Electoral Reform, Party Mobilization and Voter Turnout

Robert Stein, Rice University stein@rice.edu

Chris Owens, Texas A&M University

cowens@polisci.tamu.edu

Jan Leighley, Texas A&M University leighley@polisci.tamu.edu

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Abstract

In this paper we explore the conditions under which candidates and party officials use electoral reforms (i.e., early voting) to mobilize voters. We draw upon a unique database that studies a sample of registered voters and matches their validated voting behavior with partisan campaign activities in each voter’s respective county during the 2002 midterm election in Texas. We expect, first, that considerations of strategy and opportunity shape both parties’ use of early voting to mobilize supporters and second, that the impact of their efforts on voter turnout is mediated by these elite strategies. Our empirical evidence supports our central thesis: without the efforts of political parties and their candidates, electoral reforms are likely to have a marginal effect on voter turnout. An important modification to our original thesis, however, is that the effectiveness of electoral reforms is dependent not only on whether political elites choose to take advantage of such rules in developing their electoral strategies, but also on party members’ initial probability of voting absent any mobilization, a key feature distinguishing the effectiveness of Republican and Democratic mobilization efforts. .

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Low and possibly declining voter turnout over the past several decades has

disturbed politicians and scholars alike. Some national and state officials have responded

to this issue by proposing various institutional reforms such as election day registration,

voting by mail, early voting and motor-voter registration aimed at reducing the costs of

voting. In addition to increasing electoral participation in general, these proposals have

also been justified as a means to increase voter turnout among historically

underrepresented populations (i.e., the young, the poor and racial and ethnic minorities).

Yet research has shown that the promise of these reforms has fallen short of

expectations. Registration reform, for example, is not associated with greater turnout on

election day (see, for example, Knack 1995). The disappointing effects of these policy

adoptions pose an interesting puzzle with respect to electoral behavior. Why, when

institutional costs are lowered, does the mass public not respond?

We contend that the effectiveness of electoral reforms is contingent upon on the

strategic behavior of elites. Without strategic decisions by elites to use electoral reforms

to their advantage, electoral reforms will be unrelated to voter turnout. According to this

logic, if vote maximizing candidates utilize these electoral reforms to mobilize voters in

support of their candidacies, then voter turnout will increase. If candidates’ strategic

calculations suggest that increased turnout is not to the campaign’s advantage, then these

electoral reforms would be irrelevant to candidates’ campaign strategies and, ceteris

paribus, not affect turnout. Conceptually, this argument highlights the distinction between

voters having the opportunity of voting by mail, registering on election day, or voting

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early, for example, and candidates choosing to use these opportunities as part of their

campaign strategy.

Some researchers (e.g., Hansen and Rosenstone 1993; Aldrich and Simon 1986)

have suggested that the efficacy of these reforms is dependent upon the campaign

activities of candidates and their parties. That is, changing the “rules of the game” is not

sufficient to increase turnout. Yet most research neglects the central role of candidates’

assessments of the utility of electoral reforms in winning elections.

Another neglected issue in the literature is the potential impact of electoral

reforms on the composition of the electorate. Electoral reforms might differentially

impact voters by race, ethnicity, or class, for example. Although reformers have argued

that reducing the costs of voting would increase representation of historically

disadvantaged voters (i.e., the poor and less educated) in the electorate, there is limited

research on this question. Moreover, we know of no research that has studied how elites’

strategic campaign decisions influence the relationship between electoral reforms and

voter turnout among the poor and less educated.

In an attempt to close this gap in the literature we offer a model of how

party mobilization links the availability of early voting to voter turnout. Drawing upon a

unique database that samples registered voters and matches their validated voting

behavior with partisan campaign activities, we develop a research design for testing

hypotheses derived from our explanation. We find that individuals who have greater

opportunities to participate in early voting are no more likely to vote than individuals for

whom such opportunities are more limited. However, when early voting opportunities are

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exploited by partisan mobilization efforts, individuals are more likely to vote. Further, we

find no evidence that electoral reforms enhance the likelihood that historically

disadvantaged voters will cast a ballot. This relationship remains insignificant even in

the presence of strong partisan mobilization. Together, these findings underscore the

importance of elites in structuring mass participation and illustrate the importance of

subjecting our “conventional wisdom” to empirical analysis.

Electoral Reform and Party Mobilization

Previous research has identified four major influences on individual decisions to

participate – social and demographic traits, psychological resources, electoral rules, and

the mobilization efforts of parties and their candidates (Leighley 1995). Electoral

reforms directed at increasing voter participation have centered on simplifying voter

registration and increasing opportunities to vote (e.g., voting by mail and in-person early

voting). The rationale underlying early voting and related electoral reforms (e.g., Motor

Voter and voting by mail) has been the belief that providing more opportunities to vote

(i.e., the number of days, hours or sites at which to vote) increases voter participation.

Reducing the number of days prior to an election in which voters can register to

vote and allowing individuals to register to vote when renewing their driver’s licenses or

at the polls on election day has increased voter registration (Wolfinger and Rosenstone

1980; Squire, Wolfinger and Glass, 1987). But studies of the direct effect of voter

registration and balloting reforms on voter turnout suggest minimal responses on the part

of the electorate. Nationa l legislation (i.e., National Voter Registration Act of 1993) to

enable individuals to register to vote when they renew or obtain a driver’s license has had

only a modest impact on voter turnout (Knack 1995; Rhine 1995). Moreover, liberalized

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voting by mail (Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001) and in-person early voting (Stein and

Garcia-Monet 1997; Stein 1998) were also found to have an insignificant or marginal

effect on increasing the likelihood an individual will vote.

These findings conflict with the general belief that reducing the restrictiveness of

electoral laws necessarily increases turnout, and especially so for lower-class individuals.

Indeed, Lijphart (1997) argues that electoral reforms are justified for their ability to

redress class inequa lities in voter turnout, a particularly striking feature of the U.S.

electorate (Leighley and Nagler 1992). Yet the empirical evidence that contemporary

electoral reforms reduce class differences in turnout is mixed and weak.

Nagler (1991: 1402) concludes that restrictive registration laws do not deter

poorly-educated individuals from registering any more than the highly-educated. This

implies that liberalizing these laws may increase registration overall, but will not equalize

participation across classes. Conclusions regarding election reforms beyond registration

are similar. Stein (1998) reports that resource-poor voters did not benefit from the

adoption of in-person early voting, while Berinsky et al., (2001) find that voting by mail

has little effect on the “resource-poor” (2001:178). Stein (1998) also reports that early

voters appear to be more partisan, ideological, interested in politics, and

disproportionately likely to have voted in the past. Simply put, electoral reforms have

only been used by those who otherwise would have been most likely to vote without

them.

This “minimal effects” conclusion may be premature. When candidates and

parties engage in voter mobilization activities, there is a high likelihood that their efforts

will be fruitful (Gerber and Green 2000; Adams and Smith 1980; Huckfeldt and Sprague

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1992; Wielhouwer 1995; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). And when party

mobilization efforts rely on the use of electoral reforms such as absentee or early voting,

they tend to increase voter turnout. Patterson and Caldeira (1982), for example, find

absentee voting rates are higher in states with greater party mobilization efforts

(1982:785), while Oliver (1996) finds that in states where absentee voting requirements

are most liberal and where political parties invest time and resources to mobilize absentee

voters, “the levels of absentee voting rise and the characteristics of absentee voters

change” (1996:25). Party mobilization may thus be central to linking electoral reforms to

voter behavior.

Theory and hypotheses

How might our assessment of the efficacy of electoral reforms differ were we to

consider a model where reform effects are contingent upon elite strategic considerations?

Our model of electoral reform effects posits an ind irect relationship between electoral

reforms and voter behavior. Electoral reforms intended to increase voter turnout are not

self-actuating. That is, the implementation of these electoral reforms require agents –

political parties and their candidates – to intervene between the opportunities created by

state election laws to vote and eligible voters.

The implementation of these reforms, however, relies on candidates’ strategic

decisions to mobilize their supporters. Candidates and their parties know who their

supporters are, the likelihood that they will ballot in an election, the costs of mobilizing

these supporters and the probable impact voter mobilization will have on the outcome of

an election. With this information, parties will make decisions about when and how to

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mobilize their supporters. The efficacy of electoral reforms is thus dependent upon the

decisions of candidates to use the electoral reform to mobilize supporters.

This model identifies two central concepts, electoral reform and elite

mobilization, and predicts that their interaction will yield significant and positive effects

on voter turnout. We are agnostic about the direct independent effects of either electoral

reforms or elite mobilization (as studied in previous research) on voter turnout. Instead

our model predicts that the interaction of the availability of electoral reforms and the use

of such reforms as part of elite mobilization efforts will influence voter turnout.

The critical importance of elites' strategic decisions in this model demands

elaboration (and caution) on at least two points (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). First,

we assume (but do not further investigate) that candidates' and parties' assessments of the

utility of incorporating electoral reforms as part of their campaign mobilization strategies

are likely to vary with respect to electoral and political context, e.g., competitiveness,

ballot length, and economic conditions. Verifying this assumption is likely an important

step in better understanding the effects of electoral reforms in U.S. politics, though we do

not seek to do that here.

Second, we believe that party strategy requires leaders to focus on mobilizing

their supporters, rather than turnout overall. Thus, aside from the contextual

considerations noted above, party leaders also likely consider the personal characteristics

and behaviors of their supporters in determining their most effective use of campaign

resources. One of the key considerations following from this is the party leader's

estimate of the probability of particular supporters turning out to vote in a particular

election. While most electoral reforms are intended to benefit all voters, candidates are

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interested in mobilizing only their supporters. Moreover, the only voters who

independently take advantage of these reforms are those who are likely to vote (i.e.,

informed and partisan voters). So how do candidates use electoral reforms? This is a

calculation that candidates and parties make as a function of who they need to turn out,

who will vote for them, and who is unlikely to vote in the first place. Candidates utilize

electoral reforms as part of their mobilization strategies when they identify among their

supporters voters in need of incentives to vote.

This information might lead to the differential use and effects of reform-oriented

party mobilization for parties with distinctive electorates. The core electoral constituency

of each political party is well known and allows us to anticipate the mobilization

strategies of each party. Republican candidates draw from a middle and upper class

Anglo voter base located in suburban and rural communities. The voter base for

Democrats is comprised of lower socio-economic status voters, minorities (African-

American and Hispanic), and progressive/liberal Anglos located in urban areas of the

state. Core Republican supporters are more likely to vote than their Democratic

counterparts, largely because Republicans are disproportionately wealthier, older and

better educated than Democrats.

There is evidence in the literature to support our observation that partisans are

more likely to mobilize only their core constituents. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992) report

party mobilization efforts are targeted to those voters who are consistent supporters of the

party. Prior participation in a party’s primaries is a significant and positive predictor that

an individual will be contacted to vote by their respective party in a general election

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Huckfeldt and Sprague also observe a strong and positive class bias in Republican

party contacting: “the probability of being contacted by the Republicans is dramatically

affected by class and party (75).” This suggests that core Republican constituents are

significantly more likely than core Democrats to be wealthier and better educated. The

lower status of core Democrats would suggest a greater need and likelihood for

Democrats to mobilize their core supporters.

Consequently we expect that the Democrats are more likely than Republicans to

incorporate voter mobilization in their electoral strategies and utilize changes in the

electoral laws (e.g., early voting) to effectively mobilize their core constituencies. We do

not expect to observe higher voter turnout among Republican voters even when

Republican party leaders pair their mobilization efforts with new electoral reforms.

One logical consequence of a model that emphasizes elite strategy as mediating

the effects of electoral reforms is that elite strategy will also determine whether such

reforms are associated with changes in the class composition of the electorate. Most

research on elite strategy suggests that party elites focus on known voters and their own

party members (Herrnson 2002). This focus on existing voters and partisans might help

to explain why previous research has found limited effects of electoral reforms on who

votes.

We argue that it is impossible to hypothesize what compositional effects any

given electoral reform will have without accounting for the specific strategic decisions of

elites. We examine whether in the presence of partisan mobilization activities electoral

reforms affect the incidence of voting among the resource poor more than the resource

rich. We thus consider the possibility that the null findings on changes in the

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representativeness of the electorate result from past research failing to incorporate party

mobilization strategies in analyzing the effect of electoral reforms.

To test this elite-oriented model of the effects and effectiveness of electoral

reforms, we focus specifically on early voting. We hypothesize:

• The likelihood an individual will vote is unrelated to the availability of

early voting in the individual’s county of residence.

• The likelihood an individual will vote is unrelated related to partisan

efforts to mobilize voters in a county.

• The likelihood an individual will vote increases when the availability of

early voting is used in Democratic partisan efforts to mobilize voters in a

county.

• The effect of early voting electoral reforms on the incidence of voting in

the presence of partisan mobilization activities is disproportionately

greater for resource poor individuals than resource rich individuals.

Research design, measures and data

The 2002 Texas statewide election provides a rich setting in which to expect

significant efforts on the part of one or both parties to mobilize their core supporters and

target groups. In this election the Democratic candidates for governor and senator were

a Hispanic and African-American male, respectively. Their Republican opponents were

both Anglo males.

Since 1988 voters in Texas have had the opportunity to cast their ballots in-person

up to three weeks before a general election. 1 Texas voters do not have to establish any

prior condition (e.g., illness, age, travel out of the state, etc.) in order to cast their vote

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before the first Tuesday in November. Moreover, voting is conducted in-person at a

number of satellite sites, including nontraditional balloting sites such as supermarkets,

convenience stores and mobile voting sites.

The incidence of early voting in Texas has averaged 30 percent of the total vote

cast per election since 1991. The state sets a minimum number of early voting sites and

hours of operation that each county must meet during the three-week period prior to each

election. Counties are not prohibited from having more than the minimum number of

early voting sites.

To test our hypotheses we require a database that allows us to explain individual

electoral participation as function of individual level factors (i.e., social-demographic

traits and attitudes) and political characteristics including party campaign activities and

election procedures. A sample of registered voters in Texas (N=1,019)2 was interviewed

in September 2002. Respondents were asked about their intention to vote in the

November 2002 election, as well as standard demographic and attitudinal questions.

After the November election the voting history of each respondent was annotated from

his or her county board election. This information includes whether the respondent voted

in the November 2002 election and how they voted: in-person on election day, in-person

early or by mail.

Shortly after the November 2002 election we surveyed the county party chairs in

all 254 Texas counties. The survey instrument queried each party chair about their

efforts to mobilize target voter groups for turnout in the November 2002 election. Party

chairs were specifically asked about the party’s efforts to register voters before early

voting and election day and whether they encouraged mail- in and in-person early voting

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among their supporters and selected groups of voters. Additional questions were asked

about spending and time dedicated to different types of mobilization activities.

We also collected information on the number of early voting sites operated by each

county and their hours of operation

Partisan early voting mobilization activities

Party chairmen in each county were queried about their efforts to mobilize voters

in their county for early voting. Specifically each chair was asked:

• Did your organization provide voters with transportation to the polls during early

voting? (Yes=1, No=0)

• Did you organization encourage in-person early voting as part of its campaign

strategy in this year’s election? (Yes=1, No=0)

• How many weeks prior to election day on November 5 did your organization

begin the encouragement of in-person early voting? (1=1 week, 2=2 weeks, 3=3

week or 4=4 weeks)

• Did the Democrat (Republican) party chair in this county encourage in-person

early voting as part of their campaign strategy in this year’s election (1=Yes,

No=0)

• What activities did your organizations utilize to encourage by mail early voting:

Distributed filled out registration forms (1=Yes, 0=No).

Advertising in Spanish and English (1=Yes, 0=No).

Social activities to promote early voting registration (1=Yes, 0=No).

Promotions after religious activities (1=Yes, 0=No).

Other, unspecified activity (1=Yes, 0=No).

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A scale score of early voting mobilization activities was constructed from the above

questions for each county party organization. The score is the summed responses to each

question and ranges from zero (no activities performed in the 2002 election) to 12. The

Cronbach Alpha for the early voting scale is .674 for the Democratic party and .700 for

the Republican party.

County level opportunities for early voting

Opportunities for individuals to vote in-person before election day are function of

the number of early voting sites in each county and each site’s hours of operation during

the three weeks before election day. Under state local there is a minimum number of

early voting sites each county must operate before election day. Each site must be open a

minimum of six hours per day, though there is no limit on the number of hours a site can

be opened for in-person voting. Our measure of in-person early voting opportunities is

the total number of hours in-person early voting sites were open in each county. 3

Control variables

Democratic candidates are thought to be advantaged by greater voter turnout. This

is because core Democratic supporters, including the African-Americans, Hispanics and

resource-poor eligible voters are more likely to be infrequent voters and the object of

Democratic mobilization activities.4 The partisan competitiveness of the county should

increase the likelihood that contending parties believe their mobilization efforts will be

efficacious. Strong partisans 5, wealthier6, older, and better educated voters 7 and voters

with a strong interest in and knowledge about politics should be significantly self-

motivated to vote. Partisan competitiveness is scored as 1.0 minus the absolute

difference between the normal Democratic and Republican vote in each county. 8

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Knowledge and interest in politics was measured with six questions about national and

Texas state politics.9

Findings

Our survey of party officials indicates that both parties took significant steps to

mobilize their supporters through early voting opportunities in their respective counties

(see descriptive appendix on county chair survey). Nearly two-thirds of all county chairs

reported they encouraged their supporters to vote early. Democrats, however, were more

likely to engage in efforts to mobilize their supporters through early voting than

Republican party chairs. Approximately a third of the Republican party chairs reported

their organization provided voters with rides to the polls for early voting. Nearly half

(47%) of the Democratic party chairs provided their supporters with transportation to

vote early.

In every instance the Democratic party chairs reported a higher incidence of

mobilizing their supporters for early voting. Democrats were more likely to report

distributing registration forms for early voting, promoting early voting after religious

services, at social gatherings and, advertising early voting in Spanish language media.

This condition is clearly reflected in a higher scale score for Democratic early voting

mobilization. Most importantly the findings from our survey of party chairs in Texas

demonstrates that leaders of both parties, but particularly Democrats, took significant and

non-trivial steps to use early voting as a means of mobilizing their core supporters. The

fact that Democrats were more likely to use early voting to turnout their supporters might

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be indicative of the lower socio-economic status of core Democrats and the party’s need

to assist their supporters to the polls.

We estimate a model of validated voter turnout in the November 2002 election

(1=voted in the November 2002 election, 0=did not vote in the November 2002 election)

for voters by their partisan affiliation. Our assumption is that county party activists most

likely to target members of their own party (i.e., self- identified Democrats and

Republicans) and refrain from focusing mobilization activities on independents and other

unaffiliated voters. Parties are only interested in maximizing voter support for their

candidates, not voter turnout. Parties are risk aversive; they prefer to minimize turnout

rather risk turning out a voter who might ballot for their opponent. Consequently parties

focus their mobilizing activities on core supporters including self- identified partisan

supports and demographic groups who share the party’s policy preferences.

Our model of turnout includes an index of partisan early voting mobilization

activities, the number of hours of early voting in a respondent’s county and the

interaction of partisan mobilization activities and hours of early site operation in the

county. Additional controls are included for education, age, family income, political

knowledge strength of partisanship and race/ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic and African-

American)

Tables 1-3 report the logit regression coefficients for several models of voter

turnout in the 2002 Texas election by partisan affiliation of the respondent. While the

statistical significance of the coefficients can be used to test our hypotheses, logit

coefficients are not easily interpreted. Consequently, the magnitude and significance of

the effect of any independent variable on voting is determined by calculating the change

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in the probability of voting in the 2002 election across the range of values for our main

independent variables, controlling for all other independent variables at their mean

values. We use CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) to determine the

substantive significance of the changes in these probabilities.

Opportunities for early voting

Consistent with our own hypothesis and the findings of previous researchers we

fail to confirm a strong positive relationship between the number of hours of early voting

in a county and the likelihood a voter, Democrat, Republican or independent, voted in the

2002 Texas election. Among Democrats there is a positive but weak relationship

between the likelihood a voter participated in the 2002 election and opportunities in their

county to vote early (P <.08). For Republicans this relationship is positive but

statistically insignificant and for independent voters the relationship is negative but

statistically insignificant.

[table 1 about here]

Party early voting mobilization activities

The efforts of each party to mobilize their supporters through early voting have an

insignificant effect on the likelihood that supporters of each party balloted in the 2002

election. Furthermore neither each party’s efforts to mobilize voters for early voting

affected the likelihood an independent voted in the 2002 Texas election.

[table 2 about here]

Early voting opportunities and party mobilization activities

Consistent with our thesis there is evidence that the interaction between only

Democratic party efforts to mobilize voters through early voting and the opportunities to

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vote early is positively related to the voter participation in the 2002 election. Republican

efforts to mobilize their supporters in the presence of strong opportunities for early voting

has a statistically insignificant effect the likelihood a Republican will ballot. The

inclusion of the interaction between Democratic mobilization activities and opportunities

to vote early significantly increases the predictive power of our model of validated voting

from .109 to .233.10

[table 3 about here]

The magnitude of Democratic effo rts to mobilize their supporters through early

voting paired with greater hours of early voting in a county is modest. There is only a 4

percent change in the probability that a Democrat voted in the 2002 between one standard

deviation below and above the mean value for this interaction. 11 Moreover, there is only

.37 probability a Democrat participated the 2002 election in a county with both strong

party mobilization activities and substantial opportunities to vote early compared to only

a .27 probability that a Democrat voted in county with substantially less Democratic

effort to mobilize partisan supporters and hours of early voting operations.

In table 3 the coefficient for the hours of early voting represents the effect of early

voting opportunities on individual voter participation in counties where partisan

mobilization efforts were negligible (i.e., -1 standard deviation below the mean). For

Democrats (model 1) this effect is significant and negative. This finding should not be

interpreted to mean that greater hours of early voting decreases Democratic voter turnout.

To the contrary, this finding is due to the relationship between partisan electoral support

in a county and the incidence of hours of early voting.

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Democrats in Texas and other states promoted early voting as a means of

enhancing turnout among their core and resource-poor constituents (Stein and Garcia-

Monet 1997). Not surprisingly it has been Democrats who have lobbied for more

opportunities to vote early. The correlation between the normal Democratic vote in a

county and the hours of early voting is r=.198 (p<.01). The correlation between the

normal Republican vote in a county and the hours of early voting is r= –.205 (p < .01).

Because Democratic core voters are less likely to vo te the Democratic Party has worked

to create and expand early voting opportunities. Unfortunately without an accompanying

effort to mobilize their supporters through early voting Democratic voters are not likely

to benefit from opportunities to vote early. To the contrary, early voting is not self-

actuating and Democratic voters remain victims of their resource-poor status when their

party and candidates fail to defray the costs of voting.

It is possible that the same persons and/or political parties in each county are

responsible for determining the number of early voting sites and hours of operation as

well as partisan efforts to mobilize voters for early voting. Texas state law requires that

the county clerk determine the location and hours of operation for early voting. County

clerks are elected in partisan elections. It is possible that county clerks confer with their

party chairs when choosing early voting sites and hours of operation. If this is true our

estimates of the impact of early voting and party mobilization on turnout may be biased.

We have investigated this possibility and found it to be unlikely. First, if this condition is

present we would expect a strong and positive relationship between mobilization efforts

and opportunities for early voting in each county. This is not observed. We have

regressed the number of hours of early voting in each county on Democratic and

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Republican efforts in each county to mobilize voters. Both estimates are statistically

insignificant. Second, we would expect that over time the opportunities for early voting

would vary within counties as a function of changing political conditions. The

correlation between the number of hours of early voting in each county in our sample in

1996 (Leighley 2001) and 2002 is .956, sufficiently large to indicate little variation in

early voting opportunities over time. We speculate that state statutes (Stein and Garcia-

Monet 1997) regulating early voting account for most of variation in early voting

opportunities and that partisan influences are constrained by these requirements.12

Electoral reform and class inequalities in turnout

To test our final hypothesis that early voting reforms in the presence of partisan

mobilization have stronger effects on resource poor individuals—and thus reduce the

class inequalities in turnout—we estimate the same models reported above including

interaction terms for education and income. Our analysis follows Nagler’s (1991)

strategy of using interaction terms consisting of class and various electoral reforms to

identify whether the effect of an electoral reform varies across class. We thus add to the

models above a three-way interaction term include education, hours of early voting and

partisan mobilization effort (Democrat and Republican). We estimate a similar model

for income. The direct effects for the three variables remain in the model as do the other

control variables reported above. A positive and significant coefficient for our

interaction terms would suggest that partisan implementation of early voting has a strong

effect on the poor and less educated.

Table 4 reports the coefficients for our several interaction terms. Consistent with

our previous findings only among Democratic voters do we observe a significant increase

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in voting among low income voters when Democratic mobilization efforts are matched

with significant opportunities to vote early. We do not, however, observe the same

relationship for education. All of the coefficients for this measure of class are

statistically insignificant. We accept, albeit in qualified manner, the hypothesis that

Democrats efforts to mobilize their supporters in counties rich with opportunities to vote

earlier, reduces class disparities in voter turnout.

At first glance the results in Table 4 would appear to suggest that Republican

efforts to mobilize low-income Republicans is not effective. However, when we compare

the coefficient representing the effect of mobilization on low-income Republicans to that

for Democrats we find that they are identical. The difference lies in the size of the

standard errors in the Republicans column being twice that of the Democratic column.

We believe this difference can be explained by two factors. First, as discussed earlier,

lower socioeconomic status citizens tend to support the Democratic party. Therefore,

when Democrats attempt to mobilize low-income identifiers, their “pool” of potential

mobilization targets is much deeper than Republicans. For example, in our sample only

65 respondents with family incomes less than $35,000 a year identify with the

Republican Party while 116 respondents in this income category identify with the

Democratic Party. Because the Republicans’ targeted population is only about half the

size of that for the Democrats, the standard error of these estimates is much larger.

Second, Republicans targeting low-income voters are disadvantaged because most

low-income Republicans live in rural or low population density areas while most low-

income Democratic identifiers live in urban or high population density areas

(approximately 57% in both cases). This greater dispersion of low-income Republicans

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coupled with a population almost half that of Democrats increases the cost and likelihood

of error for Republican elites wanting to mobilize this population. These two

observations regarding the larger standard errors associated with Republican mobilization

suggest that Republican party officials are unlikely to gain a significant electoral

advantage from mobilizing their low-income supporters through early voting.

Conclusion

Our empirical evidence supports our central thesis: without the efforts of political

parties and their candidates, electoral reforms are likely to continue to have a marginal

effect on voter turnout. Yet our thesis holds for only one political party and their partisan

supporters. Only Democratic mobilization in the presence of strong opportunities to vote

early (i.e., hours of early voting operations in a county) has a significant and positive

effect on voter turnout. We find no evidence that Republican partisan mobilization

activity in the presence of strong opportunities to vote early increases the likelihood that

Republican partisans voted in the 2002 election.

Thus, an important modification to our original thesis is that the effectiveness of

electoral reforms is dependent not only on whether political elites choose to take

advantage of such rules in developing their electoral strategies, but also on the

individual’s probability of voting absent any mobilization. Our data indicates a negative

relationship between opportunities to vote early and the probability a Democratic voter

participated in the 2002 election. The demographics of core Democratic supporters

make them less likely to vote. Moreover, these voters are likely to reside in counties

where efforts to increase voter turnout through early voting are more pronounced,

producing the negative relationship we observe between voting and hours of early voting

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poll operations for Democrats. Democrats may have worked hard to pass early voting

legislation, but their continued efforts are necessary for the party to enjoy the benefits of

this change in electoral rules.

On the other hand, the demographics of Republican partisans make them likely

voters. Consequently Republican mobilization efforts are not likely to significantly raise

this already high intercept on voting. These analyses thus support the conventional

wisdom, that Republican constituents have sufficient individual resources (e.g., income,

time, efficacy) that partisan subsidies that result from mobilization efforts are not likely

to significantly affect their likelihood of voting.

More broadly, these findings help to explain the “null findings” of previous

research on voting and registration reform. This earlier research used rather naïve models

of mass political participation, where the assumption was made that a change in electoral

rules would have a direct, significant effect on individual behavior. We believe the

findings presented in this paper on early voting call into question this modeling

assumption regardless of the type of reform one considers. If elites do not take advantage

of new institutional rules, we should not expect to have them affect mass behavior.

This research also underscores the importance of political elites in understanding

who participates and the role of parties as linkage institutions. We thus echo Rosenstone

and Hansen’s (1993) claims that mass political participation reflects the strategic actions

of political elites: elites target who they want to participate when, and the mass public

responds.

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Table 1 Logit estimates for voter turnout in the 2002 Texas Election

(Robust Std. Error) Variable Model 1

(Dem) Model 2

(Rep) Model 3

(Ind) Constant -6.34*** -3.27 7.95*** (2.32) (2.28) (2.87) Education .292*** -.021 .190 (.018) (.096) (.145) Competition 4.05 2.235 4.48 (2.99) (2.69) (.320 Family income .002 -.008** .017** (.005) (.002) (.005) Age .212** .264*** .548*** (.107) (.076) (.140) Political Knowledge .118 .190** .219* (.077) (.066) (.123) Black .014 .322 -.027 (.319) (.931) (.199) Hispanic -.412 -1.91 -.026 (.555) (.930) (.882) Strength of Party ID -.107 .301 - (.292) (.212) - Early voting Hours .0002*

(.0001) .0001

(.0001) -.00007 (.0001)

Pseudo R2 .120 .094 .210 N 199 231 134 Wald Chi2 67.11 106.1 28.2 *P < .1 **P <.05 ***P<.01

25

Table 2 Logit estimates for voter turnout in the 2002 Texas Election

(Robust Std. Error) Variable Model 1

(Dem) Model 2

(Rep) Model 3

(Ind) Model 4

(Ind) Constant -1.81* -.630 -3.21*** -4.38*** (1.06) (.541) (1.22) (.917) Education .264*** -.056 .126 .305** (.074) (.119) (.171) (.126) Competition -6.08* -1.01 -3.78 -3.21* (3.27) (2.34) (3.26) (1.81) Family income .005 -.007** .016*** .020*** (.004) (.002) (.005) (.005) Age .166* .172* .502*** .550*** (.097) (.092) (.141) (.148) Political Knowledge .150*

(.080) .217*** (.001)

.252* (.151)

.190 (.139)

Black -.023 .048 -.031 .149 (.323) (.941) (.273) (.233) Hispanic -.465 -1.68* -.026 -.401 (.595) (.925) (.913) (.823) Strength of PID .065 .274 - - (.373) (.244) - - Party Mobilization .068 -.006 -.033 -.011 (.091) (.044) (.128) (.032) Pseudo R2 .109 .058 .204 .220 N 182 176 121 106 Wald Chi2 54.63 114.2 26.74 50.62 *P < .1 **P <.05 ***P<.01

26

Table 3

Logit estimates for voter turnout in the 2002 Texas Election

(Robust Std. Error) Variable Model 1

(Dem) Model 2

(Rep) Model 3

(Ind) Model 4

(Ind) Constant -7.55*** .967 5.90*** 5.04*** (2.92) (3.19) (3.31) (2.80) Education .230*** -.015 .137 .286** (.081) (.098) (.163) (.138) Competition 5.29** -2.82 4.63 .329 (2.76) (3.93) (3.54) (3.38) Family income .004 -.008*** .017*** .020*** (.005) (.001) (.005) (.005) Age .186** .217*** .514*** .567*** (.095) (.092) (.146) (.151) Political Knowledge .155**

(.974) .200*** (.052)

.260* (.146)

.210 (.150)

Black .096 .047 -.029 -.003 (.352) (.972) (.224) (.176) Hispanic .346 -1.76 -.038 -.335 (.500) (1.07) (.929) (.750) Strength of PID .007 .317 -.001 .00006 (.316) (256) (.002) (.0003) Early voting Hours -.004**

(.001) .0002

(.0004) .0001

(.0001) -.001 (.002)

Party Mobilization .102 (.110)

-.121 (.179)

-.167 (.133)

-.165 (.106)

Mobilization X Hours .0003** (.0001)

.00002 (.00005)

.00003 (.00004)

.00008 (.0001)

Pseudo R2 .233 .094 .232 .214 N 182 175 105 121 Wald Chi2 71.9 94.5 76.1 38.6 *P < .1 **P <.05 ***P<.01

27

Table 4 Logit estimates for income and education interactions

(Robust Std. Error)

All Respondents

Dem Respondents

Rep Respondents

Income Interactions Income * Mobilization * Hours .00000003

(.00000004) .00000009

(.00000005) .000000009

(.000000009) Education Interactions

Education*Mobilization*Hours -.00000002 (.0000001)

-.00002 (.00002)

.0000003 (.0000004)

Though not reported all estimates included controls for Education, Competition, Family Income, Age, Political Knowledge, Black, Hispanic, Strength of Party ID, Early Voting Hours, and Party Mobilization.

28

Appendix: Proportion of early voting mobilization activities performed by

county party organizations

127 .4646 .50072

140 .3214 .46870

267 .3895 .48856

127 .6378 .48254

140 .6143 .48851

267 .6255 .48491

127 2.7008 1.59300

140 2.9214 1.53645

267 2.8165 1.56321

127 .6142 .48872

140 .5571 .49851

267 .5843 .49377

127 .2205 .41621

140 .1500 .35835

267 .1835 .38782

127 .3386 .47510

140 .1714 .37824

267 .2509 .43437

127 .2205 .41621

140 .1429 .35118

267 .1798 .38472

127 .1181 .32402

140 .0571 .23295

267 .0861 .28110

127 .2126 .41077

140 .2286 .42142

267 .2210 .41568

127 2.9291 2.42730

140 2.3286 2.24552

267 2.6142 2.34862

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Dem

Rep

Total

Did your organizationprovide voters with rides topolls for early voting?

Did your organizationencourge in-person earlyvoting?

Weeks of early voting

Did your opposing partyorganization encourage earlyvoting?

Did you distributeregistration forms for earlyvoting?

Did you advertise in spanishand english for early voting?

Did you use social activitiesto encourage early votingturnout?

Did you promote earlyvoting after religiousactivities?

Other unspecified activitiesto promote early voting?

Early voting mobilizationscore

N Mean Std. Deviation

29

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31

Endnotes 1 Six other states including Colorado, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, etc. allow their voters to vote in-person before election day. 2 Telephone interviewers were conducted with 1,019 registered voters in 110 Texas counties. Interviews were conducted by the University of Houston Center for Public Policy between September 3-10 and September 12-15. The response rate for the survey is 38% and the error rate is +/- 3% 3 Several alternative measures were tested including the per capita hours of in-person early voting in each county and the hours in-person voting sites were open per square mile in each county. Both measures account for the possibility that opportunities to vote early are constrained by congestion or distance. Our findings do not vary significantly with these alternative measures of early voting opportunities. 4 See DeNardo (1980) for a contrary view. 5 Strong partisans, both Democrats and Republicans are code 1, respondents who are leaning Democrats, Republicans, Independents and other partisan affiliations are coded 0. 6 Total family income was recorded. 7 1-less than high school, 2=high school graduate, 3=some college/technical school, 4=college graduate, 5=post-graduate education. 8 The normal vote is the mean percent of the two party vote each party received in elections for governor, senator and Lt. Governor in 1994, 1998 and 2002. 9 The questions (answer) included: How may years is the Texas Governor’s term of office (four); How often does the Texas Legislature in Austin meet (every two years); Which party has the most members in the Texas State House of Representatives (Republican). Correct answers were score 1 and incorrect answers were score 0. A political knowledge scale is constructed from the sum of correct answers; How is the majority Leader of the U.S. Senate (Trent Lott); How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives to override a presidential veto (two-thirds); Which political party has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives (Republican). Cronbach Alpha=.781. 10 The incremental F-test for the difference between these two pseudo-R2s is 4.5, p < .001. 11 The standard deviation is calculated for the interaction term i.e., the product of early voting hours in each county and report party mobilization activities.

32

12 There is another important reason why the number of early voting sites and hours of operation do not vary over time. Voters expect to ballot at the same site (and during the same days and hours) across elections. County clerks avoid changing voting sites over time in an effort to maintain turnout and satisfy the county electorates.