Efficient Auctions Mech for Mobile Ads

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Mobile Ads

Transcript of Efficient Auctions Mech for Mobile Ads

  • EFFICIENT AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR MOBILE ADS

  • The Mobile Ad. Ecosystem

    Ad Inventory

    Different Auction Mechanisms

    Vickrey Auctions

    First price sealed bid auction

    Key Parameters

    Real Time Bidding

    Challenges

    Agenda

  • Why Mobile Ads?

    Source: http://techcrunch.com/tag/mobile-advertising/

    And

    The whole biz Model is based on auctioningMobile Ad

    space!

  • The Mobile Advertising ecosystem

    AD.

    EXCHANGE

    AD.

    EXCHANGE

    2

    Advertisers

    Apps (Users)Ad Servers

    That track users

    With/Without

    Cookies

    INTERMEDIARIES

    DE

    MA

    ND

    SID

    E

    AD

    ME

    DIA

    TIO

    N P

    LA

    TF

    OR

    MS

    SU

    PP

    LY

    SID

    E

    RTB

    EXCHANGE

    AD.

    EXCHANGE

    1

    AD AGGREGATORS AUCTIONEERS TARGET MARKET

    Ad Networks

    That aggregate

    Demand

  • The Mobile Ad. Inventory

    InterstitialsExtended BannersInteractive BannerFloating Banners

  • Types of Mobile Ad Auctions

    VickreyauctionsPre-awardauctions(PRE)Post-awardauctions(POST)

    Firstpricesealedbidauction(FPSB)RealTimeBidding

    1. Reserve Price2. Reserve Price

    3. Bid prices 4. Bid prices

    Au

    cti

    on

    s

    Ad

    Exchanges/

    Ad Servers

    Ad Networks

    Au

    cti

    on

    s

    Bid

    din

    g

    Buyers

    Bid

    din

    g

    5. Winner awarded6. Winner awarded

    7. Buyer pays 8. Intermediary pays

    Bidding Auctions

    * Direct bidding

    by buyers

  • Key Parameters that influenceClickThe act of clicking on an ad (banner or text link) that has been served to a mobile screen.

    Click-ThroughThe act of clicking on a banner or text link ad, which takes the user through to

    Used as a counterpoint to impressions to judge the response-inducing power of the ad.

    Click-Through-Rate (CTR) or Response rate

    Expressed as a percentage and calculated by taking the number of clickthroughsthe ad received, dividing that number by the number of impressions and multiplying by 100 to obtain a percentage:

    Example: 20 clicks / 1,000 impressions = .02 x 100 = 2% CTR.

    .

  • Key Parameters that influence

    CPM (Cost Per Mille, Cost Per Thousand)

    The price paid by an advertiser for a site displaying their ad 1,000 times.

    Cost per Click (CPC) The price paid by an advertiser for a single click on its ad that

    brings the end user to its intended destination.

    eCPMA useful reporting metric for measuring revenue generated across various marketing channels, eCPM or effective cost per thousand impressions is calculated by dividing total earnings by the total number of impressions in thousands.

    Example:, if a publisher earns US$200 from 40,000 impressions, the eCPM calculation would be (US$200/40,000) x1000 giving an eCPM of US$5.00.

  • Key Parameters that influence

    eCPC

    eCPCis the effective cost of each click, calculated by dividing total earnings by the total number of clicks.

    Fill Rate

    The percentage of ad requests that are filled with ads (that is, where an ad is displayed to the end user). Impression An impression is generated every time an end user views an ad.

    RPM

    RPM or Revenue Per Mille is the earning (estimated earnings) you will get for every 1000 impression. Where CPM is the cost of ads for 1000 ad impressions to advertiser, RPM is the revenue for publisher from 1000 impressions. RPM is calculated by dividing your possible estimated earnings by the number of page views, impressions, or queries you received, which is then multiplied by 1000.

  • Efficient Auction mechanisms for Mobile Ads

    For : Ad Exchanges/Supply side platforms

    Optimal reserve price of Ad exchange depends both on the number of ad networks and Advertisers/Publishers per ad networks.

    Optimal Reserve price increases with increase in number of advertisers/publisher and ad networks participating in the auction

    For : Ad Networks/Demand side platforms

    First-price sealed-bid auctions (FPSB) seem to provide a good trade-off between revenue and efficiency.

    Ad Networks shall find FPSBs better than the other two auctions

    For : Advertisers/Publishers

    For a non-captive advertiser/publisher, Post-award Vickrey auctions are preferred.

    For captive buyers, Pre-award Vickrey auctions are preferred

    Pre-award Vickrey auctions yield lower social welfare than the other auctions