Dr. Thieß PetersenProgramShaping SustainableEconomies

Phone:+49 5241 81-81218Email:thiess.petersen@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. MichaelBöhmerPrognos AG

Phone:+49 89 954 1586-701Email:michael.böhmer@prognos.com

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6 Economic impact of South-ern European memberstates exiting the eurozone

While Greece defaulting on its sovereign debt and leavingthe European Monetary Union would in and of itself have arelatively minor effect on the world economy, such a movecould, however, undermine investor confidence in the Por-tuguese, Spanish and Italian capital markets and thus pro-voke not only a sovereign default in those states as well, butalso a severe worldwide recession. This would in turn reduceeconomic growth by a total of 17.2 trillion euros in theworld’s 42 largest economies in the lead-up to 2020. Henceit is incumbent upon the community of nations to preventGreece from a sovereign default as well as leaving the euro,and the domino effect that this event could induce.

Focus Legend for the scenarios: Grexit: Greece defaults and leaves

the eurozone GP-Exit: Both Greece and Portugal

default and leave the eurozone GPS-Exit: Portugal, Greece and

Spain default and leave the euro-zone.

GPSI-Exit: Greece, Portugal, Spainand Italy default and leave the eu-rozone.

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06 The debate concerning the eventualitythat Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italymight leave the European Monetary Unionhas become increasingly strident since theonset of the euro crisis in September2009. For example, in July 2012 GermanMinister of Economics Philipp Rösler ex-pressed the view that the prospect ofGreece leaving the European MonetaryUnion was no longer so daunting as it hadonce seemed. CSU Secretary GeneralAlexander Dobrindt echoed this view inlate August 2012, when he predicted thatGreece would leave the eurozone by 2013.The European Central Bank’s decision thispast September to buy up governmentbonds of European Monetary Union mem-ber states that are facing a sovereign debtcrisis somewhat eased the situation forthese states. However, their budgets arestill in disarray, a fact underscored by thestatement by Greek Prime Minister An-tonis Samaras in October 2012 to the ef-fect that Greece will be bankrupt by theend of next month unless further infu-sions of foreign capital are forthcoming.

Against this backdrop, it is important tobear in mind that there is no legal mecha-nism for excluding European MonetaryUnion members from the eurozone. How-ever, bailout money might simply dry upbecause the actors providing it may ulti-mately take the view that budget cutbacksin the eurozone member states facingbudgetary crises are not progressing satis-factorily. Without bailout money fromEuropean rescue packages and the Inter-national Monetary Fund (IMF), thesestates would have no further revenue andwould face bankruptcy. But in order for astate that finds itself in this plight to beable to pay government employees andfinance pension payments and other enti-tlements, it would need to introduce itsown currency: in other words, it wouldhave no choice but to leave the EuropeanMonetary Union. We will now discuss the

consequences of such an event, in termsof four possible exit scenarios.

1.Design of the exit sce-narios

Our projections concerning the economicconsequences of the four European Mone-tary Union member states that are cur-rently in dire financial straits leaving theeurozone are based on four scenarios. Inthe first, only Greece takes leave of the eu-rozone (Grexit scenario). In the second,both Greece and Portugal exit (GP-Exitscenario). The third scenario sees the de-parture of Spain, in addition to Greece andPortugal (GPS-Exit scenario), and in thefourth scenario the quartet of states com-prising Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spainbids adieu to the euro. We opted for thiseurozone exiting sequence because thecurrent debate is largely couched in termsof states that might leave the monetaryunion.

We estimated the real economy-consequences entailed by these four sce-narios by carrying out simulations usingthe Prognos macroeconomic world modelcalled VIEW (see box). To this end, wemodelled the projected real GDP of the 42states in the VIEW model from 2013 to2020, based on the assumption that ourputative scenarios will become realitynext year. The computations concerningreal GDP resulting from these scenarioswere compared with the economic dataand forecasts in Prognos’s “Weltreport2012,” which was published in mid 2012and is predicated on the assumption thatthe eurozone will remain intact (baselinescenario). The forecasts presented in thisreport were likewise elaborated using ourVIEW model. According to the report, thebudget cutbacks that need to be made inthe lead-up to 2016 and 2017 will be a

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The VIEW model is a macroeconomic model that is usedto make projections and simulate economic scenarios. Thesimulations in our study encompassed the world’s 42states that account for more than 90 percent of the worldeconomy and were based on the following parameters:supply and demand; labour markets; government fi-nances; as well as exports, imports, currency rates and soon. Thus, the model also factors in the interrelationshipsbetween the various states as regards these parameters.

huge drag on worldwide economic growth(see Prognos AG 2012). Our four scenariosforecast even greater growth slowdowns.

The four simulations we carried out werebased on the following assumptions: Itwas presumed that Greek bailouts wouldbe suspended, causing Greece to face sov-ereign default and consequently introduceits own currency. No one can possiblypredict how large this haircut would actu-ally be, but our simulations are based on ascenario involving a 60 percent defaultrate. The remaining 40 percent of Greece’sdebt would continue to bedenominated in euros.This haircut would affectboth public and privatecreditors, who would beforced to take a charge on60 percent of their loansto Greece. Table 1 dis-plays how this might playout financially for selectedstates.

A Greek sovereign default would also re-sult in correspondingly high writedownsfor government budgets. As such write-downs are of an accounting nature, thebudget deficits of the states to whichGreece owes money either directly or indi-rectly would increase, thus driving up thesovereign debt and debt service of thesestates. This in turn would force the gov-ernments affected to consolidate else-where by either cutting their expendituresor raising taxes. Such measures reducedemand for goods and services, which inturn reduces economic output and in-creases unemployment. The VIEW modeltakes into account the budgetary impact ofa haircut by positing writedowns of thevarious industrial nations’ extensive loanreceivables and liabilities (EFSM, EFSFand IMF bailouts; the European CentralBank buying up government bonds; targetloans). The budgetary impact of sovereign

defaults cannot be taken into account foremerging economies owing to a lack ofdata.

Greece’s public and private sector debtorswould also need to write off 60 percent oftheir outstanding loans. According to ourcalculations, these losses would presuma-bly have a direct negative wealth effect onhousehold income for the relevant year;and this in turn would reduce housingstart-ups and consumer spending.

Sovereign default and the introduction of anational currency would of course have farreaching economic consequences also forGreece. The new Greek currency would bedevalued relative to all other currencies,and the scope of this devaluation remainsevery bit as uncertain as the scope of ahaircut. Our VIEW model simulations arepredicated on a 50 percent devaluation ofthe Greek currency. This devaluationwould drive up the government-debt ratioas expressed in the new Greek currency,because this debt would have previouslybeen denominated in euros. Hence intro-duction of a national currency would re-duce Greece’s government debt ratio by amere 20 percent; and what’s worse, capi-tal-market confidence in Greece’s credit-worthiness would evaporate. Hence theGreek government’s sole source of reve-nue would be tax revenue, which in turnmeans that the Greek budget balancewould be virtually zero in the lead-up to2020. A Greek sovereign default and 03

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The VIEW model is a macroeconomic model that is usedto make projections and simulate economic scenarios. Thesimulations in our study encompassed the world’s 42states that account for more than 90 percent of the worldeconomy and were based on the following parameters:supply and demand; labour markets; government fi-nances; as well as exports, imports, currency rates and soon. Thus, the model also factors in the interrelationshipsbetween the various states as regards these parameters.

huge drag on worldwide economic growth(see Prognos AG 2012). Our four scenariosforecast even greater growth slowdowns.

The four simulations we carried out werebased on the following assumptions: Itwas presumed that Greek bailouts wouldbe suspended, causing Greece to face sov-ereign default and consequently introduceits own currency. No one can possiblypredict how large this haircut would actu-ally be, but our simulations are based on ascenario involving a 60 percent defaultrate. The remaining 40 percent of Greece’sdebt would continue to bedenominated in euros.This haircut would affectboth public and privatecreditors, who would beforced to take a charge on60 percent of their loansto Greece. Table 1 dis-plays how this might playout financially for selectedstates.

A Greek sovereign default would also re-sult in correspondingly high writedownsfor government budgets. As such write-downs are of an accounting nature, thebudget deficits of the states to whichGreece owes money either directly or indi-rectly would increase, thus driving up thesovereign debt and debt service of thesestates. This in turn would force the gov-ernments affected to consolidate else-where by either cutting their expendituresor raising taxes. Such measures reducedemand for goods and services, which inturn reduces economic output and in-creases unemployment. The VIEW modeltakes into account the budgetary impact ofa haircut by positing writedowns of thevarious industrial nations’ extensive loanreceivables and liabilities (EFSM, EFSFand IMF bailouts; the European CentralBank buying up government bonds; targetloans). The budgetary impact of sovereign

defaults cannot be taken into account foremerging economies owing to a lack ofdata.

Greece’s public and private sector debtorswould also need to write off 60 percent oftheir outstanding loans. According to ourcalculations, these losses would presuma-bly have a direct negative wealth effect onhousehold income for the relevant year;and this in turn would reduce housingstart-ups and consumer spending.

Sovereign default and the introduction of anational currency would of course have farreaching economic consequences also forGreece. The new Greek currency would bedevalued relative to all other currencies,and the scope of this devaluation remainsevery bit as uncertain as the scope of ahaircut. Our VIEW model simulations arepredicated on a 50 percent devaluation ofthe Greek currency. This devaluationwould drive up the government-debt ratioas expressed in the new Greek currency,because this debt would have previouslybeen denominated in euros. Hence intro-duction of a national currency would re-duce Greece’s government debt ratio by amere 20 percent; and what’s worse, capi-tal-market confidence in Greece’s credit-worthiness would evaporate. Hence theGreek government’s sole source of reve-nue would be tax revenue, which in turnmeans that the Greek budget balancewould be virtually zero in the lead-up to2020. A Greek sovereign default and 03

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The VIEW model is a macroeconomic model that is usedto make projections and simulate economic scenarios. Thesimulations in our study encompassed the world’s 42states that account for more than 90 percent of the worldeconomy and were based on the following parameters:supply and demand; labour markets; government fi-nances; as well as exports, imports, currency rates and soon. Thus, the model also factors in the interrelationshipsbetween the various states as regards these parameters.

huge drag on worldwide economic growth(see Prognos AG 2012). Our four scenariosforecast even greater growth slowdowns.

The four simulations we carried out werebased on the following assumptions: Itwas presumed that Greek bailouts wouldbe suspended, causing Greece to face sov-ereign default and consequently introduceits own currency. No one can possiblypredict how large this haircut would actu-ally be, but our simulations are based on ascenario involving a 60 percent defaultrate. The remaining 40 percent of Greece’sdebt would continue to bedenominated in euros.This haircut would affectboth public and privatecreditors, who would beforced to take a charge on60 percent of their loansto Greece. Table 1 dis-plays how this might playout financially for selectedstates.

A Greek sovereign default would also re-sult in correspondingly high writedownsfor government budgets. As such write-downs are of an accounting nature, thebudget deficits of the states to whichGreece owes money either directly or indi-rectly would increase, thus driving up thesovereign debt and debt service of thesestates. This in turn would force the gov-ernments affected to consolidate else-where by either cutting their expendituresor raising taxes. Such measures reducedemand for goods and services, which inturn reduces economic output and in-creases unemployment. The VIEW modeltakes into account the budgetary impact ofa haircut by positing writedowns of thevarious industrial nations’ extensive loanreceivables and liabilities (EFSM, EFSFand IMF bailouts; the European CentralBank buying up government bonds; targetloans). The budgetary impact of sovereign

defaults cannot be taken into account foremerging economies owing to a lack ofdata.

Greece’s public and private sector debtorswould also need to write off 60 percent oftheir outstanding loans. According to ourcalculations, these losses would presuma-bly have a direct negative wealth effect onhousehold income for the relevant year;and this in turn would reduce housingstart-ups and consumer spending.

Sovereign default and the introduction of anational currency would of course have farreaching economic consequences also forGreece. The new Greek currency would bedevalued relative to all other currencies,and the scope of this devaluation remainsevery bit as uncertain as the scope of ahaircut. Our VIEW model simulations arepredicated on a 50 percent devaluation ofthe Greek currency. This devaluationwould drive up the government-debt ratioas expressed in the new Greek currency,because this debt would have previouslybeen denominated in euros. Hence intro-duction of a national currency would re-duce Greece’s government debt ratio by amere 20 percent; and what’s worse, capi-tal-market confidence in Greece’s credit-worthiness would evaporate. Hence theGreek government’s sole source of reve-nue would be tax revenue, which in turnmeans that the Greek budget balancewould be virtually zero in the lead-up to2020. A Greek sovereign default and

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06 Greece switching to a new currency wouldalso put a major dent in consumer and in-vestor confidence, which our simulations(based on past examples such as Argen-tina in 2001) show would translate into aten percent decline in 2013 and a fivepercent decline in 2014, for both parame-ters. Moreover, the aforementioned de-clines in demand for goods and serviceswould not be limited to the state affected.In a world where individual state econo-mies maintain highly symbiotic relation-ships with each other through foreigntrade, falls in consumer demand in onestate would soon spread to its tradingpartners. The result would be a worldwidedecline in economic activity.

The other three scenar-ios were simulatedbased on the same as-sumption of a 60 per-cent haircut and a 50percent devaluation ofthe new currency rela-tive to all other curren-cies.

2.Ramifications of the eu-rozone exit scenarios forthe world economy

The VIEW model simulations discussed inthis section shed light on the likely eco-nomic effects of the four eurozone exitscenarios for the 42 states encompassedby the model. Like all simulations, the re-sults we obtained were strongly influ-enced by the assumptions on which theywere based, and in this case above all bythe actual scope of the haircuts and thecurrency devaluations that would comeinto play. In our view, the assumptions

that form the basis for our simulationscurrently represent the closest approxima-tion of the reality that would actually un-fold.

Using these assumptions as basis, the im-pact of the four scenarios on the worldeconomy was simulated for the period ex-tending from 2013 to 2020. In the interestof modelling the impact of each of the fourscenarios on economic growth, annual de-clines in GDP were computed in compari-son to the projections in Prognos’s “Wel-treport 2012” and were then tallied for theyears 2013 to 2020. The projected cumu-lative declines in economic growth thusobtained are displayed in table 2 for allfour scenarios.

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Grexit scenario: A sover-eign default on the part ofGreece and its consequentexit from the EuropeanMonetary Union would, inand of itself, have only aminor impact on economicgrowth in Europe and therest of the world. The ag-gregate GDP decline for2013 to 2020 in the 42VIEW states, which accountfor more than 90 percent ofworldwide output, wouldamount to 674 billion euros.The decline in Greece’sGDP would be the singlelargest chunk in this regard(164 billion euros). The cu-mulative decline in growthin Germany would amountto only 73 billion euros. Inthe interest of putting theseGDP declines into perspec-tive for each of the variousstates, the cumulative de-cline in economic growthwas compared to GDP for2013. Greece’s cumulativeGDP decline would amountto 94 percent for 2013,compared to only 2.9 and0.9 percent for Germanyand the US respectively.The economies of France,Portugal, and Bulgariawould be relatively hard hit,by virtue of a cumulativeGDP decline amounting toaround 8 percent.

GP-Exit scenario: The eco-nomic impact of bothGreece and Portugal leavingthe European Monetary Un-ion would be palpable, butstill relatively minor. In this

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Grexit scenario: A sover-eign default on the part ofGreece and its consequentexit from the EuropeanMonetary Union would, inand of itself, have only aminor impact on economicgrowth in Europe and therest of the world. The ag-gregate GDP decline for2013 to 2020 in the 42VIEW states, which accountfor more than 90 percent ofworldwide output, wouldamount to 674 billion euros.The decline in Greece’sGDP would be the singlelargest chunk in this regard(164 billion euros). The cu-mulative decline in growthin Germany would amountto only 73 billion euros. Inthe interest of putting theseGDP declines into perspec-tive for each of the variousstates, the cumulative de-cline in economic growthwas compared to GDP for2013. Greece’s cumulativeGDP decline would amountto 94 percent for 2013,compared to only 2.9 and0.9 percent for Germanyand the US respectively.The economies of France,Portugal, and Bulgariawould be relatively hard hit,by virtue of a cumulativeGDP decline amounting toaround 8 percent.

GP-Exit scenario: The eco-nomic impact of bothGreece and Portugal leavingthe European Monetary Un-ion would be palpable, butstill relatively minor. In this

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Grexit scenario: A sover-eign default on the part ofGreece and its consequentexit from the EuropeanMonetary Union would, inand of itself, have only aminor impact on economicgrowth in Europe and therest of the world. The ag-gregate GDP decline for2013 to 2020 in the 42VIEW states, which accountfor more than 90 percent ofworldwide output, wouldamount to 674 billion euros.The decline in Greece’sGDP would be the singlelargest chunk in this regard(164 billion euros). The cu-mulative decline in growthin Germany would amountto only 73 billion euros. Inthe interest of putting theseGDP declines into perspec-tive for each of the variousstates, the cumulative de-cline in economic growthwas compared to GDP for2013. Greece’s cumulativeGDP decline would amountto 94 percent for 2013,compared to only 2.9 and0.9 percent for Germanyand the US respectively.The economies of France,Portugal, and Bulgariawould be relatively hard hit,by virtue of a cumulativeGDP decline amounting toaround 8 percent.

GP-Exit scenario: The eco-nomic impact of bothGreece and Portugal leavingthe European Monetary Un-ion would be palpable, butstill relatively minor. In this

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06 scenario, the cumulative GDP decline inthe 42 VIEW states would amount tonearly 2.4 trillion euros, with Portugal ac-counting for 84 billion of this amountalone. In Germany, the 225 billion eurodecline in GDP under the GP-Exit scenariowould wreak substantial economic dam-age. The 365 billion decline in GDP wouldbe even greater in the US (in absoluteterms) than in Europe, while the figuresfor France and China would be 331 and275 billion euros respectively. However,these figures are put into perspectivewhen compared to the declines in GDP for2013. The cumulative GDP declines in theUS and Germany would amount to 3.3 and9.1 percent of 2013 GDP respectively,while the figure for France would be ap-preciably higher (17.6 percent). But bycomparison, the 55 percent decline in Por-tugal would be far more severe. The figurefor Greece is only slightly higher than forthe Grexit scenario and would remain ataround 94 percent.

GPS-Exit scenario: Greece, Portugal andSpain leaving the European Monetary Un-ion would provoke palpable GDP declinesworldwide. The cumulative decline inFrance’s GDP in the lead-up to 2020would amount to more than 1.2 trillion eu-ros, and in Germany to more than 850 bil-lion euros. The cumulative GDP declinesfor the four BRIC states would amount to1.4 trillion euros, and for the US to morethan 1.2 trillion euros. The total economiclosses in the 42 VIEW states wouldamount to nearly 7.9 trillion euros. In theGPS-Exit scenario, cumulative GDP lossesfor 2013 would be considerable, particu-larly in Portugal (due to the fact thatFrance is a major trading partner) andFrance (due to, among other things, theextensive loans French banks have madeto Spain). In this scenario, Portugal’s GDPwould decrease by 104 percent relative to2013, followed by Greece (96 percent),Spain (81 percent), France (65 percent),

Germany (34 percent), China (24 percent)and the US (11 percent).

GPSI-Exit scenario: The departure ofGreece, Italy, Portugal and Spain from theEuropean Monetary Union would provokea worldwide recession that would trans-late into a GDP decline amounting tonearly 17.2 trillion euros in the 42 VIEWstates in the lead-up to 2020. In terms ofabsolute figures, the declines would be thegreatest in France (2.9 trillion euros), theUS (2.8 trillion euros), China (1.9 trillioneuros), and Germany (around 1.7 trillioneuros). France would be particularly hardhit by Italy’s sovereign default and exitfrom the euro, on account of the extensiveloans French banks have made to Italy.The cumulative GDP decline wouldamount to 154 percent of economic outputfor 2013, with Italy alone registering acumulative GDP loss of around 75 percentof GDP for 2013. The counterpart figuresfor Germany, the US and China would be69, 25 and 49 percent respectively.

A decline in real GDP of this magnitudewould also drive up unemployment. Forexample, in the GPSI-Exit scenario Ger-many’s unemployment rate in 2015 and2016 would be 2.5 and 2.2 percent higher,respectively, relative to the baseline sce-nario. In the ensuing 2017 to 2020 period,Germany’s unemployment rate wouldrange from 0.5 to 1.7 percent higher thanthe baseline scenario.

3.Economic policyconsequences

While Greece defaulting on its sovereigndebt and leaving the European MonetaryUnion would in and of itself have a rela-tively minor effect on the world economy,the consequences of this event are to allintents and purpose shrouded in mystery.

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06One possible consequence, however, isthat Greece leaving the European Mone-tary Union would send a robust and last-ing signal to Italy, Portugal and Spain thatthe gravy train of bailouts is bound to endunless these states make enormous effortsto get their financial houses in order. Thisin turn might potentially reduce opposi-tion to tough but necessary reforms, andthus help resolve the euro crisis. But onthe other hand, a Greek sovereign defaultcould lead to capital market speculationand other untoward responses that wouldprovoke sovereign default on the part ofPortugal, Spain and ultimately Italy. Andthis in turn would send the world econ-omy into a deep recession that would af-fect not only Europe, but the rest of theworld as well. Apart from the severe eco-nomic consequences of such a recession,it would also put major strains on the so-cial fabric and political stability of a num-ber of states, particularly those that leavethe European Monetary Union; but otherstates would feel these strains as well.Hence there is a definite possibility thatGreece leaving the European MonetaryUnion would provoke a domino effect thatwould translate into a lengthy worldwiderecession.

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06One possible consequence, however, isthat Greece leaving the European Mone-tary Union would send a robust and last-ing signal to Italy, Portugal and Spain thatthe gravy train of bailouts is bound to endunless these states make enormous effortsto get their financial houses in order. Thisin turn might potentially reduce opposi-tion to tough but necessary reforms, andthus help resolve the euro crisis. But onthe other hand, a Greek sovereign defaultcould lead to capital market speculationand other untoward responses that wouldprovoke sovereign default on the part ofPortugal, Spain and ultimately Italy. Andthis in turn would send the world econ-omy into a deep recession that would af-fect not only Europe, but the rest of theworld as well. Apart from the severe eco-nomic consequences of such a recession,it would also put major strains on the so-cial fabric and political stability of a num-ber of states, particularly those that leavethe European Monetary Union; but otherstates would feel these strains as well.Hence there is a definite possibility thatGreece leaving the European MonetaryUnion would provoke a domino effect thatwould translate into a lengthy worldwiderecession.

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06One possible consequence, however, isthat Greece leaving the European Mone-tary Union would send a robust and last-ing signal to Italy, Portugal and Spain thatthe gravy train of bailouts is bound to endunless these states make enormous effortsto get their financial houses in order. Thisin turn might potentially reduce opposi-tion to tough but necessary reforms, andthus help resolve the euro crisis. But onthe other hand, a Greek sovereign defaultcould lead to capital market speculationand other untoward responses that wouldprovoke sovereign default on the part ofPortugal, Spain and ultimately Italy. Andthis in turn would send the world econ-omy into a deep recession that would af-fect not only Europe, but the rest of theworld as well. Apart from the severe eco-nomic consequences of such a recession,it would also put major strains on the so-cial fabric and political stability of a num-ber of states, particularly those that leavethe European Monetary Union; but otherstates would feel these strains as well.Hence there is a definite possibility thatGreece leaving the European MonetaryUnion would provoke a domino effect thatwould translate into a lengthy worldwiderecession.

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06 Policy Brief 2012/04: A Modern Social Market EconomyThe new MSME Index defines and measures the features ofa Modern Social Market Economy in international compari-son. In contrast to other indices that measure economic per-formance, the MSME Index takes an institutional approach,outlining a system of essential institutions and measurableindicators for the construction and assessment of modernsocial market economies. Among other insights, the indexcould guide the European Union toward achieving the“highly competitive social market economy” that it definesin the Lisbon Treaty as its desired economic order.

Policy Brief 2012/05: Maastricht 2.0The European Union’s regulations governing sovereign debtare based on the principle of equal treatment of all memberstates. The recommendations we make here concerningchanges in EU sovereign-debt reduction rules take accountof national particularities. According to our calculations,such reformed regulations would do far more to promoteeconomic growth than would be the case under the FiscalCompact’s European debt brake. By 2030, real gains ingrowth will amount to more than 450 billion euros.

Bertelsmann StiftungCarl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256D-33311 Güterslohwww.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Thieß PetersenPhone: +49 5241 81-81218thiess.petersen@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Eric ThodePhone: +49 5241 81-81581eric.thode@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

ISSN-Nummer: 2191-2467

Upcoming releases:

• Laura Naegele, Claire Dhéret and EricThode: Better Employment Opportunitiesfor Older Workers