EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCHHuman embryonic stem cells are the cells from which all 200+ kinds of tissue in the human body originate. Typically, they are derived from human embryosoften those from fertility clinics who are left over from assisted reproduction attempts (e.g., in vitro fertilization). When stem cells are obtained from living human embryos, the harvesting of such cells necessitates destruction of the embryos. (Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2009).Fetal stem cell research may ethically resemble either adult or embryonic stem cell research and must be evaluated accordingly. If fetal stem cells are obtained from miscarried or stillborn fetuses, or if it is possible to remove them from fetuses still alive in the womb without harming the fetuses, then no harm is done to the donor and such fetal stem cell research is ethical. However, if the abortion of fetuses is the means by which fetal stem cells are obtained, then an unethical means (the killing of human beings) is involved. Since umbilical cords are detached from infants at birth, umbilical cord blood is an ethical source of stem cells. (Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2009).Though embryonic stem cells have been purported as holding great medical promise, reports of actual clinical success have been few. Instead, scientists conducting research on embryonic stem cells have encountered significant obstaclesincluding tumor formation, unstable gene expression, and an inability to stimulate the cells to form the desired type of tissue. It may indeed be telling that some biotechnology companies have chosen not to invest financially in embryonic stem cell research and some scientists have elected to focus their research exclusively on non-embryonic stem cell research. (Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2009).Another potential obstacle encountered by researchers engaging in embryonic stem cell research is the possibility that embryonic stem cells would not be immunologically compatible with patients and would therefore be rejected, much like a non-compatible kidney would be rejected. A proposed solution to this problem is to create an embryonic clone of a patient and subsequently destroy the clone in order to harvest his or her stem cells. Cloning for this purpose has been termed therapeutic cloningdespite the fact that the subject of the researchthe cloneis not healed but killed. (Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2009).Underlying the passages of Scripture that refer to the unborn (Job 31:15; Ps. 139:13-16; Lk. 1:35-45) is the assumption that they are human beings who are created, known, and uniquely valued by God. Genesis 9:6 warns us against killing our fellow human beings, who are created in the very image of God (Gen. 1:26-27). Furthermore, human embryonic lifeas well as all of creationexists primarily for Gods own pleasure and purpose, not ours (Col. 1:16). (Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2009).Many proponents of human embryonic stem cell research argue that it is actually wrong to protect the lives of a few unborn human beings if doing so will delay treatment for a much larger number of people who suffer from fatal or debilitating diseases. However, we are not free to pursue gain (financial, health-related, or otherwise) through immoral or unethical means such as the taking of innocent life (Deut. 27:25). The history of medical experimentation is filled with horrific examples of evil done in the name of science. We must not sacrifice one class of human beings (the embryonic) to benefit another (those suffering from serious illness). Scripture resoundingly rejects the temptation to do evil that good may result (Rom. 3:8). (Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2009). Stem cell therapies are not new. Doctors have been performing bone marrow stem cell transplants for decades. But when scientists learned how to remove stem cells from human embryos in 1998, both excitement and controversy ensued.The excitement was due to the huge potential these cells have in curing human disease. The controversy centered on the moral implications of destroying human embryos. Political leaders began to debate over how to regulate and fund research involving human embryonic stem (hES) cells.

Newer breakthroughs may bring this debate to an end. In 2006 scientists learned how to stimulate a patient's own cells to behave like embryonic stem cells. These cells are reducing the need for human embryos in research and opening up exciting new possibilities for stem cell therapies (Genetic Science Learning Center, 2014). Until recently, the only way to get pluripotent stem cells for research was to remove the inner cell mass of an embryo and put it in a dish. The thought of destroying a human embryo can be unsettling, even if it is only five days old.

Stem cell research thus raised difficult questions: Does life begin at fertilization, in the womb, or at birth? Is a human embryo equivalent to a human child? Does a human embryo have any rights? Might the destruction of a single embryo be justified if it provides a cure for a countless number of patients? Since ES cells can grow indefinitely in a dish and can, in theory, still grow into a human being, is the embryo really destroyed?

PROPOSITION: RETRIEVED ARTICLESEmbryonic stem cells offer hope for new therapies, but their use in research has been hotly debated. Different countries have chosen to regulate embryonic stem cell research in very different ways. Mention embryonic stem cells in the pub and the topic still divides opinion. But what exactly are the ethical arguments and why are they so tricky to resolve? (EuroStemCell, 2011).Embryonic stem cell research poses a moral dilemma. It forces us to choose between two moral principles: The duty to prevent or alleviate suffering The duty to respect the value of human lifeIn the case of embryonic stem cell research, it is impossible to respect both moral principles.To obtain embryonic stem cells, the early embryo has to be destroyed. This means destroying a potential human life. But embryonic stem cell research could lead to the discovery of new medical treatments that would alleviate the suffering of many people. So which moral principle should have the upper hand in this situation? The answer hinges on how we view the embryo. Does it have the status of a person? (EuroStemCell, 2011)The moral status of the embryo is a controversial and complex issue. The main viewpoints are outlined below.1. The embryo has full moral status from fertilization onwardsEither the embryo is viewed as a person whilst it is still an embryo, or it is seen as a potential person. The criteria for personhood are notoriously unclear; different people define what makes a person in different ways.2. There is a cut-off point at 14 days after fertilizationSome people argue that a human embryo deserves special protection from around day 14 after fertilization because: After 14 days the embryo can no longer split to form twins. Before this point, the embryo could still be split to become two or more babies, or it might fail to develop at all. Before day 14, the embryo has no central nervous system and therefore no senses. If we can take organs from patients who have been declared brain dead and use them for transplants, then we can also use hundred-cell embryos that have no nervous system. Fertilization is itself a process, not a moment. An embryo in the earliest stages is not clearly defined as an individual.3. The embryo has increasing status as it developsAn embryo deserves some protection from the moment the sperm fertilizes the egg, and its moral status increases as it becomes more human-like.4. The embryo has no moral status at allAn embryo is organic material with a status no different from other body parts.Different religions view the status of the early human embryo in different ways. For example, the Roman Catholic, Orthodox and conservative Protestant Churches believe the embryo has the status of a human from conception and no embryo research should be permitted. Judaism and Islam emphasize the importance of helping others and argue that the embryo does not have full human status before 40 days, so both these religions permit some research on embryos. Other religions take other positions. You can read more about this by downloading the extended version of this factsheet below. (EuroStemCell, 2011). The moral status of the embryos used to derive stem cell lines is debatable. Embryonic stem cell research poses a moral problem, as it brings into tension two fundamental moral principles that we highly value: the duty to prevent or alleviate suffering, and the duty to respect the value of human life. The harvesting of human embryonic stem cells violates this second duty as it results in the destruction of a possible human life. Both principles cannot simultaneously be respected in the case of embryonic stem cell research. The question then is which principle ought to be given precedence in this conflict situation. Should we give more weight to the first, and permit destructive embryonic stem cell research because of its potential benefits? The aim of stem cell research (to cure diseases and relieve suffering) is universally recognized as a good aim. Or should we give more weight to the second, and prohibit destructive embryonic research because it violates respect for the value of the embryo as the very beginning of a possible human life? (EuroStemCell, 2011).The moral status that the human embryo is given varies. Three different main positions with variations can be separated. 1. Having full moral status after fertilization of the egg This point of view can be divided into two: considering embryos worthy of protection simply because they are human or considering them as potential persons. Philosophers differ on this question. Whereas many philosophers, particularly utilitarians, do not consider a fertilized human egg before implantation to satisfy the criteria of personhood, others take a different view. However, the criteria of personhood are notoriously unclear. The perspective of the same point of view is that fertilized eggs are worthy of protection simply because they are human. Arguments: There is no non-arbitrary point, a morally significant dividing line in the continuum of physical growth between an embryo and a developed human. Since a developmental point at which personhood is acquired cannot be pointed out, individuals are counted as human beings at their embryonic stage as well as their fully developed stage. If our lives are worthy of respect simply because we are human, it would be a mistake to think that at some younger age or earlier stage of development (e.g. when we began our lives as fertilized eggs) we were not worthy of respect. Therefore, if we do not accept fertilization as a morally decisive moment from which full protection should be guaranteed, there is no other similarly decisive moment. Human embryos differ from other human beings not in what they are, but in their stage of development. A human embryo is a human being in the embryonic stage, just as an infant or an adolescent is a human being in the infant or adolescent stage.Counter-arguments: Even if it is not possible to point to an exact dividing line in human development at which personhood is acquired, it may be argued that whenever the transition occurs, early preimplantation stage embryos do not have the psychological, physiological, emotional or intellectual properties that we associate with personhood. It, therefore, follows that if human embryo does not fulfill the criteria for personhood, it does not have any interests to be protected and thus may be used instrumentally for the benefit of those who are persons. The fact that every person began life as an embryo does not prove that embryos are persons either. For example, although every oak tree was once an acorn, it does not mean that acorns are oak trees or that we should treat the loss of an acorn as the same kind of loss as the death of an oak tree. There is an opinion that instead of the end of the process of fertilization of the egg, a human embryo becomes worthy of protection at around day 14 after the fertilization. There are several reasons for this opinion: It may be argued that it is the implantation of the blastocyst in the uterine wall that is the best landmark for the definition of human life. Indeed, this is the first stage at which the individual is defined because the embryo is past the stage in which it can split to form twins. The end of the possibility of twinning is around day 14 after fertilization. Before this time, a researcher in a laboratory could divide a four-cell embryo into four embryos and, on the other hand, fuse four early embryos into one. It is only after twinning is not possible any more, when the life of one individual starts as a recognizable one. It may also be argued that it is the formation of the nervous system that is the landmark for the definition of life, since this is then that the possibility of sensation first exists. Up to embryonic day 14, the blastocyst has no central nervous system and, therefore, cannot be considered sensate. If we can remove organs from patients who have been declared brain dead but are still alive in some sense in order to save the lives of those who are alive, we can use two hundred-cell embryos as cell donors at the same moral status as brain dead individuals. Embryological studies now show that fertilization is itself a process (not a moment). Therefore, it can be argued that an embryo in the earliest stages (including the blastocyst stage, when stem cells would be extracted for the purpose of the research) is not sufficiently individualized to have the moral weight of personhood.Arguments: Although embryos do not currently exhibit the properties of personhood, they will, if allowed to develop and fulfill their potential. Since embryos are potential persons, they ought to be accorded the moral respect and dignity that personhood requires. For example, we still treat unconscious individuals as persons even though they are not able to exercise the properties of personhood in their present state. But we know that these people will be able to when they become conscious again. Counter-arguments: The embryo in itself cannot develop into a child without being transferred to a womans uterus. It needs external aid to enable its development and hence it does not have an active potentiality to develop into a human being without help. Even with the external aid provided, the probability that embryos used for in vitro fertilization will develop into full-term successful births is low. This probability is also very much context-dependent: e.g. on the quality of external human intervention, such as transferal to uterus, and on other factors such as whether the embryo will implant and grow to term or even on the conditions of giving birth. Thus something that could potentially become a person should not be morally regarded as if it actually were a person. Contrary to the previous statement, the temporarily unconscious persons already had all the properties of personhood before falling into unconsciousness and will have them again when they come out of it.2. Having a moral status that begins with deserving protection and increases as the fertilized egg becomes more human-like Arguments: The main point of the gradual view is that the moral status and the protection of the embryo should increase as the fertilized egg becomes more human-like. There are several reasons for such a position: There are degrees of value of a life depending on the stage of that life. Consequently, there are degrees of respect that ought to be shown to that life at those stages. They can be identified as follows: the implantation after the sixth day, the appearance of the primitive streak at the end of the second week, the viability phase or even birth itself. At different stages of the end of life we tend to make different judgments of how great that loss is, depending on the stage of the lost life. Thus a fertilized egg before implantation in the uterus could be granted a lesser degree of respect than a human fetus or a born baby. There is a natural embryo loss in pregnancy, where more than half of all fertilized eggs either fail to implant or are otherwise lost. Therefore, if natural process entails the loss of some embryos for every successful birth, the loss of embryos that occurs in stem cell research should not worry us either. Those who view embryos as persons might reply that high infant mortality would not justify infanticide. But the way we respond to the natural loss of embryos suggests that we do not regard this event in the same way as the death of an infant.Counter-arguments: However, there are also several reasons why human embryos at the very beginning of their existence should have the same protection as more developed embryos or fetuses: Whatever moral status does the human embryos have, the life that it lives has a value to the one who lives this life. We protect a persons life and interests not because those interests are valuable from the point of view of the universe, but because they are important to the entity concerned. Therefore, the life of the human embryo should be protected because it has a value to the embryo itself. We should be cautious and refrain from destruction of fertilized eggs even if we are not sure about their dignity, simply because being uncertain as to whether a particular organism is a human being, it would be more reasonable to refrain from destroying it. For example, a hunter refrains from shooting if he is not sure whether the particular object at which he is aiming is a deer or a man. Judging the moral status of the embryo from its age is making arbitrary definitions of who is human. For example, even if we consider that the appearance of the primitive streak at day 14 after the fertilization of the egg is the threshold of when the embryo acquires moral worthiness, we must still acknowledge that patients who have lost part of their cortex from a stroke or Alzheimers disease are no less human than they were before. 3. Having no moral status at all, regarded as organic material, with a status no different from other body parts Arguments: Fertilized human eggs are merely parts of other peoples bodies until they reach a certain autonomous or independent developmental stage. Accordingly, they have no independent moral status at all, and are merely the property of the people from whose body they came. The only respect due to these blastocysts is the respect that should be shown to other peoples property. The blastocysts before implantation cannot be harmed by being destroyed. To be harmed means to have an interest or interests defeated. For a being to have an interest, this being must have beliefs, desires, expectations, aims, and purposes. The nervous system of such early embryos is not developed enough for this. Because they are not the subjects of interests, such early embryos cannot be the subjects of basic rights that protect interests. A pre-implantation embryo contains potentially all the cells of the human body, and by conducting research one is not destroying it, but merely directing it to become certain cells and not others, since the cells of such an embryo are still totipotent (e.g. they are still capable of multiplying into twins). It can also be argued that a new human organism (at the embryo stage) is only the predecessor of the organism that the human being ultimately born will be. Counter-arguments: By directing an embryo to become certain cells, the embryo is prevented from developing in its normal complete fashion. It is completely reprogramming an embryo and thus preventing it from becoming what it was programmed to become a human being.Embryonic stem cell research and religion The view concerning the moral status of the early human embryo before the time of its implantation in the uterus differs depending on religion. Roman Catholic, Orthodox, conservative Protestant Churches: Since a human embryo is believed to have a status of a human individual from the moment of the fertilization of the egg, it has the right to its own life, and every intervention not in favor of the embryo is a violation of that right. No end believed to be good (e.g. using stem cells to prepare other differentiated cells to be applied in what look to be promising therapeutic procedures) can justify the destruction of the embryo, which is believed to be a wrong action. The Orthodox Christians as well as Roman Catholics and Conservative Protestants affirm the sanctity of human life at all stages of development and believe that the process toward authentic human personhood begins with the zygote, which is committed to a developmental course that will ultimately lead to a human person. Less conservative Protestant Churches believe that the embryo has a potential human status, reflecting its gradual development from basic cells to a fetus. Thus some embryo research may be permitted. The life of the embryo is weighed against the possible benefit for the society from embryo research. The life of the human embryo is sacred from conception, but there are circumstances under which embryo research might be allowed prior to the primitive streak stage (around 14th day after the fertilization), bearing in mind the seriousness of certain medical conditions that could possibly be treated. Judaism: The Jewish religious tradition emphasizes the importance of the saving of life and considers the ultimate goal of human embryonic stem cell research to be life saving. Healing in Judaism is not only permitted, it is required to be an active partner in the worlds repair and perfection. Man is obliged to build and develop the world in every direction favorable to humanity. Therefore, any activity that contributes to advancements in the world cannot be considered as contradicting Gods decrees. It is also believed that it is God who has given the power to create new technologies. Anything, which has no reason to be prohibited is permitted without having to find a reason for its permissibility. In Judaism the human fetus less than 40 days old and certainly the pre-implantation embryo does not have a full human status. After those first 40 days the embryo in the uterus is considered a part of the woman until birth. Islam: The majority of Muslim thinkers through the ages have accepted the morality of abortion through either the fortieth day or the fourth month of pregnancy. It is believed that the soul is breathed in to the human embryo on the 40th day after fertilization and this is when life becomes sacred. All schools of thought in Islam accept that the fetus is accorded the status of a legal person only at later stages of its development, when perceptible form and voluntary movements appear. The thinkers make a distinction between a biological and a moral person, placing the stage of the moral person after the first trimester of pregnancy. However, Muslim jurists differ over whether breathing-in of the soul takes place in 40 or 120 days. Also, it is believed that there is no disease that does not have a cure, and therefore the cure should be sought. Medical progress is a strong value and stem cell research is acceptable due to its therapeutic benefits. According to the Muslim faith, the supernumerary embryos cannot be donated to other couples, as the lineage of the father must be respected. In this view, conducting research on supernumerary embryos that will no longer be used for in vitro fertilization purposes rather than destroying them is choosing the lesser of two evils.Buddhism and Hinduism: Buddhism prohibits harm to any sentient beings, which presents possible restrictions on embryo and animal research. Also, every action (e.g. killing) that treats human beings as non-humans is considered immoral. For Buddhists, however, not all areas of medical biotechnology lead to ethical problems: more advanced medical biotechnology (where research is conducted on molecular level) is likely to be acceptable. Molecular human parts, such as cells, are hardly seen as human beings, thus their destruction in the process of research is not likely to be seen as morally wrong . Regarding the research on human stem cells, the intention is important. If the intention of the research is to help and benefit humankind, such research is considered ethical. On the contrary, if the research is done just for the sake of making money out of it, it is considered as unethical. But since Buddhism places great importance on the principle of non-harming, it has grave reservations about any scientific technique or procedure that involves the destruction of life, whether human or animal. However, the principle of non-harming can be interpreted as prohibiting only the harm on sentient beings that is those who are able to feel. Therefore, Buddhism could accept research on non-sentient embryos before the day 14 of their development. Hinduism, like Buddhism prohibits injuring sentient beings. The Hindu tradition rejects both animal research and the destruction of sentient embryos. (EuroStemCell, 2011).The discovery, isolation, and culturing of human embryonic stem cells has been described as one of the most significant breakthroughs in biomedicine of the century. This description would be warranted by virtue of the biological uniqueness of these cells alone their ability to self-renew infinitely while retaining a remarkable capacity to differentiate into any form of cell tissue. But as well as this, the culturing of embryonic stem cells holds tremendous potential for the development of new forms of regenerative medicine to treat debilitating or fatal conditions that would not otherwise be curable (Rickard, 2002).

It is somewhat of an irony that the discovery of cells with such a tremendous potential for improving and prolonging our own lives, should bring with it some of the most trenchant and intractable questions about the value of life itself. The harvesting of embryonic stem cells results in the destruction of the embryos from which they are harvested. It results, in other words, in the expiration of the very beginnings of a possible human life. Issues about the value of life emerge here in perhaps their most stark and poignant form in the question of whether life for those already existing should be improved at the seeming expense of a possible human life that has just come into being (Rickard, 2002).Needless to say, what the most ethically justified response is to this sort of question is far from obvious. It is not immediately apparent, either, just what should count as the appropriate criteria for assessing possible responses to it. Indeed, it is even contentious as to what the right concepts and terminology are for framing the central questions. What is clear, though, is that it would be remiss to fail to engage with these questions in a manner that is commensurate with their depth, complexity and importance (Rickard, 2002).With due regard to that, the following discussion provides a brief overview of some of the core ethical issues arising from the Research Involving Embryos Bill 2002 and to some extent the Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill 2002.The public debate has focused mostly on ethical problems associated with the destruction of embryos (in the case of the first Bill), and with the creation of cloned human embryos (in the case of the second Bill). The current paper will confine its primary focus to the first set of problems, since many of the salient ethical issues about cloning will arise, as it turns out, in connection with embryonic stem cell research.The paper takes most of the major ethical concerns in the debate to be encompassed by the following core questions: What, in principle, is ethically at issue with destructive embryo research? What is important when it comes to judging the value of the potential consequences of destructive embryo research? In what does the value of the human embryo consist? Does the means by which an embryo expireswhether it is destroyed or merely succumbs make a moral difference? Is there anything morally worse about using embryos created for research purposes compared to using existing excess or surplus ART (assisted reproductive treatment) embryos?The purpose of the following discussion is to clarify some relevant moral and conceptual distinctions connected with these core questions, and to clarify the basic structure of the major views and argument themes that have been developed by philosophers, bioethicists and theologians in response to these questions. Of course, in their more fully expanded form these distinctions and arguments will involve subtleties and complexities that are beyond the limited scope of this paper to address. Nonetheless, the discussion here will hopefully give an impression of where some of those further complexities and subtleties might lie (Rickard, 2002).The Basic Ethical ProblemThe possibility of destructive embryo research, particularly embryonic stem cell research, presents us with a moral problem because it appears to bring into tension two fundamental moral principles that we esteem very highly: one principle enjoins the prevention or alleviation of suffering, and the other enjoins us to respect the value of human life. As noted, the harvesting and culturing of embryonic stem cells has considerable potential to bring about remarkable potential benefits in the way of alleviating debilitating medical conditions. So, it satisfies the first principle to a very great degree (Rickard, 2002).On the other hand, there is a case to be made that the harvesting of human embryonic stem cells violates the second principle in that it results in the destruction of human life with value (i.e. human embryos). Accordingly, both principles apparently cannot simultaneously be respected in the case of embryonic stem cell research. The question then is which principle ought to be given precedence in this conflict situation. Should we give more weight to the first, and permit destructive embryonic stem cell research because of its remarkable potential benefits? Or should we give more weight to the second, and prohibit destructive embryonic research because it violates respect for the value of the embryo as the very beginnings of a possible human life? This, at bottom, is the ethical problem generated by destructive embryo research (Rickard, 2002).Crude as it may sound, responding to this problem calls for a moral calculationa decision about how the positive value of destructive embryo research is to be weighted, from a moral point of view, in comparison to the negative value (or disvalue) of destroying embryos. Whatever way that calculation is done, it is important to get a clear idea of what moral weight each side of the equation has. This will involve:i. developing a sound and accurate picture of what the real value is of the benefits of embryonic research, andii. clarifying what the value of embryos might consist in, and what, if anything, may be wrong with destroying them.iii. The rest of this paper outlines some of the ethical arguments and philosophical considerations that have been considered relevant to these two matters.iv. Evaluating the Benefits of Embryonic Stem Cell ResearchEvaluating the beneficial consequences of embryonic stem cell research is not straightforward. There are complexities associated with assessing how realistic the potential of the benefits is, how alternatives with different combinations of benefits and drawbacks are to be compared, and factoring in all of the sometimes overlooked possible consequences of embryonic research (Rickard, 2002).Judging the Benefits

Most attention has centred on the medical potential of embryonic stem cell research and cultivation, particularly somatic gene therapy for genetic disorders, and the generation of replacement tissues and organs for transplant.There is no doubt that these outcomes, once realised, would be highly valuable. It is important to keep in mind, however, that currently these benefits arepotentialones. A sound evaluation of stem cell research needs to take account of the likelihood of achieving its beneficial outcomes. In matters of science, and particularly, in areas that are newly developing and comparatively uncharted (such as embryonic stem cell research), it is sometimes difficult to settle on those probabilities with complete confidence. It is the nature of scientific discoveries and progress, that they are not easily predicted. Both advances and impediments to advancement can arise unexpectedly. This uncertainty about how real the potential benefits are, needs to be kept in mind when weighing and evaluating the consequences of embryonic stem cell research (Rickard, 2002).

Comparing the Benefits and Harms of Alternatives to Embryonic Stem Cell Research

Adult Stem Cell ResearchWhether destructive embryonic stem cell research is the right thing to do or not, will partly depend on what the alternatives are, and how their particular benefits and drawbacks balance out. There is another research program involving adult stem cells that are present in and drawn from bone marrow, brain and gut, and other tissues. Some of these stem cells have a capacity to differentiate into a limited number of different cell types, such as blood cells, muscles and neurones (i.e., they aremultipotent), but they have not been shown to bepluripotent(able to differentiate into any cell-type) in the way that embryonic stem cells are.This limitation means that adult stem cells offer more limited potential benefits in regenerative medicine and gene therapy, at least from the standpoint of our current understanding and available biotechnology. (But with that said, it is worth keeping in mind the points made above about the limited predictability of scientific advances, including the possibility of inducing adult stem cells to differentiate into a greater range of tissue types.)(Rickard, 2002).

The harvesting and use of adult stem cells for biomedical purposes, however, avoids some of the ethically and biomedically problematic features of using embryonic stem cells. For a start, harvesting adult stem cells does not involve the destruction of embryos. The extent to which that is an advantage will depend on the extent to which that destruction turns out to be a bad thing, (and this will be taken up shortly). Tissues grown from adult stem cells will be immunologically compatible with the person from whom the stem cells are harvested. This means that those tissues can be transplanted into that person without fear of the body rejecting them. Tissues produced from embryonic stem cells for the purpose of regenerative therapy, however, are unlikely to be immunocompatible with the person for whom they are intended. The immunological properties of the tissue are set by the characteristics of whatever embryo the stem cells are derived from (Rickard, 2002).Apart from the ongoing use of immunosuppressant drugs (with its possible serious side effects), two other potential solutions to this immunological limitations have been suggested. The first proposes a 'tissue bank' with a sufficiently large number of different embryonic stem cell types to generate tissue that can be immunologically matched with different recipients. Hall points out, however, that 'this would require a huge number of human embryonic stem cell lines (the number being a matter of debate). Such an embryonic stem cell bank would be technically difficult and expensive to generate. The number of embryos that would be required to produce the cell bank would probably test public support '(8). The second possible way of overcoming the problem of immunological incompatibility is through what has been called 'therapeutic cloning'. In this process, the nucleus of a human oocyte or egg is removed and replaced with the nucleus of a cell taken from the body of the intended tissue recipient. The new egg is induced to develop into an embryo, from which immunocompatible stem cells are harvested. The embryo will be a human embryonic clone of the recipient, with all his/her exact genetic characteristics. To date, there have only been one or two reported attempts at human cloning that have met with some success (Rickard, 2002).

A number of ethical objections have been expressed to therapeutic cloning, all revolving around the creating of an embryo, and moreover, the creating of an embryo for a use that will destroy it. These objections and arguments usually rely centrally on certain views about the value or moral status of the embryo (Rickard, 2002).Whatever benefit the pluripotency of embryonic stem cells has in generating immunocompatible tissue, this benefit is likely to be possible only at the cost of having to engage in either the morally contentious practice of human (therapeutic) cloning, or the morally contentious practice of using (and destroying) a large number of embryos to create a sufficient range of embryonic stem cell lines for organ banks. It is especially important to note also, that if the Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill 2002 is passed in its current form, and any kind of human cloning, including therapeutic cloning, is prohibited, there will be less opportunity to maximise the potential benefits of embryonic stem cell research, and embryonic stem cells will effectively have less of the advantage they would otherwise have over adult stem cells (Rickard,2002).The Inevitable Succumbing of Surplus IVF EmbryosThe Research Involving Embryos Bill 2002 only permits excess ART embryos existing before 5 April 2002 to be used for research purposes in accordance with a licensing regime. It is a fact about those embryos that they would likely expire or succumb anyway. They would still be destroyed, in other words, but through exposure to natural processes. On the face of it, this looks as if the harm or negative value involved in embryos expiring (whatever it might be) will be the same whether embryo research is allowed or not. In each case the embryo will expire (Rickard, 2002).But this impression can be a little oversimplified. Some philosophers argue that there is a moral difference between acts and omissions, between actively killing something, and passively failing to intervene to stop its death from other causes (when one could have). Even though the outcome is the same in each case, it can be argued that there is something worse, or more morally culpable, about actively bringing about the death oneself. There are different views on what the moral difference between killing and letting die amounts to, and there are those who argue that there is no significant difference. Whichever way one comes out on this, it is not clear that the act-omission distinction maps neatly onto the particular embryo research scenario under discussion. Destroying surplus embryos through research is certainly an act. But so too, some would argue, is removing surplus embryos from the cold storage that keeps them from expiring. They would hold that this looks less like failing to intervene in independently occurring causal processes (that will lead to expiry), than an act that sets those processes in motion. If this is true, then the first impression above will stand. The harm or negative value involved in embryos expiring (whatever it might be) will be the same whether embryo research is allowed or not (Rickard, 2002).Some would argue that there is an important logical upshot from this. If the only two alternatives in the circumstances (destroying embryos in research vs making them succumb) involve the same level of harm or disvalue or moral wrongness, but embryo research involves much greater benefits than the other alternative, then it could be argued, it makes sense to opt for the more beneficial embryo research. And indeed, some might construe that as a sufficient case for the moral preferability of that option. (This would change, of course, if the relevant alternatives changeif say, embryos were purpose created for research, which were not pre-existing and destined to be expired) (Rickard, 2002).

Taking into Account all of the Relevant Benefits and HarmsThe embryonic stem cell debate has been pre-occupied with the biological and medical benefits or drawbacks of that research. Central as these certainly are, there are nonetheless other, often-overlooked non-medical impacts that may be important to factor in. Some of the major among these are possible social impacts including:De-sensitisation to the Destruction of Human LifeIt is argued by some(10)that allowing the destruction of embryos to become an entrenched practice would serve to desensitise the scientific establishment, regulating bodies, and society in general, to the destruction of life in general. An increased social toleration of loss of life, it would be argued, may make it easier for society to accede to (currently) more controversial practices involving the ending of life such as, late term elective abortion, or withdrawal of treatment for severely disabled infants, for example. This 'slippery slope' argument about potential consequences is based on empirical assumptions about the causes and effects of certain social attitudes, and needs to be assessed in the light of their plausibility (Rickard, 2002).

Contributions to Social OppressionOne strong but minority strand of argument emphasises the impact that biotechnology has on broader social relationships. It has been argued that 'research should be evaluated not only in terms of its effects on the subjects of the experiment but also in terms of its connection with existing patterns of oppression and domination in society'.There is a considerable body of writing that explores the impacts of new reproductive technologies (such as IVF) on the interests of women, particularly how those technologies might contribute to oppression.In the case of embryonic research, it is sometimes argued that women who donate ova or embryos are at risk of exploitation to the extent that male-dominated medical practice appropriates their reproductive labour for research and commercial benefits. Women are at risk, therefore, of being alienated from their reproductive labour. Moreover, it is argued that women's body parts are at risk of being commodified, and their acts of altruistic donation demeaned, if downstream users can develop commercial applications for stem cells developed from their ova and embryos.

The Value of the EmbryoWhat weight does the other side of the moral equation have? What is wrong, if anything, with destroying embryos? If there is something wrong with that, is it sufficiently wrong to outweigh or override the benefits of embryo research, and therefore, render that research morally impermissible? Most of the leading arguments about the rightness or wrongness of destroying embryos are based on some view or other about the moral status of the embryohow the embryo ought to be regarded or treated from the moral point of view, in virtue of it arguably possessing certain morally important intrinsic characteristics.It is relatively uncontroversial to describe embryos as human life (at its very beginnings). It is another thing, however, to describe embryos as persons, or human beings, or potential persons, etc. These descriptions are morally laden in that they carry with them potential implications about what can and cannot be done to embryos from a moral point of view. What those potential implications are, and indeed, whether they are sound ones, will depend on the nature and plausibility of the particular arguments that accompany each view on the moral status of the embryo. There are different views about this moral status. The leading views speculate that embryos have the status of: persons, or potential persons, or divine creations, or subjects of moral 'harm', or the beginnings of human life, with intrinsic value, or organic material with no more moral standing than other body parts.Each of these will be outlined in turn, with particular attention to (i) what the intrinsic moral characteristics are the each particular view attributes to embryos, and (ii) what these alleged characteristics or moral status are held to imply for our moral treatment of embryosparticularly whether they can ever or never be destroyed (Rickard, 2002).Embryos have Status as Human Beings or PersonsSome argue that, despite obvious physical differences between developed humans and embryos, the latter ought to still be regarded as human beings or persons. One of the more plausible arguments to this effect relies on pointing out that there is no non-arbitrary point in the physical growth continuum between embryo and developed human that counts as a morally significant dividing line (Rickard, 2002).

Consequently, if individuals at their fully developed stage are human beings or persons, there is no non-arbitrary ground to think that they should not count as the same at their embryonic stage. Those who hold otherwise, according to this argument, need to indicate the developmental point at which personhood, or status as a human being, is acquired (Rickard, 2002).

The argument continues that it is a very deeply and commonly held view in modern liberal democracies that individual persons are deserving of especially strong moral respect in certain ways. All individuals, by virtue of being persons, have fundamental rights not to have their basic human interests interfered with in certain ways, and most importantly, their interest in the maintenance of their life and bodily integrity. If embryos have the status of persons, then they too will have rights not to be harmed or killed. Or, put in another way, we will be under a very strong moral obligation not to harm or kill embryos (Rickard, 2002).Most prominent ethicists, philosophers and commentators would agree that persons have a status deserving of strong and special moral respect, protection and dignity. Many, however, would dispute that embryos should be considered persons or human beings in any serious sense. Even if one cannot point to an exact black and white dividing line in human development, it is still reasonable (they hold) to point to the fact that wherever the transition occurs, embryos do not have the psychological, physiological, emotional, intellectual properties that we tend to centrally associate with personhood. Embryos, particularly the very early pre-implantation blastocysts involved in stem cell research,do not, for instance, have consciousness, individuality, the ability to reason, or the ability to form courses of action in life and to choose between them (Rickard, 2002).

Embryos have Status as Potential PersonsSome ethicists have a response to the foregoing objection to viewing embryos as persons. It is to concede that embryos do not currentlyexhibit these properties of personhood, but theywill, if allowed to develop and fulfil their potential. To the extent that embryos are potential persons, it is argued, they ought to still be accorded the moral respect and dignity that personhood warrants (Rickard, 2002).

This potential person argument gains some of its impetus from the observation that we still treat humans as persons (with the attendant moral respect) when they are temporarily unconscious or asleep. While in these incapacitated conditions, individuals are not conscious, cannot reason, and cannot form and choose courses of action the characteristics we associate with personhood. But we still see it as morally wrong to harm them or violate their basic rights. It is argued that we see it this way because we know that even though they are not able to exercise the properties of personhood in their present state, these peoplewillbe able to when they become conscious again. This same reasoning it is argued, and the fact they will exercise these capacities when they eventually become fully developed humans, should inform our attitude to embryos (Rickard, 2002).

Three types of concern have been expressed about this argument: the probability of IVF embryos developing into full-term successful births is low. There is a high rate of foetal loss in early embryosup to 73 per cent in pre-implantation embryos.(17)If probability is a reflection of potential, then there is relatively little potential for any one pre-embryo to become a person. Potential is very context-dependent, and it may not make sense to talk simply aboutthepotential of something. The probability of an IVF embryo becoming a successful birth depends heavily on human action and intervention (e.g., transferral to the uterus), as well as other biological conditions (e.g., whether the embryo implants, grows to term, is born properly, etc., etc.). A great deal has to come from the outside for a successful birth, in the case of both natural and assisted pregnancy. So much so, it might be argued that it is not entirely clear what could be meant when speaking of theinherentpotential of an embryo to become a person.(18)From what contextual base line could that inherent potential be measured? (Some might also wish to point out that, in the case where surplus IVF embryos are used for stem cell harvest, these would naturally succumb anyway, and consequently would not have the potential to become persons.) Some would argue, that it is not clear why something that could become a person should be morally regarded as if it actually were a person. They would hold that the observation made above about people who are temporarily unconscious does not necessarily make the required case. Arguably, we treat the temporarily unconscious with the full moral respect of personhood because we knew that before lapsing into unconsciousness they had all the properties of personhood, and we know they will have them again after they come out of it. This scepticism is not presented as suggesting that the potential personhood of embryos counts for nothing in the way they are regarded morally. Only that it might not count for the full complement of rights and respect that actual persons warrant.

Before leaving these views about the moral status of embryos as persons or potential persons, there is an important qualification to be noted. Even if embryos were shown to have this status, and the accompanying moral respect, dignity and protections due to persons, it can be argued that this still might not necessarily mean that embryos should never be intentionally destroyed. A lot depends on one's philosophical understanding of the moral rights and obligations associated with personhood. Some would argue that the human right not to be killed, and the moral obligation not to kill persons, are absolute and inviolable, and must be observed with no exception, regardless of what the consequences are. Others might argue that the obligation not to kill persons, although a very very strong obligation, is not an absolute and indefeasible one that can never be overridden. There may be some circumstances where very great harms can be averted by actively ending someone's life. For example, assassinating Hitler and saving 6 million Jews, or even pulling the plug on life-support in order to spare someone's intense suffering. Someone very attuned to the importance of consequences, therefore, might want to hold that even if embryos do have the full complement of human rights, it is still not an absolute and indefeasible obligation not to destroy embryos regardless of the consequences. The fact that many people would accept abortion in cases where the pregnant woman is at significant physical risk, is testimony to the prevalence of this consequentialist turn in people's ordinary moral thinking (Rickard, 2002).Embryos have Status as Divine CreationsIt is sometimes implicit in some points of view, particularly theistic ones, that embryos warrant special moral importance because they are divine creations in being the beginnings of human life. In other words, embryos are not ours to destroy (nor create) (Rickard, 2002).A number of concerns might be expressed about this view. For those who do not subscribe to a theistic worldview, the most obvious would relate to questions about the reality of a divine creator or creative agency. It is not clear what publicly available procedure could resolve that question. Some might also observe that this argument, at least in its simple form, could be too strong, since it argues against the destructive use of e.g., plants. On top of this, some might add, our limited knowledge of the nature of the divine tends to also limit our understanding of what divine status exactly implies re our moral obligations (Rickard, 2002).Embryos are Harmed by their Destruction (Whatever their Moral Status)It is generally held that one of the traditional reasons for protecting life, is that loss of life causes various sorts of harmto the killer, those close to the deceased, society in general, and most importantly the deceased. Some have argued that loss of embryonic life is a harm, inflicted on the embryo, by destroying it. Philip Devine, for instance, argues that:loss of life ... is a harm that can be inflicted on any organism; plants and non-human animals. Human organisms of every stage of development including the embryonic can all suffer loss of life (Rickard, 2002).Others, however, have argued that embryos cannot be harmed in the sense we usually understand that idea. The eminent American social and legal philosopher, Joel Feinberg, for instance, analyses the concept of harm in terms of the 'thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest'.For a being to have an 'interest', for Feinberg, is a matter of it having beliefs, desires, expectations, aims and purposes. These, he holds, are what are thwarted, in the thwarting of an interest. According to his views trees or the environment are not themselves morally harmed by their destruction. Feinberg allows that future or potential interests might be attributed to a developing embryo, but that these only take effect if and when the potential interest becomes actual. Another theorist makes this same point by example:

Imagine that, just as Dr. Frankenstein reached for the lever that would bring life to the assemblage of body parts on his laboratory table, someone appalled at the experiment smashed the apparatus. That act, whatever we think of it, would not have been harmful or unfair to the assemblage, or against its interests (Rickard, 2002).The nub of this view is that because embryos are not the 'subject' of interests, they cannot be the subject of basic rights that protect interests.Embryos have Status as Human Life with Intrinsic ValueEven if the foregoing views of Feinberg were accepted, some have argued that there is still something bad about the loss of life that is involved in the destruction of an embryo. In an attempt to get at the heart of this persistent residual conviction, the prominent Anglo-American legal and political philosopher Ronald Dworkin has proposed that we need to look at the value of a life in a particular way. Dworkin observes that we can conceive of the value of a life from two (compatible) points of view or directions. We very often think of the value of lives from the inside, as it were, in terms of the value they haveto the liversof those lives. Through rights and liberties, we protect a person's life and interests, not because these are valuable from the point of view of the universe, but because they are important to the person concerned. But as well as recognising that a life has value to the liver, we also recognise that a life can have value from a more objective and impersonal point of view. In much the same way that a unique and magnificent work of art has intrinsic value, a value which makes it deserving of respect and protection, Dworkin observes that a single human life commands respect. Dworkin eloquently encapsulates the intrinsic value of human life in the following. (Rickard, 2002).

(a single human life has value) no matter in what form or shape, because of the complex creative investment it represents and because of our wonder at the divine or evolutionary processes that produce new lives from old ones, at the processes of nation and community and language through which a human being will come to absorb and continue hundreds of generations of cultures and forms of life and value, and, finally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal personal creation and judgement by which a person will make and remake himself, a mysterious, inescapable process in which we each participate, and which is therefore the most powerful and inevitable source of empathy and communion we have with every other creature who faces the same frightening challenge (Rickard, 2002).Thinking of the value of a life in this more external or impersonal way, argues Dworkin, provides another way of understanding what of moral importance is lost in the loss of a human life. Because this understanding is not based on any supposed moral harms to the liver of the life, as the subject of human interests, it is an understanding that can be applied in the case of human life at its very beginnings, i.e., embryos.There is however one crucial qualification in Dworkin's view. There are degrees of intrinsic value of a life depending on the stage at which the life is being lived, and correspondingly, there are degrees of respect that ought to be shown it at those stages. Dworkin observes that we tend to make different judgements of how great a loss the ending of a life is at different stages in that life. For example, many would argue that a life ended at the peak of its achievements and promise is a greater loss than a life lost at its sunset, after its achievements and promise have been realized. Some also would argue that a human life that ends at its very beginnings is a less serious loss than a life that ends sometime after it has begun to actively engage in the process of human and social involvement that Dworkin speaks of in the passage above. We do, for instance, see sudden infant death as a more serious loss than early miscarriage, or failure of an embryo to implant. These different judgements of the degree of loss involved in the ending of a life reflect the degree of intrinsic value we attach to human life at those stages. Or so Dworkin argues (Rickard, 2002).The important implication of Dworkin's arguments is that even though embryos, as human life, deserve respect and protection, the degree of respect and protection they warrant may not be as great as that accorded to later stage human life. Consequently, some would argue that there may be circumstances where the limited loss of value involved in an embryo being destroyed is outweighed from a moral point of view, by the possible benefits in allowing that to happen (Rickard, 2002).Embryos have the Status of Mere Body PartsSome might hold that embryos are merely parts of other people's bodies until they reach a certain autonomous or independent developmental stage (and there will be differing views on when that might be). Accordingly, embryos have no independent moral status at all, and are merely the property of the people from whose body they came. The only respect due to embryos is the respect that should be accorded other people's property. This no-status view is argued for on grounds that none of the other arguments in favour of an independent moral status are compelling (Rickard, 2002).Embryos Created for Research Purposes?Is it somehow worse to use embryos created specifically for research, than it is to use embryos that are surplus to the reproductive treatments for which they were created? In other words, is there anything independently wrong with creating embryos for research purposes above and beyond whatever (if anything) might be wrong with destroying them as part of the research process?Some argue that creating embryos for research is to create them merely as a means to others' ends (no matter how laudable those ends might be).If embryos do have a significant person-like moral status (as, e.g., persons, potential persons, divine creations), then this amounts to treating them with deep moral disrespect. They are being commodified. However, when embryos are created for reproductive purposes, each has the same initial chance of being transferred to the uterus, even if it will probably turn out that not all of them are needed in the end. They are still being created 'respectfully' for a use that fits with their intrinsic or natural ends or purpose, not others' (Rickard, 2002).

Some would reply, however, that this argument is based on a view about the moral status of embryos that needs to be fully established. Moreover, if using embryos for others' ends is wrong, then that may well count against thedonatingof embryos for research purposes.Another argument has been expressed which does not rely on attributing person-like moral status to embryos, but something more like the status outlined in Dworkin's views noted above. Embryos, even if they are not the holders of rights, nonetheless have considerable value to the extent that they are the beginnings of a possible human life. Embryos can, therefore, function as powerful symbols and provide the opportunity for a community to demonstrate or express commitment to human life generally by, for example, condemning creation of embryos for research purposes. As the philosopher John A. Robertson says, 'In taking such a stance, persons define or constitute themselves as highly protective of human life.'Robertson notes, however, that this same symbolic respect for life can be expressed through allowing embryos to be created so that others' lives can be prolonged, or deaths averted (Rickard, 2002).

Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity.(2009). An Overview of Stem Cell Research. Retrieved September 30, 2015 from https://cbhd.org/stem-cell-research/overviewEuroStemCell. (2011). Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Ethical Dilemma. Retrieved September 30, 2015 from http://www.eurostemcell.org/factsheet/embyronic-stem-cell-research-ethical-dilemmaGenetic Science Learning Center. (2014). The Stem Cell Debate: Is it Over? Learn Genetics. Retrieved September 30, 2015 from http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/stemcells/scissues/Rickard, M. (2002). Key Ethical Issues in Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Retrieved September 30, 2015 from http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03cib05