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Conflicting interests?

Tensions between Japan and South

Korea rise as an intelligence-

sharing pact is brought to the

public's attention and gets

canceled in the last minute

EAST ASIANSECURITY AND DEFENCE

DIGEST

EDITOR’S NOTE - TIAGO MAURÍCIOResearcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute

This past week saw an important

event unfold in Japan-South Korea

relations. The celebration of an intelligence

pact that could smooth information-sharing

with regards to North Korea's nuclear

program, though advanced earlier as a

good step in responding to Pyongyang's

threat and as an important step in fostering

bilateral ties between Seoul and Tokyo

suffered a dramatic turn of events later in

the week. The reaction was the strongest in

South Korea, where public opinion and

nationalist politics decried the insidious

move by Japan - seen as expanding its

military influence -, and the South Korean

government.

 Analysts were prompt to base this last

minute call to cancel the pact as internal

politicking on behalf of the Koreans, whose

upcoming elections is putting pressure on

the country's foreign and security policy.

Japan policy is a sensitive topic and it does

not require much for some voices to

denounce Tokyo's revamping its influence

on its former colony, or taking advantage of

the threat from North Korea to expand its

military apparatus. News editorials and

articles have followed, mostly in the South

Korean press, airing negative views not

only on the way this pact was negotiated

and nearly signed, but also on the overall

relations between the two countries. The

reaction in Japan has been more moderate

and interpreted as a missed opportunity to

bolster security ties against a common

threat.

Until the elections in December, more

tensions are to be expected though their

true impact remains to be assessed.

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The status of current China-US relations

“Things with China will get ugly. Our

talk of rebalancing is a response to

Chinese power and provocations. The

competition is intensifying. We repeat the

mantra that our efforts in Asia are not

about China as if saying it makes it true.

In reality, politics, like physics, has an

action-reaction cycle. While we are doingthe right thing, China certainly views our

actions as hostile. We should expect

China to up its game militarily.”

“Pivoting and rebalancing: The good, the

bad and the ugly” (Dan Blumenthal -

 American Enterprise Institute).

The AirSea Battle Concept may already

be dated

“China’s development of a highly

capable Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)

battle plan to deter, slow, or deny U.S.

forces from entering a contested

geographic area or combat zone has

been well covered in The Diplomat by

myself and others. It makes sense for

 American military planners to assess the

challenges such a strategy will present as

Chinese forces begin to deploy over

greater distances.

But it’s also clear that the United

Sta tes shou ld deve lop i t s own

symmetrical and asymmetric strategies to

counter such threats. A joint operational

concept of AirSea Battle combined with a

strong cyber component could damage,

deter, and destroy any Chinese A2/AD

capabilities and ensure U.S. maritime

a c c e s s . A n e w l y r e c o n s t i t u t e d

“AirSeaCyber” operational concept would

give U.S. forces the best chance to

defeat Chinese or any other nations’ A2/ 

 AD forces now and in the future.”

“Is AirSea Battle Obsolete?” (Harry

Kazianis - The Diplomat).

China may have the teeth to dispute the

 AirSea Battle Concept

“China's boasts about its military may

soon be put to the test, as new tension

with Vietnam in the South China Sea

comes on the heels of a months-long

standoff with the Philippines. How

confident Chinese leaders are in the

strength of their armed forces will play a

big role in how far they push their

territorial claims. It also will indicate

whether Beijing is trying to bluff America

into staying out of these controversies

roiling Asia.

The question is whether the People's

Liberation Army is a paper dragon, andthe honest answer is mixed. In theory, the

growth in the PLA has been startling

since the 1990s. Starting from a ground-

centric force relying on 1950s technology,

and with very little modern air or sea

capabilities, China's military is now the

second-largest in the world.”

“Is the PLA a Paper Dragon?” (Michael

 Auslin - Wall Street Journal).

 Australia weighs its strategic alliance

“Since the writing of the last Defence

White Paper a long-term trend has

become more apparent. This trend

creates a clear 'win-win' situation

between the defence of Australia,

underpinned by the ANZUS alliance, and

 Australia's Asian engagement project.

This is particularly so when we remind

ourselves that Asia is much larger than

the People's Republic of China.

Signified by the deepening Japan-

 Australia security relationship, the Japan-

South Korea relationship and the

Vietnam-India relationship, a growing

number of Asian powers have developed

more common views of regional security

in line with those of the 2009 Defence

White Paper. These converging views

appreciate the importance of continued

US strategic leadership in the Asia Pacific

century and the role greater cooperation

between security allies and partners of

the US can play in supporting and

shaping this leadership.”

“ Australia's win-win security

alliance” (Malcolm Cook - The Lowy

Interpreter).

Controlling the Pentagon's budget must

have started earlier“Unsurprisingly, the defense industry has

enjoyed remarkable prosperity during this

time, with industry profits quadrupling

between 2001 and 2010. But with a

struggling economy and the conclusion of

two wars, the United States can no longer

afford to fund a massive defense buildup

in the absence of an existential threat.

Every bipartisan group confronting the

deficit problem -- inc luding the

President's Debt Commission (Simpson-

Bowles), the Domenici-Rivlin Task Force,and the Gang of Six -- has recommended

reducing defense spending by about $1

trillion over the next decade. And the

Budget Control Act (BCA), passed last

summer, called for Congress to identify

$1.2 trillion in cuts, revenue, or both to

address this fiscal dilemma. If Congress

failed, the act stipulated that $500 billion

be automatically "sequestered" from

defense (an equivalent amount would

also be "sequestered" from non-defense

programs) to meet the shortfall.”

“Gunpoint Stimulus” (Lawrence J. Korb,

 Alex Rothman & Max Hoffman - Foreign

Policy).

Oil and gas don't trump fish stocks, not in

the South China Sea

“Bad weather was good news in

Scarborough Shoal, a contested chain of

rocks and reefs in the South China Sea.

Earlier this month, Typhoon Butchoy

forced a break in the two-month standoff

between Philippine and Chinese vessels

as diplomatic efforts faltered. For all it

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seemed the showdown was about naval

power, oil resources, and China's

inexorable rise, the Scarborough incident

was really about one thing: the fish.”

“Fish Story” (Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt

- Foreign Policy).

Can we make sense of China's policytoward North Korea?

“Of course, should North Korea

launch any new provocations that

threaten to drag the region into military

conflict, then China may be tempted to

shift positions. After all, China is unlikely

to want to become embroiled in a direct

military conflict with the United States.

But China’s response following the two

nuclear tests and the 2010 provocations

suggests Beijing has a high tolerance for

North Korean wrongdoing, China’s and

many wonder what exactly is bottom line.

Ultimately, Beijing knows full well

that, like it or not, it must live with the

U.S.-South Korea military alliance –

there’s little it can do to stop it. But that

doesn’t mean it has to like it, and its

suspicions of U.S. and South Korean

intentions mean it sees few reasons to

change its current policies and help

facilitate a resolution to the North Korea

issue. ”

“The Logic of China's Korea Policy” (Sun

Yun - Foreign Policy).

Is the EU a relevant actor in pressuring

North Korea?

“France, Germany and the UK are

currently involved in the ‘Five Plus One’

negotiations with Iran (also known as ‘E3

plus 3’); at times they have been seen to

adopt ‘hawkish’ attitudes. Yet it is unlikelythat the EU joining the Six-Party talks

would create the same problem, because

a majority of EU member states also have

diplomatic relations with the DPRK, and

some have a long history of involvement

in DPRK-related negotiations. Sweden,

for example, has five representatives

stationed at Panmunjom as members of

the Neutra l Nat ions Supervisory

Commission (NNSC), and Poland also

attends some NNSC meetings, through

South Korea.

The current situation in East Asia

presents unique challenges for the EU,

such as the ongoing China–US struggle

for regional hegemony. The complex

relationships between the parties

involved, and the potential repercussions

for the North Korea debate could make it

difficult for the EU to maintain a strong

level of credibility in negotiations and in

the region in general. The positionadopted by some EU member states at

the ‘Five Plus One’ talks with Iran may

either prevent proper negotiations with

the DPRK or h igh l ight poss ib le

contradictions in various countries’

stances.”

“Six-plus-one-Party Talks? EU role in

denuclearisation of North Korea” (Philip

Worré - East Asia Forum).

 American hegemony in perspective

“Playing a dominant role in world politics

does not make for an easy life. Even very

powerful states encounter problems they

cannot solve and situations they would

prefer to avoid. But as Macbeth remarks

after seeing the witches, "Present fears

are less than horrible imaginings." What

really scares American foreign policy

commentators is not any immediate

frustration or danger but the prospect of

longer-term decline.

Recently, the United States has been

going through yet another bout of

declinism -- the fifth wave in the last six

decades, by the scholar Josef Joffe's

count. This one has been caused by the

 juxtaposition of China's rising power and

 American economic, political, and military

malaise. Just as in the past, however, the

surge of pessimism has produced a

countersurge of defensive optimism, with

arguments put forward about the

continued value and feasibility of U.S. 

global leadership. ”

“Hegemony and After” (Robert Keohane -

Foreign Affairs).

 Are China and India engaged in a

deadlocked race for aircraft carriers?

“China and India are neck-and-neck

in their development of new-generationaircraft carriers. Both navies now have

'new' ships undergoing sea trials, and the

race is on to see which will be the first to

undertake landing trials for fixed wing

aircraft.

The Times of India reports that India's

new carrier, a heavily modified ex-Soviet

vessel named INS Vikramaditya which

recently went to sea for the first time in its

renovated state, will start aviation trialslater this month. The new Chinese carrier,

another heavily modified ex-Soviet vessel

of so far unknown name, has now made

eight sea trials, though nothing other than

a helicopter is known to have landed on

its huge deck.”

“India-China: The carrier race” (Sam

Roggeveen - The Lowy Interpreter).

Talking tough to Pyongyang

“Last Tuesday, U.S. Congressman

Hank Johnson and his adviser Jonathan

Ossoff criticized what they described as a

“dangerous provision” in this year’s house

version of the Nat ional Defense

 Authorization Act (NDAA). The provision,

which calls for the Obama administration

to consider deploying addit ional

conventional and nuclear forces to the

Western Pacific, isn’t near ly as

“dangerous” as Johnson and Ossoff

make it out to be. It is, instead, areasonable effort to pursue U.S. policy

goals in Northeast Asia.”

“ A Big Stick for North Korea?” (Michael

Mazza - The Diplomat).

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Further thoughts on the SDF's

military march in Tokyo

“I would argue these exercises areevermore important now, in thewake of the Tohoku disasters ofMarch 2011, where the Self-Defense Forces and US militarywere at the forefront of the disasterrelief efforts, going in and servingthe citizens in circumstanceswhere no one else would go.Building on the favourable views ofthe SDF that emerged from their

outstanding performance inTohoku is of vital importance, asSaraiva rightly pointed out in hisclarifications to his original article,and offsets the risk of upsetting afew constituencies by holding themilitary march in Tokyo. Of coursethese exercises should not be heldtoo often at the expenses ofgalvanising public opinion to thetrue purpose of such exercises.Thusly, the balance between

public exposure and withdrawal isindeed a thin one and it should be

threaded carefully.”

“Riposte: 2012 Tokyo SDFMilitary March Part II”

(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).

Good arguments for the reform ofthe SDF Reserves

“Breaking down the figures givenin the investigation (below), youcan see a clear difference betweenthe two kinds of SDF Reserves:

the poorly-trained SDF Reservistsmade up of civilians and formerregular SDF, many of whom offerprofessional skills (language,medical, etc.) to the three services,and the SDF Ready Reservists, thefirst port-of-cal l for cal l-upcomprised of former regular SDFpersonnel and SDF Reservistscapable of maintaining high-readiness, operating under GSDFcommand only. No numbers are

given for the readiness of theReady Reservists who can be

penalized for refusing their duties

and be forced to resign. Of theSDF Reservists, 10% failed torespond to the Local CooperationOffices to state whether they wereready or not, this could partly bedue to the effects of the disasteritself.”

“Time For a Reform of the SDFReserves?”

(James Simpson - Japan SecurityWatch).

Some in South Korea are alarmedabout Japan's security policy

  “The specter of militarism isrearing its ugly head in Japan,slowly but unmistakably.

Japan, which started its militarycomeback on the internationalstage with the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops tothe Gulf War in the 1990s, hassince stepped up arms exports,and more recently, opened the way

JAPAN

HIGHLIGHTSA INTELLIGENCE-SHARING

PACT BETWEEN JAPAN

AND SOUTH KOREA WAS

CANCELLED LAST MINUTE

!

 Tensions between the countries have

risen

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for nuclear armament, at least legally.

Now Tokyo is sounding out thepossibility of allowing SDF to engagein military activities overseas if itsallies are attacked, under the pretextof ̀ `collective self-defense.”

This means Japanese soldiers canland on ― once again ― the Korean

Peninsula if North Korea attacks theU.S. troops in South Korea.”

“Resurgent military power”

(Editorial - The Korea Times).

 Again, maritime cooperation isbuilding mutual trust in Japan-China

relations

“In among Japan’s much moreproactive approach to Southeast

 Asia, including stronger commitmentsof aid and security cooperation toIndonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam,and increased tension over theS e n k a k u i s l a n d s d u e t odevelopments in Japan’s domesticpolitics, you could be forgiven forthinking that Japan and China havecompletely burned their bridges inthe last two years. However I passedthis interesting and unheralded pieceof information the other day that

reminds us that the countries in theregion are still looking for ways toi n c r e a s e c o n fi d e n c e a n dinstitutionalize cooperation despitedifficult geopolitical circumstances.Japan, China and India haveenhanced their coordination in piracypatrols near Somalia.”

“Japan’s MSDF leads and China’sPLA(N) follows”

(Corey Wallace - Japan Security

Watch).

Complementary views on the impactof the SDF's military march

“Yet considering only a strategicor military point of view, and far frombeing a specialist on this, mycommon sense tells me that 20armed military man, marching inTokyo with camouflage, along withsome citizens waving Japanese flags,

doesn't represent a valid urbanwarfare exercise that will make the

SDFs more prepared to face "non-traditional security threats such asnatural disasters, terrorist attacks andepidemics." In this context, MitsuoSato, leader of the Tokyo-basedJapan Peace Committee, hascommented that the government’sMinistry of Defense is trying to adjustthe public on how they see the armed

forces. He questioned why the troopsneeded to carry rifles and warnedthat since the end of World War II,Japan has been seemingly averse tomilitary imagery, with SDF troops inuniform only seen at places likemilitary bases or offices for thedefense ministry. So the DefenseMinister's decision seems more like apol i t ica l one, t ry ing to makeJapanese people more favorable to agrowing role of the military in the

Japanese Society. Again Mitsuo Satosaid, “This is an attempt to get thepublic used to the presence of armedforces.” Actually some within theGSDF have criticized the move,questioning whether guns would benecessary at the scene of a disaster. And residents filed a petition with theTokyo District Court seeking atemporary injunction to halt thetraining exercise, which the courtrejected.”

“Clarifications on the 2012 TokyoSDF's march: Why it wasn't smart!”

(Rui Faro Saraiva - JFPO).

 A civil-military reading of the rationalebehind the SDF's military march

“The things is there are differentdifficulties to obtain the permissioneach camp. Interestingly, it oftendepends on the situations in areas

around the base. In this case, CampNerima is located in the center of anurban area, in which there arepolitical camps of liberal and anti-militaristic pressure groups. Althoughthere are exceptions, urbanizationtends to make labor associations orcivilian groups which are sympathetictoward the Democratic Party in Japan(DPJ), the Social Democratic Party(SDP) and the Japanese CommunistParty.

General ly speaking, GSDFCamps in urban areas are facing anti-

militaristic demonstrations andobstructive activities, while camps inrural areas have no problems withresidents. In agricultural areas youcan confirm residents have closeeconomic and social relations withthe GSDF. As political geography andelection research showed, ruralpopulations in Japan are strong

supporters of the Liberal DemocraticParty (LDP).”

“Guest Post with Tashiro Kazuya -Civil-Military Views on the SDF's

Military March”

(Tashiro Kazuya - JFPO).

Further thoughts on the SDF'smilitary march in Tokyo

“I would argue these exercises areevermore important now, in the wakeof the Tohoku disasters of March2011, where the Self-Defense Forcesand US military were at the forefrontof the disaster relief efforts, going inand se rv i ng the c i t i ze ns i ncircumstances where no one elsewould go. Building on the favourableviews of the SDF that emerged fromtheir outstanding performance inTohoku is of vital importance, asSaraiva rightly pointed out in hisclarifications to his original article,and offsets the risk of upsetting a fewconstituencies by holding the militarymarch in Tokyo. Of course theseexercises should not be held toooften at the expenses of galvanisingpublic opinion to the true purpose ofsuch exercises. Thusly, the balancebetween public exposure andwithdrawal is indeed a thin one and itshould be threaded carefully.”

“Riposte: 2012 Tokyo SDF MilitaryMarch Part II”

(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).

The Japan-US alliance should extendto the cyber realm

“Countering cyber threatsdemands cooperat ion amongnations, in particular public-privatepartnerships. The key is the timely

exchange of warnings and follow-upinformation at the governmental,military, and private levels. Without

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prompt alerts regarding cyber-attacksor espionage methods and targets, allcountries will find it difficult, if notimpossible, to detect and preventattacks. Countries, however, arestruggling to identify common groundbecause they have different interestsand concerns, as well as differenta p p r o a c h e s t o p r i v a c y a n d

regulations –for reasons ranging fromnationalsecurity to impact oneconomic growth. Thus, it is better tocommence cyber collaboration withallies that share interests, economicmodels, and threat perceptions. ”

“Moving Forward with US-JapanCybersecurity Cooperation ”

(Mihoko Matsubara - DefenseProfessionals).

JFPO INTERVIEW:

Interview with Christian Wirth -Waseda University, Sophia University

“Analysts are coming to terms with afast evolving international powerlandscape in Northeast Asia, devisingnovel ways to understand itsintricacies and dynamics, as well as

its consequences to regional andglobal peace and stability. However,part of this analytical endeavour isframed in interpretations of historicalpasts - such as a Concert of Powersunderstanding of internationalrelations. You have expressed yourdissatisfaction with such forcefulextrapolations elsewhere (EA post),but why should a t radi t ionalunderstanding not be used whenlooking at unfolding power dynamicsin the region?

Given the fact that the idea ofa Concert of Asia replicatesa n a t t e m p t , a m e n t a lframework that was devisedby students of InternationalRelations to understand theinteraction among Europeanstates in the 19th century, Iw o u l d r e p l y w i t h t h equestion: why should it beused? Why should it be

useful for understanding therelations among Northeast Asian states more than a

century later? As it becomesapparent, the concept isbased on the assumptionthat states are like andunitary actors, which showpatterns of behaviour that areuniform across the globe andfrozen in time. However,contemporary Northeast Asia

is fundamentally differentfrom 19th century Europe inat least two respects: First,societies have become muchmore complex and pluralistic. As a consequence, even instates with weak or absentdemocrat ic inst i tut ions,governments are no moreable to conduct foreign policyindependent from domesticpolitics and public opinion.

This becomes apparent in thefact that elite consensus, forinstance on questions ofhistorical recognition orterritorial disputes as theyw e r e r e a c h e d a m o n gNortheast Asian leadersduring the Cold War years,have since the 1990s beenunravelling.

Second, looking beyond the

i m m e d i a t e r e g i o n ,governments are now actingin a globalized environment,that is, the pursuit of theirnational interests requiresm o r e t h a n t h e m e r emaintenance of diplomaticties among foreign ministries.They face the dauntingchal lenge of managingsurging global flows ofpeople, goods, capital andinformation. This not only

requ i res c lose po l i cy -c o o r d i n a t i o n ,i n te rgove rnmen ta l andinternational institutions havebecome crucial tools to thatend as well. As such, the callfor a Concert of Asia, eventhough it is based on a realisttheo re t i ca l f ramework ,amounts to a normative callfor decision-makers to adjustto changing conditions rather

than a practical roadmapbased on deeper analysis ofsocio-economic conditions.

Last, one should not forgetthat the Concert of Europemeant that while aristocratice l i t e s c h a l l e n g e d b ydemocracy movemen tsagreed not to threaten onea n o t h e r , e n g a g e d i nimperialism and colonialismoutside of Europe. Moreover,

when the Concert orderc o l l a p s e d u n d e r t h epressures of industrializationand fervent nationalism,militarism eventually led toWorld War I.

 As such, the question whythis concept is seen as asolution for the future ofNortheast Asia and the Asia-Pacific is quite interesting, far

more interesting than theconcept itself.

You have also identified an interestingnexus which should be highlightedhere. That nexus refers to thecontradiction between economicsand politics, on the one hand, andthe tensions between policy elitesand public opinion, on the other. Thisis par t icu la r ly re levant whendiscussing regional integration

initiatives in Northeast Asia (and East Asia more broadly) and cooperationat the international level. How do youenvision this interplay will affectregional security arrangements,especially in the context of Japan-China relations?

 Af ter th ir ty years of theC h i n e s e ‘ r e f o r m a n dopening’, the country isstrongly integrated into theglobal markets with the

European Union being itsmost important economicpartner . The Japaneseeconomy was initially linkedto China through OfficialDevelopment Assistance(ODA) and from the 1990sb e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l yinterdependent through theexpansion of productionne tworks by Japanesecorporations. More recent,

Japanese companies havebeen increasing their effortsto tap into the Chinese

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marke ts , espec ia l l y i nc o n s u m e r g o o d s a n dservices.

The economic crises in North America and Europe haveaccelerated the fundamentalshift in the orientation of theJapanese economy from

North America toward East Asia including China. Thisshift has not happened inpolitics. The contradiction isparticularly stark in securitypo l i t ics where Japan’srelations with its Northeast Asia (and partially also withSoutheast Asia) are stillmarred with tensions causedby diverging memories ofw a r t i m e h i s t o r y a n d

unresolved maritime territorialdisputes. The contentionsover the ownership andcontrol over islands, rocksand Exclusive EconomicZones (EEZ) with Taiwan,China, South Korea andRussia mean that Japanremains ideationally, andtherefore also politically,distant from Northeast Asia -and as a result closely tied tothe United States. There is nod o u b t t h a t d e e p e n i n geconomic interdependencewill continue to increase thepotential costs of conflict andhave a restraining effect onpolitical tensions.

 At the same time, however,the instability of politicals y s t e m s a n d r i s i n gnationalism resulting from thevery socio-economic change

that comes with the officiallyp r o m o t e d e c o n o m i cdevelopment will continue tocause tensions akin to thestand-off over the collision ofa Chinese fishing boat withJapan Coast Guard vesselsnear the disputed Diaoyu/ S e n k a k u i s l a n d s i nSeptember 2010.

The obvious follow-up to the last

question is the observation thatsocieties in Northeast Asia will beprofoundly influenced by the way

they (mis)handle these securitymatters. Cohesion and legitimacy ofthe political elites come out as two ofthe most important issues to bear inmind, but there are others. What arethe challenges ahead, namely in thecase of Japan?

In order not to jeopardise its

economic ties and avoidtensions that will lead todrastic increases in defencespending with potentiallyviolent and devastatingconflict, it is in the interest ofthe people and governmentof Japan to improve relationswith all Northeast Asianneighbours, including NorthKorea. To be sure, anti-Japanese nationalism and

military modernization andbuild-ups in China and SouthKorea as well as NorthK o r e a ’ s a t t e m p t s a tdeveloping nuclear weaponsdo not make this an easytask.

Nevertheless, it is fatalisticand wrong to believe – asconservative circles in Japanand the United States like to- that nothing can be done onthe Japanese side (becausethe responsibility for tensionsis assigned solely to others).The most urgent task is todefuse the powder-kegrepresented by the EastChina Sea disputes over thesovereignty over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands and thedelimitation of the ExclusiveE c o n o m i c Z o n e . T h eexplosive character of this

p r o b l e m h a s b e e nunderest imated on theChinese and especially onthe Japanese side. Thereason therefore is that thetwo governments (in line withpublic opinion) simply do nottake one another’s fearsserious enough. There is adangerous complacencybased on the false convictionthat the other side, when

rais ing concerns aboutmilitary developments - be itthe Chinese defence budget

increases and naval activitiesor the increasingly closecooperation of the JapanSelf-Defense Forces with theUnited States, especially inthe maritime sphere andballistic missile defence - ismerely engaging in politicalpropaganda or based on

‘misunderstandings’ of theown benign intentions.

In short, Beijing and Tokyoare already caught in asecurity dilemma. They canonly escape this situation bybroadening their perspectivesbeyond the bilateral scope.

Shifting our focus back to theregional level, one begins to see a

great deal of activity on all fronts:security, diplomatic, economic,financial, cultural and so forth. From asystemic point-of-view, it could beargued that the regional actors arebecoming more interconnected, andintegrated into the wider internationalsystem. Firstly, I wanted to ask if youagree with such an assessment, andsecondly, how do you see this greateror lesser interconnectednessaffecting the construction of aNortheast Asia region?

There is no doubt thatNortheast Asian states ands o c i e t i e s a re g ro w i n gtogether, not just at thegovernmental level and in theeconomic sphere, but moreimportantly also through theexchange of people such asp r o m o t e d b y t h einternationalization of highereducation and the increasing

conve rgence o f u rbancultures. Conditioned bygeographic proximity ands i g n i fi c a n t c u l t u r a lsimilarities, Northeast Asiashould be conceived as aregion. Ironically, the fact thathistory problems rooted inthe same traumatic eventsdivide political communitiesis the strongest proof ofcommon heritage.

However, contrary to thelinear mechanics envisioned

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by earlier theories of regionalintegration employed toe x p l a i n t h e E u r o p e a ne x p e r i e n c e o f r e g i o n -building, social and politicali n t e g r a t i o n i s n o t aguaranteed outcome ofr a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n ginterdependence because

previously held beliefs andpractices are profoundlyb e i n g q u e s t i o n e d a n dtherefore create resistancefrom those who fear tobecome losers of change. Itis for this reason that visionsof regional cooperation andinstitutions are important.They help decision-leaders toadopt novel ways of thinkingthat differ from ideas that

caused and are informed bythe violent past.

Looking at your previous reflectionson these issues, one sees that youhave taken a somewhat differentresearch path. Namely in terms ofyour analyses on the constructions ofidentity ('us' and 'them') in Japan-China relations, but also whenlooking at modernity in governancepractices in the region. I would like toknow why and how you haveadopted this constructivist view onm u t u a l r e g i o n a l d y n a m i c s . Additionally, I would also appreciate ifyou could share a few comments onthe advantages you think such a non-traditional approach has on looking atpower and security phenomena.

The reason for me favouringsoc io log ica l l y - i n fo rmedexplanations of internationalrelations is twofold and can

be found in my personalbackground and the reality ofNortheast Asian politics.Trained as a lawyer and armyofficer, and despite beingexposed to a heavy dose ofeconomics, I have long beenaware that, as a legalprinciple says: ‘things have tob e t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l yaccording to the degree oftheir difference’ and that

people simply do not followobjective rules of rationalitywhen making decisions.

There are always very humanemotions involved that haveto be taken seriously. This isnot surprising because, afterall, politics is about people.

Mainstream theor ies ofinternational relations such asl iberal ism and real ism,

however, do not treat actorsas human. Rather, in an effortto render their analyses‘scientific,’ they conceivethem as homogeneous unitsdeprived of subjectivity. Thisis because each theory iswedded to a particular era.Mainst ream theoret ica lparadigms have their roots inthe European enlightenment’sbelief system based on

ra t iona l i t y , ob jec t i v i t y ,p r o g r e s s a n d t h efundamental desirability ofm o d e r n i t y . L i b e r a li n t e rn a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n stheories emerged in theaftermath of World War I andbecame popular again in theeconomic growth phase ofthe 1970s. Realist theoriesare deeply conditioned by theoutbreak of World War II andthe straightjacket of thenuclear confrontation of theCold War.

 As a consequence of theirb a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s , acons ide rab le range o fphenomena canno t beexplained by the applicationof l iberal ist and real istconcepts. How would one,for instance, explain howSwitzerland comprised of

several social groups withdifferent languages andcustoms came to form acohesive political unit acrossgeographical barriers like the Alps.

Moreover, why, despitestrong economic and culturalt ies w i th i ts Europeanneighbours would the Swissstay away from the European

Union while, in spite of theend of the Cold War andb e i n g s u r r o u n d e d b y

powerful states, cherish theiradherence to permanentpolitical neutrality more thanever? Likewise, looking atNortheast Asia, how canrealist approaches explainwhy North Korea is seen as aconventional military threateven though its people are

suffering from humanitariancrises while the armed forcesremain technologically stuckin the 1960s? Why hasJ a p a n , d e s p i t e b e i n gdemocratic and militarilyc l e a r l y i n f e r i o r b e e nperceived as a threat to theUnited States in the 1980s?Why do South Korea andJapan, even though they facea rising China, have a

common ally in the UnitedStates and are governed bydemocra t i ca l l y e l ec tedgovernments, having such ahard time to improve theirrelations? Why is India,despite its size, economicg ro w t h r a t e s , m i l i t a r ymodernization includingaggressive pursuit of nuclearweapons and domination ofthe sea lanes in the IndianOcean, and a very mixedhuman rights record not seenas a threat similar to China?These are all important issuesthat point to the severeshortcomings of positivisttheoretical paradigms.

 As a final question, in your researchyou have also looked at issues ofocean governance and maritimesecurity in a regional context. Asr e c e n t e v e n t s h a v e c l e a r l y

d e m o n s t r a t e d , t h e m a r i t i m edim ensi on is l ik e ly to figur eprominently in any regional securityarchitecture, as it entails issuespertaining to territorial disputes,energy resources, food sufficiency,nuclear deterrence, law enforcementand protection of national waters,military build-up and so forth. Canyou please give your understandingof how important events at sea are tothe regional actors and what are the

expectations with regards to possibleareas of cooperation to defuseexisting and potential threats?

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Indeed, due to the uniquecharacter of the maritimesphere it has become thespace in which contentions,e s p e c i a l l y a m o n ggovernmental actors fromwithin and outside of theregion are being played out.

This is particularly apparentin the South China Sea andthe East China Sea wherenavies and coast guards inincreasing numbers andequipped with the newesttechnologies compete in thecontrol of maritime space.This comes in the forms ofattempts at safeguarding sealanes of communication,protecting economic rights in

exclusive economic zonesand the enforcement ofterritorial claims to featuresranging from reefs over rocksto islands, or just ‘denyingaccess’ by patrolling andtracking one another’s navalvessels.

The irony in all this is that themaritime sphere and theassets that governmentsseek to protect are in realityglobal public goods becausethe freedom of navigation,even natural resources suchas oil and fish have little ifany value for a specificcountry alone. Rather thanbeing nationalized, tradeflows and crude oil marketsare global. It makes littlesense to argue about theprotection of a vessel by astate from attack by another

because it is impossible toattribute the ship and itscargo to one country. Let memake the example of a largecontainer vessel sail ingthrough the Malacca Strait,the type of which numbershave been surging over thelast decades. Most likely thevessel will carry a flag ofc o n v e n i e n c e s u c h a sPanama or Liber ia. I ts

operating company may bebased in a European country,the shareholders in another,

its insurance documentsissued by a corporation inth i rd. I ts crew wi l l becomposed of a range ofnationals with the sailors, forexample, holding Philippinepassports while officerspredominantly being Italian. A part of the cargo loaded in

hundreds of containers may,for instance, be insured by aSingaporean company andc o n s i s t o f n o t e b o o kcomputers and smartphonesdeveloped in California andproduced in China by aTaiwanese company, to beexported to India.

 Although this example issomewhat different from the

exploration and trade ofcrude oil, the fact that thatcommodity markets areglobalized too, means thatthe conclusion remains thesame: Certain governmentalactors argue that they needto protect their sea lanes andtheir national resources fromd o m i n a t i o n b y o t h e rcountries and show militarypresence by patrolling andsurveying the East Asianseas. Given the networkcharacter of economic andsoc ia l i n te rac t ion j us toutlined, this seems quiteodd. Surprisingly, outside ofprofessional circles directlyinvolved in shipping andt rade , the th ink ing i ncategories of nation states israrely questioned. This leadsme to the conclusion that theconception of world politics

as a system of states,however inadequate, is stillneeded for some to makesense and define their placea n d p u r p o s e i n o u rincreasingly complex world. Ifwe were aware of that, futureconflict could be avoided.”

“Interview with Christian Wirth” (TiagoMauricio - JFPO).

7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 31

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“Tokyo will fight for Senkakus”

“China sure to oppose Senkaku ownership”

“Japanese fishermen stayed on 'uninhabited'

Senkakus”

“Japan gov't planning to buy disputed Senkaku

Islands from owner”

“Government to make bid for Senkakus”

“Politician sets foot on Senkaku isle”

“Medvedev visits Kunashiri Island”

“Russia's PM Medvedev launches Far East

bridge”

“Russia's Medvedev angers Japan with island

visit”

“Japan raps Medvedev's visit to disputed

Kunashiri Island”

“Medvedev isle visit draws ire”

“Medvedev 'indifferent' to Japan over island

visit”

“Korea-Japan military pact unlikely”

“Surely Japan and South Korea can patch

things up”

“Japan, U.S. agree to ensure safe operation of

Osprey aircraft”

“Japan, Germany agree to work closely on

 Afghanistan, Iran”

“Noda, Clinton agree to work closely on

bilateral, Asia-Pacific issues”

“Japan, France start joint weapons talks”

“RIMPA C chief wants MSDF executive officer”

“4 Taiwan boats enter Japan waters”

“Henoko tent protest enters 3,000th day”

“Now it is Taiwan that is taking a hard-line

stance on Senkaku issue”

“Oil-hungry Japan to test-produce shale oil as

early as 2013”

“Donors attach strings to $15 billion aid for

 A fghanistan”

“Japan’s Naval Base starts a nursery for

toddlers”

“Defense chief may visit U.S. to discuss MV-22

plan”

“Seoul starts to probe military pact snafu”

7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 31

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“Medvedev visit to Kunashiri puzzles

Japanese officials”

“Japan 'ready to discuss new UNSC

membership status'”

“Defense minister eyes U.S. trip in July,Osprey on agenda”

“17% of SDF reserves ready on 3/11”

“Experts from Japan, China call for private-

sector forum to resolve Senkaku dispute”

“Opposition to Osprey deployment grows in

Yamaguchi”

“Okinawa gov. adamant on Osprey”

“U.S. to keep using "Sea of Japan" as name

for waters off Japan”

“Cargo ship carrying Ospreys departs U.S.

port for Japan”

“Yamaguchi assembly to adopt statement 

opposing Osprey test flights”

“Experts call for an end to dispute over

islands”

“China Alings With India on Piracy Patrols”

“Senkaku purchase plan trumps creation of

national political party: Ishihara”

“Japan’s space law shift rattles regional

nerves”

“Pragmatism warms Russo-Japanese

relations”

“S. Korea looks into botched military

agreement with Japan”

“Japanese panel calls for collective defense

rights” 

“Korea, China agree on joint maritime claim

against Japan”

“Japan Seeks to Relax Curbs on Military

Deployment”

“UN Security Council extends S.Sudan

peacekeepers”

“The SDF: Looking for a Few Good Women —

 As Mates”

“Okinawa's first nuclear missile men breaksilence”

“Panel seeks permission for collective self-

defense”

“Navy eyeing off new Japanese

submarines”

“U.S.-Japan alliance grows for Asia-

Pacific security balance”

“Setback for 'Pivot to Asia'”

“[Editorial] Japan’s militarization”

“RIMPAC 2012 – Naval Forces Roaming in the

Pacific”

“31st MEU Maritime Raid Force hits the target

in Fuji ”

7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 31

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/east-asian-security-and-defence-digest-31 12/12

“New Partnership: Info-News” by the Founders

“Riposte: 2012 Tokyo SDF's Military March Part

II” by Tiago Mauricio

“Clarifications on 2012 Tokyo SDF's Military

March: Why It Wasn't Smart!” by Rui Faro Saraiva

“Civil-Military Views on the GSDF's March in

Tokyo” by Tashiro Kazuya

“Interview with Christian Wirth” by Tiago Mauricio

EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGESTEditor: TIAGO MAURICIO

Editor’s Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jp

Kyoto, Japan

East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis

and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs.

 The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the views of JFPO.

J APAN FOREIGN POLICY OBSERVATORY (JFPO)

HTTP:// WWW.JAPANFPO.ORG /