e Principles for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology Principles for... · The Principles for the...

The Principles for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology


Drafted through a collaborative process among civil society groups.

For more information or copies of this declaration, contact:Eric HoffmanFood and technology policy campaignerFriends of the Earth U.S.1100 15th St. NW, 11th FloorWashington, D.C. 20005202.222.0747 [email protected]

Jaydee HansonPolicy directorInternational Center for Technology Assessment660 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 302Washington, D.C. [email protected]

Jim ThomasResearch program managerETC Group5961 Rue Jeanne MarceMontreal, [email protected]

The views expressed in this declaration represent those of the signers and do not necessarily represent those of individual contributors to Friends of the Earth U.S., International Center for Technology Assessment, ETC Group or the funding organizations.

Funding thanks to CS Fund and Appleton Foundation.

mailto: [email protected]

http://www.foe.org


http://www.icta.org


The undersigned, a broad coalition of civil society groups, social movements, local and indigenous communities, public interest, environmental, scientif ic, human rights, religious and labor organizations concerned about various aspects of synthetic biology’s human health, environmental, social, economic, ethical and other impacts, offer the following declaration, The Principles for the

Oversight of Synthetic Biology.


1 The Principles for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology

Executive Summary

Synthetic biology, an extreme form of genetic engi-neering, is developing rapidly with little oversight or regulation despite carrying vast uncertainy. Standard forms of risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses relied on by current biotechnology regulatory approaches are inadequate to guarantee protection of the public and the environment. The Precautionary Principle is fun-damental in protecting the public and our planet from the risks of synthetic biology and its products.

A precautionary approach requires synthetic biolo-gy-specific oversight mechanisms that account for the unique characteristics of synthetic organisms and their products. Additionally, it assesses the novel consequenc-es of synthetic organisms and products of synthetic biol-ogy as well as full consideration of alternative options. Ensuring public health, worker safety and ecosystem resilience requires a committed focus on developing a critical public interest research agenda that includes risk research and development of alternatives, a robust pre-market regulatory regime, strong enforcement mecha-nisms, immediate action to prevent potential exposures until safety is demonstrated and ongoing monitoring for unintended consequences and immediate action to prevent potential exposures until safety is demon-strated. Protection of the public includes a ban on using synthetic biology to manipulate the human genome in any form, including the human microbiome. Decisive action must also be taken to protect the environment and human health and to avoid contributing to social and economic injustice. Developers and manufactur-ers must be responsible for the safety and effective-ness of their processes and products and must retain liability for any adverse impacts. Throughout, research and regulation shall be transparent and provide public access to all information regarding decision-making processes, safety testing and products. Open, meaningful and full public participation at every level is essential

and should include consideration of synthetic biology’s wide-ranging effects, including ethical, social and eco-nomic results. No synthetic organism or their synthetic building blocks should be commercialized or released without full disclosure to the public of the nature of the synthetic organism and results of safety testing.

This document outlines the following principles nec-essary for the effective assessment and oversight of the emerging field of synthetic biology:

I. Employ the Precautionary Principle II. Require mandatory synthetic biology-specific

regulationsIII. Protect public health and worker safetyIV. Protect the environmentV. Guarantee the right-to-know and democratic

participationVI. Require corporate accountability and

manufacturer liabilityVII. Protect economic and environmental justice

Governmental bodies, international organizations and relevant parties must immediately implement strong precautionary and comprehensive oversight mechanisms enacting, incorporating and internalizing these basic principles. Until that time, there must be a moratorium on the release and commercial use of synthetic organ-isms and their products to prevent direct or indirect harm to people and the environment.i

The Principles for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology 2

Introduction

“Synthetic biology” practitioners begin with computer-assisted biological engineering to design and attempt to construct new biological organisms or biological build-ing blocks, or to redesign existing biological organisms. In building new life forms from scratch using published gene sequence information or by buying inexpensive, made-to-order DNA strands from so-called DNA foundries, synthetic biologists are not just reading and rearranging genetic code, but writing it. Synthetic biol-ogy is “extreme genetic engineering” — re-engineering and designing genes and creating entire genomes that do not exist in nature as well as designing and building molecules, cell compounds and organelles to desired specifications.

Governments, universities, research institutes and cor-porations around the world are now racing to develop and commercialize products using synthetic biology. Synthetic biologists have already synthesized working viruses, including the deadly 1918 influenza virus and the poliovirus. In May 2010, the J. Craig Venter Insti-tute announced that its lab had built the first synthetic, self-replicating bacterial cell — that is, researchers in-serted an entirely synthetic genome into an existing working cell; the cell accepted the synthetic genome and reproduced. This technical feat is a wake-up call to governments around the world.

Despite industry claims that these technologies are safe, this new technological frontier poses significant health, safety and environmental hazards, as well as profound social, economic and ethical challenges.

The technical ability to synthesize DNA and create synthetic organisms far outpaces our understanding of how these novel products may work. Even engineering supposedly simple organisms could have major eco-logical and health effects. This unpredictability makes

the task of precautionary risk assessment that much more difficult, but also all the more necessary. Research on the effects of these new technologies and synthetic biology-specific regulations must keep pace with the technologies’ development. Commercializing synthetic biology at this stage is premature.

The risks of releasing synthetic organisms into the environment — intentionally or unintentionally — have barely begun to be defined, and the urgently needed ethical, legal and regulatory oversight mechanisms re-main undeveloped. Without proper safeguards, we risk letting synthetic organisms and their products out of the laboratory with unknown potential to disrupt eco-systems, threaten human health and undermine social, economic and cultural rights.

This document outlines the following principles nec-essary for the effective assessment and oversight of the emerging field of synthetic biology:

I. Employ the Precautionary Principle II. Require mandatory synthetic biology-specific

regulationsIII. Protect public health and worker safetyIV. Protect the environmentV. Guarantee the right-to-know and democratic

participationVI. Require corporate accountability and

manufacturer liabilityVII. Protect economic and environmental justice


I. Employ the Precautionary PrincipleThe Precautionary Principle must be applied to syn-

thetic biology because the risks of the technology are inherently unpredictable with potentially far-reaching and irreversible impacts. The Precautionary Principle, integrated into many international conventionsii and national laws, is aptly described in the Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle:

“When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precaution-ary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. The process of applying the Pre-cautionary Principle must be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no ac-tion.” iii

Applying the Precautionary Principle to the field of synthetic biology first necessitates a moratorium on the release and commercial use of synthetic organisms, cells, or genomes until government bodies, with full participation of the public, have:

• Developed a research agenda guided by the public interest.

• Ensured that alternative approaches to synthetic biology applications have fully been considered.

• Conducted full and inclusive assessments of the implications of this technology, including but not limited to devising a comprehensive means of assessing the human health, environmental,

and socio-economic impacts of synthetic biolo-gy and preventing harms where they are present.

• Developed national and international oversight and security mechanisms equipped to keep pace with the risks as synthetic biology technologies develop.

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety provides guide-lines for the safe handling, transport and use of any living modified organism.iv The 193 nations that are Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) agreed at their 10th Conference in 2010 that the release of synthetic biology’s products requires precau-tion. The agreement from the 10th Conference of the Parties reads:

“Parties and other Governments [are] to ap-ply the precautionary approach in accordance with the Preamble to the Convention, and the Cartagena Protocol, to the introduction and use of living modified organisms for the production of biofuels as well as to the field release of syn-thetic life, cell, or genome into the environment, acknowledging the entitlement of Parties, in ac-cordance with domestic legislation, to suspend the release of synthetic life, cell, or genome into the environment.” v

Additionally, the CBD agreed to study further the risks this technology poses to the environment, biodi-versity, livelihoods and human health.

The Principles


II. Require mandatory synthetic biology- specific regulations

Implementing enforceable and prosecutable synthetic biology-specific regulations must be a prior condition for future developments in synthetic biology. Such regulations should complement and strengthen, not replace, any other applicable regulations, such as worker protections, environmental regulations, drug laws and restrictions on pathogens, among others. These regula-tions should also be considered as a framework for new biotechnology laws as the current regulations around biotechnologies are inadequate and outdated.

Voluntary self-regulation by practitioners is not a sub-stitute for synthetic biology-specific regulations enacted by governments and international treaties. Self-regula-tion does not allow for oversight or public participation, diminishes transparency and does not provide recourse in the event of worker/public health accidents, environ-mental disruption or economic harms.

In time, different methods and techniques of synthetic biology may need different forms and levels of oversight. Therefore any new risk assessments, cost-benefit analy-ses and regulations must flexibly encompass different applications, uses and products. Furthermore, assess-ments should include full comparative consideration of alternative approaches.

Regulations should specify civil and criminal penalties for violations. Penalties should be imposed for failure to obtain proper licenses, failure to adhere to labora-tory standards, unauthorized release of synthetic DNA, RNA, or synthetic organisms, failure to train and equip workers, exposing workers to harm and failure to report adverse incidents to government authorities.

The absence of mandatory synthetic biology-specific regulations necessitates a moratorium on release and commercialization of synthetic organisms, cells or ge-nomes.

The Precautionary Principle must be applied to synthetic biology because the risks of the technology are inherently unpredictable with potentially far-reaching and irreversible impacts.


III. Protect public health and worker safetyAdequate and effective synthetic biology oversight

requires an immediate emphasis on preventing known and potential human exposures to synthetic organisms that have not been proven safe.

Workers in synthetic biology laboratories will likely be the first to be exposed to any potential hazards. Ex-isting workplace safety procedures and laws must be augmented to take into account the unique risks and challenges to human health posed by organisms cre-ated through synthetic biology. Many of the organisms engineered through synthetic biology (e.g., algae) are easily aerosolized and can easily escape confinement or be inhaled. Because these products are impercep-tible, workers could unknowingly carry them out of the workplace and into the broader community. Protocols must be in place and strictly adhered to in order to ensure that synthetic organisms and their products are adequately contained.

The public must be informed if such work is being conducted in their community. Workers and the public must be informed of the risks involved with synthetic biology and those working with synthetic organisms must generate clear and reliable means to track, disable and/or destroy strains as a prerequisite to carrying out experiments with them.

Additionally, workers should be allowed to refuse work without fear of retaliation or termination if they report safety concerns regarding the use of synthetic biology products and associated technologies. Work-ers must have access to qualified safety representatives with whom they can disclose and assess health and environmental safety concerns.

Occupational medical and exposure records must be available to workers and their representatives imme-

diately upon request, and disclosure of such records cannot be withheld as confidential business or trade secret information.

All employees must be notified whenever synthetic biological products are being used within their imme-diate vicinity or anywhere within their laboratory or workplace.

All containment failures, worker injuries or illnesses, and human exposures must be documented and report-ed to the proper workplace safety authorities, and details must be available upon request. The public must have prompt access to complete accident reports on govern-ment websites, including specific accident locations and the synthetic constructs or organisms involved. The sole exemption should be for personal medical information.

The environmental and health risks of synthetic organ-isms, their synthetic building blocks and their products must be assessed and disclosed prior to any intended or unintended release or commercial use. Continued systematic disclosure of health and safety information throughout the lifecycle of the organism and its prod-ucts is necessary to improve oversight of government and industry decisions, help people protect themselves, and encourage development of safer alternatives.

The use of synthetic biology to change the human ge-netic makeup — including the human genome, epig-enome and human microbiome — must be prohibited.

The convergence of synthetic biology with other tech-nologies such as gene transfer through viral, nanomate-rial or stem cell vectors creates the troubling possibility of altering the human genome. Any alterations to the human genome through synthetic biology — particu-larly inheritable genetic changes — are too risky and fraught with ethical concerns.


IV. Protect the environmentSynthetic biology requires the strictest levels of physi-

cal, biological and geographic containment as well as independent environmental risk assessment for each proposed activity or product.

Synthetic biology’s environmental risks are unknown. In order to identify potential environmental risks and regulatory gaps, governments must require that pre-market environmental impact and lifecycle risk assess-ments are conducted for each distinct synthetic organ-ism, each synthetic construct and each product derived from synthetic organisms and constructs.

The capacity of each synthetic organism to survive in the environment and reproduce must be known before any such organisms leave the laboratory. Unlike most other environmental contaminants that become more diffuse over time, synthetic organisms are designed to reproduce and will evolve. Once released into the en-vironment, these organisms may be impossible to recall or eliminate.

When synthetic organisms are released into the en-vironment, either intentionally or unintentionally, they could find an ecological niche and become a new in-vasive species that disrupts ecosystems. Moreover, the ability of many microorganisms to take up DNA from living and even dead organisms means that synthetic DNA can be spread in the environment even after the synthetic organism dies.


Confinement strategies for preventing the release of synthetic organisms into the biosphere must include:

1) Means to prevent the whole organism, and its components, from entering and surviving in a receiving environment.

2) Means to prevent gene contamination from the synthetic organism to ‘wild’ or naturally occurring organisms.

Adequate containment must include:

1) Physical containment to keep the synthetic or-ganism from entering the environment.

2) Geographical containment that only allows grow-ing an organism in a location where it cannot survive in the surrounding environment if it es-capes. This also includes locating facilities outside earthquake fault zones, coastal zones where tsu-namis or strong storms could damage the facility, or in flood plains.

3) Biological containment to inhibit the move-ment of the synthesized organisms, to inhibit the ability of the organism to reproduce outside a contained system, to prevent reproduction once it enters the environment, and to prevent expression of synthesized genetic constructs in other wild-type organisms in the environment.

Some proponents have suggested relying on methods of biological containment originally designed for geneti-cally engineered plants and animals, such as so-called “suicide genes” and other types of self-destruction tech-nologies. These methods are no substitute for physical, geographical and biological containment designed to prevent the release of synthetic organisms. Scientists who have studied “terminator technologies” in seeds have concluded that they are not failsafe. Frequently occurring mutations allow organisms to overcome the

intended sterilization, thereby allowing those organ-isms to remain viable. Specifically, “suicide genes” and other genetic use restriction technologies represent an evolutionary disadvantage; selective pressures will lead organisms to overcome intended biological constraints.vi Attempts to develop alternative genetic systems (such as xenobiology1, mirror biology2 or novel amino acids3) are not well enough understood to claim they provide safety. They should not be tested outside the laboratory.

Importantly, the UN Convention on Biological Diver-sity has mandated an international moratorium on the use of “terminator technologies,” such as “suicide genes,” and other genetic use restriction technologies, which has been in place for the past decade. Reliance on an unproven technology that has been deemed unaccept-able by 193 nations as a principal method to “contain” synthetic organisms is irresponsible and legally dubious.

Additionally, the intentional release of synthetic or-ganisms into the environment for such things as bio-remediation or other applications must be prohibited.

The failure to prioritize (e.g., properly fund) risk-relevant environmental impact researchvii necessitates a moratorium on the commercial use of synthetic or-ganisms, cells or genomes and their release into the environment.

1 Xenobiologists explore the possibility that life might be created without relying on carbon or water or using the 20 usual amino acids found in life on Earth.

2 Mirror biology is a biology based on the mirror image of amino acids. Mirror image molecules were not at first thought to be a problem. That is why the 1960s controversy over the antinausea drug thalidomide was such a surprise—the right-handed version calmed morning sickness in pregnant women, but the left-handed version caused birth defects.

3 Chemists long have been aware of literally hundreds of amino acids in addition to the normal 20 that make up all protein molecules coded by DNA in biology.


V. Guarantee the right-to-know and democratic participation

Comprehensive public and worker participation should be provided throughout the decision-making processes involving synthetic biology.

Information about human health and environmental effects must be communicated throughout the complete stream of commerce so that all users of products of synthetic biology know the hazards of the organisms and products they use.

Researchers and companies seeking approval for devel-opment and commercialization of any products derived

from synthetic biology must provide government agen-cies with the necessary tests to detect synthetic organ-isms in the case of unintended release or exposure. In addition to requiring synthetic biology researchers to report their activities in detail to the communities in which they work, to their national governments, and publicly on the Internet, researchers must also develop protocols for destroying the organisms when the re-search is completed and reporting the results to their communities and nations.

All accidental releases into air, water or soil should be reported immediately to the local community and national authorities, and contact information for such

Synthetic biology requires the strictest levels of physical, biological and geographic containment as well as independent environmental risk assess-ment for each proposed activity or product.


reporting must be prominently posted in all laboratories and facilities. Safety data should be available for public inspection on websites and reported to public bodies.

All containers holding synthetic organisms or their synthetic parts should be clearly labeled. Mandatory labeling will help governments track these synthetic organisms. Products, including medicines, vaccines, biofuels and other industrial materials created through synthetic biology should be labeled at all phases — in the lab, while in transport and, if commercialized, on the physical products. Marketing materials and adver-tisements for these products must state that they are products of synthetic biology.

Closely linked with the right-to-know is our essential right-to-participate in decisions about environmental and societal hazards that affect our lives.

The public must have the legally enforceable right to halt dangerous applications, not just comment after de-cisions have been made. Governments must provide meaningful involvement for the public and workers throughout the entire decision-making process related to the development of synthetic biology and the prod-ucts of synthetic biology., including setting the research agenda, the context and the scope of the risk assessment. This includes making sure that communities have ac-cess to independent scientific and legal opinions on the proposed projects. Opportunities for participation in decisions on synthetic biology should not be narrowed to only scientific input. Other forms of knowledge in-cluding traditional knowledge as well as analysis of cul-tural, legal, social and economic considerations should also carry weight in decision-making processes.

Public involvement must be open, facilitating equal input from all interested and affected parties around the globe including and especially:

1) Communities that could be impacted — espe-cially poor communities where many of the first commercial facilities using synthetic organisms will be located.4

2) Labor unions and workplace safety groups con-cerned about exposure.

3) Communities concerned about feedstock pro-curement, land use and other social, economic and cultural implications (See Principle VII below).

The use of synthetic biology techniques to develop drugs and vaccines is already underway. Data on any health effects from these techniques cannot be consid-ered “confidential business information” by companies and researchers. Additionally, long-term follow-up studies of patients taking synthetic biology-derived medicines or therapies must be mandatory and there must be full disclosure of all the material facts from these studies.

4 For example, Amyris Biotechnologies is currently raising synthetic yeast for the production of biofuels and cosmetics in Brazil. This is to have access to large amounts of cheap sugarcane to feed their yeast.


VI. Require corporate accountability and manufacturer liability for all products of synthetic biology

Those using synthetic biology must be financially and legally accountable for any harm caused to the public, worker health or the environment.

For a product produced through synthetic biology to be placed on and remain in the market, manufactur-ers must provide all available safety information about the synthetic organism and its products. The informa-tion must be sufficient to permit a reasonable evalua-tion of the safety of the synthetic organism on human health and the environment, including hazard, use and exposure information. This means that if there are no data, the product should not be on the market. Prior to regulatory approval of the products of synthetic biol-ogy, developers must demonstrate that they are able to accept the financial and legal liability that could come from manufacture, use and disposal of their products.

Developers of synthetic biology and their funders must establish financial mechanisms, even at the research stage, to assure that adequate funds are available to mitigate and compensate for health, worker or envi-ronmental damages. If commercial insurers are unwill-ing to provide insurance for this purpose, governments should not insure the developers of synthetic biology. If the risk is too great for private investors, it is too great for the public.

Synthetic biology companies should bear the cost of producing accurate environmental and health safety in-formation. This information must be a precondition for products intended for marketing and be issued before significant quantities of a product are manufactured to assist in protection of workers. Industry should pro-duce data on the earliest phases of the research and

development of its products, but full assessments on health and safety should be generated and conducted by governments or independent laboratories at industry expense to ensure the information is publically available and reliable.

Strict standards that prohibit conflicts of interest should be maintained in the oversight of synthetic bi-ology research, including but not limited to prohibiting persons with financial interests in synthetic biology re-search, development and commercialization from roles in its health and safety oversight.

Synthetic algae growing in a greenhouse.


VII. Protect economic and environmental justice

It is necessary to ensure that the development of syn-thetic biology does not deepen economic and social injustices.

The impacts that synthetic biology could have on ecosystems and communities in the global South are of special concern. At present, most commercial inter-est in synthetic biology is focused on enabling a new “biomass-based economy” in which any type of plant matter can be used as feedstock for tailored synthetic microbes to transform into high value commercial products — anything from fuels to plastics to indus-trial chemicals. As major industries shift to biomass-

derived feed stocks, larger and larger quantities of plant material will be required. Biomass to feed synthetic microbes will be extracted from or cultivated mostly in the global South, disrupting fragile ecosystems and exacerbating environmental damage from industrial crop production. Further pressure will be placed on land and water resources, already in short supply for food production. There is simply not enough land (or plant matter) for all the uses that are being contemplated. Furthermore, a number of current applications of syn-thetic biology propose to replace botanical production of natural plant-based commodities (e.g., rubber, plant oils, artemsinin) with vat-based production systems using synthetic microbes or to move production to ge-netically engineered plants. In time, these substitutions

Most commercial interest in synthetic biology is focused on enabling a new “biomass-based economy” in which any type of plant matter can be used as feedstock for tailored synthetic microbes to transform into high value commercial products — anything from fuels to plastics to industrial chemicals.


could have devastating economic impacts on farming, fishing and forest communities who depend on natural compounds for their livelihoods. These impacts and the impacts of biomass extraction and associated land grabbing must be considered in any assessment of risk. These assessments must include the full and active par-ticipation of the communities that will be impacted.

Corporations have already applied for extremely broadly worded patents on synthetic biology techniques. If granted, they could give a small number of companies virtual de facto monopoly control over entire economic sectors, affecting the rights of small producers, patients (in the case of pharmaceutical patents) and the public at large. Patents on synthetic biology processes, synthetic organisms or products derived from synthetic biology

could further the privatization and control of naturally occurring products and processes. Companies and re-searchers must not be permitted to patent synthetic versions of natural organisms. These patents could open up new avenues for bio-piracy and ways to circumvent access and benefit-sharing agreements. Transparency, public safety and environmental protection must take legal precedence over any patent or intellectual property protections.

Until the above principles are incorporated into inter-national, federal and local law as well as research and industry practices, there must be a moratorium on the release and commercial use of synthetic organisms.

Synthetic biologists predict that new and extreme genetic engineering will usher in dramatic changes in

Synthetic biology products depend upon fermenting large quantities of sugarcane. The production and harvesting, including burning, of cane fields releases large amounts of carbon dioxide and causes other environmental and social harms.


all areas of human life. While some have argued that synthetic biology can be a research tool to better un-derstand biology, it poses significant and unprecedented hazards. The development of synthetic biology without proper oversight and regulation could result in inad-equate control over the development of other potentially harmful emerging technologies.

Synthetic biology must, therefore, be accompanied by precautionary mechanisms to safeguard the health of workers and local communities, to preserve the biodi-versity of the planet, to ensure public participation, to provide for democratically decided social goals, and to restore public trust in scientific researchers and govern-ment regulators. The undersigned organizations call for the governments of the world to incorporate these prin-ciples into local, national and international frameworks to provide oversight to this extreme form of biological engineering.

Conclusion


Endnotesi This declaration in no manner limits or binds the signatories from any other relevant actions or statements, including unilateral or joint super-

seding statements on synthetic biology policy. Each organization continues to fulfill their respective mission statements in accordance with their own fundamental guiding principles. This joint declaration supplements our organizations’ work in this and related areas. This declara-tion is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of all possible oversight principles or to encompass all subsequent steps needed for their implementation; rather, it is a starting point from which future implementations of oversight policy can build.

ii See, e.g., RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (”Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”); CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 Art. 10(6) (“Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Part of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in question . . . in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.”); U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVEN-TION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, May 9, 1992, 21 I.L.M. 849, (“The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the cause of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.”); THE WORLD CHARTER ON NATURE, G.A. Res. 37/7, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982) (“Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best available technologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used.”); THE LONDON CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION BY DUMPING WASTES AND OTHER MATTER, 1996 Protocol to the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Mar. 24, 2006, art. 3, para. 1 (“Appropriate preventative mea-sures are[to be] taken when there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the marine environment are likely to cause harm even when there is no conclusive evidence to provide a causal relation between inputs and their effects.”); AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, G. A. 164/37, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF164/37 (“States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation....”).

iii “The Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle.” Science & Environmental Health Network, 26 Jan. 1998. <http://www.sehn.org/wing.html>.

iv Text from the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity can be viewed here: http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/.v “COP 10 Decision X/37.” Biofuels and Biodiversity. UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Oct. 2011. <http://www.cbd.int/decision/

cop/?id=12303>.vi Steinbrecher, Ricarda A. V-GURTs (Terminator) as a Biological Containment Tool? Rep. EcoNexus, June 2005. <http://www.econexus.info/

sites/econexus/files/ENx_V-GURTs_brief_2005.pdf>.vii One study of U.S. and European government funding into synthetic biology research conducted by the Wilson Center’s Synthetic Biology

Project found that while the U.S. government has spent around $430 million between 2005 and 2010, only 4% of this money went to exam-ine the ethical, legal and social implications of synthetic biology. When researchers searched for projects looking into risk assessment related to potential accidental release of synthetic organisms from a lab or confinement, or risks from intentional release of synthetic organisms they found no such projects. See: “Trends in Synthetic Biology Research Funding in the United States and Europe.” Synthetic Biology Project. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2010. Web. <http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6420/final_syn-bio_funding_web2.pdf?>.

http://www.sehn.org/wing.html

http://www.sehn.org/wing.html

http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12303

http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12303

http://www.econexus.info/sites/econexus/files/ENx_V-GURTs_brief_2005.pdf

http://www.econexus.info/sites/econexus/files/ENx_V-GURTs_brief_2005.pdf

http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6420/final_synbio_funding_web2.pdf?

http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6420/final_synbio_funding_web2.pdf?


African Biodiversity Network Agricultural Missions, Inc (AMI) (U.S.)Alliance for Humane Biotechnology (U.S.)Amberwaves (U.S.)Amigos de la Tierra EspañaAsociacion ANDES (Peru)Asociación para la Promoción y el Desarrollo de la

Comunidad CEIBA / Friends of the Earth GuatemalaBasler Appell gegen Gentechnologie” (Appeal of Basle

against Genetic-Manipulation) (Switzerland)Biofuelwatch (International)Biotechnology Reference Group of the Canadian Council

of ChurchesBiowatch South AfricaBrazilian Research Network in Nanotechnology, Society,

and Environment - RENANOSOMABund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland / Friends

of the Earth GermanyCanadian Biotechnology Action Network (CBAN)Center for Biological Diversity (U.S.)Center for Food Safety (U.S.)Center for Genetics and Society (U.S.)Center for Humans and Nature (U.S.)Center for International Environmental Law (U.S.)Centro Ecológico (Brazil)Centre for Environmental Justice/Friends of the Earth Sri

LankaCESTA - Amigos de la Tierra, El SalvadorCitizens’ Environmental Coalition (U.S.)COECOCEIBA - Friends of the Earth Costa RicaColumban Center for Advocacy and Outreach (U.S.)Community Alliance for Global Justice (CAGJ) (U.S.)Development Fund (Norway)Diverse Women for Diversity (India)Doctors for Food Safety & Biosafety (India)

Econexus (International)Ecoropa (Europe)Envirocare (Tanzania)Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth NigeriaETC Group (International)Ethiopian Society for Consumer Protection

(ETHIOSCOP)European Network of Scientists for Social and

Environmental Responsibility (ENSSER)Family Farm Defenders (U.S.)Federation of German ScientistsFood Democracy Now! (U.S.)Food & Water Watch (U.S.)Friends of the Earth AustraliaFriends of the Earth BrazilFriends of the Earth CanadaFriends of the Earth CyprusFriends of the Earth Latin America and the Caribbean

(ATALC )Friends of the Earth MauritiusFriends of the Earth U.S.Friends of ETC Group (U.S.)Gaia Foundation (U.K.)Gene Ethics (Australia)GeneWatch UKGLOBAL 2000/FoE AustriaGlobal Forest Coalition (International)GM Freeze (UK)GMWatch (UK)IBON InternationalIndian Biodiversity Forum Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism (U.S.)Initiative for Health & Equity in Society (India)Injured Workers National Network (U.S.)

Endorsing organizations


Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (U.S.)Institute for Responsible Technology (U.S.)International Center for Technology Assessment (U.S.)International Peoples Health Council (South Asia )International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel,

Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF) (International)

Jamaican Council of ChurchesKarima Kaaithiegeni Ambaire (CBO) (Kenya) Latin American Nanotechnology & Society Network

(ReLANS)Loka Institute (U.S.)MADGE Australia IncMaendeleo Endelevu Action Program (MEAP) (Kenya) Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns (U.S.)MELCA-EthiopiaMidwest Environmental Justice Organization (U.S.)Movimiento Madre Tierra (Honduras)Mupo Foundation (South Africa)Nanotechnology Citizen Engagement Organization (U.S.)National Association of Professional Environmentalists

(Friends of the Earth Uganda)Navdanya (India) NOAH Friends of the Earth DenmarkNon-GMO Project (U.S.)No Patents on Life! (Germany)Northeast Organic Farming Association -- Interstate

Council (NOFA-IC) (U.S.)Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association (U.S.)Otros Mundos AC/Amigos de la Tierra MéxicoOur Bodies Ourselves(U.S.)The Pacific Institute of Resource Management (New Zealand)Partners for the Land & Agricultural Needs of Traditional

Peoples (PLANT) (U.S.)Pesticide Action Network North America

Physicians for Social Responsibility (U.S.)Pro-Choice Alliance for Responsible Research (U.S.)Pro Natura – Friends of the Earth SwitzerlandPublic Employees for Environmental Responsibility

(PEER)Rescope Programme (Malawi)Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology

(India)Rural Coalition (U.S.)Save our Seeds (Europe)Say No to GMOs! (U.S.)Schweizerische Arbeitsgruppe Gentechnologie SAG (Swiss

Working Group on Genetic Engineering)Science & Environmental Health Network (U.S.)Seed Stewards Association of TurkeySobrevivencia – Amigos de la Tierra ParaguaySustainability Council of New ZealandSustainable Living Systems (U.S.)Testbiotech (Germany)Third World Network (International)Timberwatch Coalition (South Africa)Tree Is Life Trust (Kenya)United Methodist Church, General Board of Church &

SocietyUSC CanadaVivAgora (France)Washington Biotechnology Action Council (U.S.)Women in Europe for a Common Future (International)World Rainforest Movement (International)

Please e-mail Eric Hoffman of Friends of the Earth U.S. at [email protected] if your organization wishes to endorse the Principles or if you have any questions.


“Synthetic biology, the next wave of genetic engineering, al-

lows seed, pesticide and oil companies to redesign life so that

they can make more money from it. These companies now

want to take over the forests and land of the Global South

to make so called biofuels for planes and boats of the mili-

tary or to make new cosmetics for the rich. Using synthetic

biology, a biofuels dictatorship joins the food dictatorship

wrought by the first kind of genetic engineering. The Prin-ciples for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology is an important

tool to help people reign in these new technologies.” – Van-dana Shiva

- Vandana Shiva is the founder of Navdanya International, which aims to defend and protect nature and the rights of people to access to food and water and dignified jobs and livelihoods. Dr. Shiva is a renowned environmental activist and winner of the 1993 Right Livelihood Award (the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize).

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