Early Modern Expansion and the Politization of Oceanic Space

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American Geographical Society

Early Modern Expansion and the Politicization of Oceanic SpaceAuthor(s): Elizabeth ManckeReviewed work(s):Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, Oceans Connect (Apr., 1999), pp. 225-236Published by: American Geographical SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/216088 .

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EARLYMODERN EXPANSION AND THE POLITICIZATIONOF OCEANIC SPACE*ELIZABETH MANCKE

ABSTRACT. Thedefinitionof oceans as internationalpoliticized space s anintegralbut littleanalyzedaspectof earlymodernEuropeanexpansion,which tookplacebetween about1450and1800.In this essayIexploretheimplicationsof thinkingabout thedevelopmentof Euro-pean imperialismand globaldominancein oceanicterms. I arguethatoceanic,rather hanterrestrial,dominance characterized arlymodern Europeanempires, particularly n rela-tion to AfricaandAsia,whereindigenouspoliticalandeconomic controlprevailed.Thelongapprenticeship n masteringoceanicspacecontributed to the abilityof Europeans o buildland-basedempiresin Asia and Africa n the nineteenthcentury.Aswell, the internationalrelationshipsworked out by Europeans n the nonstate but militarizedarenaof thehighseascontributedto an emergent globalorder.Keywords:olonialism,European xpansion, mpe-rialism,internationalrelations.

,Iccording to the UnitedNations,sixteencolonies remain n theworld.GreatBrit-ain hasten;theUnitedStates, hree;andFrance,NewZealand,andSpain,one each.'In addition,thesecountries,aswell asthe NetherlandsandAustralia,have overseasdependencies hatarenot technically"colonies," term of contestedmeanings.2Notincidentally,almostall of thesedependenciesare slandsor islandlikeenclaves, uchasGibraltar,Ceuta,andMelilla. ndividually nd in total,they represent he firstandlastoutpostsof modernEuropean mperialism,erritorialmanifestations fthepoli-ticizationof oceanicspace.Aswell,theysuggest hatcontrolof the world'soceanswasa fundamentalpartof Europeanempirebuildingandremainsacriticalcomponentof continuedEuropeanandneo-Europeandominancein the postcolonialworld.

Drawingon the richhistorical iterature hatdescribesaspectsof earlymodernexpansion,I explorethreebroadimplicationsof the oceanicdimensions of Euro-pean imperialism.First, t engenderedanexpansivedynamicdistinctfromthe dy-namics of other seafaringpeoples,wherebyEuropeansconstructed a new kind ofempire that differedsignificantlyfromland-basedones. Second,the centralityofoceanic control and the tenuousness of territorial ontroloutsideEurope orces usto reassess he agencyof Asian,African,andAmericanpeoplesin thehistoryof theearly modern world. Third, oceanic expansion reconfigured nternational rela-tions, obligingexpansionistpowersto define thelegalanddiplomaticimplicationsof interstateconflict in the extraterritorial renaof the high seas.This in turn ele-vated interstate relationsin Europefrom a regional systemto a globalone, whichwould come to define contemporary nternationalrelations.* This essaybenefited from the comments of the participantsatthe OceansConnectworkshopat DukeUniver-sity and fromthe assessments of two anonymousreviewers.TheJohnCarterBrownLibrary,whereIwasa fellow,provided a collegial environment for completing the revisions.D$ DR. MANCKE is an associate professor of history at the Universityof Akron, Akron, Ohio,44325-1902.

The Geographical Review 89 (2): 225-236, April 1999Copyright 0 2000 by the AmericanGeographicalSocietyof New York

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THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

THE NOVELTY OF OCEANIC EMPIRESThepoliticizationand militarizationof oceanicspace,as much as its globalization,distinguishedEuropeanoceanic expansionfrom that of other seafaringpeoples.Austronesianshad settled slandsstretching romRapaNui (Easter sland)to Mada-gascarbutdid not maintain hepolitical ies with theirhearthsocietiesnecessary orempire building(Finney1994).Muslim tradersused maritimeroutesto carry radegoods andIslamasfareast as the South ChinaSea,andemporiafromJapan o EastAfrica allowed merchants o establishdensetradingnetworksspanningthousandsof kilometers.Politically, hough, the IndianOceanBasincontinued to comprisedozensof autonomouspolities,fromlargeempiresto smallprincipalities o tribal-basedsocieties,andpoliticalcontrolstopped, n most instances,atthe water'sedge.Fifteenth-centuryChina demonstrated he ability, f not the intention,to establishanempire through ong-distanceoceanicexpansion,untilthegovernmentdisman-tled the navyand curtailedseabornetrade(Das GuptaandPearson1987;Ptak andRothermund 1991;Pearson 1998). Thus when Europeans began their long-distancemaritimeventures,trade and colonization were old processesin the Indian andPacificOceans. ButEuropeans'ransoceanicpoliticalclaimsand theirattemptstocontrol and regulateaccess to the high seaswerenewphenomena.The "extendedpolities" hesemaritimeventuresengendereddiffered rom themajorland-basedempires,whether ancient and medievalempiresor the contem-poraryOttoman,Safavid,Mughal,Ming,and RussianEmpires Greene1986;Pag-den 1995).Land-basedempires grew by pressinginto strategically mportant orweak areason their frontiersor across narrowbodies of water,annexingterritoryandpeople.Ottoman encroachments nto southeasternEuropeprovidedpartof theimpetus for Iberianforaysinto the Atlantic Ocean.The fifteenth-centuryPortu-guesecourtwasdividedoverwhether o spendmoneyto confrontMuslims nNorthAfricaorto developthe AtlanticroutearoundAfrica o avoidthem;the latterstrat-egy ultimately prevailed (Boxer 1969). Between about 1450and 1700, oceanic expan-sion did not inherently represent superior strength and at times representedprecisely heopposite. Englandostensiblystayedout of theThirtyYears'War 1619-1648)andprofitedby actingasa neutral hipper.Caribbeanwaters,however,had notyet been incorporated nto the European nternationalorder,allowingEnglishpi-rates-despite England'sneutrality-to undermineSpain'swar effortby preyingonshipscarrying he silverandgoldnecessary ofinance ts armies Andrews1991).Theland-poorDutchshrewdlyrecognized hepotentialforpower throughexpertise nmaritimetradeandshipping(Boxer1965).Thusoceanicexpansion openedup newopportunitiesforweakerpolitiesto realign he balanceof powerwithinEuropeandwith itsMuslimneighbors,achievedas muchthroughcontrol of themaritimeenvi-ronmentaswith territorialacquisitions n Africa,Asia,andthe Americas(Symcox1976;Chaudhuri 1985;Pearson 1987).

Spatially hese new "seaborne" mpiresbore little resemblance o land-basedempires,with theirterritorially ontiguousprovinces Boxer1965).The coloniesofthese new far-flungempireswereseparated romtheirmetropoles,and oftenfrom

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POLITICIZATION OF OCEANIC SPACE

other colonies,by thousands of kilometersof water.Emerging n a volatile and in-creasinglyglobalenvironment,these overseasoutpostsof Europewere vulnerableto seaborneattacksby rival interests.The multiplenationsvying for colonies, theambiguityof international awfor these new oceanicfrontiers,and the difficultiesmonarchsfacedin controllingtheir distantsubjects orcedEuropeansgradually odefine anew internationalorderthat could accommodate hese newempires(Pag-den 1995).LAND-POOR EMPIRES

Whenwe think about theexpansionof Europewe oftenconflateanoceanicpresence-or aboundedpresenceon an islandor ittoral-with continental erritorial ontrol.Weignore,forget,or do not realize hatearlymodernEuropeans ontrolledvery it-tlein thewayofland, trade,people,orgovernmentsntheAmericas,Africa,andAsia.Most European-occupied erritorywas littoralor within easyreach of a saltwaterport.Papalbulls andtreatiesdividingup thenon-Europeanworldcould not elimi-nate the practicalreality hatAfrican,American,and Asianpeoplesdominated ter-restrialspace,even in the Americas,where introduceddiseases raced ahead of theEuropeanpresenceand decimated ocalpopulations.The threeareasof the Americas n whichEuropeansdid makesignificant errito-rial nroadsbeforetheeighteenthcenturyweredirectlyconnectedto theconquestoflarge pre-Columbian political or economic systems.The Spanish capitalizedontheirconquestof the Aztecsandthe Incas to settle CentralMexico andPeru,whilesmaller groups of natives throughout Hispanic Americaresisted submission toSpanishauthorityand constrainedcolonization. The Frenchpenetrated he GreatLakesregionof NorthAmericaafter hemid-seventeenth-century isruptionof theHuron-Algonquin radingsystem,although heyneverestablishedaninlandsettlerpresencethat seriously displacednatives in the waythatEnglishsettlersdid alongthe AtlanticSeaboard White1991;Hinderaker 997).Not until thediscoveryof goldinthe Brazilian nterior n the169osdid thePortuguese stablish ettlementsbeyondeasyreach of the AtlanticOcean(Boxer1969).Over more than300 yearsandwithgreateffortEuropeans olidifiedthe territorial laims n the Americas hatministersand diplomats asserted at distant negotiating tables. So limited was Europeanknowledgeof theAmerican andscape-and so expansive heirhubris-that attimesthey failed to recognizehow cluelesstheywere.Thebelief of MeriwetherLewisandWilliam Clark that theirexpedition (1804-1806) could portagethe RockyMoun-tainsin adayor two is testimonytojusthowslowlyEuropeans arneredgeographi-cal knowledge, not to mention political control, of the Americas(Jackson1978;Marshall and Williams 1982).

European nroads in AfricaandAsia were even more limited thantheywere intheAmericas,consistingat firstalmostexclusivelyof a fewcitiesandfortifiedtrad-ingposts.After nitialmilitaryconfrontations hePortuguese ettled ntonegotiatedtradingrelationswith WestAfricans, stablishing orts on offshore slandsandlitto-ralareasaccessiblebyoceangoingvessels(Thornton1998). nEastAfrica heyseized

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control of the port towns of Sofalaand Kilwaand attemptedto monopolize theirtrade.ThePortuguese ounded inlandsettlements nAngolaandMozambique; nlyin the formerwerethey marginally uccessful,andtherethey onlypenetratedabout300 kilometers into the interior (Birmingham 1965;Newitt 1995;Pearson 1998). Thelate-nineteenth-century cramble orAfricaand theensuingbloodywars o enforcecolonialsubmissiononly make sense if we recognize hatduringthe previousfourcenturies of internationalcommerceAfricanscontrolledthe productionand mar-ketingof goods (includingslaves), owhichEuropeans ainedaccessata fewimpor-tant trading centers (Pakenham 1991).In Asia the Portuguese, ollowedbytheDutch,theEnglish,andtheFrench,con-trolledtradingports,some takenbyforce,manyoccupiedat the sufferanceof localauthoritiesand a few,such as Calcutta,createdby Europeans Murphey1977).Al-though importantto European rade and economies,the overallimpactof theseemporiaon Asian economiesremained imited for most of 300years.Not until theconquest of Bengal by the British East India Company (EIC) in the 1750S and 176osdid Europeansmaketheir firstmajorterritorialacquisitionin Asia,an event thatscholarsof earlymodern Asia ncreasinglyuse to datethe onset of European mperi-alismthere.Vascoda Gama's1498voyageto India is a more importantevent in thehistory of Europe than it is in the history of Asia (Leur 1955;Chaudhuri 1985;DasGupta and Pearson 1987;Marshall 1993;Subrahmanyam 1993).

Onlyin the nineteenthcenturydidEuropeansmakethe territorialnroads ntothe MiddleEast,CentralAsia,SoutheastAsia,and Africa hatwe associatewith theheight of imperialism (Bayly1989;Pakenham 1991).The long ascent of Europeans toworlddominanceoverthelasthalf-millennium houldnot be confusedwith the ac-tual achievementof globalascendancy ess than two centuriesago. Althoughtheyderivedconsiderablewealth fromtransoceanic rade, heyremaineddependentoncommercial, inancial,andproductionnetworkscontrolledbyAsians,Africans,andnativeAmericansand vulnerable o indigenouspolitical eaderswho could and diddeprivethem of access.

TRANSFORMING INTERNATIONAL POWERAt the time of BartolomeuDias's,ChristopherColumbus's,and Vasco da Gama'svoyagesthe open oceanswere not politicizedspace.Theseas,which had been navi-gatedfor thousandsof years,wereanothermatter.By venturinginto the AtlanticOcean,westernEuropeans ouldavoid the Islamicpowersthat controlledmuchoftheMediterranean,heRedSea, he PersianGulf,andthe BlackSea.Whentheysailedsouthandwest,thechallenges heymet werenot the armed leetsof rivalpowersbuttheirown ignoranceandfear,whichin theshortrunthey suppressedwithhopesofeconomicgainandin thelongruntheymasteredwithisland ootholds,with agrow-ingbodyofknowledgeaboutwindsandcurrents, ndwith theadoptionandadapta-tion of newtechnologies(Fonseca1995).To resolve hequestionof sovereignty hathad arisenwith the successof these new maritimeventures,the PortugueseandSpanishagreedto the 1494Treatyof Tordesillas,which divided the non-Christian

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world between themselvesalong a north-south line 370leagueswest of the CapeVerde slands(Davenport1967).Thistreaty,however,did notprovideasolutionthatotherEuropeanswould accept.Indeed, t wouldtakemost of three centuries o sortout the radicallynew internationalorderthat oceanicexpansioncreated.When the Portugueserounded the Capeof Good Hope into the IndianOcean,they enteredwaters that had been known and traversedby sailorsfor centuries.Thesewaterswerelargelyunmilitarizedzones. The land-basedempiresborderingthe IndianOcean or the neighboringseas-in particularhe Safavidand theMughalEmpires-did not havenavies.Thus,when the Portugueseused their armedvesselsto wrest controlof islandsandportsfrom localrulers, heymet with relativelyittleresistance(Subrahmanyam 993).Theyclaimedsovereigntyover the IndianOceanand theSouth ChinaSea and setas theirobjective helicensingof travelon themari-time traderoutes,apoliticizationof oceanicspacethat hadno equivalent n Asianpractice(Chaudhuri1985;Pearson1987). nsufficient esources o coercethousandsof mariners,as well asAsianresistance,blunted the impactof thisPortugueseclaimof sovereignty.Rather hanpayprotectioncosts thatlicensesprovided,manymer-chantssimplyrelocated o portsnot controlledbythe Portuguese.Asianrulersem-ployedvariousstrategies o curbthesenewcomers'aggrandizementof power.TheMing prohibitedthem from tradingon the Chinese shore in the 152os.The Otto-mans expandedtheir naval fleet to keep open the RedSearoute to the Levantafterthe Portugueseblockedit and to limit Portuguesenfluence n the PersianGulf.TheAcehnesesultanate, oundedinnorthernSumatrantheearlysixteenthcentury,or-ganizedatradingnetworkbetween the Indonesianarchipelagoand SouthAsia thatchallengedPortuguesedominanceinthe intra-Asian rades.Inthelong run,peace-ful accommodation was moreprofitable hancoercion,and thePortuguesebecamejust anotherplayer n the Asiantrades(Hess1970;Lane1973;Chaudhuri1985;Pear-son 1987;Souza1987;Subrahmanyam 993).This interim solution was short-lived,however.In the late sixteenthcentury,Dutch andEnglishmerchantspenetrated he Asianmarkets,providingaEuropeanchallengeto Portugal's aim to sovereigntyover the IndianOcean andreinvigorat-ing the contest for oceaniccontrol.Significantly,ventsin Europedirectlyaffectedthe timingof this new merchantpresence,andit wouldbe neitherthe firsttime northe last that Europeansquiteliterallycircumnavigated roblemsathome throughoceanicexpansion.In 1585PhilipIIof Spainhaddosed the Lisbonspicemarket omerchantsfrom theNetherlandsandEngland,argely n reaction o thecivil war hewas waging against English-supportedDutch Protestants.Initially,Englishmer-chantswho were interestedin the Asian trades tried to avoid the PortugueseandSpanishaltogetherbysearching oranorthernoceanicrouteto Indiaandbytradingwith Asians through the RussianCompanyand the LevantCompany (Andrews1984;Lawson1993).Findingneithersolution viable,they took the SouthAtlanticrouteto India,passingthroughSpanish-andPortuguese-dominatedwaters.Oncein the IndianOcean,the EIC,charteredn 1600 with limitedcapitalization, riedtoavoidconfrontingthe Portugueseand the Dutchdirectly,but within adecadecom-

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panyofficials n Asia hadinformedthe Boardof Directors n Londonnot to "expectany quiet trade" (Furber 1976, 40). At Surat, Portuguese influence kept the Mughalemperorfromgranting he EICtradingprivileges n thecity.Inretaliation, he Eng-lish attackedIndianshipsandengaged he Portuguesen a navalbattle nearSurat'sharbor.In 1613 he emperorgrantedthe English tradingrightsin Surat,partlytocheckthePortuguese,whom hesubsequently xpelled romthecityin1632. In Persiathe EICprovidedShah Abbas the necessarynavalsupportto oust the Portuguesefrom Hormuz in 1622 (Furber 1976; Chaudhuri 1985; Subrahmanyam 1993).The Dutch EastIndiaCompany(voc), chartered n 1602 andmoreheavilycapi-talizedthan the EIC, eganto trade in the Indian Ocean with the clear ntentionofmilitarilyandcommercially hallenging he PortugueseandthenewlyarrivedEng-lish (Boxer 1965; Furber 1976). The Dutch capture of a Portuguese galleon in 1604promptedthe Iberians o claimthe IndianOceanasexclusivelyPortuguesewatersunderthe terms of theTreatyof Tordesillas.The voc hiredthe legaltheoristHugoGrotius o prepare helegalbrief,and histreatise,MareLiberum, ecameimportantinarticulatinghe internationalawon freedomof the seas.The Dutchsubsequentlyused Grotius'sargumentsagainstthe Englishattemptto exclude otherEuropeansfrom fishing in the North Sea and whaling in the North Atlanticwaters aroundSpitzbergen (Butler 1992;Roelofsen 1992).Formost of the seventeenthcenturythe Dutch were the ascendantEuropeaninfluencein Asianwaters,with the Englishan increasingly trong competitorandthe Portuguese n decline.Following hePortugueseprecedentof controllingheav-ilytraveledsea-lanes, he Dutch set theirsightson monopolizingthe spicetrade ofthe Indonesianarchipelago.TheyestablishedBatavia now Jakarta)n 1619as theheavilyfortifiedcommercial center of their Asian interests.Asian rulersenlistedtheir assistance n rebuffing he Portuguese.TheJapanesedecisionin 1634 o expelthePortuguese romNagasakiand transfer heirtradingprivileges o the Dutch hadsevereeconomic repercussions,becauseJapanese ilverhadprovidedmuch of thebullion the Portugueseused in Asian trade(Furber1976).

Meanwhile,within Asiansocieties,emergentpowersweakened he cohesionofthe Mughal,Safavid,and OttomanEmpires(Bayly1989).Emblematicof this shiftwas the rise of Oman as an autonomous state organizedaroundmaritime com-merceand navalstrength n the westernIndian Ocean.CapturingMombasafromthe Portuguese n 1698,the Omanisextendedtheirpoliticalcontrolover much ofEastAfrica.Onthehighseastheyprovidedapotentchallenge o Europeans'militarydominance.What neitherthe Omanisnor otherAsiansdid was to enter the inter-oceanictrades hatlinkedtheIndianOceanandAtlanticOceanmarkets.Aswell,inthe eighteenthcenturyEuropeanstatenavies,not just armed merchantships,ap-pearedmore frequently n Asianwaters,and in the nineteenthcenturythe Britishstate would challenge the Omanis through the EIC Risso 1986).Thepresenceof the BritishNavyin the IndianOcean createdafunctionalsepa-rationof militaryand commercialpowerandmarkeda newstage n thepoliticiza-tion of Asianocean space.Militaryexpensesno longerhad to be deriveddirectly

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from and balancedwith commercialrevenues,a shift in costs that was probablycriticalforthe territorial xpansionof the BritishEmpire nAsia.Incontrast,Dutchglobalinfluencehad declined overtheeighteenthcentury, npartbecausetheStatesGeneralof the Netherlandsexpectedthe provincesof Zeeland and Holland,themost directbeneficiariesof Asiancommerce, o fund thenavyout of maritimecom-mercial revenues(Boxer1965).Successfuland regularcrossingof the AtlanticOcean,unlike the centuries-oldnavigationof the IndianOcean,was a Europeanachievement.As a result,the dy-namic here was primarilyone of intra-Europeanconflict. Geographically,hreetransatlantic ircuitswerechartedwithinafewyearsof each other.Thefirst,andhis-toricallythe most prominent,was the mid-AtlanticcircuitconnectingEuropeandthe Caribbean.But the Portuguesepioneereda second, SouthAtlantic,route be-tween WestAfrica and Brazil;and a third route,acrossthe North Atlantic,soonopened the Newfoundland fisheryto Europeans(Meinig 1986).During the six-teenth century the three remainedseparatearenas of competition,with growingcommercialand military integrationover the next two centuries.In developingtheir Atlanticcircuits, he SpanishandPortuguese nitiallyfacedlittle competition, except in littoral waters.In WestAfrica, ocal powers ablyde-fendedthemselvesagainstPortuguesedepredations Thornton1998).Resistancebythe Caribs and the Arawaks n the LesserAntilleskept the Spanishfrom settlingthese islands (Boucher 1992). But, as knowledge of Atlantic navigation spreadthroughoutthe ports of westernEurope, he Iberians ound thattheirgreatestad-versarieswere not indigenous peoplesbut rovingFrenchand English pirateswhodoggedtheirgalleonsandforeignmerchantswho interloped nAfricanand Ameri-can markets.Spainresponded irstby armingmerchant hipsand thenbyprovidingnavalescorts for the annual fleetthat left the GulfCoast aden withbullion. Never-theless,aggressiverivalspersisted n their encroachmentson Iberian nterests.TheDutch,to compensatefor the loss of saltsuppliesfromsouthernEuropeafterSpaincut off tradeduringthe revolt in theNetherlands,beganto producesalton Carib-bean islands.Englishharassmentof Spanishand Portuguesefishermen in New-foundland, especiallyafter1585,effectivelydrove the Iberians out of the fishery,leavingthe English o competewith the French orsupremacyn theNorthAtlantic(Lounsbury1934;Andrews1984;Boucher1989).

Bythe end of the sixteenthcentury,decades of Atlanticmaritimeconflict andEuropeanwars had so weakenedSpain'spower that, in treatynegotiationswithFranceandEngland n 1598and1604,respectively,he FrenchandEnglishassertedtheir rightto establish colonies in areasnot occupiedby the Spanish(Quinn 1974;Appleby1996).The Frenchand English,as well as the Dutch,establishedcoloniesunder the auspicesof charteredcompaniesor proprietors, o whom theirCrownsgavethe rightto wagewaragainstEuropeanrivalsandindigenouspeoples.ArmedconflictamongEuropeans,mostof itseaborne,becameendemicintheseventeenth-centuryAtlantic world. Virginiasent armedships to attackAcadia. The EnglishKirke amilyattackedandtook Canada romtheFrench.EnglishandFrenchpirates

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continuedto preyon Spanishshipping.Asettlementof Scotson CapeBreton astedonlyafew months before it wasdestroyedbytheFrench.TheSpanishdestroyed hePuritancolonyon Providence sland n the Caribbean.The Dutch drovethe Portu-gueseout of the slavetrade,as well as their settlements n Brazil(Boxer1965,1969;Andrews 1984; Boucher 1989;Appleby 1996). These armed engagements, to namebut a few, dispersed strugglingsettlements, establishedcompeting claims, andforced the interventionof European tates.In short, transoceanictrade andcolonization createdsignificantnew interna-tional conflicts and constellationsof poweroutsideexisting arrangements.The in-sistence by the Netherlands,England,and Francethat Spainand Portugalcouldnot claim sovereignty over the oceans necessitated state-to-state negotiationsabout the terms of interactionin this nonstate arena.The internationalcommu-nity needed some consensus about wheresovereign,territorialwatersended andthe internationalzone began. Likewise, he control of subjectson the high seas,particularlypirates, requirednew laws and agreements,and the need to policetradeand to suppress piracydemandedstate-supportednavies.Government ex-penditures n Englandaccordinglyroseduringtheseventeenthcentury,with navalexpendituresaccountingfor alargeportionof the increase Braddick1996).Mean-while,a new rangeof trade aws,such as theNavigationActspassedbythe EnglishParliamentbeginning in the mid-seventeenth century,sought to guaranteethatthe profits of the new carryingtrades would accrue to the home country.Bythemid-eighteenth centurythemanagementof nationaleconomies,with aparticularfocus on overseastrade,had become a centralfunction of governments(Pagden1995).

Gradually, verthecourseof the seventeenthcentury,westernEuropeanpowersprovisionallyworkedoutmanyof theseissues ntreatynegotiations.Forexample,aspartof the1670 reatybetweenSpainandEnglandconceding helatter's onquestofJamaica,heEnglishgovernmentagreed o restraintspirates.The crackdown ntheAtlantic Ocean encouragedpiratesto move into the IndianOcean,where a largegroup planted itself on Madagascarand preyed on European shipping. TheseEnglish-speakingpiratesevincedsuch little regard or national ties that they cap-turedEnglishvessels,promptingthe EICto insist that the governmentcontrol itsown nationals (Thomson 1994).The Nine Years'War(1689-1697) nauguratedanother ong centuryof conflictthat wouldnot enduntiltheCongressof Vienna n1815.Over he courseof that cen-tury the spreadof Europeanwars into overseas heatersmade the world'soceanshighlycontestedspaces.FromHudsonBay oMadrasand theCapeof GoodHopetoNootka Sound,warringEuropeansattacked heir enemies'forts and settlements,anddiplomatsnegotiated he futuresofWestIndian slands,Newfoundland ishingstations, fur-tradeoutposts, Asian emporia, and Africanslave-trading orts. Al-though the expensesof wardrainedthe coffersof European tates,the prospectofacquiring ucrativeoverseascoloniesto offsetthemilitarycostsfigured n thecalcu-lationsof how long to prosecutea war.

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Throughoutthisera the edificeof European tatecraft elied, npart,on theabil-ityto competein the transoceanicarenas. nthemid-eighteenthcentury heBritishand Frenchstates fundedexploration n the PacificOcean,oftenthroughnavalap-propriations,ratherthanleavingit solelyto private nterests,as had happenedformost of the seventeenthcentury(Williams1998).Bothstates claimedthe FalklandIslands(IslasMalvinas)off the east coast of South America asdidSpain), ntendedas a lastprovisioningstation beforeheadingwestward nto the PacificOcean.Mau-ritiusin the IndianOcean,SaintHelena nthe SouthAtlanticOcean,andthe Hawai-ian Islands in the middle of the Pacific Ocean were similarlyimportant islandholdings as Europeanstatespositioned themselves n increasinglypoliticizedandmilitarized oceanic space (Gough 1980). So critical were these islands in oceanicstrategiesand so vulnerableweretheyto environmentaldegradation hatimperialstatessupportedscientific research nto managingthem as sustainableecosystems(Grove1995).Overseaspossessionsalso becameintegrated nto statestrategies orsolvingdomesticproblems, romthe creationofAustralia,VanDiemen'sLand Tas-mania),and Norfolk Island as Britishpenalcoloniesto the incarcerationof Napo-leon on SaintHelena(Hughes1986).As these examplesdemonstrate, he control of oceanicspacehad become notjust a commercialquestionbut partof the construction of powerin the Europeanstatesystem.Russia's ttempts o gaingreateraccess o theworld'soceansbeginningduringthe reignof Peter he Great sevidenceof the shifttakingplacebetween em-pires defined by continental control-whether Russian,Hapsburg,Ottoman,Sa-favid,Mughal,or Ching-and the empiresdefinedby oceaniccontrol-the British,French,Spanish, Portuguese,and Dutch. After1783 he United Statessuccessfullyentered hecompetitionforoceaniccontrol, houghmaintainingacontinentally o-cused and isolationistforeignpolicy.THE LEGACY OF OCEANIC EMPIRES

Theascendancyof oceaniccontrolas adefiningcharacteristicfpoweramongEuro-peanstatesandthenthroughout he worldwasmore thanthreecenturies ndevelop-ing. In the nineteenth century, continentally focused imperial powers foundthemselvesbeingoutflanked, f not conquered,byaggressiveEuropeanpowersthatusedoceanic access o force erritorial ubmission nAsiaandAfrica. nabroadover-view of history,however,European erritorialcontrol in AfricaandAsia was rela-tivelybrief.Inmanyplaces tlastedacenturyorless,testimonyto our need to seethepoliticalascendancyof Europe n the world as an oceanicphenomenon.With the rise ofnewpowers nthe latenineteenthcentury,particularlyGermanyand Japan,accessto oceanictrade,the creationof new empires,and an armsracewith navalcapacityas a centerpiececontinued to definerelationsamongthe greatpowers.AsGermanyaggressively cquiredcolonies,GreatBritainreactedbycreat-ing new protectorates such as the Cook Islands n 1888) n order to curbGermanimperialexpansion(Porter1996).Inthe early wentiethcentury, nternational en-sions overcontrol of the world'soceansfigured n the controversies hat led to the

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two world wars. At the end of World War II reform of world trade helped diffusesome of the tension.The contest for control of oceanic space has not disappeared, nor has the Euro-

pean and neo-European dominance of the oceans ended. Many of the remaining is-land dependencies continue to serve the strategic interests of distant metropolitanstates. Guam and American Samoa provide the United States with military foot-holds in the Pacific Ocean. Saint-Pierre and Miquelon maintain France'sterritorialclaim to the western Atlantic fishery. Island territories without permanent popula-tions are used for military or scientific purposes. The British lease their IndianOcean Territoryto the United States for military facilities; the Antarctic territories ofAustralia, Great Britain, France, and New Zealand all have permanent research sta-tions. Thus, in the twilight of oceanic empires, the colonial map is essentially one offar-flung island holdings. This fact should remind us that in the last five centuriesoceanic space has been a central arena of imperial struggle.

NOTES1. The sixteen areAnguilla,Bermuda,BritishVirginIslands,CaymanIslands,Falkland slands(IslasMalvinas),Gibraltar,Montserrat,PitcairnIsland,SaintHelena,Turksand CaicosIslands,U.S.VirginIslands,Guam,AmericanSamoa,NewCaledonia,Tokelau,andWesternSahara.Spainnotifiedthe UnitedNations on 26February 976 hat it had ceased tsparticipation n the temporarygovern-ment of the WesternSaharaand thus its internationalresponsibility or the territory(AldrichandConnell1998).On 25October1999the SecurityCouncilestablished he UnitedNations TransitionalAdministrationfor EastTimor,which until then had been categorizedas a colony of Portugal.2. Francehas departementst territoires 'outremer(FrenchGuiana,Guadeloupe,Martinique,Reunion, FrenchPolynesia,Wallis and FutunaIslands,Saint-Pierreand Miquelon, and Mayotte),most of which have representation n the metropolitanFrenchgovernment.Puerto Rico and thenorthernMarianaIslandsare commonwealthsof the United States.AustraliadesignatedChristmasIsland,the Cocos Islands,and Norfolk Islandas territories.Arubaand the NetherlandsAntillesareautonomous partsof the kingdomof the Netherlands.The Cook Islandsare free associationsof NewZealand,andNiue is adependency.SpainretainsCeutaandMelillaon the coastof North Africaandthe CanaryIslandsoff the coast of Africa.The Azoresandthe Madeirasarepartof Portugal.Aswell,Australia,NewZealand,GreatBritain,France,and the UnitedStatesclaim a numberof islandgroupswithout permanentresidents(Aldrichand Connell 1998).

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