Elective Officials Cases

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EN BANC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, RESPONDENTS. Rommel, a natural born Filipino citizen, lost his citizenship when he was naturalised as a US citizen. On July 10, 2008, he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act 9225; thereupon an Order of Approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. On April 3, 2009, he again took his Oath of Allegiance as well as executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his US citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Rommel filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On April 28, 2010, Liong, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify and/or cancel his certificate of candidacy in connection with the 2010 elections. According to Linog, Rommel is not a resident of Kauswagan; he is also a foreigner, as attested to by the Bureau of Immigration. In support of his claim, Linog presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record[ dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009. When required to answer, Rommel did not file any. It was only after his proclamation as winner that he filed an answer, traversing the allegations of Linog, and submitting his documentary evidence in support of his answer. The COMELEC First Division instead of treating the case as a petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy, treated as a petition for disqualification. Although the division dismissed Linog’s claim that Rommel is a US resident, it agreed with him in saying Rommel is a US citizen, citing that Rommel’s consistent use of his American passport negated his Affidavit of Renunciation of US citizenship and showed his intention to retain US citizenship. It therefore annulled his proclamation as Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, and ordered the rule of replacement of Rommel pursuant to the rule of succession under the Local Government Code. Rommel thus filed his Motion for Reconsideration to the order. Meanwhile, Casan, another mayoralty candidate and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, filed his Motion For Intervention and opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rommel. According to Casan, while the Comelec First Division ruled correctly on Rommel’s citizenship, it erred when it ruled that the order of succession under the Local Government should be followed. Following the cancellation of Rommel’s certificate of candidacy and his disqualification, he (Casan), as the legitimate candidate with the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed the winner. Rommel opposed the Motion For Intervention filed by Casan, alleging that intervention is not allowed after the Comelec had already rendered a decision, and Casan was never the winner. The COMELEC En Banc, acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rommel and the Motion for Intervention of Casan, granted the Motion for Reconsideration. It allowed the Motion for Intervention by Casan, but ruled that he will not be prejudiced by the decision of the First Division as it correctly ruled that the order of succession should be followed. However, it reversed the First Division and held that Rommel’s use of the US passport was not one of the grounds by which citizenship may be lost under RA 9225. It ruled that Rommel had a plausible explanation as to why he used his US passport in his travels, that is, his Philippine passport was issued late. When he took the oath of allegiance and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009, he regained his Philippine citizenship. Casan thus elevated his case to the Supreme Court. One of the core issue to be decided is the effect of disqualification of an ineligible candidate. The Supreme Court: “The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic. This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC[ when we pronounced: x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the

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Transcript of Elective Officials Cases

Page 1: Elective Officials Cases

EN BANC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, RESPONDENTS.

Rommel, a natural born Filipino citizen, lost his citizenship when he was naturalised as a US citizen. On July 10, 2008, he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act 9225; thereupon an Order of Approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. On April 3, 2009, he again took his Oath of Allegiance as well as executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his US citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Rommel filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On April 28, 2010, Liong, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify and/or cancel his certificate of candidacy in connection with the 2010 elections. According to Linog, Rommel is not a resident of Kauswagan; he is also a foreigner, as attested to by the Bureau of Immigration. In support of his claim, Linog presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record[ dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

When required to answer, Rommel did not file any. It was only after his proclamation as winner that he filed an answer, traversing the allegations of Linog, and submitting his documentary evidence in support of his answer. The COMELEC First Division instead of treating the case as a petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy, treated as a petition for disqualification. Although the division dismissed Linog’s claim that Rommel is a US resident, it agreed with him in saying Rommel is a US citizen, citing that Rommel’s consistent use of his American passport negated his Affidavit of Renunciation of US citizenship and showed his intention to retain US citizenship. It therefore annulled his proclamation as Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, and ordered the rule of replacement of Rommel pursuant to the rule of succession under the Local Government Code. Rommel thus filed his Motion for Reconsideration to the order. Meanwhile, Casan, another mayoralty candidate and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, filed his Motion For Intervention and opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rommel. According to Casan, while the Comelec First Division ruled correctly on Rommel’s citizenship, it erred when it ruled that the order of succession under the Local Government should be followed. Following the cancellation of Rommel’s certificate of candidacy and his disqualification, he (Casan), as the legitimate candidate with the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed the winner. Rommel opposed the Motion For Intervention filed by Casan, alleging that intervention is not allowed after the Comelec had already rendered a decision, and Casan was never the winner.

The COMELEC En Banc, acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rommel and the Motion for Intervention of Casan, granted the Motion for Reconsideration. It allowed the Motion for Intervention by Casan, but ruled that he will not be prejudiced by the decision of the First Division as it correctly ruled that the order of succession should be followed. However, it reversed the First Division and held that Rommel’s use of the US passport was not one of the grounds by which citizenship may be lost under RA 9225. It ruled that Rommel had a plausible explanation as to why he used his US passport in his travels, that is, his Philippine passport was issued late. When he took the oath of allegiance and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009, he regained his Philippine citizenship.

Casan thus elevated his case to the Supreme Court. One of the core issue to be decided is the effect of disqualification of an ineligible candidate.

The Supreme Court:

“The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC[ when we pronounced:

x x x.  The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC[ where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest “Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.”

[W]e have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy.  We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.  We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections.  For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC.  Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.  To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have.  Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

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It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. 

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC[ and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.  The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position.” The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.”

ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC

Posted by kaye lee on 9:25 PM

G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

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RULING:Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application  and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of theProvince of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.

Issue:

Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:

YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution. 

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

JAPSON VS. COMELEC CASE DIGEST

Topic: Dual Citizenship/ Dual Allegiance

JAPSON VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Ø  Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

Ø  Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).

Ø  Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.

Ø  While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991

Ø  Inspite of  having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.

Ø  Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.

Ø  Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.

Ø  Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which

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he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

Ø  He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]

Ø  The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Ø   Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen

Ø  Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.

Ø  The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.

Ø  Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Ø  Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.

Ø  The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

Ø  . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

Ø  The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.

RULING:

Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.

Ø  It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.

Ø  There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if

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length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Ø  Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.

Ø  To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss. 

Torayno v. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)

FACTS:  This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to

fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as

governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and

subsequently ran for mayor.

HELD:  Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He

bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in

1997.Bautista vs. COMELEC[G.R. Nos. 154796-97 October 23, 2003]En Banc, J. CarpioFACTS:On June 10, 2002, Baut ista f i led his cert i f icate of candidacy for Punong Barangay inLumbangan for the July 15, 2002 barangay elect ions. Elect ion Off icer Jareño refusedto accept Baut ista 's cert i f icate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On June 11, 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against ElectionO f f i c e r   J a r e ñ o   w i t h   t h e   R e g i o n a l   T r i a l   C o u r t   o f   B a t a n g a s .   T h e   t r i a l  c o u r t   o r d e r e d Elect ion Off icer Jareño to accept Baut ista 's cert i f icate of candidacy and to include hisname in the cert i f ied l is t of candidates for Punong Barangay. In compl iance with thet r i a l   c o u r t ' s   o r d e r ,   E l e c t i o n   O f f i c e r   J a r e ñ o   i n c l u d e d   B a u t i s t a   i n   t h e   c e r t i f i e d   l i s t   o f  candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same t ime, Elect ion Off icer Jareño referredthe matter of Baut ista 's inclusion in the cert i f ied l is t of candidates with the

COMELECL a w   D e p a r t m e n t   o n   5   J u l y   2 0 0 2 .   T h e r e a f t e r ,   t h e   C O M E L E C  L a w   D e p a r t m e n t recommended the cancel lat ion of Baut ista 's cert i f icate of candidacy since he was notr e g i s t e r e d a s a v o t e r i n L u m b a n g a n . T h e C O M E L E C e n b a n c f a i l e d t o a c t o n t h e COMELEC Law Department 's recommendat ion before the barangay elect ions on 15 July 2002.During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Alcoreza,ere candidates for the posi t ion of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Baut ista obtainedthe highest number of votes (719)  whi le Alcoreza came  in second with 522 votes, or amargin of  197 votes. Thus, the  Lumbangan Board of  Canvassers proclaimed Baut istaas the  elected Punong Barangay. Meanwhi le, COMELEC issued Resolut ion No.  5404o n   2 3   J u l y   2 0 0 2   a n d   R e s o l u t i o n   N o .   5 5 8 4   o n   1 0   A u g u s t  2 0 0 2   ( " C O M E L E C R e s o l u t i o n s " ) . I n R e s o l u t i o n N o . 5 4 0 4 , t h e C O M E L E C e n b a n c r e s o l v e d t o c a n c e l Bautista's certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584 expressedCOMELEC's policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not beingregistered voters in the place of their election.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the COMELEC en banc commit ted grave abuse of d iscret ionamount ing to excess or lack of jur isdict ion when i t issued Resolut ion Nos. 5404 and 5584;2 . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e C O M E L E C d e p r i v e d B a u t i s t a o f d u e p r o c e s s w h e n t h e COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 55843 . W h e t h e r B a u t i s t a w a s a r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r o f B a r a n g a y L u m b a n g a n w h e n h e filed his certificate of candidacy; and

 4 . W h e t h e r o r n o t i t w a s p r o p e r t o p r o c l a i m A l c o r e z a a s P u n o n g B a r a n g a y i n view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.HELD:1. A div is ion of the COMELEC should have f i rst heard th is case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction whenit ordered the cancel lat ion of Baut ista 's cert i f icate of candidacy without f i rst referr ingthe case to a division for summary hearing.T h e p r o c e e d i n g o n t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f a c e r t i f i c a t e o f c a n d i d a c y d o e s n o t m e r e l y p e r t a i n t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e C O M E L E C . C a n c e l l a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s involve the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions.2.T h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d d o e s n o t o n l y r e f e r t o t h e r i g h t t o p r e s e n t v e r b a l arguments in court dur ing a   formal hear ing. There is due  process when a party is ablet o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e f o r m o f p l e a d i n g s . H o w e v e r , t h e C O M E L E C d i d n o t g i v e B a u t i s t a   s u c h   o p p o r t u n i t y   t o   e x p l a i n   h i s   s i d e .   T h e   C O M E L E C   e n  b a n c   i s s u e d Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.A s u m m a r y p r o c e e d i n g d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e C O M E L E C c o u l d d o a w a y w i t h t h e requirements of not ice and hear ing. The COMELEC should have at least g iven not ice t o B a u t i s t a t o g i v e h i m t h e c h a n c e t o a d d u c e e v i d e n c e t o e x p l a i n h i s s i d e i n t h e cancel lat ion proceeding. The COMELEC en banc depr ived Baut ista of procedural duep r o c e s s   o f   l a w   w h e n   i t   a p p r o v e d   t h e   r e p o r t   a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n   o f   t h e   L a w Department without notice and hearing.3. B a u t i s t a w a s a w a r e w h e n h e f i l e d h i s c e r t i f i c a t e o f c a n d i d a c y f o r t h e o f f i c e o f   Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qual i f icat ions - that of being a registeredvoter in the barangay where he ran for of f ice. He therefore made a misrepresentat ion of a material fact when he

Page 6: Elective Officials Cases

made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that hewas a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. Hewho aspires for e lect ive of f ice should not make a mockery of the electoral process byfalsely representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests atthe very core of the electoral process.Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for thedenial or cancel lat ion of the cert i f icate of candidacy. The mater ia l misrepresentat ionc o n t e m p l a t e d b y S e c t i o n 7 8 r e f e r s t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r e l e c t i v e o f f i c e . A c a n d i d a t e gui l ty of misrepresentat ion may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) i f e lected, f romserving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws.4.I t i s a w e l l - s e t t l e d d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e C O M E L E C c a n n o t p r o c l a i m a s w i n n e r t h e c a n d i d a t e   w h o   o b t a i n s   t h e   s e c o n d   h i g h e s t   n u m b e r   o f   v o t e s   i n   c a s e   t h e  w i n n i n g c a n d i d a t e   i s   i n e l i g i b l e   o r   d i s q u a l i f i e d .   T h e   e x c e p t i o n   t o   t h i s   w e l l -s e t t l e d   r u l e   w a s

 m e n t i o n e d i n L a b o , J r . v . C o m m i s s i o n o n E l e c t i o n s w h i c h h e l d t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n i s predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtainedthe highest number of votes is disqual i f ied; and (2) the electorate is fu l ly aware in factand in law of a candidate 's disqual i f icat ion so as to br ing such awareness within the r e a l m o f n o t o r i e t y b u t w o u l d n o n e t h e l e s s c a s t t h e i r v o t e s i n f a v o r o f t h e i n e l i g i b l e candidate.F o l l o w i n g S e c . 4 4 o f t h e L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o d e p r o v i d e s f o r t h e r u l e r e g a r d i n g p e r m a n e n t   v a c a n c y   i n   t h e   O f f i c e   o f   t h e   P u n o n g   B a r a n g a y ,   t h e  h i g h e s t   r a n k i n g sangguniang barangay member, or   in the case of h is  permanent disabi l i ty, the secondhighest ranking sangguniang member, shal l become the Punong Barangay. Thus, theproclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void.