Editorler - isamveri.orgisamveri.org/pdfdrg/D252773/2016/2016_PARILDARS.pdftion will begin with an...
Transcript of Editorler - isamveri.orgisamveri.org/pdfdrg/D252773/2016/2016_PARILDARS.pdftion will begin with an...
OSMANLI'DA iLM-i KELAM
-~er,Eserler,~eseleler
Editorler
Osman Demir
VeyselKaya
Kadir GOmbeyaz
U. Murat Kllavuz
iSTANBUL 2016
TRACING MENTAL EXISTENCE IN AlrGALANBAwi'S
THOUGHT
TimOUGH THE COMMENTARY TRADIDON*
Sfuneyye Panldar**
Ismac-J.l ibn Mu~tafa ibn Mal~1rn:ud al-Galanbawi (d. 1205/1791) is
one of the prominent scholars of the eighteenth century. He wrote on
varying spectrum of topics from logic and mathematics to kalam. In this
paper, the notion of mental existence will be evaluated through his
Risala .fi l-wujild al-dhibni and his lftisbiya cata l-]alal (which is a gloss
on al-Dawwani's Commentary on <Ac;lud al-Din al-Iji's [d. 756/13551 al
~qa)id) together with his I;Itishiya cata l-Tabdbib (which is a gloss on
Abu l-Fat}J. al-Miri's Tahdhfb).
The aim of this paper is to focus on the notion of existence by
comparing it to two other related notions, being in the extramental
world (al-a cyan) and the realm of being itself (nafs al-amr). The evalua-
• I am indebted to respected scholars, Murat Ka~, KObra ~enel, and Assist. Prof. Veysel .J
Kaya who had been very helpful in the composition process of this article by sharing their valuable information, providing main sources, and by commenting on the text.
" Ogr. Gor. Dr.; istanbul Oniversitesi ilaruyat Faktiltesi
-165-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar
tion will begin with an analysis 9f mental existence in al-Sayyid al-Sharif
al-Jurjani's (d. 816/1413) Commenta1y on al-Mawtiqif as this is one of
the main texts for the history of the notion of mental existence. The
search for shifts in the discussions between the first commentaries and
later literature is a secondary goal of the research. This will be aimed
through comparing the sections on existence in al-Mawtiqif in al
Jurjani's commentary with eighteenth-century scholar Ismac-u al
Galanbawi's gloss and treatise.
The main reason for choosing al-Galanbawi's book is that he
writes at a later period until which scholars already established discus
sions on mental existence in Islamic lands. Thus his writing can be
deemed as a summary of the accumulated discussions on mental exist
ence. His period is also an era in which Western ideas started to influ
ence Ottoman tho.ught. Therefore, there is an opportunity in investigat
ing al-Galanbawi's works in order to observe what is unique to the late
Otto~n kalam thought, and how interaction of philosophy and kalam
resulted in the Ottoman experience.
Talking about a well-developed and sophisticated topic such as
mental existence in the late tradition requires starting with an earlier and
more classical text that influenced the framework in which mental exist
ence was discussed throughout. I will start this investigation with al
Jurjani's treatment of mental existence in Sharf? al-Mawaqif, followed by
its comparison to al-Galanbawi's Ristila .fi l-wujud ~l-dhihni [Treatise on
-166-
Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler
Mental Existence], a manuscript available in Si.lleymaniye Library,
Giresun Yazmalar section, no. 106, at folios 82-83. This introductory
section also aims to present the main discussion areas of mental exist
ence at the time of al-Galanbawi.
The second section will evaluate the details of al-Galanbawi's
Ristila fi l-wujud al-dhihni through the help of his other texts, such as
Gloss on ]ala./ (lftishiya 'ala 1-jalal), his other treatise on non-existents
in another manuscript at Si.ileymaniye Library, Re~id Efendi, no. 989,
fols. 252 ff.,1 and Ta'lfqat(andlor lftisbiya) 'ala 1-Tahdbib, which is on
Abu 1-Fatl:i al-Miri's lftishiya 'alii 1-Tahdhib. The result of this investiga
tion will be manifested at the last section in which I will contextualize al
Galanbawi's discussion of mental existence among general subjects of
philosophical research. I believe al-Galanbawi's discussion re-evaluates
discussion of mental beings from a more independent research topic
into a matter of kala.m in general and knowledge of God in particular.
We also find out that he accepts strong ties of the topic to philosophers'
stance. In that context, he synthesises the tl1eological and philosophical
positions. This research is more in the form of notes that does not prom
ise a complete picture of either al-Galanbawi's thought or of the discus-
See also (MS Istanbul: Koprillii Library, 23), as Risdla fi <ibn Allah tar.tila bi-l
ma<dftmat 'ala madhhab al-mutakal/imin. The treatise was published in a corpus titled Rasa'il-i imti/Jdn (al-Risiila li-1-GalanbawT fi 'ibn Allah ta<afa bi-1-ma<df.mzat
[Istanbul: Ma~ba'a-i <Amira, 1302 AHJ, 178-194).
-167-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar
sions on mental existence in the traclition.2
I. General Frame: Mental Existence in SbarlJ al-Mawiiqif
Al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani defines mental existence by building
it on extra-mental existence (al-wujud al-dhihni). There is fire, posses
sive of heat and material properties, but is there another being that can
fire from which its material features are extracted? The crucial question
that causes a debate is as such: When a second mode of existence is
admitted, then, is the essel)ce the same in extra-mental being and mental
being? In this formulation, the debate also rests upon the various con-
For a more complete picrure on al-Galanbawi's mought, see: Okudan, Rifat, Gelenbevl ve Vabdet-i Vucud (Isparta: FakOlte Kitabevi Yaymlan, 2006); AkgOt;, Alunet, ismail Gelenbevi'de Varltk Dii~iincesi (PhD dissertation; Ankara: Ankara
Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstittisi.l, 2006). For a developed discussion on mental existence in me Onoman tradition, see: Tashkupnzada, AbO 1-Khayr <Isam ai-Din AJ:unad Efendi, Zibinsel Varlrga Dair Tmtr§malarda Ozfm ve Hakikatin Tespiti (in Orner Mahir Alper [ed), Osmanlt Fe/sefesi: Sepne Metinler, translated and edited wim an introduction on Tashkupnzada by Omer Mahir Alper; Istanbul: Klasik Yaymlan, 2015), 241-302. There are also a number of studies on al-Jurjaru mat worlh mentioning, but I will contend wim two most related studies which are aumoritative in the field; see van Ess, Josef, Die Erkenntnislebre des <Af!udaddin at-lei:
Obersetzung tmd Kommentar des er-sten Bucbes seiner Mawaqif (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966) (yet this book is a translation of and commentary on only me f1tst part of al-Mawtiqif, mus it does not analyze me section on existence); Ti.lrker, Orner, Seyyid $erif Ciircani'nin Tevil Anlayz~r: Yorumun Metafizik, Mantrki ve
Dilbilimsel Temelleri (PhD dissertation; Istanbul: Marmara Oniversitesi Sosyal Bilirnler Enstittisi.l, 2006). One of me most comprehensive texts about me discussions on mental existence in me tradition can be found in an article by Murat K.a~: "Mustafa ~evket Efendi'nin Risalesi I~1gl!lda Zihin, Harle ve Nefsu'l-Emr K.avramlartnlll Analizi, ~ islamMedeniyetiA1-a~tmnala11 Dergisi (iMAD) 1/1 (2014), 58·87.
-168-
OsmanlJ'da ilm-i Keliim: Alim.ler, Eserler, Meseleler
ceptions of knowledge. It has been custom to discuss knowledge in
terms of its being an accident ( carat;f), a relation (it;lafa), a qualification
(kayjJ, attribute ($ija), and also to describe it as active and passive (/Ni
and infi'tlli).3 Additionally and essentially for many scholars, confirma
tion of mental beings is connected to accepting knowledge as presence
of forms in the soul. As a result, in a rough sketch, we can say that when
knowledge is taken as a passive process (at-citm al-l;nt$Ctli) of forms
occurring in the mind, it is also taken as a process of production of men
tal existence.4
As it becomes more explicitly accepted in the later tradition, the
real debate topic between theologians and philosophers is not about
affirmation or denial of mental existence per se (I). The question centers
around the definitions of soul and mental existence, and the relation
between these two. The implications of defining knowledge as form
being in the soul seem to be the real irritants in the kalam tradition.
Once mental existence is accepted, knowledge will be described as an
immaterial process. In this case, we would admit that the soul itself is an
immaterial substance as the similarity between object and knower is a
3 For a presentation of these categories in the early Islamic tradition see Memi~. Murat, Mu 'tezilf Bit· Bakt§la Bilgi Problemi (Ankara: Sarka<; Yaymlan, 2011), and for more
specific discussions dealing with these categories, see Koroglu, Burhan, Necmeddfn
el-Katibf el-Kazvtnf'nin Bilgi Teorisi Ostanbul: Bah<;~ehir Oniversitesi 1'aymlan, 2015).
4 AI-Galanbawi, Risala.fi taf?qfq %n Allah ta<afa al-muta<afliq bi-l-asbya!(in Rasa!il-i
imti/Jflt1; Istanbul: Ma~ba'a-i 'Arnica, 1302 AH), 173 ff.
-169-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar
requirement. Early theologians refrain from attributing immateriality to
the soul. Parallel to this, al-Jurjani lists nine groups that deny irrunateriali
ty of the soul whilst attributing this materialist tendency to the majority
of theologians.5 The second issue is that the essence in the extra-mental
world and the essence in the mind are regarded as identical and that
they only differed in their existence: one being in the extra-mental
world, and the other being in the mind. This kind of explanation re
quires a third being that connects these two realms and that guarantees
identity of quiddities: a separate intellect which is the source for each
quiddity, the Active Intellect. This is the case for Ibn Sina. Thanks to the
Active Intellect, Ibn Sina establishes a base for true and certain
knowledge and he can then equate quiddity (mtihiyya), reality (f?aqiqa),
Al-Jurjaru, Abu 1-I:Iasan al-Sayyid al-Sharif 'Ali ibn Mubammad ibn 'Ali, $erhu '1-MeiJOkif: Mevdkif $erhi (Metin-9eviri) [Sbar!J al-Mawdqi}J (Arabic text with a Turkish
translation by Orner Turker; Istanbul: Turkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Ba~kanl1jp Yaylnlan, 2015), II, 1212 ff. A deeper look would show that the claim about
immateriality of the soul attributed to Ash'arls requires further analysis when individual thinkers are the case. Al-Ghazali's stance is already a topic of scholarly
debate, see Frank, Richard M., Al-Ghazdli and the Ash'arite School (Durham &
London: Duke University Press, 1994), 55-56, and Marmura's statements in his translation of Tabtifut (al-Ghazali, Abu I:Jamid ·Mul)ammad ibn Mul)ammad, 1be
Incoherence of the Philosophers lA parallel English-Arabic te.xt translated, introduced,
and annotated by Michael E. Marmura; 2nd ed.; Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000], 218 ff.) and Shihadeh, Ayman, • Al-Ghazali and Kalam: The
Conundrum of His Body-Soul Dualism," Islam and Rationality: 1be Impact of alGbazali. Papers Collected on His 900tb Anniversaty. vol. 2 (ed. Frank Griffe!; Leiden
& Boston: Brill, 2016), 117 ff.
-170-
Osmanll'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler
and essence (dhat).6 However, theologians refrained from admitting
beings (divine or half divine that are supra-material beings) in between
material beings and God. Following Ka§'s categorization, there are vari
ous lineages within which the discussions on mental existence contin
ued: Fakhr al-Din al-R.azi- al-Taftazani - al-Jurjaru lineage, commentary
tradition on Na~Ir al-Din al-TGsi's Tajrid, Ottoman literature developed
by Ibn Kamal Pasha, Tashkuprizada, and al-Galanbawi, and finally, the
literature following Mulla Sadra.7 It is however debatable that Mulla
$adra has formed a mental-existence tradition on his own. Related to our
study here, al-Galanbawi might also be considered as someone who
followed the discussions with reference to the first lineage that follows
al-Razi and al-Jurjani. That is why my research starts with al-Jurjaru's
analysis. It is worthy of analysis and further study though, to investigate
how the evaluation of the topic changed until al-Galanbawi's time and
how much of his analysis exhibit then an original take on mental exist
ence.
Al-Jurjani begins with positing the difference between those
groups that disagree on mental existence: Is the form the same in the
mind and the extra-mental world? In Tactiqat/J:Iashiya, al-Galanbawi too
deals with the issue of different positions regarding mental existence,
6 Ibn Sina, Abu <AJi al-I;Iusayn ibn <AbdAllah, al-sbija•, al-ManJiq 1: al-Madkbal(eds.
Georges Anawati, Ma.J:unud al-Khu<;layri, Sa<Jd layid, and A]:unad Fu'ad ai-Ahwaru;
Qum: Manshurat Maktabat Ayat Allah al-'11~ al-Mar<ashi, 1984-1985), I, 28. 7 ~. "Mustafa $evket Efendi'nin Risalesi," 64.
-171-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thoughr/S. Panldar
explaining the meaning of the claim that the theologians denied mental
existence. It is not the case that the theologians denied that when human
thinks/imagines (yata.?awwm'~ something or confirms something of
something, no form occurs in the mind/intellect ('aql). What they deny
is that the same quiddity of the thing or a simile of the quiddity of the
thing is occurring in the mind.8
On the one hand, we see the claim that the theologians are those
who deny mental existence and the philosophers are the ones that ac
cept them. Sinillarly a common view is that the latter group which ex
plains knowledge processes through the presence of the forms are re
quired to accept mental existence whilst the former group describes
knowledge as a relation.9 However, both al-Jurjani's and al-Galanbawi's
analyses imply that the reality of the matter is not that simple.
It is common to start the discussion of mental beings by analysing
the proofs for it. So does al-Jurjani. He gives the proofs for mental exist-
8 Al-Galanbawi, Ta'/iqat al-Galanbawl 'alii Mir al-7;abdhfb min al-man{iq wa-1-
kalam (• J:ltishiyat a/-Galanbawi 'alii J:ltisbtyat Mir Zabid 'alii Shari) ai-Dawwanf
li-Tahdhib ai-Ta.ftazdni fi 1-manfiq) (Istanbul: o.-p., 1234), 240 (also available at:
hnp://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fsllobjectldisplay/
bsb10219175_00071.html). 9 It is common among philosophers to see the notion of knowledge as a relation, and
the acceptance of mental existence as two inconsistent views; see al-Rlizi, Abu ·<Abd
Allah Mubammad ibn Mubammad Qutb al-Din al-Ta)).t:ani, al-Risttla al-ma'mftlafi 1-
t~awwur wa-l-t~diq (in Risdlattin .fi l-lrJ$awwur wa-l-ta$dfq, ed. Mahdi Shan'ati;
Qum: Mu'assasat Isma'"iliyyan, 1995), 23.
-172-
Osman.h'da ilm-i Kelam: lJimler, Eserler, Meseleler
ence and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's criticisms against them. The first proof
focuses on the possibility of conceiving non-existents including impos
sible beings and ultimate non-existence. As these are most definitely
non-existent in the extra-mental world, but as we can conceive them
and talk about them through true sentences, they should be affirmed
some form of existence, which is rp.ental existence.10 This proof is built
on the principle that affirmative true judgements require exist
ence/establishmet (thubttt) of their subjects. This principle is also named
as principle of presupposition (qtt'ida far'iyya): affllliling something of
something presupposes the existence of the subject.
Al-Jurjani seems to admit this proof as he defeats the criticisms
against it. Having said this, he further discusses al-Razi's criticism, which
is as follows: We cannot conceive of something (a concept) that is non
existent extra-mentally. The concept is either existent by itself or not.
The first is like the similitudes of Plato and philosophers defend the lat
ter by positing the Active Intellect as the source of forms. So according to
the philosophers, the things in the mind are sustained by the Active In
tellect.
Nevertheless, presence in the Active Intellect presuppos~s exist
ence in the extra-mental world. If the mental forms were in Active Intel
lect, then we would have impossible beings present in the extra-mental .J
world. However, this is not sound. and it is explicitly wrong. Then we
10 Al-Jurjani, ~e1hu 'l-Meuakif, I, 533.
-173-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar
come to admit that mental existents are established, but these beingS will
be different from the forms in the Active Intellect. Consequently only
similes and shadowy existents are those that are in the mind. This is the
explanation made by al-Jurjani.11
The second proof focuses on generalizations and universals. As
these concepts cannot exist individually and extra-mentally, they should
be established mentally. Lastly, the third proof is based on the very pos
sibility of forming propositions, thus it is similar to the first proof.12
Al-Jurjani's position in Sbm-[J al-Mawaqifis that he does not deny
mental existents. He legiti.rrtizes his stance on th~ fact that the judge
ments on mental existents are different from those about extra-mentals.13
Different rules apply to each category of mental and extra-mental exist
ents.
We can go back to the original claim of the philosophers that fire
in the extra-mental world and fire in the mind (mental) are different but
only in terms of their existence. In regards to their essence, they are the
same. This stance became troublesome for some theologians mainly
because they were distant to ontological and epistemological dualist
accounts. Accepting mental existence is cl9sely linked to explaining the
process of knowledge through the presence of form which is extracted
11 Al-Jurjaru, $erbu 'l-Meuakif, I, 543.
11 Ibid . ._ I, 539-544-
13 Ibid., I, 533-544; al-Galanbawi, Ta'liqat, 240.
-174-
Osmanlt'da ilm-i Keliim: Alirnler, Eserler, Meseleler
from matter, and this is based on accepting matter-form duality for the
objects of knowledge as well as for the knowing soul. In addition, the
identity of the essence is to be guaranteed by the existence of the Active
Intellect. As a result, the claim requires two immaterial entities: the im
material substantial soul and a separate intellect, namely the Active Intel
lect. It is then no surprise that theologians did not welcome these impli
cations of mental existence.
In terms of al-Galanbawl's texts, he does not use these proofs in
his . treatise on mental existents although these proofs were widely
known and well-established among theologians. In addition, they were
frequently used in both classical kalam and falsafa texts. Instead, al
Galanbawi chooses to start his analysis on mental existents by stating
that theologians denied mental existence. He takes side with the theolo
gians, yet uses the method by which philosophers explain mental exist
ence, witl1out committing to the metaphysical implications of their ideas.
n. Al-Galanbawi and His Treatise on Mental Existence
Al-Galanbawi starts the discussions by analyzing relations (nisba)
as mental beings. First question he deals with is "What is it that makes it
possible for the relations to be true (madar al-$idq)?" (1) And the second
question is 'What is tl1e principle of abstraction thanks to which we pos
sess mental beings?" (2). In tllis evaluation, along with relations ~nisab);
quantity (kam.), relative beings (Nibtirtit), non-existent (ma'dftm) and
relational accidentals (a 'rtirj nisbiyya) are listed as examples of mental
-175-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar
beings. Together with existence and non-existence, a third component
will be added to the discussion: the realm of the thing itself (najs at
am?). This introduces the question of the relation between extra-mental
being and the thing itself. As the two questions mentioned above imply,
the central manoeuvre of the theologians is to find the principle of truth
and abstraction of mental beings in a reality that is in the extra-mental
world. The evaluation then is inherently epistemological and therefore
deals with definitions of knowledge. Moreover, considering the Active
Intellect, ontological connection can be found upon epistemological
grounds. For the Peripatetic tradition in which knowledge is the occur
rence of forms, the Active Intellect plays an ontological role as well as an
epistemological one. It is the giver of the forms as well as the agent that
activates the knowledge process. Thus, considering knowledge as the
presence of forms and acceptance of mental existence seem to follow
one another. Belonging to a school that does not employ emanational
cosmology, early theologians would disagree with any epistemological
and cosmological role played by the Active Intellect. However al
Galanbawi is a later theologian whose stance is (as I have mentioned is
the case with al-Jurjaru, centuries before him) more complicated as it
reflects the historical developments in theology in which many philo
sophical theories and concepts were integrated into the. new melting pot
of later theology.
Al-Galanbawi defmes knowledge in his al-Burhan in a similar
-176-
Osmanh'da ilm-i Keliim: AI imler, ~erler, Meseleler
way to that of philosophers. Knowledge is the presence of forms in the
intellect.14 As mentioned before, thi.s type of definition requires accept
ing mental existence, the result of which will be two forms of being in
the mind and extra-mental world. So does al-Galanbawi. He affirms
mental existence. Furthermore, he doesn't define knowledge as a special
relation between the knower and the known, as theologians do. Alterna
tively, he redefines thi.s relation of knower as the mind and the known as
the form. 15 Knowledg~ defined either as the reception of forms or as
relation requires, in al-Galanbawi's case, the occurrence of forms and
thus acceptance of mental existence. In evaluating the position of theo
logians against mental existence, al-Galanbawi agrees with al-Jurjani that
what theologians criticize is basically that the form received in the mind
is the very essence.16 However, knowledge received is mainly built on
the extra-mental reality. Thus, al-Galanbawi avoids adopting the meta
physical connotations of mental existence as much as he can.
In al-Galanbawi's universe, realization (ta/;Jaqquq) of a thing has
14 Al-Galanbawi, Burhan-i Galanbawi (along with his lfdsbiyat ai-Bttrhdn; Istanbul: n.p., 1253), 4. One of many examples for the Peripatetic approach to knowledge: "Form is something that both the internal and external senses perceive, but the external sense perceives it first and then relays it to the internal sense ... The connotational attribute is something that the soui perceives from the sensible without the external senses f1rst perceiving it." (Psychology, 1.5, 43.6-11) qugted from McGinnis, Jon, Avicenna (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 98.
15 Akgti10, ismail Ge/enbevi'de Varltk DU§ii.ncesi, 62. 16 Ibid., 63.
-177-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/S. Panldar
three levels: extra-mental, mental, and the thing itself (nafs al-am1).
Occurrence of a thing in the mind and extra-mental world happens to be
the base for their specific consideration in nafs al-amr. Thus, so a specif
ic consideration of not being necessarily dependent on the existence of
a thinker (fan;l-ijti.1i¢") is attached to a mental or extra-mental thing and
then it is taken to be in nafs al-amr.17 In accord with this defutition, if
something has no reality other than the consideration of its thinker, such
as 'four is an even number,' then it can only have realization in the mind
but not in nafs al-amr. Despite this point, we will see that in some sec
tions, al-Galanbawi does not refrain from explaining fictionals through
naft al-am1·.18 This level of realization is not itself a· realm of occurrence.
This is a level in which we consider things through their specific consid
erations. In this sense, najs al-amr is understood as the situation in
which the thing itself occurs (fa-qawlunti. bti.dhti. mawjUd111 .fi naft al
am.r yu,-acf' bi-l-a111.11 najs' dbtilika 1-shay). The irnpossibles are worthy
of mentioning as they showcase the inbetween case of being in the mind
but not occurrent. Al-Galanbawi summarises the Peripatetic position in
this context that impossibles lack quiddities in nafs al-anzr and their sole
occurrence in the mind takes place through imitation and analogy (tash-
17 Al-Galanbawi, Tanbfh (in Rastl'il-i imti~Jt!n; Istanbul: Ma~ba'a-i 'Amira, 1302 AH),
198. 18 It i~ dear that nafs al-amr is understood with nuances among different thinkers and
the term itself is far from having a dear description either in classical texts or in
contemporary studies. Thus I do welcome any further srudy that falsifies my understanding of nafs al-amr:
-178-
Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler
bib and tamthil).19
Al-Galanbawi mainly analyses propositional cases in which
propositions are various combinations of predicates and subjects chosen
from extra-mentals and possibles. TI1e ultimate cases are ''AnqiP (a
mythical bird) is possible' (i) and 'Zayd is blind' (ii). Both the mythical
bird and being possible are situations that we cannot find in the extra
mental world. Zayd himself is an extra-mental being whilst blindness as
a negative attribute is arguably abstracted from the very extra-mental
being of Zayd hinlself. Thus (i) showcases fictionals whilst (ii) is a dis
cussion about non-existents in the form of negative attribute.
Al-Galanbawi weaves his Risalafi l-wujftd al-dhihniaround ex
amples of this kind and he starts the discussion with the case of simple
relation between light and day. We lmow there is a relation of necessity
between light and day just as we know there is no such relation between
light and day. However, where is the relation itself? The · general ap
proach seems to derive the relation from the very extra-mental being of
the day itself. Such is the common stance among theologians: to find the
principle of abstraction in the extra-mental world.
To complicate the issue, al-Galanbawi enlarges the discussion
with less clear cases such as 'A ·simile of this world is possible' (iii). Nei
ther simile of the wodd, nor being possible are extra-mental realities. If ./
19 Al-Galanbawi, I<fam anna kulf munzktd" wajilf"' kana aw mumkirf'" ... (in Rasa'il
i imtifJtin; Istanbul: Mat~a'a-i 'Anura, 1302 AH), 166.
-179-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/S. Panldar
one tries to derive the simile from the existent world, then deriving the
existence of 'the partner of God' becomes possible too. Then an absurd
situation will occur that the words of an infidel who says 'a partner to
God is possible' should be accepted as truth. In order to avoid such ab
surdity, the only ~scape is to tum the proposition into negative. The
negative predications do not follow the principle of presupposition and
thus, existence of the subject is not required.
With this, al-Galanbawi provides us with two types of truthmak
ers for two types of predicates. If the proposition is affirmative, the
truthmaker (m.adar al-$idq) is abstracted from either an existent in the
extra-mental world or a thinking subject (man yat~awwaruha). If it is
negative, correspondence (m~ttabaqa) alone is sufficient and existence
of the subject is not required for the sentence to be true.
Then, al-Galanbawi asks about the propositions that cannot be
tested through human senses - i.e. the proposition occurs independent
of human perceptions' reach. The example is about a leaf that falls down
in a dark "night. Where is the relation b~tween the leaf and its movement?
It cannot be found by the p.elp of human perception and mind as it is a
situation independent of what the senses can acquire. Then the relation
will be sought in either a lower or higher intellect. Lower intellect would
not be capable of imagining, and so it cannot be the answer. In the case
of higher intellect, the choices are that the form is in it in a particular
manner or universally. As well as type of knowledge (universal or par-
-180-
Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alim!er, Eserler, Meseleler
ticular) time of knowledge becomes a relevant question. Is it before or
after the leaf falls down, or is knowledge maintained at the time of its
fall? At this point, the falling of the leaf in a dark night is the case where
al-Galanbawi links the discussion of mental existents to the discussion of
God's knowledge. Remember that theologians deem knowledge as a
relation and dependence (tacalluq). Knowledge is created (f?tidith) ac
cording to the theologians, and in terms of the event of a leaf falling, the
event itself is created too. However, attributing created knowledge or
some form of knowledge that affects the knower to God's knowledge is
unacceptable. One way of solving the issue of God's knowledge is then
to consider God's knowledge as eternal but the dependence as created20•
Problem of unending continuity and regress occurs if the relation be
tween God's will and the possible beings is taken as eternal?1
To sum up, many of the cases al-Galanbawi discusses are exam
ples in which it is difficult to find the principle of abstraction in the extra
mental world. He states that the principle of abstraction (mabda> al
intiza') is either extra-mental or built upon the nature of human after
estimation, by human beings?2 Therefore in the case of the abstraction
of a relation between a leaf and its movement (falling) is estimated by
20 Al-Galanbawi, Ta<Jiqat, 241. 21 Al-Galanbawi, J:ldsbiya li-Isma'if al-Galanbawf <ala /-]alai min gf-<Aqd'id
(Darsa<adat: Shirkat-i Khayriyya-i Sabifiyya, 1307), 58. 22 Al-Galanbawi, Risa/a fl l-wujud a/-dbihni (MS Istanbul: Si.ileymaniye Library,
Giresun Yazmalar, 106), 82a.
-181-
Tracing Mental Ex.is£ence in al-GaJanbawl's Though£/S. Panldar
the mind after the fall embedded in the nature of human.
According to al-Galanbawi, naft al-amr is more comprehensive
than the realm of the mental existence. This is because it includes every
thing extra-mental and also some of the mental. Naft al-amT is mainly
necessary to allow affirmative true statements. An example in which no
consideration of mind is required would be a leaf falling down in a dark
room when nobody can observe it, but someone says a leaf fell down.
What makes this sentence true is nafs al-amr.
Furthermore, in Ristila .fi l-wujtid al-dhihni, al-Galanbawi pre
sents other examples regarding the same issue. Th~se are mainly propo
sitional and they showcase relation to a realm which is neither mental
nor extra-mental: 'The object is white,' 'Human being is a species,' 'Zayd
is blind,' and 'the mythical bird <Anq~P.' The subjects and predicates are
chosen among extra-mentals and objects of consideration (i'tibtirtit) and
when they are both objects ofconsideration, their confirmation is to be
found in najs al-anu·.
The discussions of these later examples are treated in a similar
way to d1at of d1e earlier examples. The general schema seems to fmd
the principle of abstraction or the truthmaker of the relation either in the
extra-mental world or in a relation to the extra-mental world. If it is not
prov~ded d1rough the extra-mental woilc!, then theologians apply to a
world of realities called naft al-am1·. Although the mechanism of naft
al-amt· seems to be sinillar to that of mental beings, it help to overcome
-182-
Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelfun: AlimJer, Eserler, Meseleler
some of the metaphysical concerns since there is no any other realm of
intellect such as the Active Intellect. Thus the discussion seems to have
been evolved in theological tradition into accepting mental existence
with a reduced role and into excluding of the Active Intellect as a meta
physical principle and epistemological truthmaker. Thus, although the
formulation of the question is still .whether there is mental existence or
not, the content is not a question, based on some scepticism of positing
a mode of mental existence. Thus the claim 0) can be applied to al
Galanbawi's case that mental existence is not denied per se.23
When discussing the example of 'Zayd is blind,' al-Galanbawi
mentions an interesting point that admitting mental existence might lead
to regress, because in the case of Zayd's blindness, once possibility of
attributing a non-existent quality is made possible, then another non
existent over that attribution can be considered possible as well. As a
result, these possibilities of attribution can carry on without an end.
Similar to views of many other classical period thinkers, al-Galanbawi
also admits that this regress is to be avoided.
Going back to najs al-am.r, the important thing about it is that
purely fictional mental beings are excluded from this realm. As in the
case of ''Anq~P is possible,' one can argue that the predicate is derived
from the concept of 'Anq~P itself and 'Anq~P is derived from different .J
23 (0 The real debate topic is not about affirmation of mental existence.
-183-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/S. Panldar
pieces that were gathered from sense perceptions.24 Together with" this,
al-Galanbawi implies that the truth of propositions about fictional beings
such as ''Anq~P is a bird' and 'Five is an even number' are related to najs
al-amr. Accordingly, he should commit himself to a more comprehen
sive understanding of najs al-a1nr that includes those which are in the
mind and purely fictional. However, he does not explain the situation of
fictionals in accord with these points. Indeed, his explanations and way
cf dealing with the issue leave us many questions which are not an
swered by him in the work.
Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be derived from the general struc
ture and content of al-Galanbawi's treatise on mental existence.
First of all,_ al-Galanbawi's exemplary cases are not only follow
ing the various examples that were widely discussed in kaHim and falsa
fa traditions but also because they are handled by al-Galanbawi in such
a way th~t he reflects his peculiar viewpoint on the issue. His main dis
cussion of mental existents is on objects of considerations (i'tiban:tt). His
main approach to the issue appears to be defined by the general frame
work of major theological problems. l'tiba1·at are impottant because it
provides him with shifting the main focus of the discussionS from the
mental existence for human knowledge into God's knowledge. The ob-
24 AI-Galanbawi, Risala.fi l-wujud al-dbihnf, 83.
-184-
Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler
jects of considerations and especially those of relations are important
because they relate to the relation between the world and God. The shift
from a problem of nafs (the human soul) turns into the knowledge of
the possibles in eternity and a problem about knowledge of God. A sec
ond issue he discusses in length is the possibility of infinity related to -
mental existents, because the pn:;>blem is again shifted into eternal
knowledge and whether the possibles known before the extra-mental
existence can be infinite.
Although he mentions that the mainstream theologian stance is to
deny mental existence, he comes to the point of saying that this is a se
mantic discussion.25 His account of the exceptional cases discussed in
the paper, through eid1er nafs al-amr or dlrough estimation embedded
in the nature of human, appears to be an indirect phrasing of mental
existence. The general difference between theologians and philosophers
is not really about denying mental existence per se, but on understand
ing of knowledge and its implications .in terms of God's knowledge. He
does not focus on the implications in terms of immateriality of the source
or in terms of accepting form.
BffiLIOGRAPHY
Akgli<;, Ahmet, jsmail Gelenbevi'de Varhk DCt§ilncesi (PhD disser
tation; Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Sosyal Bilirnler En-stittisu, 2006). .J
25 A1-Ga1anbawi, Ta<tiqat, 255.
-185-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar
Frank, Richard M., Al-Ghazali and the Asb 'arite School (Dtirham
& London: Duke University Press, 1994).
al-Galanbawi, Ismac-Il ibn Mu~tafa ibn Mal:unud, BU?·han-i Galanbawi (along with his I:Itisbiyat al-Burbtin; Istanbul: n.p.,
1253).
---, I:Itishiya li-Ismti'il al-Galanbawi 'a/ti l-jaltil min al
'Aqa>id (Darsa'adat: Shirkat-i Khayriyya-i Sabafiyya, 1307).
---, !'lam anna kulf mumkin;" wtijiY111 kana aw nzumkina"
... (in Rasa>il-i imti/;Jan; Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Amira, 1302
AH), 166-167.
---, Risala.fi 'il1n Allah ta'tilti bi-l-ma'dtimat 'ala madhhab al-mutakallimin (MS Istanbul: Koprulu Library, 23).
---, Risala .fi ta/;Jqiq 'ibn Allah ta 'ala al-muta 'alliq bi-l-asbya~
(in Rasa>il-i im.ti(Jtin; Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Amira, 1302 AH),
173-178.
--- , Risata .fi 1-wujftd al-dbilmi (MS Istanbul: Suleymaniye Li
brary, Giresun Yazmalar, 106), fols. 82-83.
---, al-Risala li-l-Galanbawi fi 'ilm Allah ta 'aid bi-lma'dtimat (in Rasa>il-i imti/;Jan; Istanbul: Matba'a-i
'Amira, 1302 AH), 178-194.
---, Ta'liqat al-Galanbawi 'ala Mir al-Tahdhib min alman{iq wa-l-kaltim ( = I:Itisbiyat al-Galanbawi 'ala
I:Itisbiyat Mi1· Zahid 'ala Shar/;J al-Dawwani li-Tahdhib alTajtazani .fi l-manfiq) (istanbul: n.p. , 1234), (also availa
ble at: http:/ /reader.digitale-sammlunen.de/de/fs1/ object/display/bsb10219175_00071.html).
-186-
Osmanh'da ilm-i KeHim: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler
- --, Tanbzh (in RastFil-i imtil;Jan; Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Amira,
1302 AH),' 198-202.
Ibn Sina, Abu 'All al-}:Iusayn ibn 'Abd Allah [as Avicenna], Avicenna 's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitab al
najat, book II, chapter VI, with historico-philosophical notes and textual improvenzents on the Cairo edition
(translated into English by Fazlur Ralunan; London: Ox
ford University Press, 1952).
---, al-Shifa', al-Man!iq 1, 3 vols. in one vol. (1. al-Madkhal; 2. al-Maqulat; 3. al-Cfbarat) (eds. Georges Anawati,
Mal:unud al-KhU<;layri, Sa'id Zayid, and AJ:unad Fu'ad al
Ahwani; Qum: Manshurat Maktabat Ayat Allah al-'Uzma
al-Mar'ashi, 1984-1985).
al-Jurjani, Abu 1-I:Iasan al-Sayyid al-Sharif 'Ali ibn Mul)anunad ibn
'Ali, $erhu 'l-Mevakzf Mevdkif $erhi (Metin-c;evi?'i) [Sbm·J:; al-Mawaqi.fj, 3 vols., (Arabic text with Turkish translation
by Orner Ttirker; Istanbul: Tiirkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu
Ba§kanhg.t Yaymlan, 2015).
Ka§, Murat, "Mustafa ~evket Efendi'nin Risalesi I§1gmda Zihin,
Harle ve Nefsii'l-Emr Kavramlarmm Analizi," islam Medeniyeti Ara§tmnalan Dergisi CiMAD) 1/1 (2014), 58-
87.
Koroglu, Burhan, Necmeddfn el-Kdtibf el-Kazvfnf'nin Bilgi Teori
si Ostanbul: Bah~e§ehir Universitesi Yaymlan, 2015).
McGinnis, ]on, Avicenna (Oxford & New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
-187-
Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/$. Panldar
Memi§, Murat, Mu 'tezilf Bir Bakt§la Bilgi Problemi (Arik:ara:
Sarka<; Yaymlan, 2011).
Okudan, Rifat, qetenbevf ve Vahdet-i Viicud (!sparta: Faki.ilte
Kitabevi Yaymlan, 2006).
al-R.azi, Abu 'AbdAllah Mul:lammad ibn Mubarnmad Qu~b al-Din al-Tal)tani, al-Ristila al-ma rmula .fi l-ta$awwur wa-l-ta$diq
(in Ristilattin .fi l-ttz$awwur wa-l-ta$diq, ed. Mahd.I
Shari'ati; Qum: Mu'assasat Isma'uiyyan, 1995).
Shihadeh, Ayman, "Al-Ghazali and Kalam: The Conundrum of His
Body-Soul Dualism," Islam and Rationality: Tbe Impact of al-Ghaztili. Papers Collected on His 900th Anniversary.
vol. 2(ed. Frank Griffe!; Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2016), 113-
141.
Tashkuprizada, Abu 1-Khayr 'I~am al-Din Al)mad Efendi, Zihinsel
Varhga Dai1· Tartt§1nala1·da Oziin ve Hakikatin Tespiti (in
Orner Mahir Alper [ed.), Osmanlz Felsefesi: Set;me Metinle1~ . translated and edited with an introduction on
Tashkuprizada by Orner Mahir Alper; Istanbul: Klasik
Yaymlan, 2015), 241-302.
Ttirker; Orner, Seyyid Serif Ciircani'nin Tevil Anlay'l§t: Yorumun
Metafizik, Manttki ve Dilbilimsel Temelleri (PhD dissertation; Istanbul: Marmara Oniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler En
stittisti, 2006).
van Ess, Josef, Die Erkenntnislebre des rA{ludaddin al-lci:
Obersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner Mawaqif (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966).
-188-