EI Iraq Analysis - A Security Summary and Political Forecast v0.4

8/12/2019 EI Iraq Analysis - A Security Summary and Political Forecast v0.4

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IRAQ ANALYSIS:

A SECURITY SUMMARY AND

POLITICAL FORECAST



2PREFACE

The parliamentary elecons scheduled in April 2014 will dene Iraq’s polical and security landscape

for the next four years. Aer months of heightened sectarian tensions, reected in increased levels of

violence, polical change has indeed become a necessity. While the appointment of new legislave and

execuve bodies will undoubtedly have an eect on Iraq’s security outlook, they are unlikely to lead to

immediate improvements. A change of leadership will not suppress the dicules of the environment,

and the new government will be forced to operate within the same limitaons. The current administra-

on, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has largely avoided tackling the root causes of violence, insteadfocusing on counter-insurgency operaons. Whilst elecons have the potenal to disturb the status quo,

intractable challenges will most certainly connue to drive polical choices. Connuity, rather than serious

reforms, remains the most likely outcome.



3IRAQ’S SECURITY LANDSCAPE

Aer months of protests againstthe perceived polical exclusion

of Sunnis by Iraq’s Shia-dominat-

ed government, violence esca-

lated following an army raid on

a Sunni Arab an-government

protest camp in April 2013. Inci-

dents have reached their highest

levels since 2008, with central

and northern Sunni regions

plagued with daily bombings andsectarian aacks.

Baghdad and Nineveh gover-

norates are parcularly prone

to violent and deadly incidents,

followed by Salahuddin, Anbar

and Kirkuk. These heightened

tensions were reected in the

polical sphere, with cross-sec-

tarian plaorms losing credibility

in the latest provincial elec-

ons which took place in April

2013. The secular Iraqiyya list

coalion, originally made up of

several Sunni and Shia pares,

disintegrated before the elec-

ons, with constuent pares

running separately and achieving

low scores.

Throughout 2013, Iraq was alsovulnerable to foreign penetra-

on, with the events in Syria em-

boldening Sunni insurgents and

encouraging some Shia retalia-

tory acons, with the suspected

backing of Iran. Iraq has seem-

ingly entered a cycle of violence,

with exclusionary polics fuel-

ling extremism. In turn, sectarian

conict has increasingly prompt-ed Iraqis to turn to sectarian

pares, which is only going to

exacerbate social fragmentaon

and violence. Maliki’s leadership

has resulted in growing polarisa-

on, and subsequent increased

levels of violence.

The geography of violence is

congruent with demographicrealies, with Sunni-dominated

provinces witnessing most at-

tacks against state assets. While

Shia-dominated governorates

are substanally more peaceful,

with the excepon of Baghdad,

they also witness regular mili-

tant penetraon as insurgents

seek to demonstrate their capa-

bilies.

High levels of violence essen-

ally result from a combinaon

of deep-rooted grievances and

polical inacon. Whilst these

elements explain the seeds of

instability, foreign inuence, lack

of state control and ISF capa-

bility provide the opportunity

structure for militant acvity.

Number of violent incidents by province in 2013 Source: EI Data



4GRIEVANCES AND THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE

Despite being a polical majority

under previous regimes, Sunnis

are a demographic minority in

Iraq, represenng about 20% of

the overall populaon. The Iraqi

Sunni identy had tradionally

been associated with power,

through centuries of Sunni Ot-

toman control. Power connued

to be concentrated in the hands

of Sunnis under Saddam Hus-

sein, himself a Sunni Arab from

Tikrit, north of Baghdad. In a

country divided along sectarian

lines, democrasaon therefore

meant that Sunni Iraqis had to

surrender their authority to the

Shia majority. This sudden shi,perceived as an aack against

their very identy, automacal-

ly engendered grievances and

violence, exacerbated by the

interference of regional powers

vying for inuence in Iraq.

Addional layers fragment the

situaon further, with a Kurd-

ish-Arab divide and a collecon

of groups ranging from mod-

erates to radical religious en-

es. Whilst all Sunnis agree on

the nature of their grievances,

essenally a lack of polical

representaon and subsequent

socioeconomic disadvantage,

they arculate a dierent agen-

da as to the means to solve

them. A radical fringe launches

suicide aacks against govern-ment and civilian targets, while

others are merely sympathec

to extremist acons, seeing that

destabilising the government

is the only means to achieve

meaningful polical concessions.

More moderate groups connue

to oppose violence and convey

their grievances through ballot

boxes and peaceful protests

organised in the main cies. TheSunni insurgency, mainly orches-

trated by groups aliated with

AQI, has engendered a cycle of

violence which could only be

broken should the regime imple-

ment meaningful reforms.

The next parliamentary elec-

ons scheduled in April 2014

will decide on Iraq’s next PrimeMinister and will be determinant

for the post-elecon course of

events.

Iraq casualty gures by month Source: UNAMI



5IRAQ’S STAGNANT POLITICAL SYSTEM

Sunni grievances are exacerbat-ed by a paralysed and structural-

ly-awed polical system, which

favours stagnaon over reforms

tackling the polical roots of

insecurity.

In the Iraqi electoral system,

each province elects a propor-

onal number of representa-

ves, who will then sit in theCouncil of Representaves, Iraq’s

Naonal Assembly. Due to the

extensive number of polical

pares in Iraq, party leaders

typically form coalions in order

to gain seats in the parliament.

Elecons lead to intra-elite

negoaons to select candidates

to the presidenal oce, includ-

ing members of the Presidency

Council. Appointments have to

be conrmed by at least two-

thirds of the Naonal Assembly.

The Presidency Council, includ-

ing the President, will then be in

charge of designang the Prime

Minister, which also has to be

approved by at least two-thirds

of the parliament. Since the

2005 Constuon, most execu-

ve powers are concentrated inthe hands of the Prime Minister,

which poses two main issues,

both connected to the nature of

the electoral process.

BUILTIN FLAWS

The power conferred to the

posion and the fragmentaon

of the parliament along hardlyreconcilable lines means that

members of parliament are likely

to need weeks of negoaons

before agreeing on a name,

unless a large coalion forms.

The current trajectory is towards

disintegraon rather than uni-

caon, with exisng coalions

likely to splinter in the lead-up to

the elecon date. As the processof agreeing on a candidate drags

on, the legimacy of the Prime

Minister will undoubtedly suer

and this will impact on the de-

cision-making capacies of the

new government.

Legimacy is also hindered

by the vong system itself, an

indirect surage which thereforelimits the representaveness

of the government. To a certain

extent, every government will be

illegimate and their ability to

enforce legislaon will be con-

strained.

Lacking legimacy, elites will

increasingly seek to compensate

with populist measures havinglile eect on Iraq’s long-term

outlook, and rhetoric aimed at

manipulang foreign threats

(such as the interference of the

United States in the country’s

aairs) to gather support around

their leadership.

Iraq’s major sectarian and ethnic divide



6MAIN POLITICAL FORCES

The polical landscape is splitbetween three main Shia forces,

which will most likely arbitrate

the elecons.

• The State of Law bloc, made

up of Maliki’s Dawa party and

other Shia pares.

• The Sadrist movement, headed

by Muqtada al-Sadr.

• The Islamic Supreme Council

of Iraq, headed by Ammar al-

Hakim.

The Iraqiyya bloc which garnered

most support in the previous

elecons, has since fragmented

and the number of pares run-

ning under the coalion’s um-

brella is uncertain. The fact that

the coalion could not agree

on a government aer the 2010

elecons also backs the view

that Iraqiyya forms a strategic al-

liance rather than an ideological

one, and their secular rhetoric

appears only aimed at draw-

ing votes from both Sunni and

Shia constuencies. A credible

cross-sectarian alternave has

yet to emerge, and increased

polarisaon in society is likely to

be reected in the system.

Both Sadr and Hakim have ruled

out the prospect of entering an

alliance with Maliki’s bloc, and

they have been very vocal in crit-

icising the government’s policies

towards the insurgency and the

economy. Depending on elecon

results, a coalion could form

between Sadr and Hakim in or-der to counter Maliki, although

both pares arculate dierent

ideologies.

Final results will also depend on

each bloc’s ability to co-opt Sun-

ni pares. While the largest of

them (Iraqi Islamic Party) is part

of the State of Law coalion, dis-

content with the regime and the

more appealing stance of Sadrtowards Sunnis could prompt a

shi of alliances.

EXTERNAL ACTORS

Forming a Shia axis in the Mid-

dle East together with Syria and

Iran, Iraq has been naturally

vulnerable to events unfolding

in both countries. The conictin Syria has emboldened Sunni

insurgents, whilst Iran has argu-

ably lled the polical vacuum

le by the U.S. in order to ex-

pand its inuence in the region.

Tehran has notably inuenced

the negoaons assuring Ma-

liki of a second term in oce.

Washington’s interference is

ed to energy security and ithas been relavely absent from

Iraqi polics since their troop

withdrawal in 2011. The regional

power struggle waged between

Saudi Arabia and Sunni powers

with Iran is another key element

fuelling the insurgency in Iraq.



7VIOLENCE THREATENS THE 2014 ELECTIONS

While domesc polics remainsuncertain, any government will

have to contend with transna-

onal forces which will undoubt-

edly connue to aect Iraq’s sta-

bility and security environment.

The conict in Syria is unlikely to

reach an end and will therefore

remain an important factor in

the escalaon of violence in the

country. Potenal Shia retali-aon to the Sunni insurgency

will mostly depend on Iran. As

Rouhani’s policies are currently

focused on alleviang interna-

onal sancons, interference in

Iraqi aairs could be viewed as a

sign of non-compliance with in-

ternaonal norms. However, the

recent visit of Maliki to Tehran

illustrates the connuing author-

ity that Iran has amongst Iraqi

Shias. Isolated in the region,

Iran will most certainly insist on

exerng its inuence, especially

as Syria is arguably disintegrat-

ing. Whilst the regional environ-

ment undoubtedly impacts on

Iraq’s security situaon, external

powers are merely lling a vac-

uum and the seeds of instability

remain located within the Iraqisociety.

PREELECTION VIOLENCE

Pre-elecon violence is likely to

see an increase as crucial re-

forms will not be implemented

in the coming months. Sunni

milias will seek to undermine

the current government throughaacks involving assassinaons

and bombings against civilians,

infrastructure and ISF elements.

This violence will likely manifestfrom various insurgent groups

including the Islamic State of

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the

neo-Baathist JRTN movement,

and other autonomous Sunni

milias. Whilst Shia elements

will remain the focus of insur-

gents, moderate Sunnis accept-

ing the government will also

certainly be targeted throughassassinaons of local leaders or

inuenal gures. In the lead-up

to the elecons, incident levels

and intra-Sunni violence are

therefore expected to peak in all

Sunni-dominated provinces.

As Shia facons compete for

power, Shia armed groups

aliated with polical pares

could seek to undermine each

other through aacks against

their polical opponents. As

tensions rise in the polical

sphere, intra-Shia violence is

therefore expected to increase

and could manifest in incidents

against rival party members or

local policians in the southern

Shia-dominated provinces.

Sunni militant aacks could also

trigger the mobilisaon of Shia

milias and retaliatory acons

against Sunni targets, especially

as Iran’s involvement grows.

One of the most probable

scenarios in the lead-up to the

elecons has manifested in the

recent and ongoing unrest inAnbar, sparked by the break-up

of a Sunni protest camp by the

Iraqi army in December 2013.

In a bid to garner Shia support,

the government may indeed

crack down on Sunni protests to

appear to eciently tackle the

insurgency. This was especial-

ly true in Anbar as the protest

camp dismantled by the ISF had

been termed a “headquarters

for al-Qaeda” by Maliki. This

tacc is counter-producve and

fuels the cycle of violence with

an escalaon and radicalisaon

of protests, ulmately increasing

incident levels.

Whilst these clashes are indica-

ve of the government’s strate-

gy, they also highlight the dan-

gerous game Maliki seems to be

playing to consolidate his power

base. Although the polical will

to defeat ISIL is present, the

security forces lack the capacity

to eecvely control Iraq’s enre

territory.

2010 Parliamentary Elecon results by

main alliances



8POSTELECTION SCENARIOS

In light of the structure of the

polical system and current

violence levels, four dierent

scenarios are likely to emerge.

As already occurred in 2013 for

the provincial elecons, votes

could be delayed in several gov-

ernorates due to high levels of

violence. Although delays seem

an increasing possibility, security

measures will be considerably

heightened due to the impor-

tance of the elecons.

If elecons do take place, the

three most likely outcomes are

as follows:

Maliki is re-elected: Whilst Ma-

liki ocially denies he intends

to run for a third term, severalsigns point to the likelihood of

this possibility, including his

recent trip to Tehran. Although

cricism has been voiced from

his own coalion, no other

gure has emerged from the

Dawa party to challenge Maliki’s

leadership, and the State of Law

coalion will probably have to

back Maliki to remain in power.

If this scenario materialises, it

would arguably be the worst of

all possible polical outcomes,

as Sunni violence would inevi-

tably increase and disappointed

Shia facons would hardly toler-

ate Maliki’s grip on power for a

third term.

Another Shia coalion forms

the government and elects a

Shia representave ed to a Shia

power base. No maer which

coalion emerges, it will be ed

to its Shia constuencies and

bold policies are therefore un-

likely, especially with violence at

such high levels diminishing the

appete for polical concessions

to the Sunnis.

A cross-sectarian plaorm is

elected. Though it is by far theleast probable of all outcomes,

such a result could allow for im-

portant legislaon to be consid-

ered. Even if the polical will ex-

ists, opposion pares will likely

oppose important reforms which

are suscepble to be rejected by

the Shia majority. These reforms

would only be accepted if a

change in society occurs, and across-sectarian party in power

could at least be benecial in

that it could orient Iraq towards

reconciliaon rather than fur-

ther divisions.

Even if this opmisc scenario

unfolds, me will be needed for

reforms to impact on levels of vi-

olence, and even a government

elected on such an ambious

agenda will be tempted to fall

into populist pialls if security

deteriorates.

Most probable scenarios will

either result in connuity or a

deterioraon of the security

environment. Given the weak-

ness of naonal unity, Iraqis will

connue to vote along sectarian

lines. Furthermore, increased

violence against Shias will give

addional incenves for themto elect Shia representaves,

while Sunni frustraons will

foster a parallel approach to

the elecons. The fact that the

polical system is designed aer

sectarian fragmentaon rather

than naonal unity, with pares

dening themselves according to

their religious belonging, further

enhances the likelihood of aclear-cut distribuon of seats in

favour of Shia representaves.



9

The conguraon having the

most negave impact on the se-

curity situaon would be a repe-

on of the previous elecons –

an event tainted with allegaons

of fraud and long negoaonsresulng in a polical status quo,

with the appointment of leaders

similar to the ones currently in

power. This would be especially

true if Maliki were to be selected

for a third term, as this would

neither sasfy the Sunnis nor

large segments of the Shia pop-

ulaon. Maliki is also perceived

as clinging to power by rivalpolicians, and increasingly seen

as incompetent by a majority of

Iraqis.

In the event a more consensual

leader is elected, the new coali-

on could benet from relavely

high levels of popularity, which

would create momentum for re-

forms and a window of opportu-

nity allowing for cross-sectarian

policies to be enacted. This tra-

jectory has more probability to

materialise if a Shia gure, also

appreciated by an important

proporon of moderate Sunnis,

was chosen. If not seized, this

window would quickly close and

the new leadership will fall into

the same pialls as the Malikiadministraon.

Muqtada al-Sadr may be trying

to ll this gap. Although a prom-

inent Shia religious gure with

es to Iran and remembered

for his acve role in Iraq’s civil

war, he has progressively sof -

tened his stance towards Sunnis,

backing protesters in Anbar and

denouncing the acons of the

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Shia milia the

leadership of which now forms a

rival party. Sadr has emerged as

Maliki’s most serious opponent

and is able to derive cross-sec-

tarian legimacy from his an-

-American stance.



10THE MOST IMPORTANT REFORMS

If the establishment of a

cross-sectarian ruling coalion

with an appete for reform is

a signicant challenge, push-

ing through reforms to address

Iraq’s most entrenched polical

disputes is arguably an even

greater one. While it is acknowl-

edged that the reforms required

to drive real progress towards

stability in Iraq are numerous

and that each one requires con-

dions currently unforeseeable

in the short term, the key sck-

ing points are too linked to the

grievances and hurdles to pro-

gress to not be discussed as part

of Iraq’s future landscape.

Priorising the numerous sig-

nicant reforms required to

ensure an improved level of

polical stability and security is

controversial in itself. Beyond

the re-structuring of the process

by which governments and theiropposions are formed and a

naonal conversaon on how

Iraq’s polical classes will lead a

change in polical culture, there

are a number of issues which

must be considered to a future

unied and stable Iraq.

Condions must be set for

progress along the series of ini-

aves laid out in Iraq’s Cons-

tuonal Arcle 140. Democrat-

ically resolving Kirkuk’s status

alongside the other disputed

territories will be crucial to the

future stability of northern Iraq

and therefore the autonomous

region of Kurdistan. Ethnic, na-

onal and religious dierencesas well as the issue of Kirkuk’s oil

have been used for too long as

excuses to avoid progress.

Ulmately the current stagna-

on surrounding Arcle 140 is

the cause of too much harm for

any serious group to veto mod-

erate progressive reforms which

must build on President Tala-bani’s work prior to his illness.

The passing of the long-awaited

amended oil and gas law which

would establish clear revenue

sharing agreements is also re-

quired to sele disputes cur-

rently caused by the Iraqi con-

stuon and ensure improved

relaons between Kurdistan and

Iraq. It would also increase rev-

enues crucial to Iraq’s economic

development.

Perhaps the most important

reform which must be made in

order for Iraq to progress to-

wards naonal reconciliaon is

the reform to the accountability

and jusce law beer knownas the de-baathicaon law.

The revisions which the cabinet

agreed in April which would

see former-regime ocials able

to serve in government again,

currently represents the best

opportunity for the Iraqi parlia-

ment to come to a cross-sectari-

an agreement and may therefore

set a precedent for cross-sec-tarian polical progress which

in turn might encourage further

progress.



11THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN 2014

Although there is a consensus

on the reforms which need to be

implemented, the opportunity

to impose these changes is more

uncertain and their acceptance

will ulmately depend on social

changes which will make mean-

ingful polical acons legimate.

From this perspecve, the April

2014 elecons are unlikely to

provoke drasc and immedi-

ate changes, but they have the

potenal to either trigger a

deterioraon of the security and

polical environments, or set

Iraq on a more posive but slow

course towards stability.



Author:

Anne-Laure Barbosa

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Tim Jones - Risk and Advisory Commercial Manager

+44 (0)20 7198 8318

[email protected]

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EI Iraq Analysis - A Security Summary and Political Forecast v0.4

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Transcript of EI Iraq Analysis - A Security Summary and Political Forecast v0.4