Elena Kagan's Senior Thesis on Socialism in New York

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TO THE FINAL CONFLICT:

SOCIALISM IN NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1933

By

ELENA KAGAN

Apri l 15, 1981

A sen io r t h es i s submit ted to th e

His to ry Depar tment of Princeton Univer s i ty

in pa r t i a l f u l f i l lmen t o f the requirements

fo r th e degree o f Bachelor o f Arts



Ijf

TO MY PARENTS

Acknowledgments

The s t a f f members o f t h e Tamiment I n s t i t u t e g r e a t l y

f a c i l i t a t e d my r e s e a r c h f o r t h i s t h e s is , d i r e c t i n g me t o

r e l e v a n t c o l l e c t i o n s and a i d i n g me i n a l l p o s s i b l e r e s p e c t s .

Sean Wilentz p a i n s t a k i n g l y r e a d each page o f t h i s t h e s i s - o c c a s i o n a l l y two o r t h r e e t i m e s . His comments and s u g g e s -

t io n s· w e r e i n v a lu a b l e ; h i s encouragement was both needed anda p p r e c i a t e d . F i n a l l y , I would l i k e t o thank my b r o t h e r Marc,whose involvement lin r a d i c a l causes l e d me t o e x p l o r e t h e

h is t o ry o f American r a d i c a l i s m in t h e hope o f c l a r i f y i n g myown p o l i t i c a l i d e a s .



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CONTENTS

C h a p t e r

INTRODUCTION

C h a p t e r I

GROWTH AND ETHNICITY:

A PORTRAIT OF THE NEW YORK SOCIALIST

PARTY, 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 1 4

C h a p t e r I ISHADES OF RED:

DISSENSION WITHIN THE SP , 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 1 4

C h a p t e r IIITHE PROTOCOL OP PEACE?:

DISSENSION WITHIN THE ILGWU, 1 9 0 9 - 1 9 1 6

C h a p t e r IVTHE PECULIAR INTERLUDE:

LOCAL NEW YORK DURING WORLD WAR I

C h a p t e r VTHE GREAT DIVIDE:

1919 AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY SPLIT

C h a p t e r VI

THE FINAL CONFLICT:

CIVIL WAR IN THE ILGWU

CONCLUSION

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50

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87

1 0 5

127



INTRODUCTION

there i s no socialism in America.

iI.IIi inI,

Ever since Werner Sombart f i r s t posed th e q uestio n

1905, countless his tor ians have t r ied to expla in why

For the most par t ,

th is work has focused on e xte rn al f ac to rs --o n fe atu re s

of American society ra ther than of American soc i a l i s t

movements. Socia l is ts and non-soc ia l i s t s al ike have

d isc uss ed the importance of the f ront ier in providing the

u. S. ci t izenship with a safety valve and in keeping urban

unemployment to a minimum. They have pointed to the f lu -

id i ty of c lass l ines in the United s ta tes--a f lu id i ty

which, whether r ea l or imagined, impeded the development

of a radical class consciousness. They have dwelled on

the American labor force ' s pecul iarly heterogeneous char-

acter , which made concerted class act ion more d i f f i cu l t

than it might otherwise have been. In shor t , most

his tor ians have l ooked everywhere but to the American

soc ia l i s t movement i t s e l f fo r exp lana ti on s o f U.S. soc

ia l i sm's fa i lure . 1

Such external explanations are not unimportant but)

nei ther do they t e l l the fu l l s tory . They ignore or over\

look one supremely important fac t : Socialism has indeed

existed in the United States . I t would be absurd to over-

est imate the s t rength of the ear ly twentieth century

1



2

a s c a n t y 10,000 i n 1902 t o a r e s p e c t a b l e 109,000 i n t h e

o r d e r , t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y i n c r e a s e d its membership from

t h i s same p e r i o d , t h e s o c i a l i s t s c o u l d b o a s t a p a r t y p r e s s

Throughout t h e l a t t e r h a l f ofa r l y months o f 1919. 3

I American d i s c o n t e n t with the n a t i o n ' s hardening ~ o r p o r a t e

j

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t h a t i n c l u d e d over t h r e e hundred p u b l i c a t i o n s with an

aggregate c i r c u l a t i o n o f approximate ly two m i l l i o n .4

Each

E l e c t i o n Day demonstra ted t h a t t h e SP--a l though still

a t t r a c t i n g a very sm all p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e n a t i o n ' s t o t a l

vote -- wa s s low ly b u t s u r e l y broadening its e l e c t o r a l b a s e .

Each May Day showed t h a t , whi le t h e s o c i a l i s t s never won a

m a j o r i t y i n t h e American F e d e r a t i o n o f Labor, they com-

manded t h e a l l e g i a n c e of s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t o r s of the l a b o r

movement. It can be argued, f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e s p e c t e r

of s o c i a l i s m haunted Americans t o a f a r g r e a t e r e x t e n t than

the S P ' s numer ica l s t r e n g t h might i n d i c a t e . Even a b r i e f

p er u sa l o f t h e newspapers of t h i s p e r i o d sugges ts how,

s e r i o u s l y t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y was t a k e n : It i s d i f f i c u l t

'to c o n st r u e t h e e n e r g e t i c and r e c u r r e n t a n t i - s o c i a l i s t

polemics of t h e American p r e s s a s s imply o p p o r t u n i s t i c

'jl,



3

attempts to bludgeon a purely marginal movement. In t e l -

lec tuals throughout the country avidly debated the pros

and cons of the soc i a l i s t creed; as Charles Beard wrote

.1 in 1913, i t would have been "a work of s uper erogat ion t o

I attempt to prove t h a t men and women presumptively engaged

in the pursui t of knowledge should take an i n t e l l i gen t

in teres t" in sociali.sm, a ' subject which was, he added,

"shaking th e old foundation s of po l i t i c s . . . and penetra t ing

our science, a r t and l i t e ra tu re . "S Final ly, po l i t i ca l

progress ives and reformers of every i lk used the more mild

of soc i a l i s t ideas in t he i r platforms and wri t ings , and

occasional ly even put such ideas in to prac t ice . 6

To be sure, the American SP d if fe re d g re at ly from

the idea l type of soc i a l i s t party conceived by Sombart.

The Socia l is t Party of the United States could not lay

claim to the kind of pure proletar ianism t ha t Sombart con-

s idered essent ia l to any soc i a l i s t movement; indeed, most

of the par ty ·s members did not even consider this a worthy

,'l,

goal. But the American soc ia l i s t s · "fai lure ll to build a

movement tha t even resembled Sombart 's ideal ized notion

of a class-conscious par ty--a f a i lu re which they shared

with most of t he i r European counterpar ts- -did not render

the i r party any less s ignif icant . Nor did such a fa i lure1

render t he i r party\ any less successful . In the f i r s t two

decades of the tw entieth century the American soc i a l i s t

movement, whose very existence Sombart refused to consider ,

grew i f not by leaps and bounds a t l eas t by inches.



j

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The success of the soc i a l i s t s in e sta bl is hin g a

v i ab l e - - i f minor- -pol i t" ica l par ty in th e ea r ly twent ie th

century sugges t s t ha t h is to ria n s must examine no t only

ex te rna l bu t a lso in te rn al fa cto rs i f they hope to expla in

the absence of socia l ism from contemporary American po l i -

t i c s . The e f f e c t s of the f ron t i e r , of c l a s s mobi l i ty , of

an e thn i ca l l y divided w o ~ k i n g c l a ss may expl i ca te why

the Soc i a l i s t Party d id not gain an immediate mass fo1-

lowing; they cannot expla in why the growing and conf iden t

American s o c i a l i s t movement o f th e P ro gre ss iv e Era suddenly

f e l l apa r t . For t h a t , we must t u rn to th e i n t e rna l workings

and problems of the soc i a l i s t movement i t s e l f .

Three h i s t o r i an s have at tempted to do j u s t t h i s , bu t

each in an u lt ima t el y u n s at is f ac t or y way. In 1952, Danie l

B ell arg ue d t h a t the fa i lu re of the u.s. soc i a l i s t movement

had i t s roo t s in the SP's i n ab i l i t y to solve what Pe t e r Gay

l a t e r termed " the dilemma of democra t ic soc ia l i sm. ,,7 The

Soc i a l i s t Pa r t y ' s Achi l le s ' hee l , accord ing to Bel l , was

t h a t it was simultaneously committed to and incapable of

operat ing with in the democrat ic channels of the American

po l i t i c a l system. Bel l wri t e s :

The soc i a l i s t movement, by its very s ta tement

of goal and its r e j ec t i on of the c ap i t a l i s t

order as a whole, could not r e l a t e i t s e l fto the spec i f ic problems of soc i a l ac t ion

in ~ ~ here-and-now, give-and- take po l i t i c a lworld . It was t rapped by the unhappy problemof l iv ing ' i n but no t of th e w orld , ' so it

could only act , and t he n i na de qu a te ly , asthe moral but not po l i t i c a l man in immoralsoc i e ty . ( I t a l i c s in o r ig ina l . )8



.

"

'I!I 5IIj 'This"unhappy problem,'" Bell a rg ue s, appeared most c l ea r l y

during the years of ,W()rld War I , when the SP l eade rsh ip ,

in accordance with its own moral sense , took a s t ~ o n g l yant i -war s t ance , and thereby d i sc red i t ed i t s e l f a m o ~ gi n t e l l ec tua l s and t r ade union i s t s a l i ke .

9

Be l l ' s t h e s i s simply wi l l no t s tand up under c lo se

sc ru t iny ; In the f i ~ s t place , the Soc i a l i s t Par ty exper i -

enced little decl ine during the war yea r s ; indeed, in some

areas the pa r t y ' s an t i -war pos i t ion g rea t ly inc reased its

s t rength and popula r i ty . Even more impor tan t , Bel l ' s

image of the s o c i a l i s t as a vi s ionary , divorced from " rea l "

pol i t i c a l l i f e , i s a fa l lac ious one. The key to comprehend-

ing the pre-1920 Soc i a l i s t Par ty , as we sh a l l see , i s to

understand t h a t i t s l eader s were not only in but very much

of the wor ld- - in t a c t , too much" so fo r many of t h e i r po l i t i -

ca l suppor te r s . Thoroughly po l i t i c a l men, they had what

Moses Rischin has ca l led a I Isure sense fo r t he a ri thm e tic

of ideal ism." lO Relat ing only too wel l to the "here-and-

now, g iv e- an d- ta ke " o f America, they simply wi l l not con

form to e i t he r our own image or Be l l ' s i d ea l type of the

American rad ica l .

In The American Soc i a l i s t Movement, I r a Kipness

escapes Be l l ' s p i t f ~ l l only to blunder in to one of h is own

making. According to Kipness , th e Soc i a l i s t Par ty col lapsed

in 1912, when the r igh t - and center -wing soc i a l i s t l eader s

expel led Big B i l l Haywood from t h e i r mids t . With t h i s

s ingle s t roke , Kipness wri t e s , th e r ig ht -w in g of the SP



Kipness '

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1 ·k i l led i t s own movement; the d ep artu re o f Haywood's

I a n a rc h o -s y nd ic a li st s u ppo rt er s from the pa r ty meant a l so

the depar tu re of th e pa r ty from American l i f e . ll

6

t h es i s i s highly sugges t ive , fo r it ca l l s a t t en t i on to th e

sec ta r i an na tu re of th e ea r l y twent ie th c e n t u ~ y S o c i a l i s tPar ty . His exp lana t ion i s , however , a l so wrong. As James

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weins te in has shown in copious de t a i l , th e even ts o f 1912

had little e f f e c t on th e U.S. s o c i a l i s t movement. Af t e r

t h i s da t e , the p ar ty r eta in ed its e l e c t o r a l and t r ade-un ion

suppor t , and soc i a l i s t s con t inued to p lay a v i s i b l e ro l e

in th e na t ion ' s po l i t i c a l rea lm.12

No exp lana t i on , then ,

t ha t p lace s the dea th o f th e Soc i a l i s t Par ty in 1912 i s

c red ib l e . Something o the r than th e withdrawal of Haywood

and the synd ica l i s t s from the party must, have been involved .

James Weins te in o f f e r s th e a l t er n at iv e t he s is t h a t

the d i s so lu t i on o f the So c i a l i s t Par ty r e su l t ed no t from

the walkout of the s ynd i c a l i s t s in 1912 but from th e in -

f in i te ly more disas t rous d ep artu re o f the communis ts

seven years l a te r .

At th e end of 1919, th e Soc i a l i s t Par ty was

f ra c tu red in th ree d i r e c t i ons and i n to many

pa r t s . . . . Soc i a l i s t in f luence in th e

labor movement • • . was a l l b ~ des t royed

from the s p l i t , and th e s o c i a l i s t pre s s ,

s tru gg lin g to make a comeback a f t e r wart imes u p p r e s ~ i o n , was permanent ly deb i l i t a t ed .

In the decade t ha t fol lowed th e s p l i t , th e

l i n es drawn in 1919 were erec ted in to w a lls ,

and th e movement· became one of hos t i l e andwarr ing s e c t s . l3

In ascribing d i s a s t e r to t he s oc ia li st -c ommuni st s p l i t ,

_. n , ~ e , i n s t e i n i s co r r e c t : As we s h a l l s ee , 1919 was indeed

n '

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7

As he seesion, however, contains one fundamental flaw.

i t , "the movement for a sp l i t in the Soc ia l i s t Party

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the grea t divide , the year in which the future impotence

of American social ism wa's ensu red. W ein stein ' 5 in te rp re ta l

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1sprang forth suddenly, and with l i t t l e or no in ternal im

14petus." The sole cause of the American soc ia l i s t c i v i l

war, we in st ei n a rgue s, was the Russian Revolu tion- -an event

tha t occurred thousands of miles away. To be sure , the

Bolshevik se izure of power held romantic al lure for many

American soc ia l i s t s . But it seems dubious tha t one d i s t an t

revolut ion--even one as momentous as the Bolshevik se izure

of power--cQuld have destroyed the Socia l i s t Par.ty had it

not been for cer ta in deeper, longer-standing divis ions .

Weins te in 's explana tion i s a superf ic ia l one. The Russian

Revolution.was the precip i tan t of the American Socia l i s t

Party 's sp l i t and sUbsequent decl ine; it was not and could

L not have been the sole cause.

We are , then, l e f t with three ul t imate ly inadequate

explanations of the sudden demise of a growing soc i a l i s tl

movement. The other-worldl iness of the soc ia l i s t s , the

exp uls io n o f Haywood in 1912, the Russian Revolution of

1917--none wi ll s a ti sf ac to r il y explain the death of socia l -

"

ism in America. What, then, was responsible?

In a tte mp tin g to answer th i s quest ion, th is th esis

wil l focus almost exclusively on the history of the New

York City loca l of the Socia l i s t Party, from i t s founding

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i s espec ia l ly so when the whole i s th e SF arid th e pa r t

t i on , every t e r r i t o r i a l organiza t ion possessed a h ig h d egree

According to th e S o c ia l i s t P a r t y 's con s t i t u -ew York.

i in 1900 th rough its co l lapse in the s e ve r a l year s a f t e r

1 1919. A pa r t can never t ru ly r e f l e c t th e whole, and t h i s

,j

1of autonomy--possessed , in f a c t ,

the so l e j u r i sd i c t i on o f th e members r e s id ing

wi th in t ~ e i r r espec t ive t e r r i t o r i e s , and th e

so l e con t ro l of a l l mat te r s pe r t a i n i ng to

the propaganda, organ iza t ion , and f i nanc i a l

a f f a i r s wi th in such s t a t e o r t e r r i t o ry . IS

Such a high d eg ree o f decen t r a l i z a t i on may make the h i s t o ry

of any SP lo c al in he re ntly a typ ica l . This may seem even

more the case when the sub j ec t of th e s tudy i s New York--

a c ity la rg er , more var i ed and more po lyg lo t than any o the r

in the Uni ted Sta t e s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s and r i s k s involved

" in drawing g e ne ra l c on clu sio ns about the s o c i a l i s t movement

from such a l o c a l i t y cannot be i gno red .

S t i l l , if a s ing l e c i t y ' s s o c i a l i s t movement may be

unrep resen ta t ive in some r e spec t s , it may a l so allow fo r

_close and de t a i l ed s tudy . The h i s t o r i an may de lve more

. ~ deeply i n to complex a t t i t udes and events - - and may pinpoin t

-, 'more accu r a t e ly t h e i r causes and e f f e c t s - - t h an could othe r -

, ;-, , ',wise be th e case . Fur thermore , th e h i s to ry o f Local New

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York--no mat t e r h0W a typ ica l - -de te rmined to a t l e a s t some;

ex ten t t h a t of t h na t iona l SP. The l a rges t ' of the SP's

. ' "branches, Local New York served as one of th e pa r t y ' s most

c r i t i c a l founda t ion s toneSi indeed , th e na t i ona l organ iza t ion



members a s v ice versa .. Fina l ly , t he re a re good reasons to

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be l ieve t h a t the New York s o c i a l i s t movement was not as

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jI, sometimes seemed to depend almost as much on its New Yorkj

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unrepresen ta t ive of the na t iona l one as.it might a t f i r s t

appear. The most impor tan t of these was the presence o f

Morris Hi l l qu i t a t th e helm of the New York Soc i a l i s t Par ty .

Hi l lqu i t was no t s imply th e le ad er of the New York SP; he

was a l eader of the na t iona l par ty as wel l . Eugene Debs

might have been the SP's s tandardbeare r , its most consp icu-

ous and adula ted f i gu re , bu t it was Hi l l qu i t and h is a l ly

Victor Berger who ac tua l ly molded the par ty in t h e i r image.

Gradua l ly , t h e i r ideo logy · became the S P's id eo lo gy , t h e i r

pol i c i e s the par tY ' s . l 6 The presence of Hi l l qu i t in the

New York soc i a l i s t movement, then , ensured t h a t the c i t y ' s

t a c t i c s would never be fa r out o f l ine with the coun t ry ' s ,

fo r Hi l lqu i t had h is hand in both . Likewise , th e most

voca l and vi s i b l e l eade r o f New York CityT s l e f t -wing opposi -

Po t ion could lay claim to being a n atio n al f ig u re . Never as

'well-known as Haywood or Debs, Louis Boudin none the les s

. ,served as the t h eo r i s t of th e na t i ona l s o c i a l i s t movement 'sI ,I . . . . ':"

~ 7 · ' : m q r e r ad i c a l wing. J u s t as he and Hi l lqu i t spar r ed in: ~ ~ · · ; : ~ ~ ~ t ~ ' ~ ~ , ·.(' , ~ .. . { , = - ~ E t v ! York t so too d id they spa r in th e n at io n. To a g rea t

• 'fio. •.• -.

) ' ex ten t , the c o un tr y 's d is pu te s mirrored the c i t y ' s .', ' \

With t h i s in imind , we may ask the quest ion which th e

",.,_. ,.r:emainder of t h i s t h es i s wi l l a t t emp t to address : What. ~ .... "" 4" ...... -

::. caused the s t range death of soc ia l i sm in New York City? In

"



New York social i sm, although sudden, had deep roots indeed.

begin ni ng s o f the Socia l i s t Party , for the col lapse of

ii1:Ir answering th i s quest ion, we must go back to the very

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From i t s f i r s t days, the New York SF was both divided within

i t se l f and estranged from many of i t s t rade -un ion fol lowers .

Among the par ty ' s members, a r1ght - l e f t cleavage arose ear ly-

a cleavage based not on the m i n u t i ~ e of dogma but on the very

fundamentals o f so cia lism i t s e l f . What was the proper class

composition of a soc i a l i s t party?, What trade-union and

e le c to ra l p o li ci es should the party follow? What a t t i tude

should the party take toward dis t inc t ly non-radical reform

measures? On these quest ions I t hE{ soc ia l i s t s divided in to

two camps: those of "constructive" and "revolutionary" 5 0 -

cial ism. The constructavis ts had the upper hand in Local

laborers represented a

opposi t ion, prodding the

also met w ith h eate d opposit ion from

be more mil i tant , chas t i s ing them when--

th e c as e- -t he y were not .

radicalism extended fa r beyond tha t of the SP/

of t he i r t rade-union following. The

l i s t - con t ro l l ed unions included in the i r ranks many_i.:

1901 unt i l the Fi r s t World War, these two groups engaged in,,'

New York, but the revolut ionaries were never quel led . From

constant and acid debate over the w id est possible range of' i , " , ~ ; " : : ..

.~ b o t h · theo re t i ca l and t ac t ica l i ssues . At the same t ime, the



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1 The Fi r s t World War concealed for a time these deep

in te rna l r i f t s . Often considered by his tor ians as socia l -

jl i sm's downfall , the war ac tua l ly g ran ted th e soc ia l i s t s a;f

~ e s p i t e from sectarianism and 'allowed them to reach a

pinnacle of s t rength . From 1914 to 1917, the war was the

one issue on which everyone--r ight or l e f t , union leader

or union member--could agree. For th re e y ea rs , harmony

replaced dissension, and the New York soc i a l i s t movement

benefi ted grea t ly . The peace, however, proved an i l lusory

one. At the end of 1918, old disputes qu ick ly r eappear ed ,

but th is time in even f i e rce r form. For years , larg e num-

bers of the SP's members and la rge blocs of i t s t rade-union',\

support had expressed deep dissa t is fact ion with soc i a l i s t

lea4ership. Now, the Russian Revo lu tion ~ e the spark to~ I •

the i r long-smoldering rebe l l ion , and the Soc ia l i s t Party,.' " ."

burs t into flames. In 1919, the SP sp l i t in to two, and the

In t ra -vents soon proved him wrong.

ri,-- ~ / , .New York City communist movement emerged .

. ...•Ji:.:f.:..... : '...,";"" " " : . ~j :: - ~ ~ : ; . - Morris Hil lqui t b elie ve d th e sp l i t would strengthen

~ ) : ~ ~ ,; ~ : t · : h ~ _ . ~ o c i a l i s t Party; a small but unif ied radica l organiza-

would ul t imately go fur ther than a la rge

<I· ...

" . . " , ' ~: .•. ( ~ Y · s e c t a r i a n i s r n had previously weakened the soc i a l i s t{ ~ L 1 ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ , ' _..

,,"• ~ ~ . ' ( \ ; : , ; . : ; !" .

: { i : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e n t ; i n t e r - p ~ r t y sectar ianism now f inished the job._ ....ii,... \• ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ . . Y ; ; . : t : h e . la te 19205, the soc i a l i s t movement in New York City

' I ~ ~ : ' ; ' ~ . ~ , , , , ,; ~ : f . } ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e a d ; what remained was no more than i t s ghost .J ...."' .... ~ , ~ l ... ,1 ' ~ , . ~ ~ '1Il!::li :

~ ~ ~ - _ ..'j";- ;, . _ ~ ,1" ,



CHAPTER I

GROWTH AND ETHNICITY;

A PORTRAIT OF THE

NEW YORK SOCIALIST PARTY

1901-1914

On the eve of World War I , as a t the tu rn of th e c en tu ry ,

the New York Soc ia l i s t Par ty remained a dec idedly minor po l i t i -

ca l fo rce , its s t r eng th f a r below t h a t of e i t h e r th e Democrats

or the Republ icans . During its first t h i r t e en years , Loca l

New York ne i t he r a t t r a c t ed more than f ive pe r cen t of th e c i t y ' s

t o t a l vote n or b oa sted more than 5,000 dues-paying members. 1.. ' ".-Never the less , the per iod between 1901 and 1914 was one of{ ' ' ~ ' ~ , :", '

~ ~ * m p r e s s i v e growth fo r the New York SP. Membership r o l l s....~ ~ t s ~ : ; : :'i ltor..!1 ..7. :-' ~ ~ Q ~ a l l y grew longer ; e l e c t o r a l r e t u rn s showed s teady prog ress ;

r ~ u n i o n suppor t r ap id ly mounted. Such numer ica l and

' ~ ~ ? t i o n a l progress - -which took p lace pa r t i cu l a r l y among" " ' ~ , .

,;?o,ooo Jews who comprised over one-four th o f New

" ' ' ' ~ p P ~ l a t i o n 2 - - impres sed s o c i a l i s t s and non - so c i a l i s t s't ": ~ . ( : .. '"

~ ; I ~ 1913, Morris Hi l l qu i t ventured to p re d ic t t h a t',!"(r;:-" : .. _

< ~ l ) : e r twelve years th e New York SP would "contend wi th

po l i t i c a l suprem acy.,,3 H is for :ecast

bu t h is genera l sen t iment was widely

yea rs o f r i s i ng soc i a l i s t insurgency had

12



13

convinced many New Yorkers tha t the SPS future was a

promising one.

Local New York's expanding membership alone tended to

back up such .widespread expecta t ions. Voting fo r a soc i a l i s t

. party enta i led nei ther great time nor grea t ef fo r t . Joining

a radical par ty, on the' other hand, required commitment--

the commitment to pay dues, the commitment to propagandize

one's fellow union members or tenement dwe llers , th e commit-

ment, as Michael Walzer has noted, to cede one 's Saturday

nights to the cause. As the years passed, increasing num

bers of New'Yorkers proved will ing to make such sacr i f ices .

Early in 1904, Local New York considered 922 men and women

to be members in good standing. 4 By 1912, the number of

e ~ o l l e d members had reached approximately 5,OOOS--an in -

..crease of over four hundred percent a t a time when New York

<'··.C±'ti"s population grew by less than one-four th . 6 To be sure,. ~ . ~ ? ~ ~ - : . ; : ' i ~ !: ~ L 9 F ~ ~ ~ . N e w York's leadership sometimes expressed concern over

~ , . l .

"·'si.ity ' s ra ther steep drop-out ra t es . The Central Com-..

· ~ , ' · I · · " · i n an attemDt to overcome th i s problem, sent out a.;-:.....,. -..

' : ' ~ f l e t t e r s tha t requested old members to welcome and

: i ~ e . r e s t in new ones. Yet the par ty ' s net growth tended;:"'-;;-:u '.

i t s occasional losses. In general, SP leaders

par ty ' s membership s t a t i s t i c s as quite encour-

of soc ia l i s t expansion became a l l the more

New York's e lec to ra l campaigns. The New York



,j

1I

jJ

.J

14

par ty ' s leadership recognized tha t votes cas t for an SP

candidate did not necessar i ly imply deep and unswervable

commitment to the soc i a l i s t cause. Elec to ra l resu l t s ,

however, did provide one measure of the par ty ' s progress

among N e York I s c i t i zenry .' In addi t ion , such re su l t s

determined the degree of s erio us c on sid era tio n th e public

would henceforth accord the SP. Local New York's leaders

thus placed a, grea t deal of emphasis on campaign ac t iv i t i e s ,

and as the par ty enlarged, th i s emphasis only grew more

marked. In the summer of 1904, Local New York held only

three or four open-air campaign mee tin gs e ach night . S By

1912 the number had jumped to f i f ty per week,9 and by 1914 it

had reached e ighty , with crowds--at l eas t according to the

New;York Call --averaging between 150 and 300 persons,lO In, "

r":::;a'iidition', each caJIlpaign culminated in a so-cal led "monster

· , ~ ? ~ f i ~ ' ~ ; , ., ' s < ~ .,meetl.ng," held two weeks before Election Day, and a

parade" in which upwards of 10,000 people par t ic i -

Such ac t iv i t i e s brought ever- increasing dividends.

the New York Socia l i s t Par ty ' s f i r s t s la te of can-

approximately 11,580 votes or a l i t t l e less

of the t o t a l number cas t . l2 Three presiden

the same SP candidate--Eugene v. Debs--

q:,: :about 29, 8 B0 vote s , a !mas t three times th e or i gina 1. ' , . I

, . ~ ~ S l i g h t l ~ over four percent of the c i t y ' s to ta l . 13

bring steady SP e lec

In 1905 and 1906, for example, the two



IIi

!

115i municipal ownership campaigns conducted by William Randolph

Hearst on the Independent Party l ine sent the soc i a l i s t ,

vote plunging to one- third of i t s 1904 ta l ly .14 In general ,

however, soc i a l i s t Party s t rength increased throughout these

years despi te ' the presence 'of var ious reform part ies . This

t rend culminated in 1914, when New York's Lower East Side

r e si den ts e le ct ed Meyer London, ,one of the c i ty ' s leading

socia l is ts , to the U. s. Congres's. The New York SP hardly

threatened the major part ies ' po l i t i c a l dominance, but it

had come a long way.

,',' Respons ib il it y for th i s impressive Socia l i s t Party

<,growth rested pr imari ly with N e York's Jews, who formed

, , the backbone of the SP's membership and i t s electora l base .

. :.tbEal New York ' s records do not r ev ea l e xa ctly how many

of each of the c i ty ' s immigrant communities jo ined '

but intimations of strong Jewish par t i c ipa t ion-

of a Jewish majority--everywhere appear. lS Jul ius

s . ~ · ..£";' Local New York' 5 secre tary , noted in a l e t te r :

" ~ " .>"As you know I next Wednesday i s the 1s t of May .

; ~ T h e demonstration i s to take place a t 2:30 p.m ..~ : r h e Jewish contingent wi l l get a large crowd out ;. ~ e y have a large number of members and organiza-_t,jons to take par t , but the Goieshe bunch . . . I

' . ~ ; ~ ..a fr aid w ill make a poor showing. 16" . ~ . . . : , , > : ) . .••.i.,"""; ';': .' -

._ote. this l e t t e r in 1912, but he could have said much

':-:'i:n · ~ r . i . r t u a 1 1 y any year : Jewish names dominate the...~ -- ,

' ~ ~ h d ' correspondence of the SP from i t s bi r th through



16

the t e n assembly d i s t r i c t s i n which l a r g e numbers of Jews

jj

1I

Jews p r e v a i l e d n o t only among t h e S P ' s i n n e r c i r c l e

. but among its l a r g e r c o n s t i t u e n c y . In 1900, f o r example,

J r e s i d e d - - t h ~ s e i n t h e working-c lass d i s t r i c t s o f t h e East

S i d e - - c o n t r i b u t e d f i f t y - e i g h t p e r c e n t of t h e s o c i a l i s t

vote; on a b a s i s of t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e s e

d i s t r i c t s r e l a t i v e t o t h e c i t y ' s p o p u l a t i o n as a Whole,

they should have provided only t w e n t y - e ig h t p e rc e n t of t h e

~ . t o t a l . l ? The s i t u a t i o n changed little with each s u c c e s

'sive e l e c t i o n . In 1902, t h e s e d i s t r i c t s a g a i n gave the;,. : . ~ ~ o c i a l i s t P a r t y f i f t y - e i g h t , p e r c e n t o f i t s v o t e , and i n 1904

~ ~ h e y _ f u r n i s h e d a f u l l t h r e e - f i f t h s o f t h e s o c i a l i s t s I t a l l y . 1 8

.The Jewish s o c i a l i s t v o t e only grew more marked i n l a t e r

Cahan 's f e e l i n g s . To a f a r g r e a t e r

Monday and Thursday!n22 Jewish

. . I s t h i s a p a r t y t h a t changes i t s pro-

w e r e , " p i t i f u l s o u l s , bought s o u l s b u t

wrote i n the Forward t h a t t h e Democratic and

immigrant Jews p u l l e d t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y l e v e r . 21

'., '

..

-

'; '

. ~ ~ . y . . ~ r y s o u l every

~ ~ c t i V i t y echoed

;:an.:other; New Yorkers, t h e Jews b e l i e v e d t h a t only

they find a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y worthy o f t h e

. .. ..

i.-ye.a.rs. In 1912, when only f o u r p e r c e n t o f t h e c i t y voted.. £ ~ ~ . "~ ~ ~ ~ d l a l i s t , l 9 t h i r t y - o n e p e r c e n t o f a l l Lower East Side r e s i

~ i ; : ' ," ' ~ ' _ t ' U ' "

- : ~ : ~ \ . : 9 a v e a t l e a s t one SP c a n d i d a t e t h e i r v o t e s . 20 By 1914,

llib.~ ~ ~ r London won h i s Congressional s e a t , f o r t y - n i n e p e r -·O'i,,,;,. '



The Jewish a t t rac t ion to the Socia l i s t Party stemmed

1f

J:

1

f i r s t from the horrendous 'condit ions under which these

17

immigrants l ived and worked. Like many other fore igners ,

'Jews arr ived a t Ell is Is land expecting to find " t h ~ promised

land." They found in ste ad th e Lower East Side, the most

f i l thy, congested, and unhealthy sect ion of New York City.

In th is area, which composed only one eighty-second of the

c i ty l s t o t a l acreage, l ived ,over one-tenth of New York's

in hab itan ts , o ften in tenements t ha t housed some th i r ty

f ~ ~ l i e s . 2 3 Street -c leaners rarely ventured into the neigh-

b Q ~ h o o d , leaving pavements hidden beneath mounds of t rash .. .

.J :: : · ' · r i ~ ~ ~ ~ : a · s e s talked everywhere, leaving one out of every seven-

of a l l Jewish immigrants had, some t ime

work was famil iar to these men and women; almost

in America before they held needle and thread in

the United S ta te s, p ar t ic ip ate d in the

garments. 25 Even Jews who had no such ex-

entered the clothing t rade . There, they

"h'.employers--members of an ea r l i e r immigrant. j

~ ~ h o , hejd the new Jewish throngs in great contempt

~ e r ~ ~ a n d the i r re l ig ious customs and needs. Even

' ~ s h ent ry into the garment t rades became a se l f

' ~ : ' phenomenon. Jews sought garment indust ry jobs

I ~ I ~ _ . _ •. - -- ._._

,'! : , : : ~ ~ : ~ n , : , residents in fec ted by tuberculos i s . 24..:7>..i;,·\'," -. -

r · , : , ' ~ ' : S \ , ~ : : , . ~ reatures of work l i fe combined with those of neigh-. "

: ~ ~ d , e x i s t e n c e to d is i l lu$ ion Jews about the New World.

: ~ ~ ~ . -~ g Jews did par t ic ipa te in other t rades , most spent.f.•i.. _,7



18

because they wished to work with other Jews, who provided

some point of reference in 'an unfamiliar world.

The Jewish immigrants had -I i t t l e t rouble f inding emp,loy-

. ment in New York's clothing indust ry , which was undergoing a

period of 'rapid expansion a t the same time tha t Jews were.. {

pouring into New York. In 1880, New York City claimed 1,081

~ l o t h i n g factor ies"empi6ying a to ta l of 65,000 men and women,

or close ' to th i r ty percent of the c i ty ' s indust r ia l work force. 26

'. ,',-

Thirty years la te r , sewing machines ran in 11,172 fac tor ies-

!t ~ ' ' ' ' ; ' ' ' ' ; ' ' ' i f . / ' ; ' ·.. :. : : 6 - i 7 ~ e r ten times the 1880' figure--and the number of workers in

.. , ~ , ~ ~ * ~ ~ ... . : ' : ' ~ ~ - .... " ; " ~ ; . ' " ,

,; ::..;#l.e· indus'try,had jumped to .214,428, almost half of New York's"'1·;' .

~ t £ Q ~ ~ ' ~ u f f i b e r · 6f manufac tur ing workers . 27 Even these s t a t i s t i c s

< ~ " ~ ~ . ; ~ ~ : t " ,; ~ u f i d e r e s t i m a t e the extent of New York's garment i n d u s t r y ~ of f i "{f-:=\'·

; ~ d a t a col lectors simply did not have the means to compute....:. ~

"a;t'-ely the number of men and women who to i led in back-~ ,

the i rown

homes.I t

i s safeto

say t ha t

decade of the, twentieth century, the sewing of

come to thoroughly dominate metropolitan manu-

~ ' : ' T h e clothing industry, furthermore, was s t i l l; ~ . : " , . - - ,

,<9'rapid growth in the ear ly 1900s. No matter hows ; . ~ ",

~ ~ r t i s a n s made.the long trek to Ell i s Is land each:..;..-;."\...

'Arment industry stood ready to absorb them.",.' 'II- :.. :\ ' -

~ l r n e n t in the needle t rades created the potent ia l. , : i . ~ " ~ ' . - .

soc ia l i s t movement. Within garment

..: : ~ ~ ~ ~ turn o f th e ce ntu ry , Jews to i led remarkably~ .. '.

?r.remarkably low wages. An average. working week



I,1

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1 19

' s t re tched from f i f t y - s ix to f if ty -n in e hours exc lus ive o f over

jtirne , but during the garment t r ad e s ' busy season , Jews in

, c lo th ing f ac to r i e s of ten worked as many as seventy hours per

week. 28 Despi te such a wearisome schedule , th e Jewish f ac tory

workers who comprised the bes t pa id sec to r o f the i ndus t ry ' s

,work force earned fa r below the minimal a nn ual b ud get t h a t

h d Judged necessary to su s t a in a New York faml'ly.29, . t h ~ .. :5 ta.te a,.

:::.Skill.ed male workers in the indus t ry I s s h ir tw a i st f ac to r ie s ,• l

f

, : for ' example, earned from f i f t een to twenty- th ree do l l a r s per'. .:.. ' ;. ,

" ._

a t Chatham Square ," u rg ed Ja co b Ri i s ,

complet ing pre -cu t garments fo r the cont rac to rs

"Take the Second Avenueh e in du stry .

Sweatshop condi t ions

Laborers to i l ed to the l im i t s of

· in·cramped, f i l t hy , unvent i l a ted rooms,

. and r i de up ha l f a m ile th rou gh the swea te r s ·~ · ~ s t i i c t . Every open window of the b ig t ene -

. : ~ p . . t s ... g1 ves you a gl impse o f one of these

naps as the t r a i n speeds by ...• The road i s

~ ' ~ e .. a. b ig gangway through an endles s workroom,e re v as t multi tu de s a re fo re ve r l abor ing .

" ' ~ . i n g , nC:>0n, or n igh t , it m ~ i e s no di f fe rence ;

' ~ ~ : : , s c e n e 1S always the same.

' ~ ) ' :

.. sweatshops· descended to miserab ly low l eve l s ......,,"1

~ ~ B ~ ~ a Y e d cont r ac tor s o f f aga in s t each o th er , g iv -

~ ~ ~ t h S to the ones who would stomach the lowes t~ · ~ - r · · · · : - ~,!!,' .'thlfse c on tra ct ors c u t t h e i r own cos t s by de-

an en t i r e fami ly 'o f t en

t ~ : ~ ~ } . : , ; " , Females had even more cause to compla in : In the same

: . ~ o r k p ~ a c e s ~ e v e n the most experienced women earned a weekly pay-~ ~ s ; i ~ " " , _'- .' .."".. " t ~ . ' . 30

. + & ~ ~ ~ ' o £ no more than nine do l l a r s .~ " , " j , " ' ~ t ' J 1 , .t. ( ~ ' i . ~ : , - . ; \ '.

'" '- · ; · ' · ~ ~ ' . O t h ' e r Jews labored no t in f ac to r i e s bu t in tenement homes.. , . ~ .. ,



"

20

'

which often lacked running water or t o il et f a ci li ti es .

Long hours, low wages and ~ b y s m a l condi t ions made the

'IJews a potent ia l soc ia l i s t , cons t i tuency, but not an actua'l one.

The Jews would not have par t ic ipa ted so ac tiv ely in the New

York City' Socia l i s t Party had they not also possessed a st rong

and coherent rad ica l t r ad i t i on . In the l a te nineteenth and

:ear ly twentieth centur ies , each successive wave of Jewish im

migrants to American shores contained a progress ively la rger

number of men and women who had taken par t in the East Euro-

'kers al ike . A large port ion of the movement,

ved to American so i l following a se r i e s of govern-; ' ~ ; . "~ ~ p o g r a m s , capped by th e Kishinev massac re of~ i 1 : . .~ : Y o r k . Bundists formed a subs tan t ia l minori ty of

~ ; l : ! . · : f '. .' ._ ' : ; ~ e w i s h populat ion. An even greater number. of-.: . ~ . . . '

, . ~ s ( , - · - a l t h o u g h not former members themselves, held.,::. - \,

,-': '?-high esteem. I t was these soc i a l i 5 t s , a f t e r: : i

i ~ ~ i a ' had organized Jewish unions and fought to,.::.......

":7: ' s t a t 33,,;.. us.

9h fUnctioned as both a pol i t i ca l party and a labort f·' .

~ ~ c t e d mass support in Russia from JeWish i n t e l l ec -~

m,. .oWever, received the i r t ra in ing in the Bund, a Jewish

' . ~ ~

~ t ' o r g a n i z a t i o n with i t s hear t in Russia ' s Pale. The

.:. , , ~ ; " : 6 ; ~ " ~ •' ; p ' e , a ) : t ~ ' . s o c l a l l s tmovement. In Poland, some of these had jo ined2 ; ) t f u · . ~ ~ .....

, ~ i . F £ ~ 2 ~ l a l i s t , Circle of Aaron Liberman I the so-cal led fa ther; ; . ; . r ~ l' ~ , . . ' ; ; " . . ; .'.' . J 5 ' . ~ s h ' socialism. In Russia, a v e ~ y few had enrol led in

-" . .. .

. ~ p l e r s Will , a t e r ro r i s t group t ha t could c la im r es po n" ~ J : ; " : -

"...' ~ y ~ ; f o r Czar Alexander 1 '5 assasinat ion. Most r ad ica l



21

of the New York City

New York's soc ia l i s t s tended to blame such

j

sweatshOPs turned almost ins t inct ively to socia l ism. Discon

f tented with the rea l i t i es of American l i f e - - with the sweat

shops and the tenements and th e en dles s exploi ta t ion - - the

Jews seized on t he i r East European heri tage for use in the

.: ,New World.. So strong did the soc ia l i s t -Jewish nexus become

, t h a t it even sucked in Jews who had had no previous contact,with radica 1 movements. ,On the s t reets 0 f the Lower Eas t Side,

~ radical pas t had combined with a poverty-s t r icken present to

create a powerful at t rac t ion to socialism and the New York SF.

Local New York fared less well among other ethnic groups.

: I ta l ians suffered much the same economic condit ions as did

,·Jews in the early years of the twen ti et h c en tu ry : They, too,

worked backbreaking hours, r ec ei ved s cant y wages and resided

in · miserable quarters . Yet the SF could not . in te res t I t a l i an

,workers -in party l i f e . In 1914 I Jul ius Gerber wro te tha t "of

·the- nat ional i t ies to be found in th i s c i ty , the I ta l ians are

i ' e la t ively and propor t ionate ly the weakest in organization."34

T W o ' : : y ~ a i s prior I an SP organizer had repor ted to h is branch, ,

. ~ ~ ~ ~ : t ~ e I t a l i ans of New York's West Side f e l t so great an i n ~ . , ~ :

_ . d : i ~ · ( g ¥ : k n c e · to socialism as' to make future par ty work in the"'!i. I' ". " '"· ~ , ~ ~ ~ ; a : 6 s u r d . 35

;,. .;: : ! ' \ . : i . : I . ~ : ~ . ~ ' .'.

.· ~ ~ ~ t · ~ t · _ : ~ : : m · -the I t a l ~ a n s I religi.ous a f f i l i a t i ons j in 1913 I £or

, ~ x ~ p : , l e I 'organizers" told the Local ' s Executive Committee tha t

\

· . I . t a l i : a r i ~ , -would not jo in the Socia l is t Party "owing to the

:) _s.trong <ant i -soc ia l i s t at t i tude of the Catholic clergy. , ~ 3 6More -:likely, however, I ta l ians did not par t ic ipate in par ty



22

l i f e because t h e i r Old World t r ad i t i on s and exper iences had not

. prepared them to do so . Unlike t h Jewish a r t i s an s , the

I t a l i an s carne to the U.S. from backward a gr ar ia n a re as . Thei r

educat ion was scanty, t h e i r organ iza t iona l exper ience l im i t ed ,

t h e i r soc i a l t r ad i t i on s l and- and v i l l age -o r i en t ed . These

: ,former peasants ' found s t ab i l i t y in t he , New World not through

po l i t i c a l organiza t ions or, t r ade unions or workmen's c i r c l e s

a l l of which seemed a l i en i n s t i t u t i on s - - bu t through family

and v i l l age t i e s . The Southern I t a l i a n s , then , were l ess than

. l ' 37l i k e ly S o c ~ a ~ s t s .

The I r i sh , t oo , genera l ly s tee red c l ea r of the New York

; .Soc i a l i s t par ty . According to one h i s t o r i an , the I r i s h formed

only one percent, of the New York par ty dur ing the years before

. 38World War I . This low l eve l of par t i c ipa t ion might a t f i r s t

. seem somewhat s ur pr is in g; in t ~ l870s and 1880s, a f t e r a l l ,

involvement in I r i sh na t i ona l i s t groups - - such as the I r i sh

: R e p ~ b l i c a n Brotherhood and the I r i sh Republican Army - - helped

" lead the I r i sh immigrants to form a fa i r ly mi l i t an t t r ade-un ion

'movement. But t h e I ~ i s h ' s r e l a t i ve accl imat ion to American

r , p o ~ i t i c a l and economic l i f e by the tu rn o f the cen tury pre -

; vented th i s l abor movement from tu rn ing to soc ia l i sm. Unlike

- ' , 9 t ~ e r ' immigrant groups , the I r i s h bel ieved themselves to be

: ~ e l ~ ~ r e p r e s e n t e d in munic ipa l ~ o l i t i c s ; t h e i r l i nk , a f t e r a l l ,

to Tammany had b e e n ~ l o n g es tab l i shed . In ad dit io n, th e I r i s h ,

by ..1900" had al ready moved sev'eral rungs up the economic, l ad

-der-. As t h e i r tenure in the United ~ t a t e s lengthened and

, t h e i r mater ia l s t a t u s improved, the I r i s h f e l t l e s s and l ess



23

i n c l i n e d t o i n v o l v e themselves i n r a d i c a l movements. They i n

~ t e a d r e l i e d upon a c t iv e n o n - s o c i a l is t t r a d e unions and Tam

many Hal l t o s a f e g u a r d t h e i r econom ic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s .39

Germans comprised a f a r l a r g e r p o r t i o n o f Local New

York 's t o t a l membership than t h e I t a l i a n s o r I r i s h d ~ d , but

the number o f German s o c i a l i s t s grew only s l i g h t l y between

: 1900 and 1914. This lack o f p ro g r e ss r e f l e c t e d i n p a r t t h e

p r e c i p i t o u s plunge i n German immigra t ion t h a t began around

1900. I t a l s o , however, mirrored t h e changing p o l i c i a l o r i e n -

' t a t i o n o f t h o s e 'Germans who came t o t h e United S t a t e s . In t h e

,1870s and 1880s, many German immigrants wer e committ ed s o c i a ~- l i s t s , who f l e d t h e i r homes a f t e r Bismarck d e c l a r e d t h e i r p a r t y

i l l e g a l . When t h e German government r e s t o r e d t h e SPD's l e g a l -

i t y i n 1890, h owever, t h i s f lood o f s o c i a l i s t immigration

- abrupt ly h a l t e d . German s o c i a l i s t s s t a y e d i n Germany, those

Germans who did come t o the United S t a t e s had little i n t e r e s tI

~ i n _ ~ r a d i c a l c a u s e s .

Despi te t h e i r lack o f success among t h e s e immigrant

~ r ~ u p s , however, t h e New York s o c i a l i s t s expressed g r e a t s a t i s

-- f a q t i o n with t h e i r p a r t y ' s development . The s o c i a l i s t s regarded

~ h . ~ ~ r f a i l u r e t o expand the S P ' s e t h n i c w o r k i n g - c l a s s base

:beyond t h e c i t y ' s Jewish p o p u l a t i o n as a minor problem, which

- ~ c i u i d i n t ime c o r r e c t i s e l f . In a mere f o u r t e e n y e a r s , t h e

s o c i a l i s t s b o a s t e d ~ t h e p a r t y ' s membership r o l l s had quin

\

tupled and the- p a r t y ' s vote - - aI-though still a t i n y percen:-

- . ta'ge of t h e t o t a I - - had i n c r e a s e d some two hundred p e r c e n t ..,

Most i m p o r t a n t , an SP l e a d e r 'had marched t r iumphant ly i n t o

..... /.

-



Workers responded ac t ive ly to

In the 1880s, l abo r organiza t ion in th e in du stry

24

~ t h e U. S ' ,Cap i t o l to t ake h is s e a t . New York 's SP l eader s

regular ly poin ted to such ' achievements in the pa r t y ' s pre s s ,

i t s wri t ten propaganda, i t s i n t e rna l r ecords . At th e same

t ime, they po in ted to the phenomenal growth of a ~ e of i n s t i

tu tio ns ou ts ide the par ty i t s e l f : the New York s o c i a l i s t

t rade unions.

Not su rp r i s ing ly , the soc i a l i s t t r ade-un ion movement

'was synonymous with the Jew ish o ne. Leaders of unions t h a t

were not predominant ly Jewish shared t h e i r members' d i s t a s t e

' for ' the Soc i a l i s t Par ty , and the po l i t i c a l sympathies of t h e i r

unions re f l ec ted t h i s f ac t . But among one s e t o f unions

. those in the garment t r ades ~ h Soc i a l i s t Par ty re igned '

o :supreme. During th e f i r s t two decades of th e twent ie th cen-

, tury, almost e igh ty p ercen t of the c i t y ' s garment workers were

"Jewish men and women, whose po l i t i c a l a t t i t udes ca r r i ed over

". . . ---;", . . 40

., / in 't 'o ' , their l abor organ lza t lons . The Jewish unions formed.- '...

;; .; .•-..r t..;;:-... ••

"" ::the.::::Qrganizational mainstay of New York City socia l i sm - -.: ," ...

'\.;" .• ~ " ( , ; t n . ' ~ { ' ; " ' e r e la rge j t hey were impor tan t ; and they were c lo se ly

. ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .'.; ~ < t i e d · · t o Local New York.

~ ~ ~ : : ~ : ~ ~ ~ : ~ , "' ' ' : ~ r ~ ' ' The garment unions I growth para l l e l ed in t ime the New:';;"6~ i { S p I S .

~ •• , ; A , , ~ ... ' Q ) '

;:. '",;,;, I j) ,

' ~ L , , ~ ~ Z e ' X i s t e d only spo rad i c a l l y .,. ;.. '" ... -..: I ~ ~ ~ { ~ explo i t a t ion dur ing these year s , but in spontaneous ' and

. ¢ •• ,

' .haphazard ways. WHen d i ssa t i s f ac t i on mounted, garment l abor

" ~ e ' r s ' - w o u l d form a union and c a l l a s t r i ke ; when the walkout

; \ e ~ d ~ d , the union would disband. Such pa t t e rn s oi i abor ac-

· : t ivi ty continued un t i l 1888, when New Yorkrs Jewish soc i a l i s t s

founded the U nited Hebrew Trades - - an organiza t ion which

'1



, 4 ' ' ;; :' .. :. -

' · r n V · · · ~ : · " .:

25

'set· ou t ' to bui ld the Jewish union movement from above. Even

'! :with the effo ' r t s o f t h i s organ iza t ion , the development of '

' ~ t a b l e unions in the f ragmented and seasona l garment i ndus t ry

, .

'i took t ime. In the f i r s t few years of the tw en tie th cen tu ry ,

j

.,

: h o ~ e v e r " the UHT f i na l ly m'an:aged to c rea t e permanent unions

in the c lo th ing t r ades , and by 1913 these unions could claim

' c o ~ s i d e r a b l e success . In March o f t h a t year , the garment in

' dus t ry ' s labor ' 'o r gan iz a ti on s b o as te d 200,000 members in New

'York, most of whom belonged to the In t e rna t iona l L adies G ar-

ment .Workers ' Union, the United Cloth , Hat and Capmakers

union of North 'America o r t he I n't er na ti on a l Fur Workers I

,union.41

The se 200 ,0 00 men and women r ep!esen ted almost two-

t h i rd s of the New York i ndus t ry ' s t o t a l number of employees ,

'making the garment workers , a lon g w ith the longshoremen, th e

" :most' heavi ly unionized sec tor of the city,l s la bo r fo rc e. 42

'During the next few year s , the prospe r i t y of the need le - t rades

.. ~ . i o n s only i nc reased fu r the r . In 1914, men' 5 garment workers

founded the Amalgamated Clothing Workers o f America, soon to"' ....... ,"

become one o f the nat ion ' s most i n f l uen t i a l l abor organ iza t ions .

,.''?-q. t-he same t ime, the th r ee olde r unions in the indus try en

~ 9 1 1 ~ d ever more members .and gained ever g re a te r s tr en g th .

,B y ,1916, the ILGWU alone had 80,000 workers in its ranks and

:,had become the t h i rd l a r g e s t u ~ i o n in the AFL.43

These e x c ep t i? n a ll y s tr on g unions m a i n t ~ i n e d c lose t i e s

; \

c - ~ the New York SP. The soc i a l i s t s had helped found th e

'y€wish t rade-union movement, .and they cont inued to play an im-

por tan t ro le in se t t i ng i t s d i r ec t i on . Meyer London, for ~ l e ,

., ,

1·



;J .. ,

t26

-acted as the garment unions' at torney from 1900 to 1913;

"Morris Hi l lgui t took over the job for the next two decades,.

th is c a p a c i ~ y , the two men not only represented the unions,In

-in the i r legal ba t t l e s but also formulated union demands,

,negotiated with manufacturers, and served as in t imate advis

ors to the unions' le ad -e rs . 'Accord ing to the of f i c i a l h i s -

tor ian of the ILGWU, Hi l lqu i t was "the sage behind the scenes"

of that union: "No amount of research can t race the ex ten t

;o f his influence on the In te rna t iona l .... He was as impo rtan t

" , . ,,44 'k ' h d 'as any f igure ~ ~ t d e s t ~ n 1 e s . L ~ e w ~ s e , tetra e unlon

, leaders, by vi r tue of the i r organized power base, a uto rn at ic al

.ly gained a ~ c e s s to the to p ec he lo n of Local New York 1 s hier

!archy. The le ad er sh ip o f the, par ty and of the garment unions

: i ~ t e r t w i n e d themselves so thoroughly tha t sometimes it was

:dif ' f icul t to t e l l which was which.

;- . . ~ ; "With a leadership so closely connected to tha t of Local

.., . ".

'Ne'w'''York and a rank and f i l e so enamored of the soc i a l i s t\ . P:.•

~ , . . , : . ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ 9 a u s e , the garment unions predic tably did a l l in the i r power' . " : ; ; " ~ !. '

- t b ~ a i d the SP. This meant, f i r s t of a l l , enuncia t ing clear ly

; . ..

< ~ n ; a - - , . o f t e n the unions ' approval o f soc i a l i s t goals and po l i -~

~ '.z... "H , "C l e s ~ The garment unions wrote clauses in to the i r cons t i tu -,~ ; , r ~ ~ ~ f ; ~ ~ ~ : : ~ ( : . . 45

: t ~ ? h S - a s s e r t i n g the primacy of class st ruggle . They. .. ,....

, ; ~ r g t i ~ d voci fe rously wi th in AFL conventions for a general

__ i ~ b ~ ~ endorsement ci f soc ia l i s t t ene ts . They regularly passed

: resolut ions laUdind the SP.46 Even more important , these

. : ~ _ a b o r organi'zations gave considerable f inancial aid' to Local

'"New York - - purchasing, for example I f i f ty percent ' 'o f the'

,',' -

j ~ . ·", ,0 •••



27

47s tock t h a t f inanced the New York Ca ll . F in a l ly , the Jew ish

t rade-union movement formed the core of the p a rty 's e le c to ra l

machine. anion members, , o ~ g a n . i z e o . in to spec i a l po l i t i c a l ac -

: t ion committees, s up plie d th e bulk o f the manpower needed to

' co l l ec t fu nd s, canvass po ten t i a l vote r s and watch the po l l s .

R:ecognizing such f inanc ia l and e l e c t o r a l a s s i s t ance , New

York Cal l ed i t o r Algernon Lee s i t ua t ed th e pa r ty ' s s t reng th-----

"in the mass of men and wO!Jlen o f the Amalgamated, th e ILGWU

and other l1..l1ions. ,,48 Expressing much th e same be l i e f , one

' s uccess fu l SF candidate - - h imse l f a former ILGWU o f f i c i a l

49remarked, "I cons ider myself a t a i lo r -made assemblyman.".

By d in t of t h e i r s tr en g th , tr ea su ry and numbers, the Jewish

t r ade unions were able to g i ~ e .New York ' s Soc i a l i s t Par ty an

extraordinary amount of suppor t .

The e x i s t e n ~ e of t h i s t r ade-un ion base fused with the... Ior. "J.

growth of the SF i t s e l f to g ive New York soc ia l i s t s an out

~ o o kon the fu ture as cheer fu l as

itwas d i s t o r t ed . Loca l, ' :; -

New York might have increased both its membership r o l l s and

: i ~ ~ : ' e l e c t o r a l t a l l i e s . It might have gained th e support of

..~ ~ n f l u e n t i a l and expanding Jewish t r ade union movement •. . . . . . . . . . . . , J •

. tii ' ~ i g h t have appeared a, .v ibran t and v i t a l - - i f still dec id -o .

t' ",'.•

;:__ ~ d ~ Y r n i n o r - - po l i t i c a l force . But b en ea th th e rosy p ic tu re

'6f , 'NeWYork SF growth lay a darker one of con f l i c t and d i s -

sens ion . When no t ,mounting Elec t ion Day r a l l i e s and May Day

,p . a r : ~ ¢ l . e . s , Local New 'York's membership spen t much of its t ime

e ~ r o i led in v ic ious and b i t t e r debate s over the:, very f unda-

.mentals of soc ia l i sm. I t was t h i s cons tan t sec ta r ian i sm,



f

'roore than a n y other f ac to r t h a t c a u s e d th e eventua l co l l apse

, : o f a ~ a r t y whose program a nd i d e o l o g y we re winning o v e r in -

," c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s of New Y o r k e r s . Th e so c i a l i s t s ' f a i l ~ r e to

m a i n t a i n t he i r momentum g r ew from the i r f a i lu r e ever to

a c h i e v e internal h a r m o n y .",

~ ,

28



.'

,.....CHAPTER I I

SHADES OF RED:'

DISSENSION WITHIN THE SP , 1 9 0 1 ~ l 9 1 4

The.radicals who founded loca l New York in 1901 were

acquainted w ith th e troublesome effec ts of sectarianism .

..~ ~ .

::eefore the turn of the century, almost a l l belonged to the

:;socia'list Labor Par ty, an organizat ion marked as mue;h by i t sJ,..,.

: { i ~ t e t n a l ' c o n f l i c t s as by i t s Marxian doctrines . Throughout". ' , '1 .

..... t ~ , ~ , : ' t b e SLPI S heyday in the 18905, members disputed every conceiv-

po l i t i c a l ac t iv i ty , t rade-union pol icy, propa-

educational work. Heated debates and occa-

arose ove r s eeming ly ins ignif icant i s sues .

invect ive and pol i t i ca l in t r igue dominated the most

party meetings. Secessions occurred a t a disquie t -

1ra t e .

within the SLP had the i r roo ts in the par ty ' s

or ienta t ion . The Germans, who const i tuted a

also held a v i r tua l monopoly

In 1885, the party ' s secretary

- ~ . . , . : . admitted, tlLet us not conceal the t ru th : The Socia l is t Labor\

..,Party i s only a German colony I an adjunct of the German

3speaking Social Democracy." The German socia l i s t s in the

United States , however, re ta ined a far greater al legiance to the

29



r

J

I

j!

Ii

." .

30

t ene t s of Karl Marx than did t he i r bre thren ac ross the seas .

Taking g rea t p r id e in t h e i r Marxist her i t age , th e German SLPers

regarded th em selv es as the sole p ro tec to r s o f r evo lu t ionary

socia l ism in America. Large ly b ec au se of t h i s , they refused

to share con t ro l over the SLP with othe rs and of ten did no t

even welcome non-Germans i n to the Par ty . In pa r t i c u l a r , the ' lead-

e rsh ip bel ieved t h a t the many Jews in the SLP were not proper ly

c o ~ ~ i t t e d to Marxian theory ; they could , t hen , only c orru pt th e

, . 4par ty 5 pur . l ty .

Members of the SLP who did not ha i l from Germany - -most of whom were Jews - - could hardly f ind haven in such a

par ty . These members f e l t s l igh ted by the SLP's l eade rsh ip ,

which did not hes i t a t e to show i t s d isd ain fo r the non-Germans

within the par ty by s imply ignor ing t h e i r ex i s t ence . The

Germans conducted a l l SLP meetings and recorded a l l SLP minutes

in t h e i r na t ive language; those who had no knowledge of German','

s imply could not par take ac t ive ly in par ty l i f e . In addi t ion ,

the German l eade rsh ip of ten went out of its way to heap abuse

on the Jewish elements of the par ty . Within the SLP, a ve r i -

ta ble c as te s t ruc tu re ex i s t ed - - a cas te s t ruc tu re which could

not but e xc ite r eb e ll i on on the pa r t of th e Jewish untouchables .

In addi t ion to th e s ec on d-c la ss t r ea tment accorded them,

another more sub stan tiv e fac to r prompted some of the SLP's

Jews to ch alle ng e th e pa r t y ' s l eade rsh ip . Whereas the Germans

ins i s ted on mainta ining a t a l l cos t s the pur i ty of Marxian p r in -

c ip l e s , many - - al though not a l l - - of the SLP's other members

.emphsized the need to "Americanize" the par ty in order to



!I.lI

c rea t e a mass soc i a l i s t movement.

31

The Jews, a f t e r a l l , genera l -

ly had fa r l e ss at tachment to the ten ets o f s c i en t i f i c socia l ism

than did those who came from M arx's fa the r l and . It was no t t h a t

Jewish soc i a l i s t s lacked f ami l i a r i t y with Marxian pr inc ip l e s ;

indeed , Russian Jews had provided George Plekhanov, the o r i g i -"

a lth ou gh , a ga in , by no means a l l of

Condi t ions in the uni ted Sta t e s did no t nece s s i -

Bund - - ac t ive ly worked to r id the Czar i s t reglire o f its v i ru l en t

t h e i r own, d i s t i n c t from t h a t formed by Plekhanov and h is fo l -

lowers . In stead o f merely conce rn ing t hemse lve s with th e goal

th e 18805. As t ime wore on, however, i nc reas ing numbers o f

these Russian Jews began to c rea t e a soc i a l i s t movement o f

na to r of Russian Marxism, with much of h is i n i t i a l suppor t in

to soc ia l i sm a somewhat improvisa t iona l s t y l e . In Russ ia ,"

ant i - semit ism and to promote a kind of non-Zion is t Jewish

, I ' 5nat.l.ona l.sm.

t ionarysoc ia l i sm served only to l im i t the pa r t y ' s growth .

t a t e such a f i gh t , but many Jewish immigrants cont inued to br ing

of unive rsa l soc ia l i sm, Russ ia ' s Jews - - as organ ized in the

"were but little in touch .with the American popula t ion , and

moved almost exc lus ive ly with in t h e i r own l imi ted c i rc l e . , , 6

they had adapted and modif ied Marxian socia l ism in order to

them - - bel ieved t h a t the Germans' r i g id adherence to r evo lu -

Hence, many of th e Jews

canons o f s c i en t i f i c socia l ism" and adapt Marxian ideas to meet

the pecu l i a r c on dit io ns o f American soc i e t y . ?

c rea te a mass movemen t; in the U.S. they wished to do th e same.

. Morris Hi l l qu i t , fo r example , c omp la in ed t h a t th e Germans

. 'He advocated t h a t the SLP abjure its "dogmatic adherence to a l l



I

I

I

f

. - - - - - - - - - - - -

32

This dif ference between the S L P ' ~ German and Jewish

bers manifes ted i t s e l f .most c l ea r l y in the deb ate over the

mem-

pa r t y ' s t rade-union po l i c i e s , a debate t h a t u lt im a te ly le d to

the formation of the S o cia li s t P a rt y 's New York branch. Re-

garding the l eader s of the American Federat ion of L ~ b o r as

"essen t i a l l y hi red men o f the c ap i t a l i s t c l a s s ,. B and the organ-

i za t ion i t s e l f as "a c ross between a windbag and a rope o f

s an d,, ,9 Dani el DeLeon and h is German suppor te r s proposed in

1896 the c rea t ion ofa

new and revo lu t iona ry l abor f ede ra t ion .

The Jewish soc i a l i s t leaders argued vehemently aga ins t t h i s

plan , as se r t i ng t h a t a dec la ra t i on of war upon the AFL "would

only serve to antagonize ex i s t ing t r ade u nio ns, w hile a c c o ~ p 1 i s h -ing little i t s e l f . "

IODeLeon, however, decided to brave i n t e r -

na l oppos i t ion ; a t i t s convent ion of 1896, the SLP founded the

Soc i a l i s t Trade and Labor Al l i ance .

The move led a lmo st immed ia te ly to a s p l i t with in par ty

In 1897, the New York SLP 's J ew ish branches qu i t the

" par ty , spewing abuse a t DeLeon and th e STlA.l1

Af te r a few weeks

: in po l i t i c a l l imbo - - Abraham Cahan, th e leader o f the r ebe l l i on ,

\ . ca l led it l ike b ei ng "wi th ou t a synagogu12

-- the Jews met in

~ ; . c o n v e n t i o n to decide upon a fu tu re course of ac t ion . Here I

. three Jewish soc i a l i s t s , who tw o months ea r l i e r ~ a organized

the f i r s t New York un i t o f ~ E u g e n e Debs' New Social Democratic

Party, urged Cahan 's group to jo in them. The former SLP members,

debate , agreed to give Debs' organiza t ion a t r y .

dec is ion , the f i r s t sec t ion of the New York Soc i a l i s t

was formed.



33

Three year s l a t e r , another l a rge ly Jewish group, dubbed

the "Kangaroo Fac t ion , " depar ted from the SLP fo r much the same

reasons as had th e C ah an ite s. This secess ion assumed a d i f f e r -

en t and more v io l en t form s ince th e Kangaroos, based in New

York and led by Morris Hi l l qu i t , had in tended no t to leave the

par ty but to cap tu r e it. Claiming th e sup po rt o f a major i ty

o f the SLP, the Kangaroos stormed the pa r t y ' s headquar t e r s on

Ju ly 10, 1899, only to be met in f u l l fo rce by the German member-

sh ip . One cont empo ra ry wro te of the i n c iden t t h a t fo l lowed ,

The de lega tes pummelled each o the r un t i l bloodwas seen flowin g from many wounds. Men weresprawl ing on the f l oo r , othe rs were f i gh t ing in

the co rne r s , upon the ta ble s, c ha ir s and upon

the p iano , Hugo Vogt having climbed upon the

l a t t e r , t e l l i n g and f a i r l y foaming from the

mouth ... 3

The ba t t l e fa i l ed to r eso lve the con f l i c t . Two Soc i a l i s t Labor

Pa r t i e s soon appeared , each w ith i t s own newspaper (both named

People) , i t s o t headquar te r s , i t s own Nat iona l Exe¢utive Com-

mit tee . The c ap i t a l i s t cour t s f i na l ly decided th e d is pu te ,

awarding both the name of the organiza t ion and the title of the

newspaper to the Germans. Hi l l qu i t ' s suppo r t e r s , l ike Cahan 's

ea r l i e r , found themse lves on the outs ide o f th e SLP.

In 1901, the Kangaroos and the Soc ia l Democratic Par ty

jo ined in a marr iage t h a t seemed to have been made in heaven.

Morris Hi l l gu i t wrote s o m ~ - years l a t e r ,-.

Dissensions and antag on ism , so cha ra c t e r i s t i c o f

the Soc i a l i s t movement in every count ry in t h e i r

format ive years , were the p r inc ip l e fea tu res of

th e American Soc i a l i s t organ i za t i ons un t i l the

middle o f 1901 when a l l organ iza t ions , with one

e xc ep tio n [ th e SLPJ .,. uni ted . 14



jI

l. t

I

34

At t h a t 'p oin t, H i llq ui t wrote, con f l i c t within the s o c i a l i s t

ranks disappeared fo rever , making way fo r u niv ers al harmony and

genera l b l i s s . Indeed, so it must have appeared to contempor

ary New York r e s iden t s , who watched the SP's growth with much

su rp r i s e and no t a little alarm. Never the less , sec tar ianism

and dis sens ion cont inued to wrack the c i t y ' s soc i a l i s t move-

ment. Hi l l qu i t and Cahan had l e f t the SLP because they d i s -

agreed with i t s s t r e s s on revo lu t iona ry soc ia l i sm. Some o f the

soc i a l i s t s who defected with these two men, however, d id so

not because they d isp ute d th e SLP's mi l i t an t po l i c i e s but be-

cause they could no longer t o l e r a t e i t s superc i l ious l eade r -

sh ip . These men and women remained f i rmly committed to Marxian

p r inc ip l e s desp i t e having dese r ted the SLP. Hence, the d i s

putes t h a t had previous ly tormented the Soc ia l i s t Labor Par ty

arose again in the new SP. Despi te i t s r e l a t i ve success , Local

New York spen t much of i t s t ime in the years b e f o r ~ ! W o r l d War I

engaged in v ic io us and ul t ima te ly se l f -des t ruc t i ve deba tes over

the re l a t ive m erits o f e vo lu tio nary and r evo lu t ionary soc ia l i sm.

The forces of e vo lu tio na ry o r "c on stru ctiv e" so cia lism

cont ro l l ed New York 1 s SP, as they did the na t iona l par ty . Led

. · " " ~ . b y Morris Hi l l gu i t - - "Soc ia l i sm ' s po l i t i c a l boss,,15 - - the evo

. ~ l u t ion i s t s emphasized the g radua l na ture o f the soc i a l i s t

po l i t i c a l program. Previous ly , these men had f e l t a l i ena t ed

by the harsh rhe to r ic and unabashed revolut ionisrn of Daniel

DeLeon; they were not about to rep ea t in t h e i r own par ty what

) they had so de tes ted in h i s . The Hi l lqu i t i an s thus made no

" p r e ~ e n s e o f inc luding abrupt s o c i a l change on t he i r po l i t i c a l



35

and p o l i t i c a l system - - they merely s t r i v e to

Right-thinking s o c i a l i s t s , H i l l q u i t said in a 1908

did not exp ect such a cataclysm, n e i t h e r did they de-

do not expect socialism to be ushered i n by one

sudden and great p o l i t i c a l cata cly sm , n or dothey expect it to be establ ished by a rabblemade desperate by misery and s t a r v a t i o n . 16

Socialism, Hi1lqui t claimed, was " p e r s i s t e n t l y f i l t e r

18the p re sent o rd er ;" as a r e s u l t of recen t government

became a twofold one. F i r s t , s o c i a l is ts had to con-

work for the enactment of fu r ther reforms: wages and

i t . S o c i a l i s t s , H i l l q u i t declared j u s t one month l a t e r

Americans alread y liv ed "at l e a s t in the o u t s k i r t s of

19' S o c i a l i s t s t a t e . ' " In these circumstances, the s o c i a l i s t

i t s power to s o c i a l i z e the econcmy i..mrediately; socialists could not

This perfect ion of American s o c i e t y , the construct ive

i a l i s t s bel ieved, would r e s u l t from a long s e r i e s of economic

~ process of "social iz ing" the United States had already

. p o l i t i c a l reforms, each of which would add a b i t of s o c i a l -'"to the nat ion. Indeed, the c o n s t r u c t a v i s t s maintained,

"

,r. .

b not seek to destroy modern c i v i l i z a t i o n or to abolish the, . :.>

;urs l e g i s l a t i o n , women's suff rage , workingmen's insurance .

. ~ : t h i s way, more s o c i a l i s t threads would be added to the

.. ,;.'

fabric of American l i f e . But the evolutionary s o c i a l i s t s of1;

York recognized t b a t no c a p i t a l i s t government would go so

as t o ' i n s t i t u t e t he coope ra ti ve commonwealth i t s e l f . The

_members.of the S o c i a l i s t Par ty, then, needed to gain e l e c t i v e

~ ~ f f i c e and, eventual ly , government c o n t r o l . The SP would nott



36

'e such ac t ion nwi thout caus ing grave i ndus t r i a l d i s loca t ion . ,,20

. the soc i a l i s t government would i n i t i a t e still fu r the r

each o f which would r ep re sen t another gradual

eed a lmost impercep t ib le - - s tep along the road to a com-"Lte1y soc i a l i s t order .

The cons t ruc t av i s t s ' re ad in es s to amend ~ a r x i s t theory

s i gn i f i c an t ways provoked th e wra th of a voca l and...owing' grOt.p wi th in Local New York. These men and women simply

( t i ~ .

accep t Hi l l qu i t I s of f - a s se r t ed be 1ie,f that"Marxism i s

, · no t a f i n a l revela t ion. , ,21 They regarded the evo lu t i on i s t

from Marx as one which th r ea tened to t ransform the

' ~ from a soc i a l i s t or<;Janization in to a reform par ty . Of t h i sr.

Ioup of l e f t -wing soc i a l i s t s , Louis Boudin was the most~

· t i cu l a t e . In a s t r i ng of b oo ks , p am ph le ts and a r t i c l e s ,

udin der ided those New York ' . ' r evis ionis ts" who expressed such", . .

of r ad i c a l change:

It

i sthe

im plica tion of the suddennesso f

thechange, and the v io l en t manner in which it wi l l

be brought about a s th e c ulm in atio n of a s t rugg le ,

t h a t arouses t h e i r oppos i t ion . The change cou ld ,

should and would come in a l l imaginable ways, bu t

none of them wi l l be sudden or v io l en t . For they

a re a l l vio len t ly opposed to vio lence . And no t

only phy si ca l v io le n ce , bu t any kind of vio lence

o r dis tu rbance . Therefo re , socia l ism wi l l come,

accord ing to t h e i r not ion , as a gradual en la rge

ment o r a gradua l diminut ion o f c ap ita lism , bu t

never as an overthrow, more or l e s s sudden, moreor le ss v io le nt , phys ica l , soc i a l or economic, as

Marx imagined it. 22

According to Boudin, pi s to ry d id move in such sudden · l eaps .

Socia l ism would come not as th e c ulmin at io n o f a ple thora of in -

s ign i f i can t changes but as the r e su l t of a swi f t and sudden

r evo lu t ion . Although t h i s reVOlution c ou ld in vo lv e vio lence ,



37

to bring ul t imate sa lvat ion

The t ac t ic s of men who s t ressed the .des i ra -

t ha t would follow an SP Elect ion Day tr iumph.

But nei ther should such reforms become the be-a l l

soc i a l i s t theory but also about the narrower ones

l e f t wing more often conceived of it as a peaceful

should not go ignored; they c ould provide needed ame.li-

of working-class suffer ing in the p er io d b ef or e the

Every so of ten , New York's evolut ionis t leaders nodded

than to 'work fo r reforms

of party l i f e , as the evolut ionis t s seemed to de

The SP's f i r s t prior i ty was to prepare' for revolut ion

than immediate re l i e f .

World War I , heated controversies arose again and again

the SF's e lec to ra l s t ra tegy, i t s trade-union pol icy , and

proper class base.

ose of soc ia l i s t s who favored sudden socia l transformation .

The theoret ica l debate over the p rope r c ou rs e of Ameri

socialism found i t s echo in a wide var ie ty of smaller in t ra-

i i t y of gradual change necessar i ly di f fe red sharply from

s t ra tegy; indeed, it was the l a t t e r kind of dispute

ich usually generated the most anger . Throughout the years be-

. -'w York's SP members, then, argued not only about the grandt'

however, the New York leadership tended to r e fe r not to the

heads in the di rec t ion of labor. On th es e o cc as io ns ,

{they ~ o u l d as se r t t ha t the SF should direct i t s propaganda ef -, . ~ l . . '_ - ,

. Y ~ f o r t s toward the c i t y ' s workers whose mater ia l i n t e res t s most~ - ~ ~ . , ; '-... 23_::coincided wi th the par ty ' s goa.ls. In making such s tatements ,



38

the be t t e r educated and

The unfo r tuna te ' s lum p ro l e t a r i an s ' whose ene rg i e s ,

hopes and ambi t ions have been crushed ou t by miseryand des t i t u t i on , can only r ~ r e l y be r e l i ed on to

r a l l y to the v i r i l e ba t t l e c ry o f soc ia l i sm. 24

Hi l l qu i t argued, the s o c i a l i s t s should propagandize

to a s o c i a l i s t pa r ty . Cap i t a l i sm , he be l ieved , ex -

Hi l l qu i t d id no t doubt t h a t non-workers cou ld be a t -

and a l i ena ted a l l c l a s se s o f soc i e t y , even the cap i t a l -

paid l abo re r s . Hil.1quit wro te in 1912:

working c l a s s but tp its e l i t e

The sa l a ry earner , who each day exper ienced a dec l ine in

Without such l e ade r sh ip , New York City soc ia l i sm

f . . 1 t 25orever rema2n a marg2na ,movemen .

i n t e l l e c t ua l , who\as o ften as no t belonged to the ranks o f

? ~ t t r a c t i n g no t even the l abo r e l i t e bu t th e c i t y ' s middle

ng machin i s t s , pr i n t e r s , and bu i l de r s bu t no t among the wai t e r s,I

. ~ ~ r m e n whom th e members of New York 's I.W.W. t r i ed to organize .

\

In p rac t i c e , Local New York was ac tua l l y most i n t e re s t ed

d p r of es si o na l c la s se s . Hi l lqu i t and h is s u pp o rt er s b e li ev e d

~ the SP despe r a t e ly needed members o f th e i n t e l l e c t u a l and

ofess iona l s t r a t a - - the so -ca l l ed "bra in-workers" - - in

r ty - - th e wr i t e r s , the speakers , th e organize r s - - d id and

•der to make po l i t i c a l headway. It was from t hese c l a s ses ,

e cons t ruc t i v i s t s argued, t h a t th e l eader sh ip of the Soc i a l i s t

i f approached co r r e c t l y , if shown t h a t soc ia l i sm was a t enab l e ,

pos i t i on ; the smal l manu fa c tu re r, who found it

_:increasingly d i f f i c u l to compete with th e na t ion I 5 t r u s t s ;"

unemployed; the c a p i t a l i s t who was "more the, s lave than th e

t ,,26' 1 Id,:.; -mas e r o f h is weal th - - a l l cou d and wou ' turn to the SP



39

27movement. And once the SP begain to a t t r a c t

types of men in l a r g e ' q u an t i t i e s , the pa r t y ' s success

be ensured.

" The New York l e ade r sh ip , then , made a l l poss ib le e f -

to conver t members of the middle c l a s ses to its ph i l -

Hi l l qu i t himsel f probably spen t more t ime deba t ing

,9011ege-, professors , re l ig ious l e ade r s , and profess iona l re

:former's in f ron t o f educated and p ro sp er ou s aud ie nc es than

'he did speaking to the c i t y l s workers .28

He c l ea r l y r e l i shed

- ~ s u c hac t i v i t y ; Hi l l qu i t en t i t l e d the ch apte r o f h is au to -

'b iography t h a t dea l t with h is work among the middle c l a s ses

"The Golden Age. II ,Furthermore , those i n t e l l e c t ua l s and pro-

• ~ e s s i o n a l s touched by these e f f o r t s did no t f ind themse lves

, unapprec ia ted . Such r e c ru i t s could be assu red of gain ing a l -

r" most immediately both l ea d er sh ip p o s it io n s and publ ic ro l e s .

The muckraker Char les Edward R ussell , fo r example, jo ined ,

the New York pa r ty in 1908 only to be named its cand ida te

for governor two year s l a te r . J . G. Phelps Stoke , a mil -

l i ona i re reformer and ph i l an th rop i s t , enro l l ed in the Local

in 1906 and a t once became one o f its de lega tes to the

Nat ional Execut ive Committee. The New York soc i a l i s t l eade rs

c l ea r ly placed a high premium on a t t r ac t i ng and r e t a in ing

middle - and eve i upper -c las s r e c ru i t s .

The l e f t wing of the New York SP, however, har sh ly\

c r i t i c i z ed the l eade r sh ip ' s cour t ing of non-work ing-class

elements . This f a c t i on , cons is t ing of both i n t e l l e c t ua l s

and la bo re rs , p ro te ste d the i n c re a s ing m idd le -c la ss



40

tenaencies of the Local and demanded t h a t th e SF be kept a

predominantly working-class party ' , The controversy raged

in 1908- when a group o f cloakmakers proposed the founding of

a spec ia l workers ' s chool , ~ n t i t l e d the P r o l e t a r ~ a n Socie ty .

The New York SP already maintained the Rand School fo r Soc ia l

science, which of fe red courses in soc ia l i sm, government,

;' econ om ics an d A merican h i s t o ry . This school , however, had

a t i t s head t he m i dd le -c la ss evo lu t i on i s t s who were 50

a n a ~ h e m a to the i n i t i a t o r s of the Pro le t a r i an Soc ie ty . The

soc ie ty , unl ike the Rand 'School , was to be "throughly p ro le -

< • • d . t . d 1 ,,29 It 1 t ktar1an 1n l tS l r ec ~ a an persanne . s p a n n e r s 00

as the ' school ' s motto the French s o c i a l i s t s logan , "Workers,

t r u s t your b ra in s " ; they m ight have added, "do not t r u s t

those of the i n t e l l e c t ua l s . " In a l e t t e r to the New York

: ~ Call - - pr in ted under the headline "Vive Ie Pro l e t a r i a t " - -one of the Pro le t a r i an Society p ro mo te rs a rg ue d t h a t "the

par ty s tandard bea re r s , sometimes misnamed ' l e ade r s ' , " ig

nored the SP's working-class mernbers.30

It had thus become

necessary to es t ab l i sh an organiza t ion

to c re ate in te rn al propaganda fo r th e prese rva

t ion o f the tr ue p rin ci pl es o f s oc ia lism , to

extend ed uca tio n, to fo s t e r sel f -development ,

and to encourage fac i l i t y o f e xp re ss io n on the

pa r t of the comrades o f the rank and f i l e . 31

The Pro le t a r i an Society seems never to have got ten o f f i -

,c ia l ly under way. ; Perhaps -the l eade rsh ip ensured the school- 's

s t i l l b i r t h by vic ious ly - atta ck in g " th e p r inc ip l e s of pro le -

t a r i a n - s u p ~ e m a c y , , 3 2 ; p e r ~ a p 5 the job o f o rg an iz in g a new 1n-

s t i t u t i on s imply proved too d i f f i c u l t or t ime-consuming.



41

the case , the very proposal of the Pro le t a r i an

.demonstra ted t h a t some degree of p a ss io n at e o ppo si

the l eadersh ip ' s middle -c lass o ri en ta ti on e x is te d

Moreover,- the Pro le t a r i an Society con t ro

.... versy .showed t h a t t h i s oppos i t ion came not only from l e f t : -

i n t e l l ec tua l s l ike Boudin. bu t from working-class mem-

of the New York SF. - Although the r evo lu t ionary

: s o c ia li st i n te ll ec tu a ls suppor ted the Pro le tar ian Soc ie ty ,

: they d id not or ig ina te the plan ; rank-and- f i l e members were

too .

The perceived middle -c las s tendency of the par ty l e ade r -

~ h i p was. only one of severa l i s sues thptprovoked d i s s en t dur -

ing the years before t h e .F i r s t World War. Equally impor tan t ,

the New York SF l eadersh ip ' s e l e c t o r a l s t r a t eg i e s met with

con si de rab le oppo s it ion from some o f the pa r ty ' s more r ad i -

ca l members. This i s not su rp r i s ing , fo r e lec t ion campaigns

brought ou t Local New York 's moderate charac te r more c l e a r l y

than did any other SP ac t i v i t y . In theory , New Yorkls SP

leaders regarded po l i t i c a l campaigns as the bes t poss ib le

oppor tun i t i e s to spread propaganda and e du ca te wo rk er s in

s o c i a l i s ~ doc t r ine . I n ' f a c t , the SP candidates only r a r e ly

mentioned soc i a l i s t t each ings , concent r a t ing i ns t ead on the

p r ac t i c a l reforms soc i a l i s t s would i n s t i t u t e i f placed in

power. Soc ia l i s t s ; running fo r o f f i ce spen t most of t h e i r\

campaigns at tacking slum hous ing, propos ing soc i a l welfare

m e a s u r e s ~ ' a n d ca l l i ng f ~ clean government . The Hil lqu i t i ans

es tab l i shed t h i s pa t t e rn as ea r ly as 1901, the year of



In addi t ion, the New York soc ia l i s t leaders saw no reason not

the erasure of , the tenement evi l or the improvement of the

to emphasize reforms: The cooperative commonwealth, af t e r

42

For t h i s i n i t i a l

Lest party members complain about t h i s ap- '

We fee l t ha t the voters have a r igh t to ask:"Just what would your party do, i f it were en

t rus ted with the government of th i s c i ty?" andtha t i f our platform does not offe r an i n t e l l i gible answer to th i s quest ion, it wil l not re ceive serious considerat ion from the people to

whom we appeal . 34

Local New York I s f i r s t municipa, l campaign.

elect ion / the SP .M:micipal, camrl.ttee, chaired by. Hillquit, prepared

campaign l i t e ra ture :

a l l , represented but t he culmina ti on of a long ser ies of

g radual re fo rm measure s. Thus, the Hil lqui t ians bel ieved,

program.

sanitary system formed important par t s of the soc i a l i s t

Local .New York's leadership did rrore, however, tha.'1 rrerely stress

reforms; it spec i f i ca l ly s l ighted socia l ism's ul t imate goal .

During.one of his many campaigns £or Congress, Hil lqui t · is-

sued a broadside tha t read in par t :

Even i f you \are not a soc ia l i s t , i f you aret i red of paYing 10 cents a loaf , vote fo r H il1q uit. . . Never mind, whether you accept a l l , h i s par ty ' s

program. I t i s the cos t of today ' s l iving and to morrow's th a t is . worrying you, and Hil lqui t of fers

the only r e l i e f . 35

parent.SP preoccupation w ith municipal reform i s sues , the

, committee also published an in ternal repor t explaining the

. t· •

~ ~ ~ . 1.,.;"..t • .:'.

".""- -t,

..~ ~ ; ~ . 'propaganda l ea f le t s ent! t led "The T ene men t Evi 1 ," "The

rf.:t:;-•.' ~ ~ " - " . ; ' . sanitary. System," "Vice," -" ,Munic ipal Government" and "Public,.~ ~ 1 ' 1 : " , ~" ' : . ' ~ . . 339-. ~ < franchises."

..



43

continued:

member at tacked the Local for dis t r ibut ing an ed i to r i a l

In 1914, -to use another example, a r a n k ~ a n d - f i l e

these campaign prac t ices .

I t was l i t t l e wonder tqa t even th e g en era lly staid National

I have long been of th e o pin ion tha t a knowledgeof Marx i s not required by your Executive Com-mit tee of campaign speakers, fo r i f it was,theawful exhibi t ion of ignorance made by some ofthem would not be of f ic ia l ly to lera ted ....

When the attempt tha t i s now being made "tomake the S.P. a movement of react ion . . . has beenput under foot by the r evo lu t ion i s t s , we wil l

no longer be cal led u p o n ~ as we now are , toapologize for s o c i a l i s r n . ~ 6

p r a ~ t i c e s , b u t individual l e t t e rs of complaint f i l l the

par ty ' s correspondence books. In 1911, for example, a par ty

member fumed tha t one. o f the sp eak ers a t a s o c i a l ~ s t c ~

Within the ~ i t y i t s e l f , many soc ia l i s t s level le4 acid

Executive Committee f e l t compelled to censure Hil lqui t for

contain no evidence of o rga nize d pro tes t against SP campaign

c r i t ~ c i s m a t Local New York's e lec to ra l ppl ic ies and charged

p a i g ~ ra l ly had proudly announced, " l know noth in g about

Marx and I don ' t give a damn for Marx." The l e t t e r -wr i te r

The complainant received for his ef fo r t s a note from the

~ b a t e d .

Local 's secre ta ry , explaining t ha t the Executive Committee

the leadership with rank opportunism. The Local ' s papers.

. In th i s same campaign, the New York soc ia l i s t s cons is tent ly

had tabled the missive "as they did n ot co ns id er it of. ' . 37

_suff ic ient importance." The e lec to ra l polic ies of the

- New. York SF continued unchanged; the grumblings continued un-

. st ressed Hil lqui t ' s bus.iness acumen and f inancia l sta.tus.



44

writ ten by William Randolph Hearst tha t supported Meyer London

for off ice . This member' wrote:

We t r ied to get votes for London by the· s i l l i e s t ,

the s tupides t arguments known. But worst of a l l ,see the f i r s t column of t ha t page tha t the S.P.saw f i t to send out . Vote ind epend en tly . F org etpar t ies , and vote fo r men only .... Is it fo r t h i sthat we have worked so long, have sacr i f iced somuch to bUild.up our party? So t ha t we may playthe game of the vi le and unclean Hears t , t ha t wemay urge the voters to vote for London· . . . . [because]even i f he i s a b i t r ad ica l , never mind, it won't·do any harm: 38

At the' same· time t ha t some SP members complained direct ly to

the lo ca l o rg an iz at io n, o th ers made t he i r views known through

organs of the party press . Boudin and Henry Slobodin,

another lef t -wing . in te l lec tual , wrote s ev era l a tt aok s on

Local New York's campaign pract ices , at tacks t ha t appeared

in both the New York Call and nat iona l ' soc ia l is t journa ls .39

Perhaps the Yiddish· humor weekly, Groiser Kundes, made the

basic point most sharply; it portrayed the Socia l i s t Party

as a corpse, s lain by i t s own "Bluff i t i s , " "Demagogitis, II ·

and "Tanunanyitis.n40

Although cr i t ic ism of the New York SP's e lec to ra l pol-

i c ies never assumed organized form, as did condemnation of

i t s middle -c la ss te nd en cie s, th e in tens i ty of the former was

equally great . On th i s i s ssue , too , a deep, perhaps unabridg-

a ble, divide seemed to separate the party ' s revolut ionary

soc ia l i s t s from i t s cons t ruc t iv i s t l eaders . The lef t -wingigroup claimed number of prominent in te l lec tuals in i t s

ranks - - Boudin and Slobodin are only two examples - - but it

also included rank-and-fi le party members. This ul t imate ly



45

le thal ·o:mbinat ion W;:lS ev iden t to an even gre<?ter exten t . in

the opposi t ion toward the l eade r sh ip ' s t r ade union po l i c i e s .

New York's l eader s of ten s ta te d th at t r ade unionism

could c o n t r i b u ~ t o the s o c i a l i s t cause . By developing

among workingmen a sense o f c l a s s consciousness - - a be l i e f

t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s necessar i ly con f l i c t ed with those o f

t h e i r employers .-- t r ade unions had the p ote nt ia l to turn

the po l i t i ca l l y . unaware in to committed soc i a l i s t s . Despi te

th i s a sse r t i on , however, the New York l eader s adamantly

re£used to involve themselves in the i n t e rna l workings of

t ra d e o rg a n iz a ti on s t h a t had ye t to proclaim t h e i r soc ia l i sm.

According to evolu t ionary . soc i a l i s t theory , the l ~ b o r move-

ment cons i s t ed of "two arms" - - the economic and the

po l i t i c a l . New York's SP sh ou ld c on ce rn i t s e l f exc lus ive ly

with the l a t t e r of these , 'which was, in any case , the more

impor tan t . The economic aspec t of the l abor movement r e -

mained s t r i c t l y o f f - l im i t s . As Hi l l gu i t sa id in a debate

with Big Bi l l Haywood:

I cons ide r it a grave mistake fo r our par ty or

par ty m e m b e r ~ as such to d i r e c t the i n t e rna l

a f f a i r s of the economic organ iza t ions of l abo r

from the outs ide .... As Soc ia l i s t s , we have no

reason or j u s t i f i c a t ion fo r tak ing s ides · in

purely i n t e rna l cont rovers i e s of the economic

organ iza t ions . 41

Hence, Hi l lqu i t sa id , New York's soc i a l i s t s should n ot ex press

p re fe re nc e fo r t h e ~ i ndus t r i a l over the c ra f t form of organ-\

i za t i on i they should not at tempt to breathe the spark of mi l i -

· tancy in to s ta id l abor l €adersh ips ; they should n ot found

or even suppor t d ual u nio ns. According to Local New York ' s



46

l eader sh ip , SP l abor ac t i v i t y should conf ine . i t s e l f to pe r -

s ua din g uni on members to 'vo te s o c i a l i s t and to providing

proper union s t rugg les with f inanc ia l . support . Otherwi se ,

as the o f f i c i a l organ of the New York SP ed i t o r i a l i zed ,

"the Soc i a l i s t Par ty i s not re spons ib le fo r what happens

wi th ' in the. unions . ,',42

This. view ran di rec t ly counter , to t h a t of t.he revo lu-

t ionary soc i a l i s t s w ith in the par ty . Louis Boudin be l ieved

t h a t t r ade unions represented " the most impor tant fac to r

from the Marxian po in t of view in the f i na l overthrow o f

. 1 . . ,,4 3 h . Id 1 b h h . f 1' c a p ~ t a ~ s r n . T ~ cou on y e t e case , ' owever , abor

. unions were mi l i t an t and o r g a n i z ~ d along i n d u s t r ~ a l li.l'1es. Con-

" s e rva t i ve c r a f t u ni on s co uld not develop t h uni ty and

c lass consciousness t h a t alone would lead workers to vote

the s 'oc ia l i s t t i cke t . They could not compel a r e s i s t a n t

c ap i t a l i s t c l a ss to accept an SP e lec to ra l vic to ry . Nor

could they prepare the workers fo r t he a dm i ni st ra ti on of in -

dustry in th e cooperat ive commonwealth. According to such

l e f t -wing l eade rs as Boudin and Slobodin , then , the so c i a l -

i s t s needed to do a l l in t h e i r power to s e t New York 's

unions on a mi l i t an t path . I f t h a t meant i n t e r f e r i ng with

some othe r "arm, 11 so be i t .

This oppos i t ion view commanded the suppor t of a t l e a s t

some of the pa r ty ' s rank and f i l e . In 1913, discontented\

SP members formed the Indus t r ia l Soc i a l i s t Propaganda

League, an organiza t ion based in Branch 3 o f the Local . Six

' league members explained in a l e t t e r to Local New Yorkts

sec re ta ry t h a t they had foun ded the new organiza t ion because



47

th e Par ty as a w h o l ~ r epud ia t e s the r e a l i t i e s . o fth e c l a s s s t r ugg l e [and] i s a f ra id o f he lp ing

.develop r e a l economic , i n i t i a t i ve and c l a s s organ

i z a t i on o f Amer ica ' s wage workers a t the po i n t of

produc t ion on the bas i s o f r e a l , mi l i t an t and

d i r e c t e f f e c t i ve combat ..•44

The League hoped to coun te r ac t such conserva t ism and le ad th e

par ty i n to the arena o f ac t i ve i n du s t r i a l s t rugg l e .

The l eader s of th e par ty expressed a cu r ious ly detached

concern over the es t ab l i shmen t o f th e League. f f i l l qu i t and

' h i s fe l low evo iu t l on i s t s d id no t become t ru ly alarmed un t i l

~ r a n c h 3 i nv i t ed Danie l DeLeon to give a speech on th e

meri t' s o f i n du s t r i a l unionism. DeLeon I s views on the p roper

t rade ' union po licy o f a s o c i a l i s t par ty accorded in many r e -

spec t s w ith tho se of the SF l e f t -wing d iS sen t e r s . Although

the revo lu t iona r i e s w ith in the New York SP placed l e s s em-

phas i s than DeLeon d id on th e importance of d ~ a l unionism,

th ey sh ared with him a bas ic be l i e f t h a t soc i a l i s t s should

cons t an t l y encou ra ge unio n mi l i t ancy and r ad i ca l i sm . To

the SP l eader sh ip , however , DeLeon's t r ade union po l i c i e s

were anathema; indeed , t hese po l i c i e s had l a rge ly caused th e

dese r t ion o f Hi l l qu i t and Cahan from the SLP. Accord ingly ,

Local, New York ' 5 Cen t r a l Committee d i sso lved Branch 3 and

ca l l e d ' o f f the DeLeon l e c t u r e . The immediate problem had

been so lved .

The l a rge r d i f f i c u l t y , how ever, had ye t to be ove r -

come. Algernon Lee, the ed i t o r o f th e New York Ca l l , wrote

'to Hi l l qu i t shor t ly before th e Branch 3 a f f a i r , "We s h a l l

have our hands fu l l , dur ing th e coming months , to p reven t



49

Local New York from f a l l i ~ g i n t o t h e hands o f queer e l e m e n t s . ,,45

B ~ n e i t h e r a few months nor a few b u r e au c r a t ic r e s h t if f li n g s

could re'move t h e "queer e lements" from t h e New York Party ' .

Alongs ide New York 's p r a c t i c a l e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l i s t s , an.

a c t i v e l e f t wing had de-ve1Dped -- a l e f t wing o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s

and workers who were i r k e d by t h e H i l l q u i t i a n s ' r e s p e c t a -

b i l i t y and committed t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y

change. These voca l and h i g h l y p e r s i s t e n t l e f t - w i n g e r s

p r e s e n t e d a s t r o n g c h a l l e n g e t o t h e L o c a l ' s moderate ' l e a d e r

s h i p t h r o u g h o u t t h e years b e f o r e World War I . In doing s o ,

, fur thermore, they were not a l o n e . At t h e same t ime t h a t

r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l i s t s were making t h e i r presence f e l t

w i t h i n t h e p a r t y , numerous Jewish garment workers were do-

ing much t h e same w it h i n t h e s o c i a l i s t t r a d e unions . These

workers ' o p p o s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s t l e a d e r s h i p was no l e s s

h e a r t f e l t , no l e s s r e a l , and no l e s s p o t e n t than t h a t o f

t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s themse lves .



CHAPTER I I I

THE PROTOCOL OF PEACE?:DISSENSION WITHIN THE ILGWU, 1909-1916

On the evening of November 22, 1909, thousands of

shir twaist workers streamed into the Lower East Side 's

Cooper Uni9n .to at tend a meeting of the ILGWU. For the

pa'st several months, these shi r twais t workers--about

s e v ~ n t y - f i v e percent of whom were young women--had grown

increasingly dissa t i s f ied with t he i r working condi t ions.1

Long hours, low wages and sexual exploi ta t ion had prompted

several shop s t r ikes ; these stoppages had, in turn, only

heightened the wais t makers' rebe l l ious mood. The workers

had come to the meeting to hear SP and ILGWU of f ic ia l s

discuss the bes t means of remedying the indus t ry ' s working

i l l s . The l eadership ' s proposals , however, seemed hardly

adequate. Meyer London and others spoke words not of

militancy but of moderation; ra ther than ca l l ing the workers

to act ion, t he y counsell ed pa t i ence . "For two hours ," one

worker l a t e r wrote, "at tent ive audiences were cautioned to

use due de l ibe rad ..on, to be sober in the i r decision. ,,2\

Suddenly, a teenage shir twais t maker named Clara Lemlich

burst forward from the audience to del iver a fervent Yiddish

50



51

plea for an industry-wide walkout:

rOam a working g i r l . • . [andJ I am t ~ r e d of l i s ten ingto speakers who talk in gener al te rms. What we arehere for i s to decide whether we shal l or shal l not

s t r ike . I offer resolut ion tha t a general s t r ikebe declared--now!

The audience respondeq with thunderous cheers and

overwhelming assent . Two days l a t e r , 15,000 waistmakers-

long thought, by vir tue of the i r sex, to be the most

unorganizable of a l l garment l abore rs --walked out of t he i r

workplaces and into soc ia l i s t meeting ha l l s .

Quite apar t from d rama tic s, th e Lemlichi n c ~ d e n t

perfect ly i l lus t ra ted the widely varying at t i tudes which

the leadership and the rank and f i l e brought to union work

in the garment indust ry . Notwithstanding the i r impeccable

'Socialist Party credent ia l s J the garment unions l off i c i a l s

always d isp layed cau tion and moderation in t he i r t rade

pol ic ies . They disclaimed the s t r ike , strove fo r indust r ia l

harmony, and accepted-- indeed encouraged--the mediation of

trade disputes by the non-soc ia l i s t s ta te . In short , the

garment· union le ad er sh ip o f New York City urged accomodation

, ra ther than mil i tancy. Like Lemlich, however J the workers

themselves often expressed great impatience with the i r

leaders ' po l i c i es . Schooled in soc ia l i s t thought by the

Russian: Bund, re- radical ized by the conait ions of the garment

industry, a s igni f icant proportion of the rank and f i le\

charged i t s leaders with c o l 1 a b o r a t i o n i ~ s m and advocated

g rea te r m i li tan cy in trade-union act ivi ty , Although this-



52

leadership-membership c o n f l i c t appeared i n each of the

three S o c i a l i s t - c o n t r o l l e d garment i n d u s t r y unions a f t e r

1909, it unfolded with p a r t i c u l a r force ~ t h e l a r g e s t and

most powerful of these-- the ILGWU.

The intra-ILGWU controversy began with the s h i r t w a i s t

makers.' s t r i k e , but it did not become t r u l y b i t t e r u n t i l .the

next year , when t h e u n i o n ' s leadership signed t h e Protocol

of .Feace.4'Th is agreement , which e s t a b l i s h e d an i n t r i c a t e

system of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n the indust ry , arose o u t

' o f a cloakmakers· s t r i k e and soon spread to t he need le -t ra des "

other branches. During the n e g o t i a t i o n ~ for the Protocol--

negotiat ions conducted with the aid of several prominent

l i b e r a l Jews, including Louis B r a n d e i s - ~ I L G W U attorney Meyer

London c l e a r l y expressed the s o c i a l i s t l e a d e r s h i p ' s point

of view:

We do not come to cont rol your business; we, do notcome to control your t r a d e . I , personal ly , wouldhave l iked to see a s t a t e of a f f a i r s where mankind

should control everything i n a cooperative e f f o r tbut I r e al i z e i n the year 1910 and in t h e c l o a k

t rade it i s hardly p oss ib le o f r e a l i z a t i o n , SandI have advised my c l i e n t s . . • [of] t h a t view.

Accordingly, the s o c i a l i s t s s e t t l e d for something

less than the cooperative commonwealth. I t · i s t rue t h a t

t he ' P rotoco l granted the union several of i t s important

demands. Most c r i t i c a l l y , . the employers belonging t o the

i n d u s t r y ' s Protectfve Association agreed to recognize the',

ILGWU as the legal bargaining agent o f . t ~ e women's clothing

workers . These manufacturers also i n c r e a $ e d the s t r i k i n g



53

workers I wages and shortened t he i r work week. In re turn ,

however, the soc i a l i s t leadership surrendered much t ha t

mil i tant t rade unioni s t s considered essen t i a l . The union,

for ins tance , agreed to forego i t s demand fo r a closed

shop, accepting instead t he B randei s- in sp ir ed "prefe rent ia l

shop, n by". which employers agreed to "give the preference to

~ ~ i o n men, ~ h e r e the union men are equal in e ff ic ie nc y to. .. 6

any non-union appl icants ." Far more crucia l than even th i s

concession, th e ILGWU surrendered the weapon t ha t unioni s t s

generally considered the most powerful in the i r arsenal ;

the r ight to s t r i ke . Of course, the sig ners o f the Protocol

real ized t ha t indus t r i a l disputes would inevi tably ar i se and

tha t they would have to be se t t led in some manner. The

Protocol thus establ ished a Board of Arbitra t ion and a

Committee of Grievances, on both of which an "impart ia l"

public representat ive was to hold the swing vote . These

bodies were alone responsible for e nfo rc ing th e P ro to co l and

. mediating conf l i c t within the industry. The soc i a l i s t

leadership had subst i tuted public arb i t ra t ion for worker

rebel l ion as the primary means of effect ing short-term

indus t r ia l change.

In essence, the Protocol of Peace, far from a soc ia l i s t

document, was an e ~ c e e d i n g l y l i be ra l one, bent upon establ ishing

a plural is t ic .systkm of indus t r ia l governmen t and an equil ibrium

of class i n t e re s t s . The Protocol assumed t ha t indus t r i a l

disputes resul ted from ignorance and misunderstanding ra ther



54

than from inevi table class antagonisms. I f well - in ten-

t ioned employers and employees could.meet within an

ins t i tu t ional framework, the Protocol posi ted, they would

be able both to maintain indust r ia l harmony and to promote

business p ro sp erity . T rad it io nal enemies would become

partners , and everyone would benef i t .

The notion appealed to reformers of the day. Jewish

soc ia l i s t Melech Epstein l a t e r wrote;

: The ILGWU had acquired a prest ige u n k n o ~ to the'o ther unions. Protocol was on everybody's l ips . • .The ILGWU was heralded as a t r a i l -b laze r of a new

p rin cip le i n labor-management r e l a t i o n s v i t a ~ tothe ent ire country.7

As Melvin Dubofsky has careful ly shown, the u nio n's

signing o f th e P ro to co l met with much approval from N e York's

m i d d l e ~ c l a s s l ibe ra l s . The workers themselves, however,

expressed l i t t l e admiration for. th i s p r e c e d e n t ~ s e t t i n qexperiment in indust r ia l government. Rank-and-fi le members

needed no profound knowledge of Marx to recognize tha t the

Protocol ran di rec t ly counter to both t he i r own immediate

in teres ts and the underlying soc ia l i s t p rin cip le o f class

s t ruggle . To many workers, indust r ia l peace did not seem

a f it ' s o ci al is t end; nor did a partnership with the employing

class seem a fit soc ia l i s t means. As Meyer London's of f ic ia l

biographer writes:

Workers schooled in the agitat ion of twenty yearscould not but revol t at [ the Protocol 's] innovat ions.These men had been taught never to t ru s t the good

i n t e ~ t i o n s of the employer; n ~ ~ e r ~ bel ieve ' ,his . Bp r o m ~ s e s , never to take stock In h1S code of 'e th1cs.



55

In fac t , the Protocol would probably not have been signed

at al l-had no t a State Supreme Court Just ice issued a per-

manent injunction against the union's pickets . In these

s t ra i tened circumstances, th e le ad ersh ip g lo ssed over the

Protocol 's no-s t r ike provision, and t h rank and f i le

9accepted the agreement.

The launching of the Protocol, however, only made

more apparent the sp l i t between the mil i t an t elements .o f the

rank and f i le and the concil ia tory union leadership. Within

months, garment workers began to f ee l c on st ric te d by the

Protocol; soon af te r , they s tar ted openly to f lout i t s

proyis ions . These violat ions were necessary, rank and f i l e

members argued, because garment industry employers consistent ly

contravened both the l e t t e r and the sp i r i t of the agreement.

According to many of these workers, the manufacturers di rec t ly

violated the cont rac t ' s terms by i l l ega l iy discharging em-

ployees, refusing to pay for overtime and re l ig ious holidays,

arid l ev el li ng r e ta li at o ry measures against act ive shop chair -

men., In addit ion, the workers claimed the i r bosses evaded

the, 'Protocol by sending increasing amounts of the i r work

out of town, where the agreement was not in e f fec t .)

The union leadership admitted sueh transgressions

occurred, but counselled the aggrievted workers to do no

more than take the t r complaints to the Protocol 's adjudi\

eat ing boards. These boards, however, s imply cou ld not

handle, the, deluge of grievances b rought 'against the industry's"



56

manufacturers. Unfinished business chronical ly jammed the

committeels dockets; decisions were months in corning. ' I n -

d us tr ia l ju st ic e seemed unobtainable by peaceful methods,

and workers increasingly d efied th e Protocol--and the

soc i a l i s t leaders who had forged i t - -by turning to the

s t r ike . In 1911, lad ies ' garment workers par t ic ipated in

70 unauthorized s t r ikes ; the next year , th e number rose to

1 6 0 . ~ O The leadership responded to these spontaneous work

stoppages not by reevaluat ing t he i r commitment to the 1910

agreement butby

disc ipl ining the workers responsibie .In a t l eas t one instance, the ' leadership i t s ~ l f used scabs

b k h 'k 11to rea a s op s t r ~ e .

Such act ions could not help but arouse the wrath of

the garment workers. New York's cloakrnakers, in par t icu la r ,

at tacked the leaders of the In ternat ional and the Sp ' for

col laborat ionis t pol ic ies . The Naye Post , a cloakmakers'

weekly, proclaimed in 1912: "A union which obtains the

support of the manufacturers ' associa t ion has no moral r igh t

to eXist. , ,12 Later tha t year, the same pub li ca ti on desc ri bed

the ~ n i o n l s leaders as "react ionaries" and " t ra i tors" who

had made themselves--and the workers with them--"slaves to

the Protocol . "13 The leadership did not allow such remarks

-to- go unanswered. John Dyche, Pres iden t of the ILGWU,

accused h is c r i t i ~ s of "ignorance and dqgmatism plus demagogy. ,,14

He ~ h e n hastened' to assure the m a n u f a c t ~ r e r s l Protect ive

Associat ion tha t the diss ident workers'Hdo not in the l eas t



57

express the opinions of the r es pons ib le l eade rs in our

organizat ion, but ra ther voice the sentiments of i r respon

sible and i r reconcilable eJ,ements . . . ,,15 The m a n u f ~ c t u r e r sprobably did not need to be so advised. As early as 1911,

protect ive Association attorney Jul ius Cohen observed' tha t two

d l ff e ren t po li ci es were struggling agains t each other within

-the union: "fOlne i s the policy of, construct ive statesmanship,

and the other is ' th e p olicy o f c on sta nt and continuous war-

fare with the manufac turers because of ' the 'war between the

classes .I

"I6 Cohen also recognized on which side of t h j s

bat t le the SP/union leadership was f ight ing. In 1912 he wrote

to ' Hi l lqu i t : "The Soc i a l i s t i c view, as def ined by ~ · l ike

you ," i s not incons is ten t with the v i e w ~ of t rue effi ,ciency • . .

[I)n working to develop the Protocol , you and I occupy common

17ground. "

This ground, however, became increas ingly shaky over

the course o f the next year. Prior to 1913, opposition

to the Protocol , although s t rong , had no organ iza t iona l

base. In tha t year, however, the s i tua t ion changed,dramati-

' cal ly . ' In January, Dr. Isaac H o u r w i c ~ , an economist deeply

o p p o ~ e d to th e Protocol, became Chief Clerk of ,the Join t

Board of Cloakmakers of New Y o r ~ , a body tha t represented

over 50,000 workers, more than half Qf the u n i o n ~ s t o t a l>

membership. H o u ~ w i c h soon convinced a majority of the

Joi 'n t Board to challenge the aut ,har i ty of the union I

l eader sh ip to administer th e P ro to co l· in the clQakmaking



58

industry. I f the cloakmakers themselves could gain the

; r ight to administer the agreement, Hourwich reas on ed , they

in agreements with th e b oss es," Hourwich had trumpeted.

'''Are we going to put an end to the protocol?, ,18 The workers

answered with a resounding ' yes ' . In a referendum, ' they

overruled--by a vote of 6,553 to 1,94B--the Jo in t Board's

dismissal of Dr. Hourwich. I f tha t vote had not made t he i r

"Revolutionary Socia l i s t s • . . do not believeated agreement.

would also gain the r ight to viola te it. Not surpr i s ingly ,

the union's leaders did not take kindly to Hourwich's power

bid, and they se t out to remove 'him from the ILGWU's ranks.

,; Meyer London successful ly recaptured a majority of' the Joint '

Soard, ' and th i s body p r ~ c e e d e d to ,demand Hourwich's ' res ig

nat ion. Yet both London and the Join t Board had underestimated

the,depth of the cloakmakers ' support fo r the i r Chief 'Clerk .

These workers had come to see Hourwich as the i r champion in

, the ant i -Protocol ba t t l e , as t he i r bes t hope to d estro y th e

sentiments c lea r enough t the cloakmakers organized mass

meetings, marched in s t ree t demonstrat ions, and, as a l a s t

s tep, ent i re ly ransacked the union's 'headquarters . 19

, Some rank-and-f i le members, of cou rs e, suppor ted the

l e a d e ~ s h i p . This was par t icu lar ly t rue of the cu t t e rs , the'

most highly sk i l led and conservative 'of the union 's workers.

But the cu t t e r s fotmed a d i s t inc t minority of the- ILGWU1s

,.-membership: they tended, ' too, to be the object of ' the

, rna ja r i ty f S scorn no less than of ' i t s envy. The ' l eadership 's



"

. ~ ' .

' i :.' , ,

59

more potent ~ l l i e s lay among the employers. As Hourwich gained

ever- increas ing power in' New York, alarmed manufacturers

threatened ani n d u s t r y - w ~ d e

lockout . Notwithstanding the

continued support of the cloakmakers, Hourwich wavered in the, .

face of t h i s t h rea t . Believing t ha t the cloakmakers could

,not successful ly brave a lockout, the Doctor acceded in

J a ~ u a r y 1914 to a second Jo in t ~ o a r d request for h is res ignat ion .

~ H o u r w i c h ' s departure, 'however, fa i led to quel l the controversy

within the union 's ranks. Locals 1, 9, and 11 reca l led those

of the i r delegates who had voted to accept Hourwich1s res ig-

nat ion, and New York representat ives to the ILGWU convention

of June 1914 attacked in scathing terms the union1s leadership .

Ihdeed, these representat ives voted overwhelmingly in favor

of .a resolut ion--only narrowly defeated by the nat ional

convention--repudiating the Protocol as a hindrance to "the

his tor ic mission of the working c lass te do away with capitalism., ,20

The cloakmakers had los t the i r l ead ing c rusade r. They had

l o s t the i r only powerful representat ive in th e u nio n's of f i c i a l -

dam. But they had not los t the i r inc l ina t ion to pro tes t

vociferously the SP and ILGWU l eadership 's moderate approach

to t rade union work.

In the spring of 19l5--af te r approximately a year of

re la t ive q u i e t - - t h ~ conf l ic t between the un ion 's l eader sh ip

·and i t s rank and f f le f lared up once more. The new round

Of squabbling, which was not to ·end unt i l the e n t r a n c ~ of

the U.S. in to World War I , resul ted from the announcement



r60

of the Protective Associat ion tha t the employers intended

to abroga te t he Protocol and sever a l l re la t ions with the

union. The ILGWU's leadership, horri f ied by th i s possibi

l i t y , t r ied desperately to salvage the agreement. Backed

by the New York City public , the union persuaded 'the g'arment

itidustry employers to part icipate in a special Council of

Conciliation tha t it had previously convinced Mayor John

Mitchel to sponsor. This committee, composed of 'six

prominent New Yorkers including Louis Brandeis, was to hear

eac'h side I s posi t ion and then negotiate a settlement. From

the very beginning of the hear ings, th e u nio n's lead ersh ip

made'clear i t s propi t ia tory at t i tude . In an opening s ta te -

ment to the Council, ~ i o n at torney Hil lqui t declared:

We have heard no end of reproaches about radicalsbeing in control of the union and carrying qn theProtocol as a contention of the i r theory of theclass struggle. I beg to say tha t when it comes

down to a quest ion of class struggle and radicalismor concil ia tory sp i r i t , th e reco rd speaks for i t se l f .I f the p re se nt ad min istra tio n o f the union has stood;o r c lass struggle . . • we would not be here before yoygentlemen. I t was we who maintained the protocol . 2

Hil lqui t went on to disavow the str ike as a labor weapon

and to argue tha t the Protocol r ep re sent ed t he only means

of maintaining indus tr ia l peace. "Nothing should be easier ,"

,he concluded, "for the men and the employers in th i s industry

than to arr ive a t a understanding which wil l produce bene-

\ 22f icent resul ts for each."

Hillquit1s rhetoric could not 'have had a fess appre-

ciat ive aud ience than New York's garment workers. Aside



61

'from 'protes t ing once again the Protocol i t se l f , many workers

' scathingly attacked the l e a d e r ~ h i p for accepting--indeed,

sol ic i t ing-- the ,a id of capi ta l i s t government. Did not the

leadership rea l ize , these mil i tan t social i s t s d e m a n d ~ d , tha tthe in te res t s of such a government confl icted d i r e c t ~ y with

the workers I own? As Hourwic,h wrote on JUly 15:

So. sophist icated . . . seems to be the fai th of theSocia l i s t leaders of the Union in ' social jus t i ce 'that they would readily accept 'any other person ofrecognized standing in the community" as arbi t ra torincluding Mayor Mitchel, who has ~ x h i b i t e d his

capi ta l i s t i c bias against labor.... 23

Rank 'and f i le protest , however, again fai led to net any

resul ts . The un ion 's l eade rship continued to plead i t s case,

and the co uncil proceeded to negotia te a sett lement tha t kept

the heart of the Protocol in tact .

Only a year la te r , however, the garment. workers would

f inal ly dance in the Lower East Side 's s t ree ts . In the

'spring of 1916 1 the Protective Association unexpectedly

locked out 25,000 cloakmakers; the union responded with a

general s t r ike involving over 60,000 workers. Hil lqui t and

the res t of the leadership would have l iked t o n egot ia te a

r ev is ed ver sion of the Protocol, but thi's time they bent to

the wil l of the rank and f i1e .24

They so acted part ly because

t he manu facturer s themselves cherished an animus against the

agreement, an animus tha t could only have been overcome through\

the union's granting of substant ial concessions. Furthermore,

the rank-and-f i le members of the union were growing even



62

more res t ive than they had shown themselves to be in the

pas t . During the s t r i k e , m e e ~ i n g s of shop chairmen in the

shi r twais t industry culminated in brawls between the young

women. workers and the union off i c i a l s . Such f ig hts r es ult ed

~ m a i n l y from the varying degrees of mili tancy a d v o c ~ t e d by

the young· women workers on the one hand and the ILGWU leader-

ship on the other . Compounding th i s , moreover, was a growing

sense among the waistmakers t ha t the union off ic ia ldom

e i the r ignored or condescended to women workers. "The off icers

of the union," one shi r twais t maker complained,

boss us worse than the bosses. Now they t e l l us' to go to work. The next 'minute they withdraw t ha torder. The: women workers compr ise... [a la rg e p ercentage] of the union members throughout the,

country ....Why shouldn ' t we have something to sayabout what co ncerns us most?25

'The women demanded t ha t members of t he i r sex be promoted to

' leadership posi t ions within the union and tha t ' the shi r twais t

loca Is be t reated ,iden t i ca l ly with the ILGWU 1 s other sec t ion s .

Several of these other , predominantly male locals , however,

were themselves revol t ing against the un ion 's l eader sh ip .

In part icu lar , an inc ident subsequently lC1-belled the "Moishe

Rubin r ebe ll ion" con tr ibu ted to th e l eade r's hi p' s decision

to abrogate the Protocol. This rebell iQn occurred in

Cloakritakers Local Union 1, nicknamed "Mexico" by the leader-

ship because of what Epstein termed i t s "wild revolut ions ."

\

'Rubin, a long-time follower of ~ o u r w i c h , ~ a d become secre-

' tary of Local l - - the la rges t in the u n i o n ~ - i n January 1916,

'and almost immediately convinced i t s members to defy the



63

authori ty 'of the union's Jo in t Board. Dissat isf ied with the

1915 agreement in part icular and the Protocol system in

g e n e r a l ~ Rubin denounced the union 's leadership , demanded

wider' autonomy, for each local , and cal led a multitude of '

" shop s t r ikes . Then, in early July, Rubin proceeded , with

Hourwich's aid , to turn Local 1 into an independent union.

'The defect ion alarmed the ILGWU's leaders, and the i r

a t t i t ~ d e a t the bargaining table changed a c ~ o r d i n g l y . · The

union's l a rges t local , after a l l , had j u s t ,seceded, and

o t h e r s ~ - i n part icu lar those of the sh i r twais t makers--might

take i t s cue. Under t he c ircumstances, the abrogation of

the Protocol must have seemed almost necessary. Indeed, the

maneuver succeededi once the Protocol had been scrapped

in a l l the women's garment branches, the members of Local

Union 1 returned to the fold.

By the end of 1916, then, the union was united under

a new agreement tha t had removed the ProtoGol 's arb i t ra t ion

machinery and given the r igh t to s t r ike back to the,workers.

In rea l i ty , the differences in at t i tude between the leader-

ship and the rank and f i le remained unchanged. The off ic ia l -

dam s t i l I c ov ete d n ot workers' revolution but indu,strial

,harmony: II After a whi Ie ," Hi l lqui 1:: told the Jewish Dai 1y Forward

in 1916, nwhen both sides become accustomed to the new [post-,

Protocol] , s i t u a t i o ~ , they wil l re aliz e th at nei ther the bosses

nor the workers ought to make us.e of the i r new r ights : ,,27



64

The l e a d e ~ s h i p , furthermore, s t i l l stressed the Same moderate

· gPals ; as Hil1gui t told an audience a t the Rand Schoo 1, "The

the American entry into World War T. On th i s matter , both

. d i f fe ren t words, many garment t rade unionis ts asked th i s

union members and union leaders--as well aS,both the r i gh t

"Isn ' t it possible ," pleaded oneb e ~ s of the rank and f i l e •

differed diametrical ly from those of the more rni,litant rnem-

an<l l e f t wings of the SP i t se l f - -cou ld wholeheartedly_ agree.

. IJ;.GWU member/lito make our trade unions not only trade unions

lJut · idea l i s t ic ones as well?"29 In di fferent ways, with

· pr incip le purpose of a labor union i s · to secure proper ..and

decent working condit ions to i t s members. ,,28 These views

· i d e n t i ~ a l question from 1910 to 1916/ and most were .hard ly

sat i sf ied with the answer they received. Only in 1916 did

tha t separated leadership from r ~ and f i l e to recede from

,v iew. ~ u c h in te rna l harmony se t in par t ly because th e P ro to col

had been removed. But the re la t ive qu ie t a ls o r es ulte d from

, w o r ~ e r discontent temporarily decline, allowing the.' differences

Ci.

- ~ ':-:':: . .~ .:. ~ ~ ..



CHAPTER IV

THE PECULIAR INTERLUDE:

LOCAL NEW YORK DURING WORLD WAR I

Most h i s t o r i an s have viewed World War I a s , an ·

unqua l i f i ed d i s a s t e r fo r the American s o c i a l i s t movement.

As'Daniel Be l l wr i t e s , " [ t ]he f i n a l gus t ~ h a t sha t t e r ed

the -o ld Soc i a l i s t Par ty was the 'whi r l ing sandstorm o f the

European war . " l Bel l and other s argue t h a t , duri1'!g the

. war years , th e par ty suf fered grea t ly from the r ep re s -

s ion and per secu t ion d ir ec te d a ga in st a l l t hose - - e s -

pec ia l ly r ad i c a l s - - who dared to oppose th e A r n e r i Q ~ n war

, e f fo r t . They f ur th er a ss er t t h a t , from 191-4 to 1918, s t r i f e

within th e SP began in ea rnes t , as many members quar re l l ed

with the l eade r sh ip ' s an t i -war pos i t ion and some dese r ted

the par ty a l toge the r . Fina l ly , these h i s to r i an s claim

t h a t the par ty1s wartime s tance spe l l ed the downfal l of

sbc i a l i sm ' s in f luence among American workers , whose

economic s t a t u s g rea t ly improved as a r e su l t of th e war

e f fo r t .

The h i s to ry ofLocal

New York dur ing the World War

subs tan t ia tes none; of these cons lus ions . Despi te govern-

m'ent and popular re pre ss io n, th e New Y o r ~ SP reached i t s

apex of s t r eng th and i n f luence between 1914 and the

65



66

. beginning of 1918. The leadership 's strong anti-war posi t ion-T.

•brought a new element of unity to the c i t y ' s soc ia l i s t move-

ment, ~ h u s fac i l i ta t ing concerted act ion toward common goals .

Dissenters existed, to be sure; some socia l i s t s supported

~ o u t t i g h t the war, while others cal led f9r even ~ t r o n g e r"po l ic ies agains t it. But these voices of opposi t ion com-

manded l i t t l e at tent ion and less support . For the f i r s t

. t ime, the vas t majo rity o f both the Socia l is t Par ty ' s and

the soc ia l i s t unions' members found themselves firmly in

' l ine with the i r leadership. The in ternal harmony -did not

l a s t long; ra ther , it represented a pecul iar interlude in

the party ' s his tory. By the middle of 1918, the soc i a l i s t

leadership had ret raced i t s leftward s teps , and divi s ions

" ~ e r g e d once again. But in the few shor t years before

th i s happened, New York City ' s soc ia l i s t s enjoyed a per iod

of intense act iv i ty and success - - a per iod unl ik e any

they would ever see again.

World War I i t s e l f did not overly., astonish the soc ia l i s t s .

Host accepted, af t e r a l l , the premise tha t th e competi tiv e

st ruggles of capital ism bred armed conf l i c t . "The cap i t a l i s t s

of each country," Hilqui t wrote in 1912,

s t r ive not only to preserve and extend the i r ownmarkets, but also to invade those of the r ival

nations and to conquer new markets . . . thespecter of war i s thus ever hovering amongthem. 2 \

In addi t ion, many socia l i s t s believed by 1912 tha t th i s

"hovering specter" would soon a l igh t . . .Hillqui t , for example,



."

-, .

"

-'>

67

noted the growth of standing armies, the ballooning of

mili tary budgets, the heightening of in ternat ional tensions. 3

He drew t he consl us ion t ha t a l l these phenomena made in

creasingly l ikely the coming of war.

But i f the outbreak of ·the World War did not unduly

amaze the soc i a l i s t s , the response of t h e i r E ~ r o p e a nbreathren did. At numerous Second Internat ional congresses

before World War I , the socia l is ts proclaimed the i r opposi

t ion to any and a l l capi t a l i s t confl ic t s . Yet when the

European nat ions actual ly declared war, each of the i r social -

i s t part ies - - succumbing to pa t r io t ic passions and popular

pressures - - suppor ted t he mobilization. Such conduct great ly

confused American soc ia l i s t leaders, many of whom held con-

siderable admiration for the i r European counterpar ts . Ac-

cordingly, the New York socia l is ts responded to the onset

of the war not by at tacking di rec t ly the conf l ic t i t se l f

but by try ing to excuse the Europeans' behavior. I n ~ u g u s t1914, the New York Call admitted the European Marxists had

" fa ile d" b ut explained tha t they had' "done the i r best" in

a d i f f i cu l t s i tua t ion . 4 A few weeks l a te r , Hillqui t ex

panded upon the r atio na le in an art ic le ent i t l ed "Social is t

View of the War and Why They F a i l e d · ~ t o Stop I t . " The World. .

War, Hillqui t explflined, arose out of "murderous European,capital ism" and i t s imperia l is t yearnings. European social -

i s t s were

powerless to prevent the [war] .... They could nomore r e s i s t the brutal logic of cap i t a l i s t warfare



68

than they could escape the class war and horrorsof the capi ta l i s t regime .... Reluct an tl y buti r r i s ~ s t a b l y they w ere draw n in to the insane .

vor tex. S

The international soc ia l i s t movement, Hil lqui t hastened

to reassure h is readers, had not suffered "spiri tual ly or

morally" from the European act ion. 6

Eventual ly , the p ar ty r eg ain ed its aplomb, shook o f f

. i t s preoccupation with the Europeans, and began to ar t icula te

a policy o f s tro ng o ppo sitio n to the war. In January 1915, Hil l -

qu i t wrote an a r t ic le designed to convey the off i c i a l party

l ine . Signif icant ly, the ar t i c l e nei ther made excuses for

the socia l is ts supporting ~ h war nor l e f t leeway for the

American SP to follow t h e i r l ead . "The ghast ly carnage

in Europe," Hil lqui t wrote,

has no redeeming features. I t is not a war fordemocracy, culture or progress . I t i s not a

f ight for sentiments or ideals . I t i s a coldblooded butchery for advantages or power.?

This newly-fort i f ied argument led Hillquit" to denounce

strenuously American preparedness efforts . Increased mili tary

expenditures, Hillquit explained, benefited only mil i tary

suppliers , the so-called "armor r ing. hWhile munitions manu-

facturers accumulated prof i t s , the u.s . as a whole both

invited war and brutal ized i t s nat ional l i fe . "A mili tary

poweri s a d e s p o t i ~

power,hB Hil lqul t sta ted firmly, one

tha t encouraged i n ~ u m a n i t y , prevented social progress, l ived

for war. Preparedness effor t s needed to be nipped in the

bud, before mi li ta ri sm overcame the nat ion.



69

disarmament. Both local and national soc ia l i s t leaders had

annexations and advocated th e e stablishment of an in te r -

much l ike Woodrow Wilson's

disallowed indemnities and

They would condemn the war in th e s t ronges t

In othe r , more d i s t i nc t l y s o c i a l i s t sec t ions ,

as d id othe r soc ia l i s t s both in New York andmphasized

prehensive peace program t h a t

yet-undevised Fourteen Points

Having formulated the i r pol ic ies , the soc ia l i s t s turned

taken their stand:

the program also demanded "social changes in a l l countr ies

to e lim in ate th e economic causes of war"9 and cal led for to ta l

nat ional league.

Thed e l e g a t e ~

of the Lett ish Branch report tha tthey are to Hold an anti-preparedness meeting.The delegatesl of the 8th A.D. (Agitation Dist r ic t ]

report tha t they held an anti-war meeting whichwas successful . The delegates of Hungarian Yorkvi l le moved tha t the C entral Committee request theNational Executive Committee to se t aside a "PeaceDay" when a l l locals wil l hold peace demonstrations.The motion was passed. IO

Hillquit drafte d for the National Executive Committee a com-

In l ine with th es e s tro ng ly ar t icu la ted bel iefs , Hillquit

terms, s tr ive to aver t American involvement, and support - -

seriously the soc ia l i s t s took the i r m i s s ~ o n to preach against

the war. Curing these f i r s t years of confl ic t , the soc ia l i s t s

indeed, try to in i t i a te - - peace negot iat ions .

with rekindled enthusiasm to act ive propaganda work. The

minutebooks of New York's Central Committee reveal j u s t how

A typical se t of Central Committee minutes reads in part :

of the ent i re Local, others under those of individual branches.

reported holding hundreds of meetings -- some under the auspices

· a ~ r o s s the nation - - the SP's specia l role as peacemaker.



70

. Union· Square, Cooper Union, the Harlem River Casinb , the

nearest s t ree t corner - - a l l become s i t es where members of

the Socia l i s t Party would speak of the human horrors and

capi ta l i s t origins of World War I . For the f i r s t time in

~ h e i r party ' s his tory , furthermore, the New York socia l i s t s

viewed an issue as so important tha t they even consented

~ share t he i r soapboxes ~ i t h other r ~ d i c a l s . Hil lqui t ,Boudin and Fraina a l l spoke a t meetings with Emma Goldman;

occasionally Carlo Tresca, the I.W.W. agi ta tor , would also

appear .II

The soc ia l i s t s , however, did more than ta lk . In

Congress, Meyer London p ~ o p o s e d a bi l l : in 1915 instruct ing

the P re sid en t to convene a neu t r a l na t i ons ' congress to

mediate the confl ic t - - not in the usual dip lomat ic fashion

but in acco rdance w ith the principles p ~ e s c r i b e d in the

SP peace program. Although Congress ignored London's resolu-

t ion, the New York socia l is ts did not. The East Side Agita

t ion Committee sent a cablegram to eacn of the European

soc ia l i s t par t i es urging support for the London proposal.1 2

Meanwhile, the Central Committee persuaded the nat ional SF

to pr in t and ci rcula te pet i t ions . e n d o r s i ~ g the b i l l . 13 These

were not the only pet i t ions New York SP members carr ied;

ear l i e r in the war, for e ~ a m p l e , . they had col lec ted ~ i g n a t u r e s•

tO,support an embaEgo on m u n i t ~ o n s expor ts . l4 Final ly , the

New York soc ia l i s t s wrote. ,SP print ing presses spewed for th

scores of new leaf le ts on. such subjects as disarmament, the



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71

ev i l s ' of preparedness , the s o c i a l i s t peac,e program. ,Ne,w

York's soc ia l i s t s had always held a cer ta in fondness for

the prin ted word, but in these f i r s t years of the war they

even outdid themselves.

In the midst of -al l t ,his ' ,act! v ty , a few 9issent ing

voices issued from the party ' s l e f t wing. Louis Boudin

maintained tha t the par ty ' s ant i -preparedpess and ant i -war

posi t ions reeked of ins inceri ty and cant . The leadership

had only taken such stances, Boudin ins is ted; because it

had f e l t pressured by the pa r ty ' s ranka ~ f i l e . Were t h i s

rank and f i le ever to relax i t s guard on the par ty ' s Ropportun-

i s t i c leaders and leader le ts ," the l a t t ~ r would begin to ac t

qui te di fferent ly - - they would, in fac t , begin "maintaining

an at t i tude and preaching doctrines ~ h i c h might easi ly land

us in the preparedness camp. "15 Louis F ra ina' , a recent

rec ru i t to New York's l e f t wing, went even fur ther . He

denied outr ight that Hil lquit or the 9ther New York leaders

had ever taken a strong posi ti on agai ns t mili tarism and the

war. Indeed , F ra in a charged tha t "in th i s , as in other matters

of policy . • . Bil lqui t is in fu l l agreement with the reactionary

1 f. .' .. 16

e ements 0 bourgeo1s progress1v1sm. These individual

: c r i : t i R . u e ~ , however, failed to . a t t rac t any mass support. 1nsin-

cer i ty proved di f f icu l t to v e r i f ~ bourgeous at t i tudes among

,SP leaders seemed Inowhere in evidence. For the f i r s t time

-in the i r careers , Boudin arid Fraina found themselves pro-

tes t ing in a vacuum. During the New York SP's f i r s t t h i r -

teen years , soc ia l i s t minutes and records overflowed with



•

72

accounts of left-wing opposit ion. In 1914, such accounts

~ I 'abruptly hal ted . The records-from the i n i t i a l war years

New York.

war and had decided tha t such "entrance would not ha l t the

in 'S t . Louis.

more 'by what they do not say than byonclusively show

feature of soc ia l i s t propaganda," the c o r r a n i ~ t e e denounced

Local ' s an t i -war efforts ' . "Declaring t h a t "re len t l ess

opposit ion to war i s and must always remain a cardinal

unaware. On March 4, 1917, the Central Committee had dis-

united States entered World War I . The C o n g r e s s i o n a ~declaration of war hardly caught the New York socia l i s t s

cussed the increasing l ikelihoOd of u . s . entrance into the

what they do - - tha t dissent had yielded to unity in Local

This s i tua t ion did not change subs tant ia l ly once the

Neither the1declarat ion of war nor the SP's response

"enemies of the socia l is t movement," the New York SP pledged

only to increase the scope of i t s a n t i ~ w a r propaganda, to

those soc ia l i s t s who "give promises of cooperation with the

rul ing cla sses in case of actual war.. . 1,7 Unlike these

Hil lqui t and Algernon Lee redrafted th i s program in s l ight ly

enl i s t the support of organized labor , and to bat t le th e

f " " h" 1 18 "1enactment 0 c o n s c r ~ p t ~ o n or censors 1p aws. In A p r ~ I

more poetic form for the nat ional SP's emergency convention

d ~ s s e n t . Leon Trotsky, l ~ v i n g in New York unt i l la te March,

'to it did anything to i n c r e ~ s e , t h e scope of left-wing



73

urged the S o c i a l i s t Party t o adopt more daring t a c t i c s in

i t s f i g h t a g a i n s t the war. In p a r t i c u l a r , he suggested

' t h a t " the s o c i a U s t s pub'licly- d e c l a r e t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to

. transform t he i nt erna ti onal " c o n f l i c t i n t o a c i v i l one by

act ively r e s i s t i n g government "recruiting and by Domenting

i n d u s t r i a l s t r i k e s . Some New York s o c i a l i s t s undoubtedly

a gre ed w ith Trotsky ' , b u t it seems t h a t they d i d n o t view

the d i f f e r e n c e between the two programs as worthy of debate.

At t h i s s t a g e of t h e c o n f l i c t , ' too, i n d i c a t i o n s of l e f t - w i n g

dissent were conspicuously ' absent from accounts in the

Local's r ecords . By moving to the l e f t , the New York leader-.ship had unintent ional ly but e f f e c t i v e l y ' taken the wind out

of the revolutionary s o c i a l i s t s ' s a i l s .

I t i s t rue t h a t {n r idding i t s e l f of substant ia l l e f t -

wing dissent , the New York SP inevitably incurred some r i g h t

wingopposit ion. When

theU.S.

becamea

b e l l i g e r e n t ,a

small

group of party leaders announced t h e i r s u p p o r ~ for the war.

Indeed, th e m a jo rity of the Sp' leadership had anticipated

t h i s development. In 1916, for example , Algernon Lee had

observed in h i s diary: ""It seems tha ' t ' once a country i s

involved in a serious war, few 'of i t s ... i n t e l l e c t u a l s can

excape the infect ion o f ' ch-auv-inism. ,,19 ,Actually, Lee was to

be p leasan tly su rp r ised 'by how few'party members l ived up

to h i s prophecy. ~ o u r n a l i s t ' J O h n Spargo - - who l a t e r '

referred to "Hillquit as the "spdkesman"'of Americ'an social ism:. ., '



74

dynasty, ,20 - - l e f t th e pa rty immediately a f t e r th e U. S.

entered the confl ic t . Muckracker Charles Edward Russell

was expelled. And Congressman Meyer London announced tha t

he would do nothing ~ obstruct or weaken the American

war effor t . Such examples, however, were scarcely common.

The vast majori ty of party members - - and even the vas t

majority of party in te l lec tuals - - fu l ly approved of the SP's

opposition to the American war declara t ion. Accordingly,

they approved of the i r party ' s increased ant i -war act iv i ty

as wel l .

Before Apri l 1917, Central Committee minutes mentioned

approximately three or four indoor meetings each week. Follow-

ing American entry into the war, the number of such meetings

immediately soared to a weekly average of twelve. 2l The

New York Socia l i s t s maintained no f igures on outdoor meetings

both their frequency and the i r spontaneity probably hampered

such record keeping - - but the i r number probably skyrocketed

as well . 22 Final ly , the Socia l is ts bega? to hold mass

meetings in Madison Square Garden, with aud iences tha t even

non-socia l is t newspapers estimated a t some 13,000.23

Most

often, the soc ia l i s t s simply protested the war's con ti nuat ion ,

using argumen ts and r he to ri c s im i la r to those employed before

the· u.S. became a bel l igerent . , OCcasionally, however, Local,

New York's s p e a k e r ~ y i ~ l d e d to th e t empta tion to protes t not

only the war but also woodrow Wilson's ra t ionale for i t .



75

Speaking a t Madison Square Garden, for example, Hillqui t

declared:

We are told tha t we are in war to make theworld safe for democracy. What a hollowphrase! We cannot ... ".force democracyupon host i le countr ies by force of arms.Democracy must come from w ith in not fromwithout , through the l ight .of2ieason andnot through the fiTe of guns.

E v e ~ more frequently, the socia l i s t s i n t ~ n e d agains t c on sc ri p

t i on . The d ra f t , the soc ia l i s t s i n s i s t ed , was cons t i t u t i ona l ly

questionable and morally wrong. In accordance with th i s

be l ie f , they circulated and sent to Congress pet i t ions fo r

the repeal of the draf t law and unsuccessfully urged a

reca lc i t ran t Meyer London to propose a bi"11 to t h a t e f fec t .

The New York socia l i s t s also strove to enl i s t the

c i ty ' s trade unions into th e strug gle ag ainst World War I .

MeffiQers of the SP opposed a l l forms of union coope ra tio n i n

wartime programs but they ra i led especial ly hard against

the no-s t r ike pledge to which the AFL leadership had agreed.

Disregarding the i r own negotia t ion of a no-s t r ike provi-

sian in the Protocol of Peace, New York's soc ia l i s t leaders

claimed tha t Gompers' pledge const i tu ted a ,fundamental

departure from t rade-union principles . Nothing could be

gained from such a de pa rtu re , the socia l i s t s added; the war,

af te r a l l , was a capi ta l i s t struggle whose primary victims,

were the workers themselves.

In accordance with-these bel iefs , the socia l i s t s

lobbied the unions to re jec t both the no-s t r ike pledge and



76

The soc ia l i s t s , however, did not confine the i r effor t s to

Pamphleteers produced pieces, d is tr ib u te d to hundreds of

Equally important,

Employment opportunities hadI ': .

In these circumstances, it i s

New York's socia l is ts rea l ized they were fighting

~ uphil l ba t t l e . Workers were no less immune than other

allegiance to social ism. Speakers traversed the c i ty , addres-

those l abo r o rgan iza ti ons that had already,proclaimed the i r

sing a l l those unions to which the SP c o u l ~ g ain ac ce ss and

repeating Hil lqui t ' s words to audiences less convinced. 26

the ladies I garment workers:

other forms of wartime cooperation. As Hillqui t told

there i s not one among our employers, as amongthe employing c lass general ly, who i s not readyto take advantage of the world-calamity to cointhe misery of the. war, the misery of his fellowmen into dol la rs and ' fortunes for himself , to·accumulate vas t fortunes ". and a t the sametime try to hold ·down the workers to the lowestpossible level on the plea of p a t r i o ~ i c duty.25

Conference organized d e m o n s ~ r a t i o n ~ and ~ ~ r a d e s to pro tes t

the AFL's wartime pol ic ies .28

thousands of workingmen, decrying wartime cooperation and

the no-str ike pledge.27

Members of the SP's Anti-Militarism

Even workers who had original ly opposed American involve-

ci t izens to the wave of patr iotism sweeping the nation.

to the working class .

ment in the war soon became e n ~ ~ r a l l e d by Woodrow Wilson's

wartime prosperity,and ~ h National War Labor Board's

l iberal t rade-union polic ies had brought,$vbstantial gains- . . .

crusade for democracy and a jus t world.

unions had grown.

increased, wages and working condit ions had improved,



77

new unions to i t s cause.

war.

stormed:

Government orders fo r armyains as a re su l t of the war:

rank and f i l e from i t s new soc i a l i s t crusade. The Amalgamated

The garment unions, however, l eapt to the aid of the

such economic gains def lec ted nei ther the leadership nor the

almost without e ff or t b et te r wages and shorter days. Yet

uniforms poured in to the t rade , enabling -tPe unions to a t ta in

Socia l i s t Party. These vnions, too, had-achieved grea t

f l i e t b rought a bout by the greed and je alou sy o f kings and

rulers, ,30 and boycott ing a nat ional trade-union conference

The outspokenness and constant a c ~ i ~ i t y of the soc ia l -..

not surpris ing that the New York SP fa i led to convert any

Think of i t : Because the nation i s engagedin a war against a foreign enemy, the privateemployer i s to be p erm itte d to e xe rc is e h ispowers of oppression over the w o r k e ~ s to his

hear t ' s content. 3

Advance spoke for workers and"ieaders al ike. Unified t rade

wartime pol ic ies . Advance, the newspaper of the Amalgamated,

organized by Samuel Gompers to a ss er t la bo r's support f o the war. These unions also harshly cr iexcized the AFL's

ILGWU agreed, denouncing World War I as a " f ra t r i c ida l con-

Clothing Workers commented tha t the par ty ' s opposit ion to

the U.S. war e f fo r t "vindicated" American socialism. 29 The

unions had joined unifie d p ar ty to probest and f igh t the

·r 'i s t s soon began to i r r i t a t e the American 'people and alarm



,

'/

78

both the federal 'and municipal governments. Pr ior to

even fur ther .

April 1917, the socia l is ts had enjoyed re la t ive freedom

harrassed them; crowds of hysterical ci t izens lent federa l

In addit ion,

These effor ts did

In 1915, the New York police com-

The government prosecuted ' socia l is ts ; the police

to oppose the war.

miss ioner had sa id , " i do no t see how a peace· meeting in

and municipal off i c i a l s a helping hand.

siderably.

New York's soc ia l i s t s , not real iz ing tha t worse was to come,

impede soc ia l i s t act iv i ty to some extent ; more important,

Union Square i s in any way object ionable ," and most c i t izens

agreed. 32 By 1917, however, the si tua, t ion h ad ch anged con-

however, they provided the socia l i s t s with a common grievance.

Mass r ep re ss io n u ni nte nt io na ll y unif ied the Socia l i s t Party -

The government's contr ibut ion to th i s repression

attacked t h i s provision a t every possible opportunity. On

began with the passage ox the Select ive Service Act, which

included a provision prohibiting agi ta t ion against the draf t .

inci t ing rebel l ion in the armed forces or attempting to

obStruct the government" s recru i t ing effor t s .

June 15, 1917, Congress passed the Esp ionage Act, which

prohibited any person" frorn.willfully.helping the enemy,

the Espionage Act 19ave the Postmaster.· General the authori ty

to withhold from the mails printed matter urging "treason,

insurrect ion, or forcible ·resis tance ko any law of the

United s tates ."33 The power to deny publications second-

class mailing privi leges , although not included in the ac t ,



79

government off i c i a l s sent so many socia l i s t s to j a i l on

Blackwell 's Island tha t the New York Call facet iously exhorted

prisoners there to request a lo ca l c ha rt er . 34 Meanwhile,

In a l l ,

The humorous Jewish weekly,

bel iefs expressed in an informal conversation.

was quickly assumed by the Postmaster General.

The government quickly se t tp enforcing the Espionage

Act. Federal off ic ia ls in New-York returned indictmentsagainst p ar ty le ad er s and rank-and-f i le members a l ike .

Scot t Nearing, Max Eastman, John Reed, A.I . Ship la co ff and

Floyd Dell a l l f e l l into the· former group; th eir in dic t-

ments could, perhaps, have been expected. But other arrestees

were more l ike Morris Zucker, an unknown soc ia l i s t whom a

jury sentenced to f if teen years imprisonment for ant i -war

the u.s . Postmaster General took act ion against most of New

York's socia l i s t perodicals .. The New York Call los t i t s

second-class mailing privi leges in November 1917 and did not

regain them un t i l June 1921.

Der Grosser Kundress had i t s privi leges revoked because of

an ar t i c l e tha t sa t i r ized , among o th er t hi ng s, the govern

ment's censorship policy. An i ssue of The Masses, a socia l -

i s t magazine run by a group of Greenwich Village in te l lec tuals ,

was banned from the mails, while several others were delayed.

The soc ia l i s t s also had to cope with har ra ssment from

New York's police force and ci t izenry . Local New York's

minutebooks l i s t numerous occasions upon which pol ice

off icers disbanded socia l i s t anti-war meetings and dem

onstra t ions . The Commissioner of Police off ic ia l ly condoned



--..; ..

- ,- .

80

such behavior, arguing tha t "in-flarnmatory speeches" made

by those who sought to "use the r igh t of free speech to

cloak disorder" should be banned. 35 Given such sentiments,

it was not surprisirrg tnat the pol ice did l i t t l e to curb

some of New York's more fervently pat r io t ic ci t izens .

Although mob violence never r ea ched th e h eig hts in New York

tha t it did in smaller c i t i es -and towns, private ci t izens

did disrupt SF meetings and pummel SF speakers. In par t i c -

ular , members of the American Protect ive League and other

pat r io t ic organizations committed acts that one SP member

claimed "inaugurated a red.gn of t e rror similar to the

Black Hundreds in Russia."36

For the most par t , New York's social is ts responded

~ i t h defiance. On June 9, the Central Committee noted

tha t ;

Delegates of 2b A.D. repor t tha t they have very

successful s t ree t meetings and tha t one of thespeakers was arrested by soldiers and was af t e r wards released by the magistrate in the nightcour t and that soldiers are interfer ing withthe i r meetings which they wil l try to have anan even greater number of.37

This response was, in many ways, typical . Local New York

held specia l meetings to protes t government censorship.

I t se t up bureaus to provide party members with legal

counsel. I t scathingly cr i t ic ized the government, i t s,

laws, i t s off ic ia l s . The New York socia l i s t s believed,

according to a lengthy resolut ion adopted in 191B, tha t

the government was persecuting ~ h e m not for disloyalty

to the United States but for the i r "loyalty to the struggle



--

81

SP's annals . As one his torian puts i t , - "Rather than

keynote:

t a r a l campaign. The s o c i a l i s t s had nominated Hi l lqu i t

In his opening speech,

To a l a rge ex t en t , th e r e so -edicat ion to the i r cause.

out emphasis on immediate peace.

given before some 10,000 people a t Madison Square Garden,

lut ion proved accu ra te . The repression in New York did

not succeed in destroying the Socia l is t Party or demoral-

Local New York's new determination and unity cont r i -

i s a Vote to Stop the War" - - and sounded the campaign's

Hi1lquit announced his slogan - - "A Vote for Hil lqu i t

r eso lu t ion dec la red , would only s t r eng then so c i a l i s t s '

fo r mayor, and he entered the four-way race with an a l l -

buted to th e gr ea t success of the ' soc i a l i s t s ' 1917 e l ec -

aga ins t priv i lege and exploi tat ion. ,,38 Repression, the

a ju s t cause.

a cornmon enemy and by making them fee l l ike martyrs for

the socia l i s t s closer together by presenting them with

izing i t s members; rather, it succeeded only in driVing

Capitalism has forced war upon the whole worldincluding the socia l is ts . The soc ia l i s t s wil l

bring peace to the whole world i nc lu di ng t hecap i t a l i s t s . We are fo r peace. We are unal terably opposed to the k i l l ing of our manhood andth e d ra in in g of our resources in a bewilderingpursu i t fo r democracy which has the support ofthe men and classes who have h a b i t u a l l ~ 9 r o b b e dand despoiled the p ~ o p l e of America . . .

\Local New YQrk's members and i t s broader consti tuency

responded with an 'enthusiasm-unprecedented in the ci ty



82

As it tu rn ed out. the vote for Hil lqui t did not

quite l ive UP to e i ther soc ia l i s t expectations or non-

a race he con-

parades of thousands-and marched

42hours.

"The next mayor of New York," the .League

~ e w s formed spontaneous

through the s t ree t s fo r

on incumbent Mayor Mitchel, was now desperi9-tely "trying

to cu t the ground from under the Socia l is t ic program.,,43

tha t Tammany, which had previously concentrated i t s f i re

to win.· The New York World reported on October 21 tha t

Hi l lqu i t had "gained strength a t an alarming rate"· and

New Yorkers came to bel ieve t h a t Hi l l qu i t had a chance

As the campaign progressed, . increasing numbers of

qu i t had expected, the Socia l i s t s rapidly imparted a sp i r i t

of re l ig ious revival" to the race .

40

Each of the garment

unions donated money and manpower to the social i s t ·cam-

The Business Men's League of the City of New York sen t

paign. Left-w ing soc i a l i s t s paid t r i bu t e to th e qua l i ty

~ n mil i tance of the Hil lqui t b i ~ . 4 1 Lower East Side

tha t he believed he could win the race

elect ion year .

League ordinar i ly opposed Tammany, but th i s was no ordinary

a Socia l is t ;" it added tha t busine,ssmen "must be guided

accordingly. ,,44 Hil lqui t himself wrote a fr iend on OCtober 13•

wrote, "wi l l eigher be Hylan, a Democrat, o r H illg ui t ,

candidacy was "not a joke but a ser ious menage." The

sidered " the grea tes t t e s t of Americ.an socialisIT'\ an,d rad-

. 1· ,,45l.ca .lSrn ever .

,carrying on the ·usual propaganda campaign' which Hil l -

,a l e t t e r to i t s members warning them tha t Hil lqui t ' s



83

soc i a l i s t f ea r s . Hi l l qu i t f in i shed t h i rd in the· con t e s t ,

r e c e ~ v i n g 145, 332 votes to Hylan's 313, 956, Mitchel ' s

155, 497 and the Republican candidate ' s 56 / 438.

46

Yet

Hil lqui t ' s t a l ly represented no mean achievement. Hi11

qu i t had polled almost twenty-two percent of the t o t a l

; ·vote; previous soc ia l i s t c an did ate s in ci tywide e l ec t ions

had at t rac ted no more than four to f ive percent .47

Even

. more important, in those dis t r i c t s where he ran best - -

the Lower East S id e, Harlem, Williamsburg and Brownsville

Hil lqui t swept in to local off ice other soc ia l i s t candidates .

The p ar ty e le cte d seven of i t s nominees to the Board of

Aldermen, ten to the Assembly and one to a municipal cour t

judgeship. I t was an impressive showing, and the soc ia l -

i s t s knew i t . Hil lqui t , for example, a ss ess ed th e cam-

paign by saying it had establ ished the Socia l i s t Party

as a npermanent fac tor in the po l i t i c s of the c i ty .n48

Within one year of Hil lqui t ' s predict ion , however,

the Soc ia l i s t Party succumbed once more to in t r? -par ty

conf l ic ts . The renewed ba t t l es grew primari ly from Lenin 's

se izure of power in O . : t o i . : " l ~ r 1917. While a l l in i t i a l ly

supported the revolution, the l e f t and r ight wings of the

Socia l i s t Party in terpreted dif ferent ly the B o ~ s h e v i k

upr is ing ' s mandate, The revolution persuaded the r igh t

_wing to abandon i t ant i-wa r s ta nc e a t the same time it

convinced the l e f t wing to rea sse r t i t s opposi t ion.

In the l a s t year of the war, the d iv is io ns th at had sep-



84

a r a t e d t h e tw o groups u n t i l abou t 1914 began t o r e a p p e a r .

I n i t i a l l y , the Russian Revolution seemed an unlikely

e v e n t t o s h a t t e r t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y . When Lenin assumed

pOwer in OCtober, the e n t i r e spectrum of New York's s o c i a l -

i s t movement responded with enthusiasm. In a memoir of

New York's Lower East Side a t the t ime of the revolution's

announcement, one ~ e w ~ s h s o c i a l i s t wrote:

All the coffee houses in the Russian q u a r t e r . ~ e r eove rf lowing with people , w i t h song, with brighteyes and b r i g h t g a z e s .

I t i s the Russian Revolution!

The Revolution has triumphed!The t r u t h has triumphed!The t r u t h of the folk, the t ru i i j , the g r e a ~ t r u t hof humankind - - . o f Revolution!

The leadership of the party shared the popular exci te

ment. Morris H i l l q u i t wrote in the spring of 1918 t h a t

the Bolsheviks had "rendered a tremendous service to the . . .

cause of s o c i a l progress by shaking up the old world and

by t h e i r t e l l i n g f i g h t for a grea t and bold ideal . ,,50

The Jewish unions also hopped on the Bolshevik banawagon.

The IlGWU, for example, hailed the revolut ion as "the

f i r s t t ime i n the history of the world t h a t the workers

showed the determinat ion no t to allow themselves to be

·defrauded of "the f r u i t s of t h e i r victory by t h e i r master

. 51c l a s s e s . " In these f i r s t m o n t h s ~ Local New YorR organ-

i zed mee ti ng s, demonstrations and parades in sup po rt of\

t he Bol shev ik s. Together, i t s members fought for the

u.s. recognition of Russia and against a'U.S: invasion.

The Bolshevik revolution, however, weakened ·the



-.

85

r ight wing's opposition to the war. As the armies of

Kaiser.

in June 1918, the General Executive Board of the ILGWU

aldermen voted to suppor t the Third Libe r ty Loan. And

Td the l e f t wing, the Russian Revolution

tha t such an upheaval occurred was due

declared t h a t the Russian Revolut ion had given the · · " s t ruggle

against German mili tarism new. meaning. ,,52 This sentiment

t ing the soc ia l i s t movement's need to defeat the German

The l e f t wing 's oppos it ion to the war, however,

the Central power s advanced deep into Russian te r r i tory ,

these socia l is ts began to be lie ve the Soviet government

co uld only su rv ive i f the Al l i es defea ted Germany . . In

March 1918 President of the Amalgamated Sidney Hillman

Less than one month la ter , he and fiv e o ther soc ia l i s t

beseeching the German soc i a l i s t s "vigorously to oppose"

th eir " ru le r' 5 e f fo r t s to crush th"e Russian revolu t ion . . .53

now a soc ia l i s t a lderman, s igned a cable in early March

was widely shared in right-wing ranks. Algernon Lee ,

i t se l f purchased $100,000 of these Liberty Bonds, asser-

remained as strong as ever. In meetings.·.of the C en tra l

p ~ o v e d the value and importance of mil i tancy. No one

,

Committee, these more radical socia l is ts called for the

aldermen's res ignat ions , 54 proposed that the soc ia l i s t

Czarist Russia;

,had expected a revolut ion in agrar ian, underdeveloped,

leadership "be communicated w ~ t h and reminded to abide

"by the St Louis re&alution, "55 and re-aff i rmed the i r own

- :ant i-war s ta .nd.



. ,86

mentally d i f fe ren t from the old one. The same leaders

lern: how radical , how mili tant should the New·York Soc-

. Socia l i s t Party had once again sp l i t in two. The i ssue

In 1919, the mounting controversies would

ex is tence , d i ssens ion had brewed within the Socia l i s t

so le ly to t he de te rm ina ti on ~ n militancy of t ~ Bolshevik

par ty. New Yorkls l e f t wing j ~ d g e d the Russian R e v o l u t i o ~

but it would be wrong to see the new conf l i c t as funda-

i ~ c r e a s e mi li ta n t a g it at io n aga ins t it.

Hence, by the l a s t year of the war, New Yorkls.

Now was no time to support the W ~ ~ i ra ther , it was a time to

to mean t h ~ t for a s o c ~ a l i s t party to succeed, it needed revolu

t ionary wil l , r evo lu t ionary t a c t i c s , r ev o lu ti on a ry do c tr in e . 56

t o o ~ the same sides and a rg ued about the same broad prob-

in 1918 concerned soc ia l i s t at t i tudes toward the war,

i a l i s t Party be? And yet , the old confl ic t had been given

one new twist . The Russian Revolution· had provided the

principles or leave i t . For a l l but three years of i t s

determination to ei ther convert the party to revolutionary

f inal ly erupt.

Party I S ranks.

--left wing of the party with a new determination - - the



CHAPTER V. ,

THE GREAT DIVIDE,

1919 AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY SPLIT

Nineteen-nineteen should have been a banner year for

New York's socia l i s t s . In the months af ter the armist ice,

the economic gains which workers and unions had achieved

during t ~ war r ap idly d i ss ipa ted : Wage hikes l agged beh ind

inf la t ion; unemployment mounted s t ~ a d i l Y i employers laid

·pla ns for an open- shop drive. In re spon se, New York's

workers--released from "their pat r io t ic obligations and no-

s tr ike pledge--vi r tual ly exploded. Four days· af ter the

Armistice, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers cal led a general

s t r ike , involving 50,000 of the c i ty ' s ta i lors . Not long

af ter , o th er l abore rs joined the garment workers ~ New York's

s t ree ts . Longshoremen, harbor workers,· a cto rs , p rin tin g

pressmen, railway shopmen--all rebel led against the i r employers

within a year of the war's end. I t was the New York soc ia l i s t s '

golden opportunity, the moment of "worker discontent and re -

bellion they had rong awaited. But in 1919, the socia l i s t s\

had other , more pressing matters on the i r minds. In tha t

year, the in t ra -par ty dissension tha t had bui l t up for almost

two decades came to a climax. In" the wake of this ba t t l e ,

87



ss

American communism was born.

The Russian Revolution was, of course, a c r i t i ca l

than reform, action ra ther than words. The internat ional

In h is "Le t t e r to Americanr ev o lu ti o na ry t ime t ab l e.

to socia l is ts around the world the need for a revolutionary

to believe tha t the su rv iv al o f his own communist regime

another revolut ion. Lenin had read enough of Marx's writ ings

shown, the Bolshevik leaders encouraged a left-wing re -

bel l ion in the American s o c i a l i s ~ movement.lIn the months

factor in th e d eclin e of the SP. As James Weinstein has

American socia l is ts took Lenin's words to heart . They

Accordingly, Lenin sca th ing ly a tt acked reform socia l i s t s ,

"in a beleaguered for t ress , so long as no other internat ional

socia l i s t revolution comes to our assistance with i t s arrnies."2

who claimed to believe in the class struggle but who "rever t

depended upon the c re atio n o f other , more industr ia l ly

developed workers ' s ta tes . Hence, he constantly re i tera ted

again and again to the middle -class u top ia of 'class-harmony'

and the mutual ' interdependence' .of cla.sses upon one another.,,3

The in te rna t iona l socia l i s t movement n ~ e d e d revolut ion rather

socia l i s t movement needed to r id i t s e l f of c o n s t r u c ~ i v i s t s .

_program, conducted by revolut ionary socia l is ts according to

workingmen," publish ed i n the De ce mbe r 1918 issue of

The Class Struggle--the New York l e f t wing's bimonthly

~ p e r i o d i c a l - - L e n i n s t ressed tha t the Bolsheviks would remain

' a f te r the Armistice, the Bolsheviks s t i l l anx ious ly awa ited



-,

89

would not have done so , however, had they no t a lr eady believed what

Lenin preached. In New York, a vocal group of par ty members

had f ough t r ef orm socialism for almost two decades. They

had protested the cons t ruc t iv i s t s ' elect ion s t ra tegies ,

t rade union pol ic ies , middle-class orienta t ion. They had

asserted the need for a revolutionary party, w i ~ h i t s base

in the working c l a s s . ~ h e y had cons tan t ly cha l lenged and

def ied Hi l lqu i t i an l eadersh ip . Max Eastman, a long- t ime

member of New York's l e f t wing, wrote in th e L ib er ato r:

There i s no use pretending tha t th i s sp l i t inthe Soci al is t p a rt ie s i s new . . . lt has alwaysbeen exact ly the same--on the one hand revolut ionary Marxians, on the other reformers anddi lu ters of Marx1an theory.4

Eastman exaggerated a bi t ; although the sp l i t had always

been essent ia l ly the same, it had not been e xa ctly so .

Previously, the Social is t Party had experienced conf l ic t ,

dissension, power s t ruggles--but no fu l l -sca le rebel l ion.

The Russian Revolution changed th i s by making such a re -

bell ion seem both possible and absolutely necessary. In

this sense, the r i se of the Bolsheviks precipi ta ted the

Socia l i s t Party sp l i t . But the roots of t hi s s p li t- -t he

cleavage between revolutionary and reform socialisrn--had

long exi s t ed . The left-wing revol t of 1919 had i t s own

internal impetus, an impetus which the Bolshevik uprising,

only strengthened. '

Ou tr igh t l ef t-w ing rebel l ion struck Local New York

la ter than it did o ther s ec tions of the SP. By the end



90

of 1918, Boston's and Chicago's revolutionary socia l is ts had

organized themselves into of f ic ia l bodies, designed to grasp

control of the party machinery . . New York's l e f t wing, mean-

while, s t i l l suffered from diffuseness and a lack of formal

s t ructure . This s i tuat ion changed abruptly in January 1919,

when Local New York held a meeting to discuss five soc ia l i s t

a ldermen's support for a temporary Victory Arch along Fif th

Avenue. Jul ius Gerber, secretary of the Local, ran th i s

meeting in a highhanded fashion, refusing to ca l l a n known

left-wing socia l is ts and prohibi t ing toe proposal of con

demnatory resolut ions . S At eleven-thir ty tha t evening, af ter

having spent several hours vainly trying to get the f loor ,

the left-wingers decided to bolt the assembly. Gathering

in another room, they elected a City Committee of Fourteen,

whose duties included draft ing a left-wing manifesto and

organizing a campaign to win over the par ty ' s rank and f i l e .

With the creation of this · committee, New York's

l e f t wing f ina l ly assumed o r g ~ n i z a t i o n a l form. The revo-

lut ionary soc ia l i s t s established themselves as an indepen-

dent force within the S P - - ~ kind of party within the p arty .

They retained t he i r membership in Local New York; indeed,

they pa r ti c ipa ted ac tively in a l l facets of party l i f e . At

the same t ime, hqwever, the revolutionary soc ia l i s t s organized

The Left Wing Section of th e G reater New York Locals of the

socia l i s t Party, a section tha t printed i t s own membership

cards, assessed i t s own dues, and se t up i t s own citywide



91

gove rn ing commit te es . E v e n t u a l l y , t h e l e f t wing hoped, it

notch c l o s e r to r e a l i z a t i o n . Such beLiefs, Reed and Fraina

the party

8c l a s s .

eventually, it noped to .be the party i t s e l f .

As p a r t of t h i s a t t e m p t t o c on v e rt t h e S o c i a l i s t

party to revolut ionary p r i ~ c i p l e s , the newly-organized l e f t

Shall the SQci al is t P ar ty continue to feed theworkers with social reform l e g i s l a t i o n a t t h i sc r i t i c a l period? S h a ~ l it approach the wholequestion from the standpoint of votes and tQe

would not need a s e p a r a t e caucus w it h i n t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y ;

in terms quite similar to those revolutionarys o c i a l i s t s

had used for decades. In reviewing the events of the p a s t ,

Fraina and Reed condemned the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s for " i n e r t i a , "

"lack of vision," and "sausage social ism."? The authors

longer allow such a s t a t e of a f f a i r s to p e r s i s t .

Left-wing s o c i a l i s t s , Fraina and Reed asser ted , could no

had f a i l e d to act as the vanguard of the working

In s t r e s s i n g "petty-bourgeois socia l reformism,"

sight of socia l ism's original purpose and ult imate aim:

wing adopted, on Feb ruary 15, a document t h a t soon became

known a s t h e Left-Wing Manifes to .6 O r a ~ t e d by John Reed

and revised by Louis Fraina, the m a n i f e s ~ o a tta ck ed th e

reformis t leadership and s e t out the l e f t wing's own program

reviewed the theory of step-a t-a- t ime social ism--the r i g h t -

wing b e l i e f t h at each measure of socia l l e g i s l a t i o n wrested

from the s t a t e brought the Cooperative Commonwealth a

charged, had caused the righ t-w in g lead ersh ip to lose



92

e l e c ~ i o n of r e p r e s e n t ~ t i v e s to th e l eg i s l a tu res?

...Shal l it talk about the Cost of Liying and Taxat ion when j t should bg explaining how the worker

i s robbed a t his job?

Clearly not, Fraina and Reed an-swered themselves. But

what, then, should the socia l is ts do? The al ternat ives

presented in the Left-Wing Manifesto c9rresponded exactly

to· those t rad i t ional ly proposed by the sp ' s revolut ionary

members. Fi rs t , the socia l is ts needed to promote vigorously

indus t r ia l t rade union ism-- the only form of labor organizat ion

tha t could i n s t i l l in American workers a sense of class

consciousness. Indust r ia l unions alone, however, would not

a t t rac t the requis i te number of laborers to t he r evo lu ti ona ry

soc ia l i s t cause. In addition, Fraina and Reed counselled

soc ia l i s t s to conduct energetic po l i t i ca l campaigns, but with

a ~ d i f f e r e n t purpose from tha t which guided the Hil lqui t ians .

SP members, the manifesto declared, should regard each

campaign

not merely as a means of electing off ic ia l s topo l i t i ca l office . . . but as a year-round educationalcampaign to arouse the workers to class-consciouseconomic and poli t ical . act ion, and to keep al ivethe burning Odeal of revolution' in the hearts ofthe people.! .

Revolutionary sp i r i t , Fraina and Reed concluded, formed

the key ingredient of s oc ia l r evol ut ion; i f the socia l is ts

possessed the f o r ~ e r , the ~ a t t e r wpuld inevi tably come.INew York's l e f t wing could/·perhaps, only have

expressed such revolutionary optimism in the years immediate-

ly following the Russian Revolution. -Aside from the sense of



93

boundless confidence impl ic i t in the manifesto, h o w e v e ~ ,l i t t l e about the document was new or different · . Granted,

Fraina and Reed included one reference to the dic ta torship

of the pro le ta r ia t , a phrase tha t American soc ia l i s t s had

never previously used". "As Theodore Draper po ints o ut ,

however, the reference seemed to"be "tacked on almost as

11an after thought ." Reed and Fraina could jus t as easi ly

have w ritte n the greater pa r t of the manifesto in 1910

as in 1919. Prior to World War I, New York's revolut ionary

socia l is ts had st ressed the importance of indus t r ia l

unionism. They had regarded e lec to ra l campaigns primari ly

as avenues by which to spread revolutionary doctr ine. They

had denigrated the vafue of working for reform measures

ra ther t h ~ n for the ultim ate goal . If anyone document

provides def in i t ive proof of the cont inui ty between pre

world War I dissen t and post-World war I rebel l ion , it i s

the Left-Wing Manifesto of 1919.

Even before the publ icat ion of the manifesto, gl im-

merings of le f t -wing revolt ' had appeared, most notably in

the J ew ish Branch of the 2nd Agitat ion Dis t r i c t . Revolu-

t ionary soc ia l i s t s had begun a rebel l ion in th i s branch

in January 1919, much to th e ~ i s r n a y of both i t s own r ight -

wing members and the Local ' s r ight-wing leadership. In

\

complaints to Local New York's Central and Executive Com-

m ittees, the reform soc ia l i s t members of the branch accused



·,

-.

94

the l e f t wing of d i s r up t ing meet ings and p re ve ntin g th e

accomplishment of party work. According to the c o n s t r u c t i ~ ~ 5 t s ,the l e f t -w inge r s composed a minor i ty o f the branchls member-

12sh ip , and ye t they "did j u s t as t ~ e y pleased ." Using

"anarchis t ic t ac t ics and f i l thy l ~ n g u a g e , " they had succeeded

in driving away a good port ion of the branch's respectable,

const ruct iv is t cardholders.I3

The lef t -wing soc ia l i s t s , for the i r part , denied

a l l such claims. They asserted t h a t . ~ u l i u s Gerber had

concocted a se t of falsehoods and put them in the mouths

of accomodating branch members in order to destroy the sec t ion .14

When aSked why Gerber would wish to do th i s , the spokesman

for the l e f t wing replied that the branch housed many

revolut ionary socia l i s t s and t h a ~ the New York leaders thus

wished to el iminate i t .IS

No evidence exis t s ei ther tq prove

or to refute this charge of conspiracy, but the l e f t wing

did predic t the outcome of the conf l ic t correct ly . Local

New York's Executive C o m m i t t e ~ decided to 'reorganize ' the

branch, a euphemism for assigning, i t s members to other party

sections in an attempt to s p l i n t e ~ t he opposi ti on .

I f Local New York's leaders believed this maneuver

would deflec t further rebel l ion, the par ty ' s l e f t wing soon

proved them wrong.After the puplication of the Left-Wing

Manifesto, New Y o r ~ ' s revolut ionary socia l is ts began act ive

agi ta t ion in a l l party locals and s o o ~ s u c c e ~ d e d in capturing

about one-hal f of them. Complaints from reform socia l is ts



, ...

95

t hroughou t t he ci ty poured into the Local 's Executive Cornmit-

tee . "We t he under signed ," members of the 3rd-Sth-lOth

A.D. wrote, Mappeal to you for re l i e f from what we fee l i s

a s i tuat ion under which we can no longer function as

Social i s t s ."16 The pet i t ioners explained tha t the l e f t wing

had taken over t h e ~ r branch, and had subsequently in i t ia ted

"an anarchis t program" ~ h ~ C h th ey could not accept .17

The

8th A.D. reform soc ia l i s t s speci f ied in greater deta i l the

revolut ionar ies ' crimes:

They sowed dissension among the members by constant lyhurling the charge of " t ra i tor" on anyone who ei therdisagreed with what they termed "revolut ionary ideas"or with the i r pernicious act iv i t ies . • . • They createdan atmosphere of host i l i ty against the party no lessbi t te r than the host i l i ty exist ing a ga in st the twoold pol i t ica l par t ies . Defending the par ty was 18equivalent to defending the enemy of the working class . . .

The 8th A.D. 's reform socia l is ts could to lera te such behavior

so long as they r et ai ned con tr ol of. the branch. Eventually,

however, the lef t -wingers began to caucus before meetings

and vote as a bloc. "The resu l t , " the right-wingers com-

plained, "is tha t any proposit ion th e o rgan iz ed group i s

. 19bent on carrying i s usually carried." The 8th A.D. reform

socia l is ts should have been grateful ; the resul t of such

caucusing in o ther branches was far worse. In the 17th A.D.,

for example, reform and revolut ionary soc ia l i s t s regular ly,

spent the i r time hurl ing chai rs a t each other .20

The party leadership eyed s u c ~ fract iousness with

increasing alarm. Al love r the ci ty , left-wing agi ta t ion



.'

96

had transformed even the most ac t ive branches into a t

bes t debating soc ie t i es and a t worst boxing r ings . Worse

yet , the leadership believed the revolut ionar ies threatened

i t s own cont ro l of the par ty . The SP had housed a mi l i t an t

l e f t wing for some time, but never such a determined and

organized one. Panic-stricken a t the sigHt of branch a f t e r

branch succumbing to l ef t-w ing i nf lu ence , the party leaders

decided to use the i r power before they lo s t it. Beginning

in m id-A pril, the New York Executive Committee methodically

. reorganized eac h br an ch t h a t had fa l l en under le f t -wing

control or tha t t hr ea te ned to do so in the near future .

One month l a te r , the Committee s tar ted to suspend individual

le t t -wing branches tha t it could not succes sfu lly reorgan ize .

Final ly , in la te . t l - ~ a y , the E x e c u ~ i v e Conunittee decided tha t

each of the twenty-two branches af f i l i a t ed with the c i ty ' s

lef t -wing organizat ion should be suspended from the Local.21

One day af te r the Executive Committee suspende,t the

lef t -wing branches, the New York Call published a lengthy

a r t ic le by Morris Hil lqui t explaining the p a rty 's a ctio n.

Describing the left":':wingers as' ' ' temperamental" and "un-

,

balanced," Hil lqui t blamed them f or p ar aly zi ng the party

. , 22a t a moment of great opportun1ty. In stead o f bat t l ing

capi ta l i sm, Hillqu:it in to ned , th e soci 'a l i s t s now fought\

only themselves: "the hatr'ed engendered by the in te rna l

quarrels consumes a l l the i r energ ie s ."2 J H i l lqu i t readi ly

admitted tha t r ight-wingers had part ic ipated in the



.. 97

par t i san in f igh t ing as grea t ly as had the l e f t . This was

only natural , for the reform soc ia l i s t s r ight ly saw in

declared, "no t b ec au se it is too .radical , but because it

within themselves, could i n f l i c t far greater wounds upon

movement could aga in progress. Two par t ies , homogeneous

NO,

lead

by dissent .

26the decks."

essent ia l ly ... non Social i s t ; not because it would

too far , but because it would lead us nowhere. ,,25

The leadership needed to s uppre ss th e l e f t wing, Hil lqui t

us

continued exis tence . R e v o l ~ t i o n a r y socialism, Hil lqui t

Only le t the opposing camps separate, and the soc ia l i s t

H i ll q u it 's a r ti cl e did more than provide a rat ionale

i s

Bil lqui t reasoned, the c o n s t r u c t i ~ i s t s could not succumb to

the l e f t wing's ac t iv i t i e s a profound th re at to the par ty ' s

the SP leadership suspended the seven lef t-wing foreign

, . .

language federat ions and e x p e ~ l e d the ent i re Michigan organi-

~ a t i o n . A few weeks la ter , the Ma,ssachusetts and Ohio

revolutionary socialism, but n e i ~ h e r could the y continue to

said, had never sui ted the c ondi ti on s o f American l i f e ,

condit ions which demanded it. program with a " real is t ic basis. , ,24

waste time and effor t f ighting i t . The solut ion was clear :

a meeting of the Nationai Executive Committee in l a te May,

The time had come, Hil lqui t concluded, to "clear

for the suspension of the c i ty ' s l e f t wing; it also spurred

soc ia l i s t s across the nation to 'fol low New York's lead. At

capitalism than could a single organization torn



98

p a r t i e s and numerous l o c a l ~ , i n c l u d ~ n g t h a t o f Chicago,

. s u f f e r e d t h e s a ~ e f a t e . Within s i x months, t h e p a r t y ' s

l e a d e r s had e i t h e r e x pe l l e d o r suspended about t w o - t h i r d s

o f t h e S P ' s membership.27 Throughout t h e c o u n t r y , a s i n

New York, the SOGialist Party had s p l i t , and the communist

movement emerged.

"Hil lquit had expected t h a t the expulsion of t ~ l e f t

wing would bring harmony and peace t o the S o c i a l i s t Party.

In New York, however , events soon disproved t h i s prophecy.

A new i n t e r n a l b a t t l e arose in 1920--this time focusing

primari ly on the SP's r e l a t i o n to the Third I n t e r n a t i o n a l .

As we have seen, the r ight-wing s o c i a l i s t s had i n i t i a l l y

greeted the Russian Revolution q u i t e warmly. By the end

of 1919, however, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Bolshev ism and

American revolu t ionary soc ia l ism was complete. Under

constant attack from the Bolshevik leadership for t h e i r

reform p o l i c i e s , the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s gradually withdrew

t h e i r support .o f the Soviet s t a t e and the Third Internat ionaL

Hailing the r i s e of the B r i t i s h Labour Party as "a more

thoroughgoing revolution than the Bolshevik coup d'etat,1l28

Hil lqui t and t h other SP leaders decided against a f f i l i a t i n g

with· the revolutionary,. Soviet-led Comintern. This decis ion,

however, a r o u ~ e d ~ h wrath of many who had chosen t o remain

within the New Yotk S o c i a l i s t Party. They regarded the

H i l l q u i t i a n s ' policy as a betrayal of the only workers'

s t a t e in the world, a s t a t e with which a l l s o c i a l i s t s should



99

. '-be proud to i den t i fy .29 During 19 20 , a number of these

New York soc ia l i s t s - - led by Alexander Trachtenberg, Benjamin

At the same t ime, these members of the New York ·S?

To men l ike Trachtenberg and Glassberg such behav io r r eeked

Most notably, he convinced the National Executive Committee

st ressing

31values .

objected strenuously to a further rightward d r i f t in the

to delete sect ions of the program tha t ca l led for repudiat ion

Glassberg and Ludwig Lore--held meetings and demonstrations

support ing SP af f i l i a t ion with the Third In ternat ional .30

the expulsion of New York's f ive soc i a l i s t assemblymen,

whose pledges of .party membership were deemed i n c o n s o n ~ n twith the i r oaths of off ice . Hi l lqu i t responded to the expul

sions by· proposing to rewrite the pa r ty ' s bylaws and program.

leadership ·s domestic pol ic ies . This d r i f t resul ted from

of the war d eb ts , r es is ta nc e to conscr ipt ion. and the expul-

the r ighteousness of the soc ia l i s t cause but by

soc ia l i s t s · during the l eg i s la tu re ' s hearings not by a s s e r ~ i n g

the par ty ' s t rad i t iona l adherence to democratic

sion o£ party members in public off ice who supported mil i t a ry

appropr ia t ions. In addi t ion. Hil lqu i t defended the f ive

of corrupt ion. The former charged t ha t Hil lqui t w ~ k o w t o w i ~ gto the Assembly by trying. to "pain t the Socia l i s t Party as

b l d d ff ' ,,32 h 1a n ic e. re sp ecta e, goo y-goo y a a ~ r . . . T e a t t e r

. I

characterized Hil lqui t l s a:ttempt "to capi ta l ize on the exist ing

'American prejudices and i l lus ions about Democracy and Republican

Government" as a "disgraceful surrender., ,33



·.

100

These d i s a g r e ~ ~ e n t s over the proper relat iop to the

Third Internat ional and the proper response to the assembly-

mep's expulsion c ~ u 5 e d yet another sp l i t in the SF's ranks.

In June 1921, Trach t enbe rg , Glassberg and Lore led a group

o f s oc ia lis ts --mo st o f whom resided in New York--out of the

SP and into the C o r n m u n i s ~ Par ty. This defection, of course,

depleted the Socia l i s t Party s t i l l fur ther ; by the end of

1921, over two-thirds of .Local New York's wartime members

34

had departed. Morris Hillqui t wrote in 1920 tha t "a l l in -

d i c a ~ i o n s point to a steady development and large g r o ~ t h35

of the movement within .the immediate future . n I f H i l ~ q u i thimself believed his statement, then he was the only one.

All indica t ions pointed not to a steady development but to

a dramatic decline of the New York Socia l i s t Party.

With the Social is t Party shrinking dai ly, one might

think tha t the communist movement would have rapidly gained

in s t r e ~ g t h and influence. In fac t , the communists fared

as badly as did the socia l is ts in the years immediately

fo llowing th e sp l i t . For both these groups, the t rad i t ion

of fractiousness p r o v e ~ too strong to disappear. Just as

the soc ia l i s t s continued to Buffer internal dissension af ter

the i n i t i a l sp l i t of 1919, so too did the communists. Following•the i r expulsion from the SP, the lef t -wingers fur ther separated

into two organizations, the C o ~ u n i s t Party and the Communist

Labor Party. The programs of these two par t ies ~ e v e a l few



101

extremely injurol l5 ex te rna l forces . As the s t r ike wave

of 1919 cont inued , Americans voiced increasing- fear and

conce rn about radical act ivi t ies . In New York, the s ta te

largely American membership

36would occur. Consequently,

differences in ideology or pol icy; both organizations re -

th e CLP found it i m p o s s i b l ~ to u ni te . The l a rge ly immigrant

membership of the CP feared t ha t CLPers would seize a l l

Clayton LUSK. In June, the committee began to gather

Investigate Seditious Activi t ies under ,the chairmanship of

leg is la ture created in March 1919 a Joint Committee to

and spent much of the i r time attacking each other.

Meanwhile, the Communists had to contend with

and Reed's Left-Wing Manifesto. Nonethe le ss , th e CP and

the two organizations continued the i r separate exis tences

mained la rgely fai thful to the ideas expressed in Fra ina ' s

tacula r anti-communist raids conduct ed ove r an eight-month

mater ia l on the " reds ," p r ima ri ly through a ser ies of spec-

as Benjamin Gitlow, a leader of the CLP; Harry Winitsky,

the headqua rt er s o f the CP and CLP, seized mountains of

power in a un if ie d par ty ; the

o£: tha CLF feared the reverse

per iod. 'The largest _of these ra ids to ok p lace on November 8,

when over 700 policemen and special agents swooped down on

the CP's executive secre tary; and Gus Klonen and Carl Pavia,

rad ica l l i t e ra ture , and- arres ted hundreds of people.- Among

those the s ta tep r o s e c u t ~ d - - u h d e r

a criminal anarchy law'\ .

used only once before--were such ~ m p o r t a n t New York communists



102

editors of The Cla ss S truggl e. The New York Communist par t ies

;-, . 'w ent unde rg round irrunediately fo l lowing these r a i d s . "Con-

l, sider ing the law as it now stands," explained the edi tors

of the Communist, - " i t must be said tha t open discussion 6£

Communism i s now a cr-ime in the United States,",,3?

The effects of the Red Scare on the communist move-

ment were ' nothing shor t of catac-lysmic. National ly; me"tnber":

sh ip in th e two commun is t pa r t i e s decreased from an es t ima ted

70,000 in 1919 to 16,000 in 1920. No f igures ex i s t for the

New York sect ions alone, but the percentage drop in the i r

membership was probably comparable; if anythin g, th e i n t i -

"midation, deportation and arres t of radicals that ravaged

the party across the nation assumed t he i r most severe form

in New York.38

In addition to d e p ~ e t i n g the par t ies them-

selves , the government's repression made communist organizing

effor t s impo ssib le . Con sp ir ato ria l organizat ions, by defin i -

tion°, cannot conduct mass propaganda, cannot part ic ipate

in elec tora l campaigns, cannot engage themselves in t rade

union work. Alexander Bittelman, a New York communist', ad-

mitted in 1921 tha t , while they were underground, the CP

. 39and:the CLP did ' not exis t as a factor in the c lass s t ruggle."

- 0' Furthermore, as they grew increasingly removed- f rom American

l i fe , the communists became ever more attached to the i r\

Bolshevik brethren. The Soviets t h e ~ s e l v e s bear par t i a l

' responsib i l l ty for th is . As the years passed, the Bolshevik

leaders grew increasingly dic ta tor ia l toward the other



103

own sense of accomplishment decreased. ·Small, div ided and

As a resul t . the, New York communists formed in the fa l l of

Trachtenberg,

42charge.

the head of the Comintern, sta ted f la t ly tha t the Soviets

be l ieved ' it "obligatory to in te r fere" in the i n t e rna l a f f a i r s

of the world's communist par t ies .40

But New York's communists

proved quite will ing--even eager--to accept such

Soviet direct ion. The U.S. communist s frequently requested

the Soviet Union to se t t le the i r i n t e r n ~ l disputes, allowed

~ h Third In ternat ional to hand-pick the i r leaders , regarded

the U ~ S . S . R . as the i r native country.41 In ef fec t , the American. .

By the end of 1921, however , the Communist's prospects

began to look somewhat brighter . In May, the Comintern had

members of the Third I n t e r na t i ona l ; indeed , Gregory Zinoviev ,

that did not quel l a l l communist sectarianism but a t leas t

forced a merger between the two communist par t ies - -a merger

communists' po l i t i ca l and psychological ident i f ica t ion with

the Bolsheviks strengthened in the same measure as the i r

muted it to some degree. Furthermore, as the Red Scare

isola ted, the communist par t ies had to l ive vicar ious ly .

Cornmunists--especially those who, l ike Lore and

had only r e c e n t l y \ q ~ i t the SP--echoed Eastman's

for continuing to divorce i t s e l f from American l i f e . Other

1921 the Worker's League, which nominated Ben Gitlow for

.passed, the Communists edged towards the formation of a legal

party . Max Eastman, the best-known in te l lec tual supporter

of the Communists in New York a tta ck ed th e CP in rnid-192l



104

mayor. Short ly thereaf te r , the communists created the

worker 's, Party as a legal outgrowth of the i l l ega l CP,

and in April 19t3 ·they f inal ly d iss olv ed th e CP al together .

Despite these fa in t glimmers of Communist revival ,

however, the New York radical movement of the early 1920's

could not compare with tha t .of t he p revi ou s decade. The

sectarianism tha t had always character ized the New York

soc ia l i s t Party had f inal ly exacted i t s to l l , and the

soc ia l i s t movement almost ent i re ly collapsed. In the place

of one vis ib le and growing party , there now existed two a l

most ins ign i f ican t ones. In the place of frequent put

usually 'unorganlzed in t ra-par ty dissent there now' existed

constant and ins t i tu t iona l i zed div is ion . In fac t , only

one remnant o f radical st rength still remained in New

York. Despite th e sp l i t s , despi te the Sp's own vast ly

reduced membership, the Socia l i s t Party s t i l l commanded

tne al legiance of New York's garment unions. The question

was: For how much longer?



CHAPTER VI

THE FINAL CONFLICT:

CIVIL WAR IN THE ILGWU

The s p l i t of the S o c i a l i s t Party in 1919 necessari ly

extended to New York C i t y ' s garment unions. Since t h e i r

founding conventions, these unions had maintained close

t ; e s to Local New York; they had looked to it for leader- ·

s h i p , g i v e n it t h e i r s u p p o r t , l e n t it t h e i r s t r e n g t h . Yet

for a l l th ese y ea rs, a s i g n i f i c a n t number of workers

w it h i n t h e u n i o n s had e x p r e s s e d deep d i s c o n t e n t w i t h t h e

moderate p o l i c i e s t h a t the s o c i a l i s t leaders pursued. Such

r a n k - a n d - f il e d i s q u i e t only i n t e n s i f i e d i n t h e p o s t - ~ a ryears, primarily as a r e s u l t of the recession which h i t

the industry in 1920. Now, unlike before , the workers

had an option: I f they disl iked s o c i a l i s t leadership, they

could turn t o the communists, whose par ty longed to

seize control of the unions for i t s e l f . In the 1920s, then,

the garment u n i o n ~ became the battleground for y et another

episode in the corltinuing war between constructive and

revo"lutionary social ism. This episode, however, would be

the i a st - - o r a t l e a s t the l a s t of any consequence. The

105



•

106

sectarianism tha t raged within the garment unions during

th e 19 20 's u t t e r l y des t royed n e ed le -t ra d es r ad i ca li sm -

and, with it, the hope for any potent an t i - cap i ta l i s t move

ment in New York City.

The conf l i c t between the socia l is ts and the communists

unfolded with part icular force in the most powerful of the

garment unions--the ILGWU. Members of th i s union, l ike

workers in the l esser needle-trades labor organizations,

confronted a severe economic downturn in the ear ly 19205.

The contracting system, which had .declined slowly but

s t ead i ly in the 19105, r e t u r n ~ d in fu l l fo rc e d urin g the

recession, since many manufacturers found the y could no

longer afford to produce the i r own garments. Unemployment

rose sharply, as increasing numbers of employers joined

an exodus to open-shop towns . Wages and hours worsened ,

When those manufacturers l e f t in New York abrogated the

agreements they had previously signed with the union. These

economic i l l s revived the old controversies between t ~ ILGWU's leadership and i t s rank and f i l e . Many ILGWU

members believed tha t only through mil i tant action could

the union hope to arres t the downward spi ra l of working

condit ions. The leadership, however, followed exactly the

opposi te path. In, an effor t to l imi t the growth of con

t ract ing, the union forged a vi r tua l al l iance with the large

manufacturers. OCcsionally, the union loaned these employers



·: . ,,"

107

Jus t as new economic conditions intensif ied divisions

In 1920, discontent over the bureaucratic nature and

became increasingly aware of an oi led and polished union

workers

ILGWU off ic ia ls , for example, often placed sup-

from the rank and f i l e , but in the early 19205

anger much of the ILGWU·s membership, for not only did

union trea'sury--in exchange for the i r cooperation. In some

porters in the best shops--or even gave them money from the

Tee ILGWU·s leadership had always operated a t a safe distance

w ithin the ILGWU, so too did an expanding union bureaucracy.

the product ivi ty of thei r workers, even i f th is meant

1sanctioning the use of speed-up, Such polic ies could only

t he ir in du st ria l a ssoc ia ti on s o r helped them to improve

machine,

s o c i ~ l i s t , la ter noted, "democracy was gradually giving

way to power groupings" w ithin th e ILGWU.4

The influence

the conservative pol ic ies of the ILGNU led to the creat ion

suffered accordingly.

of th e o rd in ary rank-and-fi le member over union act iv i t ies

to express rank-and-fi le grievances against the leadership.

locals , the stuff ing of ba l lo t boxes to re ta in power became

. 3common pract ice . As Melech Epstein, a prominent Jewish

a'f the Shop Delegate League, an opposit ion group designed

"tQey seem unsocia l is t , but they also p r ~ v e d remarkably un

successful .2

'money; more often it e i ther encouraged them to strengthen



108

The members of the Ladies Waist and Dressmaker Union

Local 25 who founded the l eague c la imed tha t the reigning

ILGWU leadership was deviat ing from the social ist-democrat ic

ideology tha t was supposed to be the union's keystone. They

proposed a plan, imported from the shop stewards' movement

in Bri ta in, to reorganize the ILGWU along shop ra ther than

cra f t l ines , with a committee of each shop's delegates

forming the governing body of the union. The adherents of

the loosely-kni t league m o v e m e n t ~ - w h i c h spread to a t leas t

three other locals--hoped tha t th is new s t ructure would

turn the ILGWU in a more mi li ta n t d ir ec ti on by giving the

workers , r a t h e r than the pa id o f f i c i a l s , d i r e c t con t ro l over

5union matters.

I t i s in th i s larger context of rank-and-f i le opposi-

t ion to the TLGWU leadership--opposit ion bearing a d i s t inc t

resemblance to tha t which had arisen before the war--thaf-·

the r i se of the communists w ith in the union should be under-

stood. Communists had been present in the ILGWU as early

as 1919, the year the American Communist Party was formed.

The act iv i ty of these men and women, however, remained

extremely l imi ted unt i l 1921, when the CP emerged from the

underground and the Internat ional di rected it to adopt

the st ra tegy of "boring from within." The purpose of th is

,

plan was to capture the Social is t Par ty ' s t rad i t ional bases

of supp ort, par t icula r ly- the more radical trade unions, and

-use them to fur ther the communists' cause. As one communist



109

newspaper said, the party wanted to place i t s members "at

s t ra tegic points so tha t in the time of revolutionary

cr i s i s we may seize con tro l o f the o r g a ~ i z a t i o n and turn

the ac t iv i t i e s of the union into pol i t i ca l channels."6

In accordance with t he i r new ins t ruct ions , the

communists in the ILGWU se t out to estaql ish c ~ n t r o l over

the shop delegate movement, which ,seemed to them the bes t

base from which to bore. They e n t e r ~ j the leagues in in -

creasing numbers and began to act as a faction within them,

caucusing pr ior to any decision tha t the leagues had to

make and then voting as a bloc a t the meetings. ' Through

th i s method, the s t i l l re la t ively small group of communists

within the union began to win control over the ent i re shop

delegate movement. In turn, they used th is cont ro l to connect

the leagues to the Trade Union Educational League, a CP

organization designed to carry out the Third In ternat ional ' s

union pol ic ies by direct ing a n coo rd inat ing the ac t iv i t i e s

of party members within establ ished labor organizat ions.7

Within the f i r s t year of, i t s operation, the TUEL

chose the garment trades unions .as i t s principal area of

act iv i ty . As Benjamin Gitlow, chairman of the Needle Trades

Committee of the Communist Party wrote, the TUEL decided,

on this p a r t i c u l a ~ focus because

the majority of members in these unions were theso r t of f o r e i g n ~ b o r n who had been for years undersoc ia l i s t influence and hence attuned to our



...-

110

ideological approach • . . Cand because the Communist

Party] already had some 2,000 of our members sca t

tered in these unions. S

Thechoice was

awise one, re f lec t ing knowledge of the

s i tuat ion within the garment unions and especia l ly within

the ILGWU. Aided by the TUEL and based in the Shop Dele-

gate Leagues, the communist members of the women's clothing

union began an a l l -ou t drive for contro l o f the ILGWU--a

drive which fascinated and a t t rac ted increas ing numbers of

workers.

Part of the communists· appeal lay in the i r harsh

cri t ic ism of the union l e ~ d e r s h i p l s re la t ive ly conservative

t r ade po l i c i e s . In i t s a t tempt to gain suppor t , the l e f t

wing claimed tha t the economic ha rd sh ip s bei ng suffered by

the workers were primari ly due to the soc ia l i s t s l policy

of class collaborat · ion. In an ar t i c le ent i t led liThe Socia l i s t

Party Gomperists," the Communist Daily Worker contrasted

i t s own concept of unionism with tha t o f the soc ia l i s t s :

The former (communist viewpoint) holds tha t theemancipation of the w ork ers can be achieved onlyby the workers themselves. The l a t t e r [ soc ia l i s tviewpoint] believes in peace between cap i ta l andlabor . The one maintains tha t the workers m u ~ talways ca r ryon a pers i s ten t s t ruggle not only forbet te r condit ions of l ivino but for the i r comoletel ibera t ion . The other places i t s hope upon the goodwi l l of the capi ta l i s t s ra ther than upon the struggleof the workers . . . This Gomperist philosophy ... is thecause of tPe chaos, the demora l iza tion, the helplessness of our union organizations. 9

, .

The words rang t rue to the men and women who had taken par t

in the Hourwich af fa i r , the Moishe Rubin rebe l l ion , the



III

Shop Delega te League. Pr io r to the war , these workers

•

•

.,

had raised object ions to the union-manufacturer partnership

es tab l i shed by th e Protocol o f Peace . Fol lowing th e war ,

w ithin the union. the communists stood ready to tear it

between themselves and the rank and f i l e , the c?mmunists

The lef t -wingers , however, gained rank-and-f i le

In the communists' rhetor ic , then, the workersi thy terms.

.' ' .the communists were at tacking the 'union 's leadership for

of aiding in a l l ways p ossib le th e la rger employers. Now

the res tructuring of the union along shop ra ther than c ra f t

l ines . Where the socia l is ts had begun to build a machine

. .they had denounced in a s imilar vein the union's pract ice

support. not only through th ei r c rit iq ue s of soc ia l i s t t rade

own long-s tanding compla in ts .

heard echoed the i r own long-standing cr i t ic i sms and the i r

those same policies , but in far more coherent, far more

practices but through t h e i ~ advocacy of a different kind

o f le ad ersh ip than the socia l is ts seemed willing, or even

able , to provide. Where the socia l i s t s had turned bureau-

c ra t ic , the c ~ m m u n i s t s emphasized democrptic unionism and

down. Where the socia l i s t leaders had erected barr iers

democratic, mili tant u n i o n i s m - - ~ promise ' that the stodgy

t r ied to appear as one with the masses. Many workers, then,,regarded the communists as represent ing a new promise of



112

from the more cen t r i s t dress workers. ~ h action was a

no mood to to le ra te the existence of communists within i t s

dismal fa i lure ; in one stroke, the socia l is ts had confirmed

The r i gh t i s t sight-wing bureaucrats could not fu l f i l l .

which the communists projected. Their in s i s ten t cal ls for

democracy and militance touched a. responsive chord among

the many workers who had g r o ~ disenchanted with the manner

in which th e union was being run .lQ

The union leadership ' s reaction to the inc ipient

had begun to seem routine to the rank and f i l e ; in contrast ,

there was nothing rout ine or uninspired about the image

the early 1920's, then, the soc ia l i s t leadership was in

l e f t i s t movement within the ILGWU only enhanced the communists'

credib i l i ty among rank-and-fi le members. Men l ike Hillqui t

had always harbored deep animosity toward the revolut ionary

soc ia l i s t group, which had challenged the i r leadership and

disputed the i r views. This hatred had grown even more a l l -

unions. A cc ordingly, the socia l is ts summarily divided

existence both threatened and incensed ~ h socia l is ts . By

influence--in an attempt to isola te the radical waistmakers

consuming since the formation of the CP, a party whose very

the ILGWU o b j ~ c t e d strongly to the. leadership ' s undemocratic

Local 25--where the communists had achieved the i r greatest

and arbi t rary t reatment of the union 's dissidents , ' and, in

the l e f t wing's por t ra i t of them as conservative bureau,

cra ts , removed from the u n i o ~ ' s rank and f i l e . Workers in



•

113

ever greater numbers, these workers turned toward the

communist opposition. The division of Local 25, ra ther than

con ta in ing t he l e f t wing, enabledit

to expand i t s influenceth roughout th e union and e ~ p e c i a l l y i n to th e th r ee l a r ge s tILGWU l oca l s - -22 , 2 and 9.

11

The r ight wing, however, ignored th e lesso ns of

t hi s. i nc ident and proceeded with pol ic ies tha t only served

t o s ub st an ti at e the communists' accusations of corrupt ion

and ty ranny. On OCtober 8, 1923, th e s o c i a l i s t l e ade r sh ip

deposed the 19 l e f t i s t s on Local 22's communist-dominated

executive board on the ground tha t they bad discussed union

mat ters with a CP func t iona ry . In the nex t day ' s New York

Times, Abraham Baretf , General Sec re ta ry -T re as ur er o f t he

ILGWU, exp la in ed th e reasons for the action:

A union member may be a Republicap, Democrat,Social i s t or Communist but we 'cannot permit unionbusiness to be t ransacted in an outside organizat ionopposed to the I n t e r n a t i o n a ~ Union. The T.U.E.L. i s

modelled af te r the Ku Klux Klan, but in anotherguise. I t ' s a pity we did not clear up th i s si tua- 12t ion two years ago, when the g e was f i r s t planted •

.In accord with th is b elie f, the union leadership

d eclared th e TUEL a dual union and o r d e ~ e d tha t a l l i t s units

in the ILGWU locals disband. The r ight ~ i n g argued, not. .

without some jus t i f ica t ion , tha t the TUEL members aimed not. . .to inf luence exis t ing policy in order -to b e ~ e f i t the worker

•but ra ther to achieve complete control over the union in

l ine with the Communist Party 's pol i t ica l goals. Most



114

workers, however, found this a less t han convinc ing asser-

t i cn . The communist leadership could r ight ly claim tha t

it had avoided a dual union policy a t every turn , and th i s

>

factor seems to have been decis ive in the workers' minds.

The majority of the rank and f i le concurred with the communist

le ad ers in viewing the suspensions as the desper at e a tt emp t

of a doomed leadership to re ta in i t s power. As the

Daily worker character ized the s i tua t ion ,

In great fear of the tremendous growth andpres t ige gained by the mil i t an t s , this motleycrew of labor bureaucrats and t he ir s o ci al is tsa te l l i tes have formed a holy al l iance forsuspensions and expulsions. I3

The s t rategy of the Third In ternat ional was clear ly

paying off . Incteasing numbers of workers began jumping

on the communist bandwagon, some out of s in cer e conv ic tion

tha t the soc ia l i s t s ' pol ic ies were harming the union,

others out of rage a t the undemocratic methods of the r igh t

wing. Charles Zimmerman, one of the foremost lea ders of

the ILGWU l e f t i s t fact ion, wrote in 1927: "We Communists ...

were helped by the brazenness of the administrat ion .•,14

Indeed, by the end of 1924 the lef t-wingers had obtained

a majori ty on th e exe cu ti ve boards of Locals 2, 9, and 22,

giving them control of app roximately seven ty percent of

., k· rob h · 15the u n ~ o n s New Yor C ~ t y me e rs ~ p \

To the soc ia l i s t s , th is was an ~ n a c c e p t a b l e s t a t e

of a f fa i r s , demanding immediate correc t ion. As a manifesto



115

t ion, which came close to being a Workers' Party af fa i r , ·

The issue chosen by President of the ILGWU Morris Sigman

Sigman's response

put out by the ILGWU leadership s ta ted ,

Olgin, a well-known Jewish communist, spoke. The dernonstra-

to begin h is al l -out attack revolved around a 1925 May Day

The so-cal led worker 's Party, the American section

of the Communist Internat ional in Moscow, has se tbefore i t s e l f the defini te task of discredi t ing anddestroying our in ternat ional union • .• We have reachedthe conclusion that our in te rna t iona l union must putan end, with a firm and unfal ter ing arm, to theCommunist demora li za ti on in our midst . The Communistshave declared war upon us and our reply to them mustbe--War! Whoever i s with the Communists is an enemyof ours and for such there i s no room within our r a n k s ~ 6

become members of the Communist Party.

Although the s o c i a l ~ s t ~ ~ s u c c e e p e d in seizing the

buildings of L o c a l ~ 2 and 9, the l e f t ·wing rebuffed them

when they arr ived a t the ir th ird d estin atio n. Local 22 be-

leadership in th e s tro ng est terms and urged a l l workers to

demonstration cal led by Locals 2, 9, and 11, a t which Moissaye

able to bring the r e c a l c i ~ r a n t membership into l ine .

was immediate and drast ic : the ILGWU suspended every l e f t i s t

ended with a speech by Olgin tha t denounced the union's

off icer of the three locals , reorganized the locals them-

selves, and subjected their h ~ a d q u a r t e r s t o quas i-m il it ar yra ids in the hope tha t , by t a k ~ n g over the l e f t wing's

physical locat ions , the ILGWU leadership would be bet ter

came the headquarters of the l e f t i s t drive for reinstatement



116

into the union, a drive directed by a newly formed Jo in t

Action Commi tt ee ( JAC) . \ 'lhile ".scores of young Communists

from the col leges , Bronx h o u s e w ~ v e 5 , and party members from

the e ntir e c ity joined the l e f t ~ w i n g garment workers in

-guarding t he headqua rt er s, "1? the JAC began to function as

an independent union, co ll ec ting"dues, nego ti at ing with

employers, cal l ing shop s t r ikes . In i t s e f for t s , the JAC

commanded the support of the vas t majority of the lef t -wing

l oca l s ' former members, who .refused to r eg i s te r with or

pay dues to the newly organized Socia l is t - led locals and

who flocked, in numbers as high as 40,000, to JAC-called

mass meetings. The JAC, nonethe le ss, r efused to declare

i t s e l f a dual union; it adhered to the pol ic ies se t down

by the Third Internat ional arid emphasized tha t it aimed

only to re ins ta te the lef t -wing locals .

The l6-week stru gg le fo r reins tatement sharply

accelerated the s o c i a l i s t - c ~ m m u n i s t conf l i c t . Previously ,

re la t ively l i t t l e actual violence had taken place; the

st ruggle had instead been character ized by such phenomena

as tile ' fa int ing-br igades", groups of lef t -wing women who

pretended to pass out a t s o c i a l ~ s t mee tings , t he reby

causing pandemonium and breaking up th e a ss emb lie s. But

with th e c re at io n ~ the JAC a g ~ n u i n e war for membership

broke out , complete with threats , violence, and the use

of profess ional strong-arm men.



117

The events of the four months of war convinced

sigman t ha t he had to r e t r ea t . The garment center had

been turned in to a v ir tu al b a tt le zone by the h i r e ~ thugs

of both s ides , who roamed the s t ree t s looking for blood

to sp i l l . Economic conditions were r ap id ly de te r io r at ing ,

as employers took advantage of the in ternal dissension

to lower wages and increase working hours. Most important ,

the socia l i s t s were clear ly losing the f ight for the

workers ' al legiance. In September 1925, the ILGWU adopted

a peace plan which affirmed the principle of pol i t ica l

to lerance , re insta ted the communist locals in the i r previous

form and scheduled new local elect ions. In these e lec t ions ,

the l e f t i s t s gained majorities in four locals , enabling them

to take over the New York Joint Board, the single most

important segment of the union. The c ~ m m u n i s t s were clearly

playing t he i r cards correctly; the prospect of to ta l capture

of the ILGWU loomed large on the horizon ..Yet, within one short year, the communists in the

ILGWU 'had r educed themselves ' to vir tual . , ins ignif icance.

The sudden reversa l stenuned from the l e f t "s disastrous

handling of a general cloakmakers s t r ike called on July 1,

1926--a 2a-week s tr ike that brought severe hardship to

almost 40,000 garment workers and resul ted in l i t t l e or no

economic gain. In i t i a l ly , the walkout seemed l ike a golden

opportuni ty for the l e f t i s t s . Had they managed the s tr ike



.-

118

in New York effect ively, the communists would have vast ly

enhanced the i r reputat ion throughout the internat ional union.

As the New York Times pointed out ,

( l a s t fa l l} the Jo fn t Board was given over to

the l e f t by Pres iden t Sigman 's a dm i nis tr at io n to

run according to the i r besT junaement . This s t r ikewil l be the i r f i r s t t e s t case. l

Paradoxical ly, however, the influence of the ~ o m m u n i s t Party

i t s e l f proved decisive in dooming the walkout and thus, the

ent i re left-wing cause in- the union. Even more paradoxically,

the communists ' l o ss proved no t to be the s o c i a l i s t s ' ga in .

When'the s t r i ke ended and i n t e r n a l peace f i na ll y a rr iv e d,

it became apparent t ha t a n y t ~ i n g approaching t rue soc ia l i sm

no longer had a p lace in th e I L G ~ i U .

The communists ca l l ed the 1926 s t r i ke in response

to the pub l ica t ion o f a Governor ' s Commission r epo r t t h a t

proposed ways to s t a b i l i z e the aarment indus t ry and made

recommendations for the nex t cloakmakers ' con t r ac t . The

commission advocated th e adoot ion o f the .kev union demand:

a l im i t a t i on on the number o f c o ~ t r a c t o r s with whom any

jo bb er c ou ld dea l . This reform would have phased ou t th e

no to r ious auct ion system and g re a tl y a ll ev ia te d the wage

ea rne r s ' p l i gh t . The r e lease o f the r epo r t persuaded

many s o c i a l i s t s t ha t they a t l e a s t had a bas i s fo r nego t i a -,

t i on w ith th e m an ufac tu rers . Morr is Hi l l qu{ t , fo r example ,

urged th e acceotance of· a rb i t r a t i on and.eaut ioned th e l e f t

wing:



119

And you may be Soc i a l i s t s and Anarch i s t s and

Communists. as much as you want to , and be aszealous and enthusias t ic in your pol i t ica lbe l i e f s as you want to be . • • bu t what I want to

impress upon you i s the thing tha t it seems tome you have forgotten .... You know it i s easy todes t roy , it i s hard to r e bu i l d . 19

The Communists, however, found. cer ta in parts of the report

to ta l ly unacceptable, notably a suggestion tha t the

employers be g ~ v e n a r ight to ~ r e o r g a n i z e ! ' ( i . e . to f i re)

ten oercent of t he i r work fo=ce ear.h year and a recomrnenda

20t i on t h a t th e workers not be granted a fo r ty -hour week.

The workers' objections to these two aspects of the repor t ,

together with the compromising effe ct th at the acceptance

of a government-inspired settlement would have had on the

communists, convinced the left-wing Joing Board to ca l l

out i t s members.

At f i r s t , the str ike seemed a success: the shops

were uniformly shut down. Unfortunately_ for the c ~ m m u n i s t s ,

however, events went needlessly downhill from there. In

the eighth week of the s t r ike , Zimmerman and Louis Hyman,

the other l e f t i s t leader in the ILGWU, reached an informal

agreement with the inside manufacturers! association,which,

i f not spectacular , was at leas t respectable . The terms

of th is agreement included a forty-hour w ~ e k , a ten percent

wage hike and a compromise on_the reorganizat ion issue by,

which employers would gain the r ight ~ f i re fiv e p erc en t

·of their wcrkers each y ~ a r . Hyman a ~ ~ i m m e r m a n favored



120

a sett lement but they had to get th e app roval of the

communist apparatus f i r s t . As they soon discovered, th i s

. ,.

,

apparatus was in no mood to make peace.

The reason for the reject ion of the agreement by

intense f ac ti onal ism wi th in the party, with each of

facturers ' wish to save a par t of thei r season doomed

dragged on. A year l a te r , the admittedly part isan Sigman

Zimmerman's

the Conununist Party ' 5 Need'le Trades Committee had nothing

to do with the terms themselves. Rather. it resul ted from

several di f feren t groups t rying to appear more revolutionary

The minute Boruchowi tz got through saying. "Mavbewe could have' aotten more." William Wein stone . amember of the Politburo, was on h is fee t shouting,"They didn ' t get more. I f there i s a poss ib i l i ty

of get t ing more, go and get more." Ben Gitlowcouldn ' t afford to l e t Weinstone get ahead of himin militancy so he .jumped up -and echoed, "Sure,get going. Try and get more" ... At t ha t stageof the course, Charles .Krumbein, the par ty ' ss ta te d ir ec to r, could not s i t back and l e t himselfbe outclassed . . • So he. too.k up- the cry, and thewhole thing kept escalat ing. 22

than the next in order to gain Moscow's approval . As Epstein

might make i t appear i n s u f f i c i e n ~ l y Bolshevik.

l a te r commented, "Factional s t r i fe precluded elementary

reasoning. ,,21 None of the various factions f e l t able to

endorse an agreement· which, however good for the workers, ·

l a te r recol lec t ions of th at fa te fu l meeting are t e l l i ng :

The Communist P a rty 's r ef us al to t ake advan tage of the manu-

the st r ike to fa i lu re . As soon as the season ended, the\

employers once again hardened thei r l ine and the s t r ike



-...

. ' ;

'" commented tha t "a union can I t ac.t on inst ruct ions from. ,~ Moscow . . . lt must have i t s freedom and ac t as economic

121

d ·t· .23 I th · S'· t'on ~ o n 5 warran t . . n 1.S case , l.gman 5 asc::er 10n

seemed co r rec t . ~ n n t ~ e ~ ~ n k ann f i l e beaao orarlual1v to

adoot h is ooin t of view. The Communist Par tv ' s deoendencv

on the Balsheviks--a deoendency which had developed during

the ~ e a r s of f r u s t r ~ t i o n a f t e r the sp l i t - -had come backto haunt the n e e d l e - t r a d ~ s ' l e f t wing.

By November, the communists real ized tha t the

s t r ike had to be se t t led , no matter what the terms.

Although the walkout continued agains t the jobbers

and con t rac to rs , the l e f t wing d id reach an agreement

with the inside manufacturers--an agreement which could

only be regarded as a sev.ere defeat , . The new pact gave

employers the r ight t o r eo rgan iz e ten oercent of t h e i r

shops three t imes in two and a hal f years . In addi t ion ,

the agreement postponed ~ h i n s t i t ~ t i o n of the for ty-hourweek un t i l 1929 and r e c o g n i z ~ d the demand for l imita t ion

of contractors only "in prin ,cip le ." The cont ra c t p rovi si on s

were worse than those,recommended by the governor 's commission

s ix months ear l i e r , a point which the emboldened soc ia l i s t s

did not hes i ta te to ra i se . Forsaking the united f ront , the

r igh t i s t s began t berate openly the jo in t board for i t s

mismanagement of the s t r ike , a mismanagement ~ h i c h they

asc rib ed to the. l e f t wing's link" .to. the Communist Party



-- 122

and the Third In t e rna t iona l . In tu rn , the l e f t i s t s accused

the socia l is ts of cooperating w ith the employers to sabotage

the walkout.

Final ly , the s o c i a ~ i s t s believed themselves in a

posi t ion to take over f o r c i ~ ~ y the d i r ec t i on o f th e

s t r i ke aga ins t th e jobbers and c o n ~ r ? c t o r s . On December 13,

th e Gene ra l Execu ti ve Board OL t h I n t e rn a t i ona l declared

i t s e l f in control of both the st r ike and the local union

machinery. C harging th e l e f t i s t s with devas ta t ing th e ILGWU

for thei r own po l i t i ca l ends, . t he r igh t wing replaced the

communist off icers of the Joint Board and the four l e f t i s t

"locals with the i r own men and p r o c e e ~ e d to submit the

remaining d ispu te s to a rb i t r a t i on .

St i l l unwilling to give up.the f ight , the l e f t

wing declared i t s removal i l l ega l and continued to function

as a regular union. Their hour, h o w ~ v e r , had passed. The

Social i s t s responded by requir ing a l l workers to regis te r

with the (now) right-wing locals . Most of the rank and

f i le proved wil l ing to do th i s , having grown progressively

disenchan ted with the l e f t as the s t r ike wore on. Those

who retained the i r or ig ina l support for the communists

were soon forced to abandoD i t : the Social i s t s convinced

the employers to compel workers to join the newly const i tu ted

locals under p r e s s ~ r e of being f i red . Both groups soon

brought in thugs to .. l ~ n e up u n i o ~ members on the i r respective

s ides , but the f ierce and p h y s i c a l . f ~ ~ h t tha t ensued over

L . ..... _ ~



123

r eg i s t r a t i on was u l t ima te ly sho r t - l i ved . The s .oc i a l i s t

employer par tner sh ip added th e f in i sh ing touches to th e d a ~ g et h a t th e communis t s had a l ready done themselves by mishandl ing

the general s t r ike . The.civi l war had ended; technical ly ,

the s ~ c i a l i s t s had won.

In r ea l i ty , however, social ism w ithin the ILGWU had

seen i t f ina l hour. The strugqJe between the communists

and the soc ia l i s t s led to the expulsion or withdrawal of

many thousands of the ILGWU1s more mil i tant rank-and-f i lers ,

who had previously provided the union with much of i t s

radical outlook. Some of these garment workers had l e f t

the I L G ~ out of ,support for the communists; :others had

qui t out of disgust with both s ides . In ei ther case, these

workers' departure depleted the union 's ranks of many of

i t s most act ive members. Meanwhile, those formerly mil i tant

t rade unionis ts who remained within-the ILGWU had los t

much of the i r passion for radical po l i t i c s . These members

had watched as the Communist Party subordinated the i r

bat t le to a seemingly i r re levan t connection to the Bolsheviks.

They had watched as the socia l is ts Tesorted to unconsti tu

t ional suspensions and overt al l iances with the cap i t a l i s t

c lass in order to remove the left-wing threat . They had

watched as communists and s o c i a l ~ s t s al ike h ir ed gangst er s

and thugs to keep 1st raying members in l ine and pul l defect ing

ones back into · i t . In ' the process', these workers had seen

the i r fondest radical hopes and d r ~ a m s ut te r ly destroyed.



12 4

Never again would the ILGWU members be able to r e t r i eve

t h e i r formal mora l i s t i c and i d ea l i s t i c be l i e f in ' the

soc i a l i s t cause . Never a;a in would a Clara Lemlich rush up

to a s tage and s t a r t a gene ra l s t r i k e .

" I t i s thoroughly

In a l e t t e r he wrote to Morris Hil lqui t

Compounding th is loss of mili tance by the rank and

leaders. These leaders had never been revolut ionar ies , but

they had been soc ia l i s t s . After the civ i l war, however,

the leadership ' s socialism rapidly degenerated into mere

Thomas' forecast c a ~ e t ~ u e to a remarkable extent .

tha t the one issue on which a oreat manv ofour comrades tend to q ~ o u s e themselves. the onetha t brinos into the i r eyes the old l ight of

bat t le i s the i r hatred of Communism.

anti-communism.

on December 21, 1926, Norman Thomas ap tly p redic ted the

f i l e was a dis t inct rightward sh i f t on the par t of th e union 's

effects of such an obsession with the CPo

"the crazy l e a d e r s h ~ p fr0m which the cloakmakers have suf-

Thomas warned tha t Ita ourely.nega1;.ive anti-Conununist posit ion"

And then, Thomas continued, no al ternat ive would remain to

unhealthy," Thomas noted, af te r congratulat ing Hil lqui t

for endina t h ILGWU s t r ike ,

would ult imately ki l l the. socia l is t cause "body and soul ."

fered" on the one ·hand and the , "se l f i sh, c alc ula tin g, p lo t-

In attempting to separate them&elves clear ly and dis t inct ly

t ing , unideal i s t ic leadership of th e ave rag e AF of L union"

24on the other.



·.• 125

from the communists they so despised, the garment unions '

l eaders veered fa r away from . scci ,al ism--so fa r t h a t they

e ve ntu al ly c ut the i r long-standing t i e s to the SP. In

1933, th e .ILGWU, along with many othe r formerly l e f t -wing

unions joined the mainstream of American pol i t i ca l l i fe

by jumping on the New Deal bandwagon. These unions viewed

the NRA both as a means of withstanding the depression and

as an opportuni ty to recoup the losses they had suffered

as a r e su l t of the i r struggle with the communists. To

be sure , the NRA did enable the v as t m ajo rity of these

labor o rg an iz at io ns t o expand a t phenomenal ra tes . T h ILGWU, for example, increased i t s membership from 40,000

in 192825

to 200,000 in 1 9 3 4 ~ 6 and regained the indus t r ia l

power it had los t ' during the c i v i l war. There was, howeve r,

a price . In the pl:ocess.of ·endorsing Frank lin Roosevel t' s

New Deal, the ILGWU ceased to be a rad ica l opposi t ional

force, with deep l inks to soc ia l i s t po l i t i c s and ideology.

In 1933, then, New York's Soc ia l i s t Party suffered

yet an oth er blow, as, the old· progressive unions l e f t i t s

ranks and thereby doomed it to v i r tua l obl iv ion . The

needle- t rades u n i o n ~ _ h a d beep the only bulwark l e f t to the

50cia l i s t Party , which had los t most of i t s membership and

much of i t s s p a ~ k in the sp l i t of 1919. The ILGWU, in

par t icu lar , had been the l ~ s t major force of soc ia l i s t

t rade unionism in New York,.. Now the 1;lroa-der effec t s of the



126

sp l i t had caused the garment unions, too , to deser t the

par ty , l eav ing it with vi r tua l ly no suppor t . In the fol lowing

years , the pa r ty ' s leaders seemed to spend more t ime at tacking

the communist cause .than they did t r y ~ n g to r eju vena te the i r" "

own. Hil lqui t , for example, constant ly re i tera ted the theme

t h a t "the Sovie t regime has b e ~ n the g rea t e s t d i sa s t e r and

calamity tha t has qccurre? to t ~ Socia l is t movement.n27

He and othe r l o n g - t i ~ e par ty m ~ m b e r s r ut hl es sl y a ss ai le d

any attempts to make the SP more mil i tan t as reeking of

communism. Even Norman Thomas admitted tha t the soc ia l i s t s

appeared "quicker t see the s ins of Communism than the

s ins of cap i t a l i sm. ,,28 The sac . i a l i s t s ' was a s t e r i l e pro-

gram, sui ted to a s ter i le party . After th i r ty years , the

socia l is t movement in New York City was dead in a l l but name.

".



",. C O N C L U S I O ~

In our own t imes, a coherent soc ia l i s t movement i s

nowhere to be found in the United States. Americans are

more l ikely to speak of a golden past than of a golden future ,

called a tte ntio n to various charecter i s t ics of American soc-

part ies?

whelmed the urge to a l t e r . Such a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s c r i e s

In the per-

127

These societal t ra i ts - -an ethnical ly-

farmity overr ides dissent ; the desire to cons erv e has over-

In answering th i s question, his tor ians have often

iety that have mil i ta ted against widespread acceptance of

po l i t i c a l force? Why, in p a r t i c u l a ~ 1 did the s o c i a l i s t move

ment never become an al ternat ive to the nat ion 's established

out for explanat ion. Why, in a society by no means perfect ,

of capital ism's glor ies than pf socia l ism's greatness. Con-

an immediate mass following. Such c o n d ~ t i o n s did not , how-

has a radical party never attained the status of a major

radical movements.

ever, completely checkmate American social ism.

divided working c lass , a re la t ively f luid class s t ructure ,

an economy which allowed a t least some workers to enjoy what

Sombart termed "reefs of roast beef and apple pie"l_-pre_,

vented the ear ly twentieth century socia l is ts from at t rac t ing



128

in 1919 and the soc ia l i s t t rade-union movement in the

demise .

From the New York soc i a l i s t

we must look fur ther to find the causes of u.s . social ism's

of American society wil l not explain such a phenomenon:

i t s outlook on the future was decidedly opt imist ic . Yet

in the years af t e r World War I , t h i s expanding and

confident movement almost ent i re ly collapsed. Conditions

Granted tha t one ci ty i s not a nation, the experience

iod between 1901 and 1918, the Socia l i s t Party establ ished

I t s growth, a lthough not dramatic , was steady and sure;

i t s core . Substant ia l numbers of SP members expressed deep

movement's b i r th , sectarianism and dissension ate away a t

and abiding dissa t i s fac t ion with the brand of reform social ism

la te 19205 represented but the culmination of a decades-

problem. Here, the disin tegrat ion of the Socia l i s t Party

long process of in ternal decay.

of New York may yet suggest a new solution to t h i ~ c r i t i ca l

advocated by the par ty ' s leadership . To these lef t -wingers,

construct ive socialism seemed to s t r es s ins igni f icant

and radiant ideal? How, the cons t ruc t iv i s t s angri ly repl ied ,

reforms a t the expense of u lt im a te g oa ls . How, these

could the SP hope to a t t rac t workers i f i t did not promise

, i t s e l f as a v is ib le - -a lbe i t a minor- -po l i t i ca l organizat ion.

,

a t t r a c t workers i f i t did not dist inguish i t se l f from the

--many progressive par t ies , i f it did not proffer an enduring

.. revolut ionar ies angrily demanded, could the SP hope to



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them immediate bene f i t s , if it did no t concern i t s e l f

with t h e i r presen t burdens? Xhe d eb ate rag ed f i e r ce ly ,

but it did not rag e alo ne. At the same time, the

needle- t rades unions seethed with dissension over the

p r o p e ~ pol ic ies and t ac t ics of a socia l is t labor

organization. R a d i ~ a l i z e d Jewish garment workers demanded

mili tant unibn act ion, attacked labor-management cooperation,

perc eiv ed th e s t r ike as t he i r most powerful weapon. Socia l is t

union leaders, on the other hand, followed cautious trade

pol ic ies , advocated indust r ia l government, hesi tated to stake

t he i r powerful organizat ions on the outcome of a walkout.

Over the years , the two controversies only grew

more bi t t e r , feeding off each other and o ff themselves.

For a br ief ~ i m e during World War I , the socia l is ts of New

York achieved uni ty; during t he i r common f ight against

the war effor t , the deep and c r i t i ca l issues dividing them

l ay t emporar il y submerged. The war years , however, were

but an aberrat ion, the soc ia l i s t s ' newfound unity but a

precarious t ruce between two sworn enemies. That both

the Social is t Party and the socia l is t t rade-union movement

distinegrated under the pressure of the Russian Revolution

i s not surpris ing: The way had long since been paved for

jus t such a col lapse .,

Through i t s own in ternal feuding, then, the SP.

exhausted i t se l f . forever and ·-further reduced labor radical ism



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'. " in. New York to th e posit{on of marginali ty and ins ignif icance

i t - i s · thp t American radicals cannot afford to become the i r

R a d ~ c a 1 s have often succumbed to the devas ta t ing bane of

foe. Yet i f ' the his tory of Local New York shows anything,

In unity l i es t he i r only hope.

af ter socia l i sm's decline, s t i l l wish to change America .

also a chastening one for those who, more than half a century

from which it has never recovered. The story i s a sad but

sectarianism; it i s easier , af ter a l l , to f ight one 's

fellows than it i s ' to bat t le an entrenched and powerful'

own worst e nemie s.

Elena Kagan's Senior Thesis on Socialism in New York

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Transcript of Elena Kagan's Senior Thesis on Socialism in New York