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The Armenian Relocations and Ottoman

National Security: Military Necessity or

Excuse for Genocide?Edward J. Erickson

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To cite this article: Edward J. Erickson (2011): The Armenian Relocations and Ottoman National

Security: Military Necessity or Excuse for Genocide?, Middle East Critique, 20:3, 291-298

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The Armenian Relocations and OttomanNational Security: Military Necessity orExcuse for Genocide?

EDWARD J. ERICKSONUS Marine Corps University, USA

Professor William A. Schabas has provided a lens through which the modern world might

compare atrocities committed in the past with the intent and terminology of contemporary

international law.1 In my view, Schabas establishes, in a unique way, a context for

broadening the historical narrative by narrowing definitions and terminology.

Unfortunately, some partisans in the contemporary debate over the Armenian relocations

and massacres of 1915 may seek to use his ideas to establish retroactive accountability. In

this article, my intent is not to establish any kind of retroactivity regarding these events.

Rather, here I offer an opinion as to whether the relocation of the entire Armenian

population of eastern Anatolia was necessary for reasons of national security during the

First World War.2

As a matter of historical record, the Ottoman government considered the Armenian

population of eastern Anatolia as ‘enemies within’ during the First World War.3 When in

April 1915, internal rebellion by Armenian revolutionary committees and external

invasion by the Russian army supported by Armenian guerrillas began, the Ottoman high

command responded with an active counterinsurgency campaign of population relocation

and cordon and destroy operations.4 The speed and ferocity of the Ottoman

counterinsurgency campaign was a function of imperative military necessity. In fact,

actual Armenian threats to the logistics and security of three Ottoman armies caused the

Ottomans to consider the potentially catastrophic effect on the national security of the

Ottoman Empire should these armies collapse. The government considered this situation

ISSN 1943-6149 Print/1943-6157 Online/11/030291-8 q 2011 Editors of Middle East Critique

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2011.619765

Correspondence Address: Dr. Edward S. Erickson, US Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Quantico,

VA 22134, USA. Email: [email protected] See the article by William A. Schabas, Crimes Against Humanity as a Paradigm for International Atrocity

Crimes, in this issue.2 I previously have written about the nature and extent of these circumstances and events; see, e.g., Edward

J. Erickson (2008) The Armenians and Ottoman National Security, 1915, War in History, 15(2), pp. 141–167.3 A. Emin Yalman (1930) Turkey in the World War (New Haven CT: Yale University Press).4 See Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson (2009) A Military History of the Ottomans, From Osman to Atatü rk

(Santa Barbara CA: Praeger).

Middle East Critique

Vol. 20, No. 3, 291–298, Fall 2011

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as an existential threat to the national security of the Ottoman state.5 Today the Ottoman

government’s relocation decision continues to feed a polarized academic debate that

hinges on two positions that interpret the decision either as one of military necessity or as

an excuse for genocide.

The Historical Context

The historical context that led to the events of 1915 is crucial for understanding the

framework within which the relocation decision was cast. There are four main historical

antecedents that must be understood in order to establish this context:

(1) the activities of the Armenian revolutionary committees (particularly the

Dashnaks);

(2) the activities of outside powers supporting the Armenian committees;

(3) the contemporary counterinsurgency practices used by the Great Powers; and

(4) the Ottoman counterinsurgency policies and practices in the late nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries.

This history and these four elements form a lens through which the Ottoman government

and its military staff approached the problem of insurgency in the decades immediately

prior to the First World War.6 In effect, these antecedents provided Ottoman decision-

makers with intellectual appreciations of the scale and objectives of the Armenian

revolutionary committees as well a practical working knowledge of how to suppress

insurrections.

The Armenian revolutionary committees, particularly the Dashnaks and the Hunchaks,

grew dramatically in size and capability after 1890.7 Both committees were revolutionary,

socialist and committed to violent action to achieve their goals. Both groups werededicated to the creation of an independent Armenia carved from the Ottoman Empire, and

in today’s terms would be labeled as terrorist organizations. They were established as

secret organizations with a structure of small, independent, heavily armed and well-trained

quasi-military cells. Neither group was self-sufficient and both depended on foreign

financing, exterior safe haven and sanctuaries, and weapons acquisition via smuggling. By

1914 the Ottoman intelligence services knew that the Armenian revolutionary committees

were well led, heavily armed, well organized and possessed genuine military capabilities.

Prior to 1914 most of the Great Powers supported or tolerated Armenian activities to

some extent. Russia and Bulgaria, in particular, encouraged and supported the Armenian

revolutionary committees by allowing them to operate freely within their respective

territories.8 It was from these countries that most of the illegal weapons smuggling into the

5 See further Erickson, The Armenians and Ottoman National Security.6 See Edward J. Erickson (2011) Template for Destruction: The Congress of Berlin and the Evolution of

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Practices, in: Peter Sluglett & Hakan Yavuz (eds.) The Political and Social

Implications for the Ottoman Empire of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press).7 See Hratch Dasnabedian (1990) History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dasnaktutiun 1890 –1924

(Milan: OEMME Edizioni); and Louise Nalbandian (1963) The Armenian Revolutionary Movement

(Berkeley: University of California Press).8 See Dikran Mesrob Kiligian (2009) Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule 1908–1914

(New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers).

292 E. J. Erickson

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Ottoman Empire originated. France and the United States tolerated the committee’s

fundraising activities and allowed financial support to flow into the empire as well. When

the war started, Russia, France and the UK all supported the efforts of the Armenians to

rebel against the Ottomans. Russia bore the heaviest role by actively raising Armenian

regiments for its army and then using them to invade the Ottoman lands.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, counterinsurgency policies based on the relocationof civilian populations emerged as viable and acceptable practices in warfare. Three wars,

in particular, set important precedents for the Western world in the way in which militaries

dealt with guerrillas and irregular insurgents. These wars involved Spain in Cuba (1893),

the United States in the Philippines (1900 – 1902) and Britain in South Africa (1899 – 1901)

and all three saw the evolution of similar strategic, operational and tactical practices by the

Great Powers.9 At the strategic level, these countries sought the destruction of guerrilla

and irregular military forces in order to end insurgencies and, in the case of the Boers, end

a conventional war that had entered a guerrilla warfare phase. Operationally, Spain, the

United States and Great Britain employed campaign designs that focused on separating the

guerrillas from their principal sources of support (the friendly civilian populations),

thereby enabling the military defeat of the weakened guerrilla armies. At lower tactical

levels, military commanders isolated the guerrillas by establishing fortified lines that cut

their operational areas into manageable sectors and then removed the civilian populations

to concentration camps. Simultaneously, their regular and numerous forces swept the

sectors clean of guerrillas by relentlessly pushing them to destruction against the fortified

lines.10 To varying degrees these campaigns of population removal and concentration

were successful with the British in South Africa setting the standard by the complete and

brutal subjugation of the Boer republics.

The Ottomans, however, during the period 1890 to 1914 did not use counterinsurgency

practices that involved or depended upon on the relocation of populations. Today we would

call the Ottoman counterinsurgency policy a kinetic strategy that relied on force andweapons. In the Balkans during the nearly continuous insurrections of the Macedonian

committees (1890– 1912), the Ottoman army employed large-scale regular military forces of

over 100,000 men to crush the rebels.11 These campaigns involved isolating the battle area

and then using highly mobile and trained battalion sized units of regular soldiers sweeping

the sectors clear of rebels. In Caucasia, the nearly bankrupt Ottoman Empire formed the

infamous Hamidiye Tribal Light Cavalry as a financially expedient means of creating the

additional force structure necessary to quell Kurdish and Armenian rebellions.12 At its

9

See further David F. Trask (1981) The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company);Brian McAllister Linn (1989) The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902

(Chapel Hill NC: The University of North Carolina Press); and S. B. Spies (1977) Methods of Barbarism?

Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics January 1900– May 1902 (Capetown: Human &

Rousseau).10 See further Colonel C.E. Callwell (1996) Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln NE: University

of Nebraska Press).11 See further Duncan M. Perry (1988) The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893–

1903 (Durham NC: Duke University Press).12 See Turkish General Staff (1993) Balkan Harbı (1912–1913), I Cilt, Harbin Sebepleri, Askeri Haıirlıklar ve

Osmanlı Devletinin Harbe Girişi (Ikinci Başki) [Balkan Wars 1912–1913, Military Mobilization and the

Entry of the Ottoman State] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi); and Janet Klein (2011) The Margins of

Empire: Kurdish Tribal Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press).

The Armenian Relocations and Ottoman National Security 293

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height, the strength of the Hamidiye cavalry regiments was in excess of 60,000 heavily armed

men. In their employment, these units were used in conjunction with regular Ottoman army

infantry divisions to crush rebels and, occasionally, bandits. Both the Balkan and the

Caucasian counterinsurgency campaigns were manpower intensive and relied on thousands

of soldiers and heavy weapons such as artillery. This pattern was repeated in Yemen and the

Hedjaz against rebellious tribes, and by 1911 the Ottoman army deployed over 150,000 mento those places as well. Occasionally, when the insurgent threat was localized, the Ottoman

army would send smaller, fast-traveling columns of company or battalion size (200 to 1,000

soldiers) to subdue the rebels.13 In no case prior to 1915 did the Ottomans include population

relocation in their overall strategy, their operational designs or in their day-to-day tactical

approach to the problem of counterinsurgency.

Drivers of Change

Many historians view the outbreak of the First World War as the proximate cause of what

some historians refer to as the Armenian Genocide, others as massacres and relocations,and still others as the Events of 1915. To this day, interpretations of this question remain

hotly contested by the advocates of the opposing positions.14 However, both sides agree on

the fact that the Ottoman approach to the problem of quelling an insurgency clearly and

dramatically changed in 1915 when it shifted from a historical policy of kinetic direct

action by large-scale military forces to a new policy of population relocation. The problem

then becomes that of explaining how the First World War created the drivers of change

that caused this fundamental policy shift. Similarly to the four elements of the historical

context, there were also four principal drivers of change created by the war:

(1) the actuality of an insurrection by the Armenian revolutionary committees;

(2) the actuality of allied interventions and support;(3) the locations of the Armenian population as an existential threat to Ottoman

national security; and

(4) the inability of the Ottomans to mass large forces effectively and rapidly to

quell the insurgency.

In fact, there was an actual insurrection by the heavily armed, well-trained, and highly

motivated Armenian revolutionary committees in the spring of 1915. The causes for that

uprising are subject to debate: Did the Armenians rise up for independence or did the

Ottomans push them unwillingly into a self-protective armed response? These questions

have become the source of a vigorous, heavily politicized and highly emotional academic

debate. Nevertheless, it is a matter of historical record that by late April 1915 theArmenian revolutionary committees held the key city of Van and other Armenian

13 See further Caesar E. Farah (2002) The Sultan’s Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule

(London: I. B.Tauris); and Vincent S. Wilhite (2003) Guerrilla War, Counterinsurgency, and State Formation

in Ottoman Yemen, PhD thesis, The Ohio State University.14 For the Armenian position, see for example, the works of Vahkan Dadrian, Richard Hovannasian, Raymond

Kevorkian and Taner Akçam. For the Turkish position, see for example, the works of Bernard Lewis, Justin

McCarthy and Stanford Shaw. For balanced commentary, see for example, the works of Michael Gunter,

Donald Bloxham and Guenter Lewy. Full citations for all these authors may be found in the references of

M. Hakan Yavuz’s introductory article in this issue.

294 E. J. Erickson

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insurrections were breaking out simultaneously in other locations in eastern Anatolia.15

From the Ottoman government’s point of view the reasons were irrelevant: It did not

matter why the Armenians were in revolt as much as the fact that they were in revolt. To be

sure, not all of the Armenians were actively in rebellion—the membership of the

Armenian revolutionary committees constituted only a small portion of the Armenian

population. According to Ottoman intelligence reports and the reports of neutral observers,there may have been as many as 25,000 insurgent Armenians actively conducting military

operations against the empire.16 In fact, the cause of the insurrection was largely irrelevant

since it did actualize and by the mid-spring 1915, thousands of Armenian revolutionaries

were under arms and fighting under effective command and control. And, as contemporary

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have conclusively shown, it does not take a large

number of insurgents to cause problems when they can hide within a larger population.

The uprising in the city of Van in April 1915 was orchestrated by the Dashnaks in

conjunction with a simultaneous offensive by the Russian army, which itself included

Armenian regiments of expatriate Ottoman Armenian citizens. It was carefully planned

and the small Ottoman force in the area quickly lost control of the city and then failed to

prevent the relief of the Armenians by the advancing Russian army. The Ottoman high

command immediately viewed the loss of the city in this manner (internal revolt supported

by well-coordinated Russian military offensives) as a template for future enemy

operations. Moreover, in the Alexandretta and Dortyol region, the Ottomans expected an

amphibious invasion by the British and French to link up with and support the heavily

armed Armenian committees in that area as well.17 Today there is no doubt that the Allies

encouraged and supported the Armenian committees to revolt against the empire in the

spring of 1915 and the Ottomans believed that what happened in Van was about to be

repeated elsewhere.

The location of the Armenian population and insurgency is critical to understanding

why the Ottoman state perceived the situation as posing an existential threat to its nationalsecurity.18 The Ottomans were fighting the Russians on the Caucasian frontier and the

British in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The supply lines supporting those Ottoman fronts

ran directly though the areas of eastern Anatolia that were heavily populated by Armenian

communities and, by extension, by the heavily armed Armenian revolutionary

committees. Importantly, none of the Ottoman armies on the fronts in Caucasia,

Mesopotamia or Palestine was self- sufficient in food, fodder, ammunition or medical

supplies, and all were dependent on the roads and railroads leading west to Istanbul and

Thrace for those supplies. Moreover, none of these forces had much in the way of

prepositioned supplies available and all required the continuous flow of war material. The

Armenian revolutionary committees began to attack and cut these lines of communications in the spring of 1915. Ottoman army messages regarding the interdiction

of the roads and lines of communications in the spring of 1915 clearly demonstrate both

15 See further Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran & Ömer Turan (2006) The Armenian Rebellion

at Van (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press).16 See Edward J. Erickson (2005) Bayonets on Musa Dagh, Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations-1915, The

Journal of Strategic Studies, 28(3), pp. 141– 167.17 See Edward J. Erickson (2010) Captain Larkin and the Turks: The Strategic Impact of the Operations of HMS

Doris in Early 1915, Middle Eastern Studies, 46(1), pp. 151–162.18 See further Erickson, The Armenians and Ottoman National Security.


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alarm and concern for the acute danger presented by the Armenian insurgents. The cutting

of the road networks for more than a period of several days had a severe impact on the

amount of material getting through to the armies on the active fronts, thereby denying

them the means to fight. Thus, the Armenian insurrection was seen as a genuine security

imperative requiring an immediate solution, and it was an existential threat to the survival

of the empire’s armies.The mobilization and the concentration of the Ottoman army in 1914 brought the entire

regular army to the fringes of the empire’s frontiers. The army stayed on the frontiers and

by April 1915 was heavily engaged in the Caucasus, at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in

Palestine.19 This drained the army’s strength and left almost no trained regular army

combat units in the interior provinces. Moreover, the Hamidiye cavalry had been

disestablished previously and its successor, the light cavalry corps, likewise was dissolved

in November 1914. Even the well-trained and mobile field gendarmerie (Jandarma) were

activated for war and deployed to the active fighting fronts to assist the regular forces. 20

Thus, the Ottoman Empire had sent all of its available military combat strength to the front

lines and in the spring of 1915 had almost no military forces left in the interior.

Analysis: Understanding the Ottoman Strategic Policy Shift

How can we understand and how might we explain the Ottoman decision to shift its

counterinsurgency policy to one that was based on the relocation of the Armenians from

the eastern provinces of Bitlis, Dyarbekir, Erzurum, Harput, Sivas and Van. First, let’s

look at the historical context. Counterinsurgency campaigns as practiced by the Ottoman

state from 1890 to 1914 were characterized by large-scale military operations and large

numbers of soldiers, often exceeding 100,000 regulars. The campaigns were kinetic and

involved the hunting to destruction of insurgent bands. In smaller expeditions against theKurds and Arabs, the Ottomans employed well-trained regular forces to destroy the

enemy. As long as the Ottomans had military forces available, they were never forced to

use strategies of population removal, as had the Spanish, Americans and the British in

contemporary counterinsurgency operations. The Ottomans also knew that the Armenian

revolutionary committees were well armed and that they had significant levels of external

support. Second, we should then look at how the war drove changes in Ottoman

counterinsurgency practices. There was a genuine and existential threat to the national

security of the Ottoman Empire in the late spring of 1915. This was the result of the

unfortunate demographic fact that large concentrations of Armenian people happened to

live in cities such as Erzurum, Harput and Urfa which lay astride lines of communications

vital to the armies fighting on three fronts. While it is true that the Armenian revolutionary

committees did not represent the majority of Armenians, they were powerful enough to

take cities and large enough to choke and obstruct the flow of supplies.

Unfortunately, the Ottoman state and its leaders were ill equipped by their experiences to

deal with the Armenian insurrection. This was because in their own immediate past the

19 See Edward J. Erickson (2001) Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War

(Westport: Greenwood Press).20 See Edward J. Erickson (2006) Armenian Massacres, New Records Undercut Old Blame, The Middle East

Quarterly, 13(3), pp. 67–75.

296 E. J. Erickson

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empire had solved the problem of insurgency by sending in large armies of up to 100,000

regular soldiers and paramilitary cavalrymen. Such a response was impossible in 1915, as the

interior of the empire had been stripped of regular forces and the gendarmerie. The traditional

tools necessary for the suppression of an insurrection were nonexistent and this forced the

government into an alternative counterinsurgency strategy based on relocation, which could

be accommodated with minimal amounts of military effort. Moreover, unlike the Spanish, theAmericansand the British, who dealt with hostile and uncooperative colonial populations, the

Ottomans were dealing with their own citizens, the majority of whom did not resist their own

relocation. This further reduced the requirements for combat-capable military forces in the

relocation and much of the actual movement was conducted by local paramilitary elements.

The decision to relocate the Armenians was an evolving response that started with

localized population removal but which, by late May 1915, escalated to a region-wide

relocation policy involving six provinces. The Ottoman leaders believed this policy was

their only option, given the wartime situation. A large-scale kinetic military response as

they had employed from 1890 to 1914—the application of force—was impossible. The

Western model of population relocation had worked for the Spanish, the Americans and

the British. It is understandable therefore that the Ottoman government turned to this

viable and low-cost counterinsurgency policy in order to deal effectively with the

Armenian insurrection. As the relocations progressed into the summer and fall of 1915, it

became progressively easier for the Ottoman military forces committed to eradicating the

insurgency to mop up the battered surviving rebels. In 1915, for the Ottoman state,

relocation was an effective strategy borne of weakness rather than of strength.

With respect to the question of whether the relocation was necessary for reason of

Ottoman national security in the First World War, the answer is clearly yes. There was a

direct threat by the small but capable Armenian revolutionary committees to the lines of

communications upon which the logistics of the Ottoman armies on three fronts depended.

There was a real belief by the government that the consequences of failing to supplyadequately its armies that were contact with the Russians, in particular, surely would lead to

the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman high command believed it could not take

that chance. Pressed by the imperative of national survival to implement an immediate

counterinsurgency strategy and operational solution, and in the absence of traditionally

available large-scale military forces, the Ottomans chose a strategy based on relocation—

itself a highly effective practice pioneered by the Great Powers. The relocation of the

Armenian population and the associated destruction of the Armenian revolutionary

committees ended an immediate existential threat to the Ottoman state. Although the empire

survived to fight on until late 1918 unfortunately thousands of Armenians did not survive the

relocation. Correlation is not causation and the existing evidence suggests that the decisionsleading to the Armenian relocations in 1915 were reflexive, escalatory, and militarily

necessary, rather than simply a convenient excuse for genocide.

References

Callwell, C. E. (1996) Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).

Hratch Dasnabedian, H. (1990) History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dasnaktutiun 1890–1924

(Milan: OEMME Edizioni).

Erickson, E. J. (2001) Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport:

Greenwood Press).


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———.(2005) Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations, 1915, The Journal of Strategic

Studies, 28(3), pp. 141– 167.

———.(2006) Armenian Massacres, New Records Undercut Old Blame: Reexamining History, The Middle East

Quarterly, 13(3), pp. 67–75.

———.(2008) The Armenians and Ottoman National Security, 1915, War in History, 15(2), pp. 141–167.

———.(2010) Captain Larkin and the Turks: The Strategic Impact of the Operations of HMS Doris in Early 1915,

Middle Eastern Studies, 46(1), pp. 151–162.———.(2011) Template for Destruction: The Congress of Berlin and the Evolution of Ottoman

Counterinsurgency Practices, in: M. H. Yavuz & P. Sluglett (Eds) The Political and Social Implications

for the Ottoman Empire of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press).

Farah, C. E. (2002) The Sultan’s Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule (London: I. B.Tauris).

Kiligian, D. M. (2009) Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule 1908–1914 (New Brunswick:

Transaction Publishers).

Klein, J. (2011) The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Tribal Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford: Stanford

University Press).

Linn, B. M. (1989) The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill NC:

The University of North Carolina Press).

McCarthy, J., Arslan, E., Taşkıran, C. & Turan, Ö. (2006) The Armenian Rebellion at Van (Salt Lake City: The

University of Utah Press).

Nalbandian, L. (1963) The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press).Perry, D. M. (1988) The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893–1903 (Durham NC:

Duke University Press).

Spies, S. B. (1977) Methods of Barbarism? Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics January

1900–May 1902 (Capetown: Human & Rousseau).

Trask, D. F. (1981) The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co).

Turkish General Staff (1993) Balkan Harbı (1912–1913), I Cilt, Harbin Sebepleri, Askeri Haıirlıklar ve Osmanlı

Devletinin Harbe Girişi [Balkan Wars 1912–1913, Military Mobilization and the Entry of the Ottoman

State] (Ikinci Başki) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi).

Uyar, M. & Erickson, E. J. (2009) A Military History of the Ottomans, From Osman to Atatü rk (Santa Barbara:

Praeger).

Wilhite, V. S. (2003) Guerrilla War, Counterinsurgency, and State Formation in Ottoman Yemen, PhD thesis,

The Ohio State University, Columbus.Yalman, A. E. (1930) Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press).

298 E. J. Erickson

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