Ecology and Security in South Asia · 3/15/2012 · Ecology and Security in South Asia For the...
Transcript of Ecology and Security in South Asia · 3/15/2012 · Ecology and Security in South Asia For the...
Ecology and Security in South Asia
For the countries of the South Asian region, the post-colonial period was marked by what
Nehru called a “tryst with destiny.” It is the impacts and implications of these nationalist
trysts, as well as the growing awareness of the interconnectedness of the region‟s ecosystems
that compels a fresh examination of the interface between nature, culture and democracy. How
are the concerns of “national security”, and the politics, of development undermining ecology?
How are citizens‟ groups, communities and social movements, concerned with growing
ecological conflicts, negotiating and bargaining with the state apparatus? How are they
seeking a redefinition of governance, representation and democracy? These questions are
crucial to examine since the mainstream political process, as well as conventional democratic
forces, have remained largely apathetic, and have responded to them in traditional political
terms. As a result, the stratification of power and wealth, as well as most ecological
conflicts—whether related to the alienation of tribal peasants from their land, or the
degradation or commercialisation of a commons, or the pollution of life—and livelihood—
supporting water bodies, or displacement caused by development projects—continue to be
either neglected or co-opted within conventional political discourse.
Towards a Politics of Ecological Rootedness
One significant distinction between western environmentalist priorities and those of this
region is that, for us at the popular level, priorities are not global warming, climate change,
industrial pollution, the dumping of toxic waste or nuclear power and its adverse
implications—even though these are issues around which there is some mobilisation. For us,
the priority is the fact that an overwhelming majority of the population is heavily dependent
on the natural system and the biomass that it provides, not only for supporting a subsistence
economy, but also as a contributor to its cultural rituals and practice. Thus, any disruption in
access to and control over these resources directly impinges on the survival, identity and
security of these communities. Secondly, the current patterns of economic development,
particularly the present means of achieving economic growth, are heavily dependent on the
intensive and extensive utilisation and despoliation of the natural environment. The processes
of economic development directly and indirectly disrupt the livelihoods and lifestyles of
millions of people, pushing a majority of them into a life of subservience and dependency. The
depletion and degradation of productive natural resources have provoked increasing conflict
both within and across South. Asian states. The growing scarcity of resources for sustenance,
the exacerbation of contending claims to the same resource, and the enforced uprooting and
mass migration of people (both within and between countries) are just three instances of
conflict situations. These patterns also emanate from, and sustain, the devaluation of nature
and its processes—in keeping with the Baconian maxim that “Men are the Lords and
Possessors of Nature.”
Uneven development, multiple forms of ecological degradation and loss of control, have also
resulted in an increasing polarisation of wealth. In India in 1990, in comparison with the 20%
of the populace which controls 60% of the assets, the bottom 20% only controls 1%. In 1960,
however, the top 20% controlled only 30% of the assets. What is striking in the distributive
process is that, while Third World debt rose from $50 billion to $1.3 trillion between 1960 and
1990, net transfer to industrialised countries was $20-30 billion a year.1
Thirdly, the growing presence, role and influence—particularly on the behaviour and role of
the state—of multilateral banks and transnational corporations (TNCs), coupled with legal
regimes like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with the active support of economic and
political elites in our own countries, are significantly closing the political and geographical
spaces, to sustain ecological and cultural diversity. Based on the recognition of these
fundamental developments, this paper argues that:
(i) national security can only be achieved as an aggregate of peoples security, which itself is
critically dependent on the health and sustainability of the natural system; and
(ii) since the region is so ecologically and culturally interdependent, national security also
needs to be seen in the larger context of regional security.
This is not only the context in which the various environmental discourses or narratives (in
theory and in practice) in the region need to be located, but also the basis on which an
ecological politics needs to be, and is being, constructed. While I have delineated, these
discourses below, it is critical to briefly discuss the larger framework of the modes of
production and modes of power as they inform ecological debates.2
Modes of Production or Modes of Power?
Within this perspective, it has become important to locate the literature on ecological practices
in India within an analysis of the different modes of production. Gadgil and Guha3, for
instance, provide an insightful analysis of the conflicts between competing modes of
production and power, and their respective impacts on pastoral, tribal,4 agrarian and industrial
modes. Others deny that there exists a distinction between agrarian and tribal modes, since
most tribals practice settled agriculture.5
It is true that tribal communities such as the Gonds,
the Santals, and the Mundas practice settled agriculture and do work as labourers. However,
tribals continue to depend more heavily on the forest than other rural peasants.6
For most, the
forest not only supports a larger share of their economy, but as stated at the outset, it is
intrinsic to their culture and protection. It is this complex relationship that has inspired and
spurred most of their historical and contemporary struggles.
What has not yet been explored sufficiently are the power relations between actors in these
different modes, and how they are changing in the context of internal and external
transformations. As Rao and Hargopal, and several others have tried to point out, there is a
need for an inventory of how rights over nature (both the physical resources and cultural
meanings) were historically appropriated.7
After five decades of developmentalist regimes,
new kinds of polarisations have emerged. Simultaneously, new modes of struggle have also
manifested themselves.
Some commentators have argued that these polarisations have created two worlds—the world
of those who inhabit the urban, industrialising world, and the other rural, from where a
majority of the resources for the urban world come. As far as access to, and control over
resources is concerned, India‟s ex-Commissioner of Scheduled Castes and Tribes8, B. D.
Sharma makes three distinctions—between India, Bharat and Hindustanawa—as they position
themselves in the equation of power. (Similar distinctions can be made for the other countries
of the region). In his formulation, India envelops the urban, industrial sector, while Bharat
encompasses the landholding peasantry. What is thus excluded are the growing number of
landless and assetless people in both urban and rural areas, most of whom are experiencing a
distinct ecological crisis. His observations are worth quoting at length:
In our country, there has been talk for some time about so-called India vs. Bharat. But in that
discussion the interests of that big world of Hindustanawa which is below India and which
covers most of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, have been
ignored. Bharat is keen to compete with India and get linked with it. In this process, the
situation of Hindustanawa further deteriorates. It is necessary for the organised sector of India
to realise and accept its unjust position. In a similar fashion, it is necessary on the part‟ of
Bharat, which has full command over resources and means of production in the traditional
system, that it realise and acknowledge its unjust position in relation to the resourceless
Hindustanawa.9
It is also important to recognise that women constitute the majority of Hindustanawa. They
also bear a disproportionate burden of resource decline. Within this reality then, how have the
movements of peasants, labourers, tribals, Dalits and women defined their politics?
Gender and the Environment
Bina Agarwal, Gail Omvedt and Vandana Shiva, to name three diverse voices who have
drawn on other women‟s expressions and contributed to a wider debate on the relationship
between women and nature, assert the specific contribution of women to ecological
movements.10
Shiva portrays the cosmology of the pre-colonial period in the region in which
nature was conceptualised as mother goddess, Prakriti, or Aranyani, the forest goddess, whose
powers were that of Shakti. Highlighting women‟s ecological knowledge, Shiva argues that,
“nature herself is the experiment and women as sylviculturalist agriculturalist and water
resource managers, the traditional scientists.”
Although more rigorous historical work than that done by Shiva is needed to examine the
interface of ecology and gender in the region s history and society, her assertion that modern
science and the state have further marginalised women‟s worth and status brings a
controversial political economy dimension to the gender and ecology debate. Also problematic
is her neglect of the many levels of subjugation that women undoubtedly experienced as
repositories and practitioners of ecological knowledge.
For her part, Bina Agarwal shows how the environment is “engendered”, and how women are
adversely affected by environmental decline. At the same time, women are active in
movements of environmental protection and regeneration, often bringing to these struggles
gender-specific perspectives. Such perspectives, she observes, articulate interests generated by
women s position in the division of labour within productive and reproductive systems. Seeing
women simply as victims of environmental decline is only one side of a complex story.
The Devaluing of Traditional Knowledge
The lack of in-depth studies of the ecological knowledge and practices of rural communities
(particularly the poorer among them), and other occupational castes, has been a neglected
concern even among those committed to a politics of the subjugated. What is also neglected is
empathy for, and understanding of, ecological practices, and how they relate to a politics of
identity. In the specific context of Jharkhand‟ among others, Ram Dayal Munda, Devnathan
and the Jharkhand Mukti Andolan have begun to relate ecology with identity.12
There continues to be a tendency among policy makers and others to portray those who
populate Hindustanawa as victims. Thus the traditions of communities who have their own
ways of perceiving and utilising nature continue to be devalued or neglected altogether. The
fact that they critically depend on ecological sustainability and nature‟s economy (more than
the farmers who populate Bharat), and that their rights to these resources are not legally
recognised, are similarly issues that continue to be marginal in contemporary political
discourse.
The Environmental Narrative in South Asia: A Critical Review
To better situate this perspective and the questions raised at the outset, let me make some
preliminary comments regarding the four main environmental discourses in the South Asian
region.13
While these discourses are being constructed primarily on the basis of Indian
experiences and examples, there are obvious parallels with other South Asian countries in
particular, and the Third World in general. It needs to be stressed that the boundaries between
these discourses are not rigid. In fact, the porosity and fluidity between them creates
significant possibilities for advancing an ecological politics of the region.
Environment as ‘Discovery’: The Discourse of the State
The policies and practices of the developmentalist state14
have not only degraded the
environment, but also created an environmental discourse & where it is assumed that this
degradation can be managed along with the current patterns of industrial and urban
development. Policies and programmes for “managing the environment” raise fundamental
questions about the role of technology, and the implications of modern scientific rationality.
That is also why we need to better understand the intersection between ecology and the city.
Does the city, as it has evolved in modem South Asia, stand and develop in contradiction to
ecology? Is a reconciliation possible? Or is there a fundamental contradiction between the
resource-intensive and centralising characteristics of the city and ecological sustainability? Do
the rural and urban middle classes have common aspirations, modes of consumption and
responses to technology, or are there significant differences?
A brief historical overview of the official discourse on the environment is relevant here. After
Indira Gandhi‟s participation in the Stockholm Conference in 1972, and her much publicised
opposition to the Silent Valley Project15
, environmentalism acquired a degree of official
legitimacy. The growth of environmental concern at the global level was mirrored by a flush
of official activity. In India, various processes were initiated to set up a Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MOEF), and dialogues were organised with a wide range of
independent scientists and NGOs. Since India‟s ecosystems were under siege, numerous
individuals and organisations saw the possibilities of initiating or expanding their activities to
work in this newly discovered‟ area. Others saw the opening up of possibilities for progressive
state intervention, to protect and preserve the country‟s diverse ecosystems.
Over the past decade and a half, these groups and individuals have been participating in
numerous government programmes. They also serve in various advisory capacities. While this
does create a degree of democratic space for communities struggling in increasingly degraded
and polluted conditions, significant contradictions remain since most “collaboration” also
provides the state with legitimation — a credibility that it sorely needs and proudly
propagates, especially at international forums.
The contradictions also arise from the basic character of the modern South Asian state (see
section entitled „The Developmentalist State‟ below). It is a state that both legitimises the
intensive and extensive extraction of natural resources, as well as acts as an occasional buffer
against the expropriation of resources by non-state national and international actors.
Fundamentally, therefore, its continuing defence of a rapacious and unjust model of economic
development, as well as a commitment to a plethora of anti-ecological technologies (the most
obvious being defence and nuclear technologies), reduces most of the stated commitments to
eco-friendly planning to vacuous rhetoric.
Additional limitations arise not only from the relative lack of importance accorded to the
Ministry (or Department) of Environment in the hierarchy of state policy, but also from the
almost total lack of coordination between policy sectors. Thus in most cases, these sectors
work in opposition to environmentally sensitive directions defined by environmental policy or
in official rhetoric. In India, for instance, the Ministry of Agriculture will legitimise
widespread adoption of hybrid seeds, while the Ministry of Environment and Forests will
launch an ambitious project on protecting India‟s biodiversity. These examples can be
multiplied across the policymaking spectrum.
Obviously, official politics is far more nuanced. The alliance of Indian governmental
representatives with those of Malaysia during the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) process, their criticism of Western policies pertaining to
biodiversity and global warming, as well as their defence of anticolonial struggles in other
parts of the Third World (whatever their actual record) make basic critiques at home all the
more difficult.
There is also the complex question of national sovereignty. Invoked in a wide variety of, at
times, contradictory contexts, this invocation has been one of the most important weapons of
the state against internal and external critiques. How does criticism of a development project
(like the Kalabagh dam in Pakistan, or the dams on the Narmada river, or the Super Thermal
Power Plant at Dahanu, Maharashtra, or the nuclear plant at Kaiga, Karnataka) get labelled
„anti-national‟ by the government? Why is almost total acquiescence to the policy dictates of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or the penetration of “stateless”
TNCs, not perceived as a fundamental threat to national sovereignty? Yet, in the absence of
widespread popular mobilisation, who else but the state can act as a buffer? Is the challenge
then to democratise the state? Some of these questions are developed in a later section.
While numerous governmental and quasi-governmental institutions (examples in India include
the Forest Research Institute, National Environmental and Energy Research Institute, Indian
Institute of Science, and Botanical Institute of India) are involved in the pursuit of scientific
research—some of which has relevance to concerns of ecological justice—there are obvious
limitations to this enterprise. Functioning as they do under state scrutiny and patronage, most
of this work is either not accessible, or is propagating a knowledge paradigm that is in direct
contradiction to the recognition of the primacy of local knowledge and power. Interestingly,
emerging critiques from within these institutions embody dissenting traditions that, however
marginal to mainstream research, represent the possibilities of freeing these institutions from
state control.
Additionally, many UN agencies and institutions are concerned with environment and
development issues in the region. Almost all of them function with the consent of the
government, and as such, play a weak role in addressing the structural causes of environmental
despoliation and degradation, as well as the question of equitable local control over productive
resources. In fact, much of the technical assistance provided through the UN system supports
or condones environmentally destructive and socially unjust economic development.
Nevertheless, given the political nature of the regimes in the region, some of the UN agencies
provide a window to raise issues and resources for generating environmentally sensitive
projects and programmes (i.e. sanitation, sewage and drinking water projects), and to “repair
the damage” caused by “destructive development.”
Similarly, bilateral donors like the Norwegian Agency for International Development
(NORAD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have supported a
wide range of environmental awareness and training activities. In Pakistan, CIDA played a
strong supportive role in the development of the National Conservation Strategy (NCS), and
has contributed to the production of the NCS document. Bilateral donors are spending an
increasing amount of money on these programmes, and while a large number of groups are
collaborating in this, several others are attempting to radicalise the kinds of activities that are
supported.
2) Environment as Wilderness: The Terrain of Conservationists
Among the earliest modern environmentalists in the Subcontinent were naturalists and natural
scientists. Ambitious programmes were launched in the 19th century to map the region‟s
biogenetic diversity. The establishment of the Bombay Natural History Society is part of that
legacy. In the post-1947 period, with most governments implementing a policy of rapid
industrial growth and permitting limited democracy, the only formal environmental work was
being done by conservationists and wild-life enthusiasts.
In the recent past, however, with available land for agriculture shrinking and with more lands
being lost to desertification, waterlogging, salinisation and bad management, conflicts
between conservationists and settled farmers have escalated. Ironically, a critique against
reserved forests and sanctuaries has also emerged from Marxist and liberal democrats, whose
commitment to anthropocentric democracy stands in contraction to the defence of “green
spaces.” Significant rethinking is taking place among conventional conservationists, and while
acceptance of the importance of local people in the management of sanctuaries and parks has
grown, fundamental issues of the incompatibility between current patterns of
industrial and agricultural development and genuine sustainability are still not widely
accepted.
In May 1993, numerous citizens‟ groups supported the formation of the Indian People‟s
Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights (IPT). The IPT recently organised a national
workshop on „Forests and the Rights of Local Communities‟—an event that brought together
conservationists with academics and social activists. The debate led to a significant joint
statement and a decision to hold a national peoples‟ tribunal on the conflict between protected
ecosystems and local people.
3) Environment as Commerce: The Sustainable Development People
Sustainable development organisations, most of which came into being about a decade and a
half ago, have had the most visibility in the middle class world and in the press. Partly in
response to environment as fashion, and partly as efforts to fill the space created by official
acceptance of environmentalism, these groups have created a commendable niche for
environmental concerns. Important new ground has been broken, particularly in laying bare
the extent of ecological collapse. However, by and large, the work of these organisations and
groups has neither kept up with the pace and scale of environmental devastation and
degradation, nor graduated to effective intervention in ongoing political processes. It can be
argued that this ought not to be their mandate. While there is some truth in this, most of the
efforts continue to be targeted at the English-speaking middle class, or to primarily foreign
audiences.
There is an equally serious problem in the political perspectives of these groups, most of
whom believe that the current patterns of economic development are compatible with
environmental sustainability. The need, they argue, is to humanise industrialism and
decentralise decision-making. To this end, a dialogue with the state and with parliamentarians
and elected representatives must be sustained, and a major role must be played in informing
state policy. While these roles are important, the basic task of strengthening social movements
and being accountable to them, continues to be largely neglected. In fact, in some cases, there
is greater accountability to foreign donors than to the mandate of the movements and to long-
term ecological sustainability.
4) Environment as Tradition: The Critics of Modern Science and Development
Another important discourse from which movements have drawn, and which in turn is “fed”
by the “little traditions of knowledge” and resistance, is that of a group of individuals and
organisations that have carved out an important space for themselves. Most of them argue that
modern science encodes a structure of domination and violence, and that this violence is not
confined to genetic engineering or nuclear physics, but is an integral part of its history and its
articulation. It is this myth of being an “impersonal method” that, they argue, also legitimises
the notion of Trumanesque development. In their analysis, the modem weapon of development
is based on the legitimisation of social engineering on a massive scale, where realities are
treated as objects, and hierarchies of „developedness‟ are created. It is this worldview, they
„argue, that devalues the traditional as backward, that deems it important to inflict pain on
others in the pursuit of progress, and that justifies the irrelevance of traditions of knowledge,
cultures and species. Modern science and the project of development are then, in essence,
genocidal.
Those concerned about the environment in the countries of South Asia, and the debates that
they are contributing to, can be broadly placed in the above four groups. As stated in the
introduction to the above section, the boundaries between these groups are quite fluid, and the
more difficult task of trying to create a political consensus calls for pragmatism and
envisioning. It is in evolving a balance between compromise and resistance that the most
difficult political challenges lie. Before presenting a glimpse of the range of action in civil
society in India, we will briefly outline an overview of the social, political and economic
situation in the region.
Overview of the Social, Political and Economic Situation
The South Asian region continues to be marked by intense social stratification. Traditional
power blocs (feudal landlords, upper caste groups and social groups controlling religious
communities, etc.) have to an extent been joined by other economically upward communities
(particularly those who have gained as a direct consequence of uneven capitalist
development). Significant conflict has arisen as lower-middle class groups have become more
upwardly mobile, and have sought a share in power. However, overwhelmingly, political and
economic decisions continue to be taken by a relatively small handful of powerful groups.
India remains an essentially plural polity that constitutionally upholds a secular society where
all religions are allowed to coexist equally. In. the past few years, this semblance of unity and
tolerance has been breaking down, creating severe strains in inter-community relations. Hindu
extremists have been assertive in their desire to create a Hindu state that could more
effectively deal with the challenge (imagined or real) of Muslims both within and outside the
country. While recent state elections and other political developments have contained their
hegemonic intentions, the extremist Hindus enjoy significant support, particularly among the
elite.
In the other countries of the region, escalating social violence has continued to deflect or
devalue social and ecological agendas. In areas like the Northeast in India, or the central and
north-eastern districts of Sri Lanka, protracted ethnic conflict and state violence has had an
adverse impact on ecological spaces and practices.
For the region as a whole (though the space and timing of this differs from one country to the
other), economic decision-making has increasingly moved away from local and national
contexts to the global one. The IMF and the World Bank exert significant and powerful
influence on the direction of each economy, and though they are not always successful, the
degree of control exerted by global capital in collaboration with national capital is
phenomenal.
An Economic Overview
Global capital has become increasingly mobile across South Asian boundaries. While India is
a relatively recent entrant into the IMF-World Bank guided restructuring process, the other
countries of the region continue to be dependent on the western-dominated financial and
economic system. In that sense, it can be said that the global economy continues to be heavily
dominated by the industrial countries with selective and tactical alliances with elites in the
industrialising world. It is no coincidence that during the political changes in Pakistan in 1993,
the transition President was brought in from Washington, and was none other than Moeen
Qureshi, till recently the Senior Vice President of the World Bank.
Similarly in India, the appointment of the new Finance Secretary —arguably the most
powerful bureaucrat in the economic domain—was not only subject to approval by the Bank,
but was an individual who had worked as a senior economist for a substantial part of his
professional career.
The resulting policy prescriptions and structural change that have been implemented (or are
suggested) legitimate an extractive economy which is run primarily by the elites who control
world trade, and provide fiscal incentives to invest in export-oriented extraction. In fact, for
most parts of the region, local producers‟ control over what they produce, how they produce it,
and at what price they can sell it on the market, has diminished. Over the past decade, and for
countries like India, more intensively over the past two years, this control has even started to
slip from the hands of national elites. The new rhetoric of competitive market ideology makes
it clear that the economically vulnerable have only themselves to blame, and that money
power is the only power worth having.
As already mentioned, this economic process is significantly dependent on the intensive and
extensive extraction of natural resources, and in the societies of the region, where a majority is
critically dependent on the sustainability of the natural resource base, this extractive economy
generates large-scale impoverishment and immiseration.
However, it is not just a consensus among elites that is of concern, but the emerging
realignment of global institutions to define and sustain this control. These institutions, despite
their rhetoric to the contrary, are also perpetuating a dynamic that sustains national and global
centralisation. This is a major shift from the past when Third World countries were attempting
to define a more autonomous identity and independent economic priorities in keeping with
their own needs. As recently as three years ago, the South Commission suggested alternatives
to the increasing domination of the G-7 countries in global economic and cultural affairs.16
The attempt here is not to narrate the trajectory of the growing dependency of our countries on
“western” banks and governments. Suffice it to say, that much before the South Commission,
most South Asian governments (as well as those in most of the Third World) were so
weakened that they would have been unable either to attempt to become “equal partners” with
the industrialised countries, or assert a unified collective identity.
The Changing Nature of the Global Economy: Multilaterals, Transnationals, Trade
Regimes and Elites
The South Asian experience, particularly from an ecological and social perspective, indicates
that it would be naive to assume that institutions like the World Bank are “developmental
institutions.” With the IMF, the prescription of eliminating trade barriers, encouraging exports,
tightening monetary policies, cutting public expenditure, devaluing currencies, etc., has led to
increased social insecurity and ecological injustice. Little or no attention has been paid to land
distribution, to the recovery and regeneration of degraded lands, or to structural changes that
would generate more equitable access to, and control over, resources. In fact, what has
invariably been witnessed is that the privileged are given even greater access to land, water,
subsidy, credit and technology. The rights and eco-cultural spaces of millions have been
subordinated to the interests of corporate development.
There is now overwhelming evidence that there is an emerging nexus between four actors—
TNCs, multilateral banks, trade regimes like the WTO, and economic and political elites in the
so-called North and South—to control global and national economies. In that sense, there have
been fundamental changes in the global political economy:
Fifteen of the world‟s largest TNCs now have gross incomes that are larger than the GDP of
120 countries. TNCs control 70% of global trade, and 80% of the land that grows crops for
export. Over the past decade, these TNCs have succeeded in exerting enormous power over
national governments. They have been the main agencies that have aggressively pushed for
deregulation and privatisation, not only in national economies, but in the world economy as a
whole. The full implications of this shift in the configuration of power has received little
attention from either scholars or activists. The Indian government‟s former Chief Economic
Advisor stated in 1992 that TNCs are emerging as the new global government, a World Inc.,
with the G-7 as the Board of Directors. This is not to say that these corporations have an
uncontentious relationship, that this structure is already in place, and that the traditional
system of competition and mutual suspicion has been subsumed in this “global project.” Far
from it. Rather, what is being highlighted are the new arrangements whose skeleton and some
elements of form are already evident. A recent World Bank document states, “this relationship
[between corporations, the Bank and the Fund] is being strengthened to achieve greater
cohesiveness in global economic policy making.”17
Despite this, corporations continue to
violate ethical norms. In countries like India, this control, and efforts to direct the national
economy, have also meant withdrawing legislation that protected domestic industry, the
indigenous producer as well as other occupations that were better suited for the specific
context, i.e. that a society was labor-intensive.
The implications of this go beyond notions of national sovereignty. The emerging thinking
argues for a restructuring of the UN system itself. Specifically, it is being propagated that the
UN should henceforth confine itself to the social and cultural terrain, with economic issues
being controlled by the WTO and by a Council representing the nexus.
A careful study of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which preceded the
WTO) documents, and in particular, the Dunkel proposals18
and the process that led to their
drafting, demonstrates the almost total exclusion of most governments of the Third World,
with no participation of independent citizens‟ groups or other non-governmental agencies. In
fact, the only non-government actors that were permitted access to most of the deliberations
were senior representatives of TNCs. Undoubtedly, these proposals legitimise a fundamentally
undemocratic trading regime that will lead to the acceptance of a lowest common denominator
in environmental standards19
, and an inevitable escalation in the violation of human rights, as
governments are coerced into accepting the terms of the new global regime. In fact, a recent
commentator analysing the low interest expressed by the press in such a far reaching
development noted that if only the press had made an effort to decipher the real meaning, it
would have found an enormously important story, one that would not only be “readable and
exciting”, but that “involves money, greed, power, and lots of self-interested actors working in
corporate and political circles.”
Threats to Federalism and Sovereignty
For countries like India, these proposals and the emergence of the more coordinated nexus
poses a direct threat to its federal structure since the nation would increasingly be brought
under one homogeneous economic regime, whose terms would primarily be set by this quartet
of actors. In fact, the threat to sovereignty that is inherent in instruments such as the WTO
would be one reason alone to significantly rethink WTO.20
This critique should not be misunderstood as an argument against globalisation per se. It is,
nevertheless, the contention here that globalisation only helps when trade, labor and capital
flows are between equals, and even here there can be tremendous problems, as the current
differences of the US with Europe and Japan indicate. It is indeed a pernicious philosophy that
globalisation affords all parties access to the market. In a differentiated, heterogeneous
world—both within and between countries—globalisation can only be equated with the slow
subjugation of weaker actors, and the annihilation of cultural and ecological diversity.21
The current agendas for economic reform, in the absence of a fundamental restructuring of the
social and economic systems to make them more democratic and accountable, are then just a
means to the ends outlined above in the emerging strategies of the nexus. The imposition of
these macro policies is then not just an imposition of a monoculture, but a fundamental
flattening of the spaces for sustaining the struggles for ecological sustainability and
democracy. Clearly, the WTO, as well as the directions of the new alignment of economic
power, is an agenda for the recolonisation of most of the world.22
It is the contention of this
paper that this neo-colonising end is embedded in the dominant strategies of achieving
economic development.
Internally, within each country, the social and environmental impacts of these processes are
far reaching and grim, as the environmental situation in India demonstrates. Of course, these
impacts are differentially felt, both at the level of national economies as well as at the
individual level. Yet, since most South Asian countries are not implementing a democratic
agenda that includes significant internal restructuring, globalisation impels a maximisation of
the export of primary goods and natural resources.
Gandhiji predicted the dangers of adopting the colonial and capitalist mode of resource
extraction when he said, “God forbid that India should ever take to industrialisation after the
manner of the west. The economic imperialism of a single island kingdom is today keeping the
world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it
would strip the world bare like locusts.”23
Since these patterns are dependent on the extraction of these resources, there is a perpetuation
of processes of internal colonisation. The resultant escalation of the loss of control over
productive resources, and the consequent increase in economic and social insecurity,
contributes to the growth of dissent and the escalation of social conflict. This is not the place
to develop this argument, but the case of Punjab in Pakistan and India is an indication of how
declining surpluses from Green Revolution agriculture (caused primarily by unsustainable
agricultural practices), ecological degradation, and the low availability of employment outside
the land, can cause disaffection, part of which (as the Indian case suggests) gets channelled
into militancy and terrorism.24
Secondly, regional governments have been militarising themselves not just as a check to
threats from other national aggressors, but also as a means of containing internal unrest and
militancy. Regional liberation movements, collective dissent, and other social conflicts,
engender greater internal militarisation and counterinsurgency. This in turn absorbs key
resources, and disrupts the possibilities of long-term culturally and socially sensitive
sustainable development. This really is a central aspect of “the development question.”
This is not to say that there is a united, well coordinated “grand strategy.” Or that this nexus
operates in an all-pervasive manner. It is precisely the spaces that are left Open by conflicts
within these interests at global, regional and national levels that have created spaces for
alternatives and for resistance.
The Other Costs of Economic Development
The ecological impacts of industrialisation, and of the dominant patterns of economic growth,
are no longer “externalities” that can be neglected or “managed.” Across the region, there is
accumulating evidence that more and more areas are becoming unsustainable and unliveable
Mini-Bhopals are taking place every day. Despite a virtual explosion of awareness, legislation
and action, the root causes of much of this have hardly been touched upon.
In most of the region, with a majority of countries deep in a debt crisis25
, expenditure on
clean-up and preventive initiatives is going to remain substantially weak. With the growing
pressure to export more primary products, including raw materials, most South Asian societies
will continue to be locked into a spiral of pollution, degradation and conflict.
The South Asian experience suggests that current patterns of achieving economic growth are
incompatible with social justice, and with sustainable ecological principles. In fact, most
strategies of economic growth have left the basic systemic and Structural issues untouched.
Despite overwhelming evidence in the post-World War II period, the belief is prevalent that
this growth will not only percolate downwards and “lift” the poor from their poverty, but will
generate enough surplus to provide governments the incentives and resources to protect the
environment.”
To reiterate, the dominant patterns of economic development in the region (and in much of the
world) continue to underplay or overlook the following endemic problems:
(i) This economics continues to be reductionist. For instance, the justification of a wide range
of development projects is still based on a cost-benefit analysis where it is assumed that
everything is quantifiable. While important work is being done to incorporate hitherto non-
quantifiable elements (e.g. the value of forest resources to a local forest-based community),
there continues to be an assumption that it is only a matter of time before sophistication will
be achieved to comprehensively account for costs. Can the true value of an old-growth forest
be costed? Can the loss of culture or community cohesion be costed? Additionally, the
dominant processes of evaluation identify natural resource utilisation merely with extraction,
thereby ignoring the short- and long-term productive function of conserved resources. This
reductionism has been the direct consequence of a gradual process over the past century,
which involved a disembedding of economics from its ethical and cultural moorings.26
(ii) The dominant strategies continue to be dependent on the intensive and extensive
exploitation of natural resources. Millions integrally depend on the health of these systems,
and any disruption directly undermines not only the subsistence economies of these
communities, but their livelihoods, lifestyles and lives themselves. Much of the diversity and
complexity of social and ecological existence in areas like South Asia is due to the rich mix of
communities, landscapes, and ways of social organising that the human species has preserved
or helped create over the course of its evolution. This diversity is being fundamentally
undermined by the monoculture of modern industrialism and consumerism.
(iii) There is a progression in the loss of control from the local to the global on terms that the
local rarely sets.
(iv) By and large, development continues to be identified with sectoral growth, ignoring the
underdevelopment induced in related sectors through negative externalities and the related
undermining of the productivity of the ecosystem.
Citizens’ Responses
In each of the region‟s states, the contradictions in the “dominant logic”, as well as the
implications of the “moral purpose” of the state (which creates contradictory pressures on it),
have left spaces open for popular movements and other forms of citizens‟ action to expand. In
India, the scale and depth of people‟s response to the growing environmental crisis is quite
impressive. Literally thousands of citizens‟ groups have sprung up in the last two decades or
so, forcing their voices into the process of decision making, even where the state has/not
wanted to hear them. Besides those involved in conventional or reformist conservation and
environmentalism (some of it state-sanctioned), where the preoccupation is with symptoms
rather than causes, two broad categories of groups and individuals can be recognised: those
who challenge and oppose the structural causes and consequences of environmentally
destructive activities, and those who carry out regenerative work or build up alternatives to
these activities. Of course, neither of these roles is more important than the other, and many
groups and individuals are playing both.
Several recent examples of successful resistance can be given. In the l970s, a major World
Bank-funded project to replace a massive area of natural mixed forests in central India by
industrial pine plantations was abandoned after strong local tribal opposition. A move to hand
over several thousand hectares of common lands to a private industry in Karnataka (South
India) was contested and won in court, backed by considerable local mobilisation The
National Federation of Fishworkers, which had managed to stall destructive trawling off parts
of the Indian coast, and to enforce seasonal fishing restrictions in marine waters, is now pitted
against a fresh wave of domestic and international interests impelled by a New Economic
Policy, whose main aim is to increase the catch and export of marine “products.”
Several major dams have been stopped before or during planning stages by popular local
opposition, or in the case of Bargi, succeeded in pressurising the government to provide a
comprehensive package of land-based alternatives (Suvarnarekha Dam: Lok Jagruti Kendra;
Bargi Dam: Bargi Bandh Virodhi Samiti; Pooyamkooty Dam: Altermedia Koel-Karo, etc.).
The ongoing agitation by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save Narmada Movement) against
the Sardar Sarovar Projects has significantly redefined the contours of the environment-
development debate all over the world, and shown that even as powerful an agency as the
World Bank can be successfully challenged.
While it is obviously difficult to do justice to the full mix of activities that movements and
groups in the country are involved in, a small representative list is presented below to give a
sense of their diversity and range. Unless indicated, besides the examples cited, similar
movements are active throughout the country.
What is important to note is that most of these groups and movements do not perceive
themselves as “environmental.” They see themselves as social and political groups who are
defending and struggling for greater social, political and cultural control over their lives. To
this end, many see their defence and protection of the ecosystems that they inhabit as crucial.
Others—often the politically more powerful, like a majority of those in the Jharkhand
movement —are much less self-conscious about ecological priorities and values. The range of
these groups would include struggles of:
Tribals and other peasants against displacement, alienation of land, loss of control over
productive natural resources including commons. These communities are challenging
processes which create not just a crisis of survival, but also threaten their social and cultural
fabric. They are also asserting demand for greater political and economic autonomy. Similar to
the struggles around mega-projects like those in the Narmada valley, most of this activity also
challenges the dominant patterns of economic development.
Some representative groups are: Kashtakari Sangathana (Organisation of Toilers), and Bhoomi
Sena (Land Army) in Maharashtra. Mazdoor Kisan Sangharsh Samiti (Workers‟ and Farmers‟
Struggle Collective), Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Collective for the Liberation of Jharkhand).27
Lower caste groups (also called, „Dalits‟) against caste discrimination and various forms of
bondage, for granting permanent rights to lands that they work on as agricultural labour, for
strategies to strengthen affirmative action, etc.
Some representative groups are: Association for the Rural Poor in Tamil Nadu, and the
Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Front for the Liberation of Bonded Labor) working in different parts
of the country. The Dalit movement has a long and important history in the contemporary
political life of the country. Babasaheb Ambedkar, the chairman of the team who drafted the
Indian Constitution, was also a Buddhist Dalit leader who inspired generations of Dalits to
leave the folds of a caste-ridden Hindu community, and struggle for an equal place in Indian
society. Dalits all over India, and especially in Western India, have some of the most vibrant
organisations—from literary and cultural groups to those participating in political party
activities. Many Dalit groups are becoming increasingly conscious of issues of ecological
justice, though the dominant trend of the Dalit movement is towards seeking their due share in
the urban-industrial complex.
Urban working classes, particularly those who are unorganised, generally lack security of
tenure, and are targets of regular eviction. This would also include contract and construction
labour. Urban residents, particularly the poor who become victims of industrial and
environmental disasters, are crucial in this regard (the Bhopal gas tragedy is only one dramatic
example. In the case of Bhopal, several significant citizens‟ initiatives were taken. These
ranged from medical surveys to campaigns for justice by those affected by the gas leak and the
indifference that followed).
Also, the movements of organised workers, particularly the trade unions in mining areas like
Dhanbad in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh who have marked some of the most remarkable
struggles in the recent history of the country. One particularly remarkable example is of the
Chattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh (Union of Mine Workers of Chattisgarh).
Other examples of urban activists include the vast range of women‟s groups, as well as more
mass-based groups in states such as Rajasthan and Kerala. Several struggles also focus on
ecological questions as well as resistance to social problems like alcoholism. Representative
examples of the latter are: the Utterakhand Sangharsh Vahini (Utterakhand Struggle
Movement, which is now also active in the demand for redrawing the internal boundaries of
Uttar Pradesh), and the Chipko (Hug the trees) movement in Karnataka.
Farmers who face the adverse impacts of new economic policies, which have not only reduced
or withdrawn the subsidies to agricultural inputs, but propose to implement policies which
would increase dependence on transnational chemical and seed companies. A farmers‟ rally in
Delhi (held on March 1-2, 1993) brought together over 150,000 farmers from all over the
country to express their opposition to the new proposals drafted under GATT-proposals
which, for instance, would legitimise the foreign patenting of indigenous plant varieties and
genes. Another group of relatively more affluent farmers held a smaller rally on March 31,
expressing its support for some aspects of the GATT proposals. An example of the former is
the Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangh (Karnataka State Farmers‟ Association), and of the latter,
the Shetkari Sangathana (Organisation of Farmers), active primarily in Maharashtra. Both
movements have extensive horizontal alliances with similar farmers‟ associations in different
parts of the country.
Fishing communities whose livelihoods have been threatened by mechanised fishing, as well
as the increasing commercialisation and export of fish. Federations of fisherfolk exist all along
India‟s long coastline, as well as along some rivers and lakes. The better known movements
are the National Fishworkers‟ Federation, and the Ganga Mukti Andolan (Movement to Save
the Ganga).
The social roots of the environmental crisis are clearly recognised by these popular
movements. They have, therefore, opposed measures which are vaunted as environmental
protection by the state, but which in reality are both anti-poor and short-sighted. In the early
1980s, a blatantly anti-forest dweller Forest Act drafted by the central government had to be
dropped due to nation-wide mobilisation by tribal, human rights, and environmental groups.
Increasingly, top-down wildlife protection steps are being challenged on human rights
grounds, with the assertion that human and wildlife interests have to be reconciled in any.
biodiversity conservation attempt. (Environmental groups ranging from Sanctuary to the
Bombay Natural History Society to Kalpavriksh are collaborating with social action groups
like Vikalp (Alternative), Tarun Bharat Sangh and the Narmada movement to raise these
issues).
It is not a far step from such opposition and resistance to regeneration and the creation of
alternatives. Here, too, citizens‟ efforts in India are many and diverse. The famous Chipko
movement in the Himalaya has not only successfully resisted deforestation in several areas,
but also shown the relevance of community afforestation with indigenous species. Successful
attempts at reviving traditional, or developing new, methods of ecological farming are now
widespread. Fanners‟ and citizens‟ groups have shown that adequate levels of crop production
without the use. of synthetic chemicals are possible and economically viable, and are
increasingly networking amongst themselves to build an effective lobby. Other farmers‟
groups (e.g. Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangh, or Karnataka State Farmers Association) are
challenging multinational seed corporations like Cargill as well as the adverse implications of
the WTO. A network of farmers‟ groups are building a decentralised seed bank of indigenous
varieties (Navdanya).
A group of energy experts in Bangalore (ASTRA) has developed alternative energy scenarios
for several states, which would be far less resource-depleting and environmentally destructive
than the current energy generation models. Assisted by engineers and hydrologists with a pro-
people bent of mind, communities in diverse ecological zones, including the driest arid areas
of western India, have shown that watershed management and simple rain water harvesting
techniques can achieve—at much less ecological, social, and financial costs—what big dams
cannot.
Several groups in the urban areas are involved in producing popular literature (Centre for
Science and Environment), undertaking training (Centre for Environmental Education), and
working on urban and rural issues (Deccan Development Society, Goa Foundation).
Again, the most important issue is that a wide range of groups and movements do not self-
consciously perceive themselves as “environmental groups”, but as social and political action
groups who are also environmentally conscious. The Narmada movement, for example, is a
fundamentally political movement that sees the environment as one of the central aspects of a
more comprehensive struggle.28
In the past six years, a major development has been the formation of national level
associations. The range of initiatives is indicative of the fact that many groups working in
local contexts or spheres of action feel the need to form coalitions that can further their
political concerns on a wider societal level. These coalitions also defy easy classification. A
few illustrations will indicate the diversity. Some older initiatives were either state-level (e.g.
FEVORD-Federation of Voluntary Organisations in Rural Development in Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu), single event-based (National Convention on the Forest Policy, or the National
Convention on Women‟s Rights), or single issue-based (National Working Group on
Displacement).
Specific „developments have also engendered collective responses. One of the best examples
was the mobilisation after the Bhopal Tragedy in 1984. Doctors, lawyers and other
professionals teamed up with representatives of the affected communities to fight for justice
for the victims of the worst industrial disaster in history. Like the Narmada campaign, though
on a smaller scale, horizontal alliances were created with trade unions working in other Union
Carbide factories, as well as with grass roots organisations like the Highlander Center in the
US.
Several newer initiatives attempt to be more oriented to the longer term, and are more
politically self-conscious of the need for a structural reorganisation of society. Five examples
would be the Jan Vikas Andolan (Movement for People‟s Development—a loose coalition of
over 200 groups, ranging from political movements to urban support organisations), Bharat
Jan Andolan (a coalition of movements working almost entirely in tribal areas), the Federal
Front (a coalition of primarily movement—based groups seeking a fundamental reorganisation
of the polity), Azadi Bachao Andolan (Movement for the Defence of Independence-working
to expose the adverse implications of the lending programmes of the World Bank29
and the
IMF, as well as other interventions in the economy that threaten livelihoods and ecosystems,
particularly of poor communities), and the National Campaign for Housing Rights, a coalition
of groups working in urban and rural areas asserting a definition of the concept of housing30
.
The Narmada Bachao Andolan is obviously another example. Similar coalitions exist at the
level of states, e.g. Shoshit Jan Andolan (Movement of the Oppressed People), which
comprises groups working predominantly in the tribal areas of Maharashtra.
Recently, there have been some efforts to collaborate across these initiatives since many
people in them recognise that fragmentation and disparate, uncoordinated activity is
counterproductive. The formation of the National Alliance of People‟s Movements (formerly
Alliance for the. Right to Life) is one such effort. Most of these federative efforts have
produced literature that details a political critique, as well as a blueprint towards realising
people-centered governance.
The clear lesson from the dynamic of both environmental destruction and environmental
reconstruction in India is that people —local communities everywhere—have to be involved
in any kind of natural resource management. That is a lesson that even the Indian State,
howsoever reluctantly, is beginning to learn.
Political Autonomy or Political Party?
The issue of political participation has been the centre of concern for almost all groups
working in the country. What differs is the degree of emphasis, the content of what comprises
participation, and what means will be used for realising this. One of the most contentious
issues has been the relationship with political parties.
Often, success in establishing a base in an area motivates representatives of existing political
parties to seek the integration of that activity into the party. Refusal to consent to these
overtures, or those made by the state to become a recipient of state development funds, can
bring various forms of retribution-ranging from isolation to repression. The case of the
Chattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh (CMSS)31
is illustrative. A remarkably innovative
independent trade union, working in the mining areas of southern Madhya Pradesh (Dally-
Rajahara), was able to muster significant support, in the process eroding the base of the older
party-based unions in the area. The trade union was able to not only achieve successes in the
conventional economic agenda, it was also able to have a significant impact on the social
aspects of the worker‟s life-health, education, alcoholism, etc. Resentment grew among the
older unions, and all efforts to woo them were unsuccessful. The union was able to gradually
have an impact in the neighbouring areas, and in late 1991, one of its main leaders, Shanker
Guha Niyogi, was murdered. While this reprehensible act was not the doing of the other trade
unions (but of the then ruling party-supported industrialists), this case shows the high costs of
asserting autonomy from the established structures of society.
Unions and groups like the CMSS have been debating another option: to form a party of their
own. Several years ago, over 80 groups had also begun a process of forming a Green Party.
None of these initiatives has as yet been realised. What is gaining ground, however, is an even
more fundamental debate. Is participation in electoral politics necessary? Is it not possible to
assert local autonomy and control over the local means of production? On December 1990,
over 150 groups and movements publicly announced a radical programme of “Our rule in our
villages.” While this may be criticised as an isolationist strategy that cannot work, it
nevertheless represents the strong sentiment of disillusionment and frustration with the
democratic limitations of electoral politics.
This assertion does not mean isolation from the formal political process. In fact, the process of
making the formal system (parties and governments) accountable, continues. What also
continues is the use of the available instruments of democratic institutions, particularly the
courts.
From the standpoint of the parties, there is a growing attempt to recognise independent
movements and groups. While overtures by some of the parties have undoubtedly been
perceived as co-operative, overtures for a dialogue have called for a more thorough debate
among non-party groups. A recent statement by one of India‟s leading politicians—who has
also been a celebrated trade unionist and a minister in two different non-Congress
governments at the centre—is indicative of the “shifting mood” within some parties. He said:
“In the absence of an organised socialist movement, new issues and new challenges have been
taken up by radical youth, including women, by setting up action groups and other voluntary
organisations. These issues pertain to: the rights of women and children, and their
exploitation; protection of the environment that is being devastated locally and globally by
large industry and those who serve its interests; struggles against large dams and other projects
that displace hundreds of thousands of people and ravage their lives, even while disturbing the
ecological equilibrium.., all such groups need to be drawn into the now inevitable struggle
against the new economic policies of the government.“32
Despite these efforts to bridge the gap between parties and non-party movements, all
indications currently suggest that these relationships are going to continue to be marked by a
blend of dialogue, pressurising and conflict. A dynamic tension continues to prevail between
rajniti and lokniti (state power and people‟s power)
The State and Democratic Space
Working with a state that is simultaneously a strong state and a weak one, a developmentalist
state and one that legitimises the erosion of livelihoods, a militarising state and one that opens
democratic possibilities, makes the activities of groups and movements all the more difficult
and challenging. There have been perennial debates on what kinds of contexts justify
collaboration with the state, and when there should be resistance and opposition to it.
Dilemmas are created, for instance, when developmental initiatives are being implemented by
administrators sensitive to the demands of democratising social action. Does appealing to the
state legitimise it further?
Many feel that the state is the biggest problem. However, most recognise that criticising the
state does not mean a negation of it. In most cases when there are conflicts over natural
resources, groups seek the mediation of the state. There is also the role of buffer that the state
can play in the face of increasingly predatory transnationals. Yet, in the face of growing state
lawlessness at one level, and a partisan state acting in the interests of national and global elites
on the other, newer and more creative ways are required of defining what the mechanisms to
ensure accountability ought to be. Should all these mechanisms be from within? Many
movements and groups like those in the Narmada struggle are increasingly seeking to facilitate
building pressure from the outside—both within the UN system and through other citizens
groups. Many critics have questioned the legitimacy of this approach. In fact, the state and a
section of the media have charged that seeking accountability by invoking international human
rights standards is anti-national activity. Movement groups, on the other hand, have argued
that there are international conventions that India is signatory to, and that there are a body of
internationally recognised rights that India must respect. Additionally, when the new regime is
clearly taking its directives on new economic policies from institutions like the World Bank
and the IMF, its invocation of the anti-national bogey rings false. Other, commentators argue
that in societies like India‟s, the state monopolises both violence and the right to define policy.
In that sense, it also attempts to monopolise the decision on what constitutes “national
interest.” It is precisely these monopolies that are being challenged by people‟s movements,
many of which have also begun a process of rethinking the modern state.
Conclusion
The continued destruction of the complex ecosystems of South Asia reflects the injustice
inherent in the dominant model of development, under which capital and technology (from
biotechnology to telecommunication conglomerates) from the industrialised countries with
expertise drawn from both contexts, are used to erode local and national control, and to turn
natural resources into exportable commodities for foreign exchange and private capital
accumulation, to pay debts, to primarily maintain the upward mobility of a minority, and to
purchase military hardware both to “protect one‟s borders” as well as to quell internal dissent.
Lopsided international markets, industrial technology, and an expanding appetite for a higher
standard of living by affluent populations, create needs entirely out of balance with the
ecological and social welfare of the countries with the resources to supply those needs. It is
economically, and most often politically, advantageous (particularly in the short run) for
commercial interests within and outside these countries to join hands in the exploitation of
forest and other resources. The poor in most of the region (a majority of whom remain rural)
can only be raised above a life of poverty by „recovering and regenerating degraded lands, by
more equitably distributing these resources (developmental strategies that are almost totally
absent in today‟s official developmental plans), and by wresting primary control (through
processes of local governance) over the use of these resources. This agenda does not figure
even in the manifestos of our political parties, almost all of whom are committed (with small
variations) to the dominant patterns of economic development. The challenge for non-party
political groups is twofold: (i) to build a step-by-step consensus on the adverse impacts and
implications of the dominant patterns while struggling for greater transparency and
accountability of the parties and of the state; and (ii) to continue to give substance to
strengthening governance that builds upward from the Gram Sabha to the national, regional
and global levels.
The issues these movements have, championed, and the actors they have activised, have
implications for the fundamental nature of politics. Liberal parliamentary politics as well as
radical politics have become increasingly cognisant of them, though efforts to co-opt and
manipulate them are still prevalent. Although some orthodox politicians might label these
concerns as “Luddite” or “anti-progress”, others have begun to acknowledge the basic critique
of the dominant patterns of development. A grass roots activist from Maharashtra, Bharat
Patnakar, argues that a viable programme of social transformation should now include “not
only taking over of the means of production or the bourgeois state, but also to create more
participatory ways for organising and managing production processes and alternative concepts
of agriculture/health care/industry/ecology.”
This countervailing consciousness, particularly but not only in tribal areas, asserts that rather
than accepting development as an unquestionable truth, it is important to demonstrate that it is
a product of particular historical configurations of power relations, where „underdevelopment‟
is not a natural fact, but an imaginary geography created by the developed world. By
essentialising as distinct categories of „developed‟ and „underdeveloped‟, industrialised
countries have defined the underdeveloped in such a way that they can continue to control and
manage their affairs. But in fact, both are facets of „the same world.
Many of these movements and the alliances that are being forged are not seeking a „greener‟
and environmentally sound habitat within the current capitalist system. The National Alliance,
for instance, argues that ecological problems are inherent in the social relations of production
and the mode of capitalist development, and there is therefore an urgent need for radically
restructuring the social relations of production, and that this can be achieved by not only
seeking alternative ecological principles, but also alternative social relations, both among
humans of different gender, castes, classes and ethnicities, and between humans and nature.
Movements based on an ecological ethic are, however, only a part of the larger political
challenge that can address the existing power relations. The building of a dialogue between the
various strands of resistance will require patience and perseverance.
In another sense also, the self-awakening of the Subcontinent is bound to remain similarly
elusive and transient until we find a secure basis for a confident expression of our collective
civilization within the modern world and the modern epoch. We must establish a conceptual
framework under which our ways and aspirations seem viable in the present, so that we do not
feel compelled or tempted to indulge in demeaning imitations of the western world, and the
majority of our people do not have to suffer the humiliation of seeing their ways denigrated
and despised in their own country.
These are just a few thoughts and concerns that reflect the enormously complex challenges
that lie before anyone who is struggling for ecological sustainability and justice in the
beleaguered Subcontinent. This paper is finally dedicated, in profound respect, to those
struggling against overwhelming odds all over the region.
Notes:
1. James Gustave Speth, “A Post-Rio Compact,” Foreign Policy No. 88, Fall 1992, p.149.
2. One caveat: a task this paper can only hint at, but which needs greater political and
psychological analysis, is the diverse ways in which the dominant cultural groups have
“dialogued” with the vast diversity of identities within the context of each country and within
the region, and how ecology has intersected and contributed to the exacerbation or reduction
of conflict and insecurity. There can be no disagreement that while developmental change and
technological transformations create new solidarities, they also foster or revive old identities.
What also needs deeper understanding is the role of the state in each of our societies, both in
contributing to the growth of people‟s insecurity, as well as in being able to immediate in the
ecological conflicts between communities, identities and groups.
3. Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993.
4. According to the 1991 Census, Indian tribal and nomadic populations each number roughly
8% of a total population of 870 million. The largest tribal community in Bangladesh is that of
the Chakmas, who have been struggling for autonomy in the face of severe state repression
and forced integration. Chakmas also reside in India, and there are some efforts to assert a
unified Chakma politics that cuts across national boundaries. These crucial issues of autonomy
and assertion of control over productive natural resources occur in almost all tribal areas of the
Subcontinent. The tribal population in Pakistan and Sri Lanka is very small and does not face
the same sets of problems with regard to forest, land, or the attitude of the state towards them.
5. Pathy, Jaganath, Anthropology of Development: Demystification & Relevance, Delhi:
Gyan Publishing House, 1987.
6. Walter Fernandes, et al, Forests, Environment and Tribal Economy: Deforestation,
Impoverishment & Marginalisation in Orissa, Tribes of India Series, 1988.
7. Janardhan Rao and G. Hargopal, Lokayan Bulletin, 1990.
8. A classification made in the Indian Constitution of tribal groups and economically and
socially marginalised castes, for whom affirmative action and other stare protection was
mandated.
9. Sharma 1990:420.
10. Bina Agarwal (1991), Gall Omvedt (1987), and Vandana Shiva (1988).
11. Jharkhand is the name of a proposed new state based not on dominant linguistic criteria,
but on tribal identity. Located in east-central India, it encompasses an unmistakable identity
that separates it geographically, ethnically and culturally from the surrounding plains of
northern Bihar and West Bengal. Jharkhand‟s name itself suggests an ecological identity
Bihar‟, meaning „forest‟, and „khand‟, meaning „area‟).
12. Ram Dayal Munda (1987), Devnathan (t988), and the Jharkhand Mukti Andolan
(Ghanshyam 1992).
13. For the rest of the paper, I have used „region‟, „South Asia‟, and „the Subcontinent‟
interchangeably.
14. While there are significant differences between the nature and character of South Asian
regimes, which range from authoritarian to quasi-democratic, the basic dynamic of natural
resource extraction and capitalist development remain remarkably similar. One among the
many differences relate to how “developed” the industrial sector is. For instance, the post-
Partition Indian state laid great emphasis on industrial self-sufficiency. The weaker industrial
base of the other countries in the region have made them comparatively more dependent on
external capital and external control. However, under the new liberalisation in India, this is
changing.
15. A controversial dam project in one of the most fragile and pristine rain forests in south-
eastern India. Despite overwhelming support for the project from local politicians and trade
unions, a remarkable „elitist‟ campaign was launched, comprising scientists and other
professionals. Mrs. Gandhi, then Prime Minister, intervened to shelve the project. For years,
she cited this action as her commitment to the environment. For a comprehensive narrative on
the controversy, see Darryl D‟Monte, Temples or Tombs, Delhi: Centre for Science and
Environment, 1986.
16. The South Commission, The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990
17. World Bank Annual Report, 1992
18. The Dunkel Final Act was distributed to GATT delegates in Geneva in December 1991.
Arthur Dunkel was till recently the Secretary-General of GATT. This document, with minor
alterations, was formally adopted by India in the second week of April 1994, and the
Parliament gave its assent to the new World Trade Organisation (despite strong opposition)
on December 9, 1994.
19. Several leading environmental organisations in the US argue that regional trading regimes
like NAFTA will, in fact, lead to a strengthening of standards in Mexico and increased
environmental awareness generally. While there may be some truth in this, the trends that will
be reinforced when the current GATT proposals become internationally enforceable norms
under the WTO, point to the conclusions that I have outlined. There is no indication from the
dominant interests behind WTO that they are indeed willing to make global trade democratic,
equitable and ecologically sane, with an emphasis on empowering local production as well as
relative national self-sufficiency.
20. In a way, this ideology is popularly available in Jack Hadley‟s novel, Millennium, which
outlines a process through which, by the 21st century, the South loses control of its economy
to the North.
21. Interestingly, this recognition is not new. In the 1950s, Joan Robinson‟s Economics of
Imperfect Competition and E. Chamberlain‟s Economics of Monopoly Capitalism had made
the same observation, though without identifying the threats to cultural and ecological
pluralism.
22. Chakravarti Raghavan, Recolonization: GATT and the Third World, London: Zed Books,
1991. Also see Robert Weissman, “Prelude to a New Colonialism,” The Nation, March 18,
1991.
23. Mahatma Gandhi as quoted in Pyarelal, Towards New Horizons, Ahmedabad, India:
Navjivan Publishing House, 1959.
24. For one of the best documented studies of this relationship see Vandana Shiva, The
Violence of the Green Revolution, London: Penguin Books. 1988. On a similar crisis generated
in the Latin American food system, see Michael Redclift, Environment and Development in
Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability, New York: Manchester University Press, 1991.
25. In 1989, the combined external debt of the major South Asian countries was over $ 100
billion. India itself owed $ 62 billion (current estimates are around $ 80 billion). At $ 296 per
capita, Sri Lanka had the highest debt in the region, while India‟s per capita debt was $ 73.
Nepal had the lowest debt at $ 11 per capita.
26. Economics, Ecology, Ethics. The Unbroken Circle, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992.
27. These lists of representative groups are by no means an indication that within each cluster,
these groups are similar. While there may be vital similarities in terms of goals, histories,
individual perspectives, sizes and the nature of activities are significantly different.
28. For a more exhaustive discussion on social movements and social action groups, see my
„Social Movements and the Redefinition of Democracy,‟ in Philip Oldenburg, India Briefing,
Westview Press, 1993. This article also contains significant references on what Lokayan
termed the “non-party political process.”
29. For an excellent comparative study of the role of the World Bank in tropical forestry in
India, see Robert S. Anderson and Walter Huber, The Hour of the Fox: Tropical Forests, the
World Bank, and Indigenous People in Central India, Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1988.
30. Responding to agitation against forced displacement in several parts of the country, and
the scale of this phenomenon, a remarkable initiative was taken in 1987 by a group of
activists, researchers, scientists and lawyers. Called „National Working Group on
Displacement‟, it facilitated over a dozen meetings all over the country of activists and
professionals with representatives of communities who had either faced, or were going to face,
displacement. In light of the fact that there was no national policy for those displaced by
developmental projects, a legal sub-group drafted a policy statement, which was subsequently
used by the central government to draft a National Policy in 1990. However, the government
draft was a thoroughly inadequate document, and has yet to be finalised. Estimates of the
number of people displaced by development range from 15-25 million since Independence.
31. There is considerable writing on the CMSS. For a recent article see, Sharat G. Lin,
„Shankar Guha Niyogi: Beyond Conventional Trade Unionism in India,‟ Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 24, No. 3. July-September 1992, pp. 16-25.
32. This excerpt is from a meeting addressed by Mr. George Fernandes at a national dialogue
to forge a new coalition of democratic and socialist forces. The meeting was held in
Hyderabad, March 20-21. 1993.
Smitu Kothari
Ecology and Security in South Asia
(A State-of-the-Art Report for Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, 1994).