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April 11-12, 2011

The Capitol Building, US Congress,

and the Fairmont, Washington D.C.

EISS U M M I T

ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE

SECURITY SUMMIT

Washington DC

SUMMARYREPORT

II

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ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY SUMMIT - WASHINGTON D.C.

REPORT: THE SECOND ANNUAL WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY SUMMIT

On Monday and Tuesday, April 11-12, 2011, the 2nd Electric

Infrastructure Security (EIS) Summit took place in the U.S.

Capitol Building and the Fairmont Washington D.C.

Government representatives of twenty four nations took

part in the briefings and deliberations, with representation

from North and South America, Europe, the Middle East and

Asia.

Following the inaugural EIS Summit in London in 2010,

this new government / NGO partnership has become an

effective framework, both within the U.S. government

and internationally, for cooperation and coordination in

addressing severe electromagnetic risks to critical national

infrastructures.

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Mission

EISS Washington D.C. was focused on enhancing communication

and coordination among energy sector stakeholders: concerned

U.S. government departments and agencies, allied governments and

international corporate leaders. Given the remarkably large field of critical

players in the energy marketplace in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere, the

EIS Summit process is designed to help foster the mix of education,

collaboration and public and private partnerships that will be essential

to protect our critical infrastructures, and assure societal health and

continuity.

Conclusion

As in the founding summit in London in 2010, a common theme expressed

by many speakers was the importance of international coordination in

addressing severe electromagnetic threats. In EISS Washington D.C.

this theme was expanded, with a special focus on bringing together the

many concerned U.S. government organizations. The summit included

Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Defense, the Department of

Homeland Security and the Department of Energy, senior management

from FERC, the Director of NOAA, members of Congress and many other

organizations. U.S. government representatives joined their international

counterparts in pointing to the importance of the EIS Summit process as

a critical forum to help support national and international efforts toward

providing critical infrastructure protection against electromagnetic

threats.

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EIS Summit PresentationsEISS Washington D.C. was co-chaired by U.S. Congressman

Trent Franks and U.S. Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and the Rt.

Hon. James Arbuthnot MP, Chair of the U.K. House of Commons

Defence Select Committee. Senator Jon Kyl and Congressman

Dan Lungren were Honorary Co-Chairs.

Congressman Franks opened the summit, referring to the unique

gathering of senior international government and corporate

delegates as a historic moment. He called on the delegates “to

put aside any differences we have on other issues,” to “make a

critical difference … to the national security of the United States

of America, to your own home countries, and indeed to the

peace and security of the entire human family.”

While ubiquitous, instantly available power has brought our

societies an unprecedented standard of living, “we have also

grown profoundly dependent upon electricity,” he said, and “we

now find among our strengths an unsettling vulnerability.”

“Here’s the grim truth,” he said, quoting Brink Lindsey. “We

are only one act of madness away from a social cataclysm

unlike anything our country has ever known.” Referring to his

membership on the Congressional Strategic Forces Committee,

the Congressman explained that, of all the threat briefings he

receives, the threat of nuclear EMP “is the one that frightens me

the most.”

“The first purpose of any government,” Congressman Franks

continued, “is to ensure and protect the lives and constitutional

rights of its citizens. If we fail that test, then it doesn’t really matter

what else we do right.” Congressman Franks went on to outline

his sponsorship of the Shield Act, intended to encourage electric

grid protection against natural and malicious EMP threats.

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Morning Keynote Speakers: The United States Department of Defense and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency

EISS Summit delegates were addressed in the morning

Keynote Session by Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Paul

Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense Sharon Burke, Deputy

Undersecretary of Defense Dorothy Robyn, and DoD Principal

Deputy General Counsel Bob Taylor, and by Dr. Jane Lubchenco,

Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and

Director of NOAA.

“The Department of Defense,” Assistant Secretary

Stockton explained, “depends for 99% of our electric

power on the private sector. We’re utterly dependent on

the flow of this electric power to be able to execute our core

responsibilities to the nation, and yet in the Department of

Defense, we don’t own the electric power generation.” This

situation creates, Dr. Stockton explained, a

serious vulnerability. “Long-term outages

of electricity for the Department of Defense

would not only disrupt our ability to conduct

operations abroad, severely disrupt them,

but we would be in a different world here at

home.”

With long term outages due to natural

causes or an EMP weapon, Dr. Stockton

said “we would be facing a public safety, a

public health environment, a requirement to

provide support to our citizens that would be

unprecedented.” The most immediate societal crisis, in his view,

would be water. “When you lose electricity for a long-term power

outage,” he pointed out, “the first thing that you’re going to lose

is municipal water systems around the nation.”

For the Pentagon, Assistant Secretary Stockton explained, the

key will be to “partner with Congress,” to work together with

all the responsible government agencies and, especially, to

“work very, very closely” with the private sector.” The Assistant

Secretary made it clear that, while this subject is mission critical,

DoD understands it is a complex problem. “As we move forward

to address these very serious challenges,” he said, “ … to be

candid, we’re not far along.”

These thoughts were amplified by the other senior DoD speakers.

Deputy Undersecretary Dorothy Robyn, agreeing that “the

security of the grid, is a real concern to the Department of

Defense,” called for active involvement of the Pentagon in helping

partner with other government agencies and departments to

resolve this vulnerability. “I think we can be a significant part of

the solution,” she explained.

Session 1

“We would be facing a public safety, a public health environment, a requirement to provide support to our citizens that would be unprecedented.”

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton

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Assistant Secretary Sharon Burke, focusing on today’s reality

– with all critical societal infrastructures tied together in a common

vulnerability – spoke of the need for resilience in these systems. “We

have to be able to build resilience from the ground up,” she told the

delegates, “from the little things that don’t sound like they’re important

but that can make all the difference, to having … a military operational

capability that can function and that’s safe from day-to-day.” Resilience

and continuity of operations, she continued, must start “in the day-to-

day business of our bases and go all the way up to the greatest threat

level.”

Principal Deputy General Counsel Bob Taylor focused on the

need to broaden awareness of the issue. “One very important role

for the Department of Defense is to help articulate how we would be

affected.” This issue, he said, “is critically important … to national

security, but also critically important to day-to-day life. As Dr. Stockton

indicated, an outage of the grid would have enormous real-world

consequences,” making life “virtually unsustainable for a large part of

the American people.” Echoing a reference by Congressman Franks

to his children, Mr. Taylor focused on his own children. “I look to their

future with passion and concern. And I think we all owe it to the future

and to our own generation as well to address this problem forthrightly

and with great commitment and understanding of the role of science,

but also understanding the critical role of the private sector.”

“Government and the private sector together must address this

problem. Promptly,” he concluded.

NOAA Director and Undersecretary of Commerce Dr. Jane

Lubchenco brought a space weather perspective to the morning

keynote session. “In just ten years,” she pointed out, looking back

to the previous peak in the twelve year solar cycle, ”the world has

changed dramatically. And it has become significantly more vulnerable

to disruption by the Sun’s moods.”

“Severe geomagnetic storms can result

in global impact that will require a global

response,” she said. Referring to a recent

letter in the New York Times authored by

the Science Advisors of the U.S. President

and the U.K. Prime Minister, she highlighted

their recommendation that the two nations

“undertake tangible and substantive steps to

anticipate space weather storms; to develop

mitigation strategies to protect our critical

infrastructure; and to ensure that the power

grid and other essential assets will weather

and recover quickly from the next major space

weather storm.”

“I believe,” the Undersecretary concluded,

“that a significant space weather storm is not a matter of if, but of

when.”

“In just ten years the world has changed dramatically. And it has become significantly more vulnerable to disruption by the Sun’s moods.”

Dr. Jane Lubchenco, NOAA Director, Undersecretary of Commerce

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Problem and Impact – Severe Space Weather and EMPCongresswoman Yvette Clarke opened the second

session of the summit, covering a wide range of subjects

in her comments. A Co-Chair of the EIS Summit, she began

her remarks with a reference to last-year’s Congressional

Hearings on these threats. As then-chair of the Subcommittee

on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, Science and Technology

(Homeland Security Committee), Rep. Clarke recalled that

“members of the committee, particularly

Mr. Lungren and I, were very alarmed

by what the witnesses told us; we as

a nation have virtually no protection of

our electric grid against electromagnetic

threats, and very little against cyber

attacks.” “Protecting the electric grid

from EMP,” she continued, “will require

the best efforts of both government and

industry.”

“The likelihood of a geomagnetic event

capable of crippling our electric grid is

one hundred percent,” Congresswoman

Clarke explained. “Electromagnetic

weapons such as an intense microwave

and radiofrequency devices are both

commercially available and easy to

construct. Rogue states continue to try

to develop nuclear weapons which could

be used to generate electromagnetic

pulses. To protect our civil societies

in the face of these mounting threats

requires the hardening of our grids, and

we have to do it now.” She concluded:

“The consequences of such an event

could literally alter, disrupt, or destroy our

current societies.”

Addressing the need for grid protection,

the Congresswoman told the delegates

“time is not on our side,” and went on to

express her concern that, with current

efforts limited to “a relatively slow-moving consensus process,”

these efforts “may still be working at trying to decide if solar

storms pose a threat when the next one hits us.”

Rep. Clarke also gave the delegates an overview of the most

recent U.S. government activity in this area, including the recently

published severe space weather article by the White House and

“We as a nation have virtually no protection of our electric grid against electromagnetic threats.”

Rep. Yvette Clarke

“The likelihood of a geomagnetic event capable of crippling our electric grid is one hundred percent.”

“Electromagnetic weapons … are both commercially available and easy to construct. Rogue states continue to try to develop nuclear weapons which could be used to generate electromagnetic pulses.”

“The consequences of such an event could literally alter, disrupt, or destroy our current societies.”

“To protect our civil societies in the face of these mounting threats requires the hardening of our grids, and we have to do it now.” Rep. Yvette Clarke

Session II

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U.K. Science Advisors, the 2010 electromagnetic threat study

the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy,

and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and her current

efforts in Congress as co-sponsor of the Shield Act, designed to

provide regulatory authority to address these threats.

Rep. Clarke also spoke briefly about electric grid protection.

The Congressional EMP Commission, she said, “estimates

that equipment available today could protect high voltage

transformers in the U.S., the elements of the grid most vulnerable

to GIC for an estimated investment of only seventy-five to one-

hundred and fifty million dollars. That commission also estimated

that very robust protection of the grid, including transformers

but also generators, … control equipment, grid islanding and

simulation and training could be accomplished for $800 million

to $1.5 billion.

Mikael Odenberg, CEO of the National Electric Grid and

former Defense Minister of Sweden, concluded the

introduction to the “Problems and Impacts” Session.

“From a Swedish perspective, this international outreach is

extremely important. Homeland security or societal security,

which is a more European term, calls for international and …

Trans-Atlantic cooperation,“ he said. And speaking of priorities,

“to my mind, there are few emergency scenarios today that

require such a gross cooperation as this, which are threatening

our electric infrastructure: large serious space weather situation,

and electromagnetic pulse.”

Mr. Odenberg also offered the delegates some historical

perspective.

“Actually forty years ago, EMP -- nuclear induced EMP was a

concern, for example in our defense planning.”

“It is by the way a bit interesting that we are discussing EMP,

nuclear induced EMPs and we are discussing space weather

and geomagnetic storms as if this phenomenon were new.

EMP has been known since 1945, common knowledge since

the 1950s. And we had a severe geomagnetic storm hit in the

northern hemisphere 150 years ago, where you could see the

Northern Lights, the Aurora Borealis in Florida.”

“So the new thing,” Mr. Odenberg concluded, “is not the EMP.

The new thing is not the space weather. The new thing is the

vulnerability of modern society. The cause of outages is basically

irrelevant. We are heavily dependent on electricity and without

“The United States and Europe are interconnected in many ways, and … therefore we need to set ambitious goals for cooperation.”

Mikael Odenberg, CEO of the National Electric Grid and former Defense Minister, Sweden

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electricity modern society collapses.”

In regard to consequences, Mr. Odenberg said, “Our basic infrastructure

can be totally wiped out with blackouts over huge areas and regions

in Europe and Northern America. And … the power grid recovery

process would be very complex, very difficult, and above all very lengthy

… months, perhaps years without electric power. And that will make

in the modern society urban life impossible … There would be no

supply of drinking water, no food, no gasoline, no transportation, no

communication, no medical care, financial transactions.”

Mikael Odenberg concluded with a call for practical measures

for international cooperation. “The United States and Europe are

interconnected in many ways, and …

therefore we need to set ambitious goals for

cooperation in the area of societal security

and also in the field of security research.”

“It is vital for protecting critical infrastructure

and key resources,” he continued, “that

we build and maintain trusted networks for

information sharing...”

“We have to work collaboratively on

improving protection and resiliency of critical

infrastructure. We also need to boost training

both on the national level but also [international]

joint training and education, including different

exercises. Forging operational ties requires

insights into how our differences interact …

In the event of a major geomagnetic storm to

Earth, I can promise you everyone that will be

hit will need assistance.

“So we need to work closely with responsible infrastructure providers

to develop resilience and prevention strategies against the risks posed

by space weather and EMPs. I think decision makers and stakeholders

have to be aware both of the potential threats to our infrastructure and

of the need for international collaboration and co-creation to beat those

threats.

“The new thing is not the EMP. The new thing is not the space weather. The new thing is the vulnerability of modern society.”

“Our basic infrastructure can be totally wiped out with blackouts over huge areas and regions in Europe and Northern America.”

Mikael Odenberg, CEO of the National Electric Grid and former Defense Minister, Sweden

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Severe Space Weather: Understanding the Global Threat

The Severe Space Weather Panel began with a presentation

by Dr. Daniel Baker. As Chair of the NASA National Academy

of Sciences Severe Space Weather Study, Dr. Baker provided

insights into the report authored by the NASA / NAS study.

“We live,’ Dr. Baker, explained, “in the outer atmosphere of a highly

variable magnetic star… capable of producing huge outbursts of

energy. … when such clouds interact with the Earth’s protective

magnetic cocoon, these disturbances can lead to … powerful

auroral displays and huge geomagnetically induced currents.”

“I think it’s important to remember that our society is a complex

cyber-electric cocoon. We have the electrical power grid, we

have the communications systems, we have the satellites in orbit

around the Earth. All of these are interdependent and all of them

are vulnerable to the effects of space weather.” In particular, he

said, “the grid is becoming increasingly vulnerable to [a] space

weather event.”

To give these concerns a real-world context, Dr. Baker discussed

a dramatic geomagnetic storm that took place 150 years ago.

“In 1859, a very powerful storm was witnessed by British

astronomer Richard Carrington. … Fires broke out in telegraph

stations ... auroras were seen as far south as Cuba.” And it is

important to realize, he said, that “the Carrington event occurred

during a relatively modest sunspot maximum.”

“A storm of this magnitude,” he said, “… can knock out hundreds

of high -- extremely high voltage transformers, … [and] the

impacts of space weather on the electric power grid in particular

could be truly devastating.”

Joining Dr. Baker on the panel was John Kappenman,

Principal Investigator on the NAS Severe Space Weather

Study and the U.S. Congress EMP Commission.

Echoing Dr. Baker’s observations, Kappenman explained,

“something that could come really from just one violent active

region on the Sun can cause essentially continent wide, perhaps

even planetary scale impacts to our critical infrastructure.”

“We ran simulated scenarios on today’s power grid for a repeat

of storms like the Carrington event, like the 1921 storm event

and so forth, things that are probable within a one-in-thirty to

one-in-hundred year sort of scenario …. And you see we can be

looking at blackouts of unprecedented scale.”

Session IIPANEL

“Our society is a complex cyber-electric cocoon. We have the electrical power grid, we have the communications systems, we have the satellites in orbit around the Earth. All … are vulnerable to the effects of space weather.”

-Dr. Daniel Baker, Chair, NASA / NAS Severe Space Weather Study

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John Kappenman also addressed the question, “how did we

get into this scenario?” One of the problems,” he explained,

“was that we did not really understand the extremes of the

environment. …. And if you take away electric power, virtually

every other critical infrastructure will either fail immediately or

within a matter of a few days after the loss of that electric power

… This is something that literally could put the lives of millions of

people at risk, could impact future generations of our society.”

“[In] the March 1989 geomagnetic storm,” following the province-

wide blackout in Quebec, “… we probably came very close to an

event that could have precipitated a blackout that would have

extended from ... the New England area, clear across to the

Pacific Northwest.” He went on to explain that, as an example,

the 1921 event is estimated at about

ten times the magnitude of this dramatic

1989 storm.

“We’ve also learned in the last decade,”

he said, “that it’s not just power grids at

high latitudes that need to be concerned

about this.” Depending on the magnitude

of an event, problems could also occur

at equatorial latitudes. “For example,”

he explained, “we measured very large

currents in southern Japan in the October

2003 storm. South Africa experienced

fifteen large high-voltage transformers

that failed during that October 2003

storm.”

Discussing the range of risks to key grid assets, John Kappenman

said that nuclear power plants are at particular risk. These plants

“have very large transformers, they have low resistance, … and

they have much higher exposure to geomagnetic storms than

most of the other transformers in the power grid. So that makes

them more vulnerable to damage and failure…” In terms of

risk due to nuclear EMP, “There are also things going on within

the nuclear plants that arguably make them more vulnerable to

EMP,” Kappenman said.

In summary, Mr. Kappenman said, “I think what we have to

understand is that we’ve had about a half century long failure to

understand the risk of space weather and especially how this risk

has inadvertently migrated into the electric grid infrastructures.”

“Something that could come really from just one violent active region on the Sun can cause essentially continent wide, perhaps even planetary scale impacts to our critical infrastructure.”

John Kappenman, Principal Investigator, NAS Severe Space Weather Study and U.S. Congress EMP Commission.

”We’ve had about a half century long failure to understand the risk of space weather and especially how this risk has inadvertently migrated into the electric grid infrastructures.”

John Kappenman, Principal Investigator, NAS Severe Space Weather Study and U.S. Congress EMP Commission.

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Session Two concluded with a panel - EMP: Threat and

Impact - EMP Commission Perspective.

Dr. Robert Hermann, one of the Commissioners on the EMP

Commission, began by summarizing the commission’s

mandate from Congress: “The duties of the commission,”

he said, “were to assess the EMP threat to the United States;

the nature and magnitude of EMP threats within the next 15

years from all potentially hostile states or non-state actors;

assess the vulnerability of U.S. military and especially civilian

systems; the capability of the U.S. to repair and recover from

damage to military and civilian systems; the feasibility and cost

of EMP hardening select military and select civilian systems; and

represent protection steps that the U.S. should take. And we did

more or less all of that.”

Summarizing the Commission’s

conclusions briefly, he said, “… an

important point for this commission was

EMP is one of a small number of threats

that could hold at risk the continued

existence of U.S. civil society and can

disrupt our military forces and our ability

to project military power.”

Dr. Hermann also addressed the impact

of the changing geopolitical reality. “The

number of U.S. adversaries capable of

EMP attack is greater than during the

Cold War,” he said, pointing out that, as

opposed to the bi-polar political world

of the past, in today’s and tomorrow’s

world we have many possible enemies.

“Potential adversaries are quite aware of EMP as a strategic

weapon,” he continued, “and we think that neither the military or

civil structure is effectively dealing with the problem.”

Having concluded that EMP is “one of a handful of threats that

could be considered an existential threat to the United States,” the

commission was then asked to address the question of whether

an EMP event was likely. “In our judgment,” Dr. Hermann said,

“it was not a sensible question to ask, because how likely it was

depended a lot on what we did about it. I mean, if we actually

announced to the world we had a lethal flaw in our system, which

we were not going to do anything about, which could be easily

attacked by a … cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs, then

we’re inviting such a cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs.”

Concluding, Dr. Hermann offered an opinion on the best path

forward. Securing the national grid against electromagnetic

threats will require establishing “an accountable, responsible,

authorized authority to control and maintain that part of the

activity which you wish to secure,” he said.

“EMP is one of a small number of threats that could hold at risk the continued existence of U.S. civil society.“

Dr. Robert Hermann, Commissioner, U.S. Congress EMP Commission

“… if we actually announced to the world we had a lethal flaw in our system, which we were not going to do anything about, which could be easily attacked by a cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs, then we’re inviting such a cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs.”

Dr. Robert Hermann, Commissioner, U.S. Congress EMP Commission

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Historically, John Kappenman pointed out, speaking on the EMP

Commission panel, investing in grid protection is not a new

subject. In addressing common threats, “the investment … the electric

power industry has made truly extends into billions of dollars” he said.

By contrast, with little experience with geomagnetic storms and virtually

none with EMP, the electric power industry today does not have hardware

or procedural protection to address severe events which “can literally be

planetary scale effects, and impact multiple transformers and portions of

the power grid all at the same time.”

However, there are important opportunities for synergistic protection

in this area, John Kappenman explained. Hardening the power grid

against geomagnetic storms “also provides protection

against the slow pulse or E-3 portion of an EMP

attack.” Similarly, hardening against the fast pulse of

EMP “helps diminish the threat from radio frequency

weapon attacks or the IEMI class,” protecting against

a range of non-nuclear EMP threats.

What are the options for protection?

“Methods for hardening infrastructures are known and

readily available. We do not see this any longer as being

a technology push,” Kappenman said. Approaches

include:

• GIC current blockers for transformer protection

• “Improved situational awareness” for non-grid

users to enable temporary off-grid operation, and

• A range of options for electronic protection against the fast (E1)

pulse of nuclear or non-nuclear EMP

In this latter case, for EMP “E1” pulse protection, a mix of old and new

technologies can provide a complete menu. Commercial companies

are already “providing consulting, guidelines, materials, and systems”

for protection of control and data lines. In other areas, such as shielding

electric power feeds, recent technology breakthroughs enable high

quality protection at modest cost. In some cases the natural upgrade

process, such as migration to fiber-optics data and control cables, offers

free protection against the full set of threats.

“Methods for hardening infrastructures are known and readily available. We do not see this any longer as being a technology push.”

John Kappenman, Principal Investigator, NAS Severe Space Weather Study and U.S. Congress EMP Commission.

15

Dr. Pry summarized the work of the Congressional EMP

Commission which he supported. “The commission,” he

explained, “had the power and had the support of all departments

and agencies of the United States,” including “the Department

of Defense, intelligence communities, the national laboratories,”

and also reached out to the private sector and industry. The

Commission looked at, for example, a nuclear explosion over

Cleveland Ohio, which could trigger power grid failures across

the entire eastern seaboard. “Our prediction was that the eastern

power grid from Canada to Florida would go down and not be

recoverable for months.”

The Congressional Commission’s conclusions?

After eight years of hearings, laboratory tests and analysis,

“the commission estimated that two-thirds to ninety percent of

the American people would perish in the aftermath of an EMP

attack.”

The commission concluded, Dr. Pry told the delegates, that “while

it is a technological Achilles heel if we don’t do anything about it,

… we know how to fix the problem.” He went on to explain that

technology is not the problem, following fifty years of Pentagon

investment in developing technologies to protect against EMP.

“Nor,” he continued, “is it that expensive.” Bounding the cost,

he said that at minimum, the 300 most important high voltage

transformers in the United States could be protected for as little

as $100 to $200 million, while on the high end, the commission

had projected that $10 to $20 billion invested over three to five

years would provide “robust protection.”

Dr. Pry also addressed the slow pace of implementing measures

to address this problem. “The real Achilles heel,” he said, both

nationally and internationally, is “bureaucratic and institutional.

The problem with EMP is that it cuts across so many segments

of society, it affects everything. And there is no one institution

responsible.”

“The commission estimated that two-thirds to ninety percent of the American people would perish in the aftermath of an EMP attack.”

Dr. Peter Pry, Senior Staff, Congressional EMP Commission

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DOE and DHS perspectives on electromagnetic threats and energy and infrastructure policy.

Bruce Held, Director of the DOE Office of Intelligence and

Counterintelligence, spoke of the strategic risk of nuclear

EMP. “We’ve known about the threat of electromagnetic pulse

to our critical infrastructure for many, many years, since the Cold

War,” he said. After the Cold War, “there was a general feeling that

this problem has gone away. That is a big mistake. The problem

is still very much here. Indeed, the

problem may be even greater today than

it was during the Cold War because we

are much more reliant on IT infrastructure,

for all aspects of our economy and our

economic wellbeing.”

Mr. Held defined three different EMP

threat scenarios, each with different areas

of concern.

“On terrorists – If they get their hands

on a nuclear weapon we must expect

that they will use it to kill members of our

community. We must deny them this

capability.”

“It’s going to be much more difficult for us to deny rogue states

the capability of nuclear weapons,” he continued, “but as hard as

it may be that is the best and first line of defense. We must keep

at that. A nuclear armed Iran will not be good for us …”

The risk of EMP from great powers is, he added, “in some ways

more complicated and some ways simpler. The capability is

there. It exists. It has existed for a long period of time.” Here, he

went on, “we have to really work on the intent side. Thankfully

our ability to work in a cooperative basis with some potential

peer adversaries, great power adversaries is greater today than

it was during the Cold War. “

“At the same time,” he cautioned, “the same steps that we

are taking to defend our critical infrastructure … to reduce the

gain and increase the consequence, the same theory the same

practice has to be applied to potential peer adversaries as well.”

Some of the discipline this implies has been lost since the cold

war, Held asserted. “We have to kind of re-instill that discipline

and I think the work of the Congressman has been great in

instilling that leadership.”

“The threat from an EMP attack is massive.”

Bruce Held, Director, DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Session III

“From a DOE perspective I would like to underscore the importance the Department of Energy places on a public/private partnership in addressing this threat at this time.”

Bruce Held, Director, DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

17

“The threat from an EMP attack is massive,” he concluded. “From

a DOE perspective I would like to underscore the importance the

Department of Energy places on a public/private partnership in

addressing this threat at this time. Neither the public sector nor

the private sector can do this on its own. We have to help each

other.”

DHS Assistant Secretary Douglas Smith opened his

remarks by outlining DHS’s concern, and summarizing

the challenges offered by severe space weather. About

60 years after the severe 1859 geomagnetic storm took place,

he said, “on May sixteenth, 1921, the great storm [took place]

which disrupted telegraph service, caused fires, and burned

out cables. These [geomagnetic] storms will occur every 100

years.” Our technology-dependent society is exposed to unique

new risks, and today, “our major threats do not necessarily derive

from the militaries of other nations.”

“Our electrical infrastructure is the backbone of the way we all

do business. Major disruptions are totally unacceptable and

need to be mitigated,” he said. How should such concerns be

addressed?

“DHS believes firmly in the shared responsibilities to handle these

issues,” he continued. “DHS’s responsibility to protect the nation’s

critical infrastructure was established in 2002 by the National

Strategy for Homeland Security and Homeland Security Act.”

However, he continued, “we have a long tradition in our country of

creating problem-solving partnerships between the government

and the private sector.” In this case, “the vast majority of this

critical infrastructure of the United States is privately owned and

operated, making public/private partnerships essential to protect

and boost the resilience of critical infrastructure and respond to

catastrophic events.”

“Our electrical infrastructure is the backbone of the way we all do business. Major disruptions are totally unacceptable”

DHS Assistant Secretary Douglas Smith

18

The Cause – Solar statistics, terrorists and rogue states, and the government challenge: Imagining the Unimaginable

The Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP chaired Session IV, exploring

the causes of malicious and natural EMP, and the challenges

they present to infrastructure protection.

Addressing the political challenges, James Arbuthnot

began by pointing out that, unfortunately, our critical

infrastructures today have little protection, and awareness

of this threat is minimal. This, he explained, defines the

challenge. “The extraordinary thing,” he said, “is that almost

nobody knows about it. You know about it. A few geeks out

there know about it. Wikipedia knows about it. The Iranian

leadership knows about it. But if you go to the British Ministry

of Defense or really parts of the Department of Defense here,

and you talk about an electromagnetic

pulse or solar flares, and if you say that

sort of thing to any man in any street in

virtually any country in the world, a blank

look will come across their faces, and it will

be somebody else’s department.”

This means education will be essential.

“What we’ve got to do is to bring to the

attention of the world what is potentially

the greatest catastrophe to have hit the

world for centuries,” he said. And this education process will be

complex. Public opinion, he pointed out, is cynical. “The world

believes something only if it is backed up by the very clearest

evidence and often it doesn’t believe it even then.”

The key difficulty however, he continued, is the remarkable

breadth of impact of this risk. This threat, he said, “cuts across

so many departmental responsibilities that actually it has become

the responsibility of nobody.”

His conclusion: “One of the most serious risks we face in the

issue of electric infrastructure [e-threat vulnerability] is that

nobody knows about it. And until this is a matter of common

discussion, in each of our countries, in the offices of those who

deal with our electricity supplies, with our hospitals, with our

water supply, with our financial transactions, with our transport

systems, with our communication systems, we shall still have

work to do. So let’s get to it.”

“What we’ve got to do is to bring to the attention of the world what is potentially the greatest catastrophe to have hit the world for centuries.”

Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP, Chair, U.K. Defence Select Committee

Session IV

“[EMP] cuts across so many departmental responsibilities that actually it has become the responsibility of nobody.”

Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP, Chair, U.K. Defence Select Committee

19

Addressing the subject of Session IV, “The Cause – Solar

statistics, terrorists and rogue states, and the government

challenge: Imagining the Unimaginable,” the panel continued

its discussions after the comments of EIS Summit Co-Chair

and Session Chair, Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP. The

second speaker, Congressman Dan Lungren, also a co-chair

of the summit, continued to focus on the specific panel topic,

“Understanding the Challenge.”

Congressman Dan Lungren, a member of the House

Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees, pointed

out the security implications of natural and malicious

electromagnetic threats to our critical infrastructures,

including the risk of an EMP strike by terrorists or a rogue

nation.

Addressing the legislative challenge, the congressman

characterized the e-threat as “one of the most

serious challenges facing this nation and facing this world.”

“I do not despair of leadership,” he said, referring to the

need for government and industry leadership in addressing

electromagnetic threats to vital infrastructures. However, while

EIS Summit delegates understand the problem, he continued,

echoing James Arbuthnot, “99.9% of the people do not. And so

we have a tremendous educational campaign to be engaged in.”

The Congressman felt it would be important to find a way to

effectively communicate the challenge, in a context that would

lead to positive action, and not to confusion or paralysis. “We do

need to find a language that makes it possible for us to reach the

public,” he said, “so that they on the one hand

will understand the urgency of the matter; on the other hand will

not be so overwhelmed that they are frozen or they are paralyzed

by the threat.”

20

Dr. Thomas J. Bogdan, Director of the Space Weather

Prediction Center of NOAA’s National Weather Service,

provided a more detailed look at severe space weather

and its impact. Everything we depend on, he said, for our

security, our lives and our livelihood, can be impacted by a severe

geomagnetic storm.

“Think of it,” he suggested, “as a hurricane

in space.” When that storm impacts our

magnetosphere, changes in the earth’s

magnetic field induce powerful currents

in the ground that are “picked up by giant

antennae such as the power grid.”

What is the probability of a catastrophic

storm? “The chance of it happening in our

children’s lifetimes … is not a bet I would

like to take,” Dr. Bogdan asserted. “As Dr.

Lubchenco said earlier, it’s not a question of

if, but it’s a question of when.”

Dr. Bogdan also provided some historical

context. “What has the Sun been capable

of doing? I list here a series of extreme solar

storms that date back to the 1859 event.”

He referred, for example, to the Easter Sunday storm in 1940,

“when a million messages were unable to make their way for

Easter greetings because of space weather. No,” he concluded,

“space weather is not new. It has been out there, but the impacts

of not being able to get an Easter message, and the impacts of

being without power for an extended period of time are very, very

different.”

The final speaker of the panel was Curtis Birnbach,

President and Chief Technology Officer of Advanced

Fusion Systems, and a noted expert in

high power electric systems. “Today,”

he began, “I’m going to talk about the non-

nuclear approach [to EMP].” He started

by describing a non-nuclear EMP weapon

he built into a van, from conventional

components acquired at retail stores. “This

is a device I built a couple of years ago.

This is an EMP level source. We tested

this in conjunction with the US army on a

government range because it’s obviously

too dangerous to test in my garage where I

built it. I built this for a trifling sum of money

… and the pulses from this unit blew right through the wall of the

test chamber.”

“Think of it as a hurricane in space. The chance of it happening in our children’s lifetimes … is not a bet I would like to take.”

“As Dr. Lubchenco said earlier, it’s not a question of if, but it’s a question of when.”

Dr. Thomas J. Bogdan, Director, NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center

That [range],” he said, “is large enough that you can really do a lot of damage and in a coordinated attack you could do extraordinary amounts of damage.

Curtis Birnbach, President and Chief Technology Officer of Advanced Fusion Systems

21

“The footprint of a non-nuclear EMP event,” he continued, “is

of necessity smaller,” referring to an area of influence measured

in miles or tens of miles, rather than the thousands of miles

typically quoted for the range of nuclear devices. “That [range],”

he said, “is large enough that you can really do a lot of damage

and in a coordinated attack you could do extraordinary amounts

of damage.” He concluded his presentation by discussing

different approaches for protection of transformers and sensitive

electronics against these threats.

Note: Dr. Peter Pry, Senior Staff for the EMP Commission,

commented later in the afternoon on this subject. “Non-nuclear

EMP [also known as radio frequency or RF weapons] weapons

are also actually used in the real world right now,” he said. “On

the ninth of March the U.S. and South Korean forces were

conducting a joint exercise. The North Koreans used a Russian

purchased radio frequency weapon to attack communications

and blackout communications in three South Korean cities.”

The fifth PANEL, “Rogue States and Trans-National Terror

Groups: Current and Future Threat vs Vulnerability,”

focused on the political history and future risks of an EMP

strike.

The first speaker was the Rt. Hon. Dr. Kim Howells,

former Chair, United Nations

Security Council; Former Chair,

UK Intelligence and Security

Committee; and Former Minister,

Counter Terrorism and Counter-

Proliferation, United Kingdom. Dr.

Howells, having spent most of his career

tracking trans-national terror groups

and other dangerous groups for the

United Kingdom, illustrated the ease

with which our most delicate and critical

infrastructures can be compromised.

Based on his own experience, Dr.

Howells said, a small group of intelligent,

highly motivated but otherwise ordinary

people were able to “figure out ways

that, without explosives,” the 400 kV

transmission lines across the UK could

be sabotaged.

Decades ago, he said, “we knew then

that the electricity supply infrastructure was vulnerable and as

we’ve heard today, it remains vulnerable. Not just in the United

Kingdom and the United States, but in all countries that consider

and define themselves as developed.”

“There are people,” he said, “whose motivations are so powerful that with hardly a second thought they kick aside the barriers”

Rt. Hon. Dr. Kim Howells

“In 2011, we can only ignore at our peril the potential for hugely damaging mischief to be wrought in our societies and our economies by individuals and elements who may be living among us and who understand the continuing vulnerability of our electricity infrastructures and supply systems.”

Rt. Hon. Dr. Kim Howells, former Chair, UN Sec. Council and UK Intelligence and Security Committee. Former UK Counter Terrorism Minister

22

“There are people,” he said, “whose motivations are so powerful that

with hardly a second thought they kick aside the barriers” and work to

find and implement catastrophic attacks on our critical infrastructures.

“They could be well educated people,” he said, “familiar with the subject

of nuclear and non-nuclear EMP. They may be engineers, craftsmen,

experts in the civil use of explosives and detonators. They will certainly

know full well that our economies, our services, and our homes are

hungrier than ever for electricity.”

Today, he went on, we can no longer assume that saboteurs will be

restrained by concern for the human cost of their actions. “That’s no

longer the case amongst potential saboteurs in 2011. Nor is it the

position of the planners and strategists in rogue states. It’s not the

position amongst terrorist groups financed and sustained by rogue

governments, renegade agencies, and wealthy patrons. I doubt also

that it’s the position of some mainstream governments and corporations

that may harbor malignant plans for furthering their own political and

commercial interests.”

In his ministerial roles, he said, “I knew from my long ministerial

involvement in counter terrorism and intelligence and security that there

are in all of our societies many dangerous individuals and groups.”

The difference, he went on, between today’s groups and the potential

saboteurs of the ‘80s is that, today, “these individuals and groups

are immensely more sophisticated, and better equipped in terms of

intelligence and communications... In 2011, we can only ignore at our

peril the potential for hugely damaging mischief to be wrought in our

societies and our economies by individuals and elements who may be

living among us and who understand the continuing vulnerability of our

electricity infrastructures and supply systems.”

“A British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, once observed that most

governments find themselves having to respond, not to the commitments

they made in their election manifestos, but as he put it, ‘to events, dear

boy, events.’ Because of its centrality, in any advanced economy, I feel

that our electricity generation and its supply infrastructure will find it

impossible to escape the kinds of events that force governments to take

extraordinary actions. Indeed in the next decade, the very reputation

of governments may be determined by their success or their failure in

ensuring that the lights stay on.”

“That’s why no government … can delay carrying out its duties, not

merely to identify the threats to the continuing security of our electricity

23

supply systems, but also to ensure that adequate measures are

taken to safeguard and strengthen that security.”

Patrick Miller, CEO of EnergySec and Principal Investigator

of DOE’s National Electric Sector Cybersecurity

Organization Project, spoke about both cybersecurity

threats to the power grid, and areas of overlap with

EMP. The challenges posed by our increasingly vulnerable

infrastructures, he pointed out, are growing fast. “As we move

forward,” he said, “we have nothing but a digital landscape in

front of us. Every single blip, every mountain, every hill, every

valley will be digital.” And both the critical controllers of our

infrastructures and the devices that could be used to attack

them are shrinking in size, and growing in scope and impact. In

short, “we’re putting more and more of our eggs in smaller and

smaller baskets.”

Vulnerability, he said, is growing due to both the explosive spread

of digital control systems, and cascading impacts. “We have

widespread connectivity of all these things, so not only are

we using more and more technology, more and more of it is

getting embedded deeper and deeper. We’re connecting it to

everything.”

The consequence – rapidly growing vulnerability. “These threats

are certainly real,” he said. “There’s no doubt about it. My

organization, we deal with the actual frontlines of this battle.”

How does cyber relate to EMP? While Patrick Miller sees “a

greater risk for widespread issues with EMP or even weaponized

magnetic pulses,” cyber threats would be launched at the

same time. “It [cyber] will be used as a force multiplier,” he

said, “to make the problem far worse than you could have

possibly imagined otherwise.” An enemy intent on bringing our

infrastructures down would use both, together. “It comes along

for the ride no matter what. It’s just part of the package.”

Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former Director, Central

Intelligence Agency and Chairman of Woolsey Partners,

LLC, spoke of the nation’s EMP vulnerability to rogue

states or trans-national terror groups. “We have 18 critical

infrastructures in the United States: water, sewage, food, etc.

All 17 of the others depend on electricity. If the grid goes down,”

he said, “we are not back to 1970s pre-web, we’re back in the

1870s pre-electricity, and we don’t have enough plow horses or

enough pump handles.”

“We need to focus on a whole range of issues about the grid.

One of them certainly is cyber security because beginning a

decade plus ago … we transitioned a lot of our data systems

into operating across the web.”

24

Summarizing the nation’s EMP risk, he said he sees the key

issue as the vulnerability of the power grid. “The really tough

thing about the grid … is that it is so central and has such a

range of vulnerabilities.” As an example, he spoke of the 2003

blackout. “In August of 2003 a tree branch touched a power line

in Cleveland … and some 80 gigawatts of power went offline,

some of it for several days, 50 million Americans and Canadians

without electricity.

“The heart of the matter,” he continued,

“is that the Revolutionary Guards and

Hezbollah and Al Qaeda are a lot smarter

than tree branches and power lines.” And

the problem we face with a rogue nation

like Iran acquiring a capability for nuclear

EMP, he said, is that we cannot count on

the deterrent structures that have worked

for decades among the major powers. “If

all of a sudden the east coast just goes

dark because there was a fishing boat off

the east coast that launched something or

some other part of the United States or Europe, we have a real

problem in attribution and understanding what might be going

on.”

Speaking of missile defense, James Woolsey explained that,

while this could change in the future, current missile defense

systems could not engage a sea-launched, short range EMP

attack. For example, a “Hezbollah crude fishing boat carrying

a scud, so-called scud-in-the-bucket

threat.” In the near term, the other option

is to “build defenses into our grid,” he said.

Why is this urgent? “Iran,” he said, “is

different. It’s a sophisticated country with

sophisticated understanding of many

aspects of technology.” Most intelligence

agencies, he said, agree that Iran today

is one to three years away from having a

relatively primitive nuclear weapon. “That

puts us,” he continued, “in a very difficult

situation.” And with Iran, he suggested,

we cannot rely on mutual assured

destruction. “Mutual assured destruction

to Ahmadinejad is not a threat, but a

beckoning call.”

Speaking at some length about the

influence of radical religious thinkers on the Iranian government,

he explained that the traditional strategic deterrence that worked

well in a world of competing secular governments will not work

with Iran.

“We have 18 critical infrastructures in the United States: water, sewage, food, etc. All 17 of the others depend on electricity.”

- Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director

“If the grid goes down, we are not back to 1970s pre-web, we’re back in the 1870s pre-electricity, and we don’t have enough plow horses or enough pump handles.”

Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director

“The possibility of, within the next few years, the Iranian government being able to execute a scud-in-a-bucket EMP shot … cannot responsibly be discounted by the leadership of the United States and the West.”

Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director

25

“That world,” he said, “is gone. We’re now in the 21st century

at odds with, perhaps at war with religiously rooted totalitarians.

And that’s different. Under those circumstances the possibility

of, within the next few years, the Iranian government being able

to execute a scud-in-a-bucket EMP shot of

the type I described simply cannot responsibly

be discounted by the leadership of the United

States and the West.”

Responding to a question, James Woolsey

summarized his major concerns.

“The thing that worries me the most right now

is that Iran appears to have a couple of bombs

worth of light enriched uranium.” In practical

terms, he explained, that means they have

completed “about two-thirds or a little more

of the work necessary to enrich to 90% for a

weapon.”

“Second – the design of the weapon itself, if

you’re talking about something pretty primitive,

is not that hard, and is on the internet.” Iran, he

said, is far enough along that within a year or

two, “we could have … detonation of a simple

weapon up in the northern deserts of Iran. If

it has a mushroom cloud and some radiation and goes boom,

they are a nuclear power. And once they are a nuclear power

… you will have lots of countries getting into the fuel cycle and

enrichment, and I am afraid Iran will be a terrible gateway into a

quite unpleasant world.”

Once they [Iran] are a nuclear power … you will have lots of countries getting

into the fuel cycle and enrichment, and I am afraid Iran will be a

terrible gateway into a quite unpleasant world.”

Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director

26

The Solution:Policies and Approaches

Congressman Trent Franks chaired the fifth and final

session for the first day of the summit, as panelists

provided perspectives on the policies that will be needed

to protect the power grid.

Bill Bryan, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary, began by

summarizing DOE’s role, as a research and development

agency dedicated to supporting and advancing security

and resiliency of the energy system. DOE works to find

optimal, broadly based partnerships, he said, but there is

a downside. “The downside,” he explained, “is that good

partnerships take time, which is why sometimes you need

something else.”

“Electromagnetic disturbances,” Bill Bryan reiterated, “have

potentially significant impacts on the electric grid.” Given the

many different types of equipment, testing will be needed to

study different mitigation techniques. “We have to consider

the various types, the brands, the ages, and the configurations

of the equipment and do some required testing on the various

scenarios that are out there,” he said. Mitigation also includes

procedural steps, which in turn mean dependable space weather

forecasting. “It’s clear,” he said, referring to earlier comments

from Dr. Jane Lubchenco (NOAA Director) and Dr. Tom Bogdan

(NOAA Space Center Director), “that there’s a need for better

indication and warning.”

Similarly, “regarding the recovery options, we have to consider

the level of impact on the various systems.” This also means that

“we have to consider cost of recovery,” he continued, referring

to cost sharing as an option. The Deputy Assistant Secretary

had praise for companies that have already begun looking at

procedural changes that could offer some protection, and said

he was “very encouraged that some companies are taking steps

to retrofit their current systems.” He called for bringing these

companies forward, to share their experiences. “Let’s get them

in here,” he said. “Let’s learn what they’re doing. Let’s learn

what works. Let’s learn what kind of language they would need

that would help them continue to do that for the safety of the grid

and the security of the grid.” DOE, he said, can help, offering

Recovery Act funding as an example. “Through the Recovery

Act, our office received fifty million dollars that we could apply to

the states and cities to build reliability and resiliency plans in an

all hazard environment.”

He called for maintaining the momentum toward Congressional

legislation, while ensuring the legislation adds value, and “we

don’t tie anybody’s hands, that we don’t create bigger problems,”

inadvertently creating unintended negative consequences. “No

“If you’re a legislator, your solution is to legislate. If you’re a regulator, your solution is to regulate. If you’re a federal agency, your solution is to participate, or partnerships … But we’re not going to solve that problem unless we have a combination of all three.”

Bill Bryan, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary

Session V

27

legislation or regulation is perfect,” he said, “but we need to

make it as good as we can.”

Concluding, Bill Bryan called for inclusive solutions that arise

from coordinated planning by the many different government

stakeholders and industry, working together. “If you’re a

legislator, your solution is to legislate. If you’re a regulator, your

solution is to regulate. If you’re a federal agency, your solution is

to participate, or partnerships. And you know, we’re not going

to get there by any one of those by themselves. The threat is

real. I think the likelihood of an attack as we’ve heard today is

inevitable, not if but when. But we’re not going to solve that

problem unless we have a combination of all three.”

FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur began by

summarizing the work of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission. “FERC is an independent regulatory agency with

five commissioners appointed by the President, confirmed by the

Senate. We have jurisdiction over

interstate and wholesale electricity,

natural gas, and oil pipelines used

in interstate commerce.” The

Commissioner pointed to two

areas of FERC’s jurisdiction that

are relevant to electric infrastructure

security: Cost recovery, and reliability

standards.

Most of the Commissioner’s focus

was on beginning to think about

specifics. “There are steps we can

begin to take,” she said, “to begin to

address the issues we heard about

and make steady progress.”

What are those steps?

“There are really three categories of actions that I think we need

to collectively address to take this forward,” she said.

The first category: Equipment solutions.

The second: Preparation, planning and preventive actions, “such

as training our control room operators what to do when you

know a solar disturbance is coming.”

The third category: Supply chain preparation. “I really applaud

the efforts of DOE to get more of the transformers made in this

country.” The Commissioner also commented on work by Edison

Electric Institute and NERC on spare transformer programs,

“The 2004 EMP Commission report authors wrote ‘if we get started we can really tackle this problem in three years.’ So that means if we had gotten started, we would have been done in 2007.”

Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur“This is a classic case where we can’t let perfection be the enemy of the good. We have to figure out some prudent steps to take and just start taking them so we can tackle this.”

Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur

28

approved in 2006 by FERC. “That’s not the be-all and end-all,” she

said. “We’re never going to have enough spares if we lose two-thirds

of our system, but it’s a component of an overall strategy. And it’s an

important component.”

Referring to a full day FERC technical conference, Commissioner

LaFleur said she was pleased to see a sense of cooperative effort to

carry this subject forward. NERC, she said, has

formed a Geomagnetic Disturbance Taskforce, as

one of the important new initiatives beginning to

look at the space weather problem.

Looking forward, the Commissioner spoke about

the possibility of new legislation addressing

electromagnetic infrastructure vulnerability. “If

Congress chooses to give FERC more authority in

the Shield Act, or in any other piece of legislation,

particularly more authority over real-time threats

which is a gap in our legislation now, I can assure

you that we would use that authority conscientiously

and vigorously. But in the meantime, we’re not

waiting. We’re trying to use the authority we have

under the Federal Power Act to work with NERC

and the industry to get these codes and standards

in place, get the drills started, and just start to take

this forward.”

The Commissioner concluded with a pointed

reference to the need to get started. The authors of the 2004 EMP

Commission Report wrote ‘if we get started we can really tackle this

problem in three years.’ So that means if we had gotten started, we

would have been done in 2007. Instead, in 2008, an even fatter report

came out, the final report of the commission, and then last fall FERC and

DOE and DHS issued a 900 page report on this. We’ve done with the

studies. We have to start taking action, so we won’t be sitting here three

years from now saying if we’d started we could have done something in

three years. This is a classic case where we can’t let perfection be the

enemy of the good. We have to figure out some prudent steps to take

and just start taking them so we can tackle this.”

“Instead, in 2008, an even fatter report came out, the final report of the commission, and then last fall FERC and DOE and DHS issued a 900 page report on this. We’re done with the studies. We have to start taking action, so we won’t be sitting here three years from now saying if we’d started we could have done something in three years.”

Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur

29

“The loss of these transformers would affect 130 million people. They would be out of power … the estimate would be four to 10 years.”

Joe McClelland, Director, FERC

The third speaker on the panel was Joe McClelland,

Director of the Office of Electric Reliability at the Federal

Regulatory Commission.

Joe McClelland began his remarks with a reference to the 2009-

2010 FERC-initiated study on severe electromagnetic threats to

the power grid and energy sector. The study, run by Oak Ridge

National Laboratory for FERC, DOE and DHS and monitored by

DOD and the White House OSTP, looked at the vulnerabilities

of the bulk power system: “What lines

were most susceptible and what pieces

of equipment on those lines were most

susceptible to failure? And this was not just

natural but also manmade EMP.”

“The results of this study,” the Director said,

“were sobering.” He referred to a study

projection of what the impact would be,

today, of a repeat of the 1921 geomagnetic

storm. “If the storm were centered over

Winnipeg, Manitoba, over 300 high voltage

bulk power system transformers would be

susceptible to damage or failure. To put that in perspective, … the

loss of these transformers would affect 130 million people. They

would be out of power.” How long? “A loss of this magnitude

would overwhelm the supply chain. But even if one could get

around the supply chain issues, the estimate would be four to 10

years to completely restore these transformers. And that’s not

an exaggeration. In fact, from my personal perspective, I find it

to be optimistic.”

This study estimate is not, the Director warned, an exaggeration.

In fact, “if the event were centered a little further south … over

1,000 transformers would be at risk for failure.”

How does it happen? Joe McClelland provided a functional

description of the risk to the grid from a severe geomagnetic

storm. “There are set points on the bulk power system. Load

and generation must be in balance.” If transformers fail, the

generators they serve will not be able to feed their power into the

grid. “What happens on the bulk power system in a grid … when

the loss of generation occurs?” If enough generation is lost, he

explained, “we could have grid collapse, and that grid collapse

could last for a very long period of time.”

Repeating a warning heard from the earlier speakers, he pointed

out that “Either a manmade or a natural EMP event is going

to happen. And when it does happen, if the countries are

unprepared … the restoration of services [could] take so long, it

could be civilization altering or even civilization ending.”

What are the solutions?

“On that basis, there are steps that we can put into place and

“Either a manmade or a natural EMP event is going to happen. And when it does happen, if the countries are unprepared … the restoration of services [could] take so long, it could be civilization altering or even civilization ending.”

Joe McClelland, Director, FERC Office of Electric Reliability

30

we need to move quickly to put into place. Commissioner LaFleur said

that the time for studying is nearing an end or maybe at its end. And

I agree. There have been many studies. Studies seem to converge.

We’ve had some peer comments, good peer comments on the work

that we’ve done, but they don’t substantively change the fundamental

conclusions.”

The Director spoke of using a tiered mitigation approach. “Pick out the

most critical bulk power system elements, let’s begin with mitigation

on those, and move out in concentric circles to less and less important

elements. And it can be done on the basis that I’ve got to maintain

service to these key military facilities,” or selected large

urban areas. Sensitive elements of the grid can be rated,

he said, with prioritized protection which could include

both “proactive and reactive mitigation strategies.”

Commercially available or prototype mitigation hardware

can be tested, followed by defining deployment plans and

timelines. “Begin staging implementation. Again, based

on what are the most critical elements to assure continuity

of service for important load centers.”

Finally, Joe McClelland offered an opinion on why industry

has not yet acted. “Part of the problem is it’s got to be

identified as a priority.” “Secondly, good development or

good solutions need to be proposed and put into place,”

with industry participating in developing effective solutions.

“And lastly,” he said, “cost recovery must be assured.”

Summing up, the Director concluded: “Let’s get the

solutions built, tested, and in place.”

[What should be done now?]

“Pick out the most critical bulk power system elements, let’s begin with mitigation on those, and move out in concentric circles to less and less important elements.”

Joe McClelland, Director, FERC Office of Electric Reliability

31

Wrapping up the panel, Avi Schnurr, Summit Coordinator and

CEO and Chairman of the EIS Council spoke about strategies for

reaching solutions.

“I think there’s always a danger when we talk about actually starting

down a solution path,” he warned. “And the danger is that different

people will always have different ideas about the direction that path

should take.” The alternative, however, is inaction. “If we can just sit

and comfortably talk about how bad the problem is, we can all agree it’s

a horrible problem. There will be no disagreement. But I think it is time,

and we do have to take the risk.”

It is important not to lose sight of our critical objectives, he said, and

lose momentum as we consider diverging details. What is the real

fundamental issue here? “Our cities are not designed or constructed

to allow them to support our lives and the lives of our society without

massive amounts of electrical power.”

Introducing the International Infrastructure Security Roadmap, Avi

Schnurr described it as one possible framework for a plan, which maps

out different, evolving paths. “Think of it,” he said, “as a path through a

construction site. There are constantly going to be changes, the path

will be moving and changing. But we have to start walking.”

Defining appropriate government and corporate milestones will be key,

and it will be essential that both corporate and government stakeholders

be involved in the process. There will also have to be ground rules. “First

of all, such a plan has to be grounded in the agendas, the objectives

of the United States government and allied governments. Secondly,

such a plan certainly has to be founded on the best available science

and technology. And thirdly, it’s just not going to be effective unless it is

responsive to input that comes from the energy industry.”

“And finally, I think there’s a government opportunity and that opportunity

is to help define clear and common goals for protection, common

across the entire energy industry and energy spectrum. But doing it in

such a way that the regulatory and legislative process is transparent and

reflects industry initiative.”

Avi Schnurr ended his remarks by summarizing some of key elements

of the draft roadmap. Any successful process, he said, will need to be

based on well-defined benchmarks, with detailed, interactive milestones.

It will need to include a toolbox with a full set of tools: automated

protection, optimized procedures, spares and recovery planning will

all play a role. It will need to have international applicability, and work

toward clear objectives. “The required end state that’s recommended

here,” he said, “is an electric grid which is highly resilient to severe space

weather and EMP.”

Concluding, he called for maintaining the momentum and the focus that

will be needed to resolve these risks. “I think it will happen,” he said, “if

all of us here today can maintain that focus and keep in mind the critical

goal:

“We must secure our critical infrastructures.”

“Think of it [the International Infrastructure Security Roadmap] as a path through a construction site. There are constantly going to be changes, the path will be moving and changing. But we have to start walking.”

Avi Schnurr, EIS Summit Coordinator

3232

EISS RoundtableApril 12, 2011

The Capitol Building,

United States Congress

3333

On the 2nd day of the summit, a special industry / government roundtable took

place in the U.S. Capitol Building.

A review of the natural and malicious electromagnetic threat summary was provided by

Commissioner Robert Hermann and John Kappenman, followed by a reprise of government

perspectives by Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and Congressman Trent Franks, FERC

Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur and FERC Office of Electric Reliability Director Joe McClelland,

Patrick Wilging from DOE, Miles Keogh, NARUC Director of Grants and Research and

Southern Carolina Public Service Commissioner Elizabeth (Liz) Fleming, with Michael Rutter

representing the United Kingdom’s Department of Energy and Climate Change as Head of

Energy Resilience.

The government speakers used the opportunity to go into more detail on their perspectives

on the issues, and to provide more time for interaction.

Congressman Franks, setting the tone, said that “in all of human history, the story is that

a few people sometimes get together and make all the difference.” Referring to his work

on the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, he said, “I get to hear a lot

of scary stuff,” with regular briefings on global security risks. “But this,” he said, “is the one

that frightens me the most.” He also spoke of the Shield Act, as one possible option for

legislative leadership to address this issue.

Chris Beck, Chief Science Adviser for the House Homeland Security Committee, talked

about the legislative status, and also focused on the importance of taking even tentative,

initial steps toward mitigating these problems. “If we have a complete blackout, if everything

goes down and we really do need to black start the United States, that’s really bad. But if

there’s a core, if there are some key components that are still operating somewhere, then a

bootstrapping process is possible.”

“That changes the game,” he said.

FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur spoke about the need to begin taking practical

steps to resolving these risks. “[From] everything I’ve read, everything I’ve heard this

isn’t witchcraft. There are only a few kinds of simple solution sets that we can look to, to

help prepare for any of these threats.”

From Left: Rep. Trent Franks, Chris Beck

34

What is FERC’s role? “What FERC can do is first of all help get this paid for,” she said.

“Secondly is the more direct responsibility for the reliability standards.” Also, she added,

“under our existing authority, as Section 215, we’ve got plenty of

authority to get started on this.”

What should be done? The Commissioner argued for getting started

on practical steps. “There can be infinite reason[s] to always have

one more piece of data. At some point we have to say we’re going

to start.”

“This,” she said, “is the time, time to start.”

Joe McClelland began his remarks with a global, historic

perspective. “Whether from manmade or from natural causes, this

is going to happen. It is inevitable. It will be big. And if it is big … the

consequences would be devastating to any civilization that endures

the event but hasn’t prepared. History will judge us for how we proceed from here.”

Joe McClelland spoke in some detail about the grid’s evolution toward greater vulnerability,

such as the move away from EMP-protected electromechanical relays to today’s sensitive

digital relays, and the coming Smart Grid changes.

He concluded by concurring with Commissioner LaFleur’s assessment about the balance

between study and action. “I will echo Commissioner LeFleur’s comments that the time for

research is ending. I think we have very good convergence on the conclusions of the study.

Now it’s a matter of implementation.”

Speaking for the Department of Energy, Patrick Wilging also called for moving

forward. DOE’s focus, he said, can be summarized as four areas that will need to move

forward: Hazard mitigation, alerts and warnings, awareness and education, and testing

and evaluation.

Commissioner Elizabeth (“Liz”) Fleming expressed her appreciation for the

increasing attention and visibility being paid to this critical issue. “All of this is really

bringing attention to this issue for state commissioners,” she said. Referring to her role as

Chair of NARUC’s Critical Infrastructure Committee, the commissioner spoke of a number

of traditional vulnerabilities the committee reviews. “Now,” she said, “we’re looking at these

electromagnetic impulses that could really do harm to our grids.”

“There can be infinite reason[s] to always have one more piece of data. At some point we have to say we’re going to start.”

“This is the time, time to start.”

FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur

From Left: Patrick Wilging with Rep. Trent Franks, Commissioner Elizabeth Fleming, Deligates, Miles Keogh, Michael Rutter

35

One of the key issues, the Commissioner pointed out, is a history of poor communication

of this issue. “Most people in that group [the Critical Infrastructure Committee] who actually

are dealing with utilities on a day-to-day basis, this was all new information to them. And so

it is something that we really need to get out there and get the message out.”

What do the state regulatory commissions need? “What we need as regulators to help move

this forward is a realistic risk picture. We need to have the facts. We need to understand the

issue so that we can address it in a credible manner. We also need to have best practices

for the utilities so that we know when they come before us what questions we need to

be asking to make sure that what’s necessary is being done. And we need to have best

practices for us as regulators. Are we doing what all that needs to be done, make sure that

the right things are being accomplished?”

Miles Keogh echoed Commissioner Fleming’s comments on the importance of the

State Regulatory Commissions. “Understanding the issue for commissions is going to

be the key to being effective at making prudent decisions,” he said.

He also focused on priorities recommended by Joe McClelland as

particularly important. “Those three points of Joe’s were exactly right

on. Tier and prioritize, define the right actions, and then develop the

right kinds of cost recovery structures.”

Above all, he said, communication will be key. “We need to talk to

each other about what our best practices are, what works.”

Michael Rutter began by summarizing proactive policy decisions

that have recently been made by the government of the United

Kingdom. “In October last year, the U.K. government published its

National Security Strategy.” Quoting historic American writer Wendell

Phillips, he said, “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” This

awareness is the foundation of the National Security Strategy, and

the new document “identifies the risk of a complete shutdown of the

electricity network as something that we should be concerned about.

And it explicitly recognizes the related risks from severe space weather.”

“There’s a lot of work in progress in the U.K. to assess this risk and

understand what it means to power grids and other technologies.”

Michael Rutter also recalled significant problems that have already occurred from moderate

geomagnetic storms. “In 1989, significant GIC effects were experienced in the U.K. including

“[The United Kingdom’s new National Security Strategy] identifies the risk of a complete shutdown of the electricity network as something that we should be concerned about. And it explicitly recognizes the related risks from severe space weather.”

Michael Rutter, Head of Energy Resilience, U.K. Dept. of Energy and Climate Change

36

sudden voltage reductions, overload, changes in power flows, and standby generator

stops. Transformers on the electricity transmission system suffered internal damage. Two

transformers were damaged.”

“Increasingly,” he explained, “there is concern that periods of extreme space weather albeit

not experienced in recent decades could pose a potentially serious risk to electricity assets

and networks. And over the past few years, we are aware that it appears that the Sun is

undergoing a change of state and that future space weather conditions could be different to

those experienced over the past 50 years. We also need to take that into account.”

Finally, Michael Rutter went over a number of steps the government of the United Kingdom

is taking to address these issues. Summarizing, he said: “So we do have a milestone

driven plan that sets out what we will do to address the impact of severe space weather.

This involves government working closely with industry and with economic regulators within

the existing policy and regulatory framework to understand the risks and what needs to be

done to mitigate them.

“We’re not complacent,” he concluded. “We’re taking this forward quickly.”

A special session at the Roundtable called for industry perspectives. Gerry Cauley,

President and CEO of the North American Electric Reliability

Corporation (NERC), was the first speaker.

NERC, he said, began looking at severe space weather issues in

2010. “The potential impacts on reliability of the power system

from a severe geomagnetic event were identified in a NERC report,

High Impact Low Frequency Report that we published jointly with

the Department of Energy in June of 2010.”

Although the 2010 report addresses both severe space weather

and EMP, currently NERC has no plans to address EMP. “We’ve

chosen to focus on geomagnetic disturbances more so than EMP

at this time because the GMD risks are better understood and

preventing EMP attacks in the homeland is at this time presumed

to be a responsibility of the government, not to say that that won’t

change over time as we get clarity on information. But right now

we think there’s the greatest benefit by focusing on the known quantity of solar magnetic

disturbances and we believe that there will be inherent benefits in hardening and being

prepared for solar magnetic disturbances to EMP events as well.”

“From a power system perspective, the most well-known geomagnetic disturbance in North America occurred on March 13th and 14th, 1989. Among other impacts, the storm led to the collapse of the grid in Hydro Quebec.”

Gerry Cauley, NERC President and CEO

From Left: Michael Rutter with Rep. Trent Franks, Gerry Cauley, Deligates

37

Gerry Cauley provided a perspective on the 1989 Geomagnetic Disturbance [GMD]. “From

a power system perspective, the most well-known geomagnetic disturbance in North

America occurred on March 13th and 14th, 1989. Among other impacts, the storm led to

the collapse of the grid in Hydro Quebec, in the early morning hours of March 13th, 1989.”

“The Earth’s magnetic field experienced a large impulse along the U.S./Canadian border,

and started a chain of events that only 92 seconds later resulted in the collapse of the

Quebec power system.” Given the speed of the GMD, there was little time for human

intervention. “The rapid manifestation of the storm and impacts

to the Quebec grid did not allow operators sufficient time to fully

assess the situation or provide any meaningful response.”

Although the grid was able to restart, he said, “there were two

large step-up transformers that were damaged due to over-voltage

conditions.” In addition, “there was also as we know, damage

to equipment at a nuclear plant in New Jersey as a result of this

event.”

“This storm proved,” he said, “that individual transformers can be

damaged from overheating, which results -- which can result in

long-term outages of key transformers in the network.”

What needs to be done? “While the electric sector made important

improvements after the March ’89 storm, more work is needed to evaluate new protections

and reliability considerations associated with future storms.”

“The one thing I think that’s new and challenging with these three risks,” he explained, “the

physical and cybersecurity and the geomagnetic, is the widespread nature of the potential

impacts. Normally impacts of the risk we face are either local or regional in impact.”

Gerry Cauley told the delegates that NERC has established a Geomagnetic Disturbance

Taskforce, “charged with analyzing the impact upon the bulk power system from a severe

geomagnetic disturbance and identifying mitigating actions that users, owners, and

operators can take to ensure the reliability of the grid.”

What is NERC’s vision? “For the long-term planning, we’re recommending improved

modeling capabilities for static and dynamic simulations; review of relaying such as negative

sequence current setting on transformers; assessing the inventory of vulnerable equipment

both in operation and as spares; and system design improvements such as adding

monitoring equipment and blocking resistors on transformers. These mitigating actions,” he

“This storm proved that individual transformers can be damaged from overheating, which results -- which can result in long-term outages of key transformers in the network.”

Gerry Cauley, NERC President and CEO

From Left: Rep. Yvette Clarke, John Houston with Rep. Trent Franks, Deligates, Mike Heyeck

38

said, “will not eliminate the risk from a large solar storm but will place the system in a more

protected posture.”

“My deepest concern as CEO of NERC,” he concluded, “whether an event is caused by a

solar storm or physical or cyber attack, is the situation in which there is widespread damage

to equipment with long recovery times.”

Echoing many other presenters, Gerry Cauley called for a collaborative process. “We need

government and industry to work together to resolve the basic policy question regarding

what level of equipment reserves are sufficient to meet the expectations for national security

and the wellbeing of our citizens. And how are these equipment reserves to be funded?”

Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, welcoming the delegates to Capitol Hill, went on

to comment briefly on Gerry Cauley’s presentation. “It gives me a bit more comfort to

know that we are being forward leaning when it comes to geomagnetic force and to EMP

because certainly in yesterday’s session, we learned of the value of doing so.”

And it is important, she continued, to find the answer to some of the questions Mr. Cauley

raised. “Where will we find the funding in a time of fiscal austerity to do what we know is

important for something that is imminent? And how much risk are we willing to maintain in

order to avoid applying that financial support that we need to make sure that we can be as

resilient and as prepared as possible?”

John Houston, Vice President of CenterPoint Energy, said that CenterPoint has

already taken significant steps to review their vulnerability, and look at protection

measures for both EMP and Severe Space Weather. “We didn’t study every substation,”

he said, “but we chose to study our control center and seven types of substations which we

own, and to study each and every one of our extra high voltage transformers.” The results,

he said, were mixed – and they now have a better defined understanding of where protective

measures will be needed.

John Houston called for additional testing data on hardware protective measures like current

blockers. “I don’t think we’re waiting for the perfect but I do think we’re waiting for the

proven. And to that end, we don’t have the ability to test these devices unless I choose to

install one and go ahead and lose my transformer.”

He also suggested new approaches are needed to allow users to better interpret space

weather warnings. What is needed, he said, are well-defined approaches “so that when

a [space weather] warning is coming forth it’s not a warning that something bad’s about

39

to happen, it’s a warning that says we’re expecting a storm of the level of 1989 or we’re

expecting one of the level halfway to 1921.”

John Houston also suggested that, while the electric energy sector is a critical, vulnerable

infrastructure, interactions with other infrastructures show that “we have a lot more work

to do than the electric industry.” For example, “Houston,” he said,

“produces 45% of the gasoline used in the United States. [In the

blackout in Houston from Hurricane Ike] we were getting calls from

the White House and from the DOE with regard to gasoline refineries

that needed to be brought back with the power, and in addition, …

the largest pipelines in the world that provide gasoline all the way

to New York originate in Houston, Texas, and the first two pumping

facilities are electric driven. Talk about interdependencies.” A long

term blackout in Houston alone, he explained, could mean “the east

coast could run out of gasoline in … five days.”

In another example of interdependency, Houston’s refineries – which

use large quantities of water – were also shut down due to power loss

at the regional water supply facility, prompting emergency measures.

Entergy, the company providing power to the water facility, “had

gone completely black, so they had not only no distribution but no

transmission, similar how they’d be in an EMP.”

“I’m suggesting there’s interdependencies that we’re needing to think

about and need that leadership, I think, from the folks here in Congress and possibly from

the Executive Branch of the government, to assist in that thinking through the process.”

Summing up, John Houston spoke positively about the energy industry’s resilience. But

for EMP and Severe Space Weather, he said, “I don’t think we have the solutions. I think

what we need is further support from the experts, from the Departments of Energy, from the

regulators at FERC and from NERC. I think we can work this together and resolve these

problems.”

Speaking next was Mike Heyeck, Senior Vice President of American Electric Power

(AEP). “I agree 100% with what John Houston said, that industry is willing to do this,” he

began. “It’s really a solvable problem.”

“We are the largest transmission owner in the United States,” he continued, and pointed out

that “AEP does own the highest voltage network in the country at 765 kV.” While most of

In regard to the Hurricane Ike blackout of Houston: “The largest pipelines in the world that provide gasoline all the way to New York originate in Houston, Texas, and the first two pumping facilities are electric driven. Talk about interdependencies ...”

John Houston, Vice President, CenterPoint Electric

40

From Left: Ian Gladng, Rep. Yvette Clarke with Chris Train

these transformers are nearing 40 years old, and will be replaced soon, “we do need more

standards on the transformers,” he said, suggesting modeling help would be useful to help

define some of the specifications that will be needed.

Mike Heyeck also suggested stakeholders try to ensure grid changes for EMP or Space

Weather protection will also provide other, synergistic benefits.

“What we do with protection systems will serve the reliability of the

grid, every day, every moment of every day, so it doesn’t have to

be just for the EMP event,” he said.

He also asserted that, if handled properly, the cost of these

changes should not be an issue. “If we invest 10 billion dollars

in the United States today, and you socialize that across every

meter, that’s only a postage stamp to an average customer per

month. So it is a solvable problem. And it is not a funding issue.

It’s really a time issue.” For example, in replacing high voltage

transformers, “it takes about a year to get an outage -- to get a

transformer out to replace it,” he explained.

However timing can, he pointed out, be made to work in our

favor. “About one-third of the grid is at or near life. As we replace these assets, why don’t

we replace them with capabilities that would withstand these events? And as the water

treatment plant replaces its motor controls, the same thing. So we’ve got to make sure that

if the grid’s sustainable, that those that plug into the grid are also sustainable.”

What will all of this mean for the future? “Given all the constraints we have with respect to

GMDs and EMPs, the EPA proposals and things like that, trying to figure our future out is

going to be very much harder now than it was five years ago.”

The final two industry representatives were both from the United Kingdom.

Chris Train, Director of Network Operations for the National Grid in the U.K.,

explained that the situation in the U.K. is somewhat different. As a result of damaged

transformers in the 1989 geomagnetic storm, some hardware and procedural changes

were made, including new GIC specs on transformers acquired after that event. In terms

of procedural changes, “operating strategy becomes absolutely crucial.” “We have a

document that sits within the control room environment so we know what we’re going to

do. People have tested on that.” Space weather warning information “has still got a fair

way to go,” he said, “but it is considerably better than it used to be.” How could it improve?

“We want accurate and reliable predictions of Sun spots, particularly times of arrival,” he

explained.

“If we invest $10 billion in the United States today, and you socialize that across every meter, that’s only a postage stamp to an average customer per month. So it is a solvable problem.

Mike Heyeck, Executive Vice President, AEP

41

Today, he told the delegates, following the first EIS Summit in London in 2010, work has

begun looking at vulnerability to a much more severe GMD than the 1989 storm.

In this process, National Grid, he explained, works closely with the Department of Energy and

Climate Change. “Working with our regulators, Michael who represents the Departments

of Energy is quite crucial to us in terms of understanding that risk and developing the policy

around that. But … once we get to a point of understanding whether there are any physical

mitigations that we need to put in place, we will work with our economic regulator.”

One key issue, he pointed out, is building motivation that these issues must be dealt with.

“The problem with high impact events,” he said, “is that people aren’t interested in it until it

has happened. Therefore we as the industry need a way of assessing that, without creating

the alarm but getting that right level of prioritization of the actions.”

Ironically, Chris Train pointed out, older technology hardware that has remained in the U.K.

grid may also be helpful, such as electromechanical relays that were replaced, in the U.S.,

by much more EMP sensitive digital relays.

Ian Glading, Global Continuity, CIO, IBM Corporation, was the last industry speaker.

“IBM’s interest in this topic is because obviously we have very, very large and complex IT

systems, he explained, “running around an infrastructure not only in the U.S. but globally.”

My function within IBM is working within the CIO division on IT risk management. I’m

responsible for IT resiliency and continuity policy globally for IBM and compliance deviation

sign off.”

Regarding EMP and Severe Space Weather, “IBM is recognizing this [electromagnetic risk]

is a valid fact.” In particular, he explained, IBM has begun to realize that EMP and Severe

Space Weather can be a serious concern for a global company. “We realized that it’s got

very, very serious implications and it goes on beyond normal disaster planning and continuity

planning, because in this particular case the difference in the footprint is so much, much

bigger.”

“Whether it’s an EMP event occupying a large regional area,” or, similarly, with a severe GMD

event, IBM’s global distribution of IT assets means the company would be affected. In fact,

based on projected EMP and space weather footprints, IBM is already

beginning to reexamine their geographic planning for data and service

“failover” backup planning.

Among the many issues IBM is now looking at to address these

risks, the human component is crucial. As another example,

“telecommunications ability post-event: What’s actually going to be

available for people to use and communicate about the event?”

In summary, “we definitely believe this is a global problem,” he said. “It

affects global enterprises and organizations like IBM. We are taking

this very, very seriously.”

“Going forward from now on, we’re taking this on board as a credible

threat,” he concluded. “An example of that is that we will be using geomagnetic storm as

part of a scenario tool kit for a very large scale disaster recovery exercise that IBM’s going to

do next year with some of its internal IT.”

“We definitely believe this is a global problem. It affects global enterprises and organizations like IBM. We are taking this very, very seriously.”

Ian Glading, Global Continuity, CIO, IBM Corporation.

42

General Discussion, and Closing CommentsAt the end of the summit, there was an opportunity for general discussion. Reviewing the

day and a half of meetings, there were a number of important comments.

Congresswoman Clarke said she now realizes that “the infrastructure I’ve been taking for

granted for so long was built by a generation that preceded me, and its shelf life is basically

expired.”

Along with others, she tried also to focus on what the next steps should entail. We need

to bring all available talent to identify the key interdependencies, she said. And not just

local talent. “We’re talking a global phenomenon, and so the conversation cannot just be

continental U.S.A.”

The important question that must now be asked, she said, is “How do we get those

conversations going in those regions of the world?” The key danger is that we might fail to

increasingly talk and think about addressing this problem. “It’s the one thing that we don’t

think of that becomes our ultimate vulnerability,” she concluded.

Michael Rutter also took the opportunity to sum up where we are, and where we need to

go.

We are starting with a key asset, he pointed out: “a shared commitment amongst policy

makers, amongst regulators, and amongst industry to understand this problem and do

something about it.”

In terms of what needs to be done – he pointed to two areas: “the need for better and earlier

forecasting of severe weather, severe space weather events,” and the need to characterize

interdependencies between critical national infrastructure sectors. “I don’t think we should

be under any illusions about how difficult these sorts of issues are to address, both within

government and I think across sectors. It’s certainly something the U.K. government has

really just started to try to get its head around. It’s not easy but it really is important and we

need to think very seriously about that.”

Finally, he said, “one of the critical matters is the resilience of transformers on the system.”

We need to understand what the risk is at events worse than 1989, and what the solutions

are.”

Avi Schnurr, commenting on preparations for the 2012 summit, asked that industry

executives begin thinking through what they will need to take concrete steps toward

protection of their infrastructure. More generally, in line with several of the earlier speakers,

he recommended delegates begin thinking through interdependencies – what standards

need to be met by infrastructure components that plug into the grid?

Commissioner LaFleur used her wrap-up comments to suggest stakeholders look at EISS

London 2012 as a milestone to review concrete accomplishments. “This has been a great

couple of days,” she said, “and I think I agree with almost all the suggestions we’ve heard:

the better forecasting, certainly the figuring out how to spec new transformers. We’ve seen

a tremendous investment in the grid right now, so we have an opportunity to at least start

building the future grid in a better way.”

“I had two suggestions for the future,” she said. “One is I’d like to suggest that when we get

together in London in March, everybody come prepared to talk about what they’ve done.”

The Commissioner also called for greater participation by some of the other countries in

attendance.

Congressman Trent Franks, closing the summit, urged delegates to work toward a

comprehensive goal, hardening the electric grid against the full set of electromagnetic

threats: EMP, GMD and tactical EMP. “I’m certainly hoping that whatever we decide to do

in terms of hardening, that we put aside any political differences.”

“Whether it gets knocked out by nuclear blast or an intentional electromagnetic interference

or GIC, it doesn’t matter,” he said.

“It still goes out.”

C O U N C I LIS

EIS Summit (EISS) is hosted as a government / NGO partnership. EISS Sponsors:

www.eiscouncil.org www.henryjacksonsociety.org

EISS U M M I T

The Electric Infrastructure Security Summit process is a first step in defining a new international security framework for coordination and cooperation in protecting our vital national electric infrastructures.

The 2nd EIS Summit took place April 11-12, 2011

in the Capitol Building, U.S. Congress, and the

Fairmont, Washington D.C.

For information, visit www.eissummit.com or write to info@eissummit.com