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' CCADD 1976, The Netherla..�ds

T!'le.me .I.� I --- -Dr P.H. J(OOi j::!".a:.s

•emorandum on the problem of disarmament e.nd �r1;11!"1 ty, :-iubmi tted t o the Ne-+;herland:::; parliameu�.

On June 19, 1975, the Nether­lands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. M. van der Stoel, and the State Secretary

for Foreign Affairs, Dr. P.H. Kooijmans, subrai t ted to parliament a memorandum on the problem of disarmament and security as it pr e se nts itself today.

In order to meet re �ue at s

from interested peo�le and institutions

inside and outside the country, the following par:es cont ain the English version. of the summary of policy con­clusions (Chapter IV of the memorandum) •

septc�mber 1975

POLICY CONCUJSJONS ---·------

The d�tl9nta b�tween East and West, whicr. i·.a2 continued duri� the pa.at few yea.rs, has had littl'1 if a.ny effect on the arms race. While it �s true th�t the rapprochement between the �reat powers, notably the �3aviet Union und the Uni tad States, has great1.y redu.ced thn chances of a conflict being dsliberu:te­.ly pro·vokltd, the continuous stock-piling of nuclear

and C'onventional weapons means tha.t the coneequencee of an n.cc 1.denta l conflict which cannot be checked at �U1. ea:rly f:Jtage can only "be catastrophic. A conflict of thie kind is not inconceivable, since th.ere are eeveral trouble spots in the wo rld where fighting m:tgh ·t bl"'!te.k out in which, in certain ci r.cumata.nces,

tho major powers might become involved.

IJ()wever much the undersigned w e lc ome the d�tente and the gI'eater sense of reaponsiblity shown by the big powers, they ara d�eply disturbed at the ever­.riaine armaments level, Blld thAy consi.der it essential.

that the dtftente should. be aooompanied by substantial

reductions in e·x:isting arms systems, especially in the

nuclear sector. For any large scale use of nuclear arme would have very grave ooneequencee for humanity a.e a whole. Moreover, these are the very weapons i.n rE�eperJt of' whj oh the relative stabiltty which nae been ROh:i.eved could be eer�ouely upset by technolotrl.cal

breakthrou.�ha. r·t is therefore i.n re s p ect of nuclear

weapono that it is moat essential that effective meaeux·t�s ahould be ta.ken for arma control and arms reduction,. 'l'hi a ahould be feasible, aince the IJresent

tl"tatu of equi.lib?'ium penni ts a considerable mutual

re duo t:t.on of n.uclca.r a tocks.. k�reemente to restrict

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new developments in weaponry are also very import an 1� •

For it i3 often the fear that the other side will

achi�vc technological breakthrouchs which spurs on

a country's own efforts in weapons technology. I

cblems There are three aspects to nucleer pr

which deserve special mention: Nrin-·1.1rril 1 f'f�ra'tio:n A. 1. An increase in the number of countries in

. . us poasession of nuclear weapons would mean a serio

th:r·eat to international peace and s ecur ity . If ono

utate acquires nuolear wea�ons, other states feel thrc�a.tP.ned and insecure; this may induce them in turn

t<:> pr0vi.de themselves with nuclear arms. Netherlands policy v1j_ll therefore continue to aim at promoting

that the Non-Prol'iferation Treaty be accepted as uni­vorsaJ ly as possible. The Conference held recently to review this Treaty has open6d up certain waya of br.i.nr,inr� non-proltferation po.licy up to date. Al though d ii::lt;t.ppo1 ntment is beinr; felt, and ju.utifiably, at t;he fa.I 'Jur(1 of the nuclear powers to fulfil their oblir,a-·

tions o.:risinr; from the 'I'reaty to impose restrictions on

themselves, this must not be al lowe d to obsoure the

fact th'.lt it is of paramount importance for world ae­

curi ty that there should be no increase in the number o:f' coul1trie�J p<.)sseooing nuclear anns. Once the present psycholor";ical boundaries have been ove:rstepped, it will"�_ be '?van more difficult, if not impossible, to control

the nuclear armamf-Jnt process.

Therefore one of our main policy objectives

is ot J.11 'to prorno te rati.f'ica.tion of the Treaty by as

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many st a t e s a.s possibJ_e, in par"ticu2.ar tnose whose

technological capacities mark them out as potential

nuclear weapon states. Th e Net!leria.nds will also make an active contribution to working out the

rleta.ils of the re commendations which were adopted

at the Review �onference.

A.2. The succe ss of the non-proliferation policy

will also be considerably promoted if nuclear-weapon

free zones are set up in areas where nuclear weapons

have not yet been introduced . Tllis is why the Nethe r­

] ands has taken a positive stand towards the cre ati on

of nuclear-weapon free zones in the MiddJe East and

Southern Asia. In the latter region India's nuclear

teat in spring 1974 is a complicating fac�or.

Although the Indian gove rnmen t has s tated that this

n\�c�l.ear teat was only being held for peac e fu l purposes, then!tia, techn�loeically s peakine , no distinction

between nuclear explosive devi c es f'or peaceful and for

armaments purposes. If non-nuclear-weapon states carry

out nuclear explosions for peace:f"ul purposes, they

may the:t"ef'ore be undermining the non-proliferation

policy. For thfa reason the Netherlands has vigorously

contributed to it that thP General Assembly of the

United Nat ions asked several competent bodies, such

as the Geneva Diea:nnament Committee and t� International

Atomic Energy A��ency, to continue studying the problem

of' peaceful nuclear expl osj. ons .

A.3. The preven·tion of the prolif'eration of nuclear arms should also be ensured by means of'

o£fective safeguard s and regulations regarding the

Eupply of fissionable material and nuclear equ i pment.

The undersigned are therefore p1eased that, after

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pro 1 o ng e <1 n e .er o t 1 a t l. on 9 ' 0 �

on the subject, and reached agreements last year

they hope that these arrangements will be made more

b the means recommended by the w1dely effect ive y

Review Conference.

A.. 4. Tt is also essential that measures should

be taken internationally to prevent fissionable

material fallinp, into the hands of private persons and groups. Now that the use of nuclear energy may be expected to ex·pand and increase in importance,

�w1ng to recent events in the energy field, it is certainly mos t essent ial that effective and timely measures should be taken to ensure the physi cal security of nuclear materials. The Netherlands will cont inu e to draw attention to these problems in the relevant bodies.

Thus the Non-Proliferation Treaty continues to be orte of the touchstones of Netherlands disannament �olicy. Though it is understandable that a number of

countries should feel that the treaty's provisions

are discriminatory, international security would be

seriously j e opardised if the number of nuclear-

weapon states increased ; therefore this discriminatory

element has to be accepted as the lesser evil.

On the other hand, it should be pointed

out that the discriminatory effect of the NPT will

be the more keenly felt, the longer the nuclear­

wcapon states delay in. fulfilling their treaty

0bJ.igations to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In this

r n s pec "t it is rezrettablc that China and France do

not partinipate in the diuannament negotiati ons , but

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"} iJ r b t nr � t h e � ri. l I t; n � t ve I.\ 1:'11)11 t 'r'! (?I·�

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it is no less regrettable that the results of

the st:rater;ic arms J.imitation talks between the

Soviet Union and the United States do not come up to nY.pcctati.ons,

B, 1. It is necessary to curb and put an end to Lh e qlin.1 i tat 'L v·e arms race, notably between the two mn,j�)l' nu.c1.13ar powers, not on1y in order to

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:� t;r<�nr·thon t;hc� non-proliferation policy, but also t;o proF.:H?.r,rc interncitionn.1 �1cc1�ri ty. As we have al­ro::li"!.,y olJ�1n:rved.. n. l;ochnnlori cal 'breakthrough could up:=.1c I; the e;�qi.d.l:i.britun that haa ·�H�8n :J.<�hieved, where-l I '":' ·� l·� p n ,.. . ,, ,.�, ,.� r1 t ... "" , , ,, . • r. ..a. 11; , ;i \,,. , �!Jtn.ti:� of equi v.1.J.E"•.nce. �1e1:�ms to bi; the bo: .. : t :.�·t1ci.rr.int�t� at the moment a.-�aj not the outbreak of '.J. -rnir.!Jen.r w�ir. At tho srune time and subsequentJ.y, l,alk�; cr11..1J 1i b8 hcJ.rJ. abov t bal�in.ced roduc tions of the

r: .. :.i ... '.1t.i.ni� n1.tclo.;u, wcaponG arsenals, oo that the oq\;J 1 .. l.brit:;.rn could function A.t a lower level.

In the opinion of the undersi{�ned, a

complc�tn ban on a.lJ nuclear te��ts wovld be an 'i.mportr:J.nt; contribution towa.rde nu.rbinG the qualitatj_ve arms rA.ce. Hitherto the obstacles to such a complete rt'\)Olnru� t:Aet ban have been thG Jn.olt of a,7,'reement as· to whether on-Bite i.nt:ipcction. ohc:>u1.c1 he pormi.tted, �� � the fact that it does not look as if all nuclear-waapon powero - at o.ny rate initially - would accept ElUCh R b1u1 (notably China and France, which did not pn.r"b i c iprxte in the 1 �J6 .3 part i.al nuclear test ban t.reat.v ni.ther). H'owcvn.r, as the Nethi:!rlands has

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1 t. durJ·n� disarmanent dis-p o :i.nted out Gevera imes · (

cucston.s, these ob jec ti.ans do not compare with the

danr.crs of c ontinuins the qualitative arms race.

This is all the more so now that the increasing

perfe ction of national detection capacities has

sharply reduced the chances of evasion of the ban

r,oinc; unnoticed if on-site tnspection were not .

allowed. The Uetherlands will therefore cont inue

to press for the conclusion as soon as possible

of an arranc.ement bannine� all nuclear tests.

B.2. Such a ban should preferably include nucle ar tests which are aller,edly for peaceful purposes, as 1.on� as it has not been demonstrated that such tests can have a useful economic function. Past optimistic expectations on this subject have not �een fulfilled durin� recent yeara.

If so-called peacaful n11clear tests were not included in a comprehensive test ban, verifi­cation of such a ban would become much more difficult, unleso on-site inspect ion were permitted each time. As no d is tin c tion is possible between explosive

devices for military and for peaceful purposes,

another consequonce would be that some lmowledge

mir:i:h t he acquired. which could be use cl for armaments

purposes. If it proves i�poss iblc to in clude peace­

ful nuclear explooions in a comprehensive te st ban,

there should be st ri c t �afe�uards to prevent pro­

liferation cree p ing in under the r,uise of peaceful

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1in� be.ck role of

Lear nrms

nuclear expl o sions

C.1. More e:encrally, the undersir:ned 'believe that the role of nuclear arms shoul a be pushed back wherever poss:i_h1e, �.n order to avoid military conflic·b developinc ir to a nuclear war. Puohin� back the role of nuclear e.rms, it should be observed, is not only a matter of reducin� the numbers of nuclear weapons, but equally, if not more, a matter of creat inG con­

ditions in the international conum.,mi ty which will reduce the likelihood of conflicts breakinG out, par­ticularly conflicts which may assume nuclear pro­

portions . such cond itiono can be promoted by i ncreas ing

mutual trust, consolidating relations, and achiev ing

greater interdependence, resul tinrr in concr ete a,r_::ree­manto. For example, it can be said that the a,'?;rcement

1Jetv1e e n the � ovie t Union and the U ni ted 3ta.tes of' 22 June 1 g7 J confirmed and set a seal 1.)pon their re­

alisation that the massive use of nuclear arms in a

confl ict between the two world powers could only lead

to mutual annihilation, e.nd that consequently the

role of nuclear arms in their relations with each

other has been reduced. It is equal ly obvious, however,

that ouch an ar:reement does not remove the tensions

which could cause these arms to be actually used, Policy

should there fore aim a.t removing the cauoe s of tensions

and disputes and at ta.kinr: confidence-buildinrr measures, but equally at ac�d. evin� e..greeme nts on anns control

and arma limitation, because this is the way to remove disparities in power which are felt to be threatenini:;.

a. For these reasons the �reat�st possible

i.mportance should be attached to the success of the Mutual Bale.need Forces Reductions n.e . .:;otiations in

Vienna. If theoe ne.�otiations should result in ceneral �onventiona.1 pa.r:i.ty being accepted by both sides,

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that n.lone would already reduce the risk of early use of nuclear weapons.

b. At the same time the Netherlands believe that tactical nuclear arms should be included as soon

as possibJe in the ner,otiations, because a quantitative

reduc tion in nuclear arms can also be an impo�tant

c0ntribution to create normal relations within Europe. Another reason why it is so important that

the �BFR neL,otiations should be successful is that

in that case for the first time in history, groups

of countries which have long regarded each other

aa potential enemies will have exchanged undertakings

ae re�arde the size of their armed forces, albeit

only for a limited area.

C,2, Besides these �olicies, all of which imply

al r e ady a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons,

there should be the closest possible vigilance to

prevent any developments that could result in increa­

aine the ei�ifioance of nuclear weapons or ac centuating

their role in enaurine security. This means in concre'e

te rrna:

a.. The formation of a West European nuclear force

must be regarded ae a serious disturbance of the

politic'!l and military equilibrium which has been

achieved . There must be continual checks to make

eure that certain developments or measures cannot

intensify a movement towards the formation of such

a. force.

b. If replacement or mod.erniea.-tion of the existing

arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is heinc con­

s idered, th� gre atest care must be taken to ensure

that this do e s not result in a greater nuclear

p otential, or in added significance of nuclear

weapons in .no.intaining eecuri ty. In particular

the moderniaa.tion process must not result in the

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dividing line bet ween nuclear and conventional weapons becoming blurred.

'l1hr:1•efore "the :niniatur�sat1· on, - as it is called, of nuclear arms is rejected.

c • 'I'he h it·hly structure d deterrent system should be r�8tri.cted to the area to which it now applies. TherP. :Jhould therefore he no e x t e ns i on of the treaty area

Of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nor should

any additiona1 tasks be entrusted. to it, if' this shoulrt

eve:r be cons:i.dered in the future. 0ertai!1ly it cannot

bf! denied th at the strate:-:ic balance between the two major nucl ear powers also makes itself felt in other areaa where the i r interests conflict, but if the spheres

of action of the two alliances were extended, this woi..1ld

on1.y m�ke it thr� mor� difficult to find a solution for

the present problems in these areas.

d, Pol i cy 3hould continue to aim at d�tente b e tween East

and 'Nest by means of arrant.:"ements and a0reements whJ.ch

may :r�13uJ. t in common interests bei.n,� consoJ.idated,

trust hein.n: re stored and differences solved in a peace­

fuJ and h.":trmonious way. At the moment t!ie negoti ati ons

of ·the Conference on S ecurity and Cooperation in Europe

aro parti.cularly important for the achievement of these

objcctiv�f.1.

Notably, these talks ahould en:Jure that the rcco,.;ni tio:-i of the diversity of the politicnl and socie-economic FJyotemri ln the European cour1tries doez not mean that

they are doomed to be divided. �or if this were so we could never do more than freeze the status quo, wi. th-ov. t, by do in(- so, removinr.� the dee1Jer reasons for d iotru!3t and J.ac!r of understand.in..:·. In this

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cortcxt it is essent ial to make it clear that it

is not our int ent i on to upset the present relations,

aince this would seriously threaten our own security.

This is why the Govern.'!lent is especially

c oncerned that the rapprnchement be tween Ea�t and

We�t ohould not only be apparent from improved re­

lations b e twee n governments, but also from more con­

tact between the peoples. She is convinced that existing

d i fferences in the various systems do not r ule out such

contact, but that a new security structure needs this

better understandi ng if it is to be viable and proof

ar,ainst unexpe cted setbacks. For one must try to cul-•

tivate such relationships that military confrontat ion

can be gradually reduced, and to achieve a security

structure ·.vhic� require s a minimum of armed force,

bec ause it has othe r m�ans of settlinr, , disputes a.nd conflicts of interests. This is only feasible in a

climate of mutua.1 trust between ,:.;overnments and people n .

This approach, to.�ether with successful MBFR talks for achiev ing general conventional parity, will lay the foundations for a European security structure ,

whoae final shape cannot be predicted at the moment

but which could move toward s a balanced level of

ccinvE:,ntional armed forces based on mutual agre ement ;

whila nuclear armo, if they cannot be completely

abol ished, could serve as a guarantee that the other

side would not use them1�vertheless at �ome time

or another. In this context it could also be oon­

aidered whether asreements could be made about no­

fj.rst-use of nuclear arms and about the establish­

ment of certain areac within which these arms may

not be store d . It is o bvio�s, that we are only just settinc: out on the road which must lead finally to

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the security structure de£cribed above. The prrJ3ent atability, which should not be underestimated, re­quires us to consider carefully each further step to ascertain that it will not irresponsibly

jeopardise this stability. Dis8atisfaction with

the means by which this stability is maintained

compels us, however, to search enerr�·etically and

persistently for ways and means of establishinf,

security on a different basis.

Our tmderste.ndable anxiety aD to the nature m!" t t'F.l.t1 � ; law D. of the present security structure in }ljurope m"..lst a.r'ntf' t1 r. on.-

i. l� tu not he al.lowed to de tract from our efforts to co�bat

the factors th at threaten world security. Here too

it should he re cognised that the concept of security

canno·t be split up into sections, but that a. distinct

improvement in world ecoDomic security, for instance,

which will be the subject of various discussions

in the coming months, vvould fWljamenta.lly promote

political security by removin� some major causes

of tension. More specifically from the point of viow

of diaar:nament, ther(3 are a.lso a number of problem

areas here wi·ch which the undersi,r.'{!led are particularly

concerned.

1. Our policy will continue to look for open i:i.�s for curbinr, the international arms brade. As �xple.inad in thi s memorandt.un, i.t is practically imposoi ble as yet to obtain the co ope ration of the major producer a.nd receiver countries for this purpo3e. Nevertheless, the Netherlands should take every care within the means at its disposal to preve nt armaments i nd t · th

-- us ry �n e d�veloped world from coming to depen� for its surv1val on j.t3 salc3 p o te ntial in oth .. . e1 countr1e3,

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parttcularly in the Third. •:rorld countries, as th.is woulct make the armaments industry an autonomoi.�s factor in e3calatinr; the international ann.s trade.

:?. • The development of new weapons - includinc·

new conventional weapons - should be continually

reviewed in the light of the present rules and

cri teria of the law applicable in armed conf1ict$�

Our policy will therefore continue to aim at the observance and where necessary the adjustment of these. criteria, as is being done at present by the

Diplomatic Conference on Humanitar ian Law APDlicable

in Armed Conflicts which is being held in Geneva

under the auspices of the Swisr� Govern.Ttlcnt. So lon� as the evil of war cannot be banished, efforts shculd be made to keep the human sufferi!lfI involved to a. minimum.