Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.
-
Upload
abigayle-lamb -
Category
Documents
-
view
218 -
download
1
Transcript of Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.
![Page 1: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Economic Analysisof Banking Regulation
Economic Analysisof Banking Regulation
Chapter 11Chapter 11
![Page 2: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
StuffStuff
Review Sheet Test chapters: 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Wed, Ricketts 203, 7:00 No homework due Commercial Paper
Review Sheet Test chapters: 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Wed, Ricketts 203, 7:00 No homework due Commercial Paper
![Page 3: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
7 ways banks are regulated7 ways banks are regulated
FDIC Regulators restrict assets Minimum bank capital requirements Chartered and Auditied Disclosure Req’t Consumer Protection Restrictions on Competition
FDIC Regulators restrict assets Minimum bank capital requirements Chartered and Auditied Disclosure Req’t Consumer Protection Restrictions on Competition
![Page 4: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
1) FDIC Regulation1) FDIC Regulation
Bank panic ‘cycles’ every 20 years 1920’s: 600 insolvencies/year 1930-33: 2000 insolvencies/year 1934-81: 15 insolvencies/year
FDIC closes insolvent banks (G-S, 1933) Payoff method Purchase and Assumption of bad debt method
Used to be the most popular
Bank panic ‘cycles’ every 20 years 1920’s: 600 insolvencies/year 1930-33: 2000 insolvencies/year 1934-81: 15 insolvencies/year
FDIC closes insolvent banks (G-S, 1933) Payoff method Purchase and Assumption of bad debt method
Used to be the most popular
![Page 5: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
FDIC and Moral HazardFDIC and Moral Hazard
Depositors: no incentive to monitor bank mgmt. loan decisions
Bankers: no worries about bad loan decisions causing savers to lose saving
“Too big to fail” policyTaxpayers pay
Glass-Steagall implications
Depositors: no incentive to monitor bank mgmt. loan decisions
Bankers: no worries about bad loan decisions causing savers to lose saving
“Too big to fail” policyTaxpayers pay
Glass-Steagall implications
![Page 6: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
2) Regulators Restrict Assets2) Regulators Restrict Assets
E.g. no common stock allowed Limits on risky loans
E.g. no common stock allowed Limits on risky loans
![Page 7: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
3) Minimum Bank Capital Req’t3) Minimum Bank Capital Req’t Traditional measure: Leverage Ratio
Bank Capital/Assets (inverse of equity multiplier!!) Greater than 5%: well capitalized Less than 3%: Trouble!
Basel Accord (1988) - International Hold 8% of ‘risk-adjusted’ assets
Zero-weight: gov. securities 20% weight: claims on banks 50% weight: residential mortgages and municipal bonds 100% weight: loans to consumers and corporations
Regulatory Arbitrage Fed in ‘96: 3 times max capital that could be lost in 10 days
Traditional measure: Leverage Ratio Bank Capital/Assets (inverse of equity multiplier!!) Greater than 5%: well capitalized Less than 3%: Trouble!
Basel Accord (1988) - International Hold 8% of ‘risk-adjusted’ assets
Zero-weight: gov. securities 20% weight: claims on banks 50% weight: residential mortgages and municipal bonds 100% weight: loans to consumers and corporations
Regulatory Arbitrage Fed in ‘96: 3 times max capital that could be lost in 10 days
![Page 8: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
4) Banks chartered, audited4) Banks chartered, audited
Criteria Mgmt. adequacy Likely earnings Adequacy of capital Effect on competition (pre-1980)
Examination: Quarterly ‘call reports’ Annual Exams
Assets Risky? Get rid of them! Worthless Loans? Write them down! Capital Inadequate? Figure out new strategy!
Criteria Mgmt. adequacy Likely earnings Adequacy of capital Effect on competition (pre-1980)
Examination: Quarterly ‘call reports’ Annual Exams
Assets Risky? Get rid of them! Worthless Loans? Write them down! Capital Inadequate? Figure out new strategy!
![Page 9: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
CAMEL RatingCAMEL Rating Credit risk of bank assessed
Enough collateral? Enough L-T relationships? Enough screening?
Acronym Capital Adequacy Asset quality Management (oversight of board, internal policies) Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity
IR rate assessed (Gap and Duration analysis) Stress testing, etc.
Credit risk of bank assessed Enough collateral? Enough L-T relationships? Enough
screening? Acronym
Capital Adequacy Asset quality Management (oversight of board, internal policies) Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity
IR rate assessed (Gap and Duration analysis) Stress testing, etc.
![Page 10: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
5) Disclosure Requirements5) Disclosure Requirements
Accounting standards Annual reports Risk level disclosure
Disclose information about riskiest assets New Zealand: if full disclosure, then no
examination necessary
Accounting standards Annual reports Risk level disclosure
Disclose information about riskiest assets New Zealand: if full disclosure, then no
examination necessary
![Page 11: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
6) Consumer Protection6) Consumer Protection
Truth in Lending Act (1969) Standardization and disclosure of lending terms Fair Credit Billing Act amendment (1974)
Extends to credit cards Billing errors, mechanism for appeal
Equal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1976) Community Reinvestment Act (1977)
Invest in neighborhood in which you accept deposits
Truth in Lending Act (1969) Standardization and disclosure of lending terms Fair Credit Billing Act amendment (1974)
Extends to credit cards Billing errors, mechanism for appeal
Equal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1976) Community Reinvestment Act (1977)
Invest in neighborhood in which you accept deposits
![Page 12: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
7) Competition restriction7) Competition restriction
Branching Banks can’t be in security industry Security, insurance can’t be in banking
Branching Banks can’t be in security industry Security, insurance can’t be in banking
![Page 13: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
International Banking RegulationInternational Banking Regulation Similar to U.S. Country hopping, no overarching regulatory
organization BCCI collapse (1991)
7th largets bank in world at peak Value of 20m, when audited in ‘91, only 10m! “Registered” in Luxembourg Laundering, bribery, arms trafficking, nuclear technologies,
etc. Intentionally avoided detection: had its own shipping and
trading company, intelligence agency, etc.
Similar to U.S. Country hopping, no overarching regulatory
organization BCCI collapse (1991)
7th largets bank in world at peak Value of 20m, when audited in ‘91, only 10m! “Registered” in Luxembourg Laundering, bribery, arms trafficking, nuclear technologies,
etc. Intentionally avoided detection: had its own shipping and
trading company, intelligence agency, etc.
![Page 14: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Savings and Loan CrisisSavings and Loan Crisis
Largest banking crisis since the depression $500 billion dollar bailout over 40 years:
still paying for it! Good example of:
Deregulation vs. regulation Moral Hazard Bank management
Largest banking crisis since the depression $500 billion dollar bailout over 40 years:
still paying for it! Good example of:
Deregulation vs. regulation Moral Hazard Bank management
![Page 15: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Early CausesEarly Causes
Innovations in the ‘60s and 70’s, had to be riskier FSLIC: bank mgmt indifferent to taking risk Deregulation
DIDMCA 1980 Garn- St. Germain Act 1982 Increased FSLIC insurance from 40K to 100K Can put 40% in commercial real estate loans 30% in consumer lending 10% in junk bonds or direct investments
Innovations in the ‘60s and 70’s, had to be riskier FSLIC: bank mgmt indifferent to taking risk Deregulation
DIDMCA 1980 Garn- St. Germain Act 1982 Increased FSLIC insurance from 40K to 100K Can put 40% in commercial real estate loans 30% in consumer lending 10% in junk bonds or direct investments
![Page 16: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
More early causesMore early causes
Recession of ‘80, ‘81 Brokered deposits
Large denomination CD sold to brokerage Cut into smaller FSLIC covered deposits Remove incentive for large depositors to
monitor lending practices of bankers (covered through innovation!)
By 1982, 50% of S&L’s were insolvent!!!
Recession of ‘80, ‘81 Brokered deposits
Large denomination CD sold to brokerage Cut into smaller FSLIC covered deposits Remove incentive for large depositors to
monitor lending practices of bankers (covered through innovation!)
By 1982, 50% of S&L’s were insolvent!!!
![Page 17: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Resulting ProblemsResulting Problems
Managers did not have experience with this expanded risk portfolio
Regulators didn’t have the breadth, capacity, or experience to regulate
Result Moral hazard by managers Conflict of interest by regulators Principal/Agent problem by politicians Asymmetric Information with public
Managers did not have experience with this expanded risk portfolio
Regulators didn’t have the breadth, capacity, or experience to regulate
Result Moral hazard by managers Conflict of interest by regulators Principal/Agent problem by politicians Asymmetric Information with public
![Page 18: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Regulatory Forbearance by FHLB, FSLIC
Regulatory Forbearance by FHLB, FSLIC
Refrained from closing insolvent banks Irregular accounting allowed (goodwill) Why? Conflict of interest
Not enough money to close (payoff/assumption) Don’t want to offend politicians Protect reputation FHLB established to encourage growth of S&L
industry, not shut it down
Refrained from closing insolvent banks Irregular accounting allowed (goodwill) Why? Conflict of interest
Not enough money to close (payoff/assumption) Don’t want to offend politicians Protect reputation FHLB established to encourage growth of S&L
industry, not shut it down
![Page 19: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Zombie S&L’s: The Living DeadZombie S&L’s: The Living Dead
Bankrupt (negative bank capital) but still operating Had nothing to lose, moral hazard ‘Bad’ S&L’s gave high interest on deposits, taking
business from ‘Good’ S&L’s Negative feedback loop
‘87 legislation Provided only $11 billion to back up losses, but… Directed FHLB to CONTINUE regulatory forbearance
Bankrupt (negative bank capital) but still operating Had nothing to lose, moral hazard ‘Bad’ S&L’s gave high interest on deposits, taking
business from ‘Good’ S&L’s Negative feedback loop
‘87 legislation Provided only $11 billion to back up losses, but… Directed FHLB to CONTINUE regulatory forbearance
![Page 20: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Politician Principal AgentPolitician Principal Agent Hide problems from taxpayers, hoping it will go
away Career oriented Close relationships with industry insiders (conflict of
interest) The Keating Five
Charles Keating, owner of Lincoln S&L, insolvent Purchases 600M in junk bond to try to escape Big contributor to congressmen, tell regulators to leave him alone ‘89 collapse, $2.6 billion loss payed by taxpayers 3 senators not re-elected after reprimanded
Hide problems from taxpayers, hoping it will go away
Career oriented Close relationships with industry insiders (conflict of
interest) The Keating Five
Charles Keating, owner of Lincoln S&L, insolvent Purchases 600M in junk bond to try to escape Big contributor to congressmen, tell regulators to leave him alone ‘89 collapse, $2.6 billion loss payed by taxpayers 3 senators not re-elected after reprimanded
![Page 21: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
FIRREA (1989) - The BailoutFIRREA (1989) - The Bailout
Regulatory Structure Revised FSLIC and FHLB abolished Treasury Dept. takes over (Office of Thrift Supervision)
Resolution Trust Corporation Seizes assets of 25% of S&L Sells $450B of assets of failed S&L Fed gov’t issues bonds for $150B deficit
S&L regulations imposed again 70% must be housing, no junk bonds, leverage 8% Regulators have power to remove bank mgrs., impose
penalties, issue cease and desist legal action
Regulatory Structure Revised FSLIC and FHLB abolished Treasury Dept. takes over (Office of Thrift Supervision)
Resolution Trust Corporation Seizes assets of 25% of S&L Sells $450B of assets of failed S&L Fed gov’t issues bonds for $150B deficit
S&L regulations imposed again 70% must be housing, no junk bonds, leverage 8% Regulators have power to remove bank mgrs., impose
penalties, issue cease and desist legal action
![Page 22: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
FDICIA (1991) - InsuranceFDICIA (1991) - Insurance
No more brokered deposits Limited “to big to fail” policy Another money infusion from Treasury to
cover S&L losses Corrective action provisions: FDIC MUST
intervene early if a bank is getting into trouble
No more brokered deposits Limited “to big to fail” policy Another money infusion from Treasury to
cover S&L losses Corrective action provisions: FDIC MUST
intervene early if a bank is getting into trouble
![Page 23: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Future proposed reformsFuture proposed reforms
Limit deposit insurance to 90% of deposits Outlaw regulatory forbearance Value bank capital at cost, not market (see
today’s WSJ!) Consolidate regulatory agencies
As of Dec. 2006, bank insurance fund and savings and loan insurance fund became deposit insurance fund
Limit deposit insurance to 90% of deposits Outlaw regulatory forbearance Value bank capital at cost, not market (see
today’s WSJ!) Consolidate regulatory agencies
As of Dec. 2006, bank insurance fund and savings and loan insurance fund became deposit insurance fund
![Page 24: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
World Banking CrisesWorld Banking Crises
Scandinavia Russia Japan China East Asian ‘Tigers’ Latin America
Argentina
Scandinavia Russia Japan China East Asian ‘Tigers’ Latin America
Argentina
![Page 25: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
![Page 26: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
![Page 27: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
![Page 28: Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation Chapter 11.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022032518/56649cc45503460f9498df88/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)