G. ELECTION OFFENSESProsecution of Election OffensesSection 1.Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses.- The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.

Sec. 2.Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government.- The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission.

Sec. 3.Initiation of Complaint.- Initiation of complaint for election offenses may be done motu proprio by the Commission, or upon written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of political parties or organizations under the partylist system or any accredited citizens arms of the Commission.

Sec. 4.Form of Complaint and Where to File.-

a. When not initiated motu proprio by the Commission, the complaint must be verified and supported by affidavits and/or any other evidence. Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the Commission, or the Director of the Law Department upon direction of the Chairman, and need not be verified;

b. The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal. If filed with any of the latter three (3) officials, investigation thereof may be delegated to any of their assistants.

c. If filed with the Regional Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, said officials shall immediately furnish the Director of the Law Department a copy of the complaint and the supporting documents, and inform the latter of the action taken thereon.Sec. 5.Referral for Preliminary Investigation.- if the complaint is initiated motu proprio by the Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or to any of the Regional Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the Commission.Sec. 6.Conduct of Preliminary Investigation.-

a. If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8(c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

b. Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall be furnished by him to the complainant.

c. If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, doe not submit counter-affidavits within the ten day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.

d. If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

e. Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.Sec. 7.Presumption of Existence of Probable Cause.- A complaint initiated motu propio by the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause and the investigating officer must forthwith issue the subpoena mentioned in the immediately preceding section.Sec. 8.Duty of Investigating Officer.- The preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter.

a. If the investigating officer finds no cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall recommend dismissal of the complaint.

b. If the investigating officer finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution, and the corresponding information wherein he shall certify under oath that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

c. In either case, the investigating officer shall, within five (5) days from the rendition of his recommendation, forward the records of the case to:

1. The Director of the Law Department of the Commission in cases investigated by any of the Commission lawyers or filed personnel, and

2. The State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, as the case may be, pursuant to the continuing authority provided for in Section 2 of this Rule.Sec. 9.Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records.-

a. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the records stated in paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding section, the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall take appropriate action thereon, immediately informing the parties of said action.

b. In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the same shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an information in court against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate court.

c. In all other cases, if the recommendation to dismiss or the resolution to file the case in court is approved by State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal, they shall likewise approve the Information prepared and immediately cause its filing with the proper court.

d. If the recommendation to dismiss is reversed on the ground that a probable cause exists, the State Prosecutor, or the Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by himself prepare and file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any of his assistants to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.Sec. 10.Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal.- Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers may be made only to the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials, provided, however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power to motu proprio review, revise, modify or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said appeals shall be immediately executory and final.Sec. 11.Duty of State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal to Render Reports.- The State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall, within five (5) days from the rendition of their resolution on recommendation or resolution of investigating officers, make a written report thereof to the Commission. They shall likewise submit a monthly report on the status of cases filed with and/or prosecuted by them or any of their assistants pursuant to the authority granted them under Section 2 of this Rule.

Sec. 12.Private Prosecutor.- The appearance of a private prosecutor shall be allowed in cases where private rights involving recovery of civil liability are involved.

ALFREDO GUIEB,petitioner,vs.HON. LUIS M. FONTANILLA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 42, Dagupan City, and MANUEL ASUNCION,respondents.

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:Revealed in this case is the parties' and the lower court judges' unfamiliarity with or ignorance of the constitutional provision on the appellate jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in election contests involving elective barangay officials and of the decision of this Court declaring unconstitutional a provision of law vesting upon Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over the said cases.

We find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner,viz.,whether or not a vote for a candidate for an office to which he did not seek to be elected is valid. We shall, instead, deal with the validity of the challenged decision.

The antecedents are uncomplicated and uncontroverted.

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for the position ofPunong Barangayof Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election of 9 May 1994. After the canvass of votes in the said barangay, the former was proclaimed as the winning candidate. The latter then seasonably filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.

On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per Judge Lilia C. Espaol, rendered a decision confirming the proclamation of the petitioner and dismissing the protest of the private respondent.1The private respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The case was assigned to Branch 42 thereof.

In its decision2of 31 August 1994, the RTC, per respondent Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, reversed the decision of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and declared the private respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes over the petitioner.

After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration3of the decision was denied4on 25 November 1994, the private respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

In its order of 8 December 1994,5the RTC declared that the motion should be properly filed with the court of origin and that the decision of 31 August 1994 had already become final; it then ordered the remand of the records of the case to the MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, for proper disposition.

On 12 December 1994, the petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review oncertiorari. On 29 December 1994, he sent by registered mail his petition, which this Court received only on 25 January 1995. It turned out, however, that his motion for extension of time to file a petition had already been denied on 4 January 1995 for his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that motion. On 8 February 1995, he filed a motion for the reconsideration of the denial.

Meanwhile, on 20 December 1994, the private respondent filed with the MTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.6In its order of 19 January 1995, the MTC deferred action on the said motion and required the petitioner's counsel to inform the court of the status of his petition with this Court.7For failure of the petitioner's counsel to comply with the said order, the court issued an order on 7 February 19958granting the issuance of a writ of execution. On 13 February 1995, however, the court received the said counsel's Compliance dated 9 February 19959wherein he informed the court of the petitioner's motion to reconsider this Court's resolution denying the motion for extension of time to file his petition.

In the resolution of 8 February 1995, this Court required the respondent to comment on the petition.

On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or Suspend Execution.10This motion was, however,denied11on the ground that the writ, having been hand-carried by the private respondent to the office of the sheriff, must have already been implemented and, therefore, the motion to stay or suspend the same has become moot and academic.

On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of execution with the information that in the presence of a barangaykagawadand barangay residents, he enforced the writ and proclaimed the private respondent asPunong Barangayof Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.12In view of the issue involved, we resolved to give due course to the petition.

The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction over the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the decision of the MTC.

Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article IX of the Constitution,13it is the COMELEC, and not the Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited jurisdiction, which are the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.14InFlores vs.Commission on Elections,15this Court struck out as unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 vesting upon the Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over such cases.

The private respondent should have appealed the decision of the MTC to the COMELEC; the MTC should not have given due course to the appeal; and the RTC should have dismissed outright the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

In accepting the appeal and deciding the case on its merits, the respondent judge manifested either ignorance or palpable disregard of the aforesaid constitutional provision and decision. It must be noted that a judge is presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the laws; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.16Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be "studious of the principles of the law." Thus, if the respondent judge were only aware of the aforementioned constitutional provision and decision, he would have cut short the journey of a very simple case and put an end to the litigation. What this Court stated inAducayen vs.Flores17deserves reiteration:

Nor is this all that has to be said. There is need, it does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts, which according to the Constitution refer to all those outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the discharge of their judicial functions. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Moreover, while it becomes hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum of effort should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they betray awareness of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. If such were the case, then resort to us would be less frequent. That way our time could be devoted to questions of greater significance. Not only that, there would be on the part of party litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of justice, if there be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Such an indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed as a manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The situation thus calls for a more conscientious and diligent approach to the discharge of judicial functions to avoid the imputation that there is on the part of a number of judges less than full and adequate comprehension of the law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 31 August 1994 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and its order of 25 November 1994 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the said court to entertain and decide the appeal. The decision of 27 May 1994 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, is hereby declared final for failure of the private respondent to appeal the same before the proper forum, and the writ of execution to enforce the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

PEDRO C. CALUCAG,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 04, TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN and CESAR CARBONEL,respondents.D E C I S I O N

ROMERO,J.:

This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court questioning the dismissal of petitioner's appeal before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the ground of prescription of time for filing an appeal.

Petitioner Pedro Calucag and private respondent Cesar Carbonell were both candidates for Barangay Captain in Barangay Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan during the May 9, 1994 elections. Petitioner garnered 478 votes while private respondent obtained 477 votes or a difference of one vote.

Private respondent filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan praying for the judicial recount of the ballots cast and the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner. As agreed upon by the parties, a recount/revision of the votes/ballots was made. As a result, private respondent obtained 491 votes as against petitioner's 489 votes. On May 31, 1994, the MTC promulgated a decision in open court declaring the former as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao.[1]Petitioner appealed this ruling to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3 which appeal was opposed by private respondent in a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the proper forum being the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).[2]On July 18, 1994, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal based on such ground.[3]Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal which was also seasonably denied.[4]On appeal, the COMELEC likewise dismissed petitioner's case for lack of appellate jurisdiction in its order dated August 12, 1994, which provided,interalia:"Guided by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case ofFlores vs. COMELEC(GR No. 89604, April 20, 1990), We have disregarded the detour of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court and considered this appeal direct to the Commission from the Municipal Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, however, unlike in Flores case,this appeal was not perfected as it is wanting on the required payment of appeal fees on time, hence the appellate jurisdiction of this Commission does not attach.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) hereby DISMISSES the instant appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction."[5](Underscoring supplied)

A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed, but this was also denied by the Commissionen bancwhich found the motion to be devoid of merit, not because of non-payment of appeal fees on proper time but because the same was filed out of time.[6]Hence, this petition.

The main issue which must be addressed herein is whether the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

It is high time that this question be settled definitively to obviate situations similar to the one at bar.

The Court has categorically pronounced inFlores vs. Commission on ElectionsthatSection 9 of R.A. No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the Regional Trial Court,is unconstitutional.Said pronouncement is hereby reiterated here. The section is in direct contravention of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall:

"(e)xerciseexclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, andappellate jurisdictionover all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involvingelective barangay officialsdecided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction."Petitioner wishes this Court to entertain his case and rule as it did inFlores. This, however, cannot be done anymore even if the facts of this case were on all fours withFloresbecause in said case, the petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed Punong Barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 6679[7]after having received the highest number of votes for Kagawad in the March 28, 1989, elections. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, filed an election protest with the MTC of Tayum, Abra which sustained his arguments and installed him in place of Flores as Punong Barangay. The latter appealed to the RTC of Abra, which affirmedin totothe challenged decision. Thereafter, Flores went to the COMELEC which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it has no power to review the decision of the RTC. Said ruling was based on Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679[8]which states that decisions of RTC's in electoral contests brought to it on appeal from the MTC regarding questions of fact shall be final and unappealable. In resolving the petition forcertiorari, the Court supported the dismissal of the appeal, not on the basis of said provision but on Constitutional grounds. Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 was declared unconstitutional even if it was not squarely and properly challenged by Flores. Despite the non-compliance by Flores with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question,[9]the Court felt that it was fruitless to wait for the issue to be raised anew, perhaps in the next barangay elections, before being resolved. Technical obstacles were disregarded so that the defect in R.A. No. 6679 may be brought to the attention of Congress and the same be corrected.

At the timeFloreswas resolved, there was as yet no pronouncement on the constitutionality of said Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679, such that the Court held that Flores had a right to rely on its presumed validity.He merely relied on said law when he appealed the decision of the MTC to the RTC.His subsequent appeal to the COMELEC was, therefore, considered to have been made directly from the MTC, thereby disregarding the detour to the RTC.

It follows that after the promulgation ofFlores, the same arguments propounded therein by the petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."Said pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer be countenanced.Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days after the promulgation of the MTC's decision.[10]The erroneous filing of the appeal with the RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.Petitioner filed his notice of appeal only on August 12, 1994, or one month and twenty six days from the time he received a copy of the MTC's decision on June 16, 1994.The five-day period, having expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal before the COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the appealed decision has become final and executory.

Petitioner's contention that the COMELEC erred in disallowing the case based on sheer technicalities is likewise unmeritorious. The COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, based on his failure to perfect his appealon time. That this is NOT A TECHNICALITY is correctly pointed out in the questioned order citing various jurisprudence. Granting that petitioner paid the appeal fees on time, he chose the wrong forum; the payment, therefor, having been done after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. In support of his arguments petitioner cites the case ofRoleto Pahilan vs. Rudy Tabalba,[11]wherein the Court proceeded to rule on the election protest brought to it which was dismissed in the trial court due to incomplete payment of docket fees.The Court stated that the trial court had "no basis for the dismissal of petitioner's protest for the simple reason that an election contest is not an ordinary civil action.Consequently, the rules governing ordinary civil actions are not necessarily binding on special actions like an election contest wherein public interest will be adversely affected. x x x.The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases, especially if we consider the fact that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and application bearing in mind always that the will of the people must be upheld.Ordinary civil actions would generally involve private interests while all election cases are, at all times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural and technical infirmities."The Court, however, inRodillas vs. COMELEC[12]categorically made a pronouncement that "the requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure.It is an essential requirement without which the decision to be appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all.The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order of the Commission on Electionsenbancdated February 1, 1996,DISMISSINGthe instant case for lack of appellate jurisdiction, is hereby AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,petitioner, vs.HON.TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN,respondents.D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR.,J.:The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action forcertiorariwithmandamusis whether R.A. No. 7691[1]has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.The antecedents are not disputed.In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities.The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:a)Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.c)Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua only;d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor only.In an Order[2]issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23,motu proprioordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,[3]the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for[sic]Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.Sec. 31[sic]of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691[sic](Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:(1)Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and(2)Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time[sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years.The two motions[4]for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997,[5]the petitioner filed this special civil action.It contends that public respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling inAlberto [sic]vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly.They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.We resolved to give due course to the petition.Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.[6]It reads as follows:SEC. 268.Jurisdiction of courts. -The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts.From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof.The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:SEC. 261.Prohibited Acts.The following shall be guilty of an election offense:(i)Intervention of public officers and employees.Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:SEC. 32.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:(1)Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and(2)Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.We have explicitly ruled inMorales v. Court of Appeals[7]that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor.Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e.,prision correccional, arresto mayor,orarresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.Among the examples cited inMoralesas falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property;[8]and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,[9]as amended.Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.As we stated inMorales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress.Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court.Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified.That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law,[10]to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,[11]to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.[12]Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.In the motion for Reconsideration[13]he filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case ofAlberto Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996,where the Supreme Court succinctly held:A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code andthe RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same.The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote.Noting that these provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code),we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.(Underscoring ours)Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:16.This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto-vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same.The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote.Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code).We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended.Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neitherAlberto Naldezaas indicated in the motion for reconsideration norAlbertoalone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA.Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words.The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[14]mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED.The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE.Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.Atty. Jose P. Balbuena isADMONISHEDto be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.No costs.SO ORDERED.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,petitioner, vs.HON. LORENZO R. SILVA, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branches 2 and 3, Balanga, Bataan, HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, as Presiding Judge, Branch 1, of the same Court, ERASTO TANCIONGCO, and NORMA CASTILLO,respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This case presents for determination the extent of control whichthose designated by the Commission on Elections have in the prosecution of election offenses.The facts are not in dispute.Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of 27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan.Tanciongco, who is provincial prosecutor of Bataan, was vice chairman, while Castillo, who is division superintendent of schools, was secretary of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.Uy, who is assistant regional director of elections, was chairman of the board.In each information, the three were accused of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections.The twelve cases were raffled to three branches of the court presided over by respondent judges, Honorable Lorenzo R. Silva Jr. (Branches 2 and 3) and Honorable Benjamin T. Vianzon (Branch 1).On October 30, 1996, Tanciongco and Castillo filed a joint Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the Cases.Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents request.On the other hand, the complainant, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. expressed no objection to the dismissal of the cases against the two.[1]In orders dated March 31 and April 7, 1997 respectively, Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents.[2]The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals by filing notices on April 18, 1997,[3]but the judges denied due course to its appeal. The sole basis for the denials was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.Thus, in his order, dated May 16, 1997, denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC in Criminal Case Nos. 6439, 6441, 6443, 6445, 6646, 6647, and 6470, Judge Silva, Jr. stated:A Notice of Appeal dated April 18, 1997, in the above-entitled cases was filed on April 23, 1997 by Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV, Law Department, Commission on Elections, from the Order of the Court dated March 31, 1997, insofar as it dismissed the above-entitled cases as regards the accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma P. Castillo.Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo who has been authorized by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, was required to comment on the Notice of Appeal which does not bear his signature.In his comment dated May 9, 1997, the Chief State Prosecutor states that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena of the Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide by whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of probable cause as against the accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo.Consequently, the notice of appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena is unauthorized and without legal effect.WHEREFORE, the Notice of Appeal dated April 13, 1997, filed by Jose P. Balbuena is denied due course.[4]SO ORDERED.Judge Vianzon took a similar course in Criminal Case Nos. 6438, 6440, 6442, 6444 and 6471.In his order of May 23, 1997,he stated:Considering that Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo has filed his comment to the Notice of Appeal filed by Director Jose P. Balbuena of the COMELEC, manifesting his non-conformity with the same because of his previous commitment to abide by the ruling of this court on the Omnibus Motion filed by accused Tanciongco and Castillo and the Motion to Quash filed by accused Uy, and considering further that Chief State Prosecutor has been duly deputized by the COMELEC en banc to handle the prosecution of this case, the said Notice of Appeal is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.[5]Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the nullification of the ordersof the two judges, denying due course to the Notices of Appeal of the COMELEC.[6]The issue is not just the right ofthe prosecutionto appeal from the previous orders of dismissal.It is settled that the approval of a notice of appeal, in cases where no record on appeal is required by law, is a ministerial duty of the court to which the notice of appeal is addressed, provided that such appeal is timely filed.[7]Of course in criminal cases the prosecution cannot appeal if the accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy, but here the cases were dismissed by the judges before the accused were arraigned and, therefore, jeopardy has not attached.For while the right to appeal is statutory and is not constitutional, once it is granted by statute, its denial would be a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.[8]The ultimate question concerns the authority of the COMELEC prosecutor. More precisely, the question is, who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissalthe COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?The trial courts heldthe view that the Chief State Prosecutors decision not to appeal the dismissal of the cases, consistent with his earlier decision to leave the determination of the existence of probable cause to the trial courts, was binding on them.We think this view to be mistaken.The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC.Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.As this Court has held:In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court.This power is exclusive with COMELEC.[9]Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in court.[10]The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.[11]Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies.They derive their authority from it and not from their offices.[12]Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC.For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed.Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction.If he disagreed with the COMELECs findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from the cases.But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused.It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as basis for denying due course to the notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.Whether respondent judges also erred in dismissing the cases filed by the COMELECindeed, whether the trial courts at that stage were justified in inquiring into the existence of probable cause because of exceptional reasons[13]must be determined in the appeal after it is allowed.Here we only hold that whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor Zuo whom it has merely deputized to represent it in court.Private respondents have nothing to say on this question.Their sole contention is that the petition should be dismissed because , so it is argued, it should have been brought in the name of the People of the Philippines andhave been filed by the Solicitor General.This contention is without merit. This is not the first time the COMELEC has come to this Court in its own name in regard to an action taken against it in cases filed by it in the lower courts.InCommission on Elections v. Court of Appeals[14]the COMELECs right to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a criminal case filed by it was sustained.This Court said:The COMELEC has sufficient interest in filing the petition [for certiorari] to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals having sustained the demurrer to evidence in the criminal case against private respondent for violation of the Election Laws.This is so, for it is not only entrusted with the duty to enforce the said law but also to prosecute all election offenses.Under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices (Art. IX [C], Sec. 2[6]), and under the Omnibus Election Code, (BP Blg. 881), it may avail of the assistance of other prosecution arms of the government (Sec. 265).Thus, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gave the Chief State, Provincial and City Prosecutors a continuing authority as deputies to prosecute offenses punishable under the Election laws (COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part 12, Rule 34,Sec. 2).We have allowed government agencies to handle their cases before appellate courts, to the exclusion of the Solicitor General.[15]InCommission on Elections v. Romillo[16]the right of the COMELEC to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus to question the dismissal of criminal cases which it had filed for violation of the Election Code was assumed.Although the petition was eventually dismissed, the ruling was based not on the lack of authority of the COMELEC to file the petition but on this Courts determination that the dismissal of the criminal cases by the trial court was correct, considering that the evidence was insufficient.Indeed, under the Rules of Court, the proper party who can file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus is the person aggrieved by the action of a tribunal, board or official because such action was taken without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or in willful neglect of duty.[17]In contrast to an appealed case which is brought in the name of the parties in the court of origin and for this reason retains its title below, the case, which is an original action, is brought byhim.[18]In this case, denied by the courts below the authority to prosecute the criminal actions because they recognized instead the Chief State Prosecutor as the representative of the People, the COMELEC had to bring this suit to seek vindication of its authority.Naturally, the petition has to be brought in its name as the aggrieved party.InAssistant Provincial Fiscal of Bataan v. Dollete,[19]this Court granted a petition forcertiorari, which the fiscal had filed in his name, to annul an order of the trial court denying his right to make an independent examination of the witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of satisfying himself of the sufficiency of the evidence.Considering the authority of the COMELEC over the prosecution of election offenses, its decision to bring this instant petition forcertiorariandmandamusis conclusive on the Solicitor General.It would simply be a matter of referring this case to the Solicitor General so that, if he agrees, he may take over the conduct of this case.Otherwise, the COMELEC could just continue handling this case as it has actually done.Hence, the omission of the COMELEC to refer this petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for representation should be disregarded.To make the filing of this case depend on his decisionwould be to place him in the same position in which respondent judges placed Chief State Prosecutor Zuo.That would further negate the constitutional function of the COMELEC.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of respondent judges are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and respondent judges are ORDERED to give due course to the appeals of petitioner from their respective ordersin Criminal Case Nos.6438, 6440, 6442, 6444 and 6471 (filed in Branch 1); Criminal Case Nos. 6439, 6441, 6443, 6445, 6446, and 6470 (filed in Branch 2);and Criminal Case No. 6447 (filed in Branch 3).SO ORDERED.EUGENIO "JING-JING" FAELNAR,petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAMON CODILLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 19, Cebu City, and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This is a petition forcertiorarito set aside the order, dated July 29, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cebu City, denying petitioners motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941[1]and 49942,[2]and the order, dated October 4, 1999, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The facts are as follows:NexoldOn April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNARS CUP," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy. The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioners name was placed on the facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2) petitioners name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone during the games; (3) the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and (4) a raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given away as prizes.Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth.ManikxThe complaint was investigated by Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner and Gillamac. On the other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of a case against petitioner and Gillamac for violation of 80,[3]in relation to 262,[4]of the Omnibus Election Code, and 50 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2888, in relation to 12 of Republic Act No. 6679.[5]In its Resolution No. 97-3040, dated September 16, 1997, the COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations against petitioner and Gillamac.Accordingly, petitioner and Gillamac were formally charged in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City under two Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and CBU-49942.Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of the case, contending that Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, was immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered.MisoxPetitioners motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated July 29, 1999. He moved for reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied by the court in its order, dated October 4, 1999. Hence this petition.Petitioner reiterates his argument in the trial court that COMELEC Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against him, can no longer be reconsidered by the COMELEC. He contends that under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, the dismissal of the complaint was immediately final and executory. Additionally, he avers that Antonio Luys Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 97-3040 is a prohibited pleading under the Commissions Rules of Procedure. He avers that since the resolution in question was immediately final and executory, it was no longer within the power of the COMELEC to reconsider. Consequently, Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing of charges in court, was "ultra-vires," and the Informations filed against him should have been quashed.[6]The petition is without merit.First.While the instant petition challenges the trial courts orders denying petitioners motion to quash the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and 49942, the grounds relied upon by petitioner are directed at the validity of Resolution No. 98-2914 of the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner prays that said resolution be declared null and void.[7]This petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the COMELEC.Resolution No. 98-2914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en banc on October 29, 1998. Petitioners remedy was to seek its annulment by way of a special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64, 2 provides:SEC. 2.Mode of Review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the resolution sought to be reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The present petition to set aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to quash and motion for reconsideration was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after Resolution No. 98-2194 was promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently, the resolution is now final and binding upon the parties.ManiksEven if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, the same is not void. Since it has become final and executory, it is already binding and effective.[8]Second.The above discussion should be enough to dispose of this petition. However, we think there is an important question of law that must not be left undecided,i.e., is the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the election laws immediately final and executory, as petitioner contends?The contention is untenable. In support of his claims, petitioner cites Rule 13, 1(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC which provides:SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:. . . .(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision; . . . .The above quoted provision, however, is taken from the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which has already been amended. The 1993 Rules of Procedure, now provides:Rule 13. -Prohibited Pleadings.SECTION 1.What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:. . . .(d) motion for reconsideration of anen bancruling, resolution, order or decisionexcept in election offense cases; . . . (Emphasis added).Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is allowed in cases involving election offenses.Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Hence, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.Petitioner likewise invokes Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides thatManikanxSEC. 10.Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal. Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers may be made only to the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials,provided, however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power tomotu proprioreview, revise, modify or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors.The decision of the Commission on said appeals shall be immediately executory and final. (Emphasis added)Even a cursory reading of the above rule, however, will show that it governs appeals from the action of the State Prosecutor or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers. The present case does not involve such an appeal but a resolution of the COMELEC itself in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases.[9]Such distinction can be easily explained.In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated power[10]to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating officer submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve the issue of probable cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the Commission of its review powers would, at this point, already constitute a second look on the issue of probable cause, the COMELECs ruling on the appeal would be immediately final and executory.OldmisoxOn the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon which the Commissions Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which determines the existence of probable cause.[11]Consequently, an appeal to the Commission is unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original resolution, in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal ormotu proprio, may review the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.Reliance by petitioner upon Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is thus without any basis.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED.SO ORDERED.HERMAN TIU LAUREL,petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 10, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.NcmD E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:Petitioner seeks to annul the Court of Appeals decision, as well as its resolution denying reconsideration, in C.A. G.R. SP No. 42618, which upheld the trial courts denial of his motion to quash the charges against him for falsification of public documents and violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On 13 December 1995, the Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo, Chairman of respondent COMELEC[1]sent a verified letter-complaint to Jose P. Balbuena, Director of the Law Department of the said respondent, charging petitioner with "Falsification of Public Documents" and violation of [Section 74] of the Omnibus Election Code, stating in the same letter the facts on which he relies upon to support his accusations, which are,inter alia, that petitioner "was born in Manila on October 8, 1951 xxx (and) (a)t the time of his birth, both his father and mother were Chinese citizens. xxx On February 20, 1995, Herman Tiu Laurel filed a certificate of candidacy with the Law Department xxx for the position of Senator, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen xxx. This statement xxx is false and constitutes not only a falsification of public documents but also a violation of the Omnibus Election Code."

On the basis of the said Complaint, an investigation was conducted by the COMELEC Law Department, docketed as EO Case No. 95-843 entitledThe Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo, Complainant, versus Herman Tiu Laurel, Respondent. Thereafter, or on 18 January 1996, a Report was made by the said Department recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. During an en banc meeting of the COMELEC held on 25 January 1997, the said Report was deliberated upon, after which COMELEC resolved:

"1. To file the necessary information against respondent Herman Tiu Laurel with the appropriate court for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, the prosecution of which shall be handled by a lawyer to be designated by the Director IV of the Law Department with the duty to render periodic report after every hearing.

2. To file a criminal complaint with the appropriate court against the same respondent for falsification defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171, in relation to paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code."Ncmmis

Pursuant thereto, on 05 February 1995, an information for "Violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code" was filed by Director Jose F. Balbuena against petitioner, which was raffled to respondent court, docketed as Crim. Case No. 96-147550.

On 14 February 1996, or after the filing of the Information, plaintiff filed a Motion for Inhibition in EO Case No. 95-843, seeking the inhibition of the entire COMELEC, alleging that "(r)espondent (petitioner herein) is not confident that this present forum is capable of fairly and impartially rendering a resolution on the merits of the above-captioned complaint", [stating] his reasons therefor. In a Minute Resolution, the COMELEC informed petitioner "that the Commission has lost jurisdiction over the case as it is now before the Regional Trial Court of Manila xxx." With respect to the Information, plaintiff in turn filed on 07 May 1996 a Motion to Quash the same, alleging lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority on the part of Director Balbuena to file the information. On 16 May 1996, respondent COMELEC, through Director Aliodem D. Dalaig of the Law Department, filed an Opposition thereto. On 20 May 1996, plaintiff filed his Reply.

On 11 September 1996, respondent court issued the first questioned order, the decretal portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash together with the Alternative Motions contained therein is hereby denied."

To this, petitioner duly excepted on 09 October 1996 by filing a Motion for Reconsideration, which respondent court denied in its second questioned order dated 29 October 1996."[2]From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner then filed a petition forcertioraribefore the Court of Appeals. He alleged, in essence, that the COMELEC violated its own rules of procedure on the initiation of the preliminary investigation and the consequent filing of a criminal complaint against him.[3]The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and ruled that the proper procedure was followed by the COMELEC.

According to the Court of Appeals, the complaint signed by Pardo was in the nature of amotu propriocomplaint filed by the COMELEC and signed by the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 34, Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Pardos referral of the complaint to the COMELECs Law Department and the subsequent preliminary investigation were likewise done in accordance with the rules.

The complaint being an official act, it bears the presumption of having been regularly performed.Scnc m

The Court of Appeals added that even if the complaint were to be considered as a complaint filed by a private citizen, still, Pardo as head of the COMELEC had the authority to direct commencement of a preliminary investigation in connection therewith.

At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals also directed the trial court to remand the case to the COMELEC for reception of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution dated January 25, 1996,[4]which approved the filing of a criminal complaint against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that he failed to receive copy of this resolution and, consequently, failed to move for its reconsideration.[5]The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision. Hence, the present petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:

A. It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold there was no flaw in the procedure followed by the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

B. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners protestations on COMELECs having acted as complainant, investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner in the conduct of the preliminary investigation ring hollow.[6]Petitioner asserts that the preliminary investigation was defective since the complaint was not initiated in accordance with applicable law and rules. He alleges that the information filed with the trial court was void and respondent judge could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner cites Section 3, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

"Sec. 3. Initiation of complaint. -- Initiation of complaint for election offenses may be donemotu proprioby the Commission, or upon written complaint by any citizenxxx." (Emphasis by petitioner)

Petitioner contends that the complaint filed by Pardo was not in the nature of amotu propriocomplaint filed by the COMELEC since Pardo, by himself alone, was not the COMELEC. If the complaint were to be considered as one filed by a private citizen, then Pardo as a citizen did not have the requisite authority to file his complaint directly with the COMELECs Law Department. Petitioner contends that only the COMELEC has the capacity to do so, under Section 5 of said Rule 34.Sdaa miso

"SEC. 5.Referral for Preliminary Investigation. -If the complaint is initiatedmotu proprioby the Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. xxx"

Petitioner argues that a resolution of the COMELECen bancis necessary for the referral of a complaint to the Law Department. He asserts that Pardo did not have the authority, as a private citizen, to directly file his complaint with the Law Department. According to petitioner, Pardo should have filed his complaint with the COMELEC and the latter should have passed a resolutionen bancreferring the matter to the Law Department.[7]Petitioner insists that only the COMELEC, through anen bancresolution, may direct the Law Department to conduct an investigation. Thus, it was wrong for Pardo to direct the Law Department to conduct a preliminary investigation, as he did in his complaint, and the latter "could and should not have acted pursuant to Chairman Pardos complaint."[8]Moreover, petitioner avers that the resolution of the COMELECen bancdated January 25, 1996, issued after the preliminary investigation and which recommended the filing of charges against him, did not cure the irregularities present during the preliminary investigation.

Lastly, petitioner contends he could no longer expect impartiality and fairness from the COMELEC. In his Memorandum, petitioner declared,

"This was the then COMELEC boss, personally and by himself, (who) gathered the evidence in an attempt to nail down petitioner. The then COMELEC Chairman was the complainant as well. And, as his letter-complaint incontrovertibly shows, it was also the then COMELEC Chairman who directed that a preliminary investigation be conducted and completed within 30 days."[9]Petitioner concludes that the COMELEC could not but be partial in this case, hence the proceedings are fatally biased against him.Sdaad

On the other hand, the COMELEC in its Memorandum[10]contends that the complaint was properly filed since Section 4(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically states that the complaint shall be filed with the Law Department. It is of no moment that the complainant was, at that time, the chairman of the COMELEC himself. This should not preclude him from filing a complaint with the COMELEC for alleged violations of election laws, provided he does not participate in the discussions regarding the case. The COMELEC points out that, indeed, Pardo did not participate in the deliberation of his own complaint.

On the charge that there can be no fairness in the investigation of the complaint filed by the COMELEC chairman, the COMELEC points out that the Commission is a collegiate body. It is the entire membership of the Commission that deliberates and decides on cases brought before it and not just the chairman. To disallow the COMELEC in this case from conducting a preliminary investigation would be to tie the hands of the Commission and prevent it from performing its constitutional mandate. It could also cause a deluge in the number of election law violators.

In addition, the COMELEC asserts that petitioner was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense while Pardos complaint was being investigated by the Commission.

The Constitution gives the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violations of election laws.[11]This power is an exclusive prerogative of the COMELEC.[12]There are two ways through which a complaint for election offenses may be initiated. It may be filed by the COMELECmotu proprio,or it may be filedviawritten complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of political parties or organizations under the partylist system or any accredited citizens arms of the Commission.[13]Motu propriocomplaints may be signed by the Chairman of the COMELEC and need not be verified.[14]On the other hand, complaints filed by parties other than the COMELEC must be verified and supported by affidavits and other evidence.[15]The complaint shall be filed with the COMELEC Law Department or with the offices of election registrars, provincial election supervisors or regional election directors, or of the state prosecutor, provincial or city fiscal.[16]Whether initiatedmotu proprioor filed with the COMELEC by any other party, the complaint shall be referred to the COMELEC Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairman, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of the Department, any Regional Election Director or Provincial Election Supervisor, or any COMELEC lawyer.[17]Scs daad

The complaint subject of this case was filed by then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo. It was addressed to Jose P. Balbuena, director of the COMELEC Law Department. It starts with the following statement:

"I hereby charge former senatorial candidate Herman Tiu Laurel with falsification of public documents and violation of the Omnibus Election Code."[18]In the same complaint, Pardo directed the conduct of a preliminary investigation of the charges he leveled against Tiu Laurel, to be completed within 30 days. In the verification at the end of the complaint, he stated that, "I am the complainant in the ... letter complaint..."[19]Was the complaint one initiated by the COMELECmotu proprio?

To our mind, the complaint in question in this case is one filed by Pardo in his personal capacity and not as chairman of the COMELEC. This is obvious from the opening sentence of the complaint, which starts with "I hereby charge..." It is also manifest in the verification of the complaint in which Pardo stated that he is the complainant therein. The fact that the complaint was verified is another indication that it was filed by a private citizen, for only such complaints require verification. Pardo must have known this.

Besides, the COMELEC itself, in its Comment filed before this Court, admitted that the complaint was initiated in Pardos "individual capacity."[20]Could Pardo then have, in his personal capacity, filed his complaint directly with the COMELECs Law Department? We believe he could, under Rule 34, Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which clearly provides:

SEC. 4.Form of Complaint and Where to File. - xxxSup rema

(b)The complaint shall be filed with the Law Departmentof the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal..."(Underscoring supplied.)

But petitioner insists, and this is the crux of his arguments, that absent anen bancresolution directing the Law Department to conduct a preliminary investigation, there could be no valid investigation. Without a valid preliminary investigation, no valid information could be filed against him. He cites Rule 34, Section 5 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in support of his claim.

"SEC. 5. Referral for Preliminary Investigation.-- If the complaint is initiatedmotu proprioby the Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or to any of the Regional Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the Commission."

However, we fail to see from Section 5 the requirement that only the COMELECen bancmay refer a complaint to the Law Department for investigation. What Section 5 states only is that it is the Law Department, not another office, of the COMELEC which may conduct an investigation into the allegations in the complaint. There is no specific requirement as tohowreferral to the department shall be made. We cannot read into the rules what simply is not there.

Section 5 refers to two situations, one of which is where a complaint filed by a party other than the COMELEC is addressed to the Commission itself. Since it is not the entire Commission that conducts the preliminary investigation, the complaint must necessarily be referred to its Law Department. Under the rules, this department is tasked with conducting preliminary investigations of complaints filed before the COMELEC.[21]Where, as in this case, the complaint was directly filed with the Law Department under Section 4 of Rule 34, obviously there is no need to refer such complaint to the same Law Department.

There is likewise no rule against the COMELEC chairman directing the conduct of a preliminary investigation, even if he himself were the complainant in his private capacity. In fact, under Section 5, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any of those officials specified in the rule, upon the direction of the COMELEC chairman. We agree with the Court of Appeals observation that,Juris

"[E]ven if we regard the complaint to have been filed by Chairman Pardo as a private citizen, there is no rhyme nor reason why he cannot direct the Law Department to perform an investigation and delegate the conduct of preliminary investigation to any lawyer of said Department in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections. The justification is, in so doing, he was merely acting pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. No clash or conflict could be attributed in his performance of the said acts, one as a private citizen, and the other as Chairman of COMELEC, as it would not be him but another lawyer in the Legal Department that would actually be carrying out the preliminary investigation. The outcome of the inquiry, therefore, could not,per se, be considered as sullied with bias."[22]Clearly, the applicable rules were followed in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of Pardos complaint against petitioner, contrary to the latters assertion.

Anent petitioners contention that bias tainted the preliminary investigation, we again quote with approval from the ruling of the Court of Appeals:

"There may be evidence that the relations between petitioner and Chairman Pardo are not exactly cordial. However, this should not detract from the validity of the preliminary investigation and corresponding Information filed against the petitioner, for two (2) important reasons: First, the records will readily support the conclusion that there is sufficient evidentiary basis to at least find probable cause to indict the petitioner for violation of the Omnibus Election Code; and second, it also appears from the records that, apart from directing the Law Department to launch an investigation, Chairman Pardo had no other participation in the proceedings which led to the filing of the Information."[23]The entire COMELEC cannot possibly be restrained from investigating the complaint filed against petitioner, as the latter would like the courts to do. The COMELEC is mandated by no less than the Constitution to investigate and prosecute, when necessary, violations of election laws. This power is lodged exclusively with the COMELEC. For the entire Commission to inhibit itself from investigating the complaint against petitioner would be nothing short of an abandonment of its mandate under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. This we cannot allow.Sc juris

As regards the alleged failure of the COMELEC to serve petitioner with a copy of its resolution recommending the filing of an information against him, this is denied by the COMELEC. However, the Court of Appeals found that, indeed, there is no showing that petitioner was ever sent a copy of said resolution. This factual finding is binding upon this Court. Thus, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the case should be remanded to the COMELEC for reception of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the January 25, 1996 resolution, if petitioner is still interested in submitting one. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-147550 should be suspended while resolution of the motion that may be filed is pending.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42618 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.ANTONIO V.A. TAN,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RUSTICO T. ILAGAN, Regional Election Director, Commission on Elections, Region XI, Davao City, and SENFORIANO B. ALTERADO,respondents.

Leonido C. Delante for petitioner.

Eduardo C. de Vera for Atty. S.B. Alterado.

VITUG,J.:On 10 May 1992, petitioner, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") asVice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.

Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private respondent Alterado was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"). The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. Still pending is an administrative charge, the case now before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."

Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC thereover, he being under the Executive Department of the government. The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in continuing to take action on the administrative case. He argues that

1) Petitioner is the City Prosecutor of Davao City. His office belongs to the executive branch of the government, more particularly to the Department of Justice. As such, he is under the administrative jurisdiction of the said department and not of respondent COMELEC.

2) The Civil Service Law provides that department heads "shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers under their jurisdiction" (Section 47[b], P.D. 807).

3) Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which authorizes respondent COMELEC to deputize public officers belonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. It does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction