InternationalConferenceon“Minorityrepresentationandminoritylanguagerights:Origins,experiencesandlessonstobelearned”

October11‐13,2012Cluj‐Napoca/Kolozsvár,Romania.

ElectoralSystemsandNationalMinoritiesinCentralandEasternEurope:ADilemmainFiveParadigmsRevisited

Prof.Dr.Dr.h.c.CarlosFloresJuberías (DepartmentofConstitutionalLawandPoliticalScience,UniversityofValencia,Spain)

In virtually every Central and Eastern European democracy, the design ofelectoralruleshasbeenaffectedbythepressingneedtoreconcilethegoalofrepresenting all citizens in an equal, fair, and non‐discriminatory manner,withthefactthat–again,invirtuallyeverycase–citizenshiphappenstobeamultiethnicreality.Thisposesthequestionofwhetheritispossibleornottoreconciletheappellationtotheprinciplesofequalityandnon‐discrimination,with the parallel resurrection of the national consciousness which ethnicminoritieslivingintheirterritoryhaveequallyexperiencedsincethedemiseofcommunism.Whiletheproscriptionofanydiscriminationduetoacitizen'sethnic origin seems to be an absolutely essential feature of a democratic,rule‐of‐law State, the respect for and the promotion of ethnic pluralismseems to be an equally essential feature thereof, and –moreover– a keyinstrumentforpoliticalstabilityandsocialcohesion.Atthebeginningofthelastdecade,andwithintheframeworkofacollectivereflection on the politics of national minority participation in postCommunistEurope, 1 I suggested a classificationof the variousmanners inwhichtheelectorallegislationofthenewpost‐Communistdemocracieswereaddressing the problem of the parliamentary representation of ethnicminorities,tryinginsomecasestoreconciletheseapparently–and,perhaps,

1 Jonathan P. Stein (ed.),The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post­CommunistEurope:State­Building,Democracy,andEthnicMobilization,EastWestInstitute/M.E.Sharpe,Armonk,NY.,2000.

Departamento de Derecho Constitucional y Ciencia Política

Facultad de Derecho. Avenida de los Naranjos, s/n 46071 Valencia (Spain)

Tel.: (34) 96 382 8587 Fax: (34) 96 382 8119 e-mail: carlos.flores@uv.es

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truly–contradictorygoals,preferring insomeotherstoclearlyendorseoneofthemwhilemarginalizingtheother,orsimplyignoringtheissueasmuchas itallowedtobe ignored. In thatessay, 2whichwaspublished inSpanishand Hungarian as well, 3 and that has been referred since in a number ofarticlesandpapers,4Iarguedthatthetreatmentofnationalminoritiesintheelectoral laws of post‐Communist Europe had swung from an extremehostility inthe formof the lawsprohibitingthecreationofethnicallybasedparties,toanassumptionofethnicdiversitysocompleteastoconvertethnicidentificationintotheverybasisofpoliticalrepresentation,goingthroughanumberof intermediate strategies likehindering that representation,beingindifferent towards it, facilitating it, and providing legal guarantees for itsimplementation.Moreprecisely,myargumentatthatpointwasthattheapproachestoethnicpluralism thatwere tobe found in thiswide setof electoral rules couldbeclassified in fivegroups,dependingon thegoalspursuedand thestrategiesfollowedbytheelectoral lawdesign.Movingfromoneextreme–theradicalrepressionofethnicpluralism,atleastintheelectoralscenario–totheother–the elevation of ethnic pluralism to the rank of a basic a Constitutionalprinciple,andtheconsiderationofethnicityasakeyinstrumentforpoliticalparticipation–,thesestrategieswerethefollowing:1)Opposingethnicminorityrepresentation.InBieber’swords,5though“nosingle country in Central and South‐Eastern Europe has completelyprevented the representation of minorities in parliament since theintroduction of multi‐party systems in 1990. Nevertheless, reducing the

2 Carlos Flores Juberías, “Post‐Communist Electoral Systems and National Minorities: ADilemma in Five Paradigms”, in Jonathan P. Stein (Ed.): The Politics of National MinorityParticipation…,cit.,pp.31‐64.3CarlosFlores Juberías, “Választási törvényhozásésetnikaikisebbségekKelet‐Európában”,PolitikatudományiSzemleNo.2(1998),pp.61‐92;“MinoríasétnicasysistemaselectoralesenlaEuropadelEste”,CuadernosConstitucionalesNo.26/27(1999),pp.65‐96.4 See, among others, AlinaMungiu & Ivan Krastev, Nationalism After Communism: LessonsLearned,CEUPress,Budapest, 2004; Jack Snyder, “La gestiónde la etnopolítica enEuropaOriental: una valoración de los enfoques institucionales”, in Ruth Ferrero (ed.),Nacionalismos y minorías en Europa Central y Oriental, ICPS, Barcelona, 2004, pp. 49‐76;MariaSpirova,ElectoralRulesandthePoliticalRepresentationofEthnicMinorities:EvidencefromBulgariaandRomania, Center forPolicyStudies,CentralEuropeanUniversity/OpenSociety Institute, Budapest, 2004; Denitsa Tsoneva, “The Puzzle of the Bulgarian‐TurkishInterethnic Cooperation in Post‐Communist Bulgaria”, Master’s Thesis Submitted to theCentralEuropeanUniversityNationalismStudiesProgram,Budapest,2005;DanielBochsler,"Electoral Rules and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Post‐CommunistDemocracies”,EuropeanYearbookofMinorityIssuesNo.8‐7(2007):153‐80;FlorianBieber,“Regulatingminorityparties inCentral andSouth‐EasternEurope”, inBenjaminReilly andPerNordlund(eds.),PoliticalPartiesinConflict­ProneSocieties:Regulation,EngineeringandDemocraticDevelopment,UnitedNationsUniversityPress,Tokyo/NewYork/Paris,2008,pp.95‐125; Maria Spirova & Boyka Stefanova, “The European dimension of the politicalrepresentationofminorities”, Paperpresentedat theEUSAConference,April 24‐26, 2009,Los Angeles, CA.; J. Bernauer & Daniel Bochsler, “Electoral entry and success of ethnicminority parties in Central and Eastern Europe: a hierarchical selectionmodel”, ElectoralStudies No. 30/4 (2011), pp. 738‐755; and Maria Spirova, “European integration andminoritypolitics:ethnicpartiesattheEPelections”,EastEuropeanPoliticsNo.28/1(2012).5FlorianBieber,“Regulatingminorityparties…”,cit.,p.106.

representationofminoritiesinthepoliticalsystemhasbeenanimplicitandat times explicit policy of numerous governments in post‐communistEurope”. This was the case of Albania, as well as Bulgaria, the only twocountriesinCentralandEasternEuropeopposedasamatterofprincipletothepresenceofethnicminoritiesassuchintheirlegislatures;aswellasthecaseofRussiaandotherpost‐Sovietrepublicsfearsomeofgettinginvolvedinan endless process of disintegration as the result of the emergence of newethno‐nationalist parties, which did not go as far as to ban them, butnevertheless introduced in their electoral laws rules directed at making itharder for them –or de facto impossible–, to achieve parliamentaryrepresentation.6InAlbania,LawNo.7556,ofFebruary4,1992,onElectionstothePeople'sAssembly–heavilyamendedinthefollowingyears,andfinallyderogatedby LawNo. 8609, ofMay8, 2000– 7 stated that citizenshad theright to run for deputies either as representatives of a political party or acoalition, or as independents, a disposition which had to be brought intorelationwith the provisions of the 1991 Law on Political Parties,which inturn excluded from registration parties created on a religious, ethnic orregional basis. Similarly, the resistance against ethnic minorityrepresentation in Bulgaria was carried out jointly through the provisionscontainedintheJuly12,1991ConstitutionandinthesubsequentAugust22,1991 Electoral Law:while the formermandated in article 11.4 that "thereshall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor partieswhich seek the violent usurpation of state power", the latter restrictedcandidate nominating and electoral campaigning only to political parties,which, in registering, were obviously bound by the above mentionedconstitutional requirement. 8 In both cases the consequences of these legallimitations were that ethnic minority organizations –basically, thoserepresenting the Greek community in Albania (8% of the census in 1992),andtheTurkishoneinBulgaria(8’5%ofthecensusin1992)–9wereforcedtodisguisethemselvesasparties“forHumanRightsDefense”or“forRightsandFreedoms”10inorderbecomeregistered,andtoconvincinglyarguetheir

6ThelegaltextsreferredinthefollowingpageshavebeencompiledbyStephenB.Nix(Ed.),ElectionLawCompendiumofCentralandEasternEurope,IFES/ACEEEO,Kiev,1995.Awiderselectionoftheselaws,lastupdatedin2002,canstillbefoundatthewebpagesetupbytheUniversityofEssex “PoliticalTransformationand theElectoralProcess inPost‐CommunistEurope”Projectatwww.essex.ac.uk/elections(lastretrieved01.09.2012).7On theAlbanian1992electoral law,seeKrenarLoloci: “ElectoralLaw inEasternEurope:Albania”,EastEuropeanConstitutionalReviewNo.3/2(1994),pp.42‐50andFeliGjilani:“Lalegislazioneelettorale inAlbania”, inFulcoLanchester (ed.):La legislazioneelettoraledegliStatidell'EuropaCentro­Orientale,Giuffrè,Milan,1995,pp.229‐245and8OntheBulgarian1990and1991electorallaws,seeRumyanaKolarovayDimitrDimitrov:“Electoral Law in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria”, East European Constitutional Review nº 3/2(1994), pp. 50‐55 and Snejiana Botusciarova: “La legislazione elettorale in Bulgaria”, enFulcoLanchester(ed.):Lalegislazioneelettorale…,cit.,pp.267‐281.9 Here, and all through this text, figures relative to the population of the different ethnicminoritiesintheregionhavebeentakenfromtheTheCIAWordFactbookoftheappropriateyear (available on‐line atwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the­world­factbook/index.html).Figuresfromothersourcesmayvary.10SeeIvanIlchev,“EmigrationandthePoliticsofIdentity:TheTurkishMinorityinBulgaria”,in JonathanP.Stein (ed.),ThePoliticsofNationalMinorityParticipation..., cit.,pp.237‐268,

commitment to the general interest of the country and to prove theiropenness towards citizens not belonging to these communities in order todefendthemselvesofthesuccessiveclaimsagainsttheirregistration.The strategies pursued by those countries that chose tomarginalize, ordefacto exclude, the representation of ethnic minorities in their legislatureswere manifold. As Bieber has argued, 11 besides explicitly banning thecreation of ethnic minority parties, several other less evident, but almostequally effective, strategies were available and became used for the samepurpose. Among them, (a) excluding minorities from the politicalparticipation, or minimizing their presence in the census, through theapplication of restrictive citizenship laws; (b) introducing rules for partyformation and for running candidates thatwere difficult tomeet by ethnicminority parties; (c) practicing gerrymandering in the delimitation ofelectoral districts, in order to dilute the presence of ethnic minoritiestransferring them into mixed districts, or simply malapportioning thosedistricts; and (d) applying electoral thresholds which were irremediablybeyond reach for ethnicminority parties. The first strategywas ominouslyfollowedbyEstoniaandLatviaduringmostofthenineties,whenlawspassedin thesenewly independentStates restrictedcitizenship to individualswhohad lived, or whose ancestors had lived, in those States prior to theiroccupationbytheUSSR,consequentlydisenfrachisingbetweenone‐thirdandover40percentofthepopulation–mostlyofRussianorigin–whohadsettledinthesecountriesinSoviettimes.12ThesecondstrategywasusedinplaceslikeRussia,UkraineandMoldova,whichrequiredthecollectionofsignaturesfrom a prescribed number of districts for a party to be registered, or fornational or regional lists of candidates to be presented, thus precludingregionallyconcentratedminoritiesfrombeingorganizedand/orrepresentedat the national level. Gerrymandering and malapportionment aimed atreducingtherepresentationofethnicAlbanians(22%ofthecensusin1998)was a permanent –though by no means exclusive– feature of Macedonianelectionsallthroughthenineties,sinceboththetwo‐roundmajoritysystemapplied in the 1990 and 1994 elections, and themixed one applied in the1998 elections (with 35 seats elected from a national list by PR, and theremaining 85 in single member districts by two‐round majority system)reliedonaclearlybiasedapportionmentinwhichthedistrictscreatedinthepredominantlyAlbanianmunicipalitiesaveraged25%morevotersthatthosecreated in the predominantly Slavic part of the country. 13 In the case ofRussian,while the 1995 law (featuring amixed electoral system,with 225seats elected by PR from a national list, and the other 225 from single

andJamesPettifer,‘‘TheGreekMinorityinAlbania:EthnicPoliticsinaPre‐NationalState’’,inJonathanP.Stein(ed.),ThePoliticsofNationalMinorityParticipation...,cit.,pp.67‐188.11FlorianBieber,“Regulatingminorityparties…”,cit.,pp.107ss.12On this issue, seeNeil J.Melvin,RussiansBeyondRussia:ThePoliticsofNational Identity,Pinter,London,1995,andmorespecifically,“Post‐ImperialEthnocracyandtheRussophoneMinorities”,inJonathanP.Stein(ed.):ThePoliticsofNationalMinorityParticipation…,cit.,pp.129a166.13SeeCarlosFlores Juberías: “Macedonia:entre la crisisy la consolidación”,RevistaCIDOBd’AfersInternacionalsNo.51‐52(2000/2001),pp.61‐94.

member districts by FPTP), 14 remained applicable parties were not onlyrequiredtoproduceatleast200,000voters'signatures,withtheprovisothat"nomorethansevenpercentoftherequiredtotalnumberofsignatures"maybecollectedinthesamesubjectoftheRussianFederation,inordertoputupanationallistofcandidates,butwerealsosubjecttoa5%thresholdtogainseatsfromthatlist,apercentageplainlyunattainableforanyoftheexistingminoritiesinthecountry(namely,Tatars:3’8%,Ukrainians:3’0%,Chuvash:1’2%,Bashkirs:0’9%ofthecensusin1995).2) Disregarding the issue of ethnic minority representation. This was thepositionadoptedbythoseCentralandEastEuropeancountrieswhichchosenottomakeexceptionsintheirelectorallegislationtothebasicconstitutionalprincipleofequalityandnondiscrimination,eitherbecausetheylackedanyethnicminoritieswhosepresencemayjustifysomekindofexceptiontothisrule,or–conversely–becausetheyindeedhadsizableminoritieswithstrongnationalistic tendencies, and therefore preferred to downplay the ethnicissue in the electoral context in order minimize the possibility of theseminoritiesachievingasizeableparliamentaryrepresentation.Amongthefirstsetofcases,theratherethnicallyhomogeneousCzechRepublic(withCzechscurrently representing 90’4% of the census) would probably be the bestpossible example, since neither the its Constitution nor its electoral lawcomprised any single disposition aimed at guaranteeing, preserving orenhancing their political representation, nor at making it more difficult toachieve.15AlsoHungary–oneofthemostethnicallyhomogeneouscountriesintheregion(withHungarianscurrentlyrepresenting92’3%ofthecensus)–countedamongthecountrieswhichoverlookedtheissueofethnicminorityrepresentationasfarastheelectionofthemembersoftheNationalAssemblywasconcerned, thoughmechanismsaimedatmaking iteasier toachieveatthe local level were introduced, creating a very effective network ofconsultative bodies in order to help vertebrate minorities and let theirdemandsbeknown.16Slovakiacouldbeagoodexampleofthesecondcase,sincetheradicaladherencetotheprincipleofnondiscriminationforethnicreasons, and the refusal to grant any special treatment to the sizableHungarianminority(currently9’7%of thecensus)–andtoothergroupsasRoma (1.7%) or Ruthenians (1’0%)– grounded in its Constitution and

14 On the June 21, 1995 Russian electoral law see Carlos Flores Juberías, “Vybory '95: laselecciones del 17 de diciembre a la Duma Estatal de la Federación Rusa”, CuadernosConstitucionalesNo.13(1995),pp.157a196.15 See Petr Kopecky: “The Czech Republic: Entrenching Proportional Representation”, inJosep M. Colomer:Handbook of Electoral System Choice, Palgrave‐Macmillan, Nueva York‐Londres,2004,pp.347‐358.16TheHungarian1990LocalElectionsLawexemptedallowedethnicminoritycandidatestoappearassuchintheballot,andtowritetheirnameandthenameoftheorganizationwhomtheyrepresentedintheirmotherlanguage,orderedtheHungarianpublicTVandRadiotosetapart special programs for them, and stated thatwhen a candidatebelonging to an ethnicminority failed tobe elected in a singlememberdistrict, hewouldbe considered so if thenumberofhis voteswereat least2/3of thenumberof votesobtainedby the last electedcandidate, andwhen electionswere held using party listswith a proportional system, thefirstcandidateinanygivenethnicminorityslatewouldalsobeelectedprovidedthathislisthadobtainedatleast2/3ofthevotesobtainedbythelastordinarilyelectedcandidate.

electoral lawswasprobablyduemore to the fearofenhancing thepoliticalinfluence of ethnic Hungarians and giving grounds to their claim forterritorial autonomy, than to a wholehearted appreciation of the value ofequality.173) Supporting ethnicminority representation. In countries likePoland and,for a short while, Lithuania, electoral legislation was arranged to includeclauses facilitating –but not entirely granting– the presence of ethnicminoritiesinParliament,eitherthroughtheintroductionofexceptionsfromtherequirementsinordertofieldcandidates,orthroughexceptionsfromthegeneral electoral rules applicable for the distribution of seats, aimed atmakingiteasierforethnicminoritypartiestofieldcandidates,and/ortogetthemelected.ThefirstpracticecouldbefoundinthePolish1991and1993Electoral Laws: 18 the former allowed organizations representing nationalminorities (Germans: 1.3%, Ukrainians: 0.6%, and Belorussian 0.5% of thecensus in 1992) to field candidates in any district of the country providedthey were able to gather just 20.000 signatures, while these figure was50.000forordinaryparties;andalsoallowedthemtoputupanationallistofcandidates regardless of the number of district lists of candidates it hadregistered,whileordinarypartieshadtohavelistsregisteredinatleastfiveof these districts. A legal reform passed in 1993 introduced in the Polishelectoral system the second strategy as well, adding the possibility thatethnicminority parties be also dispensed either from the 5% threshold toobtainseatsatthedistrictlevel,orfromthe7%thresholdtogetseatsfromthe national list, two requirements that would have certainly made itimpossible for them to get any representation in Parliament. Similarly,between1992and1996theLithuanianelectorallaw,whichfeaturedamixedelectoralsysteminwhichhalfofthedeputieswereelectedinsinglememberdistricts on the basis of a two‐roundsmajority systemwhile the other halfwere nationwide elected by PR with a 4% threshold, exempted ethnicminority parties (Russians 8’6%, Poles: 7’7%, Bielorussians: 1’5% of thecensusin1992),fromachievingthisproportionofseats,andawardedseatstotheircandidatesbyjustachievingtheso‐calledHarequota.194) Granting ethnic minority representation. This even more supportiveapproach to the issue of ethnicminority representation in parliamentwasfeaturedintheelectoral lawsofRomania,Sloveniaand–forashortperiod–Croatia, all three countries whose Constitution and/or electoral legislationexpresslygrantedethnicminoritiesaminimumnumberofseatsinthelower

17 See Sona Szomolanyi and J. Gould (eds.),Slovakia: Problems ofDemocratic ConsolidationandtheStrugglefortheRulesoftheGame,FriederichEbertFoundation,Bratislava,1997andEben Friedman, "Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia andMacedonia”,EthnopoliticsNo.4/4(2005),pp.381‐96.18 SeeFrancesMillard, “ThePolishParliamentaryElectionofOctober1991”,Soviet StudiesNo.44/5(1992),pp.837‐855and“ThePolishParliamentaryElectionofSeptember1993”,CommunistandPost­CommunistStudiesNo.27/3(1994),pp.295‐313.Forabroadervision,see Marek M. Kaminski & Monika A. Nalepa: “Poland: Learning to Manipulate ElectoralRules”,enJosepM.Colomer(ed.),HandbookofElectoralSystemChoice,cit.19 NidaGelazis: “Institutional Engineering in Lithuania: Stability Through Compromise”, inJan Zielonka (ed.): Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe (Vol. I: InstitutionalEngineering),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2001,pp.165‐185

housesoftheirbicamerallegislaturesand–insomecases–alsointheirlocalrepresentative bodies. In Romania, the March 14, 1990 Executive Decreewhich governed the first multiparty elections, establishing a proportionalsystem, stated that organizations representing national minorities (amongothers,Hungarians:8’9%,andGermans:0’4%ofthecensusin1990)whichdid notmanage to get the number of votes needed to obtain a seat at theAssembly ofDeputieswould be granted one deputy each, on the conditionthat they were the sole representatives of the said community. On thatoccasion, only three ethnic minority organizations –the HungarianDemocratic Union of Romania, which obtained almost a million votes, theDemocratic Forum of the Germans and the Roma Democratic Union–managedtoobtainrepresentationonthebasisofthevotescollectedbut, inapplicationofthisrule,othernineethnicminorityorganizations–Armenians,Bulgarians,Greeks,Lipovenians,Poles,Serbs,Slovaks,TurksandUkrainians–were granted one seat each. Embraced and guaranteed by the December1991Constitution,thissystembecameslightlylimitedbyanewLawonJuly15,1992,whichestablishedthatanationalminoritywouldonlybegrantedrepresentationprovided that itscandidacies"haveobtained throughout thecountry at least five per cent of the average number of validly expressedvotes throughout the country for theelectionofonedeputy", andexcludedfrom this privilege ethnicminority organizationswhich participated in theelectionsfullyorpartiallyintegratedinbroadercoalitionswithotherpoliticalforces. 20 In Croatia the system introduced by the short‐lived August 1992ElectoralLawalsoguaranteedaminimumrepresentationinParliamenttoallethnic minorities, but differed from the Romanian system in that itacknowledgedtheexistenceofanspeciallysignificantminority–theSerbians(12%ofthecensusin1992)–andgranteditnotjustasingleseatbutashareinthetotalnumberofseatsproportionaltoitsshareintheoverallpopulationof the State. Hence, the Law created four special electoral units forHungarians, Italians, Czechs‐Slovaks‐Russians‐Ukrainians and Germans‐Austrians,andregardingethnic‐Serbs it stated that incase theircandidateswerenotelectedinanumbersufficienttomatchintheHousetheirshareintheoverallpopulationoftheState,thenumberoftherepresentativesoftheHouse would be increased up to the number needed for the requiredrepresentation to be attained, and candidates who had not been electedwould be considered as elected in the order corresponding to theproportional success of each individual. The system lasted only until 1995,when a new electoral reform drastically reduced the parliamentaryrepresentation of the Serbian community, since only three seats in specialdistricts were granted to it; a restriction further aggravated by the 1999Electoral Code, bywhich the number of legally guaranteed ethnicminorityrepresentatives was reduced to only five, with the Serbian communityentitledtojustoneseat.21Finally,itisworthnotingthatthe1991Slovenian

20SeeVasileGionea:“LalégislationélectoraleenRoumanieaprèslarévolutionde1989”,inFulcoLanchester(ed.):Lalegislazioneelettorale…,cit.,pp.23‐57.21 See Ivan Šiber&MirjanaKasapović: “Electoral Policy and theDeterminants of ElectoralBehaviour in Croatia (1990‐2000)”, Central European Political Science Review No. 2/3(2001),pp.112‐139,MirjanaKasapović: “Electoralpolitics inCroatia1990‐2000”,PolitičkamisaoNo.37/5(2000),pp.3‐20andNenadZakošek,“EthnicWarandDisempowerment:The

Constitution grants the right of Hungarian and Italian minorities (0’4 and0’2%of the census in1991) –which,despitebeinghistorical inhabitantsoftheactualterritoryofSlovenia,arebynomeansthelargerminoritiesinthecountry(sinceCroatsrepresented3%andSerbs2%ofthecensusin1991)–tohaveaseateachinthe90‐memberNationalAssembly.22Thesedeputiesareelectedexclusivelyfromandbymembersofthesecommunities,inspecialconstituencies based in Koper/Capodistria for the Italian community andMurskaSobotafortheHungarian.5) Making ethnicity the basis of political representation. It can easily bearguedthatthemostradicalexampleofethnicityturnedintothedominatingfactor of the entire political system –including political representation–comes from both pre‐ and –quite shockingly– also post‐war Bosnia andHerzegovina. The November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreements, which stilldefine the actual Bosnian political system, created a whole set of newpolitical institutions comprising –among others– a bicameral Parliament, acollective Presidency, a cabinet and a Constitutional Court, all of themconstructedonthebasisoftheexistingethnicdivisions(Bosniaksestimatedat44%,Serbsat33%,andCroatsat17%ofthecensusin1992),andjustifiedby the need to establish a mutually satisfactory power‐sharing system.Hence,theHouseofPeoplesoftheParliamentaryAssemblycomprisesfifteenmembers,fivedesignatedbytheRepublikaSrpskaNationalAssembly,fivebythe Croat delegates, and five by theMuslim delegates at the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina legislature; two thirds of the 42 members of theHouse of Representatives are directly elected from the territory of theFederation,with the remaining thirdbeingelectedat theRepublikaSrpska;the collective Presidency has to be composed by a Bosniac, a Croat and aSerb, directly elected by the citizens in each of the two entities of theRepublic;andtheCabinethastobecomposedinamannerinwhichnomorethat two thirds of theministers are citizens of the Federation, and deputyministers necessarily belong to a different community to that of thecorrespondingMinister. Regarding the Constitutional Court four of its ninejusticesaretobeappointedbytheFederationlegislature,anothertwobytheSerbianlegislature,andtheremainingthreebytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights –surprisingly enough, among individualswho arenot citizensof theRepublic nor of any neighboring state–. 23 Finally, the system includes anumberofsafeguardsforthedifferentethniccommunities,allowingthemtoblock any piece of legislation or relevant political decision on the groundsthatitmightbeharmfulfortheirspecificinterests,thereforeturningBosniafromademocracytoan“ethnocracy”.

Serb Minority in Croatia”, in Jonathan P. Stein (Ed.): The Politics of National MinorityParticipation…,cit.,pp.213‐236.22 Franc Grad: “The Slovene Electoral System”, en Fulco Lanchester (ed.): La legislazioneelettorale...,cit.,pp.245‐266.23 On the Bosnian Constitutional system see, among others, Džemal Sokolović and FlorianBieber(eds.):ReconstructingMultiethnicSocieties:TheCaseofBosnia­Herzegovina,Ashgate,Aldershot,2001,andFlorianBieber,Post­WarBosnia:Ethnicity,InequalityandPublicSectorGovernance,Palgrave,London,2006.

Now, ten years later, in a context in which democracy is already fullyconsolidated; where the then newly created States are have been entirelyaccepted by the international community;where European integration hasadvanced in such a decisive manner that ten of those former CommunistStatesnowbelong to theEuropeanUnion,and fourotherare in thewayofjoiningit;wheresecurity,bothinternalandexternal,hasbeengrantedbyasweepingextensionofNATOmembership;andwherethelegacyofthearmedconflictswhich afflicted theBalkan area throughout the 1990s is graduallybeingovercome,itseemslogicaltoanticipatethattheperceptionofwhatanadequate treatment of ethnic pluralism in electoral legislation should beoughttohavesubstantiallychanged.24Hasitbeenthecase?Andifso:inwhichdirectionhasthischangehappened?Whyhave thesechanges takenplace?Whichhavebeen their consequencesfor the parliamentary representation of minorities? And, as a conclusion,which of the two conflicting principles –that of equality before the law, orthatof respect fordiversity–has finallybeen imposedor is, at least, in theprocessofbeingso?Beginning with those countries characterized as hostile to the idea thatethnic minorities should enjoy a specific representation in the legislativebranch, the formal changes verified in this regard in the last decade havebeenquitesensibleinmostcases,andhaveresultedintoastrongerminoritypresenceinthecorrespondinglegislatures.In Albania, and more significantly in Bulgaria, their most relevant ethnicminorities (theGreeks in the first case, theTurkish in thesecond)arenowregularly represented in Parliament, and in some cases have evenparticipatedinthecompositionoftheirexecutives.Thishasbeentheresultoftheirabilitytoovercomethelegalobstaclesfortheiroperationaspoliticalparties,aswellasofthesteadysupportoftheirconstituents.InAlbania,theUnityforHumanRightsParty,whichobtained1.2%ofthevotesinthe2009electionshasanMP;andinBulgaria,theMovementforRightsandFreedoms,whichinthe2009electionsgarnered14.5votes,has38members,ofwhich33wereelectedbytheproportionalsystemandtheremainingfiveinsingle‐memberdistricts.Thefactthatthesepartieshavebeenabletoneutralizethe

24ForabroadervisionofelectoralsystemchangeinCentralandEasternEurope,seeJanuszBugajski,PoliticalPartiesofEasternEurope:AGuidetoPoliticsinthePost­CommunistEra,M.E.Sharpe,NewYork,2002;SarahBirch,FrancesMillard,MarinaPopescu&KieranWilliams,Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post­Communist Europe, PalgraveMacmillan, London, 2003; Frances Millard, Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post­communist Europe, Palgrave‐Macmillan, London, 2004; Sarah Birch, Electoral Systems andPolitical Transformation in Post­Communist Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004;Dusan Pavlovic, Goran Petrov, Despina Syrri and David A. Stone (eds), Democratisation inSoutheastEurope:AnIntroductiontoElectionIssues,SEERC,Thessaloniki,2005;andRichardRose, Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, ECPR Press,Washington, 2009. And also Carlos Flores Juberías, “Nuevas consideraciones en torno a latransformacióndelossistemaselectoralesenlaEuropadelEste:elcasodelosnuevossocioscomunitarios (1995‐2003)”,Cuadernos ConstitucionalesNo. 41/42 (2002/2003), pp. 75‐97and“NuevasconsideracionesentornoalatransformacióndelossistemaselectoralesenlaEuropa del Este: el caso de los países balcánicos (1995‐2005)”, in Carlos Flores Juberías(ed.):DelaEuropadelEstealestedeEuropa,UniversitatdeValència,Valencia,2006,pp.41‐70.

several legal attempts barring them from political life, 25 are now fullyconsolidated,andhavebecomeanessentialpartof theircountries’politicallandscape–theMovementforRightsandFreedomshasbeenpresentineachand every legislature since the instauration of democracy, its last popularvotebeingahistoricalrecord–,alongsidewiththefactthattheycertainlydonot enjoy any legal advantagewhen it comes to their chances of obtainingparliamentary representation, may somehowmove these two cases to thefollowing category, defined by the existence of ethnically blind electoralrules.ThisisindeedthecaseofAlbania,whereasaresultoftheinternalaswell as external pressures, a new law on political parties passed in 2000liftedthebanonethnicminoritypartiesthathadbeentheoreticallyinforcesince 1992; but it is not so evidently the case of Bulgaria, since the banremains formally in force, and has indeed been applied when the muchweaker Macedonian community has tried to establish its own politicalorganizations.InthecasesofEstoniaandLatvia,aratherconsistentEUpressure–speciallypersuasive having in mind these countries bid for European Unionmembership during the first half of the last decade–, combined with thepermanentpresenceoftheOSCEHighCommissioneronNationalMinoritieshas contributed to a gradual evolution towards a more inclusiveinterpretation of their very restrictive nationality laws. This has led to agradualincreaseinthepercentageofthepopulationholdingeitherEstonianor Latvian citizenship, a figure which now is in the range of 80%. As aconsequence, the parliamentary presence of parties representing theinterests of the Russian‐speaker population has somehow increased: inLatvia, their share has risen from around 5‐6 % in the early 1990s toapproximately 20 % in this last decade; while in Estonia their electoralsupporthasbeensomehowweaker,andtheirparliamentaryrepresentationanintermittentone.26In the case of Macedonia, the most relevant advance regarding theparliamentaryrepresentationofethnicminoritiescamein2002,whenasetofthreenewlaws–onefortheelectionofmembersofParliament,asecondoneontheelectoralroll,andathirdlawonelectoraldistricts–27,waspassedas a part of the comprehensive package of legislative measures adoptedfollowing theso‐calledOhridPeaceAgreement, 28which in turnhadputanendtothedecade‐longunrestoftheAlbaniancommunitywhichhadputthecountryonthebrinkofacivilwaroneyearbefore.DraftedunderUSandEU

25 See, again, Ivan Ilchev, “Emigration and thePolitics of Identity: TheTurkishMinority inBulgaria”,cit.,pp.249ss.26SeeDavidGalbreath,‘‘ThePoliticsofEuropeanIntegrationandMinorityRightsinEstoniaand Latvia’’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society No. 4/1 (2003), pp. 35‐53 andPeter Van Elsuwege, ‘‘Russian‐Speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems ofIntegration at the Threshold of the European Union’’,European Centre forMinority Issues,WorkingPaperNo.20(2004),(availableonlineatwww.ecmi.de).27 The English version of these three laws is available at International Foundation forElectoralSystems:MacedonianElectoralLaws,IFES,Skopje,2002.28 Carlos Flores Juberías: “Macedonia: el Acuerdo de Paz de Ohrid y su problemáticaimplementación”,RevistaCIDOBd’AfersInternacionalsNo.60(2002/2003),pp.61‐92.

pressure, and with the participation of various international organizationsactive in the field of election monitoring, the new legislative packageaddressedmostof the issues identifiedasproblematic inpreviouselectoralprocesses, and replaced themixed systemused in theprevious electionbyoneentirelyproportional,onthebasisofsix20‐memberconstituencies,withno threshold.While thedecision toexpand theproportional featuresof theexisting system responded to a recurring demand of the social‐democraticopposition, the decision to redraw the electoral districts was intended tosatisfy one of the most serious demands of the traditionally under‐represented Albanian minority, as well as to minimize the potential forconflictthatineachpreviouselectionshadbeengeneratedbytheredrawingof the districts. 29 In addition, the new laws also provided for the use ofAlbanianlanguageeitherinthevotingballotsandinthepollingstations.Among the countrieswhichwe initially labeled as neutral regarding ethnicminorityrepresentationinparliament,themostremarkablechangehasbeentheone so recentlyproduced–andyetuntested– inHungary, asa resultofthe adoption of Act CCIII on the Elections of Members of Parliament ofHungary.Theadoptionof thisnewelectoralcode30 ispartof thesweepinginstitutionalreformnowbeingcarriedoutbytheOrbánexecutivefollowingthe adoption of the new Hungarian Constitution on April 25, 2011, whichrequiredtherevisionofseveralcardinallawsandtheadoptionofsomenewones.ThenewElectoralLaw,replacingtheonedatingfrom1989,waspassedbyParliamentonDecember23,2011andcameintoforceonJanuary1,2012,though itwill have towait until the 2014 elections in order to be applied.Besidesaradicalreformoftheexistingelectoralsystem,oneoftheoldestinthe region, the new law has introduced an entirely new formula for theparliamentaryrepresentationofnationalminoritiesgivingcompliancetothemandatecontainedinArticle2.2oftheConstitutionbywhich“Nationalitiesliving in Hungary shall contribute to Parliament’s work as defined by acardinalAct”, andat thesame timecompleting the reforms initiatedby thepreceding Act CLXXIX on the Rights of Nationalities of Hungary. This lawcontained a list of recognized national minorities, and established theprocedure for the constitution of nationality self‐governing institutions. Onthe basis of these institutions, and according to Article 9(2) of the newElections Act, nationality lists may be drawn up by nationality self‐governmentinstitutions,providedthattheyaresupportedbyatleastonepercent, though never more than 1.500, of the voters registered with thenationality. Once they have been put up, such listsmay enjoy no less thanthree advantages vis a vis other lists, since the five per cent thresholdrequired to access Parliament iswaived for them; they are entitled to oneseat in Parliament if they secure at least one fourth of the electoralHare’squota; and in the case they do not, they are still entitled to a non‐votingparliamentaryspokesperson,whoshallbetheunsuccessfulcandidaterankedfirstonthenationalitylist–amovewhichappearstobeevenbolderhaving

29EbenFriedman,"ElectoralSystemDesignandMinorityRepresentation…”,cit.30 SeeEuropeanCommission forDemocracyThroughLawandOSCEOffice forDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights,DraftJointOpinionontheActontheElectionsofmembersofParliamentofHungaryNº.662/2012,CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg,2012.

inmindthesimultaneousreductioninthenumberofseatsoftheHungarianlegislature,whichwill shift from386 to just199–.Article12(2)of thenewElectionsActstipulatesthatvotersregisteredasminorityvotersmayvotefora candidate in a single‐mandate district and either for the list of theirnationalityorforapartylistattheconstituencylevel,thechoiceofballottobecarriedoutwhenregisteringinthenationalityregister.Poland and Lithuania were originally branded as countries supporting,thoughnot entirely granting, ethnicminority representation. In the case ofLithuaniawe have alreadymentioned that the legal advantage provided tonationalminoritypartiesbythe1993electorallaw–theexemptionfromthe4% threshold in order to have access to the 70 seats awarded byproportionalrule–hadalreadybeensuppressedbythe1996reform,whichalsoraisedthisthresholdto5%.Bothchangesprovedtobehighlyprejudicialfor the representation of the Polish minority, the most important in thecountry,whosepresenceintheSeimasdroppedfromseventojustoneseatin1996 and two in 2000 and 2004, all of them obtained in single memberdistricts, but also for Russians. 31 The unfairness of this situation has onlyaggravated in recent years, since the Electoral Action of Poles (currently6’9%of thecensus) inLithuaniahasbeengradually increasing itselectoralsupport and even featured a remarkable 4.80% of the vote in the 2008elections, which was nevertheless insufficient to overcome the saidthreshold. As far as Poland is concern, the 2001 Electoral Law, which didaway with the existing mixed electoral system introducing instead a fullyproportional one in multimember constituencies shaped after the existingadministrative divisions, chose to keep the advantage already enjoyed bynational minority parties, thus maintaining the exemption from the 5%threshold required to all otherparties –8% for coalitions– in order to gainaccess to the Sejm. Thismeasure, however, has proven insufficient for theGermanMinority (currently0’4%of thecensus)Party to retain itspoliticalinfluence,32sincethenumberofitsvotershasbeenconsistentlydecreasingand its parliamentary representation has dwindled from seven to just oneMP;andwasdeclarednonapplicable to theSilesianminority, so its impacthas been quite reduced. The same move, albeit with more relevantconsequences, happened in Serbia. The 2000 Law on the Election ofRepresentativesoftheRepublicofSerbia,33whichintroducedaproportionalsysteminasinglenationaldistrictwitha5%threshold,hadasasideeffectthat no minority party was able to gain representation at the 2003parliamentary elections. As a consequence, an amendmentwas introducedallowingnationalminoritypoliticalparties toparticipate in thedistributionofmandates even if they did notmeet the said threshold, so they became

31SeeAneRamonaite,“TheDevelopmentoftheLithuanianpartySystem:FromtoStabilitytoPerturbation”, in Susanne Jungerstam‐Mulders (ed.), Post‐Communist EU Member States:PartiesAndPartySystems,ashgate,Aldershot,2006,pp.69‐91,inp.78.32MichaelFleming, ‘‘TheLimitsoftheGermanMinorityProject inPost‐CommunistPoland:Scale,SpaceandDemocraticDeliberation’’,NationalitiesPapersNo.31/4(2003),p.399.33 SeeOSCE/ODIHR:Assessment of election legislation of the FederalRepublic of YugoslaviaandSerbia,OSCE/ODIHR,Warsaw,2000;andSarahBirch:“The2000ElectionsinYugoslavia:the‘BulldozerRevolution’”,ElectoralStudiesNo.21(2002),pp.499‐511

entitledtoparliamentaryrepresentationprovidedtheygotatleast1/250ofthe national vote, a measure which has since led to the regularrepresentation of Hungarians (currently 3.8% of the census), Bosniaks(1,8%),AlbaniansandRoma(1’1%)intheSerbianNationalAssembly.AmongthethreecountriesinwhichethnicminorityrepresentationappearedtobesecuredeitherbytheelectionlaworbytheConstitutionitself,Sloveniahas not altered its original design, so both the Hungarian and the Italiancommunitieskeeponenjoyingaconstitutionally‐grantedoverrepresentation,which is not shared neither by the Serbs and the Croats –the largestminorities today– nor by the rest of the ethnic communities present inSlovenia.NorhasdonesoRomania,despitehavingsignificantlyamendeditsConstitution in2003,and itselectoral law in2004. 34Hence, theregisteredparties and cultural associations representing thevarious ethnicminoritiespresentinRomania(withsince1990havegrownfrom11tonolessthan18,and now include Italians, Macedonians, Rusyns, Tatars, Jewish, Albanians,andCroatians)keeponhavingaguaranteed seat in the lowerhouseof theRomanianParliament,providedtheygetasfewasacouplethousandvotes.Aright never exercised by the Hungarian community, represented by theDemocratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR/RMDSz), since thisparty has been able to permanently keep its sizeable parliamentaryrepresentation–currently:22deputies,and20senators–andeventogainakey political position which has been translated into several seats in theexecutivebetween1996and2008,andagainfrom2009on.35AndasfarasCroatia isconcerned, therecurrentpracticeofchanging itselectoralsystemontheeveofeverynewelectionwhichcharacterizedthe firstdecadeof itslife as an independent State, and that with regard to the question of therepresentationofnationalminoritiesresultedinagenerousregulation(thatof 1992) which was progressively restricted by each new reform (1995‐1999), has been perpetuated over the last decade too, but in the oppositedirection.Thelastchapterofthisendlesssuccessionofreformsandcounter‐reformselectoraleffectwasverifiedin2003,36whentheCroatianlegislatureadopted a new amendment of the electoral code giving a newwording toArticle 16 and raising from five to eight the number of representativesattributedexlegetoethnicminoritiesintheSabor.Ofthese,three(twomorethan in theprevious legislation)wouldbe awarded to the Serb community(1’0%ofthecensusin2001),onetotheItalians,onetotheHungarians,onetotheCzechandSlovakcommunities,onetoAustrians,Bulgarians,Germans,Poles, Roma, Romanians, Rusyns, Russians, Turks, Ukrainians, Vlachs andJews, and another one forAlbanians, Bosniacs,Montenegrins,Macedonians

34 OSCE/ODIHR: Romania: Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 28 November and 12December2004,AssessmentMissionReport,OSCE/ODIHR,Warsaw,2005,39pp.35 See Ciprian‐Calin Alionescu, ‘‘Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania’’,Southeast European Politics No. 5/1 (2004), and Oleh Protsyk, Marius Matichescu andBaptisteChatre:“RepresentationalConsequencesofSpecialMechanismsforEthnicMinorityInclusion:Evidence fromRomania”,EuropeanCentre forMinority IssuesWorkingPaperNo.41(2008).(availableonlineatwww.ecmi.de).36 OSCE/ODIHRElectionObservationMission:Republic of Croatia. Parliamentary Elections.23november2003.FinalReport,OSCE/ODIHR,Warsaw,2004,23pp.

andSlovenians(altogether,2’9%ofthecensusin2001),who,consequently,have to “share” their parliamentary representation. In any case, citizensbelongingtothesecommunitieshavethechoicebetweenvotingforageneralcandidatelistorforthespecificminoritylist,andamajorityofthem–atleast,amongtheSerbcommunity–usuallyoptforthegenerallist,andnotforthosedisputingtheirreservedseats.It seems difficult to argue that thesemarginal increases in the presence ofethnic minority representatives both in the Romanian and in the Croatianparliament is the consequence of a substantial change in the approach ofthesecountriestotheissueofethnicminorityrepresentation.InthecaseofCroatia,thechangehappenstobeminimal,whileinthecaseofRomaniatheincreaseinthenumberofethnicminorityrepresentativeshasbeenmoretheconsequence of a better organization of these communities and a clearervision of how influential their presence in parliament might become.Continuityhappenstoberuleinthiscase,too.Anyway, this short list of countries has through the last decade beensignificantlyexpandedby theadditionof twonewcases,bothcoming fromnewly independent States: Montenegro and Kosovo. Montenegro, whichbecame independent on June 3, 2006 on the basis of a referendum heldearlier that year, and following a EU‐sponsored agreement with Belgrade,opted for a list PR electoral system in a single national districtwith a 3%threshold for the election of its 81‐member Skupština,but also establishedthan fiveseats, tobeelected inaespecialelectoralunit,wouldbereservedfor the Albanian community (currently 5% of the census). This formula,which had been in use with minor changes since 1998, while the countryremainedapartoftheYugoslavFederation,hasnotleadtotheformationofasingleAlbanianparty,buthelpedanumberoftinyfactionssurvive,soatthismoment and as a consequence of the 2009 elections, no less than fourdifferentAlbanianpartiessitattheMontenegrinlegislaturerepresentingthiscommunity, while the mostly Montenegrin and pro‐government EuropeanMontenegro party holds the fifth Albanian seat. In what amounts to anobvious, yet rather common discrimination, nor the very relevant Serbiancommunity inMontenegro (32’0%), nor the less numerous communities ofBosniaks (7’8%), and Croats (1’1%), have any right to an specificparliamentaryrepresentation,sotheirpresenceintheSkupštinacanonlybeachievedonthebasisofthevotesgatheredbythedifferentethnically‐basedparties, namely the Bosniak Party, the Croatian Civic Initiative, the NewSerbianDemocracy, and themostly pro‐Serbian SocialDemocratic Party ofMontenegro.WithregardtoKosovo–whoseunilateraldeclarationofindependencedatingfromFebruary2008isstillfarfrombeinguniversallyrecognized,andhasnoteven been so by all the EU States nor by those of the Balkan region–, itsConstitution –also dating from 2008–, established, or confirmed theexistence,ofawiderangeofmechanismstoensuretherepresentationofitsminorities in theseveralpolitical institutions thatwereabout tobecreatedbythenewRepublic.AdesignaimednotsomuchatmeetingthedemandsofSerbia and the Serbian minority in Kosovo, whose opposition to Kosovo'sindependencewasnotandisnotlikelytoplacatewithminorconcessions,as

to satisfy the international community that had to ratify and secure it, andstrongly inspired by the provisions of the so‐called Ahtisaari Plan, deeplyconcernedabouttherightsofminoritiesandveryadamantinKosovobeingconceivedasamultinationalState.Thus,article64oftheKosovoConstitutioncreateda120‐memberAssembly,electedPRonthebasisofasinglenationallist,orderingthatatleast20ofitsseats would be reserved for the representation of ethnic minorities(altogether, 8% of the census in 2008), of which tenwould necessarily bereserved for the Serbian community, four for the Roma, three for theBosniaks,twofortheTurksandonefortheGorani.37Thesystem,whichhadbeen set inmotionalready in2001, allowsmembersof theseminorities toparticipateintheelectionofthenon‐reservedseatstoo,thereforeduplicatingtheirchancesofgettingparliamentaryrepresentation.After theelectionsof12December2010,anddespitetheboycottoftheSerbianpopulationinthemunicipalities north of the Ibar River, the ten seats allocated to thiscommunity were distributed among the United Serbian List and theIndependent Liberal Party, which also gained three additional seats fromtheir national lists, and were subsequently invited to join the ThaciGovernmentwiththreeportfolios,whiletheremainingcommunitiesdividedtheirvoteamongamyriadofsmallparties,oftenofapurelylocalnature.On the other extreme of our classification, where the case of Bosnia andHerzegovinahadbeenplaced,thepanoramahasnotbeenalteredyet,butthefactthatcallsforaprofoundrevisionoftheDaytonconstitutionalmodelarenowmoreintensethaneverbefore,andthatthereisevenalandmarkjudicialdecisionpressinginthatdirection,makesitpossibletoforeseechangesinanot too distant future. As we have already exposed, the prescriptionscontained in theDaytonPeaceTreaty imply that the threemembersof thecollective Presidency are to be elected for a four year term by citizensbelonging to the threemajor ethnic groups –or constituent nations– of thecountry (withBosniaks representing48%,Serbs37’1, andCroats14’3%ofthe 2000 census), the most voted candidate in each constituency beingelected regardless of the votes obtained by other candidates from othergroups,whileasimilarthinghappensatthelegislativelevel.ThefactthattheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinaprovides thatonlyethnicBosniaks,Serbs and Croats can be elected members of Presidency, legally excludingcitizens from other ethnic backgrounds, was brought before the European

37 In addition to this, the Constitution also mandated the creation of two specific bodiesintendedtoincreasetherepresentationofminoritiesinthenewKosovarinstitutions:theso‐called Consultative Council for Communities (article 60) which, operating under theauthority of the President of the Republic, and with a representation of all Kosovarcommunities, will allow them to “comment at an early stage on legislative or policyinitiativesthatmaybepreparedbytheGovernment,tosuggestsuchinitiatives,andtoseektohavetheirviewsincorporatedintherelevantprojectsandprograms”,andtheCommitteeonRightsandInterestsofCommunities(article78),apermanentcommitteeoftheAssemblyintegrated by an equal number of Albano‐kosovar, Serbian, and other minoritiesrepresentatives,andresponsibleforproposinglegislationandothermeasuresthatrespondtoparticularinterestsofthedifferentcommunities,aswellastomakerecommendationsonthedraftlawssubmitted.OnthenewKosovarinstitutionsseeJavierJordáGarcía,LadisputaentornoalestatusfinaldeKosovo.Contexto,actores,propuestaseimplicaciones,unpublishedPhDThesis,UniversityofValencia,Valencia,2012,pp.410‐422.

CourtofHumanRightsbytwoBosniancitizensofRomaandJewishorigin.InthelandmarkSejdićandFinciv.BosniaandHerzegovinaDecember21,2009decision, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR determined that applicants'ineligibilitytostandforelectiontotheHouseofPeoplesviolatedArticle14ofthe European Convention onHuman Rights (banning discrimination in thefieldofConventionrights)takeninconjunctionwithArticle3ofProtocolNo.1 (free elections), and that their ineligibility to stand for election to thePresidency violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general ban ofdiscrimination).38Though Bosnia’s response to this ruling has been extremely slow andambiguous, and it is not clear that the final outcomewill be other that toincreasethepoliticalrightsofthecitizensincludedinthe“others”category,thus maintaining the comprehensive ethnification of Bosnian politicalinstitutions,itcanbearguedthattheSejdić­Fincidecision,alongsidewiththegradualemergenceofcivic‐orientedparties,andcombinedwiththepressurefromtheEuropeanUnionauthoritiesonoccasionofBosnia’saccessiontalks,mightbecomeastartingpointforasubstantialchangeinthewaypoliticsareplayedinthiscountry.39Thisrapidenumerationoflegislativechangesallowsfortheformulationofatleastfiveconclusions.Thefirstisthatthefrequencyandtherelevanceofthechangesexperiencedintheveryspecificareaofelectorallegislationinwhichwearenowfocusedhave been, both in absolute and in relative terms, rather modest. Thoughsomechangeshaveindeedoccurred,theyhavenotbeenthatmany,andtheirpotentialforinnovationhasbeenratherlimited,intendedmoreatfine‐tuningthe existing systems of ethnic minority representation than at radicallyalteringit.Andthisagainstacontextinwhichotheraspectsoftheelectoralrulesofthecountriesconcernedhaveinseveralcasesexperiencedimportantchanges. It can be said, therefore, that against a background of an ongoingdispute about the rules of the electoral game, the issue of ethnicminorityrepresentationappearstobemarginallymoresettledthanothers.The second conclusion is that it is undeniable that most of the changesintroduced with regard to the parliamentary representation of nationalminorities have been the consequence of predominantly internal politicaldynamics, related both with already well rooted positions regarding thepolitical role that minorities ought to play, with the need to promote

38EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,«Sejdic­Finciv.BosniaandHerzegovina:«ProhibitingaromandjewstandingforelectiontotheHouseofPeoplesandtheParliamentaryAssemblyandfortheStatePresidencyamountstodiscriminationandbreachestheirelectoralrights»(availableon‐lineatwww.echr.coe.int,lastretrieved10.09.2012).39OnthereactionstotheSejdic­Fincidecission,andthesubsequentdebateonthefutureofethnopolitics in Bosnia, see Esma Kucukalic Ibrahimovic, “El lugar de «los Otros» en laConstitucióndeBosniayHerzegovina.Larepresentaciónconstitucionaldelasminoríasysusconsecuencias sobre los derechos individuales”, Cuadernos Constitucionales No. 67/68(2009)pp.135‐152.

governance fostering the stability of the executives, andwith the desire tosatisfythedemandsoftheinternationalcommunityinthisregard.In the third place, it is possible to distinguish some kind of geographicpattern regarding the treatment of ethnicminorities in this complex set ofelectorallaws,asitisrevealedbythefactthatthemostgenerouslegislationsoftheregionarethosetobefoundinthecountriesoftheformerYugoslavia,namely, as shown by the examples of Bosnia, Kosovo,Montenegro, CroatiaandSlovenia,andtoalesserextentalsoSerbiaandMacedonia.Thismaybeduetothefactthattherecognitionandinclusionofminoritiesanddifferentethnic groups was already a basic constitutional principle in SocialistYugoslavia, and this legacy may have been transmitted to the newlyindependentstates,but itmayalsobedue to thestrong interferenceof theEuropean Union and other Western democracies in post‐Yugoslav affairsduringandaftertheconflictseruptedinthenineties–asthecasesofBosniaandKosovoclearlyshow–,totherelevanceofthesecommunitiesinthestatestheyarepresent,ortotheimportanceoftheirofficialrecognitioninordertomaintaingoodneighborlyrelationsamongthem.Fourthly,incanbearguedthatitisalsopossibletofindacertainlogicandacertainconsistencyinallthissetofchanges:indeed,theyreveal,ontheonehand, that the expulsion of ethnic minorities from the political life of thecountryonthegroundsthattheirpresenceisdetrimentaltotheprincipleofnationalsovereigntyandinvolvesariskofruptureofthenationalunityisasunsustainableasit is itsopposite:thatcitizensmustremainattachedtotheethnic community to which they belong and cannot participate in publicaffairs but as members of such community and through the participatorymechanisms articulated by it. It is not a coincidence that both the mostdownright hostile positions towards the presence of ethnic minorities inpoliticallifeaswellasthoseproposingacompleteethnificationthereofhavebeenalreadyruledoutor,atleast,aresubjecttothemostseverecriticism.Hence,itseemsarguablethatwearemovingtowardintermediatepositions,inwhichtheaspirationofethnicminoritiestoenjoyasignificantpresenceinparliamentary life is in some cases treated with the same –and no less–respect of those of any other interest group or ideological tendency, or inwhich they may benefit from protection of the law when it is required tomake it possible. Ultimately, the option for one or another strategywouldhavemoretodowiththepeculiarsituationofminoritiesthemselves–and,inparticular, with their relative size, and their capacity to vertebrate anautonomouspoliticalalternative;inotherwords:withtheirowncapacitytoremaininfluential intheircountry’spoliticalscenario–thatwithanysortofideologically motivated positioning for or against ethnic pluralism. In thissenseitwouldbewrongtothinkthatthoseStateswheretheparliamentaryrepresentationofminoritiesisguaranteedbylawpossessahigherdegreeofrespectforethnicpluralismthatthatthoseotherswhichonlyprovidesomerelative advantages, or that these in turn are more generous towardsminoritiesthanthosewhoapplyauniformruleforallkindsofcandidatesintheir electoral legislation. At the end of the day the effectiveness of theparliamentarypresenceofethnicminoritieswilldependmuchmoreonotheraspects either belonging to the electoral system–like themagnitude of the

districts, the fairness of the apportionment of seats, the practice of afavorable or an unfavorable gerrymandering, the applicable electoralformula, or the existence or not of a legal threshold–, or regulated at aconstitutional level –like size of the Assembly, or the requirements for theconcession of nationality and voting rights–, or even related to politicalculture of the country –as the likelihoodof coalition cabinet formation, thepositioning of ethnically based parties at one or the other edge of theideological spectrum, or their ability to keepholdof the voteof thosewhobelong to that community, or even capture the vote of thosewho are not–thanonthespecificregulationofethnicminorityrepresentationcontainedintheapplicablelegislation.Thefifthandlastconclusionofthisessayisthat,asthedebateonwhetherornotethnicminoritiesshouldenjoyparliamentaryrepresentationseemstobegoingintothebackground,andastheirpresenceinthelegislativechambershas become an absolutely regular feature –and even a permanent one insome cases– of the political life of the countries of Central and EasternEurope,maybe itwould be timely tomove the focus of our analysis to theissueoftheirintegrationintheexecutivesofthesecountries.Theexperiencegained by formations such as The Movement for Rights and Freedoms inBulgaria, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, the Alliance ofVojvodina Hungarians in Serbia, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition inSlovakiaand,aboveall,thatofthedifferentAlbanianpartierswhohavebeensucceeding one other in each and every of the governments formed inMacedonia since 1990, provide valuable data and also interestingexperiencesonwhichtosustainfurtherresearchinitiatives.40

40 Which, of course, are already being developed. See, among others, Monica Robotin, ‘‘AComparative Approach to Minority Participation in Govern‐ment’’, in Monica Robotin &Levent Salat (eds.),ANewBalance:Democracy andMinorities inPost‐CommunistEurope,LGI,Budapest,2003,pp.161‐162,andMartinBrusis, ‘‘TheEuropeanUnionandInterethnicPower‐sharingArrangementsinAccessionCountries’’,JournalonEthnopoliticsandMinorityIssuesinEuropeNo.1(2003).

CarlosFloresJuberías(Valencia,1964)is

professorofConstitutionalLawattheUniversityofValenciaLawSchool,wherehegraduatedin1987andgothisJDin1993,withExtraordinaryAnnualAwardsinbothcases.HewasFulbrightscholar(1993‐1994)andvisitinglecturer(1994‐1995)attheUniversityofCaliforniaSanDiego.In2007,healsograduatedinPoliticalScienceattheUNEDUniversity.

Hisacademicpublicationshavebeenfocusedmainlyonthecomparativestudyofelectionsandelectoralsystems,theformationofpartysystems,constitutionmakingprocesses,andEuropeanintegrationinthenewEastEuropeandemocracieshavingeditedfifteenacademicvolumes,amongthemLasnuevasinstitucionespolíticasdelaEuropaOriental(CEPC,1997),“DerechosylibertadesenlasnuevasdemocraciasdelaEuropadelEste”(HumanaIura,1999),LatransformacióndelaspolíticassocialesenlaEuropadelEste(MinisteriodeTrabajo,2001),EstudiossobrelaEuropaOriental(PUV,2002),Rusia,envísperasdesufuturo(withA.Colomer,PUV,2002),DelaEuropadelEstealestedeEuropa(PUV,2006),EspañaylaEuropaOriental:tanlejos,tancerca(PUV,2009),Europa,veinteañosdespuésdelMuro(PlazayValdés,2009)and“LaUniónEuropea,mirandohacialosBalcanes”(forthcomingin2012).

HeistheEditor‐in‐chiefofthequarterlyCuadernosConstitucionales,theHon.ConsuloftheRepublicofMacedoniaintheValencianCommunity,andDoctorhonoriscausabytheSt.FrancisXavierUniversityinSucre,Bolivia.