian housing dilemma (as demonstrated bythe conditions depicted in Figs. 1 and 2). This thenbegs the question of how such tenets could be used todrive designs toward true empowerment.

Consider, for example, the solutions presented atthe Building Back Better Communities Expo spon-sored by the Clinton Foundation. Many proposalspresented failed to meet basic engineering require-ments, many homes retailed for $20,000–$30,000,and only about 1 in 10 relied exclusively on localmaterials (MacDonald 2011). Had basic expectationsfor designs akin to the tenets of the empowermentmodel been communicated in advance and had theproposals been scored with an appropriate assessmenttool, not only would the submitters have been moti-vated to incorporate features that target long-termempowerment of the Haitian people, but there wouldhave been an objective framework to score and rankproposed models.

This realization motivated us to use the four tenetscontributing to the empowerment model, withappropriate mechanisms for community input, to de-velop a process to score and assess how well differentreconstruction models meet the multidimensionalneeds explored in this paper thus far. This assessmentprocess ensures that the empowerment model canserve not only as a framework for approaching urban

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housing problems, but also as the basis of an assess-ment tool to identify the strengths and weaknessesof proposed housing solutions.

Development of the Assessment ToolSystems that evolve organically in resource-constrained settings inherently satisfy the tenets ofan empowerment model in that they are practices bornof common experience with the support of the com-munity. Unfortunately, these practices are not guidedby engineering knowledge and can prove vulnerableto infrequent extreme events, as was the case in Haiti.In order to objectively evaluate not only the existinghousing systems but also potential alternative systemsfor permanent housing in postquake Haiti, the writersdeveloped an assessment rubric that measures compli-ance with the empowerment model’s tenets by scoringspecific attributes of homes. While the rubric dis-cussed here was developed during the CommunityPlanning Workshop (the writers’ third trip) specifi-cally to assess urban permanent housing options inHaiti, it can be readily adapted to other applicationsin the developing world. The attributes selectedfor the rubric, listed in Table 1, were informed bythe writers past fieldwork in Léogâne and by thefeedback received from citizens participating in theworkshop.

As demonstrated in Table 1, each of the tenets ofthe empowerment model materializes as two or moreattributes. Most attributes can be rated with one offour choices scored on a scale from 0 to 100, wherea score of 100 is the most favorable. In two instances,an attribute has only binary scoring options that arepunitive in nature; a negative score can be awardedfor an undesirable behavior. Each attribute is then as-signed a weighting as a simple way of reflecting itemsof high priority for the community being served; inthis case, the weights were derived from a brainstorm-ing exercise with Haitians at the Community Plan-ning Workshop [Fig. 9(a)]. Participants indicatedthat security, seismic performance, and the use of localconstruction materials and processes were among themost important considerations. The weighted scoresfor each attribute are then summed to yield thecomposite score for a particular housing option.Certainly the scores assigned to each choice and theweights assigned to each attribute are subjective,and effective scoring does require some expertise,but what is important is the development of a rationaland consistent framework for evaluating various recon-struction options across a spectrum of predeterminedattributes embodying the wide-ranging constraints

in Haiti and purposefully generalized to allow assess-ment at all three housing class levels. As such, thisrubric encompasses attributes such as cost and qualitycontrol, issues that are very important to the familiescurrently in IDP camps, but also addresses issueslike cultural acceptability and construction time,attributes that may be more important to moreaffluent Haitians.

Many solutions may be offered for permanent hous-ing in Haiti and, based on how they score using thisrubric, may be appropriate for certain demographicsand not others. Therefore, variations on the rubriccould be developed with scoring and weightingadjusted to explicitly filter noncompliant designsoutright; for example, for bottom-of-the-pyramidapplications, material cost might be more heavilyweighted, and the choices could be replaced withHaitian dollar amounts and with scores assigned tothese choices levying heavy penalties for exceedinga certain price point accessible to most families in thisdemographic. In fact, the current lack of solutions thatsatisfy all four tenets for this population ultimatelymotivates the paradigm shift that will be discussedin the last section of this paper. Use of the rubricto target the solutions best serving a given demo-graphic is encouraged, as it returns to the holistic ap-proach of the empowerment model. In this way,it becomes not only an assessment tool but also apowerful tool within planning processes and designcompetitions to incentivize certain desirable attributesand disincentivize certain undesirable practices.

Application of the Assessment Tool: DatabasingPotential OptionsAfter the writers developed the rubric, the housingfocus group identified the typologies best suited toHaitian reconstruction and the spectrum of materialsthat could be used for these primary load resistingsystems, as well as their accompanying claddingand partitioning, if applicable [Fig. 9(b)]. Giventhe functional requirements of Haitian urban housing,the writers determined that primary load-resisting sys-tems include load-bearing walls, confined masonry,and moment-resisting frames. This exercise did notseek to evaluate the feasibility of any system ormaterial but rather to propose an exhaustive suiteof options. While roof and flooring systems were alsoevaluated as part of this exercise (see complete report;Rebuild Léogâne 2011), this paper focuses on the pri-mary load-resisting systems only; results are presentedin Table 2. CMUs are the nation’s most popular andversatile modern building element. In fact, according

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Table

1.RubricUsedto

AssessHou

singSystem

Com

plian

cewithEmpow

ermen

tMod

el

Attribu

teChoices

(point

values)

Weigh

t

Resiliency

Hurricane

resilience

Collapse

(10)

Failu

re:major

elem

ent

(40)

Failu

re:minor

elem

ent

(70)

Nodamage

(100

)1.50

Seismic

resilience

Collapse

(10)

Failu

re:major

elem

ent

(40)

Failu

re:minor

elem

ent

(70)

Nodamage

(100

)1.50

Durability

1year

(10)

1–5years

(40)

5–25

years

(70)

25+years

(100

)1.00

Feasibility

Requiredconstruction

skills

Individu

al(100

)Masterbu

ilder

(80)

Trained

crew

(60)

Trained

crew

and

equipm

ent

(25)

1.00

Constructionprocess

Modular

byhand

(100

)Modular

withfasteners

(70)

Staged

construction

(40)

Allat

once

(10)

1.20

Potential

forcodification

Unlikely

ð−50Þ

Likely

(0)

0.50

Needforqu

alitycontrol

Not

requ

ired

(0)

Necessary

ð−10

0Þ1.00

Sustainability

Use

oflocalmaterials

Majorityim

ported

(25)

Potential

localproduction

(50)

Likely

localproduction

(75)

Majoritydomestic

(100

)2.00

Materialcost

Raw

(100

)Handprocessed

(66)

Shop

processed

(33)

Mill

processed

(0)

1.50

Constructiontime

1week

(100

)1month

(70)

3months

(40)

6months

(10)

0.25

Viability

Culturalacceptance

Existscurrently

(100

)Existed

historically

(70)

Possiblewithprogramming

(40)

Unlikely

(10)

2.00

Security

Manualintrusion

(10)

Intrusionwithhand

tools

(40)

Intrusionwithpower

tools

(70)

Intrusionun

likely

(100

)1.75

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to a government survey prior to the earthquake, CMUswere used in the walls of 76% of single-story and97% of multistory construction (Institute Haïtien deStatistique et d’Informatique 2003, 2010).

The housing focus group at the Community Plan-ning Workshop applied the rubric to evaluate morethan a dozen primary load-resisting systems (RebuildLéogâne 2011), a sampling of which are representedwith their scores in Fig. 10. The rubric then facilitatesa means to quantitatively assess and compare potentialsolutions and identify comparative weaknesses andstrengths of proposed systems and the tenets they bestsatisfy. This process was conducted for each systemevaluated, and recommendations were made to helpfurther enhance compliance with the EmpowermentModel (Rebuild Léogâne 2011). Given that theCMU is the only widely available partitioning andcladding material in Léogâne, the attributes of localavailability and construction process drove the em-powerment model toward selection of the “lowesthanging fruits” of reinforced load-bearing CMU

walls and confined masonry systems, as one would ex-pect. Unfortunately, the rubric, in its current form,cannot predict whether the solution will be trulyresilient, feasible, sustainable, and viable enough forthe community being served, particularly if the totalprice of the redesigned system dramatically exceedsthe revenue available to families in that incomeclass; it only facilitates objective comparison betweensolutions. In order to achieve this function, scores andweights would need to be adjusted with a particulardemographic in mind, as mentioned in the previoussection.

It is not unreasonable that the rubric tends to biastoward existing technologies and systems, as it is dif-ficult to score a proposed system that has not yet beenvetted in the free market. Thus, despite the poor per-formance of CMU walls in the earthquake, CMU con-struction remains viable due to the lack of other localoptions that still satisfy the cultural and environmen-tal needs of the community. Load-bearing CMU wallsystems primarily served low-income populations in

Figure 9. (a) Third author gathering local input to prioritize attributes of the assessment rubric (photo courtesy ofMark Taylor); (b) first two authors leading a brainstorming exercise during the Community Planning Workshop to identifythe spectrum of construction materials for potential housing models

Table 2. Spectrum of Materials for Residential Systems

Primary load-resistingsystem

Primary material choices Partitioning choices

Historicallyor currentlyavailable

Not historicallyor currentlyavailable

Historicallyor currentlyavailable

Not historicallyor currentlyavailable

Load-bearingwalls

CMUs, earth,stone, wood

Brick, manufacturedstructural panels,

recyclables

N/A N/A

Confined masonry CMUs Brick N/A N/AMoment-resistingframe

Wood, concrete Light steel, bamboo Woventhatch,

CMUs, lathe

Brick, recyclables,manufactured

nonstructural panels

Note: CMU = concrete masonry unit; N/A = not applicable.

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Léogâne and did sustain damage in the earthquake,but due to their small size, single-story modalityand usually light metal roof, they generally did notexperience total collapse but rather loss of one or morewalls in brittle shear failure. The reimplementationof this system should include reinforcement ofbetter quality masonry units and a ring beam to tiethe system together. However, it must be stressed thatlack of quality materials, certified construction, andthe finances to procure them will lead to housesthat are just as vulnerable as the homes that were de-stroyed during the earthquake.

Sadly, this same concern surfaces as one evaluatesoptions available to middle- and upper-income resi-dents in Léogâne. As Fig. 10 indicates, the formal in-troduction of confined masonry construction to Haitiscores well across all four tenets as it is a direct exten-sion of current practices using materials already avail-able locally. When executed properly, the systemhas the flexibility to support multistory construc-tion, which allows the potential for future expansionin dense urban zones—an attribute many Haitiansdesire. For organizations like Build Change, “minor,low-, or no-cost improvements to existing ways ofbuilding” often prove easier “than to introduce a com-pletely new technology or reintroduce a traditionalbuilding method” (Hausler 2010). The rubric sup-ports this hypothesis. Unfortunately, engineeringadequate seismic resilience through higher-qualityCMUs and larger quantities of steel can cost up to$20,000, well beyond the reach of most displacedHaitians, who have sporadic sources of income(Phillips 2011). As a result, the current reconstructionin Léogâne shows limited examples of the successfulimplementation of confined masonry: CMU construc-tion escalated between July 2011 and December 2011in Léogâne, and while there is evidence of increasedquantities of transverse reinforcement in columnsand vertical reinforcement through CMU walls, othernecessary features such as ring beams, horizontal wall

reinforcement, and effective keying of higher-qualityblocks are not yet a consistent practice. In fact, themost consistent mitigation measure that has beentaken is the use of lightweight metal roofs framedin timber. Although Haitians still prefer the optionto add floors to their homes in the future, the aversionto concrete slabs after the earthquake has increased theuse of metal roofs in postquake reconstruction.

PARADIGM SHIFTS TO MAXIMIZEEMPOWERMENT

While the previous section provides immediatelyimplementable options, one should take care in advo-cating solely these construction modalities for allHaitian urban housing, as many people do not havethe financial resources necessary to make masonry sys-tems effective against earthquakes. Indeed, masonrysystems are the preferred systems identified by the em-powerment model largely because there are no otherlegitimate free market competitors. For many of theother possible main force resisting systems discussedin the workshop report (Rebuild Léogâne 2011)and shown in Fig. 10, the lack of native resourcesand industries to manufacture engineered materialsin Haiti led to punitive scoring in the evaluation pro-cess. However, many of these systems, including theone presented in the next section, could be dramati-cally more sustainable, feasible, and resilient if thematerials and technologies were locally producedand retailed in the Haitian free market.

Technology Innovations: Alternate PartitioningSystemsConsidering that CMUs are a staple constructionmaterial but also create considerable vulnerabilitiesin earthquakes, one domain ripe for technology inno-vation is lightweight partitioning elements to reducevulnerability but still satisfy cultural expectations forprivacy and security within the practical constraints

Figure 10. Composite scores from the assessment of several potential residential housing systems; higher scores representthe most appropriate system based on the criteria and weights used (CMU = concrete masonry unit; RC = reinforcedconcrete)

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related to the lack of resources and oversight. Interest-ingly, historical Haitian construction of gingerbreadhouses (late nineteenth century, European-inspiredwood construction), many of which survived the earth-quake despite their age and condition [Fig. 11(a)],used timber framing with plank walls. These light-weight structures were well adapted to the climateof Haiti and were sustainable prior to deforestation.Therefore, it is of interest to explore technologies sus-tainable in modern-day Haiti that would permit load-bearing walls to be replaced with frames similarly cladin nonstructural partitioning systems. In fact, by rec-ognizing that most families have limited resources andcannot afford the degree of reinforcement required toaseismically design every wall in a highly partitionedconfined masonry home, the adoption of a framesystem is preferable because it concentrates structuralresistance and thereby limited financial resources inonly select elements of the system.

While frames could be feasibly made of reinforcedconcrete using local materials and skill sets—thisstructural system is already used in commercial struc-tures in Haiti—an equally feasible plank or panelingtechnology is not available currently. As a result, wepropose production of thin panels from a variety oflocal raw material sources, including precast concretepanels using a lightweight mix reinforced with wiremesh (Morrison 2011). These lightweight panels areisolated from the primary structural system and helpreduce the seismic demand on the home while stillmaintaining adequate strength to bear the pressureof hurricane-force winds and provide the basic securityfrom intruders necessary in urban zones. The panelscan be attached to frames using a simplified fastenerand then the joints sealed and the walls continuouslyfinished with mortar and paint. More importantly,since the panels are nonstructural in nature, strictquality control on material properties is not required,

allowing them to be produced without the need forheavy machinery or technical training.

Process Innovations: Engineering Quality ControlAlthough the elimination of CMU walls will signifi-cantly reduce the seismic demands on the structure,the resistance of the system is no longer distributedand is instead concentrated in the discrete elementsof the frame. Therefore, a high degree of qualitycontrol is necessary to ensure that the frame is properlydesigned and constructed, with columns and beamssized and reinforced appropriately. Deficiencies com-monly encountered in reinforced concrete constructionin Haiti, as discussed previously, include inadequatelysized members, insufficient reinforcement (particu-larly transverse), and poorly mixed concrete. Achiev-ing quality control in each of these facets is difficultin settings where building codes, certification, andinspection are nonexistent. In fact, interviews withHaitians throughout our fieldwork and especiallyduring the Community Planning Workshop demon-strated an overwhelming desire for regulations onany type of construction and a clear recognitionof the need for quality control and oversight of con-struction processes, but also the admission that thegovernment is ill equipped to deliver these presently.As a result, several process innovations will be neces-sary to support alternative partitioning systems andengineer the frame’s quality control explicitly.

The spirit of konbit in Haitian culture evolved inrural areas as a cooperative approach to tending fieldsand ultimately building basic infrastructure to sup-port one another in a communal effort. A similar ap-proach could be introduced in urban settings throughthe formation of depots with communal constructionkits, including standardized plans for single-story,single-family frame-and-panel homes. To addressthe three common deficiencies in reinforced concrete

Figure 11. (a) Surviving gingerbread house in Léogâne beside collapsed masonry home; (b) displaced Haitian holding asample of thin concrete panel while discussing new housing concept with third author and translators

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construction, depots would make available for rentalreusable formwork sized to achieve the dimensionsof this standardized home and concrete mixers withmeasurement trays to guide appropriate raw materialproportions. This proposal is consistent with currentpractices in the country, where construction teamsoften rent wood for formwork. At these depots, col-umn and beam reinforcing cages and lightweight pan-els can be prefabricated with greater efficiency, betterquality control, and protection against damage andimproper execution in the field. The lack of up-frontfinancing implies that the only sustainable housingsystems are ones that allow components to be pur-chased progressively, in the same manner as CMUs.Therefore, the use of prefabrication for not only thepanels but also the reinforcing cages in this proposedhousing model enables this same purchasing modalityas well as quality control.

Bringing Concepts to MarketFor this or any alternative to succeed, it ultimatelymust offer consumers a value proposition and gainconsumer trust. In particular, by adopting a frame-and-panel style of construction with heavy relianceon prefabrication, the home can be constructed quicklyin three stages, as shown in Fig. 12, dramaticallyreducing labor and thereby cost. Interior panels canbe added later to divide the rooms as the family accu-mulates savings.When flanked by an appropriate busi-ness model that supports capitalization of locallyowned and operated depots and maintains profit mar-gins despite consumers’ irregular cash flow, this style offrame-and-panel construction can achieve all tenets ofthe empowerment model and can compete in the freemarket.

Even by offering the value proposition of a homewith the appearance and security of CMUs but with-out its vulnerabilities and constructed at a fraction oftime and cost, the aforementioned solution, as well asany others representing typologies and approachesthat deviate from traditional CMU construction, willrequire exposure within the community to achieve anylevel of acceptance. While preliminary interviews with

displaced Haitians and construction crews indicatedwillingness and even enthusiasm to consider alternatehousing systems [Fig. 11(b)], these conversations willcontinue with ongoing surveys in the spring andsummer of 2012. Moreover, the introduction of theseconcepts must again be conscious of Haitians as tan-gible thinkers who do not speak in hypotheticals.Thus, should the technology prove market ready,education and outreach programming must be offered,including public demonstrations of new systemsalongside traditional CMU subassemblies, and ulti-mately prototype homes should be introduced in part-nership with trusted community members as thefirst owners and operators of depots producing andretailing components and renting construction kits.The effectiveness of such experiential programmingis the subject of our ongoing field research slatedfor the summer of 2012.

CONCLUSION

The 2010 Haiti earthquake was the most destructiveevent any country has experienced in modern timeswhen measured by lives lost as a percentage of popu-lation. For the global community, it is a soberingreminder of the extreme vulnerability of many urbanzones throughout the developing world; Haiti wasthe unfortunate case study where this vulnerability,particularly in housing, was ultimately exposed. Itshould be no surprise that traditional responses topostdisaster recovery have not extrapolated effectivelyto Haiti and that this unprecedented disaster has leftmost of the afflicted families still grappling for lasting,hazard-resilient solutions, despite the millions ofdollars pledged in foreign aid. While most agree thata sustainable recovery, with genuine empowermentof the Haitian people at its core, is essential, itsachievement has proven elusive. Instead, well-intended efforts have focused on extrapolating im-ported solutions without a complete understandingof the unique challenges Haitians face, especiallythe most vulnerable families confined to tent cities

Figure 12. Three-stage construction process for proposed frame-and-panel home: construction of reinforced concreteframe, placement of roof system, and attachment of lightweight panels

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whose conditions are even worse now than the extremepoverty they experienced prior to the quake.

To solve the dilemma of sustainable recovery fromlarge-scale disasters, it is ultimately necessary to tacklethe substandard infrastructure that affects the hun-dreds of millions of people living at the bottom ofthe economic pyramid worldwide. Unfortunately,the lack of precedent for a disaster whose victimsare in such dire economic straits as they were in Haitihas left the civil engineering community at a loss,with many failing to understand that Haiti has uniqueconstraints and that well-intentioned, but poorly in-formed, rebuilding efforts can actually perpetuate vul-nerabilities in the long run. The inability to provideaffordable, long-lasting solutions more than 2 yearsafter the earthquake proves that for vulnerable popu-lations, particularly with respect to housing, which re-mains a privately financed and supervised process,first-world solutions are often inaccessible withoutcomplete reliance on foreign aid. First-world goodintentions must move from reimplementation offamiliar systems toward paradigm shifts that empowerthe bottom of the pyramid. To do so requires inno-vation in technologies and processes that addressresiliency, feasibility, sustainability, and, most impor-tantly, cultural viability.

Our experiences in postquake Haiti have demon-strated that such pathways to empowerment can in-deed be discovered, first and foremost by listeningto the community being served, but also with a com-mitment and patience to follow what inevitably is along, arduous, and at many times uncertain path torecovery, requiring continuous feedback from thepopulation being served and frequent re-evaluationof priorities and proposed solutions. This is an impor-tant lesson that must be learned from this disaster, notonly for the people of Haiti, but also for the millionslike them throughout the developing world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support ofthe National Collegiate Inventors and InnovatorsAlliance (NCIIA) and the Kellogg Institute forInternational Studies at the University of Notre Dame.We also thank the Notre Dame Haiti Program, in-cluding Fr. Tom Streit, Sarah Craig, Susan Soisson,and numerous staffers in Haiti led by Jean MarcBrissau and Wesley Pierre, who have offered graciousassistance in coordinating site visits and supportingcontinued efforts toward rebuilding Léogâne.Additionally, we acknowledge our local translators,

Lamarre Présuma and Jean Edson, for their enthusiasmand commitment to providing a voice to the manydisplaced citizens of Léogâne. We also thank theundergraduate research team—Michael Chieffo,Jacqueline Gilhooly, Benjamin Keller, KelseyHaddad, Daniel McGeever, Meggan Muller, andAnna Wanzek—and graduate student Ioannis Gidarisfor their efforts on behalf of the people of Haiti.Finally, we acknowledge Prof. Mark Taylor of theUniversity of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign for hiscollaboration as part of the housing focus groupand for providing the image in Fig. 9(a).

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Tracy Kijewski-Correa is Linbeck AssociateProfessor, Department of Civil and Environmen-tal Engineering and Earth Sciences, University ofNotre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana.

Alexandros A. Taflanidis is associate professor,Department of Civil and Environmental Engi-neering and Earth Sciences, University of NotreDame, Notre Dame, Indiana. He can be contactedat a.taflanidis@nd.edu.

Dustin Mix is a master’s degree candidate,Department of Civil and Environmental Engi-neering and Earth Sciences, University of NotreDame, Notre Dame, Indiana.

Ryan Kavanagh is engineer, Anadarko Petro-leum, Spring, Texas. At the time this articlewas written, he was undergraduate researcherin the Department of Civil and Environmental En-gineering and Earth Sciences, University of NotreDame, Notre Dame, Indiana. LME

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