Election Law (Assignment No. 1) (1)

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    Additionally, consider the following:

    (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by thePresident, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, andthus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the

    negative.

    (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom theCommission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

    (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in theU.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it wouldbe incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the

    U.S. Senate.

    Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

    We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that givethlife.

    Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judeaasked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah

    agreed on condition that

    No blade shall touch his skin;

    No blood shall flow from his veins.

    When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed aniron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes.

    This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilahwas beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused theprocurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any bladetouch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearlyrelying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

    In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

    SO ORDERED.

    Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

    Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan

    Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

    Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

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    In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Electionswould most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves wouldhave appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for themand not the President to make.

    The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was

    moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation.But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflictswith the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in theBautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

    The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of theCommission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of itsmembers. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman ofthe Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

    WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondentHaydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby ordered to desist fromserving as such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent AssociateCommissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same positionif they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending theappointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines with theconsent of the Commission on Appointments.: rd

    SO ORDERED.

    Fernan C . J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,

    Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

    Feliciano, J., is on leave.

    Sarmiento, J., took no part.

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    Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are persuadedthat respondent Regional Trial Court erred and committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in failing to dismiss private respondent's election protest againstpetitioner. And to reiterate, respondent COMELEC en banchad no jurisdiction to

    affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private respondent's electionprotest.

    WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RESOLUTION ofpublic respondent COMELEC is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Thetemporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 21, 1999, is madepermanent. The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42,is hereby ordered to DISMISSelection protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against privaterespondent.

    SO ORDERED.

    Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

    Pardo, J., no part.

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    VITUG,J., separate opinion;

    The instant petition, now technically moot, presents issues so significantly that aslights change of circumstances can have a decisive effect on, and possibly spell adifference in, the final outcome of the case. I am not inclined to take the case in anacademic fashion and pass upon the views expressed by either party in preemptive

    judgment.

    While I understand what the ponencia is saying quite laudably, I also appreciate,upon the other hand, the concern of the Commission on Elections, i.e., that theconduct of exit polls can have some adverse effects on the need to preserve thesanctity of the ballot. The Commission performs an indispensable task of ensuring

    free, honest, and orderly elections and of guarding against any frustration of thetrue will of the people. Expectedly, it utilizes all means available within its powerand authority to prevent the electoral process from being manipulated and renderedan absurdity. Like my colleagues, I greatly prize the freedom of expression but, soalso, I cherish no less the right of the people to express their will by means of theballot. In any case, I must accept the reality that the right to information and freespeech is not illimitable and immune from the valid exercise of an ever demandingand pervasive police power. Whether any kind of restraint should be upheld or

    declared invalid in the proper balancing of interest is one that must be resolved atany given moment, not on perceived circumstances, but on prevailing facts.

    Neither of the advocations proffered by the parties in this instance, I believe, shouldbe foreclosed by the Court at this time.

    I vote, therefore, to dismiss the petition on the foregoing thesis.

    Footnotes

    1Rollo, p. 14.

    2Ibid.Words in parentheses in the original; those in brackets supplied.

    3 Petition, p. 4.

    4Rollo, p. 78 et seq.