Effects of Strikes

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Effects of industrial conflict between and within organizations: Contagion in collective bargaining and the deterioration of work relations * Agnes Akkerman Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Radboud University & Department of Sociology, Utrecht University. E-mail: [email protected] René Torenvlied Department of Sociology, Utrecht University & Department of Sociology, University of Groningen. E-mail: [email protected] Abstract The present paper outlines the essentials of a new research program in industrial conflict. We study two different effects of industrial conflict. The first effect is on the contagion of industrial conflict between organizations and sectors. Whereas most micro-economic, explanatory studies of strikes assume that strikes are isolated events, the present paper argues that the dispersion of strategic information among negotiators and employees can explain why strikes sometimes occur in waves, and sometimes do not occur where expected. The second effect is on the work relations between management and employees, and between employees at the work floor. Whereas some case studies of strikes mention effects of conflict between strike participants and non-strikers, the present paper argues that systematic research is necessary to unravel the conditions under which industrial conflict affects employee well- being and productivity long after the settlement of a strike. 1. Introduction The current study of industrial conflict is dominated by attempts of scholars to explain the prevalence of industrial conflict in sectors and countries. For example, a prominent question in the industrial relations literature is: ―why do some countries exhibit more strikes than other countries?‖ The actual effects of strikesalthough widely recognized in the literaturehave received much less systematic scholarly attention. If a strike occurs, this may have profound effects beyond the actual industrial conflict, and beyond the stakes of the direct participants in bargaining. In the present paper we introduce a research program that studies the effects of strikes in two areas: (1) collective bargaining outside the immediate scope of the focal organizations, and (2) work relations among employees within the organizations that are affected by strikes. * Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Dutch and Flemish Political Science Associations, Leuven, May 27-28. The authors acknowledge financial support from the ―Conflict and Security‖ program of the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).

Transcript of Effects of Strikes

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Effects of industrial conflict between and within organizations: Contagion in collective

bargaining and the deterioration of work relations*

Agnes Akkerman

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Radboud University &

Department of Sociology, Utrecht University. E-mail: [email protected]

René Torenvlied

Department of Sociology, Utrecht University & Department of Sociology, University of

Groningen. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

The present paper outlines the essentials of a new research program in industrial conflict. We

study two different effects of industrial conflict. The first effect is on the contagion of

industrial conflict between organizations and sectors. Whereas most micro-economic,

explanatory studies of strikes assume that strikes are isolated events, the present paper argues

that the dispersion of strategic information among negotiators and employees can explain why

strikes sometimes occur in waves, and sometimes do not occur where expected. The second

effect is on the work relations between management and employees, and between employees

at the work floor. Whereas some case studies of strikes mention effects of conflict between

strike participants and non-strikers, the present paper argues that systematic research is

necessary to unravel the conditions under which industrial conflict affects employee well-

being and productivity long after the settlement of a strike.

1. Introduction

The current study of industrial conflict is dominated by attempts of scholars to explain the

prevalence of industrial conflict in sectors and countries. For example, a prominent question

in the industrial relations literature is: ―why do some countries exhibit more strikes than other

countries?‖ The actual effects of strikes—although widely recognized in the literature—have

received much less systematic scholarly attention. If a strike occurs, this may have profound

effects beyond the actual industrial conflict, and beyond the stakes of the direct participants in

bargaining. In the present paper we introduce a research program that studies the effects of

strikes in two areas: (1) collective bargaining outside the immediate scope of the focal

organizations, and (2) work relations among employees within the organizations that are

affected by strikes.

*Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Dutch and Flemish Political Science

Associations, Leuven, May 27-28. The authors acknowledge financial support from the ―Conflict and

Security‖ program of the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).

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Most current explanations of industrial conflict consider strikes as independent and

isolated events: the bargaining between negotiation partners is not affected by conflict

elsewhere, and the conflict has neither an influence on other bargaining events. The micro-

economic models developed in bargaining theory attribute the occurrence of a strike to its

information-providing function: a strike provides negotiators with information about their

relative strength. Thus, these models ignore the possibility that negotiators may reduce their

uncertainty in the first place by looking around and informing themselves about what other

negotiators do (or have done) in similar circumstances.

The crude assumption of independence and isolation of strikes is not very plausible for

two reasons. First, from the assumption follows that strike-waves and sudden rises of

industrial conflict can only be understood as a coincidence, or as the consequence of macro

(socio)-economic and political factors—which would affect negotiations in the fashion of an

unexplainable, ‗invisible hand‘. Second, the assumption that bargaining parties are

uninformed about what happens in the rest of the world is not very plausible. Modern

collective bargaining practice makes use of well-trained and professional negotiators—often

responsible for several collective bargaining negotiations—that are part of an extensive

network of peers and other professional contacts. It would be rather naive to assume that

negotiators ignore information from bargaining events, claims made by parties, employer‘s

resistance, and worker‘s willingness to strike, and to assume that such information is not

distributed among others and used in other bargaining events.

This is the aim of the research project ―Contagious Conflict‖: to study how strategic

bargaining information spreads between bargaining events, and how it is used for the

mobilization of workers and in negotiations between employers and employees. The project

further aims to study how bargaining institutions affect this spread of information and its use.

Thus, the contagious conflict project contributes to a further and deeper explanation of

industrial conflict.

In addition, we argue that strikes do not only have an effect outside the realm of the

organization involved in the strike, but also have a long-term after-effect on relations at the

work floor between employees within the organization. Several case studies point at the

negative effects of a strike for the quality of production and the overall productivity of a firm,

even long after the strike is settled. Psychological studies show that strikes have long-term

effects on employees‘ health and job-satisfaction. These empirical findings suggest that the

social relations between both management and employees—as well as between those

employees who joined the strike and those who did not—can become severely damaged by

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the process of the strike. Systematic empirical research into the effects of strikes for social

relations among employees (and management) within organizations lacks to date. To fill this

gap, the project ―The Aftermath of Strikes‖, studies under what conditions social relations at

the work floor are affected by strikes.

2. Contagious Conflict: effects of strikes on other bargaining events

A remarkable feature of industrial conflict, such as strikes, is that it sometimes ‗spreads all

over the country like a forest fire‘, while in other times it is limited to a single sector or firm.

Standard bargaining models in economics and industrial relations studies offer little

explanation for this phenomenon (Hicks 1932, Reder and Neumann 1980, Mauro 1982).

These models attribute strikes to information problems of bargaining partners to assess each

other‘s bargaining power. Under full information, all bargaining partners perfectly calculate

their capacities to endure conflict, and peacefully reach an outcome. Under imperfect or

asymmetric information, miscalculations lead to mistakes in strategic behavior. These theories

regard strikes as dysfunctional incidents.

In a world of static bargaining power, industrial conflict would never recur. But, in reality we

observe that industrial conflict continues to occur, even in well-established bargaining

relations. Current comparative research in industrial relations focuses on (exogenous)

parameters of political and socio-economic systems to explain differences in strike activity

between countries (Franzosi 1995), for example through the presence of central bargaining

institutions, a social dialogue (such as the Dutch ‗Polder Model) or arbitration. However, this

explanation assumes that strikes occur independently, and provides no answer for the

contagion of industrial conflict. Little is yet known about how bargaining in one firm or sector

is affected by industrial conflict in other firms or sectors. Both bargaining theory and

comparative research in industrial relations ignore the mechanisms that relate strikes—or

other forms of industrial conflict—to each other.

Studies of more violent forms of collective conflict, such as civil war, reveal patterns of

violence comparable to strikes: some are isolated events whereas others spread over the

country or region in sequential patterns. Scholars of violent conflict clearly demonstrate the

presence of contagion effects (Holden 1986, Hegre et al. 2001, Gleditisch 2007). There is one

theoretical-empirical approach in industrial relations, mobilization theory, which

acknowledges that (industrial) conflict is contagious and which made some major

contributions (Oliver and Meyers 1998). The core idea in mobilization theory is that unions

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and their members (workers) learn about a changed balance in bargaining power through

‗example strikes‘ (Conell and Cohn 1995). Faced with imperfect information, unions

permanently observe industrial conflict in order to obtain information about their bargaining

power vis à vis employers. Example strikes yield valuable information about worker

grievances and employer responses (Ibid. 367). When unions learn about the favorability of

strike conditions, strikes become contagious.

However, mobilization theory has two crucial drawbacks. The first drawback is that it

exclusively focuses on a unitary union/worker actor to explain a proliferation of strikes.

Mobilization theory boldly assumes that trade union negotiators and workers share a common

interest and common information. Thus, it does not acknowledge the specific role of

professional (trade union) negotiators to stimulate or discourage a strike. In addition,

mobilization theory completely disregards the crucial role of the employer as a bargaining

partner! Professional negotiators for employers may also learn from industrial conflict. They

could very well anticipate a favorable bargaining position of employees by giving in to their

demands before a costly strike. But then strikes could also prevent the further contagion of

conflict. Consequently, the puzzle remains: why do some strikes stimulate other strikes, while

others remain isolated events and prevent social partners from engaging in future strikes? The

second drawback of mobilization theory is that it suffers from a selection bias in empirical

studies: these are limited to the spread of conflicts, and do not incorporate a study of isolated

events. Consequently, an empirical test of mobilization theory is problematic, since variation

in the dependent variable is absent (McAdam and Paulsen 1993, Soule, 2004) and the theory

cannot provide us with conditions under which strategic information leads to appeasement so

that conflict does not spread.

Research question: Under which conditions does industrial conflict lead to contagion effects

and under which conditions does it lead to appeasing effects?

This gap in our understanding of how industrial conflict in one firm/sector affects bargaining

in another firm/sector still severely hinders industrial relation practice. If we are able to

identify the conditions under which industrial conflict spreads or not, we contribute to labor

peace and reduce important economic and social costs.

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2.1 Theoretical background

In order to provide an explanation for the contagion of industrial conflict, the project aims to

integrate the three approaches mentioned above: (1) bargaining theory, which focuses on the

interactions between professional negotiators for employers and employees; (2) mobilization

theory, which focuses on the decisions of workers to participate in industrial conflict; (3) the

comparative approach, which focuses on economic and social-political institutions. Below,

we describe this integration on the basis of five elements of a theory of contagion: (a) actors

involved; (b) use of strategic information; (c) channels for diffusion; (d) behavioral options,

and (e) impact of institutional arrangements.

Actors involved. Bargaining theory and mobilization theory focus on different sets of actors.

Bargaining theory focuses on the interactions between professional negotiators for employees

and employers to explain the outcomes of labor negotiations. However, bargaining theory

disregards the worker as a crucial actor. This is highly unrealistic, as the phenomenon of

‗wildcat strikes‘ shows. These are strikes not organized by a union, but strikes that develop

spontaneously and often expand rapidly, for example those recently in the United Kingdom in

response to lay-offs (The Economist 2009). Most wild cat strikes often are hastily recognized

by trade unions. Hence, interactions between trade union negotiators and members explain the

spread of industrial conflict.

Mobilization theory studies the effects of information from co-workers and the mass-media

on the decision of workers to participate in industrial conflict. The theory explains the

emergence of social movements (Hedstrom 1994) from the behavior of a unitary actor. Thus,

mobilization theory disregards the intervening influence of trade union negotiators and

negotiators for the employer on workers‘ decision to participate in conflict. Yet, trade union

negotiators and workers often have different and sometimes conflicting interests (Ross and

Irwin 1951; Kochan 1980). Ashenfelter and Johnsons‘ bargaining theory (1969) even explains

strikes as a union‘s instrument to reduce workers‘ high expectations about collective

bargaining outcomes, masking its inability to negotiate better conditions. Unsuccessful strikes

produce more realistic expectations about bargaining outcomes.

A theoretical explanation for the spread of industrial conflict combines actor assumptions

from both theories. Therefore, we distinguish between three types of actors and their

interactions: the negotiator for employees, the negotiator for employers, and the worker.

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Use of strategic information. Bargaining theory and mobilization theory focus on a different

use of strategic information by actors in their decision to engage in industrial conflict.

Bargaining theory does not inform us how strategic bargaining information is obtained and

processed by negotiators. Reder and Neuman (1980) and McConell (1993) limit their analysis

to learning from information obtained within the same bargaining event—ignoring potential

learning from strategic information from other negotiations. Thus, we are still poorly

informed about the question of why some bargaining parties suffer from information

problems and engage in industrial conflict, while other parties manage to reach agreement

without the burden of incomplete information.

Mobilization theory assumes that workers learn from strategic information obtained from

industrial conflict in other events (Biggs 2002, Soule 2004, Meyer 2000, Andrews and Biggs

2006). The diffusion of industrial conflict depends on two mechanisms. First, workers must

have access to strategic information, either through informal, personal relations, or through

non-relational sources, such as the mass-media. Second, workers must decide whether the

strategic information obtained is useful (Klandermans 1984). Mobilization theory assumes

that the key mechanism to assess usefulness is identification: the worker uses information

from a source who is comparable to himself. Thus, the rule-of-thumb is: ‗how do other

workers like me behave?‘ (McAdam and Rucht 1993 p. 63). The predicted behavior is

imitation.

‗Example strikes‘ show that workers learn from strategic information about the outcomes

of industrial conflict: learning about successes in one firm/industry may drive workers in

another industry to engage in a strike. Conell and Cohn (1995) found that also lost strikes

inspired other workers to engage in a subsequent strike. However, it is quite unrealistic to

assume that professional negotiators base their bargaining strategy on the outcomes of other

conflicts solely. Negotiators need strategic information about: the resistance of

unions/employers to engage in conflict; the judicial, social or political acceptability of means

of protest; potential for the mobilization of workers; specific costs and benefits associated

with the conflict.

A theoretical explanation for the spread of industrial conflict must incorporate the use of

various types of strategic information by both professional negotiators and workers to alter or

persist in their strategy. The use of strategic information depends upon the access to (multiple)

trustworthy sources of information (Centola and Macy 2007).

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Channels for information diffusion. Trustworthiness of information depends on closed and

strong network relations between actors (Raub and Weesie 1990). Thus, we expect that

professional negotiators who are tied together in cohesive (sub)networks, exchange strategic

information. Mobilization theory makes a distinction between relational channels of

information and non-relational channels, such as the mass-media or meetings and gatherings

(Bohstedt and Williams 1988, McAdam and Rucht 1993, Biggs, 2005). Studies of violent

conflict report that the mass-media are the main channel through which information flows

between groups (Haas and Stack 1993; Holden 1986; Meyers 2000; Andrews and Bigg 2006).

A theoretical explanation for the spread of industrial conflict incorporates both relational

and non-relational channels for information diffusion. The more actors must rely on non-

relational channels, the more they use identification as a filter to assess the trustworthiness of

information. Whether or not the diffusion of strategic information results in a spread of

industrial conflict, further depends upon the behavioral options of actors, and the institutions

for conflict resolution.

Behavioral options of actors. Remarkably, mobilization theory assumes that workers have

only two behavioral options. They can either mimic the conflict of others, or ignore that

conflict. But, there are much more effects of learning from strategic information than pure

imitation. Bargaining theory describes the behavioral options of negotiators for using strategic

information. They can alter their strategy, that is: adjust their claims, reframe their grievances,

be more patient, or otherwise alter their input in the bargaining process.

Because negotiators and workers interact, different combinations of behavior are possible.

We discuss the three most important. In the first place, negotiators and workers could simply

imitate the behavior of others. For example, when employees learn a wage claim rewarded

elsewhere, they could become eager to make the same demand. In the second place, the

negotiator for employees or for the employer could decide to a unilateral adjustment of

strategy. For example when an employer becomes informed about the strength of a union and

its resources for mobilization, he could anticipate a strike and reward the claim without

conflict. In the third place, both negotiators for employees and for the employer could decide

to a mutual adjustment of strategy. Better information about the causes of a conflict and the

interests/strength of the other party could inspire both parties to find a common solution.

Clearly, simple imitation is a catalyst of conflict, while unilateral and mutual adjustment

could lead to appeasement and the prevention of industrial conflict. A theoretical explanation

for the spread of industrial conflict must incorporate such conditions.

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Impact of institutional arrangements and bargaining structure. In advanced capitalist

societies industrial relations are highly institutionalized, involving diverse instruments and

arrangements for the resolution of industrial conflict. Comparative industrial research reports

conditions that explain differences in strike levels between countries, such as: centralized

wage bargaining and arbitration institutions (Clegg 1976); presence of socialist parties in

government (Korpi and Shalev 1979); a social dialogue, like the Dutch Labor Foundation

(Visser and Hemerijck 1997) and the Belgian National Labour Council; state involvement in

tri-partite consultation, like the Dutch Socio-economic Council; interventions, like collective

agreement extension procedures.

Institutions for the resolution of industrial conflict are an integral part of a theoretical

explanation for the spread of industrial conflict. In the first place, they affect the access of

negotiators to trustworthy strategic information. A social dialogue and tri-partite consultation

procedure are platforms in which employer negotiators and unions meet and discuss on a

regular basis. In the second place, the institutions partly affect the result of bargaining

between the negotiators for employers and employees.

2.2. Approach & methods

The overall objective of the project is to determine under what conditions industrial conflict

leads to contagion or to appeasing processes. The theoretical background identifies three main

mechanisms that drive contagion: (a) use of strategic information in collective bargaining

between negotiators for employees and employers; (b) role of mass-media, and

communication between workers, unions, and the employer in worker mobilization; (c)

impact of institutional arrangements. This distinction drives a research design which

comprises of three interrelated subprojects: one subproject (PhD) focuses on collective

bargaining, one subproject (PhD) focuses on worker mobilization, and one subproject

(postdoc) focuses on the impact of institutional arrangements.

The approach and research design aim to create variation in the independent variables in

order to test hypotheses. Firstly, we select two countries for a comparative analysis of the

impact of institutional arrangements: Belgium and The Netherlands. Both countries are

comparable on a large number of socio-economic indicators, but differ in their institutional

arrangements for industrial relations and the level of industrial conflict. Secondly, within each

country we follow a multi-stage sampling design. We start by selecting potential ‗trigger

events‘, that is: events that express a minimal level of industrial conflict, such as a protest

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meeting, work stoppage, or strike. Subsequently, a number of collective bargaining

negotiations are randomly selected from the population of negotiations that started during, or

shortly after the trigger event. For all selected negotiations, the characteristics of the

bargaining process are analyzed (project 1). For each negotiation, we randomly select a

sample of workers, large enough to generalize to the population of workers in the

firm/industry (project 2).

In addition to surveys and network analysis, experiments in the Nijmegen Decision Lab are

planned. These experiments complement the research design for two purposes. First, the main

question of the project is whether negotiators and workers adjust their strategies on the basis

of information from ‗trigger‘ conflicts. Computer-aided experiments allow to systematically

vary (sources of and types of) strategic information under controlled conditions. Second, the

experiments serve as a means for developing and testing the training program for negotiators,

as described in the dissemination and communication plan.

2.3 Subprojects

Subproject 1 (PhD). Learning from strikes: The use of strategic information in collective

bargaining. A core hypothesis of the project is that professional negotiators for employers and

employees use strategic information from other industrial conflicts when they have access to

trustworthy sources of information about that conflict. The dependent variables in this

subproject are: (a) negotiators‘ decisions to adjust their strategy; (b) the resulting level of

conflict in collective bargaining. This subproject studies whether sequences of conflict in

collective bargaining can be understood as the result of inadequacies in the transmission of

strategic information in networks. The main research questions of this subproject are:

o How do professional negotiators obtain strategic information about other bargaining events

(including conflicts) from their social network, institutionalized networks, and mass-media

coverage?

o How do negotiators interact with workers and exchange strategic information?

o To what extent, and under what conditions does the information obtained result in an

adjustment of bargaining strategies?

o Under what conditions do the adjusted strategies lead to conflict events, or to an

appeasement?

The design of this subproject is a multi-level diffusion study of strategic information in the

networks of professional negotiators, using in-depth expert interviews and questionnaires.

Networks will be measured and analyzed using social network methodology (Wasserman and

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Faust 1994). Members of the dissemination board (see section 5) warrant access to the

negotiators. Computer-aided experiments study the (adjustments of) strategies of negotiators

in collective bargaining negotiation under conditions of: (a) trustworthiness of information;

(b) availability of information channels; (c) communication with workers (including union

members).

Subproject 2 (PhD). Industrial conflict as a catalyst: the role of unions in worker

mobilization. To date, mobilization theory has ignored the impact of the union negotiator in

the decision of workers to participate (or not) in industrial conflict. This subproject studies

whether workers‘ willingness to participate in industrial action (or to accept bargaining

outcomes) can be understood as the result of strategic information passed on by: union

negotiators, union representatives like shop stewards,1 or the employer. The dependent

variables in this subproject are: (a) the decision of workers to engage in industrial conflict, (b)

workers‘ aggregate willingness to engage in industrial conflict, or accept a bargaining

outcome, indicated by voting results or actual participation in conflict. The main research

questions of this subproject are:

o How do workers obtain strategic information about other bargaining events (including

conflicts) from their social network, their employer, union representatives and mass-media

coverage?

o How do workers interact with workers and exchange strategic information?

o To what extent, and under what conditions, does this information result in an adjustment of

workers‘ willingness to participate in industrial conflict or accept a bargaining outcome?

The design of this subproject involves a survey under workers (including both union members

and non-union members). In addition, computer-aided experiments study participation

decisions of workers under conditions of: (a) trustworthiness of information; (b) availability

of information channels; (c) communication with union representatives and employer.

Subproject 3 (Post doc). The diffusion of industrial conflict in different institutional settings

In the first stage of the project the postdoc coordinates the development of theory, hypotheses,

and data collection of all three subprojects. Thus, integration of all subprojects within the

overall project is assured. In the final stage of the project (s)he integrates results from all

subprojects in one comprehensive study.

The core hypothesis of subproject 3 is that bargaining institutions interfere with the

diffusion of strategic bargaining information. The dependent variable is the proportion of

1 Shop stewards are workers who are representatives of the union (in Dutch ‘kaderleden).

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conflict events in the population of bargaining events. Theoretically, this subproject elaborates

current institutional theories with hypotheses and results from subprojects 1 and 2.

Empirically, it extends current international data collection on industrial conflicts for at least

two additional countries—all in close collaboration with country-experts from the European

Industrial Relations Observatory Online (EIRO) and the International Labor Organization.

The current availability of data on industrial conflict is limited because it (a) is limited to the

aggregated, sector level; (b) lacks information on crucial features of industrial conflict, such

as starting/end dates; success/failure indicators; unions and employers involved, and

substantive issues); (c) is limited to strikes (and lock-outs), ignoring other forms of industrial

conflicts; (d) lacks a uniform definition of industrial conflict. Hence, the data collected in

subproject 3 aims to obtain international comparable micro-macro data for testing hypotheses

derived from the overarching project, as well as replicating relevant sociological and

economic studies with more valid, reliable and richer data. The data-set will be public

domain.

3. The aftermath of strikes: effects of strikes for relations within the organization.

Most strikes are resolved within a few days. Their material costs, in terms of production

losses, are well-documented in micro- and macroeconomic research. Nevertheless, the

aftermath of strikes is often long-lasting and involves personal and relational costs that may

have profound long-term effects on production. During strikes, fault-lines arise: between

management and employees, but also between groups of employees. During strikes,

emotional confrontations occur between employees on strike and those who ―break‖ the strike

and remain at work. (Francis, 1985; Getman, 1998).

The core hypothesis of the project is that fault-lines developed during strikes can have long-

lasting effects for work relations when persisting after a strike has been settled. Associated

problems of cooperation and lack of motivation combined with socially detrimental

behaviour, such as harassment and bullying, further affect productivity.

Economic research on the consequences of strikes focuses on the volume and quality of

production (Addison & Teixeira, 2009; Krueger & Mas 2003; Mas, 2006). Although these

studies mention obstruction and cooperation problems as probable causes of sub-optimal

production after strikes, they fail to specify causal mechanisms that link strikes to economic

performance. Psychological research reports prolonged effects of strikes on workers‘

psychological health and job satisfaction (Barling & Milligan, 1987; Kelloway et.al. 1993;

Fowler, et.al., 2009). Although they verify that strikes have strong effects on occupational

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health, these studies cannot explain why employees experience stress long after the dispute—

the stressor—was settled (up to six months). Fowler et.al. (2009) suggest that social factors

are responsible for continuation of stress.

Indeed, sociological and anthropological research indicates that social factors are

responsible for a prolonged experience of stress and frustration. Case-studies of severe strikes

reveal strong and destructive cleavages between management and employees, as well as

between groups of employees (MacDowell, 1993). These studies show that overt hostilities

persist after dispute settlement between the former strikers and strike-breakers and report

instances of physical and verbal harassment (Frances, 1985; Brunsden & Hill, 2009;

Waddington et.al 1994). Strike-breakers are put aside as ―blacklegs‖ or ―scabs‖ in union

terminology, effectively splitting teams, organizations, and sometimes whole communities

(Francis, 1985; Waddington et.al., 1994; Getman, 1999). The lack of solidarity demonstrated

by strike-breakers induces sentiments of ―betrayal‖ in those who strike, thereby creating sharp

fault-lines between employees. Although offering rich descriptions, these case-studies suffer

from selection bias: only effects of long and severe strikes are analyzed. The studies do not

inform us why some strikes lead to insurmountable schisms, while others do not affect work-

relations. Thus, systematic research about the effects of strikes on work-relations is virtually

absent.

Research questions:

(a) Under which conditions does conflict between managers and employees, and between

groups of employees, persist after the settlement of a strike, and under which conditions does

this conflict dissolve?

(b) How does this conflict affect the relations between management and employees, and the

relations among employees?

Identifying the mechanisms that explain how industrial conflict affects social relations

between employees contributes to our understanding of how (industrial) conflict persistently

affects production and employee well-being long after settlement of the strike.

3.1 Theoretical background

This project develops and tests a theory that explains how industrial conflict creates fault-lines

between groups of employees and management, and specifies the conditions under which

these fault-lines persist. Social cohesion theory suggests the presence of an external threat to

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explain sharp fault-line between groups (Stein, 1976). Over time, conflicting groups become

more cohesive internally, and develop negative stereotypes of the other group, triggering

polarization and disruptive conflicts (Nelson, 1989). Although a strike makes management the

natural ―out-group‖, it does not explain out-group sentiments between groups of workers.

The harsh relations between groups of employees can be explained by a solidarity norm. This

norm explains strikers‘ contempt for strike-breakers and their strong out-group sentiments

towards them. Case-study research (Brunsden & Hill, 2009; Waddington et.al, 1994) shows

that strike-breakers break a solidarity norm and pose an immediate threat to strikers: strikers‘

success depends on the degree to which the production process is disrupted–and thus on the

number of employees on strike. Moreover, because strikers incur considerable costs (e.g. loss

of income) and risk future repercussions by the employer, those who continue working are

considered free-riders. Social disapproval and punishment of free-riders serve to reinforce

solidarity norms (Gächter & Fehr, 1999; Casari & Luini, 2009). The punishment of free riders

increases with the deviation of the free rider from the average investment of the other

members (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In reaction, strike-breakers may develop strong out-group

sentiments towards strikers (Falk et. al., 2005).

Conflict between management and strikers

An ideal-type settlement of a strike resolves all conflict issues between the union and

employer. If not all issues are resolved, some external threat will continue to exist after

settlement. Thus, the perceived effectiveness of the settlement (by both management and

strikers) will positively affect the quality of work relations between management and strikers

after the strike (Hypothesis I).

Conflict between groups of employees

Settlement of a strike not automatically restores work relations between strikers and non-

strikers. We expect that the strength of the solidarity norm negatively affects work relations

between strikers and non-strikers (Hypothesis II). Moreover, we expect that the perceived

need to reinforce the solidarity norm will negatively affect work relations (Hypothesis III).

The perceived need to norm reinforcement depends on (a) the expected future need for

solidarity and (b) on free riders deviation of the investments strikers made (e.g. loss of income

and repercussions by the employer).

3.2. Approach & methods

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Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied 14

The project applies a longitudinal multi-level design, using data about work relations in four

organizations that experienced a strike. A survey will be held at three moments: (1) during, or

immediately after the strike; (2) two months after, and (3) six months after the settlement of

the strike. This design enables us to analyse changes in attitudes and behaviour within

employees over time and within/between groups of employees over time (participants, non-

participants, and management). Such a design is appropriate since a pre-event survey is

unfeasible: we cannot predict the occurrence of a strike before mobilization starts and fault-

lines already develop (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). Two aspects of work relations are

measured within and between groups: cohesion and conflict. We use cohesion scales

developed by e.g. Sargent & Sue-Chan (2001) and interpersonal conflict scales developed by

e.g. Jehn (1994, 1995).

4. Conclusion

In the present paper we challenged current explanations of industrial conflict, which consider

strikes as being independent and isolated events: the bargaining between negotiation partners

is not affected by conflict elsewhere, and the conflict has neither an influence on other

bargaining events. By contrast, we argued that strikes are not isolated in space from on other

bargaining events, and are not isolated in time from their consequences for relations at the

work floor. Correspondingly, this paper described two important avenues for industrial

relations research, and outlined the details of a comprehensive research program in these

directions. The aim of the research program is to move from explanations of the prevalence of

industrial conflict in sectors and countries to the actual effects of strikes. Effects of strikes are

most profound in two areas of study: (1) collective bargaining outside the immediate scope of

the focal organizations, and (2) work relations among employees within the organizations that

are affected by strikes. For each of these two areas, the paper described a series of interrelated

research projects.

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