Election Law Doctrines

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC.

The word “residence,” for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, means “domicile” or the individual’s permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. It includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place, and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Caasi vs Comelec

The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

Macalintal vs Comelec

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile

and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

Election and Suffrage

Moya vs Del Fierro

no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).

Badelles vs Cabili

 "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 9 assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically, with reference to provincial and municipal officials,

election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." .

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno in Tolentino vs COMELEC

The electorate should have been informed of the time, place and manner of conduct of the May 14, 2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong and Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely free, orderly and honest election is predicated upon an electorate informed on the issues of the day, the programs of government laid out before them, the candidates running in the election and the time, place and manner of conduct of the election. It is for this reason that the Omnibus Election Code is studded with processes, procedures and requirements that ensure voter information. Free and intelligent vote is not enough; correct ascertainment of the will of the people is equally necessary. The procedure adopted in the case at bar for holding the May 14, 2001 special senatorial election utterly failed to ascertain the people’s choice in the special election. In not allowing the voter to separately indicate the candidate he voted for the three-year senatorial term, the voter was deprived of his right to make an informed judgment based on his own reasons and valuations. Consequently, his true will in the special election was not ascertained. As a particle of sovereignty, it is the thinking voter who must determine who should win

in the special election and not the unthinking machine that will mechanically ascertain the 13th placer in the general election by mathematical computations.

COMELEC

Purisima vs Salanga

Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.

Cauton vs Comelec

The Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there exist discrepancies among the various copies of the election returns.11Of all the copies prepared by the board of inspectors the copy least susceptible to being tampered with is the one deposited in the ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to have been uniformly altered, there is no plausible reason why the copy deposited in the ballot box may not be used to determine whether discrepancies exist in the various copies. Inasmuch as the Commission on Elections has the right to determine whether said discrepancies exist, it must also have the right to consult said returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does not provide that it is the courts that have the power to order the opening of the ballot box in a situation like this.

Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on which petitioner herein relies in support of his stand in the present case, authorizes the opening of the ballot box whenever it is the subject of an official investigation. It provides:

The municipal treasurer shall keep the boxes unopened in his possession in a secure place and under his responsibility for three months, unless they are the subject of an official investigation, or a component court or tribunal shall demand them sooner, or the competent authority shall order their preservation for a longer time in connection with any pending contest or investigation.

Under this section the ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest. They may also be opened even if there is no election contest when their contents have to be used as evidence in the prosecution of election frauds.12Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject of any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent authority.13The "competent authority" must include the Commission on Elections which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the conduct of elections. In the instant case the Commission on Elections found that it has been clearly established that the election returns outside the ballot boxes, in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, have been tampered with.

Roque vs Comelec

The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its

awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections.

Arroyo vs DOJ and Comelec 2012

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Arroyo vs DOJ and Comelec 2013

DOES THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE POWER TO INVESTIGATE ELECTION CASES?

YES, UNDER BP 881 OR THE COMELEC ELECTION CODE. BUT NOT ANYMORE UNDER SECTION 43 OF RA 9369.

“…… While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.”

BUT IS THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE NOT AN ABDICATION OF COMELEC’S INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?

NO BECAUSE THE COMELEC HAS STILL TO APPROVE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE. JOINT ORDER NO. 001-2011 DATED 15 AUGUST 2011 PROVIDES THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ELECTION OFFENSES SHALL STILL BE APPROVED BY THE COMELEC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.

“To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction” authorized by the amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:

x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed.

Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

Ongsioko reyes vs Comelec

Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.  Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open

session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied

Voters

People vs Corral

The modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. The existence of the right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of the constitution

Registration of Voters

Yra vs Abano

The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.

Akbayan Youth vs COMELEC

Right of suffrage is not absolute. It ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature. Sec. 8 of RA 8189 provides: System of Continuing

Registration of Voters. – The Personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. Failing to register on time, the court notes the doctrine on coming to court with unclean hands. “Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.”

Candidates

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

Article XI Sec 9 of 1987 Constitution states that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. The Court did not allow petitioner to sit as a governor while owing allegiance to another country.

Mercado vs Manzano

Section 40 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, declares as disqualified from running for any elective position “those with dual citizenship.” The phrase “dual citizenship” must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance” “Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall

under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Villaber vs Comelec

“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” That “not every criminal act involves moral turpitude,” and that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.”

The presence of the second element (in elements of violation of BP 22) manifests moral turpitude. We held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and

“certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person….”Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.

Lonzanida vs Comelec

Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. To come within the prohibition, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Abundo vs Comelec

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.

Marquez vs Comelec

The Court believes and thus holds that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations

Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Dela Cruz vs Comelec

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. Private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters' constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the

name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same. 

Risos-Vidal vs Comelec

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Maquiling vs Comelec

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30

November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.

Miranda vs Abaya

SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy -- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office.

In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond

the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all.

A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Aratea vs Comelec

As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

Jalosjos vs Comelec

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Quinto vs Comelec 2009

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:(1)     It must be based upon substantial distinctions;(2)     It must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3)     It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4)     It must apply equally to all members of the class.

 The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

Quinto vs Comelec 2010

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or

officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concernedThe dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law.  

Mendoza vs Comelec

Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that despite the existence in its books of the clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, which incidentally has been acknowledged by this Court in the recent case of Marcoleta v. COMELEC, 5 it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with the questioned Resolution of 8 February 2010 and Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as the duly elected

governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of Bulacan and to vacate said office in favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan.

The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is underscored by the fact that the protest that petitioner Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007 overstayed with the COMELEC until the present election year when the end of the term of the contested office is at hand and there was hardly enough time for the re-hearing that was conducted only on 15 February 2010. As the hearing time at the division had run out, and the re-hearing time at the banc was fast running out, the unwanted result came about: incomplete appreciation of ballots; invalidation of ballots on general and unspecific grounds; unrebutted presumption of validity of ballots.

Socrates vs Comelec

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Campaign, Election Propaganda

Chavez vs Comelec

SECTION 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television

station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

Penera vs Comelec (1st 2009)

“True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate.  Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections.  The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider

his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. 

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity.  However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.   Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.  Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.  Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.

Penera vs Comelec (MFR 2009)

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the

campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it.

SWS vs Comelec

The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”

GMA Network vs Comelec

The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This is

where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press

The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits — leveling the playing field — does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings. 

ER Ejercito vs Comelec

SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. — The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:

(a) For candidates — Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other

candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and

(b) For political parties — Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.

The phrase "those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate" is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or donated in the candidate's behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate's allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters' rights of

speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law's concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising.

Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec

COMELEC's general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate in the electoral exercise.

The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office. Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations. They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."

But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty,

but their parishioner's actions will have very real secular consequences.

Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.

This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.

1-UTAK vs Comelec

The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one's preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.

In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has supervisory power vis-à-vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, nevertheless held that such supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of an individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by placing election campaign stickers on his vehicle.