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excellence in dependable-automation

Copyright exida LLC 2001-2011

Functional Safety According to

IEC61511 & IEC62061

SAFA, July 2011

Owen Tavener-Smith Pr. Eng CFSE

idae

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The Functional Safety Standards

International Performance

Based Standard For All

Industries

IEC61511 : Process Industry

Sector

IEC62061 : Machinery

Sector

IEC61513 :

Nuclear Sector

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IEC 61508 Standard

Released 2000, Ed2: 2010

Umbrella FS standard

Risk Based

Performance basedTargets Suppliers

– Requirements for suppliers of control and instrumentation for component / sub-system safety

– End Users seek suppliers with products certified to this standard by reputable certifying agency

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Industry Sector Standards

Targets End Users, Contractors and Integrators

Performance NOT Prescription

IEC61511 for Process Industry

IEC62061 for Machinery Safety

Apply Functional Safety concepts to industry sectors

•Establish safety requirements

•Design to safety targets

•Maintain safety targets throughout system lifetime

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IEC61511: Process Industry

• Hazards with large consequences but

low frequency of occurrence

• Demand rate on SIF < once per year

but typically much lower.

• Structure: 3 parts

– Part 1: Technical requirements

– Part 2: Guideline for application of part 1

– Part 3 : Guidelines for the determination of

required SIL.

• IEC technical committee 65Copyright exida LLC 2001-2011

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IEC62061: Machinery Safety

• Hazards with smaller consequences but

high inherent frequency of occurrence

• Demand rate on SIF > once per year.

• Structure:– Management of Functional Safety

– Requirements for specifying SRCFs

– Design & Integration of SRECSs

– Validation

– Modification.

• IEC technical committee 44


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Functional Safety to Manage Risk

Increasing

Risk

Process RiskAcceptable Risk

Minimum Risk Reduction

Optimal Risk Reduction (ALARP)

DesignBPCSAlarmsReliefSafety Function

Layers Of

Protection

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REACTOR

TT 1

Power

SupplyCPU Input

Module

Output

Module

PT 2

PT 1

TT 3

TT 2

PT 3

Power

SupplyCPU Input

Module

Output

Module

IEC61511 Terms

SIF: safety Instrumented function

SIS: Safety Instrumented System

IEC62061 Terms

SRCF: Safety Related Control

Function

SRECS: Safety Related Electrical

Control system

Safety System Definitions

Safety Instrumented Function (SIF):

An instrument loop that protects against a single hazard1. Automatically taking an industrial process to a safe state when specified conditions are violated;

2. Permit a process to move forwardin a safe manner when specified conditions allow (permissive functions); or

3. Taking action to mitigate the consequences of an industrial hazard.”

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Random Failures, (hardware)

A failure occurring at a random time, which results

from one or more degradation mechanisms.

Systematic Failures, (includes software)

A failure related in a deterministic way to a certain

cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification

of the design or of the manufacturing process,

operational procedures, documentation,

or other relevant factors.

Failure Categories

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Specification 44%

Design &

Implementation

15%

Installation & Commissioning

6%

Operation &

Maintenance

15%

Changes after

Commissioning

21%

HSE study of accident causes

involving control systems:

Industrial Accident Causes - HSE

“Out of Control: Why Control Systems go Wrong and How to Prevent Failure,”

U.K.: Sheffield, Heath and Safety Executive, 1995

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Safety Lifecycle Summary

• Conceptual Process Design• Identify Potential Hazards• Consequence Analysis• Layer of Protection Analysis• Develop Non-SIS Layers• Determine SIF Target SIL• Document Requirements

• Startup• Operation• Maintenance• Periodic Proof Tests

• Modifications

• Decommissioning

ANALYSIS

How much safety do

I need?

[Determine SIL]

IMPLEMENTATION

How do I get the

safety I need?

[Achieve SIL]

OPERATION

How do I keep the

safety I need?

[Maintain SIL]

• Select SIS Technology

• Select SIS Architecture

• Determine Test Frequency

• SIS Detailed Design

• SIS Hardware Build

• SIS Software Configuration

• SIS Testing

• SIS Installation

• SIS Commissioning

• SIS Initial Validation

Modification = Change Requirements

Modification = Change Design

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Safety Lifecycle – IEC 61511

Management

of Functional

Safety

and

Functional

Safety

Assessment

Clause 5

Safety

Lifecycle

Structure

and

Planning

Clause 6.2

Allocate Safety Function to Protection

Layers [Clause 9]

Verification

Clause 7

&

Clause 12.7

An

aly

sis

Re

alis

ati

on

Op

era

tio

n

SIS Safety Requirements Specification

[Clauses 10 & 12]

Process Hazard & Risk Analysis

[Clause 8]

SIS Design and Engineering

[Clauses 11 & 12]

SIS Installation & Commissioning

[Clause 14]

SIS Operation & Maintenance

[Clause 16]

SIS Safety Validation

[Clause 15]

SIS Modification

[Clause 17]

SIS Decommissioning

[Clause 18]

FEED

Concept

SIS FAT

[Clause 13]

Design &

Build

Test

Install

Manage

Validate

Proof

Test

/

(9)(10) (11)

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Safety Lifecycle“Analysis” Phases

Assess

Consequences

Assess Likelihood

Develop Non-SIS

Layers

1. Conceptual Process

Design

SIS Required?

2. Identify Potential Hazards

Process Safety

Information

4. Layer of Protection

Analysis

Potential Hazards

Hazard Frequencies

3. Consequence Analysis

Hazard Consequences

5. Select Target SIL for

SIS & SIF

Target SILs

6. Document SIS / SIF

Requirements

Event History

Layers of

Protection

Failure

Probabilities

Tolerable Risk

Guidelines

Hazard

Characteristics

StopNo

Yes

To Realization

Safety Requirements Specification -Functional Description of each Safety

Instrumented Function, Target SIL,

Mitigated Hazards, Process parameters,

Logic, Bypass/Maintenance requirements, Response time, etc

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Functional Safety to Manage Risk

Increasing

Risk

Process RiskAcceptable Risk

Minimum Risk Reduction

Optimal Risk Reduction (ALARP)

DesignBPCSAlarmsReliefSafety Function

Layers Of

Protection

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Safety Integrity Level, (SIL)


• The Safety Integrity Level is an expression of risk

reduction.

• A Safety Instrumented Function protects against a

specific hazard

• Analyse the hazard scenario in terms of risk.

SIL Risk Reduction Factor

4 10,000 to 100,000

3 1,000 to 10,000

2 100 to 1,000

1 10 to 100

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What is risk?

Risk is a measure of the likelihood and consequenceof a hazard. (i.e., How often can it happen and what will be the severity of the effects if it does?)

We want to:

Personnel

Environment

Financial

• Equipment/Property Damage

• Business Interruption

These categories are called Risk Receptors

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Measuring Risk

Alarp 1 2 3 4 bMultiple fatalities

NR Alarp 1 2 3 4One fatality

NR NR Alarp 1 2 3Disabling injury

NR NR NR Alarp 1 2Reserible injury

NR NR NR NR Alarp 1First aid

Between once /10000yr and once /100000yr




Between once /yr and once /10yr

> once /yr


Frequency

Severity

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Consequence Analysis

Incident Outcome: Uncontrolled spillage of unleaded petrol from

storage tank into bunded area. Potential for vapour cloud formation

which if ignited could result in VCE and subsequent tank fire.

Consequences:

Personnel Safety: Fatalities within effect zone

Environment: Serious national environmental impact

Financial: Damage repair cost and lost production: >USD100M

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/Buncefield2.jpg

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Likelihood Analysis

• Hazard can only occur when an unwanted event occurs,

(typically a control system failure or human error)

• In most cases the hazard will not occur immediately since

there may be other conditions that have to be satisfied.

• Example: Uncontrolled tank spillage resulting in VCE

– Unwanted event: Tank level control failure

– Condition #1: High level alarm did not work or operator ignored

alarm

– Condition #2: High high level safety function did not work

– Condition #3: Spillage was not detected by CCTV or other operator

surveillance

– Condition #4: Weather conditions suitable for vapour cloud

formation

– Condition #5: Presence of ignition source


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Likelihood Analysis

Uncontrolled tank spillage resulting in VCE

– Tank level control failure AND

– Condition #1: High level alarm did not work or operator ignored

alarm AND

– Condition #2: High high level safety function did not work AND

– Condition #3: Spillage was not detected by CCTV or other operator

surveillance AND

– Condition #4: Weather conditions suitable for vapour cloud

formation AND

– Condition #5: Presence of ignition source.

FIE * PC#1 * PC#2 * PC#3 * PC#4 * PC#5 = Hazard Frequency

FIE: Frequency of initiating event, (events per year)

PC#n: Probability of condition, (0-1)


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LOPA: Likelihood Analysis

Layer Of Protection Analysis

Initiating event IPL #1 LOC IPL#2

Level control

failure

Independent

alarm + operator

intervention

Spillage of

flammable fuel

at 500m3 ph

Routine field

operator

surveilance

Stable

weather

conditions

Probability

of ignition

0.9 0.0027 VCE followed by tank fire

0.1

0.3

1 Yes

0.1

0.1 0.0003 Vapour cloud forms but no ignition source found

0.9 0.0270 No significant vapour cloud formation

0.7 0.07 LOC but mitigated by post release intervention

0 No 0 No LOC

Outcome Modifiers

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Measuring Risk: SIL Determination

Alarp 1 2 3 4 bMultiple fatalities

NR Alarp 1 2 3 4One fatality

NR NR Alarp 1 2 3Disabling injury

NR NR NR Alarp 1 2Reserible injury

NR NR NR NR Alarp 1First aid





Between once /yr and once /10yr

> once /yr


Frequency

Severity

SIL 2

Target

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SIL Determination Example

Community Safety 2.70E-03 Community: 2

0.0027

CAUSE 2

0

Cause frequency: 0

0.1 0.9

CAUSE 1

Tank guage failure

High level alarm +

operator intervention

IPL #5, (Personnel

occupancy)

IPL #5 (Community

occupancy)

At least one worker will

normally be within effect

zone

Probable that public

will be within effect

zone

2

1

Safety:

Financial:

2.70E-03

2.70E-03

15 min

2

3

32.70E-03PFD:

Personnel Safety

EML

Environment

Notes:

PFD: 11

05/12/2005SIL Review Date:Project Description: Buncefield Fuel Depot Tank Overfill LOPA example

Environment:

119-1910

Spurious trip effect and impact cost

Intermediate

Frequency

Outcome Modifier #2

[Probability]

Area: Tank farm zone 1 P&ID

1

Total Intermediate Frequency

0

0

Target SIL

Target MTTFs: (years)

PST: (seconds)

Initiating Event Cause(s)

[events per year]

IPL #2

[PFD]

cSIF No: 1 Initiator Tagname: 30-LSHH-001

IPL #1

[PFD]

SIF Definition:

Description of hazard:[include initiating event and incident outcome]

On detection of high high level, (30-LSHH-001) at storage tank 001, close tank inlet valve 30-XV-010.

Outcome Modifier #1

[Probability]

Continued filling of storage tank will lead to spillage of unleaded fuel into the bunded area. Formation of vapour

cloud is possible, (aggravated by aerosol formation). Build-up of vapour cloud beyond bund wall could be ignited

leading to potential for VCE with flash back and tank fire.

Personnel Safety Community Safety Financial EnvironmentConsequence:

1-2 fatalities

Hospitalisation or multiple press

articles regarding complaints 100 - 1000 Million

Serious national environmental

impact

Operator notices level

reading is not changing

Weather conditions

favourable for vapour

cloud build-up

Ignition source found

0.1Cause frequency: 1 0.3

1 1 1

1 1 1

CAUSE 4

Cause frequency: 0 1

CAUSE 3

1Cause frequency: 0 1 1 1

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excellence in dependable automation

10. SIS Installation,

Commissioning

and Pre-startup

Acceptance Test





7. SIS Conceptual

Design

7a. Select

Technology

7b. Select

ArchitectureRedundancy: 1oo1,1oo2,

2oo3, 1oo2D

7c. Determine

Test Philosophy

7d. Reliability,

Safety EvaluationSILs Achieved

SIL

Achieved?

No

Yes

8. SIS Detailed

Design

Failure Data Database

Manufacturer’s Installation Instructions

9. Installation

& Commission

Planning

SILver Tool

Manufacturer’s Failure Data

Detailed Design Documentation -Loop Diagrams, Wiring Diagrams, Logic

Diagrams, Panel Layout, PLC

Programming, Installation

Requirements, Commissioning

Requirements, etc.

DD DOCUMENT TemplateManufacturer’s Safety Manual

Choose sensor, logic solver

and final element technology

Safety Lifecycle “Realization” Phases

How to achieve the safety target?

SIF Design

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Copyright exida.com LLC 2001-2009

• Design solution:

– Three transmitters voted 2oo3

– Certified Safety PLC: Triconex or Honeywell FSC

– Single solenoid and actuator/valve

Eliminate Weak Link Designs

TT

TT

TT

Safety PLC Solenoid Control Valve

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Safety Integrity Level, (SIL)


• The Safety Integrity Level is an expression of:• Risk reduction,

• Probability of failure of the Safety Function.

• To achieve the target SIL, the probability of

the Safety Function must be calculated.

SIL Risk Reduction Factor PFDavg

4 10,000 to 100,000 10-4 to 10-5

3 1,000 to 10,000 10-3 to 10-4

2 100 to 1,000 10-2 to 10-3

1 10 to 100 10-1 to 10-2

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SIF Design


On high high tank level, close inlet valve

– Level transmitter

– Portion of Safety PLC

– Actuator/valve + solenoid

Probability of Failure = λTI/2

λ, (lambda): Device failure rate, (dangerous)

TI: Time interval between proof test

The lower the failure rate the lower the failure probability,

The shorter the time interval between proof tests, the lower the

failure probability.PFDavg = λTI/2 valid for low demand mode

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SIF Design: Transmitter

• Device type 1: λ = 2E-06 failures per hour

– TI = 2 years

– PFDavg = λTI/2 = 1.75E-02 SIL 1

• Device type 2: 90% diagnostic coverage

– λ = 2E-07

– PFDavg = λTI/2 = 1.75E-03 SIL 2

• Device type 1: 2 devices voted 1oo2

– PFDavg = λ2TI2/3 = 4.1E-04 SIL 3

– Common cause: PFDavg = 1.25E-03 SIL 2


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• Objective

– Choose the right equipment for the purpose. All criteria

used for process control still apply.

• Tasks

– Choose equipment

– Obtain reliability and safety data for the equipment

– Obtain Safety Manual for any safety certified equipment

SIF Design: Select Technology

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• Objective

– Choose type of redundancy if needed.

• Tasks

– Choose architecture

– 1oo1 no redundancy

– 1oo2 two devices single fault tolerant

– 2oo3 three devices single fault tolerant

– Obtain reliability and safety data for the

architecture

SIF Design: Select Architecture

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SIF Design: Establish Proof Test Philosophy

In general the testing can include:

• Automatic testing which is built into the SIS, (called

diagnostics)

• Off-line testing, which is done manually while the

process is not in operation.

• On-line testing, which is done manually while the

process is in operation.

• Frequency of tests?

• Effectiveness of tests?

Proof testing: responsibility for maintenance team:

the design team should always think about

facilitating the maintenance tasks.

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SIF Design and Verification


• The SIL is based on the complete SIF:

– Sensor(s) PFDavg (S)

– Logic Solver(s) PFDavg (LS)

– Final Element(s) PFDavg (FE)

SensorFinal Element

Logic Solver

PFDavg (SIF) = PFDavg (S) + PFDavg (LS) + PFDavg (FE)

PFDavg = λ.TI/2

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Systematic Capability

• Hardware failures

– Stress/strength model

– Wear out mechanisms

– Useful life

• Systematic failures

– Software errors

– Specification error

– Manufacturing defect


Systematic Capability addresses systematic failures

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Copyright exida 2000-2011

Trend toward 61508

certified products •IEC 61508 Certification addresses both Hardware Integrity

requirements and Systematic Integrity requirements.

•More and more products are getting IEC 61508 Certification:

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

200'2

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Number of IEC 61508 Certified Sensors

From exida Process

Measurement

Instrument Market

report

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12. Validation:

Pre-startup

Safety Review

ModifyDecommission

14. SIS startup,

operation,

maintenance,

Periodic

Functional Tests

15. Modify,

Decommission?

16. SIS

Decommissioning

Verify all documentation against

Hazards, design, installation testing,

maintenance procedures,

management of change, emergency

plans, etc.

13. Operating and

Maintenance

Planning

11. Validation

Planning

Safety Lifecycle “Operation” Phases

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Maintenance of SIS

• Planning the proof tests

• Writing the proof test procedures

• How to perform the tests?

– On-line vs off-line

• What is the coverage of the tests?

– How to test impulse lines?

• Document the proof test results – why?

– Company/site device database.


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Management Of Change

• 21% of incident causes due to changes

after commissioning!

• Must be a formal process

• Is the change necessary?

• Impact assessment, (mini risk evaluation)

• Document the process

• Execute the change, (within the safety lifecycle).


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Management of Functional Safety

• Addresses the impact of failures due to

human actions

• Define safety lifecycle activities

• Define roles and responsibilities

• Communicate

• Ensure competence of persons

• Verify and validate activity deliverablesCopyright exida LLC 2001-2011

Specification 44%

Design & Implementation

15%

Installation & Commissioning6%

Operation & Maintenance

15%

Changes after Commissioning

21%

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Adoption of the FS Standards

• IEC 61508 has been adopted in the UK as BS EN 61508, with the “EN”

indicating adoption also by the European electrotechnical standardisation

organisation CENELEC.

• COMAH Assessment: The report should state which standard these systems

have been designed to. If the standard claimed is not a currently recognised

relevant standard such as BS IEC 61511 or BS EN 61508, then a justification for

this should be included in the report.

• COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 2006 NSW Govt.

Interpretation: “electrical and mechanical control systems [and safeguards] are

designed in accordance with established functional safety and machinery

safeguarding concepts. Refer: AS 61508, AS 62061 and AS 4024”.

• Buncefield Recommendation 1: The Competent Authority and operators of

Buncefield type site should develop and agree a common methodology to

determine safety integrity level (SIL) requirements for overfill prevention systems

in line with the principles set out in Part 3 of BS EN 61511.

• HSE recognises BS IEC 61511 as relevant good practice for safety functions

implemented by safety instrumented systems in the Process Industry sector in

the context of assessing compliance with the law in individual cases and the use

of good practice.


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Functional Safety Summary

• Its not rocket science..

• Its good engineering common sense– Establish what safety performance you need,

– Design to achieve the performance targets,

– Maintain the systems so that the performance

levels are ensured throughout the system life.

• Risk is managed without over

engineered solutions

• Cuts out weak-link designs

• Addresses human error.


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Thank-you

Any questions?

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Backup Slides

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Case Study – Deepwater Horizon

• BP owned oil production platform suffers explosion and sinks

– 11 persons dead

– Asset loss >USD 500 million

– Environmental: catastrophic

– Reputation: ???

• Process fluids in seabed well head cause overpressure.

• Blowout Preventers failed or not activated?

• Questions to be answered:

– How good were the Blowout Preventers?

– How good did they need to be?

– Were procedures followed?


API-14C is a prescriptive standard. Safety

performance targets are not specified..

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Systematic Faults

A single systematic fault can cause failure in multiple

channels of an identical redundant system.

REDUNDANCY IS NOT A PROTECTION AGAINST

SYSTEMATIC FAILURES!

Early example: A bad command was sent into a redundant

DCS through a “Foreign Computer Interface.” The

command caused a controller to lock up trying to interpret

the command. The diagnostics detected the failure and

forced switchover to a redundant unit. The bad command

was sent to the redundant unit which promptly locked up as

well.

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Competency Requirements in the Standards

• “…ensuring that applicable parties involved in any of the overall E/E/PE or software safety lifecycle activities are competent to carry out activities for which they are accountable.”

-IEC 61508, Part 1, Paragraph 6.2.1 (h)

• “Persons, departments, or organizations involved in safety lifecycle activities shall be competent to carry out the activities for which they are accountable.”

-IEC 61511, Part 1, Paragraph 5.2.2.2

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• SIL Determination tool; supports:

– Risk Graph

– Risk Matrix

– Frequency Based Target, (quantitative)

• Safety Requirements Specification

– Template

• SIL Verification

– Built-in equipment reliability database

• Extensive reporting

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Analy

se

Realis

eO

pe

rate

Ma

na

gem

ent of F

unctional S

afe

ty

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Safety Lifecycle“Analysis” Phases

Assess

Consequences

Assess Likelihood

Develop Non-SIS

Layers

1. Conceptual Process

Design

SIS Required?

2. Identify Potential Hazards

Process Safety

Information

4. Layer of Protection

Analysis

Potential Hazards

Hazard Frequencies

3. Consequence Analysis

Hazard Consequences

5. Select Target SIL for

SIS & SIF

Target SILs


Requirements

Event History

Layers of

Protection

Failure

Probabilities

Tolerable Risk

Guidelines

Hazard

Characteristics

StopNo

Yes

To Realization





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Safety Requirements Specification

• Objective

– Specify all requirements of SIS needed for detailed engineering

and process safety information purposes

• Tasks

– Identify and describe safety instrumented functions

– Document SIL

– Document action taken – Logic, Cause and Effect Diagram, etc.

– Document associated parameters – timing, maintenance/bypass

requirements, etc.


Requirements

To Realization





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ida.come

excellence in dependable automation

10. SIS Installation,

Commissioning

and Pre-startup

Acceptance Test





7. SIS Conceptual

Design

7a. Select

Technology

7b. Select

ArchitectureRedundancy: 1oo1,1oo2,

2oo3, 1oo2D

7c. Determine

Test Philosophy

7d. Reliability,

Safety EvaluationSILs Achieved

SIL

Achieved?

No

Yes

8. SIS Detailed

Design

Failure Data Database

Manufacturer’s Installation Instructions

9. Installation

& Commission

Planning

SILver Tool

Manufacturer’s Failure Data

Detailed Design Documentation -Loop Diagrams, Wiring Diagrams, Logic

Diagrams, Panel Layout, PLC

Programming, Installation

Requirements, Commissioning

Requirements, etc.

DD DOCUMENT TemplateManufacturer’s Safety Manual

Choose sensor, logic solver

and final element technology

Safety Lifecycle “Realization” Phases

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Safety Requirements

Specification - Safety

Function Requirements

including target SIL

PFDavg, RRF

MTTFS,

SIL achieved

Manufacturer’s

Failure Data

SIF Verification Task

Failure Data

Database

7d. Reliability and

Safety Evaluation

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PFDavg, RRF

MTTFS,

SIL achieved

SIF Design Options

7d. Reliability and

Safety Evaluation

If the SIF verification shows that the SIL

level has not been achieved by the

proposed design a number of options

are available to the designer:

1. Re-evaluate the SIL requirement by

adding other layers of protection, etc.

2. Reduce the proof test interval – this

may involve provisions for on-line

testing.

3. Choose equipment with better safety

ratings – lower dangerous failure rate

or better diagnostics.

4. Change the architecture by adding

more redundancy.

Safety Requirements

Specification - Safety

Function Requirements

including target SIL

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• Objectives– Verify that the SIS functions

according to design requirements.

• Tasks– Verify operation of field instruments– Validate logic and operation– Verify SIL of installed equipment – Produce required documentation –

Certifications if required

Validation

12. Validation:

Pre-startup

Safety Review

INSTALLATION

FAT

SAT / SIT

COMMISSIONING

Functional Safety Assessment

START UP

V

A

L

I

D

A

T

I

O

N

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• Objectives– Verify that the SIS continues to function according to

design requirements and detect otherwise hidden failures

• Tasks– Verify operation of field instruments– Validate logic and operation– Document results of all periodic testing

Periodic Proof Testing

14. SIS startup,

operation,

maintenance,

Periodic

Functional Tests

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exida Certification S.A. in Switzerland, Geneva

Exida founded an independent certification company in

Geneva Switzerland, the home of IEC.

Certification are issued by independent assessors and

auditors

Swiss Quality reputation


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