II

I

I

e

¢

, i

• t"

STUDIES AND ANALYSESOF THE

SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE

i Contract No. NASw-3737

II

iI

Technical ReportCovering

SSME FAILURE DATA REVIEW,DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY AND

SSME DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION

i BCD-SSME-TR-86-1

I

IDecember 15, 1986

R.C. Glover, B. A. Kelley and A. E. Tischer

I

!Prepared For

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

I George C. Marshall Space Flight CenterMarshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812

I

II

BATTELLEColumbus Division

505 King Avenue

Columbus, Ohio 43201-2693

co

u) v_

I _1_

\

:'4r_D

L_ t.._t I.-_4,,.-I

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19870005835 2020-03-31T16:38:51+00:00Z

III

IIIIIlII|

IIli

II

I

STUDIES AND ANALYSESOF THE

SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE

Contract No. NASw-3737

Technical ReportCovering

SSME FAILURE DATA REVIEW,DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY AND

SSME DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION

BCD-SSME-TR-86-1

December 15, 1986

R. C. Glover, B. A. Kelley and A. E. Tischer

Prepared For

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center

Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812

/_ E. Tischer

Manager

SSME Study

N. H. Fischer

Manager

Space Systems Section

BATTELLEColumbus Division

605 King AvenueColumbus, Ohio 43201-2693

!

II

I

ii

iI

I

I

Ii

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

ABSTRACT

The results of a review of the SSME failure data for the period 1980 through

1983 are presented. The data was collected, evaluated and ranked according to

procedures established during the study. A number of conclusions and

recommendations are made based upon this failure data review. The results of

a state-of-the-art diagnostic survey also are presented. This survey covered

a broad range of diagnostic sensors and techniques and the findings have been

evaluated for application to the SSME. Finally, a discussion of the initial

activities for the on-going SSME diagnostic evaluation is included.

I

!I

!

!!

!!!!

I!!II!I!

!

!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY ...............................................................

Introduction .....................................................

SSME Failure Data Review .........................................Diagnostic Survey ................................................

SSME Diagnostic Evaluation .......................................

On-Going Research ................................................

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................

SSME FAILURE DATA REVIEW ..............................................

Failure Modes Analysis ...........................................

Data Collection .............................................UCR Review ..................................................

SSME Accident/Incident Reports Review .......................

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Report Review ............Test Firing Cutoff UCRs Review ..............................

Failure Mode Ranking ........................................

Measurement Parameter Analysis ...................................

Conclusions ......................................................Recommendations ..................................................

Partially Developed and Tested ..............................

Devices with Major Development Efforts Needed ...............

DIAGNOSTICS SURVEY ....................................................

Survey Approach and Methodology ..................................

Approach ....................................................

Methodology .................................................

Diagnostics Background ...........................................

Definitions .................................................

State Identification Process Hierarchy ......................

Information Acquisition .....................................Information Reduction .......................................

State Identification ........................................

Summary and Conclusions .....................................

Paqe

1

11356

9

9

9

1017

18

19

2O

22293O

3233

35

35

3536

37

373940414243

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SSME Diagnostic and Maintenance System Overview ..................

Information Gathering .......................................Information Reduction .......................................

Diagnostic Decisions ........................................

Summary .....................................................

Survey Findings ..................................................

Liquid-Fueled Rocket Engines ................................Aircraft ....................................................

Non-Aerospace Industries ....................................

Recommendations ..................................................

Data Acquisition ............................................

Signal Processing ...........................................

Diagnostic Techniques .......................................

SSME DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION ............................................

Issues and Approach ..............................................

Failure Information Propagation Model ............................

FIPM Example .....................................................

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump FIPM ............................

Revised FIPM Methodology .........................................FIPM Status ......................................................

ON-GOING RESEARCH .....................................................

DATA SOURCES ..........................................................

Liquid-Fueled Rocket Engine Diagnostics ..........................Aircraft Diagnostics .............................................

Non-Aerospace Diagnostics ........................................

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................

ii

44

46464647

47

475158

62

626464

67

676869737778

81

83

838383

85

I

!Ii

!!

I

iI

!

I

I

I

I

I

|

I

i

!

!IlI

IIIIIIIItIIIi

Figure 1.

Figure 2.

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

Figure 5.

Figure 6.

Figure 7.

Figure 8.

Figure 9.

Figure 10.

Figure 11.

Figure 12.

Figure 13.

Figure 14.

Figure 15.

Figure 16.

Figure 17.

Figure 18.

Figure 19.

Figure 20.

Figure 21.

LIST OF FIGURES

Sample of First UCR Review Listing by Component ...........

Samples of First UCR Review Failure Mode Tables ...........

Sample of Second-Cut UCR Tables ...........................

Number of UCRS by Failure Type ............................

Number of UCRS by Component ...............................

Fault Tree Diagram for Hot-Gas Manifold ...................

Example of Test Firing Cutoff UCRs Review Tables ..........

Example of Measurement Parameter Tables ...................

Strategy for State-of-the-Art Survey of MachineDiagnostics ...............................................

Partitioning of System States Into Operational andErroneous States ..........................................

The Hierarchy of Process Required for State

Identification ............................................

Machine Control Versus Machine Diagnostics. Note

the Opportunity for Sharing Resources .....................

Overall SSME Diagnostics and Maintenance Picture ..........

Modules Comprising Exhaust Fan FIPM .......................

Connections Between Exhaust Fan Modules ...................

Addition of Failure Modes to Exhaust Fan FIPM .............

Failure Information Associated With Exhaust Fan

Connections ...............................................

Failure Information Grouped by Signal Type for theExhaust Fan FIPM ..........................................

Excerpt from Initial HPOTP FIPM ...........................

Key for Initial HPTOP FIPM ................................

Failure Information Matrix for Initial HPTOP FIPM .........

iii

Page

10

11

12

14

14

18

21

28

36

38

40

43

45

70

70

72

72

73

74

75

76

I

Table 1.

Table 2.

Table 3.

LIST OF TABLES

Failure Mode Ranking Results for Rank 5 or Above ............

Break-Down of the Diagnostic Hierarchy ......................

Summary of Diagnostics Recommendations ......................

iv

Pa_e

23

44

63

I

IIII

IIIIi

1i

IIIIIii

STUDIES AND ANALYSES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE

Contract Number NASw-3737

Technical Report

CoveringSSME Failure Review, Diagnostics Survey, and SSME Diagnostic Evaluation

SUMMARY

Introduction

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently

has shown increased interest in condition monitoring and failure diagnostics

for the Space Shuttle program. This interest has been prompted primarily by

the need to reuse various Space Shuttle elements. NASA is emphasizing the

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) as a key candidate for condition monitoring

and diagnostics.

This study was initiated by NASA to (1) review the SSME failure data

base and identify major failure types, (2) survey a broad spectrum of diag-

nostics and identify promising candidates for use on the SSME, (3) conduct a

systems-level analysis of the SSME diagnostic system using the outputs of

Items 1 and 2 and (4) make recommendations concerning improvements in the SSME

diagnostic system.

This technical report covers the following tasks of this study:

• SSME Failure Data Review

• Diagnostics Survey

• SSME Diagnostic Evaluation (on-going).

SSME Failure Data Review

The first task of the SSME study was to develop an understanding of

the engine operating characteristics and failure modes. The task included

collection and reduction of data on SSME failure modes, categorization of the

failure modes, ranking of the failure modes, identification and evaluation of

measurable parameters for each failure mode and identification of parameters

for possible trending information.

2

The initial activity on this task was a review of the available SSME

failure data. The information used in this study included all of the 3-1ine

UCRs written from January 1980 through November 1983, selected full-page UCRs,

the Rocketdyne Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Report and the $SME

Accident/Incident Reports for 1980 through 1983.

Approximately 3000 abbreviated UCRs were reviewed in this task.

This number was reduced to about 2900 by an initial screening process. The

next step in the data reduction was to chart the failure modes over time to

see the effects of the recurrence control procedures, to combine like failure

modes and to eliminate minor problems which did not reappear in the data. The

final step in the UCR data reduction was to collect the significant full-page

UCRs and to review the detailed information. At the conclusion of these three

screening processes, 1440 of the original UCRs were remaining. These UCRs

represented approximately 190 engine failure modes. The reduced UCRs were

plotted versus failure type. The UCRs were also plotted as a function of the

individual SSME components.

The eight SSME Accident/Incident Reports written between January

1980 and December 1983 were reviewed along with the FMEA Report. The review

of the FMEA Report led to the development of fault tree diagrams for each of

the major components to augment available data on the failure modes and their

propagations. The test firing cutoff UCRs were also reviewed to determine the

diagnostic role of the current SSME sensors. A procedure was developed for

ranking the failure modes identified by the data collection and screening.

The failure modes were ranked from i to 10, with 1 being the most critical.

The measurements necessary to detect each failure mode were identi-

fied and evaluated. The several hundred failure modes for the entire engine

can be reduced to about fifteen types of failures. The possible measurable

parameters for each failure mode are evaluated along with possible in-flight

and between-flight sensors or diagnostic techniques.

The conclusions drawn from the SSME failure data review include:

• Turbopumps have the highest priority, but other components have

failure modes which must be considered

• Major accidents have had random failure modes and the commonly

recurring failure types generally have not been to blame

• Many failure modes presently are detected too late to implement

engine shutdown without sustaining further damage

I

|

I

II

III

IiiiI

I

III

i

3

• UCR data from test firings indicate that the present sensors can

be useful in reliably diagnosing many failure modes

• Several recently developed and novel sensors could be useful for

detection of critical failure modes, especially in the high-

pressure turbopumps

• Many fatigue or wear-related failures can be trended by informa-

tion from conventional sensors.

The recommendations resulting from the SSME failure data review

include:

• The design and development of an integrated diagnostic system

should be pursued (including in-flight and ground-based elements)

• SSME failure diagnosis could be improved by analysis of the data

being collected by the current conventional sensors coupled with

signal processing and enhancement

• Promising sensing techniques which target major engine failure

modes should undergo further development and testing.

Diagnostic Survey

A survey of the state of the art of machine diagnostics was

performed as the second task in the SSME study. The primary goal was to iden-

tify new diagnostic sensors, processing techniques, and/or diagnostic

approaches which might be applicable to the SSME. A secondary goal of this

task was to identify the overall status of machine diagnostics and the rela-

tive position of the SSME diagnostic system within this framework.

The diagnostic survey section of this report begins with a number of

definitions and other general information regarding the nature of machine

diagnostics. This terminology and discussion is necessary to provide a

foundation for organizing the survey data.

A high-level overview of the SSME diagnostic and maintenance system was

also prepared to identify the major elements of the current diagnostic

approach and the interactions between them. This information was used as the

basis for evaluating items identified during the diagnostic survey.

The survey covered the three rather broadly defined applications

areas of (1) diagnostics for liquid-fueled rocket engines, (2) diagnostics for

aircraft engines, and (3) diagnostics for relevant non-aerospace industries.

I

4

The survey involved interviews with experts in NASA, USAF, and a broad range

of industries. In addition, relevant Battelle experts were interviewed and a

thorough literature search was performed.

The review of liquid rocket engines found that the SSME represented

the state of the art in nearly all respects. This is not a startling conclu-

sion in view of the fact that the SSME is the only major engine development

program funded over the last 15-20 years. The SSME diagnostic system is also

more sophisticated than its predecessors due to the engine's design

attributes.

Aircraft engines and their associated diagnostic systems have

received far more attention than the liquid rocket engines. This can be

attributed to a number of factors including the military emphasis on weapon

availability, the civilian air carriers' desire to reduce costs, and the FAA's

mandate to assure safety and reliability. This particular portion of the

survey was especially informative.

The non-aerospace industry has been somewhat slow in recognizing the

potential of machine diagnostics. This position is probably influenced some-

what by the higher safety factors which can be utilized in non-aerospace

machinery. This situation is changing rapidly for a number of reasons. A

number of potentially relevant techniques such as expert systems and pattern

recognition ultimately may be proven first in this arena.

The survey findings can be summarized as follows:

• Diagnostics on liquid-fueled rocket engines other than the SSME

were found to contain no novel techniques

• Diagnostics on jet aircraft engines currently use a number of

novel techniques that are not employed on the SSME

• Diagnostics in non-aerospace industries employ the entire

spectrum of sensors and diagnostic techniques.

As a result of the survey findings, the following recommendations

were made:

• The use of new types of sensors and an increase in coverage pro-

vided by on-board sensors

• The use of image processing techniques to assist in ground-based

inspections

• The use of pattern recognition to improve on-board diagnostics

I

!

I

II

IIlIl

!iI

I

I

II

|I

• The application of non-linear filters for ground-based analysis

• The establishment of an integrated data base system to include

all engine performance/historical data.

i

I

I

I

II

i

Ii

I

II

i

I

i

SSME Diaqnostic Evaluation

The third task of the SSME study is intended to assimilate the out-

puts of the SSME failure data review and the diagnostics survey and to use

this information for evaluating the current SSME diagnostic system. The prin-

cipal objective of this task is to identify potential means for improving the

availability of high-quality, pertinent engine data. This information will be

used both in-flight and on the ground to assess the condition of the SSME and

its respective components.

To accomplish the objective outlined in the preceding paragraph, an

analysis approach was formulated to address the key SSME diagnostic issues.

These issues centered on maximizing the information yield from the current

engine sensors. A secondary emphasis was placed on the efficient augmentation

of this system in cases where major failure modes were not adequately covered

by existing sensors.

The Failure Information Propagation Model (FIPM) was selected as the

analysis tool for use in this task. The FIPM is a technique developed by the

Battelle Columbus Division to qualitatively evaluate the potential test points

in a system. The objective of this qualitative evaluation is to assess the

information bearing value of each test point. The model assumes that the

system being depicted is in a near-normal state of operation.

The high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) was selected as the

initial SSME component for evaluation using the FIPM. An HPOTP FIPM was

graphically constructed using the steps outlined in the SSME diagnostic evalu-

ation section of this report. Subsequent to the development of the HPOTP

FIPM, a preliminary analysis of the HPOTP failure information was performed

using a failure information matrix. This matrix was used to develop a pre-

liminary set of test signature equations for the HPOTP.

Subsequent efforts to specify a set of diagnostic sensors which

would target all of the high-priority HPOTP failure modes encountered diffi-

culty due to the need for additional data. A decision was reached to restruc-

ture the HPOTP FIPM to include the additional data needed, to adopt a more

!

6

formal development methodology, and to implement the new procedure in a data

base format.

The revised FIPM methodology has been completed and documentation

will be provided in a subsequent technical report. The software associated

with the FIPM data base is currently under development. The revised HPOTP

FIPM presently is being formulated in parallel with the development of the

FIPM data base software.

On-Goinq Research

A number of activities are currently in progress or planned in

connection with this study. The tasks include:

• Development of FIPM data base software

• Generation and loading of FIPM data for the HPOTP

• Generation and loading of FIPM data for the following SSME

components:

- high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP)

- low-pressure oxidizer turbopump (LPOTP)

- low-pressure fuel turbopump (LPFTP)

- oxidizer preburner (OPB)

- fuel preburner (FPB)

- main combustion chamber (MCC)

- heat exchanger (HE)

- main injector

- nozzle

• Assessment of candidate diagnostics

• Analysis of existing engine data

• Examination of on-board implications of SSME diagnostics

• Recommendations for diagnostic system development.

!III

lI

I

t

It

i!

Il

I

!IiiII

II

m

I,iII

II!II

IIII

I

III

INTRODUCTION

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently

has shown increased interest in condition monitoring and failure diagnostics

for the Space Shuttle program. This interest has been prompted primarily by

the need to reuse various Space Shuttle elements such as the Orbiter, Space

Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). The reuse of

these major hardware items has created additional requirements for acquisition

of valid wear and failure data on key Space Shuttle subsystems and components.

This information is needed to verify the proper functioning of the Space

Shuttle during its mission as well as to evaluate the maintenance required

between flights. The principal NASA goals for improved monitoring and

diagnostic systems are increased Space Shuttle reliability and safety coupled

with reduced maintenance and turnaround costs.

NASA is exploring the entire spectrum of monitoring and diagnostic

techniques for potential application to the Space Shuttle program. Research

is being conducted in the areas of instrumentation, data acquisition, data

analysis, automated decision making, and automated record keeping. Several

NASA field centers and a number of contractors are currently involved in these

evaluations. Since diagnostics, as a science, is still in the early stages of

development, much of this work is very fundamental and exploratory in nature.

However, with recent technological gains in the field of electronics, specifi-

cally microprocessors and computers, the capability of performing comprehen-

sive diagnostics and condition monitoring tasks is now limited primarily by

the availability and reliability of the appropriate transducers, and by the

ability to understand and interpret the data being collected.

NASA is emphasizing the SSME as a key candidate for condition moni-

toring and diagnostics. The need for additional SSME data is the direct

result of the engine's vital role during Space Shuttle launch and ascent. The

ability to monitor, diagnose, and control degradations or failures of an

operating engine is very important to both crew safety and mission success.

It is also desirable to obtain an accurate assessment of the engine's overall

condition after completion of the firing cycle. Decisions concerning an

engine's suitability for a subsequent mission and the extent of any post-

flight maintenance or repairs require detailed data on major engine com-

ponents. Information on engine condition both during and after firing is

I

8

equally important for ground test operations. However, the goal of accurately

monitoring and diagnosing conditions in the SSME is complicated by a number of

factors including the general engine design which maximizes performance while

minimizing size and weight, the severe thermal and acoustic environments dur-

ing engine operation, the reactivity and other properties of the liquid oxygen

and liquid hydrogen propellants, and the extremely small time constants asso-

ciated with major degradations and failures.

This study was initiated by NASA to (1) review the SSME failure data

base and identify major failure types requiring diagnostic monitoring,

(2) survey a broad spectrum of diagnostic sensors and processing techniques

and identify promising candidates for application to the SSME, (3) conduct a

systems-level analysis of the current SSME diagnostic system using the outputs

from Items 1 and 2, and (4) make recommendations concerning improvements in

the SSME diagnostic system and approach.

The task reports presented here cover three efforts to provide NASA

with information to determine the major SSME failures, means to detect indi-

cations of failures in time to take appropriate actions, and ways to evaluate

the need for and usefulness of those means.

The task reports accordingly cover and are entitled:

• SSME Failure Data Review

• Diagnostics Survey

• SSME Diagnostic Evaluation.

The SSME failure data review has been completed from the standpoint

that the data from January 1980 to November 1983 has been collected and

analyzed for use in the diagnostic evaluation and other areas. The diag-

nostics survey has similarly been completed, with the information being

incorporated in the diagnostic evaluation as well as providing a background

for other work. The SSME diagnostic evaluation is being performed using

Battelle's Failure Information Propagation Model which is described in the

third section of this report. The FIPM process will rely heavily on the data

collected and assessed in the first two tasks. Detailed results from the FIPM

are only now being realized, and these are to be presented in a separate

report.

i

Ii

II

Ii

I

II

I

II

II

Ii

I

IIIII

Ii!IIIIIIIIII

9

SSME FAILURE DATA REVIEW

The first task of the SSME study was to develop an understanding of

the engine operating characteristics and failure modes. The task included

collection and reduction of data on SSME failure modes, categorization of the

failure modes, ranking of the failure modes, identification and evaluation of

measurable parameters for each failure mode, and identification of parameters

for possible trending information. This information is necessary to evaluate

the effectiveness of diagnostic monitoring systems.

Failure Modes Analysis

Data Collection

Most of the data necessary for the failure modes analysis was sup-

plied by the Rocketdyne Division, Rockwell International Corporation, Canoga

Park, CA. The main source of information was the Unsatisfactory Condition

Reports (UCRs). Since there were many UCRs written and Rocketdyne's previous

study had included UCR information through 1979, it was decided in the present

study to review all UCRs in a three-line format from January 1980 through

November 1983. After the preliminary data reduction had taken place, selected

full-page UCRs were collected for review. Other supplemental information

received from Rocketdyne included the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

(FMEA) Report and Accident/Incident Reports for 1980 through 1983.

To provide Battelle personnel with additional information, engine

data from a recent test firing and a Shuttle flight were obtained from NASA

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) along with general information on the SSME

program. A diagnostics overview presentation was given by NASA Lewis Research

Center (LeRC) personnel along with other general information needed to educate

the Battelle researchers about various aspects of the SSME program. Informa-

tion was also obtained from Rocketdyne personnel at NASA Kennedy Space Center

(KSC) with regard to maintenance procedure and history.

I

10

UCR Review

To identify the SSME failure modes and their relative importance,

all three-line UCRs written from January 1980 through November 1983 were

reviewed and categorized. Approximately 3000 UCRs were used in the review

process. Each UCR had a criticality factor associated with it which ranged

from one to three, one being the most dangerous. The only UCRs that were

eliminated on the basis of their low criticality factor were those that had

criticality N, or no criticality factor. These were very minor problems for

which a UCR should not necessarily have been written. Some UCRs of criti-

cality three were eliminated because the problem described could not possibly

cause any failures. Examples of this type include UCRs written on normal dis-

colorations of the main combustion chamber or small contaminants on the nozzle

that could not affect engine performance. Approximately 2900 UCRs were

included in the first-cut review.

Appendix A contains the listing of the UCRs and their criticalities

by component and a sample of the listing is shown in Figure 1. The high-

pressure fuel turbopump had the most UCRs followed by the high-pressure

oxidizer turbopump and the nozzle, respectively. The high-pressure oxidizer

turbopump had the most criticality one UCRs, followed by the main injector,

heat exchanger, and high-pressure fuel turbopump, in that order.

TotalNo. of CRITICALITY

Component Descriptlon UCR'S I 2 3 N*

AI00 Hot Gas Manifold 80 2 77 I

A150 Heat Exchanger 18 4 12 2

A200 Main Injector 175 5 3 162 5

A330 Main Combustion Chamber 105 I 3 98 3

A340 Nozzle 296 2 285 g

A600 Fuel Preburner 171 2 165 4

ATO0 Oxidizer Preburner 13 13

B200 High Pressure Fuel Turbopump 457 3 11 429 14

8400 High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump 331 7 11 302 11

FIGURE 1. SAMPLE OF FIRST UCR REVIEW LISTING BY COMPONENT

I

I

II

1

|I

II

I

Ii

III

II

I

I

I

I

il

I

I

I

I

I

iIII

I

IIt

1

11

Appendix B contains a breakdown of the failure modes, cause, and

recurrence control for each component. A sample of these tables is given in

Figure 2. There were literally hundreds of failure modes identified, many

having several causes. A large percentage of the problems were assembly or

manufacturing problems. Most listed design, assembly, or manufacturing

changes to correct the problems.

The next step in data reduction was to chart the failure modes over

time to see whether the recurrence control procedures had remedied the prob-

lems. Also, the failure mode listings were revised to combine like failure

modes and to eliminate those that were minor, had occurred only once or twice,

and where the corrective action showed that there were no recurrences. Appen-

dix C contains the results of this review and a sample is shown in Figure 3.

After this step, the number of UCRs remaining was approximately 1900 from the

original 3000 reviewed including 260 failure modes.

Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalityID Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

Leak(a) Pin Plug Leak--Inadequate Seal--Add

Leak Test I(b) Wireway Leak--Epoxy Did Not Adhere--

Process Change 3(c) Internal Leak--Tolerance Stackup--

Detectable in Test 2(d) Hyd Oil Leak--Excessive Proof Test

Cycling--None 2(e) Static Seal Leak--Burr Induced Scratch--

New Inspection I

(f) Vent Port Leak--Defective O-Ring--Open 2(g) Wireway Leak--Inadequate Epoxy Coverage--

Spec. Change 2

2 Hydraulic Lockup Orift--Mfg. Error--Detectable--None S 5

3 Slew Rate Error--Contamination--None 2 2

FIGURE 2. SAMPLES OF FIRST UCR REVIEW FAILURE MODE TABLES

I

12

I

IC_.0-6O0 1980Failure I-6 7-12

1

3

4a I 2

4c

5 2

lime Period (Months)1981 1982

1-6 7-12 1-6 7-12

1

1

19831-6 7-12

Crltlcallt@I 2 3

-- • -- 1

.... 4

.... I

-- 2 --

Description - CauseResolution

Low insulation resistance-damage@ fabrication-none

Broken wire-suspect thermalinduced-thermal test revised

Output failure-unknown-none

Erratic output-suspect sensor nutvariations-evaluation

Open circuit, encapsulementcracks-assembly-assy, change

I

I!

!m

FIGURE 3. SAMPLE OF SECOND-CUT UCR TABLES

The final step in the UCR data reduction was to collect the signifi-

cant full-page UCRs and review the detailed information. At least one full-

page UCR was requested from Rocketdyne for each failure mode identified. As a

result of this step, several more failure modes were eliminated because they

were minor problems of an aesthetic nature or were items which quality control

and/or engine pretesting would eliminate. Some failure mode descriptions were

modified using the more detailed information in the full-page UCRs. The full-

page UCRs also provided more information as to the severity of the failure

mode for use in the ranking of the failure modes. At the conclusion of the

full-page UCR review, some failure modes were found to be similar enough to be

grouped together. With some of the failure modes being eliminated, there were

1440 of the original 3000 UCRs and approximately 190 failure modes.

m

I

m

mII

Im

Iim

I

i

I

l

I

I

I

!

!

i

I

I

!

I

!

!

I

13

Many of the failure modes in the UCR review were of an infrequent

nature and were the result of assembly, procedure, or repair mistakes. Only a

few of the failures were recurrent in nature and posed an important safety

risk. (Among these were turbopump bearing wear, turbine blade cracking,

nozzle leaks, injector erosion, and sensor system failures.)

The failure modes were then placed Into fifteen categories and tabu-

lated for each component. This categorization resulted in a matrix which

forms Appendix D. Figure 4 gives one dimension of the matrix, the number of

UCRs versus failure type after the completed screening process. Cracking,

usually caused by vibration or thermally induced fatigue, was shown to be the

dominant failure type followed by various leakage problems. Most of the leak-

age UCRs were written on the nozzle coolant tubes which are mainly a time con-

suming maintenance item. The electrical problems mostly related to the

sensors and their associated wiring. Contamination was a significant problem

and was found on many of the components; it was usually caused by assembly

errors and some contamination could precipitate many other failures depending

upon the type of contaminant and location involved. Erosion was mainly a

problem in the high temperature areas such as the injectors, turbines, and

igniters. Wear was typically a problem for the high-pressure oxidizer turbo-

pump bearings and this has been a continuing problem on the SSME. Torque,

vibration, and excess travel problems are measurements made on the turbopumps

to check for problems before they lead to catastrophic failure. The rest of

the categories are not indicative of any particular component of the SSME.

Figure 5 shows the number of UCRs versus individual $SME components.

The dominance of the two high-pressure turbopumps along with the disparity

between the preburners are the most striking features in the graph. A

detailed listing of the failure types and causes for each component Is located

in Appendix E.

A brief description of the failure modes and general problems

for most of the major components follows:

High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) - The turbine area of the HPFTP

is subjected to higher temperature and pressure than the other

turbopumps in the SSME and consequently has more problems. Erosion

and fatigue cracking were the subject of many UCRs for the turbine

blades, turbine sheetmetal, and preburner to turbine joint area.

i

300

250

200

iso

!I00

5O

3OO

i 200

i00

14

I

I

m

4_

FAILURE TYPE

1

II

FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF UCRS BY FAILURE TYPE

I

I

- !m

- I

l-1 lr il_ 7_TPlFIril-!_mz

Z

_ENTS I

FIGURE 5. NUMBER OF UCRS BY COMPONENT

I

I

i

g

I

!I

Ii

!!!

I!

!!

I

!!

!

15

The pump inlet and diffuser had a few failures along with some minor

bearing problems. Seal leakage and rubbing has been more of a prob-

lem than in the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump. Vibration due to

cavitation and possible near resonance vibration conditions have

been the subject of several UCRs.

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) - Bearing problems have

been a major source of UCRs for the HPOTP including severe vibration

levels during testing as well as bearing ball and race wear. Bear-

ing cage delamination has also occurred several times. Turbine

blade cracking and erosion has been a lesser problem on this turbo-

pump than for the fuel turbopump. Contamination and erosion of the

turbine area is also a concern. Turbine area rubbing and minor

sheetmetal cracking have also been reported.

Nozzle - Unlike the rotating machinery, the nozzle has only a few

problems. Cracking and leakage in the small nozzle coolant tubes

that line the inside of the nozzle are the most common source of

UCRs. Nozzle coolant tube leakage is caused by vibration fatigue,

thermal fatigue, and brazing anomalies in assembly or repair. While

these leaks are usually a nuisance item, the nozzle has been the

source of at least one catastrophic failure. A steerhorn rupture

caused by the use of incorrect weld wire during fabrication

destroyed an engine on the National Space Technology Laboratories

(NSTL) test stand.

Sensors and Electrical Harnesses - Sensor or sensor output failures

were a frequent problem and are to be expected in view of the envi-

ronmental extremes associated with the SSME. Typically, temperature

and pressure sensors had the highest failure rate. Sensor relia-

bility is an extremely important factor in designing an on-board

diagnostic system. To date, the only specific action taken with

respect to a postflight data review is to replace faulty sensors or

sensor cabling.

i

16

Fuel Preburner (FPB), Oxidizer Preburner (OPB), and Main Injector -

All three of these components have similar problems even though the

fuel preburner dominates the number of UCRs. This is probably due

to the higher temperature and pressure in the FPB. Erosion and

cracking of the LOX posts and injector faceplates are the most fre-

quent subject of the UCRs on the injectors. Vibration, temperature,

and nonconcentricity of the LOX posts are the primary causes of

injector failures.

Hot-Gas Manifold (HGM) - Cracking and rupture of ducting was the

primary failure mode and this is caused by vibration loading or

assembly error. Leakage at the joints along with loose fasteners

which could cause leakage was also a problem.

Main Combustion Chamber (MCC) - Most of the UCRs were written for

erosion or cracking on the hot-gas wall of the MCC. Low-pressure

fuel turbine drive manifold leaks were the only major failure occur-

rences for this component.

Heat Exchanger (HE) - There were few UCRs written for the heat

exchanger, probably because of the extreme precautions taken during

assembly. Small leaks of oxygen from the HE would be catastrophic,

so even minor tolerance and clearance discrepanices were reported in

UCRs.

Low-Pressure Turbopumps (LPFTP) and (LPOTP) - These had problems

similar to those for the high-pressure turbopumps, but they were

minor in nature and much less frequent.

Valves and Actuators - Leaks were the common thread throughout the

UCRs on these components. Internal leakage and ball seal leakage

occurred in various valves and actuators. Also, valves did not

function properly due to contaminants or a noisy or erratic position

transducer signal.

Igniter - The igniter UCRs usually dealt with either the electrical

connection or tip erosion failures.

I

III

I

IIi

II

II

I

IIliI

iL

I

II

I

II

II

III

I

I

II

I

17

Fuel Line, Oxidizer Line, and Drain Line Ducts - Joint problems and

joint leakage were the focus of most of these UCRs. Weld and seal

cracks also occurred.

Gimbal - Wear of the gimbal and cracks in the bushing were the two

failure modes which caused UCRs to be written for the gimbal.

SSME Accident/Incident Reports Review

Major failures of the SSME or its components are subjected to a

rigorous review with the results summarized in Accident/Incident Reports. The

eight reports written between January 1980 and December 1983 were reviewed for

failure mode information and the value of present instrumentation for failure

detection. Summaries of the individual reports are contained in Appendix F.

During this four-year period, there were no duplications of any of

these major failures. This indicates the complexity of the $SME and the

degree of randomness involved in the failures. The nonrepetitiveness of the

failures is also influenced by the detailed analysis of the incidents and the

corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence.

Certain reports showed that human error in the SSME fabrication and

assembly cannot totally be eliminated. The use of the wrong weld wire on the

steerhorn portion of the nozzle caused a catastrophic failure and a welding

mistake on the heat exchanger coil could have destroyed an engine or worse had

it gone undetected. The UCR data reviewed has shown that human error in

fabrication, assembly, and repair has been a constant source of problems.

Most of the catastrophic failures occurred on test stands after the

instrumentation had indicated an unsafe condition and shutdown procedures had

been started. In these cases, the time between detection of the measured

failure condition and the consequent engine destruction was much shorter than

the time to safely shut down the engine. To correctly and safely shut down

the SSME, deteriorating conditions must be detected earlier than is presently

being done. Because of the random causes of these major failures, the diag-

nostic system design should include as many of the engine parameters as is

economically and technically possible.

18

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Report Review

The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Report prepared by

Rocketdyne was reviewed to evaluate failure'modes to help in ranking them.

Although it was some help for major failure types and valve procedure prob-

lems, the FMEA Report did not contain a sufficiently thorough analysis of the

failure modes and their propagation paths.

Fault tree diagrams are very helpful in charting failure modes and

their effects on the engine. Figure 6 shows an example of such a diagram for

the hot-gas manifold. Appendix G contains fault tree diagrams for each of the

major components. The diagrams provided in this report are not at a detailed

piece-part level, but at the level shown, they can help with two major tasks.

They show the cause and effect of particular failure modes in a simple graphi-

cal fashion which determines their relevant importance and provides a means

for diagnosis. Another important aspect of the fault tree diagram is that

they allow the representation of failure propagation times for each step in

the failure process, and this is important in structuring a diagnostic system,

as indicated below.

FIGURE 6. FAULT TREE DIAGRAM FOR HOT-GAS MANIFOLD

I

II

II

III

II

I

II

lI

IIl

I

19

Because the time between the duct rupturing and engine fire

(Figure 6) could be practially instantaneous, detection of such ruptures is

too late for shutdown and would not be an effective diagnostic measurement.

The diagram shows that cracking preceeds rupturing of the duct and may be

detectable for many seconds before rupture occurs. If the failure could be

detected at this level, the engine could be safely shut down and repaired. To

detect all the causes of cracking, however, might take a prohibitive amount of

time and be very costly.

In many cases, the most desired failure mode to detect may be

realistically undetectable because of the advanced level of technology needed

or because the environment within the engine would preclude measurement. In

these cases, ground inspection techniques for the failure modes may be

necessary. The fault tree diagram can be used to check the completeness of

the diagnostic system. If the system checks for cracking of the ducts, but

fails to detect loose bolts, the diagram in Figure 6 indicates that an engine

fire would still be a possibility. Thus, if a particular failure mode propa-

gates very quickly and there is presently no method for detection, then it may

be cost effective to develop an appropriate sensor.

To conclude, the FMEA report should be greatly expanded with inputs

from the Rocketdyne design groups for each particular component by assessing

the thermal and vibration environment in conjunction with the design

parameters.

Test Firinq Cutoff UCRs Review

The UCRs that resulted from test firing cutoffs (shutdowns) from

early 1975 through late 1983 were reviewed to assist in determining the use-

fulness of the present sensors on the SSME for the design of a diagnostic sys-

tem. Even though the sensors produced a significant number of improper cut-

offs, as shown in the tables in Appendix H, there were also many shutdowns

that were due to valid measurements. These shutdowns were usually due to

simple signal-level-activated commands. However, several catastrophic

failures occurred after some safety limits ("red lines") had been exceeded but

before shutdown could be completed.

20

Figure 7 is an exampleof the tables of the reduced UCRdata. The

data are organized by the measurementthat caused shutdown. The year ofoccurrence, the numberof improper cutoffs, the criticality of the UCR, theplace they occurred, and the determined cause and action taken are included inthe table. If there was a valid reason for the measurementto have exceeded

the appropriate "red line" level, it was not an improper cutoff. Of over 255test firing cutoffs, 41 (16 percent) were the fault of the test facility or

the controller; 130 (51 percent) of the UCRs involved cutoffs for validreasons.

This does not, however, meanthat a similar event would result in an

engine shutdownduring flight. The importance of engine power output to thesafety of a flight is such that manyundesirable conditions would be accepted,but the basis for an overall diagnostic system may well reside with these

previously used basic sensors. Other activities, moreover, will be required

to adapt these sensors. For example, signal processing techniques, such asfrequency domain and trend analysis, may be utilized to locate specific

failures. Outputs from several sensors may indicate a unique failure mode(pattern recognition). Downstreamand upstream sensors can be used to vali-

date sensor output to improve the reliability of any diagnosis. Someof these

techniques can be used for prognostic monitoring, and with the inclusion of aground-based data acquisition and maintenance computer system, the results can

be in the maintenance personnel's hands before the Shuttle returns. Such an

"expert system" would be too slow for on-board diagnosis using today's com-puter technology, but maybecomea viable on-board tool in the future.

For the most part, fast-propagating and high-criticality failure

modesare key targets for any on-board diagnostic or shutdowndecisions. Thepresent sensors should be helpful, but optimized placement of these sensors

may be necessary. Also, knowledge of the background signal levels andexpected signal levels of the failure modesis important.

Failure Mode Ranking

To assess the importance of each failure mode to the design of a

diagnostic monitoring system, a procedure for ranking the failure modes was

developed. Three factors were given equal weighting for the ranking:

III

II

III

II

I

Il

II

lI

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

I

I

|I

II

I

II

[

==

..)

21 c

- o

c'_ _ ,,, o ,_ -

i ! "_"°_--_ - _ _; _ i-_

3_ "O O

_= _

"_-= gt [= " "_g'| c= =,- __. .;_,=

_'-_- i _-_!

P- r" I -"I - - " "_ "_"

-t"

-- r" -_"

-_-

- _ - I

g !".=o o _ _o .-o

= = _. _ - _ = -

w.-I

IJJ

t_J

¢11

-=

IJ--L_

Z

IJ.

IJJ}--

L,

tJJ

3'<

IJJ

IS.

I

22

Cost Factor - estimated cost per year of the failure

after subtracting the cost that diagnostics

could not eliminate

Risk Factor - based on the criticality factor

Time Factor - estimated time for failure mode to

propagate to a catastrophic failure

A detailed explanation of the ranking procedure is in Appendix I along with

the tabulated results. The failure modes are ranked in categories of import-

ance from 1 to 10, with 1 being the most critical and 10 the least.

Failure modes in Categories 1 through 5, listed in Table 1, are most

important and must be considered in the design of an on-board diagnostic

system. In Categories 6 through 10, some failure modes may still be economi-

cally included in an on-board system although they are not ranked very high.

Their inclusion should depend on the additional cost involved to detect each

failure mode. Due to economic and technical considerations, some highly-rated

failure modes may be impossible to include in an on-board system in the near

future, but they are important areas for research and development of either

in-flight or ground-based detection methods.

Measurement Parameter Analysis

Once the importance of the failure modes to the design of a diag-

nostic system has been evaluated, the measurements that can detect each

failure mode must be identified and evaluated. To evaluate the measurement

parameters, certain factors must be assessed such as signal level, background

noise, existence of commercially available transducers, feasibility of devel-

oping special transducers, and the information necessary to uniquely identify

the failure modes.

Signal level and background noise can only be roughly evaluated by

experience and engineering judgment. An important step in evaluating signal

levels quantitatively is to review the real-time data recordings of test stand

and flight engine firings. Analyzing the real-time analog data should provide

enough information to assess signal and noise levels, and may also indicate

signal processing enhancements that would discriminate particular failure

occurrences.

III

II

III

II

I

II

II

II

II

I

I

I

23

TABLE i. FAILURE MODE RANKING RESULTS FOR RANK 5 OR ABOVE

IRANK COMPONENT FAILURE MODE

HPOTP Vibration - bearing loading

I

II

lI

II

II

I

I

2

3

4

Heat Exchanger

Hot-Gas ManifoldHot-Gas Manifold

Main InjectorHPOTP

MCCHPFTP

Sensors

Nozzle

Fuel Preburner

HPFTPHPFTP

HPFTP

Ball Valves

Poppet ValvesSensors

Main InjectorFuel Preburner

Fuel Preburner

Fuel PreburnerHPFTP

HPFTP

HPFTPHPFTP

HPOTP

HPOTP

Check Valves

IgniterElectrical Harnesses

Electrical HarnessesElectrical Harnesses

Duct Seals

HPOTP

Cracks, leak in coil

Cracks, rupture in duct

Leak in MCC ignition jointASI supply line cracks

Bearing ball and race wear

Turbine drive manifold leak

G-5 joint erosion

Temp. and press, output failuresSteerhorn rupture

Faceplate erosionDiffuser failureInlet failure

Missing shield nuts

Ball seal leak and ball meltingCracked poppet

Temperature sensor debonding

Heat shield retainer cracks

Baffle and LOX post erosionBaffle, molyshield, and liner cracks

Missing/extra support pins

Turbine blade and platform erosionSeal cracking

Coolie cap nut crackingBroken turbine bladesTurbine blade cracks

Bearing cage delaminationCheck valve leaks

Igniter tip erosionBirdcaged harness

Loose, defective connector

Debonded torque lockSeal damageVibration level - cavitation

I

II

I

24

With reference to Figure 4, the several hundred failure modes for

the entire engine can be reduced to about fifteen failure types. In parti-

cular leaks and cracks are by far the most common failure type among all the

failure modes. Each failure type has a unique signature, but since many

failure modes have the same failure type, it may be difficult to identify a

particular failure mode. A brief description of each failure type, the nature

of the signal produced, and the possibility of identifying individual failure

modes follows:

Leaks - Leakage of a liquid or gas from the system, or from one com-

ponent to another within the system, can occur in several ways. It

may be due to a crack in a structure, a bad seal, or possibly a mal-

functioning valve. Presently, leaks are detected between flights by

pressurizing the system with helium. The signals produced by leak-

age for possible in-flight detection are sound, vibration, optical,

and possibly, in some cases, temperature or engine performance. In

most cases, the sound and vibration signals will be low when com-

pared to the background noise, probably even at ultrasonic frequen-

cies (acoustic emission frequencies). An acoustic emission method

for leak detection would moreover require many transducers to detect

all the possible places that leaks can occur even if selected as a

between-flight method of leak detection. Optical methods such as

holographic leak detection are still in the developmental stages and

also have resolution problems in detecting small leaks and are more-

over only applicable where easy access is possible (e.g., for

external leakage). In many cases, indirect measurements such as

temperature, flow, or pressure may infer leakage. For example,

leakage of hot gas into coolant passages could be detected by

temperature measurements. Also if the leakage is severe enough, it

will affect the downstream pressure and flow.

Cracks - Cracking of a structure is usually caused by mechanical or

thermal loading which can eventually lead to failure of the struc-

ture with possible secondary effects such as fluid leakage. One

present method of detecting cracking is by measuring the acoustic

signal in the structure's material caused by the energy released

through the cracking phenomena. These signals are detected by

acoustic emission transducers at a frequency dependent upon

I

I

I

I

I

II

II

II

I

II

III

II

I!

I

I!

II

!!!

!!

!

II

!I

I

25

material properties. High background noise, however, may be a prob-

lem in the application of this technique to many parts of the $SME.

Other detection methods include magnetic, electric potential, and

mechanical impedance methods. When the cracking leads to other

problems, detection of these failure modes may be easier. But,

since these are secondary effects, catastrophic failure of a com-

ponent may be imminent, and the ability to shut down the $SME with

minimal damage at this point may be impossible. Nevertheless, pre-

dicting cracking by trending vibration and temperature data should

be useful in monitoring structural fatigue life.

Erosion - Erosion of surfaces usually occurs in the hot-gas turbine

sections of turbopumps and in injectors. In the case of injectors,

local hot spots may indicate erosion. In the case of both turbine

and injector erosion, the performance of the turbopump and down-

stream components will directly be affected and should give rise to

indicative measurements. Temperature trending of these components

may be the most useful measurement possible in flight. Detection of

ablated particles or, more likely, surface wear is possible in the

case of erosion. Isotope wear detection, presently being developed

by Rocketdyne, is considered to have the best chance of success for

erosion detection.

Wear - Wear is caused by surface friction on a component due to

mechanical contact or flow impingement. Erosion is a special case

of wear, but it has been considered in a separate category of its

own. Wear was considered, in this study, to result from mechanical

contact between components with relative motion. Wear in the $SME

generally occurs in the rotating machinery, e.g. the turbopumps.

Bearings are the most critical parts affected by wear, followed by

seals. Rubbing usually causes vibration, and in many cases the

nature of the vibration signal can be used to identify which parts

are involved. For example, seal rubbing may involve some RPM

related vibration as well as indirect measurements such as reduced

shaft RPM and torque. Wear is usually detected at high frequencies

where the ambient noise is relatively low. More accurate measure-

ments may be made by isotope wear detection (but not for pitting),

!

26

magnetic wear detection, or ultrasonic doppler transducer. Magnetic

wear detection measures the ball passage frequency. Ultrasonic

doppler transducers can detect the shaft vibration, and should be

more sensitive to bearing wear than vibration of the housing.

Detection of worn particles or surface wear is also possible, as in

the case of erosion. Isotope wear shows the most promise in this

category. All these wear detection methods, moreover, are nonintru-

sive. Another possible wear measurement device, the fiberoptic

deflectometer, however, would be intrusive.

Dings, Dents, and Damage - This is a general category that usually

relates to debris impacting a part of the SSME. This can usually be

detected by vibration sensors as a high-energy impulse signal.

Electrical - Electrical problems is this study relate to sensors,

sensor cabling, and electrical connections. Many systems presently

can self-check for continuity and other transducers can be used to

verify the validity of a sensor's output (analytic redundancy),

rather than using multiple sensor redundancy to increase sensor

reliability.

Contamination - Contamination is a broad category of foreign depo-

sits or objects present in a component. In most cases there is

little or no effect, but problems such as reduced coolant flow

through passages and impaired valve operation can occur. The

effects of contamination can manifest themselves in different ways,

but temperature, flow, and pressure measurements generally provide a

good indication of a serious contamination problem.

Delamination and Broken Parts - These failure types are further

extensions of cracking and several other failure types previously

discussed. When a part fails structurally, the vibration signal

will increase dramatically in most cases, but catastrophic failure

of the engine may also be imminent.

Loose Parts - This cateogry usually refers to connections involving

bolts or other fasteners. The possibilities for detection include

increased vibration levels, an optical method, and measurement of

torque on the bolt.

I

III

III

i

Ii

Ii

I

III

II!

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

27

Missing/Extra Parts - This failure type is usually a problem with

stud keys or other small parts that are installed in large quanti-

ties. Inspection and verification during assembly or between

firings is the only way to directly detect missing or extra parts.

One verification method might involve accurately weighing subcom-

ponents before final assembly. Missing/extra parts may also result

in another failure type that may be detected in flight, e.g. loose

bolts.

Torque, Vibration, and Excess Travel - These measurements have all

been used as criteria for assessing turbopump condition. All three

have the potential for being performed in flight and could be used

in combination to adequately evaluate turbopump condition.

Tolerance - Tolerance problems can possibly be detected in flight by

optical methods, but ground inspection is usually required. Optical

methods for enhancing ground-based inspection of injector parts

could possibly save time, but these techniques will need extensive

development.

Information on potentially useful transducers for detecting particu-

lar failure modes came from several sources including the diagnostic survey

conducted as part of this study, the Rocketdyne Reusable Rocket Engine Main-

tenance Study, Final Report, and Battelle's past experience. Detailed des-

criptions of several promising sensors and diagnostic techniques are included

in this section's recommendations or in the section covering the diagnostic

survey.

To evaluate diagnostics for detection of particular failure modes, a

Battelle developed tool, the Failure Information Propagation Model (FIPM), has

been used and is described in detail in a subsequent section of this report.

This tool can be used to evaluate the information at a transducer location and

to assess the ability of the entire transducer set to identify engine failure

modes.

The results of the measurement parameter analysis for each compoent

are described in tabular form in Appendix J. A sample table of results is

shown in Figure 8. The failure modes, their causes, rankings, and effects are

listed in the tables. The possible measurable parameters for each failure

I

e-

|O

ccJ

_E

_r

E

U

w

C

C iX

28

_ C i_ m e m

v

_v v_

vvvvv_A

f: ¢_ vvOv ,_.

e-

e-

"10

|

•-_ e- I

I_e- o

"o

_ _ o

_ ov Iu_

_ E

v_ v

vcu _ e, e-v

o

E

cu o

IU I

_,

0 I I I

3

e. o

|-_

0

w,_1

j--

w

I--zw

u_

w,,.1

xw

hJ

[1

III

II

II

iI

II

II

I

III

Ii

I

I

II

I

II

III

II

I

II

II

I

29

mode are listed along with possible in-flight and between-flight sensors or

techniques. Additional comments are also supplied to indicate relative

strengths and weaknesses of the measurement techniques.

For most failures, the possibility exists to trend or detect their

occurrence with conventional transducers that are already being used on the

SSME. The problem is that current engine transducers may not be strategically

located for detection of many of these failures. Knowledge of the signal con-

tent is also insufficient to differentiate between the many possible failure

modes detectable by a given transducer. There are also some transducing

methods that need development, but which have excellent promise for detecting

failure modes which are undetectable by conventional methods.

The use of sensor data for failure trending could reduce the amount

of between-flight inspections. Any failure mode that involves a slow degrada-

tion or fatigue type of failure could be trended. Detailed descriptions of

measurements that can be used for trending particular failure modes are

included in the measurement parameter tables in Appendix J. Many fatigue

failures in the turbopumps and other components can be trended with mechanical

and thermal load history information obtained by accelerometers, other vibra-

tion transducers, and temperature sensors. Injector and hot-gas component

erosion can be trended with temperature measurements and, in some cases, pres-

sure measurements.

Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from the failure modes and measurement para-

meter analyses are:

• Turbopumps have the highest priority for in-flight monitoring,

but many other components also have high-ranking failure modes

which must be considered.

• Major accident failure modes have been random in nature and the

commonly recurring failure modes generally have not been to

blame. Many of the major accidents were due to either assembly,

manufacturing, or design problems which must be considered in the

development of a diagnostic system.

I

30

• Presently, many failure modes are detected too late to safely

shut down the SSME with minimal damage. The propagation rate of

many failure modes provides an extreme challenge in designing an

effective diagnostic system.

• Test firing cutoff UCR data reveal that the present sensors can

be valuable for reliably diagnosing many failure modes. This

could and should be achieved with proper signal processing, pat-

tern recognition (unique combination of sensor outputs), analy-

tical redundancy (correlate outputs from upstream and downstream

sensors), and development of more rugged sensors and cabling.

• Some recently developed and novel sensors could be useful for

detection of critical failure modes, especially in the high-speed

turbopumps. Some of these can target key failure modes that may

be masked from conventional sensors. They are described in the

diagnostic survey discussion or in this section's recommen-

dations. In many cases, there will be a great deal of develop-

ment required before these new sensors are flight ready. The

most immediate gains may be made by improving the use of the

present sensors.

• Many slow-developing fatigue or wear related failures can be

trended by information from conventional sensors, both to predict

eventual failure and to reduce the amount of between-flight

inspections. Such applications are possible for many turbopump

and injector failure modes.

Recommendations

Diagnostic monitoring of the SSME can be improved by better use of

present instrumentation, installation of more conventional sensors, and use of

some recently developed sensing techniques which target specific failure

modes. Three important steps for improving flight safety and maintenance

costs are:

• Design of an integrated diagnostic system including both

in-flight monitoring and ground inspection and maintenance.

III

II

III

II

I

II

II

III

I

i

I

II

II

I

III

II

I

II

II

I

31

• Improving failure diagnosis with conventional sensors by analysis

of present flight and test firing data as well as assessment of

signal processing and enhancement techniques to identify failure

modes.

• Further development and testing of promising sensing techniques

which target costly and hazardous failure modes that are diffi-

cult to detect with conventional sensors.

To design an effective diagnostic system for reduction of mainten-

ance costs, turnaround time, and catastrophic failure risk; failure informa-

tion in the entire SSME must be evaluated. The Failure Information Propaga-

tion Model (FIPM) is being used to evaluate failure information for all possi-

ble failure modes on the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump and assess sensing

opportunities at various locations in the turbopump. Once the FIPM is com-

pleted for all components, a qualitative evaluation of a complete SSME diag-

nostic system can be made. The FIPM will help determine how better to use

conventional and advanced technology sensors for in-flight monitoring and

trending of information in conjunction with necessary ground inspections. An

important aspect in the design of the complete diagnostic system is to incor-

porate an effective computerized information system for data processing and

retrieval. Such a system would give maintenance personnel the relevant infor-

mation to quickly assess and complete between-flight inspection and main-

tenance and would also be adaptable to incorporate new diagnostic

developments.

There are many opportunities to improve the capabilities of the pre-

sent sensor set as well as possible additional conventional sensors. The key

to developing the use of these sensors is analyze the recorded analog flight

and test firing data. By looking at the full bandwidth of the sensors, com-

bining various sensor outputs, and correlating the signals with the known

failure occurrences, diagnosis of many failure modes may be improved. Also,

the FIPM can be useful in identifying possible applications for the present

sensors and situations where additional conventional sensors would be helpful.

The reliability problems of the present conventional sensors can be attacked

by technological gains in hardening the sensors and through analytical

redundancy in checking the validity of the sensor outputs. Analytical

I

32

redundancy could reduce the number of sensors needed and thus reduce the

amount of sensor repair and replacement. Specific applications are detailed

in the measurement parameter tables in Appendix K.

Some new sensors may see applications on the SSME in the next couple

years and others could be developed for use on the engine within five years.

Most of these new or additional sensors target specific failure modes that are

both costly and not presently detectable by conventional sensors. A list of

the most promising sensors or sensing techniques follows:

Partially Developed and Tested

• Isotope Wear Detection - Between-flight noninstrusive detection

of slowly developing wear-related failure modes. Potential uses,

mainly in the turbopumps, include bearings, seals, and turbine

blades. Cannot detect cracking or pitting. Presently being

tested by Rocketdyne with funding from NASA LeRC.

• Ultrasonic Doppler Transducer - Nonintrusive means of detecting

shaft vibration through solid and liquid interfaces. Extremely

sensitive to imbalance and other RPM related vibration and may be

useful for detecting other failure modes on the information rich

shaft assemblies of the turbopump. It can detect cavitation,

bearing wear, and seal rubbing. Developed by Battelle and tested

at NASA MSFC in the mid-70's.

• Fiberoptic Deflectometer - Possibly more durable than conven-

tional accelerometers and can potentially target specific vibra-

tion problems that need intrusive measurement capabilities such

as bearing wear. Presently being tested at NASA LeRC by

Rocketdyne.

• Ultrasonic Flowmeter - Has been tested as a means of nonintru-

sively measuring flow through ducts. The mounting conditions,

however, have caused a duct to rupture. With proper design of

the duct and transducer mounting, this sensor is believed to be a

reliable method of detecting flow rate.

I

II

I

I

III

II

II

I

III

II

I

II

I

II

II

II

II

II

I

II

II

33

• Optical Pyrometer - For possible trending of turbine blade crack-

ing. May have resolution and calibration problems, but there is

no other acceptable method of detecting this failure mode at pre-

sent. Under test by Rocketdyne with funding by NASA LeRC.

• Borescope Image Processor - Off-the-shelf packages are available

to enhance the visual inspection of internal parts. New genera-

tion borescopes may be much better for low-light situations.

Devices with Major Development Efforts Needed

• Magnetic Wear Detector - A small experiment at Battelle showed

that the ball passage rate can be monitored by a Hall-effect

sensor. Bearing ball wear will change the contact angle and thus

the ball speed. If the signal can be cleaned up enough, higher

order effects may also be detected. Could be used as either a

flight sensor or ground inspection method.

• Acoustic Emission Detectors - Possible in-flight applications for

detecting cracks and leaks of quickly propagating failure modes.

May have resolution problems in high background noise environ-

ment. Cracks and leaks are by far the most predominate types of

failures.

e Laser Doppler Velocimeter - Can measure flow speed and direction,

but needs access via an optic fiber through a hole or "window".

e Tracers Added to Helium Leak Detection - A radioactive tracer

(Krypton, Tritium, etc.) could improve leak detection for ground-

based applications.

Holographic Leak Detection - Has the possibility of detecting and

locating leaks faster and more effectively than the present

helium method. Being investigated in a detailed Rocketdyne

study.

• Exo-Electron Emission - May be useful in ground inspection for

cracked parts. Also detailed in Rocketdyne study.

All of the above measurement applications should be evaluated for cost effec-

tive means of improving the present diagnostic system, but the most immediate

improvements should come through studying the on-board sensors.

I

34

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I

III

III

II

I

II

I

III

III

35

DIAGNOSTICS SURVEY

A survey of the state of the art of machine diagnostics was per-

formed as the second task in the SSME study. In this survey, a general look

was taken at the area of machine diagnostics across three rather broadly

defined application areas:

1. Diagnostics for liquid-fueled rocket engines,

2. Diagnostics for aircraft engines,

3. Diagnostics in relevant non-aerospace industries.

The survey involved interviews with experts in a broad range of industries,

NASA, and the military. In addition, relevant Battelle experts were inter-

viewed and the literature was reviewed. The current diagnostic methods for

the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) were also examined and the relevant

survey findings were identified for potential use on the SSME.

Surve X Approach and Methodoloqy

Approach

This diagnostic survey has two objectives: (1) the determination of

the state-of-the-art of machine diagnostics, and (2) the identification of

new, candidate diagnostic techniques and/or approaches for potential applica-

tion to the SSME. Throughout this effort, the focus is on those techniques

that are considered to be off-the-shelf, or mature areas of research and

development.

The intent of the diagnostic survey is to be broad, spanning as wide

a spectrum of industries as possible. Within the general area of machine

diagnostics, three topics are considered:

1. Maintenance logistics and strategies,

2. Diagnostic techniques,

3. Design approaches for diagnostic systems.

_.C_DING PA&E BLAI_ NOT

|

36 !i

Because of its breadth, this study does not attempt to focus on any I

specific technique or approach in great detail. Throughout the survey, only

enough detail was sought to permit an assessment of the usefulness of the g

techniques under study.

Methodology I

There are two phases in diagnostics survey, a state-of-the-art sur- g

vey and the subsequent assessment of the survey findings. For the survey mphase, we selected three application categories: B

1. Diagnostic systems for liquid rocket engines,

2. Diagnostic systems on civil and military aircraft, m

3. Diagnostic systems in non-aerospace industries.

Information was gathered using literature reviews and interviews g

with a number of industry, government, and military experts. Figure g depicts gkthe overall

survey strategy, g

,!ROCKET ENGINES

JMANUFACTURERS

IINTERY IEWS

BATTELLE EXPERTS

IINTERVIEWS

AIRCRAFT

J\MILITARY CIVILIAN

/ /\LITERATURE

,INTERVIEWS

NON-AEROSPACE

MILITARY

/AIR CARRIERS MANUFACTURERS INTERVIEWS

I /\INTERVIEWS LITERATURE INTERVIEWS

CIVILIAN

/\INTERVIEWS LITERATURE

!I

I

!FIGURE 9. STRATEGY FOR STATE-OF-THE-ART SURVEY OF MACHINE DIAGNOSTICS I

!

I

I

!

|

IIt!ii

!IIIIII

II!!

liII!

37

The second phase of the Diagnostics Survey was a preliminary assess-

ment of the survey findings to screen out those that were not considered rele-

vant to the SSME. This was done in two steps:

1. The diagnostic systems and maintenance strategy currently

employed for the $SME were reviewed.

2. The survey findings were reexamined in light of the current SSME

environment, and those that were not considered useful were

dropped.

Information sources for the review of current SSME diagnostic sys-

tems and maintenance practices were NASA and Rocketdyne experts, and selected

published reports.

Diagnostics Backqround

By its very nature, machine diagnostics encompasses a broad set of

disciplines. Much of the scientific knowledge necessary to design and fabri-

cate machines, as well as to understand the physics of their failures, falls

under the technological umbrella of machine diagnostics. Because of this

breadth, it is necessary to provide an organization through a hierarchy of

related functions. This organization results in a logical, manageable set of

elements.

Definitions

We begin our discussion with a set of definitions to remove ambi-

guity in terminology. The following are taken from Reference 3-8:

• FAULT DETECTION - the act of identifying the presence of an

unspecified failure mode in a system resulting in an unspecified

malfunction.

• MALFUNCTION - an inability to operate in the normal manner or at

the expected level of performance.

• FAULT ISOLATION - the designation of the materials, structures,

components, or subsystems that have malfunctioned. Fault isola-

tion extends fault detection to the detection/identification of

the specific part that must be repaired or replaced in order to

restore the system to normal operation.

38

• FAILURE DIAGNOSIS - the process of identifying a failure mode or

condition from an evaluation of its signs and symptoms. The

diagnostic process extends fault isolation to the detection/

identification of the specific mode by which a part or component

has failed.

• FAILURE MODE - a particular manner in which the omission of an

expected occurrence (or performance of a task) happens.

By examination, the universe of states for any given system may be

partitioned into two overlapping regions, operational states and faulty states

(see Figure 10). This partitioning does not, however, produce a dichotomy,

and there is overlap between the two regions.

CONTROL ALL SYSTEMDOMA IN _ STATES

_ .

I/ SYSTEM / _ X X _" SYSTEM \r / STATES ",, F'_/X,,.,Y,,vX, jl_. _ STATES _ '_

AREA OF DEGRADED DOMAIN OFSYSTEM PERFORMANCE ERROR DETECTION, FAULT ISOLATION,

AND FAILURE DIAGNOSIS

FIGURE 10. PARTITIONING OF SYSTEM STATES INTO OPERATIONAL

AND ERRONEOUS STATES.

Notice the Overlap.

This area of overlap represents states of degraded system perform-

ance. In general, the region of operational states represents the control

domain, whereas the faulty states, constitutes the domain of fault detection,

fault isolation, and failure diagnosis. The above definitions can now be

rewritten so that they are in terms of these states.

I

!

IIII

IIIII!I

IIIII

I

!

l)t

lI

I

I

I

iI

I|

39

• FAULT DETECTION - the identification of a system state lying

within the region of faulty states.

• FAULT ISOLATION - identification of a class of system states

within the region of faulty states which classify the malfunction

of a specific module or component.

• FAILURE DIAGNOSIS - identification of a system state within the

region of faulty states which classifies a specific failure mode

of the malfunctioning module or component.

• STATE IDENTIFICATION - the determination of the condition or mode

of a system with respect to a set of circumstances at a particu-

lar time.

In addition to redefining some of the diagnostic-related elements,

one can also express the concept of control in terms of system states.

• CONTROL - the identification of a current system operational state

and the subsequent adjustment of the system so as to maneuver it

to another desired operational state.

From the above discussion the following, self-evident conclusion

results:

All types of detection associated with error perception,

fault isolation, failure diagnosis, and system control areclasses of state identification.

This conclusion is quite important in that it allows the grouping of

the various facets of machine diagnostics, fault detection, fault isolation,

and failure diagnosis under the more general topic of state identification.

Additionally, since detection for control purposes is also a class of state

identification, the importance of considering both the machine diagnostics and

control in an integrated fashion is emphasized. Therefore, there exists a

common denominator, state identification, around which this study is logically

focused.

State Identification Process Hierarchy

One can specify a hierarchy of elements that are necessary for the

state identification process. First, at the lowest level, information about

!

40

the system or machine in question must be gathered. Second, once this infor-

mation has been gathered, it must somehow be reduced to a manageable set of

relevant features. Finally, at the highest level, that set of features can be

used to perform the state identification. This hierarchy of functions is

shown in Figure 11.

I STATE IDENTIFICATION I

I INFORMATION REDUCTION I

I INFORMATION ACQUISITION I

' MACHINE OR SYSTEM I

FIGURE 11. THE HIERARCHY OF PROCESS REQUIRED FOR STATE IDENTIFICATION

Information Acquisition

The potential sources of information about a given system or machine

necessary for state identification are: specifications, history, sensors, and

inspection. Optimally, all of these are utilized in the state identification

process for machine diagnostics.

Specifications. Specifications are those documents which define the

normal operating characteristics of the system or machine. Deviations from

this norm may be caused by component failures, design errors, or both.

If a given system is operating according to specifications, it is in

that sector within the region of operational states which does not overlap

with the region of faulty states (see Figure 10), otherwise it is in the

region of faulty states. The specifications define the performance explicitly

for the system controller, and implicitly for the system fault detection

mechanism.

HistorX. History about a system or machine's performance can be of

a short-term or long-term nature. Short-term history represents those events

which are related to one another and take place within the physical or char-

acteristic time cycles of the machine. For example, all events occurring

I

I

II_+_

I

I

t!I

II

III

II!I

!

I

!I!

!!|I

i!!

i

I!

ii

41

within the decay time for a pendulum might be considered short-term history.

Long-term history consists of those events which occur in a time frame greater

than that considered to be short-term (as previously defined). Observation of

all events, whether they are of short-term or long-term historical nature are

made using sensors or by inspection (see below).

Sensors. The transducers that measure the various physical para-

meters. Sensors may either be permanently installed on-board a machine or

used as part of test instrumentation. The sensor output information is often

called raw data. This raw data must be reduced to a set of features in order

to perform state identification for diagnostic or control purposes.

Inspection. Inspection techniques are often used in lieu of sen-

sors. In effect, a human serves the function of a wide-band sensor. Some

tools are available to assist the human during the inspection process. The

physician's stethoscope is an example of such a tool.

Information Reduction

Having acquired information about the performance of a machine or

system, it must be subsequently processed and reduced to produce a set of

features from which to perform the state identification. Usually, this part

of the process involves the reduction of the information by removing that

which is redundant or irrelevant. Sometimes data from several sources are

combined to generate features which cannot be or which have not been physi-

cally measured at a single place or time. A commonplace example of this is

the combination of sensory data about a machine, along with its long-term

history, in order to derive a feature which describes a machine's failure

trends.

There are two principal means by which this reduction of information

takes place, signal processing and/or human expert analysis. The difference

between these two approaches may be seen simply as the difference between

machines and humans. Signal processing can be accomplished in a number of

machine domains:

• Analog electronics (continuous or discrete),

• Other analog domains,

!

42

• Digital electronics (hardware only),

• Hardware and software.

Human expert analysis may be accomplished with or without the

assistance of mechanized tools. A mechanic listening to the noise of an auto-

mobile engine to discern the tapping of a valve exemplifies the later case.

An automotive engineer observing the output of an acoustic spectrum analyzer

to make the same determination represents the former case.

State Identification

Having acquired information about a system or machine, and subse-

quently generating a set of relevant features, the state identification must

be performed. As is the case with information reduction, the same identifica-

tion can be carried out either by humans or automated devices.

In general, there are three approaches for automated state

identification:

i. Pattern recognition (with the most trivial case being a table

lookup).

2. Nonlinear filters (with the simple algorithm representing the

most trivial case).

3. Expert systems.

In the specific cases where state identification is used for error

detection or fault isolation, a fourth technique is at our disposal, i.e.,

voting. In the voting process, a society of identical hardware modules oper-

ate in parallel to highlight any nonconformists (malfunctioning modules).

Human-based decisions (state identifications) are the most common in

the diagnostic/maintenance areas. In the vast majority of these cases, the

expert has no assistance (other than perhaps another human expert). Recently

however, the use of computer expert systems as decision aids is gaining

acceptance. Witness, for example, the increasing commercialization of

computer-based expert systems to assist in medical diagnosis.

!

I

I|

11I|

i!!

|

I

|I

I

i

I!IiIIii

i

III!I!

43

Summar X and Conclusions

In an effort to find a common denominator for the various aspects of

machine diagnostics (namely fault detection, fault isolation, and failure

diagnosis), it was determined that all were classes of the more general

process of state identification. In addition, it was concluded that detection

for control purposes was also a class of state identification.

The process of state identification can be thought of as a hier-

archy. First information must be gathered about the system in question.

Then, the information must be reduced to a set of features. Finally, based

upon those features, an identification of the system state may be

accomplished.

Viewing this hierarchy from the perspective of machine diagnostics

versus machine control, we can gain insight into the interaction between those

two functions. Revising the pyramid of Figure 11 we obtain that of Figure 12.

It is evident from the above discussion that machine control requires many of

the same elements as do machine diagnostics. As shown in Figure 12, there is

every reason to expect that a sharing of hardware between the control and

diagnostic functions is both possible and desirable. Reliability theory tells

us that the addition of any component into a system will always increase the

likelihood of failure--even though the component may serve a diagnostic

purpose (it is possible that system reliability could be increased if the

addition of the component in question added redundancy of some type). By

allowing control and diagnostic functions to share resources, system relia-

bility is kept to a maximum. Because diagnostics help to reduce system down-

time, once a failure has occurred, system availability is improved.

///11 k\ \DIAGNOSTIC- _: -' "CONTRIIII1 -!_ \ ",

/ / zx. X)_ X T<.2_j,,,.7,, ,

y_VY_Y M _'Y V_,"'IMCMINE. SYSTEM PERFORINANCE"X" _

.xLX

FIGURE 12. MACHINE CONTROL VERSUS MACHINE DIAGNOSTICS.

NOTE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SHARING RESOURCES

I

44

Taking the elements from the above hierarchy and using the class-

ifications discussed earlier in this section, Table 2 is formulated. We are

now in a position to use this classification as a tool for organizing the

results of our diagnostic survey.

TABLE 2. BREAK-DOWN OF THE DIAGNOSTIC HIERARCHY

DIA_OSTIC

INFORMATION

REDUCTION

INFORMATION

SOURCES

AUTOMATEDDECISION

HUMANEXPERTOPINION

SIGNAL PROCESSING

HUMANEXPERTANALYSIS

SPECIFICATIONS

HISTORY

SENSORS

INSPECTION

PAI'FERN RECOGNITION

NONLEAR FILTERS

EXPERT SYSTEMS

VOTING SYSTEMS

HUMANONLY

MACHINE ASSISTED

ANALOGELECTRONICS

OTHER ANALOG DOMAINS

DIGITAL ELECTRONICS

HUMANONLY

MACHINE ASSISTED

SHORT TERM

LONG TERM

ON-BOARD

TEST INSTRUMENTATION

HLI_IANONLY

MACHINE ASSISTED

SSME Diaqnostic and Maintenance SjKstem Overview

This section presents a brief description of the SSME diagnostic and

maintenance system. It should be noted that the current maintenance/

diagnostic structure is highly complex. In the interest of brevity, the

elements chosen represent rather coarse groupings of the numerous related

components. Nevertheless, it is felt that the categorizations are accurate

and that the description is therefore a good representation of the diagnostic

system.

The diagnostic system elements for the SSME may be broadly cate-

gorized as either "on-board" or "ground-based". For the sake of this dis-

cussion, by the term "on-board" we mean those diagnostic elements that are

physically close to the engine, whether it is flying on a Space Shuttle or

operating on a test stand. "Ground-based" el_m@nt_ nf th_ diannncflr aria

maintenance system are those that are not considered to be on-board ("every-

thing else").

I

i

II!iII!ii

lIIi

ImI

IIIIIIi|,|,

1

!iI'

1!JI

I

45

In addition to the "ground-based" versus "on-board" categorization

of the SSME diagnostic elements, they may also be classified according to the

diagnostic hierarchy discussed in the previous section. There are a number of

levels in the hierarchy, the lowest of which is the plant level (the level

containing the engine itself). The next-to-the-bottom level can be thought of

as the information gathering level. All elements which have a role in the

acquisition of information about the plant's (engine's) performance belong to

this level. Control actuators also reside at the information gathering level.

The next-to-the-highest level is termed the information reduction level. It

is here that any signal processing or conditioning occurs. Finally, the

highest level is termed the decision level. At this level, diagnostic and

control decisions are made.

Based upon the previously described hierarchical organization we can

identify (albeit somewhat broadly) the various elements that comprise the

diagnostic system for the SSME. Such an overview is given schematically in

Figure 13. It must be noted that those elements which are classified as

on-board (including crew) are meant to apply to test stand firings as well as

in-flight service.

O(C ,SIOII

L(lffL

llIT_llOll

UM_?IOIIL[VI[L

IlPmIMT 1011IATN(IIIm

L['_L

l.LH,-_*,

I_riJ ITIOI |

PLAIT

i •

I ..,I I,.,

TLEWL

FIGURE 13. OVERALL SSME DIAGNOSTICS AND MAINTENANCE PICTURE

I

46

Information Gathering

There are two on-board elements which provide the function of data

acquisition: crew perceptions and on-board sensors. The crew perceptions are

those observations of the flight crew on the Orbiter, and the support staff

during test stand engine firings. These observations are results of the

physical senses and should not be confused with information presented to the

crew by the diagnostic subsystems.

A number of on-board sensors are used primarily for control pur-

poses. The remaining sensors are dedicated to diagnostic functions. Some of

the control related sensor outputs are also used for diagnostic purposes.

Aside from the data acquisition function, there are on-board ele-

ments for data telemetry and data recording. Nearly all sensor outputs are

ultimately telemetered for ground-based analysis. A number of these data are

also recorded on-board the Orbiter.

On the ground-based side, a large amount of diagnostic data comes

from between-flight inspections. Data acquired by on-board subsystems are

ultimately integrated with the results of ground-based inspections and engine

repair actions to establish the engine flight and service history. This his-

torical data represents a valuable information pool for detailed analysis.

Information Reduction

All of the data, whether acquired by sensor, observation, or between

flight inspection must be reduced to a manageable set of features so that the

appropriate diagnostic or control decision may be quickly and accurately made.

Sensor data is characteristically reduced using signal processing techniques

such as time integration or low-pass filtering. Observations and inspection

results are typically reduced by the inspection specialists through the use of

heuristics.

Diagnostic Decisions

The on-board diagnostic subsystem uses a basic form of pattern

recognition. A table of "red lines", dynamically adjusted for changes in the

!

!1!!

!il!|

!!1!

!t!

I

I

|I

i

I

Ii _

i

I

!

I

I

47

engine's operational modes, is employed to flag potentially dangerous condi-

tions and dictate responses. Similarly, the crew reactions represent a human

pattern recognition resulting in well practiced responses.

Currently, the ground-based analysis employs an analytical model of

the engine combined with heuristic-based decisions to identify potential

trouble spots. This information is used to some degree to direct the between-

flight inspections, and aids in the maintenance evaluations and repair

decisions.

\

Summary /

This section has presented a high level overview of the SSME

diagnostic and maintenance system. The various diagnostic and maintenance

elements as well as their interactions (or possible interactions) have been

described and are depicted in Figure 13. The intent of the state-of-the-art

diagnostic survey is to identify possible techniques to improve the per-

formance of those elements and/or to improve the quality of their interconnec-

tions.

Survey Findings

This section presents the significant findings and highlights of the

state-of-the-art diagnostic survey. These findings are broken down into three

major application areas:

1. Liquid-fueled rocket engines,

2. Aircraft,

3. Non-aerospace industries.

Within each application area, the findings are further organized

according to the hierarchical classification discussed in the previous

sections.

Liquid-Fueled Rocket Enqines

The principal sources of information for this part of the survey

were rocket engine manufacturers, instrumentation vendors, Battelle experts,

and NASA reports.

I

48

The SSME is unique in that is the first truly reusable rocket engine

not on an experimental vehicle. This fact, combined with a design which

allows for smaller error margins than previous rocket engines, has dictated a

much more comprehensive diagnostic and maintenance philosophy than any of its

predecessors.

Data Acquisition. The vast majority of the sensing and instrumenta-

tion techniques are based upon well-seasoned approaches. In the case of

on-board devices, such well-established transducers as thermocouples, pressure

sensors, accelerometers, etc. are typically used. The data from these trans-

ducers are usually telemetered for ground-based analysis. Historically, manu-

facturers have not had a great deal of confidence in on-board instrumentation.

Rocketdyne is currently under contract with NASA to develop new instrumenta-

tion as a part of an advanced condition monitoring system.

Ground-based inspections are characteristically manual in nature.

Some instruments such as mass spectrometers have found application in the iso-

lation of gas leaks. Some new techniques for data acquisition have been pro-

posed and/or are under development, but none of those are yet considered to be

mature products.

Signal Processinq. Because of the basic nature of the diagnostic

systems employed on prior rocket engines, minimal on-board signal processing

techniques were used. The techniques used are basic in nature and have as

their objective the enhancement of the signal-to-noise ratio or sensor sig-

nals. Ground-based analyses of telemetered data characteristically employ

more sophisticated approaches.

Diagnostic Techniques. The sophistication of the diagnostic techni-

ques used on-board previous rocket engines has been minimal. The most common

real-time monitoring technique was based upon the violation of limits or "red

lines". Post-flight analyses, were usually more thorough, relying on tools

such as computer simulations.

Hiqhlights. Items of particular interest which were obtained during

the liquid rocket engine portion of the survey include:

I

|!

!

iI

!

i

!I

I

!f_

!

!

I

!

I

Ii

Ii

1

!i,

!

!

II

II

!

!l

II

49

Awareness of Need for Diagnostics. All of the manufacturers of roc-

ket engines that were interviewed (Rocketdyne, Pratt and Whitney, and Aerojet)

indicated an awareness of the need for comprehensive diagnostics on reusable

engines. Rocketdyne, due to its involvement with the SSME, has already

embarked on the development of a comprehensive condition monitoring system.

Both Aerojet and Pratt and Whitney intend to develop such systems on future

engine programs.

Current SSME Diagnostics. The engine monitoring system currently

employed on the SSME has been successful from the standpoint of crew/vehicle

safety. However, it is labor intensive and does not lend itself well to the

quick turnaround objectives of the STS program. The on-board diagnostics are

based upon violations of a series of safety limits ("red lines") some of which

are dynamically allocated. The on-board sensor set includes the following:

• temperature - resistive temperature detectors, thermocouples

• pressure - strain gauge, piezoelectric

• tachometer - magnetic pickup

• position - potentiometers, RVDT, LVDT

• vibration - piezoelectric accelerometer

• flowmeter - turbine

• calorimeter - thermopile

• radiometer - foil.

These sensors are considered by Rocketdyne to be adequately reli-

able. Data from some of these sensors are telemetered for ground-based

recording at 20 millisecond intervals during engine firings. The ground-based

portion of the diagnostic system is centered around a series of routine and

periodic inspections. The routine inspections include the following:

• external inspection

• internal inspections - HPFTP, HPOTP, MCC

• leak tests

• automatic/electrical checkotlts.

Borescopes are used for some of the internal inspections. Instru-

mentation required for leak tests includes flowmeters and mass spectrometers.

The periodic inspections involve the removal of either the HPOTP, HPFTP, or

both. During this activity turbine blades are inspected using optical

!

50

microscopy, and the respective preburner sections are inspected visually and

with concentricity gauges. In addition to the physical inspections of the

various engine components, the recorded flight sensor data is reviewed to

identify anomalies. The results of this review are communicated to the

inspection team when any action is deemed necessary.

Future SSME Condition Monitoring System. Rocketdyne is currently

under contract with NASA LeRC to develop an advanced engine condition moni-

toring system. The first phase of this study involved an analysis of failure

reports for a number of liquid-fueled rocket engines, including the SSME, J-2,

H-l, F-l, RS-27, Thor, and Atlas. The failure reports were reduced by succes-

sive screening and the resulting reports categorized into sixteen general

failure types.

• bolt torque relaxation

• coolant passage splits

• joint leakage

• hot-gas manifold transfer tube cracks

• high torque

• cracked turbine blades

• failure of bellows

• loose electrical connectors

• bearing damage

• tube fracture

• turbopump face seal leakage

• lube pressure anomalies

• valve fails to perform

• valve internal leakage

• regulator discrepancies

• contaminated hydraulic

control assembly.

Sensors were subsequently evaluated based upon their ability to aid

in the detection of the sixteen failure groups. An implicit philosophy during

this selection process was that one sensor (or group of sensors) would be

dedicated to each failure mode. A number of state-of-the-art and novel con-

cepts were identified. The sensors selected from those concepts were:

• fiberoptic deflectometer

• optical pyrometer

• isotope wear detector

• tunable diode-laser spectrometer

• ultrasonic thermometer

e optical tachometer

• ultrasonic flowmeter

• digital quartz pressure sensor

• holographic leak detector

• thermal conductivity leak detector

e exo-electron fatigue detector

• connector continuity checking

• particle analysis.

!

!i

i

I

,!|l

IiIi

Iii1!,II

!I!

I

I

II

Iil,

II

i

!III

51

Ultimately, the first three of these concepts were identified for

development and testing. This program is currently in progress. Another of

the sensors mentioned above, an ultrasonic flow meter, was tested during an

NSTL test firing. Because of problems arising from the sensor mounting, a

duct rupture occurred precipitating a catastrophic engine failure.

In addition to the identification of applicable sensors, the study

identified and evaluated the required signal processing techniques for use

with sensors to isolate the various failure modes. These techniques are:

• amplitude histogram

• RMS histogram

• filtered histogram

• cross correlation

e transfer function

• product histogram

• ratio histogram

• differentiated histogram

• phase diagram histogram

• time profile

• power spectrum density

• integral over threshold

• RPM profiles

e Cambell diagram

The various instrumentation vendors interviewed provided information

regarding many of the currently implemented SSME and aircraft test programs.

However, little information was obtained regarding new or novel instrumenta-

tion concepts.

Ultrasonic Doppler Vibration Sensor. Under contract with NASA MSFC,

Battelle's Columbus Division developed a shaft vibration sensor and success-

fully tested it on a J-2 rocket engine. The sensor was of a non-invasive

nature and determined the velocity of shaft vibrations by measuring doppler

shifting from reflected ultrasonic waves. Although a success, this sensor was

never developed further or utilized.

Aircraft

Sources for this part of the survey included interviews with experts

from the military, commercial air carriers, airframe manufacturers, engine

manufacturers, and instrumentation vendors. Information was also gathered

from literature and interviews with Battelle experts.

!

52

Aircraft engines and their diagnostics have received considerable

attention over the years. This attention is due to a number of factors,

including the military's emphasis on weapon system availability, the civilian

air carriers' push to minimize maintenance costs, and the FAA's desire to

assure safety and reliability. Consequently, this part of the survey yielded

a good deal of relevant information.

The current diagnostic/maintenance philosophies in the Air Force and

the civilian air carriers are similar. The Air Force is attempting to estab-

lish a policy termed "retirement for cause". This concept is most easily

described as an interactive preventative maintenance program. Component

failures are carefully analyzed and accurate life indicators are derived for

the engine components. The components will then be replaced only when a com-

ponent is deemed to have degraded sufficiently that it will not last until the

next periodic maintenance cycle.

The air carriers have a slightly different approach to maintenance.

Given the need to reduce ground time and keep the aircraft flying as much as

possible, a modified life limit approach to maintenance seems to prevail. An

engine is used until a component failure occurs, albeit in some cases an inci-

pient failure, or until life limits dictate a scheduled repair cycle. If the

engine is being repaired after a component failure, additional components

which would exceed their life limit prior to the next scheduled repair cycle

may be replaced.

Both the military and the commercial carriers employ a multi-tiered

maintenance structure. The first level is that of the flight line at which

major modules are replaced. A second level is responsible for troubleshooting

the modules that have been replaced so that they may be quickly placed back in

inventory. The third (ultimate) repair level is that of the specialized

shops. This level may also include the equipment vendors. Here the damaged

components are repaired and returned to the inventory of good parts.

Data Acquisition. Commercial aircraft engines all come equipped

with an array of accelerometers, temperature sensors, flow meters, pressure

transducers, and tachometers. The presence of some of those transducers is

due to FAA requirements placed on the manufacturers. While all of the air-

lines use the majority of the installed sensors, there has been some mistrust

of the accelerometers. Historically, they have experienced high false alarm

_j

II

II

nIii

IIIIII

!III

53

rates. As such, at least one airline removes them upon receipt of new

engines. The sensor manufacturers insist that the current generation of

sensors exhibit high reliability. Their claims seem to be substantiated by

the number of airlines that do use the entire sensor package for sophisticated

analyses such as trending.

Military aircraft engines usually carry many of the same transducers

as commercial engines. They serve both control and diagnostic purposes.

In the area of ground-based test, visual inspections, borescope

inspections, x-ray checks, eddy current checks, and oil analyses all find

application. Some sophisticated instrumentation systems are employed to

acquire data from engines in test cells. Temperatures, hot-gas flows and

pressures, and other similar data are gathered for off-line analysis.

Siqnal Processing. The signal processing employed for data from

on-board sensors is centered around the enhancement of signal-to-noise ratios.

Techniques such as low-pass, high-pass, and band-pass filtering are common

place. Features are sometimes generated using straight-forward approaches

such as integrating acceleration signals to derive velocity information.

Ground-based instrumentation employs similar signal processing approaches.

Diagnostic Techniques. The most common approach employed for

on-board jet engine diagnostics relies on a table of limits. When a limit has

been exceeded, the appropriate alarm is signaled and the response, if any,

initiated. Recently, this approach has been extended or supplemented by some

carriers who perform limited on-board trend analysis. Data gathered by

on-board sensors are recorded at regular intervals (ranging from several

seconds to several minutes). Trends are calculated in order to estimate when

the measured parameters will exceed their "red lines". This estimate may be

modified to allow for changes in the rate of degradation. Some air carriers

are now relying on information from ground-based trend analyses to con-

veniently schedule engine repair.

One diagnostic technique used by both the military and the civilian

air carriers merits discussion. This technique is referred to as "gas path

analysis". Developed and popularized by Hamilton Standard, the approach

involves the optimal estimation of the state, and subsequently the health, of

jet engines. In practice, a mathematical model is developed which represents

IJ

54

a simulation of a particular engine. Sensor data are then used as a gauge for

the optimal adjustment of the model parameters. When those parameters exceed

acceptable limits, a failure is declared.

At Kelly Air Force Base, the Air Force uses such a system for test

cell analysis of engines. TWA has also recently purchased such a system from

Hamilton Standard. In addition, TWA has initiated a program whereby sensor

data is telemetered from their latest generation of aircraft, and a quasi-

real-time analysis is performed to assess engine performance. The air

carriers rely heavily on an integrated system where in-flight data is analyzed

and used in conjunction with ground-based test results to plan maintenance

actions.

An on-going research and development effort is focused on the

concept of an expert system (artificial intelligence based computer program)

for jet engine diagnostics. This concept is based on the transfer of human

expertise to the expert system computer program. Although these systems are

maturing very rapidly, they are not yet considered to be off-the-shelf.

Hiqhlights. Items of particular interest which were obtained during

the aircraft portion of the survey include:

USAF Retirement for Cause. The USAF is in the process of imple-

menting a maintenance policy referred to as "retirement for cause". In short,

this policy requires that an experimental analysis be performed on each batch

of engine components in order to accurately understand and predict the life

limits in the presence of the potential failures. For example, the level of

propagation that a crack in a turbine vane must attain before failing will be

empirically determined. Once these life limits are known (or at least esti-

mated), the engine monitoring systems and periodic inspections are used to

track engine component failures. Only when the life limits are approached are

the faulty components replaced.

USAF On-Board Diagnostic System. An on-board engine monitoring

system similar to the AIDS (see below) was experimentally implemented on five

tactical F-15A aircraft (FIO0 Engines). The parameters monitored were:

!

!iiII

II!!l1lifII

I,I

aIf|ilI

ltl

!!!

!

I!

IIIIiiII

!

!

|,

!

I

55

• augmentor fuel pump discharge pressure

• augmentor permission fuel pressure

• burner pressure

• fan/core mixing pressure

• fan exit duct pressure

• fuel pump boost pressure

• fuel pump inlet pressure

• fuel pump discharge pressure

• main breather pressure

• number four bearing scavenge

pressure

• rear compressor variable

vane pressure

e fuel pump inlet temperature

• main oil temperature

e compressor exit static

temperature

• fan exit duct temperature

• diffuser case vibration

• inlet case vibration

• power level angle position.

The on-board data acquisition system monitored these parameters and

subsequently transferred the data for ground-based analysis. Such analyses,

in conjunction with ground-based tests were used as the basis for a main-

tenance program. On the whole, the experiment was considered to be

successful.

Experience with Commercial Carriers. Three domestic air carriers

were interviewed in addition to making a review of literature describing some

of the maintenance policies of European airlines.

Nearly all carriers utilize a variation of the aircraft integrated

data system (AIDS). This data system was specified by ARINC and has the

following attributes:

• diagnostic information is centralized

• some data is available for in-flight analysis

• data is recorded on a cassette tape for

analysis.

later ground-based

A number of carriers have implemented engine monitoring systems

which are also integrated with the AIDS. In these systems, important engine

parameters are monitored in-flight such as gas pressures and temperatures,

fuel flows, rotor velocities, lubricant temperatures, and vibrations. Engine

condition reports are available during flight to the flight engineer for

short-term trending analyses. Long-term trending is performed using the AIDS

data tapes during ground-based analyses.

56

In addition to the engine monitoring systems, ground tests andinspections are used to identify failures and trends. Ground-based inspec-tions may include:

• visual inspection

• borescope inspections

• x-ray checks

m eddy current checks

• spectrographic oil analysis

• ferrographic oil analysis

The general consensus in the European air carrier community is that

such sophisticated diagnostic and maintenance programs are cost justified.

The domestic air carriers are not quite so aggressive. TWA, however, has a

maintenance and diagnostic program which is very much along the lines of the

European carriers. United Air Lines on the other hand, seems to employ a more

conservative, people intensive approach to maintenance and diagnostics.

Gas Path Analysis. Hamilton Standard Division of United Technolo-

gies has been marketing a computer software package called Gas Path Analysis.

This software relies upon a linearized mathematical model of a specific jet

engine to estimate the performance characteristics of the engine's constituent

modules using measured input parameters such as temperatures, pressures, spool

speeds, and fuel consumption. The program also estimates the performance of

the various sensors that are used to acquire the data used in the analysis.

The mathematics of gas path analysis is based on the premise that it

is possible to linearize any thermodynamic cycle model by deriving matrices of

influence coefficients which relate deviations in measured parameters and com-

ponent performances to coefficients describing component faults for each of

the engine's operating points. The equations solved are:

A=HX+B

Y = Ge Xe

Xe

where X = (_-_) and H = (HelHs)

The significance of the various variables is as follows:

• Z is a column vector of measurement deviations or deltas

• Y is a column vector of performance deltas for the engines' con-

stituent modules

!i

i

i

I

II1

I

iit

iI

!iIi!

I

I

i

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

II

I

!

!

57

• Xe is a column vector of engine fault deltas

• Xs is a column vector of apparent sensor errors

• He and Ge are the matrices of coefficients derived from the

engines' mathematical model

• Hs is a matrix of sensor fault coefficients

• e is a random vector denoting sensor non-repeatability.

The dimensions are such that there is an over-specified set of equa-

tions which are a result of analytical redundancy in the measured parameters.

It is also this fact which allows the determination of sensor errors as well

as engine component malfunctions.

A number of air carriers use this technique for ground-based

analysis. Some European carriers and TWA use the gas path analysis program

for analysis of flight data. Other carriers and the USAF use it only for test

cell analysis of engine performance.

Sensors and Instrumentation Development. The area of sensor devel-

opment receiving the greatest amount of attention for flight applications is

that of fiber optic sensors. These sensors are especially desirable from the

standpoint of weight and noise immunity. At this stage of development, how-

ever, the fiber optic connector technology is not sufficiently robust to allow

widespread use on flight engines. A recent NASA study has examined applica-

tions for fiber optic sensors such as:

• rotary encoders

• optical tachometers

• rotor blade tip clearance

• optical temperature sensors (pyrometers).

Optical pyrometers have also been used in experiments to accurately

determine turbine blade life. Solar Turbines Incorporated has provided such

instrumentation for a number of these experiments. Optical clouding due to

the presence of combustion products has been the principal operational draw-

back of this type of instrumentation.

In the more general area of data acquisition, a number of instru-

mented engine core test programs have been carried out. An off-the-shelf sys-

tem for telemetering data from an engine rotor is available from Acurex Cor-

poration. These systems are not considered to be sufficiently robust for

flight applications.

/

58

Expert Systems. There are at least two programs underway for the

development of rule-based expert systems for jet engine diagnosis. On the

military side, the Air Force has been funding such a development at General

Electric. In the commercial sector, Boeing has also been developing an expert

system for jet engine diagnosis.

Non-Aerospace Industries

Information sources for this part of the survey included interviews

with experts in fields ranging from medical electronics to transportation sys-

tems. In addition, interviews were conducted with Battelle experts and rele-

vant publications were reviewed.

In general, the industrial sector has been somewhat slow in recog-

nizing the potential of machine diagnostics, but recently, there has been an

increasing emphasis in this area. The motives for this interest are varied.

For example, NRC regulations have had a strong influence on the nuclear power

industry while customer support issues have had an impact on the use of diag-

nostics in the automobile industry. Whatever the motives, some interesting

techniques have resulted which may ultimately be of value to the SSME program.

Data Acquisition. In the area of transducers, most industries have

embraced the proven sensors, e.g., accelerometers, thermocouples, etc. The

manufacturers of those devices have been developing more reliable and "rug-

gedized" transducers and recognize that their sensors will be located in pro-

gressively more hostile environments.

In terms of sensing concepts, a number of techniques in development

or use merit discussion. These concepts are described in the following

paragraphs.

In the nuclear power industry, a device known as a miniature

accelerator or MINAC has been developed for radiographing pump housings. The

device is placed inside the housing and photographic film is placed around the

outside of the housing. Once activated, the MINAC generates radiation that

penetrates the pump and exposes the film--from the inside-out. This device

has simplified a difficult imaging problem.

IIitgI

iI

!|

,iI

III,I

i

1iI

I

!I

I

I

!

|

II

!

I

!

!

i

!

59

For the conventional power industry, Solar Turbines Incorporated is

under contract with the Electric Power Research Institute to instrument a gas

power turbine with an optical pyrometer. The pyrometer is positioned to scan

the passing turbine blades and provide measurements leading to accurate pre-

dictions of the blades' life.

A number of novel fiberoptic-based sensors have been under develop-

ment. An example of this is the laser-doppler-velocimeter (LDV) which mea-

sures the velocity, not speed, of moving material. The material being mea-

sured can be a solid or a fluid. Because of its optical nature, the informa-

tion can be communicated from the moving medium to the sensor by optical

fibers. This sensor is already finding application in the manufacture of

synthetic fibers.

A new class of semiconductor devices for measuring the presence of

various elements has been under development. This device is called an ion

selective field effect transistor (ISFET). These devices have been proposed

for measuring such parameters as hydrogen concentrations in gases, and glucose

levels in human blood. ISFETs have certain stability problems that have not

as yet been resolved.

Cooperative sensing schemes are finding increased usage. The prin-

cipal behind this concept is not new: the design of the system or component

to be examined is altered so as to provide a clear, unmistakable signature

which is easily monitored. Putting a tracer in a gas to measure concentra-

tions and flows represents a well developed application of this technique. In

a more recent example, bearing balls where magnetized to allow the monitoring

of their behavior by simple magnetic field sensors.

For the storage of performance data, the memory card, an extremely

portable device, is gaining popularity. This device is comprised of a micro-

computer and nonvolatile data memory in a very small package (typically the

size of a credit card). Memory cards, because they are inexpensive and port-

able, can permit the highly accurate tracking and monitoring of modules and

components as they progress through the repair cycles. Unfortunately, the

storage capacities of the data memory are still limited.

Vibration monitoring is common in numerous industries ranging from

petrochemical plants to paper mills. For example, at Exxon's petrochemical

plant in Baytown, Texas much of the machinery is continuously monitored using

a minicomputer and on-board accelerometers. The signal levels of the

!

60

accelerometers are analyzed to determine trends. Based upon such trends,

maintenance can be optimally scheduled. In this same plant, such phenomena as

pump cavitation were also detected by more careful analysis of the accelero-

meter signals. However, the ability to gather this additional information has

not been integrated into the monitoring system.

Siqnal Processinq. In the realm of signal processing, the most

impressive developments have been in the area of hardware. Integrated cir-

cuits are now available which perform such functions as real-time digital fil-

tering or real-time Fast Fourier Transforms. A manufacturer of charge-

coupled-device (CCD) arrays, EG&G Reticon, also manufacturers semiconductor

devices which perform many of the filtering and analysis functions in the

discrete time analog domain. Prior to the availability of those devices,

these filtering techniques were only possible using digital electronics.

In the continuous time domain, a number of sensors have been devel-

oped for specific applications to perform filtering functions in a non-

electronic fashion. One well developed example of this approach is the use of

a tuned acoustic transducer for the monitoring of predetonation in GM automo-

bile engines. This approach was used by GM in a effort to minimize production

costs.

In the field of automated inspection systems a good deal of progress

has been made in image processing and image interpretation. Commercial sys-

tems are now available for the automated inspection of pieces on an assembly

line for manufacturing defects. Similar techniques have been developed for

the autonomous inspection of printed circuit boards. This area will likely

continue to evolve due to the recent successes.

Recent research in the human factors associated with display tech-

nology is directed toward the presentation of high level information, rather

than machine parameters, in a graphical format. In industries such as nuclear

power, the operators of the systems need diagnostic information in a high-

level and unambiguous format, thus, permitting the decisions to be made

quickly and accurately via human pattern recognition.

Diagnostic Techniques. The approaches used in the industrial sector

for making diagnostic decisions span the entire spectrum, from the simple

table lookup technique employed on most automobiles, to expert system computer

l

IIlI!I

IIil

I

l

ID

i

II

l

IIIiI

IIIIISIII

IIiI

61

programs for the diagnosis of failures in train locomotives. Of the informa-

tion gathered during this part of the survey, there are several concepts worth

mentioning. These make up the remainder of this section.

General Electric Corporation has developed an expert system (com-

puter program) for the diagnosis of failures on railroad locomotives. In this

approach, the computer program was written to reason and draw conclusions

based upon a set of rules. The set of rules is derived from interviews with

human experts in the area (that of repairing GE's locomotives). In operation,

the expert system guides the actions of a repair technician. This is only one

of several diagnostic "experts" that have been developed: Westinghouse's

Steam Turbines Division has developed a diagnostic expert system for steam

turbines. The Westinghouse program, moreover, identifies sensor malfunctions

as well as turbine component failures.

On-going research in the area of non-linear diagnostic filters pro-

mises to improve their performance by increasing sensitivity and reducing

false alarm rates. In one particular effort involving Case Western Reserve

University and Bailey Controls Division of Babcock and Wilcox, an industrial

heat exchanger will be the test bed for an improved non-linear diagnostic

filter. The benefits of such research efforts are likely to be incremental in

nature, but available in the relatively short term.

The commercial application of pattern recognition based upon statis-

tically derived and/or empirically determined features has been a reality for

a number of years. The benefits of this approach is that the computation

times for making decisions about a machine's performance can be very brief.

Other computationally oriented techniques, non-linear diagnostic filters and

expert systems, typically require substantially more time than pattern recog-

nition. Historically, most pattern recognition systems have been custom

tailored to the signatures of single specific machines, rather than, for

example, other identical machines. This shortcoming has been addressed

through the use of adaptive pattern recognition systems.

Vibration trend analysis is becoming a commonly used technique,

especially in industries such as petrochemicals and paper manufacturing. This

technique usually involves the monitoring of vibration sensors (most often the

integrated outputs of accelerometers) to watch for change. The rate of

increase is estimated, and repairs scheduled according to the estimated time

until a failure occurs.

I

62

Predictive diagnostics based upon ferrographic analysis of lubricant

has been a reality for a number of years. This technique is based upon the

gathering and analysis of wear particles to determine the mechanisms and

severity of wear. While there are machine mounted sensors available for auto-

mated ferrographic analysis, the most thorough analyses are performed off-line

using bichromatic microscopy.

Voting systems have been used to address anticipated failures (i.e.,

those failures that result from known component failure modes). However,

unanticipated faults due to such causes as design errors cannot be addressed

by voting systems. The more complex a machine, the greater is the likelihood

of latent design errors.

Recommendations

Given the nature of the SSME environment and maintenance structure,

several of the approaches and techniques identified in the previous section

are recommended. We will hold to the same organization that has been used

throughout this report. These recommendations are further summarized in

Table 3.

Data Acquisition

To the extent possible, those existing on-board sensors which have

experienced reliability problems, should be considered for replacement. As

existing sensors are continually improved for sensitivity and durability, they

should be examined and, as warranted, tested and considered for use on the

SSME. A sensor data base would be beneficial for both the $SME, and for

future rocket engine development programs.

The on-board sensors should be more effectively used. For example,

the accelerometers currently on the SSME are only used for the RMS values of

their outputs. There is undoubtedly a great deal of information available in

the higher frequency harmonics that is not being used. The full bandwidth of

all existing sensors should be recorded onboard and the data later used for

detailed ground-based analysis. It also may be possible to telemeter this

recorded data while the STS is on orbit.

I

I

I1IIi

!i

IIIIi

!I!i

I

II

!

63

TABLE 3. SUMMARYOF DIAGNOSTICS RECOMMENDATIONS

IDiagnostics

CategoryRecommendations

On-Board Ground-Based

IIIIIII

II

II

i

Data Acquistion

Signal Processing

DiagnosticTechniques

More Reliable Sensors

Increased Bandwidth

for Existing Acceler-ometers and Trans-

ducers (pressure,temperature, flow,

and speed)

Additional Conventional

Sensors

Extensive Data

Recording

Continued Developmentof:

Optical Pyrometer

Fiber Optic Deflecto-meter

Ultrasonic DopplerTransducer

Ultrasonic Flow

Meter

Improve S/N Ratios

by Spectral Filteringand Noise Cancellation

Analysis and Developmentof Pattern Recognition

Diagnostic System

Continued Development

of Isotope Wear Detector

Extension of Isotope

Wear Detector Conceptto Include Ferro-

graphic Analysis

Use of Tracer Elements

(Tritium or Sulfur

Hexafluoride) forLeak Detection

Image Processing+to Enhance

Borescope Inspections

Develop Gas Path

Analysis Model of SSME

Evolve Gas Path AnalysisModel to Include Non-

Linear Diagnostic Filter

Establish and Maintain

Integrated SSME Data

Base (diagnostic and

maintenance)

I

I

I

64

It is estimated that upwards of 85 percent of all failures are

intermittent in nature. Over the course of our survey, two approaches to the

isolation of intermittent failures were identified: marginal testing and

extensive logging. The use of marginal testing techniques on the SSME is not

feasible. Therefore, we recommend that extensive on-board recording of the

engine be performed. By analyzing this extensive amount of data, either on

the ground or on-board, intermittent problems may be identified and isolated.

In addition, the extra sensors required for such monitoring will augment the

analytical redundancy of the diagnostic system.

The sensors proposed by Rocketdyne for the monitoring of turbo-

machinery should be carried through to application. Specifically, the optical

pyrometer, fiberoptic deflectometer, and isotope wear detectors, will signi-

ficantly improve the information available on the health of the turbopumps.

In addition, the isotope wear detector program should be extended to encompass

ferrographic analysis. Numerous precedents suggest that this type of analysis

would be valuable for predictive diagnosis.

For ground-based inspections, we recommend that tracing elements

should be considered to aid in the detection of hydrogen and other fluid

leaks. It is felt that this would result in the simplified sensing apparatus.

Signal Processinq

For ground-based tests, image processing should be used to augment

certain inspection processes, especially the borescope inspections. It is

believed that such techniques could both improve the accuracy, and reduce the

time required for inspections.

For on-board instrumentation, more elaborate signal processing will

be required. Given the noise environment of the SSME, both spectral filtering

and statistical noise cancellation techniques could be used to provide

improved signal-to-noise ratios. High signal-to-noise ratios are essential if

the existing sensors are to be more fully utilized.

Diagnostic Techniques

In the arena of diagnostic techniques there are three recommenda-

tions, one for on-board diagnosis and two for ground-based analysis. The

!

!

l

III

i

1

l

I

I

i

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

!

!

I

I

!

i

I

III

!IIiI

65

principal purpose of the on-board diagnostics is to avert rapidly developing,

catastrophic failures. Because of the speed of diagnosis and level of

accuracy required, pattern recognition is the only realistic technique. To

increase the coverage and accuracy of the on-board diagnostic system, a

pattern recognition-based diagnostics should be considered.

For ground-based analyses, an effort to improve the analytical model

for the SSME should be undertaken. In conjunction with such a model, a non-

linear diagnostic filter should be developed. This effort might begin by

initiating a gas path analysis program, and improving the analysis on an

incremental basis. It may even be possible to run such a program in real-time

based upon telemetered data (given adequate computing resources). If the

system is sufficiently accurate, detailed trend analysis capabilities could

result.

Finally, a thorough and highly integrated data base should be estab-

lished to track and correlate information about engines and components.

Information from on-board sensors, ground-based inspections, repair actions,

and component histories should be included. Analysis of this data base must

be made highly interactive to be most effective. Ultimately, such a data base

could benefit the SSME maintenance staff, the operations staff, and the engine

component manufacturers.

!

66

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

"o_,

I

I

I

!

II

I

!

j

t!!!!!!

!

67

SSME DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION

The third task of the SSME study is intended to assimilate the out-

puts of the SSME failure data review and the diagnostics survey and to use

this information for evaluating the current $SME diagnostic system. The

principal objective of this task is to identify potential means for improving

the availability of high-quality, pertinent engine data. This information

will be used both in-flight and on the ground to assess the condition of the

SSME and its respective components. To accomplish this objective, an analysis

tool has been selected to perform a systematic examination of the diagnostic

information in the SSME. This tool (Failure Information Propagation Model)

and its initial application to an SSME component is described in this section.

Issues and Approach

To evaluate the overall SSME diagnostic system, the information

gathered during the failure data review and diagnostic survey must be inte-

grated and analyzed. At the outset of this evaluation task, the following

data were available:

• Results of the SSME failure data review

• Knowledge of the existing SSME inspection and maintenance process

• Knowledge of the current SSME sensors

• Information on sensor research and development underway for the

SSME

• Results of the diagnostic survey.

This information was believed to provide a solid foundation for performing the

required evaluation.

The first step in the analysis was to select the actual tool or

technique to be used. To facilitate selection of a suitable analysis method,

an overall approach was defined for the task. The approach adopted centered

on addressing several key diagnostic issues. These issues included the

following:

• What additional diagnostic information is available to the

existing SSME sensors?

68

• Are there any information rich test points on the SSME that

should be instrumented? If so, which sensors should be

considered?

• How can we optimize the placement of additional sensors so as to

minimize their total number and cost while maximizing their

information gathering potential and reliability?

Which _,_lrumentation research and development areas represent

the best investment relative to the diagnostic needs of the SSME?

The common denominator for all of the issues mentioned above is an under-

standing and characterization of the engine failure information and its flow

paths.

The major focus of the initial effort on this task was directed,

therefore, at finding a suitable means to represent the SSME failure informa-

tion and at developing a data format which could be easily manipulated to

address each of the above issues. The tool which appeared to satisfy all of

the proposed requirements was the Failure Information Propagation Model

(FIPM). The FIPM concept is discussed in the following subsection.

Failure Information PropaBation Model

The Failure Information Propagation Model (FIPM) is a technique

developed by the Battelle Columbus Division to qualitatively evaluate the

potential test points in a system. The objective of this qualitative evalua-

tion is to assess the information bearing value of each test point. The FIPM

basically divides the system under analysis into its principal components or

functions, describes the failure modes for these components, catalogs the

physical connections between the components, details the flow of failure

information through the various connections and groups the failure informa-

tion according to signalproperties. It must be emphasized at this point that

the FIPM models the propagation of failure information and not the failure

itself. The model assumes that the system being depicted is in a near-normal

state of operation. The failure information flow is described for the instant

of time immediately following a given failure.

The FIPM was initially developed to evaluate the factors affecting

copy quality in a photographic copy machine. This proprietary study was

performed for an industrial client. Due to the nature of the system involved,

III

i

II

III

il!

i

Il

I

Il

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

69

this analysis was primarily concerned with the electronic functions of the

device. Subsequent to this study, the FIPM was applied to an ion chamber and

a home furnace. All of this work preceded the FIPM's consideration for this

task. As a result of this early work, the FIPM has demonstrated the capa-

bility to adapt to a broad range of mechanical and electronic systems.

Three principal applications exist for the output of this model.

These applications are:

• Design of sensor systems for new devices or components

• Evaluation of existing sensor systems to maximize the information

yield

• Identification of sensor research and development needs to target

key diagnostic data.

These important features of the FIPM made it especially attractive for use in

the SSME diagnostic evaluation.

FIPM Example

The formulation of an FIPM must begin with the identification of the

modules (components or functions) that comprise the system being evaluated.

These modules may be piece parts, subassemblies, or subsystems depending on

the level of detail sought. In the case of a typical exhaust fan, which is

used here solely as an example, the constituent modules are subassemblies

which have been selected to illustrate a top-level FIPM. In the case of the

high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) FIPM which will be discussed later in

this section, the constituent modules generally are piece parts.

The modules selected to illustrate the FIPM concept for the exhaust

fan are the AC motor, the fan belt, the fan, the fan bearing, and the frame

which supports these components. These elements are shown in Figure 14. The

resulting model is very simple in that the AC motor actually has both elec-

trical and mechanical parts, the fan has both blades and a pulley for the

drive belt, etc. It is recognized that this model ignores many factors which

would be considered in a thorough engineering analysis.

The network of connections between the exhaust fan modules is

depicted in Figure 15. As indicated in this figure, the motor is mechanically

mounted to the frame and transforms electrical power into mechanical power

_.

70

AC Electric

MotorFan Belt

2

Fan

Frame

5

Bearing

FIGURE 14. MODULES COMPRISING EXHAUST FAN FIPM

AC Electric

Motor

\ \ \\\

Key

Electrical Power

Friction

Air Flow

Rolling Element-- Mechanical

----- Thermal

\\\ \

\

Fan Belt

2

Frame

5

Fan

Bearing

FIGURE 15. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EXHAUST FAN MODULES

H

I

I

II

I

III

I

!I

I

II

IIt

II

i

I

I

I

nI

i

i

I

I

l

l

I

I

I

II

i

71

through friction with the fan belt. The fan belt also is connected by fric-

tion to the fan. The fan and frame are joined through the bearing by means of

rolling elements. A thermal connection also exists, in normal operation,

between the AC motor and the frame. The final element in the network is an

air flow path out of the fan.

The failure modes of each of the exhaust fan modules is shown in

Figure 16. It should be noted that these failure modes do not include

mechanisms which are external to the module. Failures due to such outside

causes as fire, explosion, or mechanical damage are not considered. Events

such as fire in the fan motor also are not considered since these are actually

effects of more fundamental failure modes. It should be reiterated that the

FIPM is modeling the situation immediately following a failure and not the

longer-term effects and consequences of that failure.

The occurrence of any exhaust fan failure mode produces failure

information which can be detected externally to the component and which will,

in general, be transmitted to adjacent components. An assessment of the

failure information propagations for the exhaust fan example is shown in

Figure 17. It is interesting to note that, in this example, all of the

failure modes transmit failure information to all of the other modules. The

large amount of failure data which is available at any given connection in the

system is evident in this figure.

The failure information in the current example can be further cate-

gorized at each connection according to the type of measurement or sensor

required for detection. An open winding [1C] or breakage of the fan belt [2B]

could be detected by an ammeter on the electrical line. Similarly, binding of

the motor ilAl, a shorted winding lID], or dirt on the fan [3B] can be

detected by a voltmeter across the motor terminals. In Figure 18, the failure

information for each connection has been grouped according to the type of

measurement involved. This clustering of the failure information is the final

step in the development of the FIPM. Analysis of the data in the model can

now be initiated.

A sensor of the appropriate type would detect any or all of the

failure modes within a particular group. It would be necessary, therefore, to

provide additional information or to further process the signal to uniquely

identify any single failure mode. The process of determining the failure

signatures and respective sensor sets is highly detailed and has not been

undertaken for the exhaust fan example.

!

72

AC Electric Motor

1

A. Binding

B. Bearing Vibration

C. Open Wlndlng

D. Shorted Wlndlng

\\\

\\ \\

Key

Electrical Power

Friction

Air Flow

Rolling Element-- Mechanical

----- Thermal

\\

\ \\

_.\\

_."

Fan Belt

2

A. Slipping

B. Breakage

Frame

5

Fan

3

A. Blade Damage

B. l_rt

Bearing

4

A. Wear

B. Pitting

FIGURE 16. ADDITION OF FAILURE MODES TO EXHAUST FAN FIPM

1-A.B,C.O

2-A,B

3-B

Key

AC Electric Motor 1-A,B,C.O

1 2-A,B3-B

A. Binding

B. Bearing Vibration

C. Open Winding

0. Shorted Winding

\\ \\ 1-B

\

1-A,D_ \ 4-A• \

\

Electrical Power

Friction

Air Flow

J'0"F0_ Rolling Element--- Mechanical

---- Thermal

Fan Belt

2

A. S,_ngB. Breakage

Frame

5

1-A,C,D

2-A,B

3-A.B

4-A,B

3-A4-A,0

Fan

3

A. Blade DamageB. DWt

3-A4-A,B

Bearing

A. Wear

B. Pitting

1._,c,o2-A,B

3-A,B

FIGURE 17. FAILURE INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH EXHAUST FAN CONNECTIONS

I

I

i

II

I

1I

II

III

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

73

[IC] [1A, ID.3B

I_B.2A){2B]

Key

--- Electrical Power-- Friction

Air Flow

Rolling Element--- Mechanical---- Thermal

AC Electric Motor[1A,1C,1D,3B]

1 [2B) [1B,2A]

A. Blndlng

B, Bearlng Vlbrallon

C. Open Wlndlng

O. Shorted Winding

\\\ _[1B,2A,4A]\ \

[1A.wlx-x, \• \

_.. \\

\

Fan Belt

2

M. mlpp_gB. Breakage

Frame

5

[1A.1C.1D,3B]

[2A,3A,4A]

[2el [4B]

[3A,4A][4B]

Fan

3

A. Blade DamageB. D6rt

_ 13A,4A]I4B]

Bearing

4

A. Wear

B. Pitting

[1A,lC,IO,3B]

[2A,3A]

FIGURE 18. FAILURE INFORMATION GROUPED BY SIGNAL TYPEFOR THE EXHAUST FAN FIPM

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump FIPM

The high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) was selected as the

initial SSME component for evaluation using the FIPM. An HPOTP FIPM was

graphically constructed using the steps outlined in the preceding example.

The resulting model was quite large due to the complex nature of the HPOTP. A

large portion of the initial representation also was color coded for ease of

interpretation. Due to both of these factors, the initial HPOTP FIPM is

unsuitable for inclusion in this report. An attempt will, however, be made to

describe the significant features of this model and the subsequent analysis

which was performed. The version of the FIPM which will be described in this

section is no longer the baseline configuration for the HPOTP. The reasons

for this situation will be discussed. The revised FIPM approach which is

currently being used is outlined in a subsequent subsection.

I

74

The original HPOTP FIPM had the following features:

• 46 modules

• 100 module failure modes

• 59 connections

• 2248 failure information propagations.

A small black and white excerpt of this FIPM is shown in Figure 19. A key for

this graphic is included as Figure 20. All of the data comprising the FIPM

was displayed on the graphic representation.

Subsequent to the development of the HPOTP FIPM, a preliminary

analysis of the HPOTP failure information was performed using a failure infor-

mation matrix. A portion of this matrix is shown in Figure 21. In this

matrix, the rows represent connections (test points) between modules. The

columns correspond to specific module failure modes. The data entered in the

matrix at the intersection of a given row and column is the failure

information types associated with the designated failure mode which can be

detected at the designated connection. This matrix was used to develop a

preliminary set of test signature equations for the HPOTP.

i 13

BEARING #3 1

INNER RACE

b. Pitting

I

[RAV] Ib, ]9a _ [STF]

[CAV] 2a, 21b _ [REW_

[RUB] 2b, 2Ia [REP]

14

13-15a, 13-15b13-15a13-15b

J._._P2:c_T2i: ..... __ ..•..-_--.-.-I I------_

AXIAL SPRING

CARTRIDGE

a. Wear: Friction

BEARING #3BALLSm a. Wear

b. Pitting

I

[RAV] ib, Iga _ [STF] 13-15a, 13-15b

[CAV] 2a, 21b _ IREWI 13-15a

[RUB] 2b, 21a LREP] 13-15b

15

OUTER RACE

a. Wear

b. Pitting

I

FIGURE 19. EXCERPT FROM INITIAL HPOTP FIPM

II

I

II

I

i

I

I

II

I

tI

F ,!

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

i

75

+

I +" l+'t

COUPLING TYPE

, Solid

-- ... --. Liquid

O 0 e e • • o • • • Gas

==,,,==,O,=,_,O_u,O_-,,- Liquid and Gas

Thermal

FAILURE SIGNAL TYPES

[RUB] Rubbing[CAV] Cavitation[CRK] Cracking[REW] Rolling Element Wear[REP] Rolling Element Pitting[RAV] RPR Associated Vibration[IMP] Impact[LFP] Low Flow or Pressure[STF] Stress-time fatiglm Candidate[ERO] Erosion[HLT] High Local Temperature

COUPLING NODIFIER

Q Oxygen

Q Heli_

Q Common Part

:I Unanticipated Coupling

Spring

Rolling Element

Lubricant

FIGURE 20. KEY FOR INITIAL HPTOP FIPM

The test signatures were formulated by marching through the columns

of the matrix. For each column, the rows were examined to determine where

failure information resided. The rows also were scanned to identify other

failure data present at the connection which exhibited the same signal

characteristics (i.e., high temperature, low pressure, etc.). By careful

evaluation of the matrix, it was possible to determine sets of signals which

could be used to uniquely identify specific failures. Some examples of the

initial results included:

• Failure mode 1B = rpm associated vibration @ test point 34 OR

= rpm associated vibration @ test point 36 OR

= rpm associated vibration @ test point 38

• Failure mode 2A = cavitation @ test point 5 AND NOT

cavitation @ test point 1

I

76

=11.,. w_

= ;

I

ORIGIX_-P_'_ IS I

I

_3

I

I

Ze_

OI--

z

oi,

x

I,.--

o

_rev,0

z

I

II

Ii

II

I

II

III

Il

77

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

• Failure mode 2B OR

• Failure mode 3A OR

• Failure mode 5c : rubbing @ test point 4.

No attempt was made to determine a unique signature for certain classes of

failure modes. In cases such as the turbopump bearings, it is not necessary

to know which particular bearing is bad. An indication that any of the four

bearings is experiencing degradation is sufficient cause to remove the turbo-

pump from the engine and overhaul the bearings.

Subsequent efforts to specify a set of diagnostic sensors which

would target all of the high-priority HPOTP failure modes, as identified in

the SSME failure data review, encountered difficulty due to the need for addi-

tional data. The model, as constructed, did not have sufficient detail to

adequately describe the failure signals. It was determined that specifying

high temperature was insufficient without some sort of associated range. This

initial application of the FIPM methodology to a complex mechanical system had

also demonstrated the need for more formal definitions and standardized

development rules. The definitions and development rules had previously been

instituted on an ad hoc basis as the need arose. A decision was reached to

restructure the HPOTP FIPM based on a more formal development methodology.

Revised FIPM Methodoloqy

The revised FIPM methodology was prepared by the originator of the

FIPM concept with major inputs provided by the participants in the initial

FIPM activity. A number of definitions and rules resulted from this process

which will be documented at a later date. The definitions, in general, con-

cerned the types of physical connections, failure modes, signals, and signal

parameters which can be used in constructing the FIPM. These definitions have

been made with respect to fundamental physical properties and laws. Their

intent is to reduce the number of arbitrary and possibly confusing choices

which must be made during model formulation. The rules relate to the handling

of certain situations which otherwise might be ambiguous.

It was also decided that the new FIPM procedure should be imple-

mented in a data base format. This step was necessary to accommodate the

large amounts of information which were projected for the SSME models. After

I

78

consultation with the technical staff at both NASA Headquarters and NASA MSFC,

Digital Equipment Corporation's Datatrieve data base management system was

selected for use in this application. This system was chosen in large part

because of its availability at NASA MSFC and the substantial base of experi-

ence which existed at both Battelle and at MSFC.

The revised FIPM methodology still uses a graphical representation

of the system. However, the failure information propagations are no longer

shown on this diagram. The graphical representation includes only the

modules, module failure modes, and the connections between the modules. All

of this data is used extensively during the propagation of the failure infor-

mation throughout the system. The information displayed on the FIPM diagram

is also stored in the data base along with the failure information propa-

gations. The data base also allows additional descriptive data to be stored

concerning the modules, module failure modes, and connections between the

modules. Incorporation of this data would have been impossible with the

original graphic model.

FIPM Status

The revised FIPM methodology has been completed. It is recognized,

however, that any procedure such as the FIPM must always undergo some expan-

sion and modification. The development methodology does allow for flexibility

but such changes should be made only after careful consideration of all the

consequences. The methodology will be documented in the final report covering

the on-going phase of this study.

The software associated with the FIPM data base is currently under

development. This software will be documented at the time of delivery to NASA

MSFC. MSFC will be provided with a magnetic tape containing all of the input,

modification, and listing procedures developed. All SSME FIPM data generated

during the conduct of this study also will be transferred to MSFC.

The revised HPOTP FIPM presently is being formulated in parallel

with the development of the FIPM data base software. The completed HPOTP FIPM

will be documented in a separate technical report. This report will include

the FIPM graphic representation and listings of all the HPOTP information

stored in the data base.

I

II

llII

I

II

l

II

I

III

II

79

The process of implementing the data base and producing the HPOTP

FIPM is a highly interactive situation. The data definitions associated with

the various data files affect the information which must be generated for the

HPOTP. Likewise, situations or problems encountered during the loading of the

HPOTP data can affect the design and implementation of the FIPM data base.

The completion of the HPOTP FIPM should resolve the majority of these issues

and interactions.

80

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

III

I

III

II

Il

I

I

II

II

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

B1

ON-GOING RESEARCH

A number of activities are currently in progress or planned in

connection with this study. The tasks which presently are being worked

include:

• Development of FIPM data base software (previously discussed)

e Generation and loading of FIPM data for the HPOTP (previously

discussed).

The efforts which are currently planned include:

• Generation and loading of FIPM data for the following SSME

components:

high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP)

- low-pressure oxidizer turbopump (LPOTP)

- low-pressure fuel turbopump (LPFTP)

- oxidizer preburner (OPB)

- fuel preburner (FPB)

- main combustion chamber (MCC)

- heat exchanger (HE)

- main injector

- nozzle

• Assessment of candidate diagnostics

• Analysis of existing engine data

• Examination of on-board implications of SSME diagnostics

• Recommendations for diagnostic system development.

p_F..CEDII_I PAGE I_ NOT FILMED

!

82

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

II

Il

I

lI

I

II

I

II

I

III

II

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

83

DATA SOURCES

Information for the diagnostic survey was obtained through numerous

contacts in government and industry. The following is a listing of many of

the government and industry sources used.

Liquid-Fueled Rocket Enqine Diaqnostics

• Aerojet

• Battelle Columbus Division

• Bentley Nevada

• Honeywell

• NASA LeRC

• NASA MSFC

• Perkins Elmer

• Pratt and Whitney

• Rocketdyne

Aircraft Diagnostics

• Battelle Columbus Division

• Battelle Geneva Division

• Boeing

• Eastern Airlines

• General Electric

• Hamilton Standard

• Pratt and Whitney

• Rolls Royce

• Solar Turbines Incorporated

• Trans World Airlines

• United Airlines

• USAF Griffiss Air Force Base

• USAF Kelly Air Force Base

• USAF Wright-Patterson AFB

• Vibrameter

Non-Aerospace Diagnostics

• ATE Management and Service Company

• Battelle Columbus Division

• Battelle Geneva Division

• Bently Nevada

• Case Western Reserve University

• Department of Defense

• Detroit Diesel Allison

• IRD Mechanalysis

• Marsh-McBirney

m The Ohio State University

pRECE.DING PAGE EA.,AZ4KNOT iqL.MED

• Scientific Atlanta

• Sensor Developments

Incorporated

• Solar Turbines

Incorporated

• StrainSert

• Universal Engineering

• United States Army MICOM

• Vibrameter

84

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I

III

iII

i

Ig

II

I

iI

iiII

I

I

I

I

l

l

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

85

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Diagnostic Survey

Liquid Fueled Rocket Engines

i-io "Advanced Research and Technology Plan for Advanced High PressureOxygen-Hydrogen Propulsion", National Aeronautics and Space Administra-

tion, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Volume 1, September 1,1983.

1-2. "Reusable Rocket Engine Maintenance Study - Final Report", C.A.MacGregor, Rockwell International, Rocketdyne Division, January 1982.

i-3, "Reusable Rocket Engine Turbopump Condition Monitoring", M. E. Hampson,

Aerospace Congress and Exposition, Long Beach, California, October,1984.

1-4o "Space Shuttle Main Engine Ground Turnaround Operations, Maintenance,and Support", Rockwell International, Rocketdyne Division, July 1983.

Aircraft Diagnostics

2-1. "Aircraft Engine Diagnostics Conference",Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, May, 1981.

(preprint), NASA Lewis

2-2.

2-3°

"Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Monitoring Systems", Aerospace Congressand Exposition, Los Angeles, California, October, 1980.

"Engine Monitoring and Display System (EMADS)" G.E. Mas, J.B.Erickson, and D. Jordon, IEEE Third Annual Digital Avionics Systems

Conference, Fort Worth, Texas, November, 1979.

2-4, "FIO0 Engine Diagnostic System (EDS) - Summary of Results", J.A.

Boyless and D. C. Butts, J. Aircraft, Volume 21, Number 2, pp. 110-115,February, 1984.

2-5,"Fiber Optics for Aircraft Engine/Inlet Control", Robert J. Baumbick,NASA Technical Memorandum 82654.

2-6."Gas Path Analysis--An Approach to Engine Diagnostics" A. J. Volponi35th Symposium, Mechanical Failures Prevention Group, Gaithersburg,Maryland, April, 1982.

2-7° "Gas Path Analysis Applied to Turbine Engine Condition Monitoring",

L.A. Urban, J., Aircraft, Volume 10, November 7, pp. 400-406, July1973.

2-8. "Helicopter Health Monitoring", N. E. Trigg, Noise Control VibrationIsolation, pp. 91-97, March 1978.

pRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FtI_E.'D

86

2-9. "Incipient Failure Detection in High Speed Rotating Machinery",Proceedings 10th Symposium on NDE, pp. 8-18, San Antonio, Texas,April, 1975.

2-10. "Non-Destructive Evaluation Systems for the Naval Aviation Maintenance

Environment Technology Assessment - Final Report", R. Cahill, NAEC-GSED-120, July 5, 1978.

2-11. "Optical Methods of Flow Diagnostics in Turbomachinery", C. J. Moore,D.G. Jones, C. F. Haxell, P.J. Bryanston-Cross, and R.J. Parker,

ICIASF 81 Record, pp. 224-255, 1981.

2-12. "Throw It Out Just Before It Breaks", Machine Design, pp. 25-30,March 10, 1983.

Non-Aerospace Diaqnostics

3-1,

3-2.

"Acoustic Analysis of Quiet Ball Bearing Failure Modes", T. A. Rutler,Marine Technology, Volume 16, Number 2, pp. 181-188, April, 1979.

"Condition Monitoring by Sound Analysis", R.A. Collacott, Non-Destructive Testing, pp. 245-248, October, 1975.

3-3. "Condition Monitoring of Rotating Equipment", M.A. Elbestawi,

T. Loewen, D.F. Lau, Ontario Hydro Research Review, Number 5,pp. 25-30, July, 1982.

3-4.

3-5.

"Design of Analytical Failure Detection Systems Using Secondary

Observers", M. Sidar, NASA Technical Memorandum 84284, August, 1982.

"Development and Application of Advanced Diagnostics Methods in Fossil

Fuel Combustion Studies", D. R. Hardesty, Proceedings 27th NationalSAMPE Symposium, pp. 104-120, May, 1982.

3-6, "Electric Generator Monitoring and Diagnostics" F.T. Emery,M. Gottlieb, and G. B. Brandt, Final Report, EPRI NP-25645-SY, August,1982.

3-7. "Electronic Instrumentation", J.A. Allocca and A. Stuart, Reston

Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1983.

3-8. "Failure Diagnosis and Performance Monitoring", L.F. Pau, MarcelDekker, Incorporated, 1981.

3-9. "Fault Detection and Isolation in a Nuclear Reactor", A. Ray, M. Desai,

and J. Deyst, J. Energy, Volume 7, Number 1, pp. 79-85, January-February, 1983.

3-10. "Gas Turbine Systems Diagnostics Development Task Three - DiagnosticsNeeds Assessment and Program Planning", G. Brawley, J. Tuten, and

R. Byers, EPRI Report, Research Project 2421-1, April, 1984.

IlI

II

II

II

Il

I

II

II

III

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

3-11.

3-12.

3-13.

3-14.

3-15.

3-16.

3-17.

3-18.

3-19.

3-20.

3-21.

3-22.

3-23.

3-24.

87

"How Regular Bearing Inspection and Maintenance Boost Reliability",T. Durkina and R. Menning, Power, pp. 49-50, October, 1978.

"How to Develop a Machinery Monitoring Program", J. S. Mitchell, Sound

and Vibration, pp. 14-20, February, 1984.

"Measuring and Analyzing Vibration", T. F. Meinhold, Plant Engineering,pp. 82-91, October 4, 1979.

"Narrowband Analysis - An Enhancement to Productivity" B. Calloway

Proceedings 1982 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium,pp. 62-66, 1982.

"On Human Reliability - Bibliography", B.S. Dhillon, MicroelectronReliability, Volume 20, pp. 371-373, 1980.

"On-Line Diagnosis of Turbine Generators Using ArtificialIntelligence", A.J. Gonzalez, R.L. Osborne, and C.T. Kemper,

Technical Note, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Steam TurbineGenerator Division.

"A Pattern Recognition and Rule-Based Approach to Power System Security

Assessment", S.Y. Oh, Ph.D. Dissertation, Case Western Reserve

University, Cleveland, Ohio 1981.

"The Role of Surface Profilometry in Failure Diagnosis", T. C. Chivers

and S. J. Radcliffe, Wear, Volume 57, pp. 313-321, 1979.

"A Survey of Design Methods for Failure Detection in Dynamic Systems",

A. S. W_sky, Automatica, Volume 12, pp. 601-611, 1976.

"Technical Diagnostics", Symposium on Technical Diagnostics, London,England, November, 1981.

"Technology Advances in Engineering and Their Impact on Detection,Diagnosis, and Prognosis Methods", G. A. Whittaker, T. R. Shivers, and

G. J. Phillips, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

"Using Modified Acoustic Emission Techniques for Machinery ConditionSurveillance", H. P. Bloch, and R. W. Finley, Proceedings of theSeventh Turbomachinery Symposium, pp. 139-158.

"Using Signature Analysis for Maintenance Planning", Turbomachinery

International, pp. 42-45, March, 1978.

"Vibration Diagnosis for Turbine Generators", S. P. Ying, and E. E.

Dennison, Noise and Vibration Control Worldwide, pp. 50-52, March,1981.

I

88

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I

!

I

II

III

II

I

II

II

II

II

II

I

II

II

IiI

II

i

I

iI

iI

I

APPEND ICES

II

II

I

II

II

II

II

II

II

I

I

APPENDIX A

UCR REVIEW

Preliminary Distribution of UCRs by Component

A-I

UCR DATA REDUCTION

Total

Component

No. of

Description UCR'S

CRITICALITY

1 2 3 N*

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

II

I

AIO0

A150

A200

A330

A340

A6OO

A700

B200

B400

B600

B800

ClO0

C200

C210

C250

C270

C300

DIIO

DI20

DI30

DI40

DI50

D200

D300

Hot Gas Manifold 80

Heat Exchanger 18

Main Injector 175

Main Combustion Chamber 105

Nozzle 296

Fuel Preburner 171

Oxidizer Preburner 13

High Pressure Fuel Turbopump 457

High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump 331

Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump 59

Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump 92

Check Valves 11

Pneumatic Control Assembly 7

Solenoid Valves, Pressure Activated Valves,

Pneumatic Filter, and Helium Precharge 11Valve

Main Fuel Valve

Main Oxidizer Valve

Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve

Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve

Chamber Coolant Valve

Bleed Valves

Antiflood Valve

15

14

12

28

9

4

18

2 77 1

4 12 2

5 3 162 5

i 3 98 3

2 285 9

2 165 4

13

3 11 429 14

7 11 302 11

3 49 7

89 3

10 1

7

2 1

11

14

13

11

27

9

4

15

! *No criticality.

!

Component

A-2

UCR DATA REDUCTION (CONTINUED)

Description

TotalNo. ofUCR'S

CRITICALITY

1 2 3 N

III

ID500

D600

EO01

EO02

EIIO

E120

E130

E140

E150

E201

E202

E203

FO00

F500

F600

F700

F800

GO00

HO00HO01HO02

J200

J300

GOX Control Valve

Recirculation Isolation Valve

Main Valve Actuator

Preburner Valve Actuator

Main Fuel Valve Actuator

Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve Actuator

Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve

Main Oxidizer Valve Actuator

Chamber Coolant Valve Actuator

RVDT

Servovalve

Torque Motor/Servo

Controller

Software (Not Reviewed)

GSE, Controller

CADS Software (Not Reviewed)

FASCOS

Igniter

Electrical Harnesses

Pressure Sensor

Temperature Sensor

Actuator

8

9

23

2O

35

8

9

5

25

3

0

0

265

0

3

0

29

76

105

84

113

8

9

1 22

19

1 33

8

1 8

5

2 22

3

167 98

I 2

i0 17

62

15 77

4 70

15 96

i

1

2

14

13

i0

2

I

III

I

II

I

II

II

III

I

I

I

A-3

UCR DATA REDUCTION (CONTINUED)

Total

IComponent Description

No. ofUCR'S

CRITICALITY

1 2 3 N

I

II

II

II

II

I

II

J600

J700

J800

KIO0

K200

K300

K400

K500

K600

LO00

L200

L300

MOO0

NIO0

N200

N300

N400

N600

N700

QOOO

Q5OO

Flow/Speed Pickup

Fuel Flowmeter

Accelerometers

Fuel Line/Duct

Oxidizer Line/Duct

Drain Line

Hj_raulic Line

Pneumatic Hose/Line

Controller Cooling Duct

Static Seal

Stretch Bolts

Leakage (Joint)

Gimbal

Interconnect Hardware

Thermal Protection

Engine Vehicle Interface

POGO Accumulator

ASI, Lee Jet Orifices

Line Orifices

GSE (Not Reviewed)

Closures

13

0

7

81

32

5

3

9

5

18

7

4

9

3

5

0

3

6

0

0

0

2 I0 1

5

79

31

5

3

8

5

18

7

4

9

3

5

3

6

I

II

A-4

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

II

II

III

II

II

I

I

III

III

I

II

I

Ii

II

II

IIi

I

I

II

II

APPENDIX B

UCR REVIEW

Preliminary Listing of Failure Types by Component

!

i

!Fail.

B-1

AIO0 HOT-GAS MANIFOLD

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

!ID Recurrence Control NO.

Criticality1 2 3 N*

I

I

II

III

II

i

II

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Cracks in Liner

(a) Thermal & Vibration Loads--Redesigned(b) Not Heat Treated--Heat Treat

Weld Cracks--Defective Weld--Fab. Modified

Contamination

(a) Metal Fabrication Chips--None(b) Adhesive--None

(c) Fluid, Internal--None

G-5 Seal Joint--Gouge, Leak--Planning Change

Flange Corrosion--None

Stud Keys Broken--Vibration or Tolerances--

Plate Keys to Fit

ASI Chamber Cracks--Thermal Fatigue--None

Studs

(a) Loose-lntallation--Train Tech

tD) ulmenslon-repeatea _zre_cn-Kepalr(c) Soft Keys--Design Change

Dimension Discrepancy

(a) Powerhead Dimension Discrepancy--Open

(b) Igniter Threads--Open(c) Plug (0.005 Out of Toler.)--Fabrication--

None, Rework

Leak in MCC Ignition Joint--Open

Bent Flange (FPB) Install--None

Flange Nuts Galled--Stud Ref. Error--None

Spacer Gap--Vibration & Installation--None

Elliptical Plug Plating Missing--Unknown--None

SML Cracks--Not Config. for FPL

18

1

16

8

12

7

1

9

1

2

L

3

11

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

80

1

2

18

16

1

1

1

1

1

77

81

I 1

7

1

I-i

i*No criticality.

!

Fail.ID

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

B-2

A150 HEAT EXCHANGER

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

TotalNo.

Coil Dings(a) Bracket Clearance--Redesign(b) Tech Mishandling--Mfg. Change

Coil Crack-Fitting Material Incorrect--National Change

Coil Leak--Wear--None

Coil Clearances--Mfg.--Mfg. Changes

Coil-Bent Tubes, Clearance Problems--Planning Change

Coil Leak--Weld Incomplete--Inspection

Bypass Line--Damaged When Removed--None

Forward Vane--Inclusion--Open

3

i

1

i18

i

4

Criticalityi 2 3

i12

22

III

l

I

II

II

iI

I

II

II

III

B-3

A200 MAIN INJECTOR

Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalityID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

Heat Shield Retainers

I

II

I

III

II

I

II

I

2

3

16

15

26

25

9

5

18

2O

7

14

21

(a) Damage--New Heavy Design(b) Secondary Failure

(c) Gas Turbulence--FPL--Change

(d) Open

Baffles--Cracks, Erosion (Replace as Needed)

Lox Posts--Broken, Cracked

(a) Broken-Gas Turbulence FPL--ChangeStructure

(b) Thermal Overload--None

(C) Open

Lox Post--Erosion

(a) Blocked Orifice--Repair

(b) High Cycle Fatigue--Material Change

(c) Braze Joint--Leak--Spec Change

Lox Posts--Crooked, Bent--Inspect

Lox Posts--Plugged

Braze Joints--Leaks, Cracks--Inspect

Buffles--Loose Improper Installation--None

Heat Shield--Cracks, Thermal--New Retainers

Heat Shield--Cracks @ FPL--Unshaped Structure

Lox Post Inertia Weld-Spalling (FPL)--None

Primary Face Plate

(a) Erosion--High Cycle Fatigue--Mat'l Change

(b) Cracks--Load Distribution--Inspection

Interpropellant Plate

(a) Cracks--Heat Shield Failure--BetterRetainers

(b) Cracks--Gas Turbulence FPL--U-StructureInstalled

(c) Cracks--Open

Secondary Face Plates--Chaffed--Improper Assy.

84

193

20

3I1

3

1

3

2

1

3

1

3

31

2

8

419

3

20

21

3

31

1

1

1

3

2

1

3

1

13

3

31

2

2

!

!c-;)_

Fail.

B-4

A200 MAIN INJECTOR (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

II

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I24

6

22

23

17

19

10

11

Secondary Face Plate Retainers(a) Cracked--Insufficient @ FPL--Redesign(b) Cracked--Plugged Post(c) Not Flush--No Problem

Face Nuts (Erosion)(a) Local Over Heating--Maintenance(b) Secondary--Hot Gas Containment--Redesign(c) Mismachined Orifice--Plugged Post-Repair

344

Blocked Fuel Inlet--None

ASI Supply Line--Cracks, Liquid Embrittlement--Redesign 5

Reinforcement Ring Damage(a) Torn-lmproper Assy.--Planning Change(b) Damage--Secondary Failure--None(c) Damage-Gas Turb. @ FPL--U-Structure

Design

43

4

T-Bolts

Ca) Loose-lmproper Assy.--Design Change(b) Loose--Operation-Maintenance

4i

Strain Gauges--Inoperative--None 3

Contaminants--Metal From Other Failures--None 17

Broken Fuel Filters--Insufficient Life--Eliminate 25

175m

5

17

25

3

m

35

III

I

II

I

II

II

III

I

!

I

B-5

A300 MAIN COMBUSTION CHAMBER

Fail.

ID

1

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

I 2 3

Burst Diaphragm

I

I

i

I

I

II

III

I

I

I

2

3

7

15

17

18

i0

12

9

ii

(a) Leak-Rupture, Rise in Temp--UCR A010713

(b) Leak, Weld--Redesign Weld

(c) Leak, Improper Plug Install--PlanningChange

Irregular Hot Gas Wall

(a) Bulges--Ok--Coolant Holes Enlarged(b) Blanched, Discolored--None--Normal

(c) Hot Spots, Coolant Flow Restriction--None(d) Erosion by Contamination--None

Hot Gas Wall Liner

(a) Cracks--Restricted Cooling Channels--Enlarge Channels

(b) Cracks--Normal--None

(c) Crack in Cavity, Crown Weld--Machine

(d) Centerline Crack, Hot Gas Impingement--Under Study

MCC Coolant Channels--Cracks

(a) Delamination--Repair as Needed_bl Inherent CrackK--Nnnp nr hnmn

MCC Liner--Delamination EDCU Plating--None

Port--Plugged, Brazing Alloy Contamination--Machining

Port--Damage, Poor Reliability--Modify Engine

Coolant Inlet--Missized--Open

Turb. Drive Support Manifold--Leak by WeldRepair--Discontinue

Welds

(a) Hole Near Exit Manifold--Welding Improved(b) Microcracks--None, Normal(c) Surface Cracks--Planning Change(d) Coolant Inlet Welds Mismatch--Open

Elbow--Cracks, Internal, Radiograph Oversight--Improve

8

1

2

1516

2

2

5

8

1

3

1 71

15

16

22

5

8

1

1(}

3

2

I

!

Fail.ID

B-6

A300 MAIN COMBUSTION CHAMBER (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotalNo.

Criticality1 2 3 N

III

|I

14

16

8

19

6

Acoustic Cavity--Erosion, Hot Gas Impingement--UCRA015766

Lee Jet--Tolerance--Planning Change

Strut Assy.

(a) Lugs Cracked, Weld--Change Weld

(b) Clevis Worn--Open

Retainer Ring--Installed Wrong--Modify Engine

Contamination

(a) Fabrication Contaminant--Alert Personnel

(b) From Outside Engine--None

(c) Internal, Unknown--Ongoing Program

2

1

4105

D

1

2

3

2

1

4

3 98m

3

i

!

!

!

!

!

!

i

IIiI

Ii

g

I

i

B-7

A340 NOZZLE

I Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

iID

2

Recurrence Control No. i 2 3 N

Nozzle Tubes

II

I!

i

I

I

g

I

i

I

I

I

|

14

6

(a) Ruptures, Leaks--Local Overheat--Cutoff

Sequence Change 5(b) Leaks--From Previous Repairs--Repair 44

(c) Leaks--Braze Bond & Voids--RA 1607--014 Amended 18

(d) Cracks--Incorrect Braze Alloy--IL-78-CD-3139 3

(e) Cracks--Local Thermal Strains & FlowRestr.--Thicker Wall Tubes 41

(f) Cracks--Mishandling--Repair as Necessary 2(g) Ruptures--Inadequate Expm. Band Design--

Design Change 2(h) Leaks--Strains @ Braze Bonds--Fabrication

Change 36

(i) Leaks--Internal Corrosion--PlanningChange 6

(j) Leaks--Open 4

Brazing Voids on Tubes

(a) Brazing Voids--Inadequate--DoublersInstalled 7

# &_ _ ._--_-_--, --t ..., _ "v" L_.+ T ............... I.. ,tJl l--

None 4

(c) Separation of Tubes--From Previous

Repair--None 1

Nozzle Plating Failure--Inadequate--Steerhorn--

Redesign

Nozzle Fel.dline Wall Thickness Undersize--

Metal Ground--Redesign

Nozzle Tubes--Secondary Failure--Injector Post

Broke--Repair

Welds

(a) Support Bracket to Hotbend Broke--Vibration--Reinforcement i

(b) Aft Manifold Weld--Vibration & Thermal

Fatigue--None 5(c) Spot Welds--Broken From Drain Bracket--

Redesign 4

(d) Nozzle Bracket Weld Broke--Vibrations--Repair 1

(e) TPS Spot Welds Broke Welds--InadequateWelds--None i

544

15

3

412

2

33

64

7

4

1

2

I

B-8

A340 NOZZLE (CONTINUED)

!!

IFail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticalit X

i 2 3

i

II

15

i0

19

(f) Broken DFI Bracket Welds--Vibration--Add Clips

(g) TPS Bracket Welds Fail--Added Loads--Eliminate Brackets

(h) Steerhorn Fillet Welds--TransientLoads--None

(i) Spot Welds, Fuel Supply Duct--UnspecifiedRouting--Spec. Change

(j) Spot Welds DFI, Hyd Drain--Redesign(k) Spot Welds Broken--Random Failures--

Configuration Change(I) Support Bracket Debonded--New Repair

Procedure(m) Weld Broke--Vibration--Incomplete Weld--

Repair(n) Broken Weld/Open

Outer Jacket(a) Cracks--Thermal Cycling--Reworked(b) Cracks--Fabrication--Change Fabrication

Hyd. Drain Bracket Broken--External Fire--Improved Design

Hot Band

(a) Crack #9 HB--Previous Repair--Prepared

(b) HB #9 Tube--Material Deterioration--

Drawing Change(c) HB Pinholes--Stress Corrosion--None

(d) Hyd. Drain & Hot Bend Leak--Transients--

Redesign(e) Leak, Cold Weld-lnadequate Expm. HB--

Design Change(f) HB Aft Manifold Leak-Strain Crack @

Braze--Fabrication Change

Filler Weld Wire Incorrect--Mixed Lots by

Supplier--Caution

Joint Leaks

(a) Leak @ F6.7--Seal Replaced

(b) Leak @ F6.10--Inadequate Requirements--Improved

(c) Leaks @ F17--Seal Not Positioned--None

Tubes Blocked--Contamination--Repair

2

9

1

32

11

1

4

7

2

2

i

9

2

i

I

14

1

2

9

1

3

2

11

1

4

7

3

i

2

!IIIi

II

|IiIII|I

III Fail.

B-9

A340 NOZZLE (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

IID

18

Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

TPS Bracket

I

II

l!I

|1I

II

13

25

5

20

21

26

23

27

16

17

8

12

24

(a) Broken & Spot Welds--Loads--Redesign

(b) Shifted--Open

DFI Straps Broken--Repair as Needed

TPS Foil Damage--Fab. Handling--Design Mod.

Contamination

(a) In Joint--Inadequate Cleaning--Improve

Cleaning(b) From Previous Repair--None

(c) Deposit From External Source--None

Steerhorn Fire--Operational Strains--Fabrication

Change

Insulation Damage, Loose--Interference,Thermal--Repair

Sheet Metal Seal Missing--Seal ThicknessIncreased

Joints--Misfit(a) Joint 17 Misaligned--Assembly--New Tool(b) Joint F6 & F6.4 Misaligned--Open

Drain Fan Damage--External Fire--Design Change

Temp. Sensor(a) Defective--Contamination--Replace New

Location(b) Debonded--Handling--Repair

Radimeter

(a) Defective--Contamination

(b) Debonded--Handling--Person Notified

Installation Error-Bolts Loose--Procedure

Change

Broken Studs on Nozzle Assy.--Ref. UCR A014085

Loose Bolts on Drain/Aft. Manifold--Open

4

2

i

5

21

12

1

1

1

296

11

4

4

2 285m

9

!

!

Fail.

B-IO

A600 FUEL PREBURNER

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

!!!

ID Recurrence Control

Baffles (Erosion)

NO.Criticality

1 2 3

i

2

6

(a) Erosion-Water & Ice--New DryingProcedures

(b) Erosion--High Local Mixture Ratio--

Repair

(c) Erosion--ASI Hot Gas Impingement--None(d) Erosion--Feed Coolant Channel Blocked--

Open Coolant Holes(e) Erosion--Secondary Failure--Turb. Duct--

Ref. UCR A018306

Baffles Cracked--High Mixture Ratio--ReplaceAs Needed

Lox Posts Nonconcentric, Blocked

(a) Nonconcentric--Improper Installation--Correct As Needed

(b) Slag Blockage--Reworked(c) Nonconcentric--Thermal Distortion--R&D

(d) Blocked--Installation--Reworked

Lox Posts Erosion

(a) Erosion--Water & Ice--New DryingProcedure

(b) Nibbling--Temp. Spikes, High MixtureRatio--Repair

(c) Erosion--Contamination--Repair as Needed

(d) Crack in Oxidizer Post--Alternate Design

Face Plate Erosion

(a) Erosion--Flow Inpingement--DivergentLiner Installed

(b) Erosion--Water & Ice--New DryingProcedure

(c) Box Pin Missing--Erosion--Repair

(d) Erosion--Slag In Fuel Anulus--ImproveDesign

(e) Bowing Plate--Welding--Repair(f) Erosion--Fabrication Debris--None

(g) Erosion--Blocked Coolant Orifice

(h) Erosion--Unknown or Open

(i) Erosion--Secondary Failure--Ref. UCR A018288

1

14

I

1

6

3

6

11

I

7

7

Face Plate Cracks--Low Cycle Fatigue--HotGas--Divergent Liner Added 2

2

1

37

2

1

4

2

1

1

1

i

1411

!

!

IigI

II!I!

I

II Fail.

B-11

A600 FUEL PREBURNER (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

IID Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

m

I!Il

m

IiiI

Ii

i0

12

13

14

15

Face Plate Deposits--Slags, Hot Gas Flow--

Divergent Liner Added

Liner

(a) Cracks--Overheat--Install DivergentLiner

(b) Erosion--Fuel Annulus Restrictions(c) Erosion Unknown

Elliptical Plug Locked--jam Not InstalledWrong--Repair

Elliptical Plug

(a) Erosion--Direct Hot Gas Flow--RevisedInstallation

(b) Erosion--Ring Installed Wrong--Repair

32

Coolant Holes(a) Plugged--Metal Braze Flux Contam.--

Braze Discontinued(b) Blocked High Mixture Ratio, Slag--

Repair as Neededtc) rluggea wl_n were wlre--improper

Installation--Repair(d) Plugged During Cleaning--Change Procedure

Moly--Shield Cracks Thermal Strains/PressureLoads--None 9

Fuel Sleeve

(a) Hole Cracks--Water & Ice--Change DryingProcedure

(b) Hole--Decayed c/o Purge-Change ShutdownProcedure

(c) Cracks--Open

Contamination(a) Contamination in Coolant & Buffles--

External Source--None(b) Contamination--Wire Brush Pneumatic Tool--

Eliminate Tool

(c) Contamination--Introduced During Rework--Alert Field Oper.

(d) Contamination--Unknown(e) Contamination--Loose Retainer End--

Design Change

621

32

I

Fail.

B-12

A600 FUEL PREBURNER (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

I

!

!ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I16

17

18

19

2O

21

22

23

24

25

Liner Exit Mismatched--Mfg.--Rework

Air Damp Cap Undersized--Thermal Loads--None

Inspection Crack-Pressure Cycled (One Engine)--Eng. Removed

Igniter Cracks--Hot Gas Recirculation--None

ASI Done Cracks--Hot Gas Recirculation--None

Support Pins

(a) Missing--Misinstalled--Improve Procedure,

Design Rod(b) Extra Pins--Misinstalled

Coolant Holes Cracked--Distress--Procedure

Change

Plug Weld Closure Eroded--Excess Braze--

Procedure Change

Baffle Weld--Crack in Nicro Filler--

Penetration--Welds Improved

Elliptical Washer Cracks--Residual Stress--

Repair

4

1

1

19

3

15

1

171

193

2

15

m

2 165 4

i!II|

|I

/ •

I

!I

I

i!

I

i! Fail.

B-13

A700 OXIDIZER PREBURNER

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

IID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

|I

1III

!

Ii

8

Lox Posts

(a) Slight Melting--Normal After PFC Tests--None

(b) Erosion--Contamination in Fuel Annulus--None

Lox Orifices Cracks--Hot Gas Recirculation--None

Lox Post, High Eddy Reading--Work Hardened--

Spec Change

Liner Erosion--Contamination in Fuel Annulus--None

Dome--Void--None

Welds

(a) Weld--Buildup--Revised Drawing

(b) Weld #3 Hairline Crack--Open

Lox Post Support Pin Dislodged Installation

Contamination From Fuel Filter External toEngine--Eliminate Filter

Contamination From Heat Shield Failure--Redesign 1

13

1

2

2

113

II

It|I

Fail.

B-14

B200 HIGH-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

!ID Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

Liftoff Seal

(a) Leakage--Contamination in BushingGroove--None

(b) Dimension Discrepancies--Mfg.--Supplier Notified

(c) Low Noise Load--Not Repeating--Repair

Fishmouth Seal

(a) Rubbing or Cracks--Overheat of Turb.

Bearing Support--Redesign(b) Cracks--Thermal Caused--Redesign(c) Yielding--Inherent Thermal Stress--

Ref. UCR A011185

(d) Rubbing--Turbine Blade Platform--

Temperature--Redesign

(e) Gouged--Secondary Fail, Dampers--None(f) Erosion--Temp. From ASI--Coolant Hole

Enlarged

Labyrinth Seals

(a) Cracks, Rubbing @ Teeth--High CycleFatigue--Clearance Changed

(b) Failure Unknown?

(c) Seal Configuration--Vib, Suction Low,

Procedure Changed(d) Erosion--Contamination--None

Seals

(a) Groove Out of Tolerance--ThermalGradients--Maintenance

(b) Break Torque High--Rubbing of Seals(Interstage)--None

(c) Contaminant on F/U Seal--Unknown--None

(d) Fractured Hydrogen Embrittlement--None(e) Binding G-6 Seal Improper Install.--

Planning Change

(f) Tip Seal Damage--Secondary FailureContaminated--Fix

(g) Tip Seal--Overheat Fatigue--MaterialChange

(h) Tip Seal Gauges--Cracked Housing PilotLip--Redesign

(i) Max. Leak Rate--Old Configuration--NewConfiguration

5

4

2

66

2

2

1

2

9

8

16

3

3

3

1

2

1 4

2 2

2

2

2

1

|

!!

I

II

!

!i!

i

!

I

|

I

i

!I

Fail.

B-15

B200 HIGH-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP iCONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

IID Recurrence Control NO.

Criticalityi 2 3 N

!I

!

i

|

l

!I

I,|

I

!

(j) Seal Separating--Secondary Failure 2(k) Kel-F Seal Damage--Retainer Motion--

Redesign 2

(1) Seal Crack/Leak--Low Cycle Fatigue--None 1

(m) G5 Seal Grooves Stained--Residual Com-

bustion Products--None 2

in) Pitting on G-5 Seal--Secondary--Ref.UCR A014015 1

(o) Kel-F Seal Failure--Secondary--SpecialInspection 1

(p) Broken Seals--Undetermined 3(q) Delaminated Seal--Inadequate Cleaning--

Material Change iJr) Leak Joint F-4--Oversize Groove--

Planning Change i

Turbine Blades--Erosion

(a) Erosion, Burnt--Secondary Failure--Ref. UCR A016031

(b) Erosion, 1st Stage--Transient ThermalEnvironment--RedesiQn

(c) Erosion--Rubbing, Overspeed--None(Normal)

(d) Erosion--Thermal Environment--Redesign

Blades--Cracked, Damage(a) Deformed/Drawings--Contamination--Seal

Redesign

(b) Cracked Blade--Combined HCF/LCF--Inspection

(c) Blade Failures, Premature Cutoff--FPB

Configuration--None, Unique Conf.

(d) Cracked Shunks--Low Cycle Fatigue--None

ie) Fracture--Moisture--New Drying Procedureif) 2nd Stage Damage--Dislodged Damper--

Ref. A013999

Turbine Platform Erosion--ASI Temp.--Redesign& Coolant Holes Enlarged 12

1

1

2

5

1

21

11

II

I

B-16

B200 HIGH-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

I

II

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

TotalNo.

Criticality1 2 3

i8

10

12

13

14

Sheet Metal

(a) Cracking--Fitup Weld Variation--Inspect 8

(b) Crack in Turbo Shroud--High Cycle

Fatigue--Material Change I(c) Crack--Secondary Failure 1

(d) Cracking--Full Power Level (FPL)--Monitor 2

(e) Crack-Weld Bead Notch--Design Change 2(f) Cracks--Built in Insufficiency--Redesign 35

Inlet/Discharge

(a) Linear Cracks--Overstressed--Spec Change 1

(b) Cracks--High Cycle Fatigue--Monitor 2

(c) Cracks--Insufficient Joint Strength--Spec. Change 2

(d) Damage--Open 1

1Synchronous Vibration--Unknown--Limit Unbalance

Vanes

(a) Turbine Edge Damage--Debris, SecondaryFailure--Ref. A012653

(b) Erosion, FPB Malfunction--UCR A004402(c) Erosion, ist Stage--High/Low Cycle

Fatigue--Material Change(d) Burn Through--Secondary Failure--

Ref. UCR A016031(e) Nick--Weld Operation--Rework(f) Erosion, Hot Preburner Start-Limit

Established(g) Hole--Open(h) Erosion--Rapped Gas Pocket--Life Limit

Established(i) Material Missing--Open

Rub Ring Warped--Misinstalled--Notified Person

Contamination(a) Self-Generated--No Problem(b) Installation--None(c) Unknown, Minor, Gold--None(d) Bearing Debris--None(e) Spring Debris--Vibration--None(f) Blade Rubbing Redesign(g) Heat Shield Damage--Secondary, UCRAOI5968(h) Unknown--Suspect Seal Wear(i) Ref. UCR A004585

5

12

26I

21

5

5I

ii22

35

1

2

21

1

I

3

6

22

512

251

21

5

I

II

I!II

iI

t

I

I

II

I

Fail.

B-17

B200 HIGH-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalityID

16

Recurrence Control No. i 2 3 N

Struts/Posts

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

(a) Cracks--Sheet Metal Fitup & WeldVariations--Inspect

(b) Cracks--High Cycle Fatigue, FPL--Posts Modified

(c) Cracked--Oversized Electrode Repair

(d) Cracks--Weld Bend Notch--Design Change

Nickel Insulation Damage--Repair as Needed

Bolt Holes Cracks--Internally Induced--

Redesign Turbine

Impeller Broken--Internal Rubbing--Material

Change

Bellows Shield

(a) Cracks--Thermal Spikes--Inspect

(b) Crack--High Cycle Fatigue--ECR 09689

(c) Crack--Machining--None

(d) Weld Crack--Tolerances--Change Planning(e) Cracks--Open

T/A Manifold

(a) Cracks--Thermal Gradients--Repair

(b) Damage--Weld Failure--Planning Change

Bearing Balls(a) Thrust Ball Cracks--Dry Lube Overheat--

Maintenance

(b) Loose--Improper Swage--Planning Change

(c) Streaks Eccentric Wear--Tooling--Correct

(d) Wear--Cantom. Unknown?

Shaft Insert Wear with Balls--Ref. UCR A003411

Bearing Race(a) Wear--Contamination--None

(b) Scoring--Outer Race Preload--Ref. A011480

(c) Cracked--Misalignment Planning Change

Turbine End Ring

(a) Cracks--Sheet Metal & Weld Variations--Maintenance

(b) Plating & Peeling--Ambiguous ReworkSpecs--Change Specs.

47

1533

9

8

47

1433

9

8

31

41

2

1

2

1

B-18

B200 HIGH-PRESSUREFUELTURBOPUMP(CONTINUED)

IiI

Fail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N

!26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

Coolant Liner Bulged High Pressure--ThickerLiners

Dog Bone Wt. Fragmented--High Cycle Fatigue--Specs Change

Cav. Sense Line Damage--Installed Wrong--Redesign

Slag Erosion G-5 Ft. Fuel Annulus--Improved

Design

Subsynchronous Vibration(a) Increasing--Pump End Imbalance--Limit

Allowable(b) High Vib--Wear on Preload Springs--

Seals Modified

Shaft Travel(a) Excessive--Unknown Reason--None(b) Excessive Wear on Balance Piston

Orifice--OK(c) Low--None--Within Toler,

Fuel Drain Leak--Excessive--None (WithinNew Specs)

Fuel Discharge Part Crack (Weld)--Penetration--

Planning Change

Preload Springs Worn--Vibrations--InterstageSeal Change

Blacking Pin

(a) Sheared--High Torque--Planning Change(b) Missing--ASI High Temp.--New Material

Diffuser

(a) 2nd Stage Broken--Interference Fit--

Planning Change(b) Broke--Overaging During Heat Treat--

Repair

(c) Gouge--Machining--Alert Tech

8

32

2

8

3

22

2

2

,

I

III

i

JI

t

iII

|I

!

I

B-19

B200 HIGH-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

I

|Fail.

ID

37

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3

Nozzle Cracks

II

!

!

IiII

III

II

38

39

40

41

42

44

45

46

47

48

(a) Crack--Thermal Low Cycle Fatigue--Change FPB

(b) Erosion--High Transients--Redesign

High Accelerometer Signals

(a) Vibration (16g) Cavitation Wrong Labyrinth

Seal Conf.--Procedure Change(b) High Levels--Unknown--None

Inlet Cap Nut

(a) Crack/Erosion-ASI Temperature--Redesign

Saureisen Material Washed Out--ASI Temp.--Cool Hole Mode

Nuts & Washers

(a) Missing From Shield--Unknown--InterimDesign

(b) Loose Nut--Typical--None(c) Discharge Bolt Loose--Open(d) Lugs Missing--Open

HPFT (Water Contamination)

(a) Water Trapped in Pump--None

(b) Water in Bellows--New Drying Procedure(c) Moisture in Bearing Support--None

Inlet Failure--Pump Cavitation--RequirementsChange

Bearing Support(a) Crack--Open

(b) Crack--Insufficient Joint Strength--Limits Estab.

Missing Damper--Damaged Blades--Open

Dimension Discrepancies--Afterburn--New Specs

Seal Tabs

(a) Cracked--Load--Redesign

(b) Missing--Hot Gas Impingement--Redesign

13

1

1

457

2

2

3 Ii

13

429I

14

I

I

B-20

B400 HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP

Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

I!

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

|

2

Beari

(a)(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

ngs--Balls

Discoloration--Superficial--None 2

Spalling--Transient Axial Forces--Redesign 14

Surface Distress & Spalled--BearingLoading--Solid Film Lab. Added 14

Undersized Ball--Loading Condition--Solid Film Lab 4

Surface Distress, Wear--Secondary Fail.--UCRAO06806 1

Gold Contamination--Temp. Aggravationof AU Plate--Studies 1

Surface Distress--Fluid Jet Impinge onCage--Redesign 2

Spalling/Surface--Distress--Bearing &Vib. Problems IL 170TM-1594 4

Spalled/Undersized--Open 3

Beari

(a)

(b)

(c)(d)

(e)(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(J)(k)

7

Beari

(a)(b)

2

7

11

4

ng Cage/Cartridge

Contamination in Cartridge--ImprovedCleaning 5 5

Fretting--High Transient Axial Loads--

Acceptable 2 2

Cage Delamination--Drawing Change I 1Cage Frayed--Fluid Environment--LimitEstablished 11 11

Cage Damage--Machining--None I 1

Cage Delamination--Loading Condition--IL 170TM-1594 3 3Wear/Cartridge--Secondary Failure--A006806 i ICartridge Dry--Lubeworn-Bearing Loading--IL 170TM-1594 2 2Cage Delamination Fluid Jet Impinge--Redesign i iCage Delamination--Open i IRub Mark--Bearing & Vib.--IL 170TM-1594 i i

ng Races

Wear--Loading Condition--IL 170TM-1594 4

Inner Race Raised--Bearing & VibrationIL 170TM-1594 1

Isolator Fretting--Insufficient Clamping Load--None

4

1

I

!

!

IlII

!Ii

!i!I

I

II,

! Fail.

B-21

B400 HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

IID Recurrence Control

Total CriticalityNo. 1 2 3

Impeller

I

IIl

I

Ii

I

III

i

6

7

8

9

IN

11

(a) Rust Deposits--Moisture--Precaution(b) Cavitation Erosion--Normal--None

(c) Rubbing Secondary Failure--UCR A004664

27

1

Primary Seal

(a) Breakway Torque High--Rubbing of Seal--

Spec. Change

(b) Yield of Seal--Design Change(c) Leakage--Ref. UCR A006374

322

Tip Seal--Breakaway Torque High--No Problem 2

K-Seal Leak-lmproper Installation--PersonnelLateral 2

Labyrinth Seal

(a) Metal Contam. @ Teeth--Planning Error--Change

(b) Rubbing--Paddles Oversized--PartElevated

(a)'Seal Wear--Old Shaft Sleeve--New Design

(b) Secondary Seal, Leak--Roughened ShaftSleeve--New Material

(c) Seal Leak--Improper Installation--

Planning Change

(d) Int. Seal Pressure Dropped--Coolant

Blockage--Redesign

(e) Pits on Seal Washer Crack--ImproperStaking Tool--New Tool

(f) Seal Groove to Deep--Inspection Advised

1

2

1

1

1

2

Bellows Shield(a) Scratches--Normal Installation--None(b) Crack Thermally Induced--Design Change(c) Compressed Improper Installation--

Adhere

I

2

1

1

12

iII

B-22

B400 HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

Ii

ID

12 Nozzle Vane

Recurrence Control NO.Criticality

1 2 3 N

I

13

14

15

17

(a) Erosion--Installation Damage--None 1 1(b) Cavitation Wear--Normal--None 2 2(c) Erosion--c/o Purge Eliminated--None i I(d) Eroded--Hot Gas Imbalance--OPB/FPB

Modified i I(e) Erosion--FPB Injector Failure--None i I(f) Metal Folded Over Vane--Machining--None I i(g) Erosion--Modified Start Sequence--

Modify OPOV Command I i(h) Crack--Erosion--Open 3 3

Shaft Sleeve Wear--Old Configuration--New Design 1

Contamination(a) Metal Contam.--Unknown--None 23(b) Krytox Excess-Leak--Techs Alerted 4(c) Contam. From Other Failures--None 4(d) Contam. From Turbine Damper Failure--None i(e) Gold Rub on Housing--High Thrust @

Shutdown--None 2(f) Contamination Material During Machining--

Personnel Alerted 7

(g) Gold Splatter on Turb. Blades--Bondingof AU (Temp.)--Study 8

(h) Oil Contam.--Transport of Aircraft--Add Inspection i

(i) Metal--Filter Breakdown ECR 10370 & 10347 i(j) Contamination--Improper Staking Tool--

New Tool I

Hi

23331

2

gh Break Torque(a) Rubbing of Seals--None 18 18(b) Out of Spec.--Old Shaft Sleeve--New

Configuration i I(c) Primary Seal Rubbing--Heated Krytox--

New Spec. 2 2(d) Yield of Primary Seal--New Design 2 2(e) Particles of Dampers Floating--Change

Dampers 2 2

Strut Assembly(a) Damage--Assenbly/Disassembly--None 3(b) Erosion--Leaky OPOV--UCR A017523 I(c) Cracks--Unknown--Estimate Limits 6

I

III

I

iII

II'

I

!iII

Fail.

B-23

B400 HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit XID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

18

19

2O

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Drain Line(a) Mux Leakage Exceeded--UCR A011981(b) Draw Line Tan Tube Leak--Unknown--

Material Change

Housing(a) Pin Leak @ Pump Hsg.--Lock Wire Hole

Inadequate--Redesign(b) Rubbing--High Thrust Loads @ Shutdown--

Study

(c) Cracks--Unknown/Open--Plan to DetermineLife Limits

Turbine Blades--Cracks

(a) Cracks--High Cycle Fatigue--PeriodicInspection

(b) Chips--Fabrication/Manufacturing--None(c) Broken--High Cycle Fatigue--Design

Improved(d) Slay & Cracks--Main Injector Failure--

None(e) Damage--Bearing Loading Condition--

IL-£/U I PI-13_H

Blades Erosion

(a) Erosion--Unknown--None(b) Erosion--Secondary Failure--UCR A010631

(c) Erosion--Hot Start--OPOV Command Change

Sheetmetal(a) Burnt--Main Injector Failure--None(b) Cracking Establish Life Limits

Shaft Rubbing--High Axial Thrust--Design Change

Locks Broken--Ductile Overload--Change

Eccentric Ring--Installation Error--None

Bearing Support(a) Fretting--Not Detrimental--Add Preload

Spring(b) Pitting--Open

Inducer Vane Out of Contour Handling--PersonAlerted

1

i

I0

19

2

1

1

1

i

i

I0

19

2

1

1

I

i

5

1

2

i

3

2

i

B-24

B400 HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

J

i

iFail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

1 2 3

!28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

Diffuser Vane Damage--High Cycle Fatigue--Redesign

Jet Ring

(a) Flow Tubes Damaged--High Cycle Fatigue--Life Limits Established

(b) Cracks Residual Welding Stress--None(c) Obstructed--Open

Wave Preload Spring

(a) Improper Installation--Planning Change(b) Worn Spring--Secondary Failure°-

UCR A006806

(c) Spring Land Worn--Loading Problems--IL-170TM-1594

Carbon Seal Ring Worn--Coolant Blockage--Design Mod

Turb. Blade Dampers Broken--High CycleFatigue--Revision

Subsynchronous Vibration(a) Bearing Loading Condition--

IL-170TM-1314

(b) Bearing & Vibration Problems--Development Plan IL-170TM-1594

Synchronous Vibrations

(a) Bearing & Vibration Problems--IL-170TM-1594

(b) Instrumentation Problem--None(c) Inadequate Balance--Green Run

Isolater Dri Lube Wear--Secondary Failure--None

Nuts & Washers(a) Nut Cavitation--Installation/Disassembly--

Maintenance

(b) Nut Cavitation--Pumping Action of Lobes--

Design Change

(c) Washers Broken--Improper Staking Tool--New Tool

7

2

1

2

1

3

I

!I

I

II

l

I

tII

i

I|

,L Fail.

B-25

B400 HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

!ID

37 Roll

Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

Pin Cracked--Suspect Grain Bonding

,

II

I

i!I

i

38

39

4O

41

42

43

44

45

Carbides--None

Turbine Disk

(a) Damage Surface--Jet Ring SecondaryFailure--UCR A006735

(b) Cracks on Au Plating--Low CycleFatigue--None

(c) 2nd Stage Rubbing--High Thrust Loads @Shutdown--Study

G-3 Area, Water Trapped--New Drying Procedure

Liver Erosion--Open

Bolt Hole Flange Cracks--Open

Weld Cracks--Fatigue--Add Dye Penetrant

Inspection

Turbine Inlet

(a) Plating Worn--High Thrust Loads--None

_ _1 _a----_ lil_ _C_C_----_III_I UVC _Q_ I1_

(c) Cracks--Determine Life Limits (Fatigue)

Fir Tree

(a) Gold Missing--Poor Adhesion--None(b) Cracks in Gold--Open

Shaft Travel--Bearing Loading--IL-170TM-1594

1

8

i

331n

7

1

1

2

ii 302m

11

I

III

Fail.

B-26

B600 LOW-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X IID Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

Turbine BladesI

4

6

10

11

12

13

!4

(a) Dings--Engine Generated Ding--None(b) Dent--Fabricated--None

Pump Inlet Gauge--Open

Bearings--Improper Installation--PlanningRevision

Labyrinth Seal Rubbing--Max. Torque

Excessive--Redesign 10

Liftoff Seal

(a) Carbon Nose Rubbing--High Torque--None(b) Carbon Nose Failure--None

(c) Squeal--Rubbing--None

Turbine Inlet Nicks--Temp. Sensor Debonded--A017772

Vibration(a) Suction Pressure--None Found(b) Synch Vibration(c) Rubbing @ Labyrinth Seals--Design Change

Nickel Insulation(a) Ruptured--Mishandled--Silicon Repair(b) Split--Engine Generated Ding--None(c) Crack--Moisture Entry--Field Repair(d) Insulator Boots Loose--Installation--None

Contaminated

(a) Suspect Dust Cover--Awareness

(b) Contamination--Inadequate Clearing--Alert

2

2

Excessive Torque

(a) Torque Anomality--Not Failure(b) Copper Plate Buildup--Labyrinth Seal

Redesign(c) Excessive Torque--None

Housing Copper Plate Damage--Unknown Repair

Omniplate Crack-Previous Repair Damage--None

I

II

Ii

Ii

II

I

Im

t

|

I

II

Fail.

B-27

B600 LOW-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

IID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I

I

I

III

i

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Locking ]ubs Loose--Improper Handling--Tech Alert

Fuel Feed Leak--Thermal Cycling--None,Repair

Impeller/Inducer(a) Scuff Mark--Not Detrimental

(b) Ding--Open

R&V Patch Loose--Moisture None, Repair

Nuts--Rub Marks--Open

Stator Shroud Low Pressure Misbraze--

Revise Drawing

Nozzle

(a) Erratic Pressure--New Nozzle Conf.--Not Detrimental

(b) High Pressure Drop--Excessive NozzleBlock--Rework

(C) Hlgh Pressure Drop--Open

Leak Not Detrimental--None59

1

1

u

3 49 7

I

I

i

IIII

Fail.

B-28

B800 LOW-PRESSURE OXIDIZER PUMP

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

!

!I

ID Recurrence Control NO.Criticality

i 2 3 N

Bearing Balls!

2

3

6

7

9

i0

ii

12

(a) Worn Thrust Balls--High Torque--Track Bearings

(b) Coating Contaminated During Installa-tion, Notify Techs

i

i

16

i

Bearing Cage Friction--None

Bearing Journal Vibration--JournalUndersized--Planning Change

Seals Groove Oversized-Hand Lapping--Planning Change

Stator Silver Plate--Lifted--Open

Bolt Hole Rust Deposits--Iron Bolts--Replace

Contamination(a) Metal--Transducer Base--Ref. UCR A012678(b) Steel Chip--Main Vane Assembly--None(c) Teflon Pieces @ Ring Nozzle--Tool--None(d) Shop Debris--Ref. UCR A015786(e) Contamination--Unknown Source--Awareness

(f) Coatings on Bearings--Glove Fragments--Mfg. & Inspect

(g) Silver in Turbine Section--None

(h) Contamination-Discharge Duct Failure--UCR A011506

(i) Grease--Assembly Error--None

(j) Metal on Rotor Arm--Open

(k) Deposit on Nozzle Vanes & Surface--Open

4213

16

High Break Torque(a) Ball Speed Variation at Low Speed--OK(b) Bearing Ball Wear--Truck Bearing Wear(c) Cage-Bearing Friction--None(d) Silver in Turb Section--None

31

171

Shaft Travel

(a) Bearing Wear--Track Wear

(b) High Axial Load--Reduced m/s Axial Thrust(c) Wear--Not a Failure--R&D

14

2

Erroneous Cutoff-FASCOS Inaccurate Redline--New Red Line

i

I

16

1

32I2

16

31

171

I

II

!

I

!

B-29

B800 LOW-PRESSURE OXIDIZER PUMP

I Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

IID

13 Flange

Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

i

I

I

I

14

16

17

18

(a) Undercut on Surface--Misalign--None(b) Raised Metal, Nick--Open

Inducer Leading Edge Rolled Over--Improper

Handling--None

Plating Chipped--Interference Fit--Revise Spec.

Shim Discoloration--Open

Pitting on Spline--Open

i

2

1

i

1

I92 89 3

I

I

I

i

II

i

Ii

I

I

Fail.

B-30

CI00 CHECK VALVES

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

I

II

ID Recurrence Control NO.Criticality

1 2 3

FPB Purge Check Valve Leak-Dri-Lube From

!Flange Bolts--Alert

OPB Purge Check Valve Leak--Leak Not Verified

Oxidizer Dome Purge Check Valve

(a) Reverse Leak--Contamination, UnknownSource--None

(b) Leak--Not Verified

Fuel Purge Check Valve Leak--MomentaryStuck--None

Fuel Purge Ch. Valve Pressure Spike--Closed?

FPB ASI Check Valve

(a) Leak Sticky Poppet, Fabrication, Add

Inspection

(b) Seat Leakage--Contamination--None(c) Leak--Open

OPB ASI Check Valve Leak--Poppet BoreInterference Inspect 1

111

i0

2

1

D

i

i

II

III

II

IIi

Ii

II

I

II

Fail.

B-31

C200 PNEUMATIC CONTROL ASSEMBLY

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

IID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

i

Il

III

2

3

4

Helium Burst Diaphragm--DVS Test Induced

Fatigue--Test Change

Vent Seat, DVS Testing Leak--Inter. Seal PurgePav--A017367 2

Inlet Seat--Suspect Instrument Error--New TestProcedure

Pneumatic Solenoid Leak--Seal Impressions--None, Repair

Contamination

(a) White Residue in Inserts--GalvanicCorrosion--None

(b) Lub Oil in PAYs--Source Unknown--Cleanliness

i

1

7

1

7

I

i

I

II

I

I

II

B-32

C210, C250, C270, C300-SOLENOID VALVES, PAV, PNEU FILTER,HELIUM PRECHARGEVALVE

I

II

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N I

5

6

Emergency Shut Solenoid Sent Leak--AllowableLeak Rate

FPB Purge PAV Inlet Seat Leak--Not Substan-tiated--OK

Fuel Purge PAV (Pressure Activated Valve)(a) Leak--Leak Rate Allowable--Change Limits(b) Inlet Seat Leak--Transient Contam.--Clean

and Use

HPOT Inter. Purge PAV

(a) Leak--Inlet Seat Distortion--Poppet SealRedesign

(b) Dynamic Seal Leak--DVS Test Induced--None

PAV Internal Leak--Open

Man Chamber Dome PAV Vent Leak--Trans.Contamination--None

4

I

i

III II

1

I

I

I

I

I

I1

I

II

II

II

I

iI Fail.

B-33

Dl10 MAIN FUEL VALVE

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

IID

Leaks

Recurrence Control No.Criticalit X

1 2 3

I

I

I

III

Il

I

!

4

5

6

(a) Ball Seal Leak--Scaling Factor Error--Person Alerted

(b) Valve to Actuator Misclock--Change toStd. Height Blind Tooth

(c) Internal--Suspect Contamination--NotDetermined

(d) Ball Seal Leak, Downstream Temp High--Contaminated--Leak Check

(e) Leak, Static Seal--Defect--IsolatedIncident

(f) Primary Seal Leak--Dri--Film Particles--None

Throat Sleeve Nicks--No Problem

Housing Crack--Thermal Stress @ Mfg.--AddInspection

Metal Contamination--Unknown Source--None

Bearing

(a) Washer Damage__V_+_^- _-_ ....

None, Isolated

(b) Race Cracked--Not Determined Why

Plating Separation--Handling Damage--Material Change

Broken Cam Follower Guide--Cryogenic Temp.--None I

15 14m

1

I

!

I

!

I

Fail.

B-34

D120 MAIN OXIDIZER VALVE

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

I

!I

ID

Leaks

Recurrence Control NO.Criticality

1 2 3 N

I(a) Deformed Bellow--Unknown--None, Isolated

Case(b) Ball Seal Leak--Contamination--Unknown

Source--None(c) Ball Seal Leak--Dri-Lube on Surface--OK(d) Ball Seal Leak Installation Position

Marginal--Redesign

i

i1

1

2Inlet Discharge Sleeves Nicked--Debris--OK

Bearing Retainer Hub Broke--Fatigue--Mov Spec. Change 2

IContamination Source Unknown--Inspection

Follow Guide Omitted in Assembly--Mfg.Oversight--Notify Person

Drift Open Installation Error Procedures

Change

Bearing, Rusty--Isolated Case--None

Excessive Pressure @ Hotfire--UCR A008305

Water in Joint 07--Inadequate Closure--New Closure I

14 13

I

11

1

1 1

i

III

III

I

II

II

Ii

I

I

!

!

B-35

D130 FUEL PREBURNEROXIDIZER VALVE

I Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

IID Recurrence Control No. i 2 3 N

Leaks--Ball Seal

I

!i

I

II

I

l

2

(a) Ball Seal Leak--Particle Contamination,Unknown--None

(b) Leak--Cracked Ball Seal, Poor Material

Spec. Change

(c) Leak--Discrepant Bellows--None, IsolatedCase

Leak (Other)

(a) Suspect Leak--Marginal Bellows--Spec.Change

(b) Internal Leak--Particle Backflow--

Closing Rate Change

Ball Seal Damage--ASI Combustion Backflow--Personnel Alert

Contamination--Unknown Source--None

Bolt Stretch Error Caused Low Flow Rate--

Personnel Alert

Suspect Over Pressurization--UCR A008305

Excessive Flowrate During Test--Normal

2

I

i13

2

1

2

1

1

12m

1

I

II

lIII

Fail.

B-36

D140 OXIDIZE PREBURNEROXIDIZER VALVE

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

I

II

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

Ball Seal Leak, Hot Fire--Flow Reversed

ICombustion--Software Change i

Flow Reading Low--None 1

Ball Seal Melting--ASl Combustion Backflow--Software Change 20

Contamination(a) Secondary From Steerhorn Failure--

UCR A010997

(b) Oily Substance on Flange--Unknown--None I

Studs Overtorqued--No Failure--None 2

Overpressure--UCR A008305 i

Excessive Flow Rate--Incorrect Test--Spec Change I

Wall Sleeve Scratches--Unknown Source--Not Detrimental I

28

2O

27 -i

III

I

IIl

D150 CHAMBER CHART VALVE !Fail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.

Slider Corrosion--Brown Dust None, OK

Criticality1 2 3

I!

2

3

4

Roll Pin Broken Interference--Installation

Changed

Studs

(a) Overtorqued Improper Tool Use--TrainPerson

(b) Overtorqued--Unknown--Repai r

Contamination

(a) Metal Clip--Handling--None, Clean(b) Unknown Source--Clean

I39

I

IlI!

I

!

B-37

D200 BLEED VALVE

II

I

Fail.ID

1

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticalitx

1 2 3

Leak--Isolated Incident--None 2 2

I!

LVDT VoltageRedesign

Oscillation--Vibration, Fatique--2

4

2

4

ID300 ANTIFLOOD VALVE

IFail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticalitx

1 2 3

IIi

I

II

i

III

LVDT & Wiring

(a) Output Voltage Low--Wire Fatigue--Spec. Change

(b) Output Voltage Low-Handling Damage--None

(c) Position Signal Eratic--Broken Probe,Vibs--None

(d) Open Circuit-_High Cycle Fatigue--Hys Fillet Increased

(e) Erratic Position Indication--BrokenWire--UCR A012535

(f) Erratic Position Indication--Open

Poppet

(a) Cracked Suspect

(b) Cracked--OpenHandling--Assembly Change

Separation @ Weld--Defective--Weld ScheduleReview

Piston Spring Broke--High Cycle Fatigue--Redesign

Valve Remained Open @ Shutdown--Not Lodged--Inspection Alerted

Indicator Bolts Incorrect Type--Supplied--Notified

Contamination

(a) Particle--Tapping Debris--InspectionAdded

(b) Source Unknown--Cleanliness

i

2

18I

2 1

2

2

1

2

1

1

2

15

I

Fail.

B-38

D500 GOX CONTROL VALVE

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

!II

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I

2

Seal--Leak

(a) Leak, Reverse Flow--Seal Crack,

Machining--Drawing Change(b) Leak--Insufficient Sealing Strength--

Leak OK

(c) Leak--Source Not Determined--Inspect

(d) Leak Cracked Seal, High Cycle Fatique

Not to Print, Change(e) Seal Leak--Particle Contamination--None,

In Spec.

(f) Leak @ Part 024.1--Open

Supply Pressure Low--Open

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

8

1

2

1

1

11

i

8

II

II

D600 RECIRCULATION INSULATION VALVE

II

iFail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

1 2 3

!

2

3

4

Leak(a) Internal Leak--Allowable Rate, OK(b) Leak--Fabrication--Planning Change(c) Upper Shaft Seal Leak--Thermally

Induced, DVS Test, None

2i

LVDT

(a) Output Voltage Low--Shim Install Error

Mfg. Alerted

(b) Output Erratic--Armature Fracture,

Fatigue--Redesign

Contamination

(a) Metallic--Source Unknown--None

(b) Brown Deposits--Unknown--None

Housing to Shaft Wedging Wear--Open I9

IIi

III

I

!

!

! Fail.

B-39

EO01 MAIN VALVE ACTUATOR

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

!ID Recurrence Control NO.

Criticality1 2 3 N

I

I

I

III

II

I

Leak(a) Pin Plug Leak--Inadequate Seal--Add

Leak Test(b) Wireway Leak--Epoxy Did Not Adhere--

Process Change(c) Internal Leak--Tolerance Stackup--

Detectable in Test(d) Hyd Oil Leak--Excessive Proof Test

Cycling--None(e) Static Seal Leak--Burr Induced Scratch--

New Inspection(f) Vent Port Leak--Defective O-Ring--Open(g) Wireway Leak--Inadequate Epoxy Coverage--

Spec. Change

Hydraulic Lockup Drift--Mfg, Error--Detectable--None

Slew Rate Error--Contamination--None

Servo Switch Failed--Thermal Damage--Ref. UCR A001737

RVDT Error--Mismatch to Actuator--PersonnelAlerted

Activator Failed to Close--Design LifeExceeded

I

3

2

2

i2

2

5

2

I23

1

3

2

2

i2

2

5

2

1 22

II

II

II

Fail.

B-40

EO02 PREBURNER VALVE ACTUATOR

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

II

ID

Leaks

Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I(a) Wireway Leak--Inadequate Joint Seal-

Surface Finish Change(b) Failsafe Servoswitch Leak--Not

Determined--Replace, Detectable

(c) Wireway Leak--Epoxy Sealant Did Not

Adhere--Process Change(d) Servoswitch Leak--O-Ring Omitted--

Personnel Alerted

(e) Wireway Leak--Open

(f) Leak--Shaft Seal Surface Scratch,

Handling--Inspect Change

RVDT Channel Error--Bearing Freeplay--Configuration Change

Bent Terminal, Dielectric Test Failure--Supplier Changed

Silicone Oil Contamination on Shaft--

Unknown--Persons Alerted

Vent Port Pitting--Unknown Cause--Personnel Alerted

Pneumatic Sequence Test Failure--Open 120 19

1

1 1

6

14

1

1

I

I

II

III

I

1

III

III

D

!

B-41

El10 MAIN FUEL VALVE ACTUATOR

!

!Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalityID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

i Leaks

I

III

IIII

iil

I

DI

Ili

(a) Wireway Leak--Epoxy Did Not Adhere--

Process Change

(b) Vent Port Leak--Scratched Piston--None, Detectable

(c) Vent Port Leak--Out of Round--IsolatedCase, None

(d) Servo Valve Leak--Dirt on O-Ring,

Assembly-Alert

(e) Vent Port Leak--O-Ring Nibbled byMovement--New Backup Ring

(f) Wireway Leak--Insufficient Epoxy

Coverage--Procedure Change(g) Vent Port Leak--Open

(h) Leak--Open

Heater Blanket

(a) Damage Handling--Technicians Alerted

(b) Open Circuit--Defective Spot Welds--

Inspection Added

Servoswitch

(a) Erratic--Insulation Damage by Pitting--Persons Alerted

(b) Pull In-Drop Out Test Failure--Open

Servoswitch

(a) Erratic--Insulation Damage by Pitting--Persons Alerted

(b) Pull In-Drop Out Test Failure--Open

4 Contamination(a) Suspect Contam--UCR A018556(b) Particle in Shaft Cavity--Unknown--None

5 Position Indicator Failure--Open

6 Actuator

(a) Handling Damage-Not Determined--Procedure Change

(b) Improper Installed Warmer Insert--

Procedure Change(c) Slow to Respond--Coil Short Circuit--

Procedure Change

2 2

1 1

i I

1 1

3 3

5 5i I2 2

2 2

i i

1 11 1

1 11 1

1 11 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

!

!

B-42

El10 MAIN FUEL VALVE ACTUATOR (CONTINUED)

!

!Fail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticalit X

1 2 3 N

Actuator to Valve Mating Proc. Error--

!

!

10

11

Wrong Instructions--New Instructions 1

Hyd. Oil Wetting @ Servo-Anomaly--Tech Alerted 1

Washer and Spring Bent--Mfg. Procedure Error--Procedure Change 1

Failsafe Performance Test Failure--Open 1

Seal Damage--Housing Fab. Error--Tech Alerted 235

1

1

1 I1 33 I

!

II

I

E120 MAIN OXIDIZER VALVE ACTUATOR

!

!Fail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

1 2 3 Ni

Leak

(a) Leak--Contamination, Source Unknown--None

(b) Hyd Oil Contaminated Induced Wear--Clean

(c) Contam. Induced Cap Seal Scratches--Source Unknown--None

(d) Leak--Housing to Actuator Cylinder--Pending Analysis

Contamination

(a) Contam.--See UCR A018556

(b) Hyd. Reservoir and Supply (Facility)--Purge Added

Wireway Nut Broken--Undetermined--None

Wire Insulation Cold Flow Marks--Vibration--Not Detrimental 1

8

l

B

giiI

Ii

I

I

I Fail.

B-43

E130 FUEL PREBURNER OXIDIZER VALVE ACTUATOR

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

IID Recurrence Control No.

Criticality1 2 3 N

I

I

II

II

2

Leak

(a) Dynamic Seal--Hyd. Oil Contam. Induced

Wear--Clean and Maintain 2

(b) Seq. Valve Seal Leak--O-Ring Shift--Redesign 1

Contamination

(a) Suspect--UCR A018556 1

(b) Contam. Facility Hyd. Reservoir--

Drum Purge Added 1

Pretest Check Out FIDs--Suspect Contam.--None i

O-Ring Defect--Personnel Alerted i

Crank Failure--Obsolete Configuration--Replace 1

Sequence Valve Anomaly--Open I

9

1

1

1

1

1

11 8

I

I E140 OXIDIZER PREBURNER VALVE ACTUATOR

I

I

Fail.ID

1

Fa41ure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotalNo.

Criticality1 2 3

Forwara Servo Leak--Not Determined--OK

I

II

I

Use As Is

Contamination(a) Contamination--See UCR A018556(b) Facility Hyd. Reservoir Contam.--Drum

Purge Added

Bolts Rusty--Cosmetic Condition--Change Bolts

Actuator Would Not Close--Crank Failure,Obsolete Conf.--Replace I

5

I

B-44

El50 CC VALVE ACTUATOR

I

IIFail.

ID

Leaks

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

TotalNo.

Criticalit X1 2 3 N

I

I0

11

(a) Internal--Tolerance Stuck Up--NoneDetectable

(b) Pneumatic Seal Leak--Scratched Piston,Contam.--None, Detectable

(c) Servo Valve Leak--Not Determined--OK,Use As Is

(d) Wireway Leak--Insufficient EpoxyCoverage--Spec. Change

(e) Vent Port Leak--Damaged Orifice O-Ring--Back Up Ring Added

Contamination(a) Contam.--Source Unknown--Personnel

Alerted(b) Fac. Hyd. Reservoir Contam.--Drum

Purge Added

Post Shutdown Purge Terminated Early--O-Ring Shift--Redesign

RVDT

(a) Comparison Limit Exceeded--Engine

Flashback--None, Unique

(b) Adjustment Error, Obsolete Design,Redesign

(c) Insulation Resistance Low--None,Isolated, Detectable

Error Position FID, Suspect Contamination--None

Actuator Failure--Design Life Exceeded--Replace

Solenoid Screw Loose--Handling--InspectionAdded

Servo Coil Open Circuit--None, Isolated Case

Servo Switch Land Wire Worn--Vibration--None, OK

Spring Guide Chaffed--Material Deficiency--Material Change

Pneu. Shutdown Out of Spec--Sleeve Not PerDrawing--Check Added

I

I

2

3

i

4

i

2

I25

i

I

1

i

2

m

1 2 22

I

II

II

II

I

I

l

I

I

III

L

I

I

I Fail.

B-45

E201RVDT

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

IID

RVDT

Recurrence Control NO.Criticalit X

1 2 3 N

Coil Voltage Erratic--Design Problem--

I

I

2

New Design

Strength Test Failure--Add Insulation Tape I3

2

1

3

I

III

I

II

II

I

I

II

Fail.

B-46

FO00 CONTROLLER

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

I

IID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

TransistorI

(a) Memory Altered Ch. A or B--Lugs Too

Long--Now Measure

(b) Short Circuit--Sensitive to HighVoltage/Temp--None

(c) Ch. A P/S Shutdown--Shorted Transistor--

Inspection Faded(d) Ch. A P/S Shutdown--Trans. Shorted to

Chassis--None, Isolated

(e) 400 Hz Input Power Overload--Emitter/

Collector Short--New Requirement

Circuit Board

(a) Fails to Execute Skip Instruct.--LooseBoard--None

(b) Ch. A P/S and Halt--Inproper Board

Seating--None

(c) Noise Coupling--Ungrounded Substrate--Grd. Strap Added

(d) Ch. A Parity Error--Improper Board

Seating--Board Ht. Measure(e) Ch. B Halt--IEGB S/N 19 Card--None

Possible

Wire

(a) Open Circuit, Broken Wire--None

(b) Open Circuit, Broken Wire--Handling--Alert Mfg.

(c) Short-Pinched Wire Caused Xistor toShort-Use Tie Cord

(d) Failed Self Test--Broken Land--None

(e) Damaged Insulation--Enhanced Inspection

(f) Parity Error--Wire Fractured by Rework--None

(g) MOVA Failsake Servovalve Wire Break--

Tooling Change/X-Ray(h) Short to Chassis--Insulation Cold Flow--

Insulation Tape(i) Ch. B MFV Failure Reported--MIB Wire

Broke--None

(j) H/S Wire Output Low--Contam. Damage--None Applicable

(k) DCUA Halt--Multiple Insulation Scrapes--Defective Tool Removed

(1) DPOT Disch. Press. Fail.--Twisted, PairWire Damage--None

11

1

113

4

5

2

5

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

9

1

I

1

2

2

2

I

1

1

2

1

2

4

3

3

I

I

I

I

I

I

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

B-47

Fail.

FO00 CONTROLLER (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalityID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I

I

iI

II

III

I

I

II

i

4

5

6

8

9

i0

(m) DCUB Failed Accept. Test--Shorted Wire,Insulation--Caution Note

(n) DCUB Address Error--Pinched Wire @Closure--Procedure Change

(o) Excessive Power Draw--Power Wire--Pinched--Wire Removed

Miscellaneous Open/Short Circuit(a) Failure--Open Circuit--None(b) Failure--Short Circuit to Chassis--None(c) DCUB--Failure--Hex Inverter Short(d) Ch. B Halt--Contamination Caused Short--

None(e) Not Able to Load Memory--Short by Wire

Clippings--Add Procedure(f) Failure--Short Due to Tight Wires--

Inspection Added(g) Failure--Open Circuit--Overstrussed

IC--None

Connector Pins(a) Cannot Load Ch. A--Mismatched Pins--

Change Procedure(b) Error Reading--Broken Pin--None

Assembly Error (Miscellaneous)(a) Loss of Ch. A Power--Assembly Error--None(b) Heater Power Shorted--Careless Assembly--

Amend Instructions

Noise(a) Interrupt--Noise in Interrupt Current--

Already Handled(b) Ch. B., Temp. Calibration Low Voltage--

Noise From 500 Hz Gen.--None(c) Command Failure--Noise on 12 MHz Clock--

Add Filter

Unknown Cause(a) Various Small Problems--Unknown Cause--

None(b) Same as Above--Open

Miswired(a) Simulated +5V DC Undetected--Unsoldered

Lead--None(b) Ch. 6 6V Supply was -gV--MiB Miswire--

None

13027

82

21

48

6

I

B-48

FO00 CONTROLLER (CONTINUED)

I

!

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3

(c) Ch. B VEEI Not Copying--Miswired Pulse

!

I

11

12

13

14

15

16

Transd.--Test Change 1

(d) Failure--Incorrect Rework Wiring--None 1(e) Heater Failure--P/S Terminals Miswired--

None I

(f) Command Ch. C Failed--MiswiredConnection--None 1

(g) Int. Temp A, FID, Incorrect Resistor--

Redesign Adapter 1

(h) Command Channel C--Part Installed Wrong--Alert Person i

(i) FPOV Miscompare and Interrupt--Unsoldered

Joint--Open 1

1Defective Plating--CCV FiD--Improve Inspection

OP Amps

(a) Bad Reading--Low Op Amp Slow Rate--New

Type Op Amp 4

(b) Miscompare--Bad Op Amp--None, Replace 1

(c) Miscompare--Particle In Op Amp--New Test 2(d) Sensor Failures, Out of Range--DC Offset--

None 1

(e) A/D Conversion FIDs--Amp Failure--None 2(f) Ch. B P/S Not Power Up--Op Amp Short,

Particle Add X-Ray Test 1

1Wrong Indication--Heated Circuit--Add Jumpers

Contaminated Contacts

(a) Current Out of Tolerance--None 1

(b) MOVA Feedback Miscompare--Sockets Contam.--None 1

Diode

(a) Premature Heat--Diode, High Junct. Cap.--Change Diode 1

(b) DCUB PRI w/o PFI--Damaged Zener Diode--None i

Bad Bonding(a) Erroneous FID.--Loose Lead Bond in IC--

None i

(b) Voltage Failure--Debonded Resistor Lead--None 1

(c) Ch. A WDT2 Failure--Debonded Socket--Inspection I

1

1

1

I

1

1

3 11

2

12

1

I

I

1

1

I

II

II

II

I

Il

III

II

I

II Fail.

B-49

FO00 CONTROLLER (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

IID

17

Recurrence Control No.Criticalit X

1 2 3 N

Corrosion

II

I

III

II

18

19

20

21

22

(a) Solenoid Hold Voltage Low--CorrodedCapacitor--New Cap

(b) Pressurant Leak Rate High--CorrodingSeals--OK, None

Voltage Error--Hardware Timing Condition--S/W Patch Delay

Oscillation

(a) Miscompare Design Causes Oscill.--Ferrite Beads Added

(b) OPOV Oscillation @ Hotfire--Open

Capacitor

(a) Voltage Dropped--Capacitor Short toGrid--None

(b) A/D Conversion Failure--Defective Cap.--None

(c) Compare FIDs--Capacitor Momentary Short--None

Pressure Miscompare--PR Bridge 2mV Offset--Put Cap. in Bridge

Pressure Sensor Failure--High ResistanceConductor Path--None I

265

i

i

I ii

1

167 98

I

IF600 GSE CONTROLLER

I Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

TotalNo.

Criticalit X1 2 3 N

II

I

1

2

Two ICs bad--None Applicable

CADS Circuit Breaker Dropout, Other Equipment--Separate Power Supply

CAPS Halt--Improperly Seated Card--NoneApplicable i i

3 1 2

I

Fail.

B-50

F800 FASCOS

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

II

IID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

Cable/WireI

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

(a) FID--Intermittent Coax Cable--Redesignand Change Installation

(b) Chaffed Wires--Poor Surface Preparation

and Routing--Repair

12V Power Supply Low--Defective Resistor--None, Isolated

Failed Propagation Delay Test--CapacitorDefect--X-Ray Caps

FIDs on Ch. 2--Short Circuit in Signal

Cond. Module--Spec. Change

FIDs--Combined Accelerometer and MountResonance--None, Redundancy

Torque Anomaly--Defective Tooling--None,New Tools

Failed Stability Test--Fatigue FractureCapacitors--Better Adhesive

Contacts/Connectors(a) Connector Failed Capacitance Test--

Die Cracked @ Bonding--None(b) No Volts to Accelerometer--Poor Solder

Joint--Personnel Alerted

(c) Connector Min. Gap to Small--DrawingProblem--Change Drawing

Pressure

(a) Internal Pressure Low--Solder Crack,

Thermal Exp.--Change Material(b) Pressure Leak--Coax Connector Leak--

Change Leak Requirements

Unknown Cause(a) Intermittent FIDs--Unknown--Personnel

Alert(b) Receptacle Threads Dented--Unknown--

None

Design--Erroneous Output When Power Off--

Software Change

10

I

29

8 2

2

I

II

II

II

l

II

III

II

I

!! Fail.

B-51

GOO0 IGNITER

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalit X

IID Recurrence Control No. i 2 3 N

Ignitor Tip Cracks

II

II

II

II

II

I

Il

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

(a) Surface Cracks--Extended Service--OK,Normal

(b) Copper Tip Damage--Extended Service--Past Design Life

(c) Output Failure--Suspect PhysicalDamage--None

Igniter Tip Erosion(a) Tip Erosion--Off Combustion, ASI

Contamination--OK As Is

(b) Tip Erosion--Off Normal Combustion--None, Replace

No Spark--Contamination (ASl)--None OK As Is

Igniter Tip Melting--ASl Contamination--OK As Is

Insulator Crack(a) Cracked Ceramic--ASl Contamination--

None, OK As Is(b) Ceramic Flaking--Off Normal Combustion--

Repair or Replace(c) Ceramic Failure--Spark Quenches--

Add Criteria

Electric Connections(a) Output Voltage Off--Bad Connection--

Isolated, None(b) Ch. B Igniter Malfunction--Inadequate

Ground--Mfg. Process Change(c) Intermittent--Internal Ground Strap

Not Attached--Mfg. Notified

Igniter Tip--Moisture(a) Spark Failure--Moisture on Tip--Drying

Procedure

(b) FID During Checkout--Moisture--None

Intermittent--Transformer Short, Void-

Change Mfg.

Monitor Voltage High--Transistor Failed--None, Detectable

Igniter Tip Debonding--Plating Deficiency--Mfg. Improved

13

8

I

ii

6

i

22

1

1

2

7

6

1

2

2

6

4

I

Fail.

B-52

GO00 IGNITER (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

II

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

I11

12

13

14

15

Cause Unknown--Various

(a) Erratic Output--Cause Unknown--None

(b) Low Insulator Resistance--Suspect--Spec. Change

Potting Void--Erratic Operation--Mfg. ProcessChange

Low Resistance Pin--F2 Filter Failed--ChangeCleaning Solvent

Output Failure, Electrode Short-OffCombustion--None

Quench Problem--Off Normal Combustion--None

i

276

2

6

4

2

1

2

62n

14

III

I

II

II

I

II

II

II

!

i

B-53

HO00, HO01, HO02 ELECTRICAL HARNESSES

i Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalityID Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

!Harness Braid Birdcaged--Handling Damage--

II

I

III

II

!

II

!

I

2

3

4

5

6

Repair Procedure

Ground Wire Lug Broken--Handling Damage--Heat Shrink Added

Connectors(a) Connector Loose--Open I(b) Rust in Connector--Rain Water--None,

Proc. Adequate 3(c) Connector Defective--Pin Hole

Misplacement--None, Isolated i(d) Unlocked Connector--Unknown Cause--

Remove Bout Requirement I(e) Defective Connector--Particle Contam.

Unknown--None 2(f) Connector Disengaged--Suspect Improper

Torque--ECP 416 6(g) Connector Backshells Loose--Normal

Condition--None 6(h) Loose Backshells--Handling Damage--

New Design 7(i) Connector Disengaged--Unknown, FPL--

New Design 3(j) Incorrect Connector Mating--Human Error--

Person Alerted i(k) Backshell Broken--Inadequate Cleaning--

Techs Alerted 2(I) Loose Connector--Installation Error--

New Instructions 2

2Pin Recessed--No Failure--None

Wire(a) Broken @ Connector--Excessive Bending--

Not Flight Conf. i(b) Broken--Suspect Handling Damage--Alert

Tech. 5

Open/Short Circuit(a) Open Circuit--Handling Damage--Techs

Alerted(b) Short Circuit/Insulator Sleeve and

Leads--Open

17 17

5 4 1

1

3

1

1

2

4 2

7

2 i

i

2

2

1

1 4

1 i

i

6

!!

B-54

HO00, HO01, HO02 ELECTRICAL HARNESSES (CONTINUED)

I

II

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

TotalNo.

Criticality1 2 3

I

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Improper Harness Support--Support Require-ments Added

Torque Lock

(a) Debonded--Surface Contamination--None,Isolated Case

(b) Missing--Defective Material--NewMaterial

(c) Missing Connector Loose--InadequateTorque--Increase Torque

(d) Torque Lock Debonded--Bad Surface

Preparation--Spec. Change

Birdcaged @ Connector

(a) Birdcaged--Not Determined--None, Repair

(b) Birdcaged--Handling Damage--None, Repair

Loss of Continuity--Handling Damage--PersonnelAlerted

Retainer Ring

(a) Broken--Stress Corrosion--No FunctionalProblem

(b) Retainer Cracked--Stress Corrosion--

Redesign

Undetermined Problems

(a) FIDs @ Flight Readiness Test--Unknown--None Applicable

(b) Noisy, Low Signal--Unknown--Field SigntsNotified

Insulation Low Resistance--Moisture inConnector--None

Material/Elastomer Problems

(a) Material Moisture Contam.--New Supplier(b) Elastomer Abnormal--Humid Environment--

Spec. Change

(c) Material Defective--Moisture Sensitivity--

New Packaging

I

2

3

Broken Strain Relict Rope--Hardened byEpoxy--Mfg. Notified i

105 15

1

2

2

6

14

2

1

2

3

77

III

I

II

I

II

II

IIII

I

I

I Fail.

B-55

J200 PRESSURESENSORS

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

iID Recurrence Control

Total Criticalit XNo. 1 2 3

Wire Fatigue (Vibrations)

II

I

III

II

I

II

I

II

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

(a) Open Circuit--Wire Fatigue--Redesign(b) Output Failure--Gold Wire Fatigue--

Redesign

(c) Output Failure--Gold Wire Fatigue--Redesign ECP454

Wire Break

(a) Sensor Output Failure--Wire Break--Terminal to be Welded

(b) Sensor Output Failure--Wire Break--Inadequate Putting--Insp.

Output Failure--Thermal Induced Gold WireBreak--NASA Decision

Low Insulation Resistance--Shorted Diode--None, Detectable

Assembly Error(a) Connector Misaligned--Assembly Error--

Inspection Added(b) Bent Pin--Handling Error--None Applicable(c) Error Band Deviation--Improperly Set

Overload Screw--None(d) Output Failure--Assembly Defects--

Document Revised

Output Failure--Thermal Induced ResistanceChange--NASA Decision

Manufacturing Problem(a) Erroneous Output--Shop Aid Plug Not

Removed--Supplier Caution(b) Input/Output Resistance Low--Supplier

Data Oversight--Techs.

Thermal Problems--Miscellaneous

(a) Zero Offset--Thermal Gradients--ImproveCharacteristics

(b) Output Failure--Thermal Environment--NASA Decision

Open/Short Circuit(a) Open--Unknown, Suspect Hot Gas Leak--None(b) Short--Pin to Case--Documents Changed(c) Erratic Output--Open Circuit--Replace

3

3

18

i

2

2

i2

I

i

8

I

B-56

J200 PRESSURE SENSORS (CONTINUED)

I

II

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

i 2 3 N

I10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Undetermined Output Errors(a) Error Band Deviation--Unknown--None,

Unit Compensated

(b) Erroneous Output--Suspect ColdEnvironment--None

(c) Bad Output--Unknown, Maybe Gold Wire--

Redesign(d) Pressure Rise--Not Known, Suspect Ice-

Drying and Purge Added(e) Sensor FIDs--Unknown--None(f) Output Drift--Unknown--None

(g) Output Failure--Unknown--None

(n) No Output on Flights, Low Input

Capacitance--Unknown; Replace(i) Calibration Test Failure--Unknown--

Sensor Redesign

(j) Noisy or Hot Fire or Flight--Open

Internal Failure--Gold Wire Bond Parted None,Not Used Now

Welds(a) Output Failure--Weld Defect--None,

Isolated(b) Bad Output--Link Pin Weld Cracks--Weld

Inspection Added

Output 100 psi High--Overheated @ Hot Fire--Thermal Isolation

RC Error--Resistor Compartment Failure--None

FIDs During Shutdown--Coefficient Error--Correct Coefficient

Thermal Block Cracked--Installed Under Stress--QA Advised

16

i

3

ii32

2

i2

184 4

16

1

2

1

3

2

2

1

2

70

1

1

10

II

II

II

II

I

II

II

II

I

I

B-57

J300 TEMPERATURE SENSORS

I Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N

II

I

II

II

III

I

I

II

I

1

2

3

6

Sensor Tip Erosion--Suspect Contamination--

Improved Cleaning

Sensor Tip Broken/Damage

(a) Tip Broken--Hot Gas Flow Impact--

Redesign Pending(b) Tip Bent--Over Temp.--None Applicable

(c) Erroneous Output--Flow Debris Impact--Shield Added

(d) Tip Broken--High Flow Velocity--ProbeRetracted

(e) Sensor Tip Broken--Vibration, Fatigue--Redesign

(f) Erratic Output--High Cycle Fatigue--Check Added

Output Problem--Unknown Cause(a) Erratic Output--Unknown--None

(b) Output Failure, Cracks in Pressure Seal--

Unknown--Redesign

(c) Erroneous Output--Open

Open/Short Circuit (Miscellaneous)

(a) Open Circuit--Handling Damage--PersonnelAlerted

(b) Open Circuit--Suspect Debris Impact--None

(c) Erroneous Output--Open

Open/Short Circuit (Miscellaneous)

(a) Open Circuit--Handling Damage--PersonnelAler%ed

(b) Open Circuit--Suspect Debris Impact--None

(c) Short to Case @ Test--Overheat--TechsAlerted

(d) Off Scale Output--Circuit Not Isolated--

Redesign

(e) Short Circuit--Open

Erratic Output--Braze joint Defects--CheckAdded

Insulation

(a) Open Circuit--Fatigue, Sheathing Contam.--

Redesign(b) Low Insulation Resistance--Moisture--None

(c) Low Insulation Resistance--Overheating--None

(d) Isolation Insulation Test Failure--Open

4

1

7

i

4

1

15

1i

I

i

1

4

1

1 3

1

2 5

1

4

12

11

I

Fail.

B-5B

J300 TEMPERATURE SENSORS (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

II

IID Recurrence Control No.

Criticalit X1 2 3

Wire BreakI

10

11

12

13

14

(a) Open Circuit--Wire Break--Redesign 1(b) Performance Shift, Wire Break--Flow

Debris--None 2

(c) Erratic Output--Wire Break, Fabrication--

Mfg. Procedure Change 2

(d) Open Circuit, Element Wire Break--HandlingDamage--Techs. Alerted 2

(e) Output Failure, Element Wire Break,Assembly--Assembly Change 2

(f) Erratic Output--Wire Break--DesignInvestigation 1

Electrical Connector Damage--Unknown--None,Repair

Miscellaneous Handling Damage

(a) Resistance Off--Handling Damage--TechsAlerted 1

(b) Ground Short--Handling Damage--PersonsAlerted 1

(c) Skin Temp. Erroneous--Handling Damage--Repair i

Missing Receptacle Insert--Requirement NotDefined--Add Requirements

Sensor Debonding(a) Improper Epoxy Cure--Epoxy, Instructions 1(b) Handling Damage/Inadequate Bond--None,

Repair 26

Coax Cable

(a) Electrical Leak to Case--Cable Crack--None 2

(b) Output Failure--Coax Fracture--AssemblyProcedure Change 2

Moisture

(a) Noisy--Moisture Contamination--None

(b) Resistance Test Failed--Moisture,

Fabrication--Assembly Change

1

1

113

1

2

2

1

1

26

2

1 1

1

I15 96

m

2

I

II

II

II

I

II

III

II

B-59

J600 FLOW/SPEED PICKUP

! Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticalitx

iID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

Low Insulation Resistance--Wire Insulation

I

Ii

II

I

2

3

4

5

6

Damage/Fabrication--None, Detectable

Speed Sensor Tip Contact Housing--DimensionError--Change Drug

Broken Wire--Suspect Thermal Induced--ThermalTest Revised

Miscellaneous Output Failure(a) Output Failure--Unknown--None

(b) Output Failure--Suspect Thermal Shock--

Test Change(c) Erratic Output--Suspect Sensor Nut

Variations--Evaluation

Open Circuit, Encapsulment Cracks--Assembly--Assembly Change

Open Circuit--Cracked Epoxy--Assembly Change

2 2

1 1

4 4

1 1

1 1

2 2

1 113 2 i0 1

i

| J800 ACCELEROMETER

i Fail. Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total CriticalitxID Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

I

II

I

3

4

Accelerometer Debonded--Not Detrimental--None 2

Noisy Accel.--Accel. and Mount Resonance--None, Redundant

Dielectric Insert Missing--Cause Unknown--None

High Readings

(a) High Amplitude Output--Unknown--None I(b) Off Scale Spikes (STS7)--Failure Could

Not be Reproduced--None i7

2 2

i I

2

!

!

B-60

KIO0 FUEL LINE DUCT

I

IIFail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticalit X

1 2 3

IBellows Flex Joint

(a) Collapsed During DVS Test--Leakage @Weld--New Design

(b) Frost Formed--Handling Damage--None,Repair

(c) Frost Formed on Bellows--Bond Seal,RTV Cure--Specification Change

(d) Spring Rate High--Excessive Epoxy--None(e) Exp. Joint Boot Torn--Cause Unknown--None,

Repair(f) Frost on Bellows--Open

2

I

11

I1

2

I11

I21

21

5

11

Rust in LPFT Discharge Duct--Open

Fuel/Seal Leak(a) Fuel Leak--Cause Unknown--None Applicable(b) Seal Leak--Defective Seal--None Required(c) Leak @ Joint F4.2--Open

Nickel Insulation Plating(a) Damaged--Handling--Improve Procedure(b) Cracked--Inadequate Repair--New Specs.(c) Cracked--Unknown Cause--OK(d) Damaged--By People in Area--Test

Personnel Advised(e) Insulation Damage--Open

Contamination(a) Contamination--Source Unknown--None,

Clean

(b) Contamination--Human Error, Shop Debris--Advise Techs

Flange Insert(a) Backed Out--Key Not Fully Engaged--

Procedure OK

(b) Damaged--Incorrect Branching of Slots--Planning Change

(c) Key Not Flush--Suspect Tolerance Buildup--None, OK

Joint Holes Damaged--Repeated Use--ImproveProduct

Pinhole Leaks in Flow Meter--Carburization--Redesign

2

I

11

I

1

2

1

1

i

1

21

2

1

5

i0

III

I

II

I

II

1

II

III

I

ll

l Fail.

B-61

KIO0 FUEL LINE DUCT (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

iID Recurrence Control NO.

Criticality1 2 3

Dimension Errors

I

II

I

III

II

I

II

II

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

(a) Orifice Size Error--Inspection Error--Planning Improved i

(b) Seal and Groove Misfit--Groove

Undesize--Managers Notified 1

(c) Joint Misalign--Tolerance Stackup--Revise Report 2

(d) Flange ID Undersize--Blend Oper.Omitted--Add Blend Oper. 1

Burst Diaphragm Broke--Handling andVibration--None 10

Accel. Debonded--Improper Adhesive Prep.--Advise Tech.

Duct Cracks--Were Not Detected--Revise NDT

Drawings 1

Seals

(a) Seal Groove Edge Damage--Bad Installation--Persons Alerted 1

(b) Cut and Chatter Marks--Machining--None 1

(c) Tolerance Problem--Rework--Acceptable 1(d) Discoloration and Pitting--High Humidity

and Salt--None--Polish 4

Nuts/Screws

(a) Nuts Yielded--Increasing Stresses--NoneRequired i

(b) Sheared Screwhead--Impact, Unknown--None I

I

1

2

I

10

Joints--Overmold

(a) Split in Overmold--Ice, Thawing--TestStand Notified 1 1

(b) Debonded--Improper Adhesive--ChangeAdhesive 3 3

(c) Overmold Raised--Not to Print--Use

Silicone Tape 4 4(d) Missing--Accidental Impact--Person

Cautioned 1 I

Cracks in Weld--Improper Technique--TrainWelder

Excessive Copper Plate--Planning Change

2

1

I

Fail.

B-62

KIO0 FUEL LINE DUCT (CONTINUED)

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

II

ID

18 F/M

Recurrence Control No. I 2 3 N

I(a) High Fuel Indication--F/M Constant Bad--

Change

(b) F/M Calib. Bad--Synchronous Wake Pulse--

Redesign(c) F/M Calib. Const. Low--Fuel Prediction

Error--Conduct Tests

i

1

i81

I

1

11 79

m

1

III

II

I

II

I

III

III

IIIII

'!!

B-63

K200 OXIDIZER LINE DUCT

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N

iiII

iI

|

|I|

2

Duct Cracks

(a) Failure, Pressure Test--Seam Weld

Crack--Develop Detection Method

(b) Crack @ Weld Ft. 7--InspectorInattentive--Improve Inspect.

(c) Possible Crack--Open

(d) Leak/Crack @ Weld 14--Open

Duct--Damage

(a) Nicks on ID Surface--Debris Impact--None OK

(b) Worn Spot--Handling Damage--None

Duct Leaks

(a) High Leakage--Unknown Cause--None, OK

Installation Error/Misfit(a) Port @ Joint 9.1 Off Drilled Incorrect

Hole--Advise Person

(b) Crack @ Support Link--Flex Joint

Backwards--Repair

(c) Seal Groove Tolerance--Inspection Alerted

Contamination(a) Weld Debris in Duct Joint--Procedure--OK

As Is

(b) Contamination Throughout--Unknown--Cleanliness

(c) Metal Inside Joint--Bolts Stripped None,Replace Bolts

(d) Tape. on Flange--Improper Use of LoxTape--Change Process

(e) Brown Residue--Open(f) Metal Sliver in Seal Groove--Measure

Error--Alert

3

12

1

iI

i

3

12

i

11

I

Bulge in 039 Tube--Local Explosion--c/o

Sequence Change

Impression Marks on Ring--ImproperInstallation--Alert 1 1

32 1 31

!

I

Fail.

B-64

K300 DRAIN LINE

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

IID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

ILine Damage

(a) Damaged Drain Manifold--Repeated Removal

HPOT--Replace

(b) Gouges on Flange--Dropped in Assembly--No Further Action

Misalignment

(a) Drain Line to PCA Improper HandlingProcedures Clarified

(b) Misalign Joint--Unknown Cause--Inspect

Contamination @ Joint--Sample Too Small--None

1

1

I1

15

1

I

11

15

!

!

!

K400 HYDRAULIC LINE

/

|I

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

Total

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N !Line Leak

(a) Leak @ Joint 1/16--Elastomer Damage--OK As Is

(b) Hydraulic Leak @ Joint H-l--Relax of

Torque--None, OK

Joint Misaligned--Exchange of Nozzle--None, OK

1

1

1

3

II

II|i

I

!!! Fail.

B-65

K500 PNEUMATIC HOSE/LINE

Failure Mode Failure Cause - TotalID Recurrence Control NO.

Criticality1 2 3

!

!

Damaged Line(a) Kink, Bent or Twisted--Improper Handling--

Procedure Change(b) One Compressed--Installation Error--

Person Cautioned

Misaligned Joint--Cause Unknown--Inspection

Contamination(a) Joint and Seal Contamination--Source

Unknown--None(b) Residue in Joints--Dry Lube Residue

Mfg. Alerted

2

29

3

1

1

2

18

n

1

I

it

K500 PNEUMATIC HOSE/LINE

IFail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

I 2 3 N

t,II

5

Duct Cracks

(a) Cracks--Improper Installation--Personnel Alerted

(b) Side Panels Cracked--Open

Coolant Holes Plugged, Debris--NozzleRemoval--Non-Flight Problem i

5

I

1!I

Fail.

B-66

LO00 STATIC SEAL

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

!!!

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

4

Seal Damage(a) Seal Sliver in Joint--Assembly Mistake--

Personnel Alerted

(b) Seal Surface Blistered--Cause Unknown--None

(c) Chatter Marks--Turbine Housing MovedRadially--None

(d) Damage--Seal Came Loose--RevisedRF004-146

(e) Protrusion on Seal--Open

Contamination in Seal Groove--Mfg. Error--Improve Inspection

Tolerance Problems(a) Kel F Dimension Small--Measurement

Error--Planning Change(b) Discrepent Dimensions--Material

Characteristics--Drawing Revised(c) Seal Diameter Out of Toler.--Unknown

Cause--None

(d) Seal Oversized--Drawing Error--Correct Drawing

(e) Seal Size Anomaly--Improper ID--Vendor Alerted

(f) Seal Undersized When Cryogenic--Calculated Wrong--Planning Change

Low Leak Rate--Heat Marks on Sealant--None Needed 2

18

1

1

2

1

1

i

2

18

|I!

!I

It1tiII

I!

I

!

! Fail.

B-67

L200 STRETCH BOLTS

Failure Mode - Failure Cause o Total

IID Recurrence Control No.

Criticality1 2 3 N

Bolt Preload Error

I'IIgll

2

(a) Studs Not Stretched--Assembly Error--

Procedure Change(b) Damaged Bolts on Removal--Preload

Error--None

(c) Bolt Found Loose--Overload at

Installation--None

Bolt Damage

(a) Nicked--While Slotting HGM--Person

Alerted, Superficial

(b) Broken Bolt--Suspect Excessive Torque--NSTL Alerted

Stud Keys

(a) Piece of Key Missing--ImproperInstallation--Persons Alerted

(c) Keys Protrude--Improper Installation--Persons Alerted

1

17

1

1

7¸

Il|

L300 LEAKAGE--JOINT

!Fail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N

.

Joint Leaks--Scratches, Unknown Cause--Alert 44

4

4

I!I

I

Fail.

B-68

MOO0 GIMBAL

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality

I

!!

ID Recurrence Control No. 1 2 3 N

Fretting & Galling

!(a) On Block and Body--Vibrations--None(b) Wear, Interference Condition--

Eliminate Interf.

Bushing Cracks--Low Ductility Material--New Purchasing 3

9

3

9

II

I

NIO0 INTERCONNECT HARDWARE!I

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -Recurrence Control

TotalNo.

Criticalityi 2 3 N

Missing Locking Clip--Removed for Test--Reinstalled 3

3!

!

N200 THERMAL PROTECTIONi!

Fail.

IDFailure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

No.Criticality

1 2 3 N !Insulation Separation--Application Technique--None, Repair

Insulation Debond--Improper Cleaning--EliminateTools

4

15

4

1

5

!

!!

!

!

I Fail.

B-69

N400 POGO ACCUMULATOR

Failure Mode - Failure Cause - Total

!ID Recurrence Control NO.

Criticalityi 2 3 N

!

Cracks

(a) Cracks in Welds--No Failure--MRD091051,None

(b) Crack in Baffle--Gas Pure Defect--None,Inspect OK

(c) Cracks in Slotted Wall--Open

1

i13

1

113

!I

I N600 ORIFICES--ASl, LEE JET

Fail.ID

Failure Mode - Failure Cause -

Recurrence ControlTotal

NO.Criticality

1 2 3 N

!!

|_.

|

1

2

3

Orifice Deformed--Open

Tolerance Problems

(a) Orifice Not Per Print--Rework Wrong--Personnel Alerted

(b) Lee Jet Pin Not to Print--Installation--Alert

Low Torque Value--Installation Lee Jet Error-;Alert I

6

3

I6

)

|,I _'

!

!

B-70

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

!

fIIt

I

IIIiii

t!

I

I/

|I

!1

I

APPENDIX C

UCR REVIEW

List of High Occurrence/Criticality Failure

Types by Component

I

1I

!!t

!i!!!,I

I,

I

I

i

...Jou_a..-4

zc:[

(/I

0

(I)Ln

e:l

u

,.o

u(/I

ul_,J

,4.=,'1

I |

c_

| |

i !

•_1" c,,4 Ir_

0o_:E: ,--,

"" I',0

O iv-,,_.p=.

o. I_1

_I_E°_" _

_,r-.

or-.

u_

• I

I _ QJ

s- _n

I_'o r-

"o'o ! 13"

c" 0 ¢1 _.,- .-I !.-

•,-I= "IS..

_II-- t.)_0

CO,--4

I

ioq-

_n

> 0*e- *P.

u

cu_-

0VEu

I- 0(J °r-

,-" U

L

Cx_

_O

C-I

Ir-

I_ u 4_

I- o _;U 4-_ N

(1) I ",--

u o _ I-

I 0°,- _ ,-- 0f,. -!O I_ _ u_

I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

E

•r- Z

>_

_ I r"e" _ O_J _,_ o_,,.

! "IO r-

•," (_1 U _"

!

I II I

i I I I I I I I !-,=1

I I I I I I I I

f_

un

c_

e--i

,=-I

¢M

I_ GO CO

e-i

i===_

¢vl

,,.,,,,I.i,i

z

x

I--

,.oC.I-_

_ ,r.Y.u

0.)

,4--'!

u I(",,,i

_,,J l,--.,m

'-'I_++,

c"_,,l_,...

oor_=El,--,

I',Dm I

+r-

P

Iml ""4 I_0i l

I !

i_. l.n .-sIE +--+ ,'"O t .,-

1.1_

C-2

O,J I I _ _ I ,r-.l

I I I

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

I L"k,J _ I l ,,,-.4 I

I I I I

,.....,i (',,,.i

,,,-,+ o,,,i 1'_

,..+ot-

O°_

f,,..,.

133E

°_

..l..tt+

0_e-

_..0

t--0

4.1

.f.,..

.p

O3r'-

t"

0_

"s

Ut'-

.p

oJ

u

z

>_.4-1

P

u.p

op

u41

|

II

I

!i

II

i!!I

II

I

IIIii

!t

IIaII

l--

IJ.J

z

z¢..-=1

,!

I

II

i

I!

!

u'l

r..o

o0p..

aJa.

QJE

,,oe-.O_0 "_

ll....P=_

X_

|_"4

co

iP,,,-I

I I

cO

| |

iv=-,i

• n

NP,,,4

!,-.4 I_

• C::} 5,,,,

O I or...

C-3

,--_ O0 ,.-0 ,=.q

i_ _ ,_I ,--.q I.=-I

o_

o

G)..C4-)

0

0

4-)

4-)tn

"0

"0

_.)

t_

ut

(..)

3[

"¢3aJ

¢-

4Jt--O{Jv

C)I--(.3i.tJ'-3z

zI--t

Z t/1.¢=4-)¢-c)

"1oo

o1--

GJeL.

GJE

Ol--

I--

(IJ¢/13i10(_3 E

_._

a.i

,.6--'1,_l

_m

fDI

UIC_J• P i

._,.a i

UIv--_

ICM

COO_

leM

C_jIr TM

ooo_v--I

| i

IC_J

o_•-41_ O

IcM

o_r-o_

iv,--_

oJ.of,.

_.C)

1,

C-4

zhi

C)I

(/1

U

f,.U

OJ

¢1P

4-)E

PP

_J

Of,.

f,.

E

cM

"1o¢u

¢1¢-u

o)

P- o

I

14- ¢/III=1

•Io _.¢:: 00 f,,-

¢I E

¢M

I I I @M I I I I I

I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I

c_

t/If,.0J

op-

4J_J

_J4-) r"

(13_J'lOU @JII_ !-

..4

Ula-_J

"IO

U _

N,¢1(M

|I,

I1!I

UII

tiI!

!I

iIl!I

f-°p.

e-o

r_0

"3Z

Z

s-

C.J c-

j.o

u_QJ

.i--*n• _ m

_m

u #t',,,,i

.6..i n

_m

U I,'-"'a

Ic',,J11"--4

l I

oO

"_ I_,{:)! !

f. I i

L_,dIt'"

OO'13E,_

'_" ND

O u,--.a

op

S-GP

_. IC_

E,,r- 0"_

I,--.4

I-

¢)*_ _

_.c)E ¢_1 ,-0 I "P

u¢_ cou_

C-5

I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I,r) I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I

(M

141

,'_ ¢M

•-_ cv1 _r

CZ:

122

_E

f.J

ZC)1-.it'-(,,'1

C)(J

Zi.-i

JE4-)

O

O.r-

O.

S.p-I--

f-4-_D "_

r- O

_.. Go:(J¢/1

b._m

m,rGIUle, J

_m_m

_ m,"-*

l(%JhJ-i| ,

'_IP_

i i

I_,Jh'--(I i

:10

=-I

! iiv-,,l

i_=i

i_,,i

i,_,4

iw-,,,,l

(U

#,.m-

i

_

_ OU

• __E EE

_._ _

P.. (M

C-6

Ir-

{4 _ EI eJ "P G} "P"

_"" -¢: E E(U 0 I 0

**-- -£: P- I::: 4-)4-.) _" I r'

S-I- _U U

"_ 0 ItS .l-J 00 _'J I,') .r-

S.- i 4-_ v_ 0S.- -- 0 _.) S..

S.- S.-• .£:0

_CS.-- _'- _1_

_P" _ 0-t-_ I_) 0

_ {U_- _-_ 0 _ 0O.C " 0 0 0",-

"r" .1._ qj "r 0 "r" .t_

I.r) O0 od

0*r-

.l-i P--

f,. l'-I I_

¢_ ..IE.._ U

I

S.. ,-"U W

r-,'-'- I=:

_I ¢"

vl .I-._

P4-_ 00 0

-r- U

0i-I

EI-0

II.'1

0

l-IJ

m

0-r-

01-- I

v O _ ._'_ .._U 4-1 U _ U

S.- E f,- E I.-U ".- f,- U (.J r"

•pC" 4.b "_i E _h- E•P E I IE-P E S-

II_ ..C _J .I-J _ ItS I_ 0

ICl _J U_J U_,--E ,--E S.. E,-- m ,-- W ._ , .*-) 0_"o _cl ol E E IE £:

(IJ ,r-. ,,--.I- r- .t.._

_E Oe_ OqJI_ I::: O_.,'- U I:: (J f,.

• .,-- Q)

O f,- 0 11=I _-) _ U _""I" O :2:: I_ =E,-- =E:: "P

I I I I I II I I I I I

I I I I I I II I I I I I I

I I I II I I I

I I I II I I I

CM

I-,.4

CM 1,'.,=1

I-,-I

!II

I!

I

mIIIIiIIi

Il

i

IIII!

,_.'

!

IIFI

I!II

IiII

ii

"o

.=-st-

,p-

t-O

Uv

iJ=i

-i-c=)

zC_1=.¢

I---¢11

z

,,n

u f..

i.-4-)o _

¢Jv1a.p

•d....,i

_m

_N

uIC%l

<l._u

I¢%1iliq

• i

("_-)Ir,_

,-'-Ol_iDI I

0 I *,-(-) _ e3

M C_

,-- >_

q-

e_ c-E o

U4-) 4_1

0"_

=C

!._ •

C-7

I _ CM _ I CM _I I

I I ! _ I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

('v-)

vii

i--,I e--I

l_l eiI

.--J

=E

(/1_E

I.i.1iJNNC3Z

QJ&/1

El

(-J c-

U1/II1)

C_

_,

U|_,I

i!--I| !

r',,')Ir-.-

,-.41_I I

O_

_'_ I_C_

0 m,,-,.,-qof.-

%...

(_IC',Jm_

QJ _ It...E

I I

I'r_l

leu

°m.-.

"_ F.O

C_• C) S..

O.qc_ "E o_ ,--O I "P

¢._ c_2 rOI.i..

u_ _r It')

I I

I I II _ m

v-4

c_

q_T

O_

u_

C-8

fvl ,-_ (M (M_r

I I I II I I I

I I I II I I I

,Q-

N

i--I

C_I N CM C_I C%1 CM C%1

lid _

I I I II I I I

I I I II I I I

UD 'Q"

CO

_r

cO

4(.tE ,-- -P_ lidC%1 (_1 CM _1"

OJe-{4

O,p-

f,.

QJE

q...

4-)

I-0

c-O

4a

X_

l-

e-

e-

Ue-

l-

Ul,Y(J

Z

If--

P

Uif-

4_

I

.I

I

II

'...:

,

Ii1I1III

i

1I

iI

!|!|iIII

iI

!I

II

III

I

Q_

,f=.

0c..}v

_.INN

Z

Q.PU'l

,.o

_o

(,.)

Q.I

._=*i

L,)I_,J

Fml

,_ I_,,p-

-_I_olin C_I

! !ii--i

I,---4

N,_

(la• C_ f,.-

¢'_ ,,,_ ,-,,is= c',,") _0 I .r-

f,J ,mE _I.i_

I=f,,.(IJ

,.I::

Ii/I

r-

O r'-I

O O• p,,..f-

,,i-) .i-),I:I f,.,.I,.. O,el ,,l.aIzv)Q,) ._=-

v1 "I_

i I I Ii I I I

I=-4

I I I I

I I I I

•--, I'M

C-9

I.-'4

"_ Ill

I

QJ4.JQJ r-,.'

_ .1,-I::

I_.C_ .t_ I

_,t.a (=} Ill

,,,_ ,r-. e-

_ 0 0I,- I ._-_

&1,-

i/I i__

_-- IJ

4-_0 1_._

4,.i.1.1U

0

>_-_

U

i/1

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

.'.-,.I

.'.4

(M .,-i ('_

I'M _ .,--I s,-,,l i,-,.,,l

(,J "_ OJ _ I_ _' .,,-

i

1-.lI

4-1t-O(J

>-

r_

hiVI

':E

I.IJ-JNNE)Z

VI

(-) (--

U(,'1

"Ill

L,) IO,J

,.l,.wi

L,_ I,,--"1

IO,JIi,-,-I

r,"_Ir-..o0cr_

! i

IO,J

IJ1 I_! !

e-._ CM If'_"C:QO00"_

.,_ I I

o- |_1

E

I-- ,--41_0

_i_z

Iv-,,,,l

.C) S-£_._- :3E n') ,--O I "--

i.

I

S-

E°P O

*r-

E

c

I z

P.,-_ *n_ -_ 4-) _,,00. ,'-_J 0

C-lO

c,,J

I I I

I I t

I I II I I

(M

I

_.. 00 _-

_- o

{u,.-. _.- {u ._

¢- I

.o 0

e" "I_ _ 0

._ '_ .._ I£:

4-_0 4=_0•P _I oP

"I" 4.._ '=r ul

I e-,lI

I

i-

$-

I

e-

"Io I

=;

¢-

_T

E

P.l=0 UUI E

I_1 *P

P

i_ "r"

E

X-I- G_

eM

.lI

I

m

•- UO

q-.,_ ,._

_ N

I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I

._ (J

¢M

¢)

e-4 e--i

0.l=I/I

0

l-{u

_uE

4-)

_Je=.

I.-0

0

I,-

.I,.=.

"Io

_J

e.-.IF.=.

"IOe3

"Io

£::

¢Il-

el

(=3

z:

r--

iClL>

I-¢_)

iiiItIIIi,I

II

II

II

I1_1 '_

!III

I

IIIII

I

III

l

"Io(IJ=3i.-.

.r-"

c-o

(=3

>-

wisl

=_irMPMc)z

QJ

:3

L) ¢...

,.o

s.. ,'_L.)

(u

,,dI.BU

_u

It::l I

(.,.)IO_J

Iv-,I

r_l_

,,g.) _,,,,iIr',-r-.{_ oC;) Or_

Z.,-0

I_.0

n n0 I,"-S

"l'-'

QJa.. IC',,.n

I,¢,--q

E°P" CPI

eJ• C) S-

C1.x:" :_E rfl ,-.0 I .,-

(..) (z: _1.1_

_u¢-.o

.p..

o

E

f--.

(1,)

I

(1,)

r...

i,

4-) aJ

• F-- O

o t--r-3 !

.kL.)

s- e_o,'-" (_

i r-,_" cu _"o _-. z o

• r- I hi .p.

"P O "_ ",'-

r" n_ (U .p- _. e-

LJ ¢_ O is, _.,-i QJ _ _vl

_ (/1 E'_

O 6/1 ._ _ I:::P {_ U E PeP

S- S- .P O# 0 "0Ul.P .IO I/1 ._: q-I=

_r_i-.-I

¢'M

I-"4

cO

C-ll

I II I

i I

I i

@d

14")

CO• -, (M

IlO

I (- I

-- E _"

E I=: ,-- .6-) ,--O "--- J:_ =i} IE "10_- -_- E o ,"

_J V'I i.l- I .4=

+: _- _ _._ ,I to 4-1 O QJ f,.."P _J P"P" I IE l/_ "IO Ou,l r- I_ "_ .P IE _J VIO0 _E _J 0 WW _"

0J I I_oJ I_ t/I "I_"I0 QJ IO=C: .,.- 4a oV'_ _J

_'_- _ ,_O E _._J

"_ O 4_ "P 4-_ IE 4-_ U W _"I/I I".p S 0./ { .I_

E E IO U I -P 4a !.. "I_ !.II_ S,- P E ,_ _i.. P U | E "f-

0 X _" _ 0 I- *,'-I_. (I#-,-- G3 (IJ

_" _1" o'1 ,--, (%1 ,--i

l I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I II I I I I I

s--I

i,--I

o

c_j

i1_ Jo i10 e._

(%1 c_j (%1 ,-_ ,--i

OJ=i/I

i/1

O

I..

4.)

..I=

0

0

.la

1-.l.avl

_J

.6.)

I:::

_J

e-if=-

l-

i/I,,v.u

z

I

.r--

C0

,_JNN

Z

k.)

_m

_m

(.9IC%J

l(%,J

O0

"al,,D

IC'_,J

m,,.--,m

,,¢.)C%.imr'_"

CO000",

0 m,,--.¢

|_

IIJ

I-- ,'-4 i_ 0

i,P.,..4

.'oI_,D

my-..4

• 0 5-.

O I .r-

fO .0r_ I_

owl

C-12!I

i

I

m

II

I

II

I

II

IItI

i

i

I

II

iI

I

I

II

III

II

III

,.,,.-i.l.izo_

col.¢J

a.

.=.=il.l.I

1.4-

(..) ¢-

j.o

_3

_m*_ m_m

._m

_m

I¢%1

r,')iP_

i mI,i,,-,,¢

I,--'4

I i

"0 m i

,r'-

J,.

|_,,I

E _0 It"°P 0'_

I-- "_ I_D

1_"4

Iv,=,=(

*Of,-_.¢_ -._E '.D ,--0 I *P

IJ.

C-13

I I I I I I I I I ¢%J I

I I I I I I I I I I

| i I i i I I i I I I

i I I I I I I I I I l

,--, ,..-i cxj

,..4 (Y) C_J

s-=.¢ ,,-=¢ 14") ,,.=¢ ,l=-¢

s.--i ,-¢ od _iO ,=..¢

u (lJ *"1 u "o a: u ,1:1 u

"1o0

S-O

¢,-

.=0

*In

*r'*

S-

"10

J_

*r'-

"o

"Io

r,m

U

.ira

_VS-m

3[

U

i

A

r*r-

e"

O(J

p,.

c_

r_I.lJ

Q.

._JI.tJ

i.i_

vI

(J c-

o _I'm"

s. P"uv)

.*-,m•_ m

_m

•it,_ i

IC,,l

iv-....l

e--4.) fM m_'._

oo'_

0 m_,,._*r-

aJ

0JE _:o '_"

'_m_m,---a

I¢'_U

_,,_

,-_|_

i w,..,,,I

*C) S-

E _D ,'-0 I .r-

u ¢1:: iI_1,

I

(/1

SEE

%

*r-

_m

or- O

LE

0*r-

.r =.

s-

IEo0r..*

V1

os-q_

w--- Ie'_ ¢n

or m

(2_ S.-O..C_

o

o

Ico.p

o_m

_J

UU.-_

U..O

_J

P*m--

q.-

s-

"o_.-0o00_cOul(_

cor-,_,

(/I0,-/s-o

C-14

*P ,p .p

o_ O_

_ _ m

_*_ _ _

U_ UO E

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

q- ..¢:: *r- _:_U') 14") I.£') Lk') k_) _ O0

C_ Er" RS0 *_"__- tI

I- (IJ

0 u I-_- O.,-v _

_) 1 :3 s..E E _ I

•," 0 I_.'_

£: S.- U _Cl(2) _) oP 4-)

S- S.- _2. EGJ (2_ ,t,- *r,-

I[:: r-- VIIp Ip p IP

-_ _j h, E

_i_ _i I

I II I

I II I

(JcO 0"_

I I

I I

I II I

¢3 c_e--I _iI

O1"(/1

u_"oO

lid

£.G)

E

4a

Oq-

O*Ira

4-)

.O,f.-

t.

tn

(1)

4-)

.p.

"o

f,.-

ue-

Iu

ul

(J

4-)qI

r-'-

Iou

,.i I

4-)

(..)"l'

I

II

iI

III

II

Ii

I

II

III

I

I

1l

IiI

I

o

z

a.

l.¢J

I

II

III

L.) c-

I=. 4-)

"P" 0

:_.M('vl

0 I,'--_

I(MIs=.=.(

c_

'-' I,,D• |

Is._l

I('M

¢-- . .4..) (_j ir_c_

Z ,---4

,,_ I n

°p

L

a_ |_J

E

_.- ,--4 i_O

i i

.p-

U_E _

C-15

¢=

0q..

i...0

4-)=1

f,.4..)In

.1=4=)

elm,

P

U¢:

.,tin.

_JI,-I0

U

:lE

P

U

I

°P-

C0

L.l=iZ

a..

..,=.I

l--0

Z

0°;,=.f_

S.r==I"

U

•,w..m

(.._ lO, J

o_,

; IC_,J

! i

! !

ir=-i| !

_11_

1_,,4

IC_,Ji,_-i

i i_,-I

I) I_,,,I

ic) '

(1)• C) S-

S= f,D ,--0 I "_

i.¢.

I v}

f"E !•i,D I_

•_'-" I v

lid I" U

V E _..

¢..) .,- rcS £..]_.,--

"_ ¢" II:1,'--0 ,'-- _.G_.r- cO (1)_._-) US.

(1_ .r- IG_ S- 4.-) (/1

r'- -I-) ('_ r,/1q-G,) "'-" G;q_.r" ,-- S,-rOGJ f--4-_

I II I

I II I

O

C-16

!

I

I

IIIlI

II

II

I

II

lII

I

,

C-17

I

a.c)nnn_

I--

-Jw

Ia-

I.¢Jn,-

v1¢11hi

"r(3

"I--¢n

.E4-)

O

Oo1_S--

a.

CUE

.p.I--

Q>¢n

(J ¢--

,.o

(J

.b-,u

(..) ICM

,4,--"n

_mr.._ m,,--_

I(_,jle.=,l

m l

,rv")ir...O0

,--'al_ 0

Is,_l

I ('_,.I

i i

C%11f'.,,,.

I'.0! i

1_'-'4

I C'_,JIs'_4

I s"_i

IC"_Is,_4

I,,"-4

GJ

E c'_J F--C) ! -"

(..) n_ II:1L.I.

C-18

CM I I I II I I I

¢M

¢M

I I I I I II I I I i I

CM ._ CM

n')

l-=(

•Z3 U ._ U G}•"_ ,--_ ¢%1 ¢M (%1

(%1 (','1 _ I_ I'_

I I I I II I I I I

I I I I II I I I I

•--I e--(

(%1

(%,1 _l sil

I'--I

CM ¢",4

e-¢ .--¢ It') ¢%1

¢%1 ("1 f_ _l" '_"

O

U1

C/I

O.p,-

I-

EIr..

QJJ_

I-0

0'I'-"

,.f-,

l,-

,,f=-

"I0

QJ

e-

"I0G_

U

GJI-

el

Z

It==.

I,-

I

Ii

1IIII

II

II

III

III

I

!

lI

!II

I!

Il

lII

!

Iil

ii

A

q.}:pe-.

t-o

-.,j

i--

_.J

L*

.,,,..j

L_JQ_

"I":

"Jr"

(_

fCS

! I

.&.j .v

(..)Ul

:>,Jr,')

• _ m

_m

• _.

.l,..a !

_ | v.....l

! !

m-1ii_

i i

ii, ml

_ Iv--(

jr. I i

OOhX_-4

_ i_,*r-

#(L)

* (_ S.-£_. ¢:_ --_E ¢_J '-"0 I *_

(.._ CG fOI._

!

r---

.4-)or-

r_E

-g.r-

"7

"o

%.-

u

I--h

c-O¢-i

c-

E

i i

•_ S.=

bocm

II#n_ CinoO 0i C) u

¢1 IE r_ o_itl ¢_) _l.n

4--_c)r-- • .I.-_ 'q"

I _'--

-- %- _,) (.._F-- "-s (,_--_

C-19

I_J

*_

E

b

o o_u I

I v)_- e- ¢1_l -r-- ¢1

(11 _--m e"

I 0 .._"-- q_ 0

_ en

b !

0 Eu

ul

0

_c_ o

C_ .r-

i---r_ _ 1-

I

Et-OS-

=l.--

ri

¢I:1ES.. nr_

.c:u.

I c-

O • r'-

• r- M'I

0"_

• ,J S-

I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I

i---I

,--¢

ii:1l,n

eII

.Q

1"4

i.n

i

i i ii i i

e,-i

I--i

Iii

I _ II I

,iI

U "oIZ)

A

c-

t-o

¢.)

c)n_n,.

I--

_.J1.1.1

1.1_

n,-

IJ.I

c_

=1"

¢/1

,=.O

O*e-

_u

S

I--

Q.}vl

¢..) ¢-

,.o¢-. 4._o -I

i==.

s.. n_tJ

¢Jc_

,.ib-, m• _ n

L..)I("_J

.4--,I

_J

r_,.,P|_r-,-4

tY'Hr..,.

i

I I

! i

Ir.-I

I_,.1

"'_ IS,Dn n

I_...I

i m

*C_ L_.C_EC_,--0 I .r-

I.a-

0

E _,_ 0

"_ O _J I

v_ _ 0,-

o L,-- I,-- _ ¢'- v'l

•,- E U

I o I_ !-

•,-- o_ 1_2."_ 4._

¢+- ,--_ ¢_l- E

_n_ LE QJ,.-- (_) _J Qj ¢.-

,-4 CO

I I I

I I I

pM

i+_tZ)

I I I

I I I

.--4

s--I

•w ,I_

Iil

•_ fO -,--

U

r" _ U• e-- "1_

e- (..) .i-)

o,- u._ i:: __._o i o

• r- _ 4,1 .,-s- _1_ Qj r-¢1 f,- ,- o> (..3 ¢I) E

I I

I I

I I

I I

e.=.q

C-20

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

Gh

Gh

(._ "_ I+- "1

•-', _ ,-4

e.=4 e--i

•-_ c_J ¢_1

.W

s=.=l e--I _ !"='1

OJ_vl

O

S-

E

_J

S-O

0

s-

(/1

"o

_J

"IO_J

r.--

o

_JS.-icl

v_

o::3

z

.f-

i=m

*r.-

S..(._

I

II

i

I

II

I

II

III

IIIII

I

I

I

I

III

I..-Ii-

ll "-4.a

' 0ov

C)

,...,

I-.-

..Ii.¢J

IJ_

II.i.I

-I-

N=..¢

I =

I

l

III

(=.) r-

,.o

,i=. f='="

_o

:>.Jn'_

uIC_J

U I_

ICMit-.4

i i

(_lr_cOO'_

| iis--_

.._. IcMIll 1_--4

JE I I

c_j If'-t-(Z)0o_

X:,-_

I_)

i:) t_.-i.r-,,

f,..,

_. ICM11....-_

• P (_l

I-- ,-41_ D

I1_..I

IcM

E @,J ,'-O I .P

Urn I_i.l-

C-21

I I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I t I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I

_r

s--I

Ix1

4( 4{ .k

cM (M c_l N _"s--I ,--.4 i._ !'==1

If) ,--4i--I

-k

i_l I--I s_l s-.-I 1--4 s-.-I

O

5-

E4.l

J_

I-o

c-O

*p

i-

i#1

_J

"1o

ue-

l-

u

z

4-)

io

el==,

¢...)

I

A

"C3QJ

r-O

5"

a.O

r,"

l'-

--.ii.¢J

IJ-

W

a..

"s-(.9

..f-

VI

r-

¢-o

o.fi.

%=cu

a.

IE

(..3 r-

,.o

L.)(/I

GJ

o_ m

ul_,l

4--'1e_ m

I,_=I

"q I_0| |

C, jI r_

i r..,..I

i,_.,I

_,r-.o_

h=--I

|1,.-...¢

Iv......l

• C) L_._ =3E c_J ,--O ! ",-

I.¢-

C-22

I I I ! I I I I _ I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

I i i I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I I

C_J s.--i _ s--4

¢'_ @d

Nc_l c_J

O

ul

O

1,-_J

_JS

_J

I,.0

q.-

0

4-)

l-

v)

"o

Cuf-

4-)

"o

"o

!-

ul

(,3

I..(.3

!

II

IIIIII

I

II

III

II

I

I

t

II

I

I

c)

I °i--.J

I"'

-r-f.Do,--e

I =

I

Ii

I

I

u (..

j.o

or,-

o

c.) I,--_

(',_ Ir.-.o{3

le---I

,... le, J

L" m m{,_.jir-..

e-co0(_

_-,._

"" I_O

0 m,'-_

.f-,

I.0_

Q. IO,J

S,t-"

G.)• C_ L

C-23

_J

iG)

.1_

S-O

e"0

It'-

4,a

q.,.

I..

e.I,.c,.i.a

e-

U

I

4-)f--O

U

=E

O-

CO,Y

F--

.-JI,I

1.1-

Ia.J

V1V1I,irv"Q-

"l-

-r"

UlJ=:

O=E

Oo1--S-

a.

E•iiI--

Ia5"-s

$.. Pr"(JfJ1

_m

_m_m(.,)l(',J,_m

•i-,,|

U I"-_

IC',J

i it'Y')It-..COO_

"'_ I_| i1_,,4

11"4l i

! !ir,=l

i_,=,1

IC_JI_,,,I

IF,,,,,4

a.I

,p-

I II I

I (MI

C)

@,J

.J_

C-24

CO _r_

Z C c-I.lJ I IO

C::) _ S.. OC O I

_n r- O- OO I ::l .t-O _. u_

P E

O. r- .-P _- .r.- •0 l.,.l _ _

•P _ %..

0 _ _ _ O,_ ._"(/) I_ 4-) "P P'- II}

•,-" "I ES O *" (_

,--_ (_0 _ II

I I I I s-,,4m I I I

I I I I II I I I I

"WU _ I_ U U

Zi,i

*" C)

E "T2

f,- P.l.a j=vl

E _r_

o S"-_ I0

I ¢/1 "_4-_J_ IS.-.P S-O EiE_..P O._-P" E

{/)

E:,-- e'-

S.- tO ul,_ .I-) ul_.) (4 .,-

I II I

I II I

{'M ,--I

GOe-¢n

(/)

O.i-S-

A)E

.p-4-}

,L0

,..-0lid

--Ie"

orb

U

I"

'rV"

m,

I""

"k

I

i

I

IIII

I

II

II

I

IIiI

II

I

II

1II

II

I

iIII

II

II

I

CLC_

C_

In

La.JNI--4

I, iI

XC_

I.¢J,.v'

C_

i.¢Jrv.a..

"r-'_DI,,--¢

8_or,- r'I

4-_ C)

,.-.,

.,(l_m

_w

_m

3L

| J

I I

I-- I m

C_

0 m,.-_

h--,¢

Sof-"

I,--"¢ l_I{)

I"

GJ• CD S..

ol--"

i,a-

C-25

I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

I ! I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I

¢" .r-- _ ¢.} "l_ _ I_ J_ .r-'--' ,--' Owl Owl C'_ _ _ C_ C_

I

A

"1oQJ

0r.-

0¢.J

Q_

O

I--,

I.i.IN

i,'-,i

xC)

L,I.I

r,.

-r-CO

VI

l,,-

c-o

I::

o.If-'

l,.,O,l

O.

OJE

0,}

-I

i. oI::U(/I

..-,,

>.ll (','),.4l,.il• _ i

{'O1

(,.)I(",,,Jo_ i

,.dlll I

le,,JIf--I

re) it,,,.o0O"i"-q I_£:)

i !

l,r-',.-4

I !

L,,_jIr',,.ODO'I

I,'-4

I('_I,I"-,4

o'i

II,_I

I('_,IIv--"4

Ir--4

0J

_.C) :3

O I .r.-¢..) ,-n _i

Io')

ioo

r---

1.4=I -f-

c)

¢-o o')

• r"" _r

r- n_l l.n

I.-•'_ n:IC)

Er-,.oJ

I I

I I

I I

t I

Io_

0

i-o_

0

m ch

uo_r,_

or-- |

oOJ °_--

C-26

I I I I I

I I I I I

I I I I I

I I I I I

w-..I

.13

Iv)

"W-_ C.J

0

lJ

C• I -

l

_J

00

oos-

"o

z

I I I

I I |

I I II I I

e_

e.-i

o e.-

--_ U

I4-1

0 _-•f- G,_4-_ _--"Itl II:1

I•,-- I/1E WII:1 QJ QJ

O XO _ QJU I

_J X,--" U O

¢%1

!

I

I

I

I

0

- IE

- I0

c-O

mS,-

° I

Iu

° I

° !_J

- !

I

I

IIII

i

c

I °u=E:

I _c)

1.11'.,,,4

I xC)

hi

I..IJ,.,,.-

I-

II

II

I

("3 E

8_°r--

-{_,

>,,1_•d..._,n

• _ m_m

(..91("_,_

IC_,,JIf,.-1

IC,,lIs--=4

x i4._ C'_JIP'"e-DOO_

Z,-'_

,._ I n

*r-

l-

Q. le_.l

_1_E

i_=.i

i_=1

| •

{p• C_ S-

D.C) -iE ,_r ,---0 I .e-

i.¢.

C-27

! I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

s--I PM

¢M ¢M

CM CM ¢_

{M

14")

IJL'b i==.I

4_

,"-I _ 1.-4 _--I _ e'.=l !_1 I--I l_l s"l

E

14

O

L_P

4a

4-J

S-O

0*fro

S-

t4-1r--

4)

4-;

e"*r-

"0

"1o

0

*F"*

g_S..fo

z

P

u

I

"13

(--o1--

e-o

(J

:E

r_C_rr_p,-

l'-

la.IN1,,-4

xCD

i,ies,.-_

laJ

-r-(.9

(/%

t-O

0op

E

&/%

i.o

o "_

uu%

•.l.m'mD_ m

_m

_N(.Jl(_,J

'4--'I

_m

L.JN,-_

r,-)ir_

(3"_'

ICXJ

I I

_,j |r'_

i i

_m_z

i I

I_,,I

,_

IE _" _'-0 i -,-

(...) e,._ _

_>C_

Q

ro

r_

I

c-O

o_'

_IndOU_

O

-'I_._,"

e_I"-,

I I I

I I I

I I I

I I I

{M

-k

r,,, CO C_

C-28

I

0 u

_- uo

e-

_._ ="

CoP -_ 0

U'P e_

U G_ _.PE P I

E t:

:3.l_ 5..i_

0

I II I

I I

I I

E) _3"

{'M

_r

_r

(j i_

N

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

(M

.1(

O O ,--_ ,--i {%1 e_lN N N CM N _1

O.1=(/t

I/I

O

f,.

i=

(uz-4-;

%-0

t4.

t-O

!-4-)

lib

e-

_J

f....

Ue-

_J

e_

f..)

P

u

.It

I

i

I

I

II

I

III

I

I

IIII

I

I

i

I

Ii

II

l

IIlI

I

l

I

II

l

r-*p

0UV

D..C)n_n,*

ILlNl=..=l

X0

l.iJ,Y

¢..0

¢-) c-

,.o

_o

iJl/l(lJ

•t-,.n

_m

UIC, J•_ i

.*-*m•_ m

IC_,J

m m

(') Ir.._

| m

mP,-u¢m i i

C'_..imr'_

OCh_-,--,

"" I_1::)

,._ n n

.p-S--

Iv"-I

S' _oIr-.-

i_.=1

,'--4 i_0

iv.,,_

QJ.C}S-

_-C)E 'q" ,--0 I .r-

C._ ,'_ _L_.

C-29

_O¢%1

I I I II I I I

I I lid I .--II I I

I I I II I I I

I I I i-,I II I I I

s-=l

¢',,Iq-f_

I II I

f_

I

A

(lJ

C--olm

C-O

¢.Jv

0.=E

Onnn,-

I--

n_IJ=l

_nl

X

m.mr_

U'%

-e"

OJ

¢J ¢.-

,.o

_o

ul

,,4,.m!

_m

U IC",J

,,f.l,m

_ m','--_

IC'_,j

!'7,O0O"L

,,,-,

.,-. I_i i

{xj It'"_0(:)O_

=E: ,,'--*

n iO u_-..._

.p.-

I--" "_ I_1_

1_,,,4

ir=...l

,,C) S-

O I ,,-'

C-30

I I I ,_I I 1

I I I II I I I

r_

¢M

_o .._ U ._O0 CO O0 C)

I I II I I

I I OI I I

(_) _ _

I I I II I I I

I I I II I I I

CO e-4 _-g

U tO .1_

_ _r

0

101

"00

_U_e-

I-0

q-

0Mp_

I-

"0

e"

"0

"0

PUa,

*p

I-

a_¢.J

Z

>_

P

U.p

S..

I

i

I

IIII

I

III

I

I

IIIl

II

l

I

l

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

C)nnn_

I"

....Ii.l.l

I.I.

n,,"

¢I)

n,"a.

--J

(]U

Cl

¢'-')

,.o

l._ n,"U

.i...wi

ncllUIC'_

._ |.6.=.x

_..._i_,,-_

l@,JIt=--II I

rV')ir_O0

,-.41_ 0| i

I" I I4--_C_I II'_E{:_)

Z'--"

"--" 1'4:)

I IO l_'--I

£,.QJa.. IN

ri I I{301p..E

_-C)E_"-0 I .,-

0 "'_ _

S-O

EI

Z I::l,a=J or-.

0 _ ¢-

O _'_

os=- oP.- i_lL cn

-I _ Xn ..j _

!

I II I

C-31

If,.

• 0_'_ _ ,-- (..)

S.-Q.} .=,i _ 4._

I _ G,I i_4-_ ¢_ _ "=I•i=.. .r == op

!

0.l ¢" O ¢}_"¢- Of,- 05- I_.II (_ o_. osi lid of=" IG_

•=_ I _ I_. Vl _. I_P"U O_ ,'-- QJ .i-) _J I _J

• P = =l S- O f,- E e"t'- .,.- _ O O C

•P"-- QJ .l_ Ill

O _ IE.P O O " 0.1•i=_ 4._ .,-q- 4=_ _ ",-- I_.I0 I0 I I_I I I_

_-" I,.. ,=_ _._ r--, ,L I_I .I-)_ _J U f,- :3 0 4._ I--

E GJ t- I::: c- f._ Or--"

I

r-

,-.

cu o4-_ u

QJ

'- cu•P- cj

i x _"

o i -=-

•,-- i_ o I..E 4-_ i

•l=} 13_ J=4_IE _-" i_ecl

(j r- "_- 1_.

I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

I 1 I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

M

_O

e-i

s,.=l_4

_ 0', _ C) C)

I

"13CLJ

f-er-4-)t-0

CJ

0.:E

C1.

rr_

f'-

..JLi.I

1.1-

i,i

(,,'1V1i,i

:3=0...J

(/1

0 r"

0 _

"P" 0

(J(/I(1)

:_1 ¢")

nDIUIC_

IC_It-4

h--_

IC_

t"CM tr_

O_X_-4

O 1_....4°_,,.

I-

Ir.....l

Q,)E _1_ It"

°P" O'_

11'='=4

IC,.I11"'=4

(1)• _ _.

E _,D t-O I ._"

{...) n'_ _0I.I.

S.. II .r- 0"_

C_ _ -r-_0 _,) _--E S.- U

>_

0 ,lZ _- -P _0

Q ¢0 S.- -,-" _)I ,-- C_._ JE

¢'_ I _. 4-)v GJ I

cr S.- S- U f,- .._

0 C_._ f_ _, _1

0 (1.) t-(_ U &- OJ 0 "0> I .I-) E a_

P (1_ q-ul ",-" 0 _.C_

t/I IE: .P I_ p

X Or" E_ :3

I II I

I II I

L)tM

I II I

I II I

r,-)

C-32

I

Q_

O_ Z e-U_ _ 0X £- I_. I=_) 0 C) I

0 5-- 0 I:::

:3 U =3 _.)¢n 0 ¢4I/1 P-- u__)._ _) 4-)f.- l,- 0

I

_ e- -1,- _j

I I I _ I I II I I I I I

I I I I I I Ii I I I I I I

r,_ cO (_ C3

c%i

P, o_l_ _ NCM C%1 N

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

II

I

III

III

I

I

II

ll

I

G_

N

I °b..4XC_

L_

g _LLJ_Y

n _

I

II

II

II

._ O

C2

(,,) I,-_

O_

"41_C)a i

.j_ n ._lr_

OO__-- ._,_

""' I_JD

0 i,,,,-,ior.-

L

Ir',J_i iw'--4

QJE, _0 It",,,,.

Iv,,,,,¢

_,r-.

i i

Iv-,,4

JO._ "-',nE CO ,"C:) ! .f-

C-33

: : : : : : : : : :

'L_

(%1

E

e-

l-o

_.

c-o

!-

ul

oJ

ue-,

,.w,

.I

U

_m

°r-

r-O

(Jv

=E

C)

OC:

I'-

Njil

XO

i.i

VI

I.IJ

C)

Q_

I0

('J c"

r._-)O _

(.3¢4

•0..,m

0 lC',,J

ww-.u

_t

I@,.I

_h

'm"OI_Z3

I('M

IV'--q

_ C'_.lIr'"

E_00_

X:,-_

.p-

Q)

1_-,4

E _lr_

"P" 0'_

F- "_ I_D

|v-....I

• C) S,,.r,,_ECO_0 I ._

1.6.

l

£°p-S,,,.

r_I

S,,,.,0

v S,,..

S,,-_

S,,-

&S,.,-

(,JI

S-O

4-) ¢'"0

a_l I

,f.-

e'- _.9

• P" L•-r- 4._

p_v.==_

Ua_L

i

.0-.-

(I.)

I

¢-4i_ .r-4- _-

aD

C-34

,p

eJUE

&.Z

4- I.l.J

O_ C)4-) I Z¢" E _¢J

.1,- O _-! IE .P C)

'- e O 4-)U f.- U "PI I ¢_ _.

I_ "t3 °P

"P" X E

I_ P .p p

I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

(%J

I

IIII

III

I

II

I

I

II

II

II

I

II

II

II

II

III

I

I

II

II

I

--J

UL_-.r-(J

U E

,.o

U

•,6--'m•_ m_m

U IC'X,I

_w

_m

I(%J

m i

'-_1_| iiP,-i

(1,)

,'_ _E ,,-o ,..,,-0 I --

(,._ (,.,.) _i,

£L)

•,- > (I.)L+-) ,'-- E

"0%- rO 0I aJ _ E

_'_ ,'-" I

P'- _'1 JE.._4=) U E

:_ O

• E 4._

_'- P" E OU_- 0 U

E .=__0 S.- e_

_u.- N,'--

_- *_ X _Jl.u,-- _) £.

C-35

0 0I I_..,,l_I I U

e==- i*=.

U U _

I I I I I I II I I I 1 I I

I I I I I I II I I I I I I

P-4

r,,.

-Jnn

U')

...=i0

I-"ZC)0

(..)i.-4I--

:E

Za.

O.}4/1

¢") E

0 -Isi-

S.. nr*(J(/I¢)

_nP_ m_m

_u

_ m.--'_

IC_,,l

ICX,.l

(_.jfr_'_

00__-,-_

"" IkJC)

"00 i,-.._

opS.-

Q') I(_Ja.

i...=1

CUE _0 'r"

_- ,---I i_ D

1_,,,4

iw-....¢

G_4, C) _

E C_ ,"-0 I .r-

U ¢..) _i.I-

(U

%,-

O(/1

Iu_

r_

r- u_•r-- (/I

• EI::: .r-cO_--

r"OO,'-

UI

0p _--O

OG) e"

E

U')

>-..JC_

c_

W

...J":C

(.9

-r"UI.*.Jr,-

i...q..J

-r-

W

_.JI.,-4

Ui-..¢

=E

L_J

r,

L_J

-.J

W).--

t...¢h-

W

(,'1U_Wr,-

W

..Jc_

I,..-4OZW--JC)

C-36

U

=o

U

mm

U ICX,I

_U•_ m

I_m-¢

(_lr_O0

'_1_)

&/I m_i i

COO

ar,._

" I',_

.pS-IlJ

_ _1:_ _"

_. ,.--,E O,J ,--O I .P

¢..) (..) _:1L,

•r=-{/1 r--.E El_l ,PS.- m4-) '-"

v G_P E z

CU _ i.tJ

ul C)

S,. I

G_ • S,- G)G,) ,--" n_" C) ,-"

I.- I I'-" _

_ 0 _ QJ e'-

I I II I I

I I II I I

I

p.-

CU

0

0 m

_ E

I-

u_e- e-

m

Iiii

m

iI

i

im

i

iiI

m

m

m

I

!

I

I

I

I

I

i

i

I

I

l

i

I

i

I

I

I

i

W

,..i

...Jhi.--_1.1.

Z

_EZ

U E

_._

L. eY

U

.1._1oP n

UIC_Io_ l,4,_1

IC_,li!--(I I

CO

"-_1_o! i

&/1 iP-Ie- i i

•i-) L'M Ir_EO0

I_O

01 ,--4ol--

(U ICM

; "12

{U

E v...4 p-O I .P

U P'_ IC_1.i..

I

4-)EOU

UG)

I "_

n_ E(_ .P.

"- E

_-- (__4.-)

f,.'_

E O

(J

1=

.4.-)

E

I.-jE

0

0.)

e'- 4._

Ip- e-

EOEI

U

I

i_ U

oP i1_.l-)Pi_ O

_#1 oP-

in-

.p-

.r-

I

P- _.)t-

," 0I_ r-(U J(_ {/I

U

C-37

EI-

_..•l_ _"

I 0

U .¢.-)U

'P I

OI¢-"_'E

(U

0e-l

U

0

)0r"

I

e-

o

iu

0

dE: .P

(/1

_de.-

e- 0

0 m

.p

E

0

•r,- _

_,1 .P.

0EI

(UvU

U

U

E

El=•P 5..

.O

I

lad

--d¢C

nr"l.l.;N

XC)

Z

(C

GJ¢/I

tO

¢...)¢-

i.o(.-4-)O -Ir..-

_o

l_n,"fJul8J

I,Jl_

wl-.,!._ m_m

Iv--'4

IC_,JI11=--'1

I I

IC'_J

| m4..) _j Ir.__0OC_r_

0 m,,--.ior.'-

Q,)ICXJ

WE _0 'r_

o_ _1_

I¢_,J

I.I-

I I I II I I I

I II I

I II I

o

°r'-I

0

v¢,..

I

c-of=-1.

¢-.o

(/t

C-38

_..0r-

icl

I_u

of.-

4-)0

¢)1.---!

_n

0

>aO",-0_0

(j,_.x (...)

L_=3

O0

I

III

III

Il

II

I

I

IIII

II

iI

II

I

II

II

III

I

II

I

I

I

l,J.i

.J

N0ig

i,=-4x

r,,-

z

I.¢J,.,,,Q.

,..i

IJ_

¢/1-I

u E

¢-4-)o :_p-,

{J(,/1

r-,,

,6--'1

d=-'l

Iv--4

ICM11--'4I I

n") If",,QO

"ql_| |

i-- ! i,._ c_,l Ir_

Z,,--i

0 u,""_opL

_oI_E

I-- "_ I_D

iv-,.t

*_ S-._. (','1 3E ,.._ r.-O I -P

U _::) io1.i.

i

4-ar-ou

uop

L

c-_i

n:lo,J

f...

r--n_OJ

e,,,--

e.n

EoEI

(IJus.-

O

E

o

i-

I

3=o I E

'- _ oP .p.

E _ c

r- U E e-cO O U

S.- U _._ .1_

_n {n 4-) E ¢l: S,.

e.-- _ 0 ¢JO e'l P" I

(4 E :_ V),--. S.. O _-

P (1.) (1_ E P-._I" E 4-) -_ P U

C-39

oo.) ,i'o IE _ Eo "_._ OE (1.; s.. -P

u 110 _ NS.. U .P

O S.- 0_ --I_n O E _n

S- E _nE I- O

O _- _.E .IE _ I-

t" 4-) I >0::3 (]J _J 0_I

O OP" ::1 (_)U n_q.. 1.4 =::)

I I I I II I I I I

I I I I II I I I I

•--; _ ¢M Or) _r

c_l !.-4

i ii i

i ii i

eli

4{Jc) _D

Of-4/)

Oop.S,.

E.i-.4-)

..1=4-)

o

EO

.i.a

e-I.p

4-ai/1

,p"o

_ue-

4.a

E

PUE

l.-e:l

IAev"U:::)

Z

I-D¢1U

.p.t.a

I--U

W

W

XC)

IllZrV

I.I=I_::

I..I.IN

I,,,-¢

XC)

O.;

r,..)r-

,.o

0 "_p-

_o

U

OJ

i,_=1

1_ IP-..C_

i_...i

_ 1_-4

,_ _,.1 u_'-

O_:_::_

"" lU:::)

0 m,_4°p

E _0 'r'"•f'- _

i r,,,,,¢

• _ J..

E ,.-I t-O I .,-

L_

C3

O0C30¢:[!

oq

_J

e_

>0

C_

I I II I I

I I II I I

evle_

,_r _0

C-40

l.m

.--I

l--Z

C:)C)(J

r._la.l_C3=E:

:E(.J

OJ¢/I

U E

,._r- .i-_o _

;a

U

>,,t¢_.4.mn_n_n

0 IC_,,,Io_•m,-,I

IC",,,I

!('") Ir_'03

hn.I

IC".I

I I_ CM It'%

O_

'_ F,O

0 m_

f.

mE

| m

h=,,,_

""_ |_,D

i,_=1

1.1.,,

IP00

&)

0f.

I"0(U

00

0 _-

I

0

r-

UI

i-04-)l-_J>0

I.-I/I -P

¢-0

!

E"0

t-

I

{U,--"

I

0

f.

0

I

0•,..- _j

E

0,-"

I

Ili

IIII

I

II

II

I

II

IIII

I

I

II

I

Il

III

Il

l

lI

I

ll

l

i.&J

..J

_2

i_J.-Ja2

0 e-

,.o

_o

wk-,,m

_m

U IC'_..I

•O.m'm

l,--'a

IC'_J

(') II"_

A IC_,J

m,,'--q_-- m m

e,Jmr_

rm'Qo

X i"--'q

i,_

)I"

E _:I_ I_'-

'PI 0'_

_- i ,---II_ID

IF,,,,1

"12G_

• C) S,-

E C_ r--0 I .P

I.k.

U

r--

o°r,.-

GJ-.J

v--¢

L.m.J

.-I

C_C_C)

I--Zc:Z2

¢..) (-

°r- r--..0

C_

_J(-v-)4--'I

_m

_mUl_._m.b.,u

?L

r_l_

• |

m m

_e" _,,11r'_

,_... __

I',,_

%.

E _m-.

OJ• (_ S.-

E r'3 ,_0 I ._-

¢,.) C_ rOk_

C-41

CM _ _ (M!

I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

m i m m _ i m i iI I i I I I I i

I.U...J

.-JOQ¢:i--Z

XCD(.0

C0

0

OJ

QJE

U

i. o

ol--

t.)

aJ

_.wl(V)_u

_m

_i_

_mo_m

_mU m,,'-_

I('_,.j

! !

O0O_

•"-'4 i_1:)I !

ICxlI_..I

m i

m I

_lr-.

• |

I_...I

Iv..-i

,-'-elL.l _

°p

U _ a,)0 S....

0

Iv

.--I .--I (.,,,')

! II i

t !t I

L.a,J

,,,,.,.J

ZC_

I---

,..J(:3

ZCD

I---

-.I

Uiv"

(,_)

C-42

U E

_._

,r-. _

T-_U

,,e-_ i

_t

U IC',,,I

,4-,_ !

I(_,,Ile-.,,q

r',") Ir',_

Ii,_q

,,,,,. ICXJ

e-.:OO_

"_ ND

.li

S...

_.. I('_I_.-I

E _0 jr"

_._ka,-

I

OJ tO 0 "Pt_ O 5- Ieel -- QJ'_2 I_

P'.0- U _=1 E .,'-0 E "P S ',- S.-

f,- ,-- E %,- G9l---O ¢; }eC3 I- .i_ C) ,_-_ "__ I= cI_ S...QJ QJ

i i e Ii i i i

i i i ii i 1 I

s--i

I

II

II

I

II

II

IIII

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

i

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

i

F.-,,=C

I-.-U

w

,_J

Z0,,--4

u c.-

L.,}

4--"1

fll_l

I I

,'-41_D! i

Ih " •

_ _,_1it'_

Ogr_

,,_ n J

op

I_,,I

Ir,,,,,l

Iv-,,,,I

Iq_,,4

Q.I

E C=) ,--0 I .P

i.

M

(M

xo

(u

_J

O-e-

"o.c:

e-• r-- •

0 u

_'- I(u

s.-"_" 0"_ u

cM

C-43

S-O

S-_J

&

!4_

_p

¢,_ e,._ O

u

° dP

u,.l_• P- I_

Ic-O

e_¢-

.p-

EICl

0UI

S-OS.-I.-w

4-)

I.-

P" 0(/) 1"-

(M

(M

E

4-_I

f,.P_

"P¢3,Cl,_

¢0-¢3_E

JEU,Y

4.._U

:_ O

0

!-.-4

_r

,Y(:3f--_E

i'--U

i,,

-.J

i,iZ

--jCaLIJr.1Ch.

opq3

n:_ P EU E _l_

e_.C:I .__. ul U

_ 0 O_

5-+J°_" O

::_m tD4,,,,oi

iUle, J i

.4._i

i...i i_... 4 Ii

IC_,jis._4| |

iv-.....i

¢/1 i_-.,,,Ii !

Em

,,_ n u _

i,_,=1

I-- "_ I_

°p

L,I-

I

4_°p.EO

e-or-

IC3

,-, (_ I.I

U

_- ¢-- 5.-(3.) "P

I II I

I II I

C-44

I I I II I I I

I I I II I I I

III

IIII

I

II

I

II

II

IIII

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

C)

I---U,cO

,._]

w

Z

u')

U c""

C: ,+-;

lB.

(JLrlaJ

::::bJ('_")

_a_m

t(31U I(",,.I

o_ m

_m_ m_"--_

I('_..1I!.-,,I

r") Ir,,._O0

,--01_ 0u !i,v,_l

IC",,.Iii1..-,li i

{,_,,.iI1"_C_0 {:Y'_

=E:: ,--a

"" I_0

0 u.,-i.1,,.,.,.

,,.,, IC_,,.I

uE

i-

"12(U

• (:::) _

_,-;,,.--.u,-U 1.1,.I _

L,

I I Il I i

I I II I I

C-45

,-_ ¢M (%1 i--( ,--I ,,-I ,--_ ,--I

I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I II I I 1 I I I I I

¢%1 ¢M ,_ i--I

e--I

,--I

,-_ ,--I ¢%1 f_l f_l _" _r

I

.I,D4-)f-O

(J

I"

(.3cC

.J

..J

i,

Z

QJ

rO

c.-._0 "_

U

,,,o,_m•_ n_m

U I (",,_o_ i,,_b-.,n

_mU F"-"I

I0',,.IIt'_gl l

rl_,')I t._

i iiv--4

l@,JIJ1 1,--4

i i4-_'E,(.M ir_

IE ,-'_

,,_ i J

L-

_1,-.:E

|v,==l

QJ• C3 _-

£:),.,--4:3E ,.-_ ,--O I -,--

U I_J to

L0 g

P

0U CO 0

Q_ E f,- "t3

E *" _-o-)O U ¢-

G.) P_ f,- O_ ct:lf,- 3 E

"1_ 0p •

OU .4-) l"_-- 0 QJ U

L I _ I

:30 • E•_ _ "[30U'P >_ E

I

I

S-

;4-

4-)lJ1

UEn_

S.-O

S.-O_

CL_

(/1P-Z•P I.l.I

4.a

Uopf,.

E4-_

JEI

I_e.._ u

_-_ I I II I I

t I I II I I I

Os--(

.-M

(J

s_4

4(

C-46

,z:moto-

o,pf,.

E

fl)

0

00p

.pS.-

..C:

0r',-

"!PU

.p

(.,3

Z

opi.=-e:lU

°p

.p$..

U"k

I

IIII

II

II

II

I

II

IIII

I

I

fY0l--

(.J

id=i

....I"=E

a::l.¢JI'Ml.il

X

L4.JZQ::

IdJ

C_.

.=J

=3L4,..

aJ1,4-s

¢..3 E

(.-4--)O _

U(,'I

:>,,J(-,-)•.Im' !

ro!

i_=...i

i r-.._

t==. . ._ _,1 ae'-e"00C) O'_Z ,"

.f.-f_OJ

l(",J

E _:)'_

• f,- _

|_,,4

OJ• 0 S,,..

l,-_ fY) :3lEE ,--J -"0 I .r--

L,_

t4")• c'- 14"*)

E.r- 00

•_ .4...) C)

O.r=-

E O

•r- c_

E u Q)

e-- .._ m

aJ "oC:I. aJ z

4..) L4J

_ C)I r--- !

_ 0 E

0 J G)

U e- _I "_ _J

G) e- l.- I_"_.- 0 i (].)

" (.J C) i._

I

@,J

i i ._i i II I I i

I ! i i iI I I I I

s-.=l

C-48

OIn

l--

w

-J

N

X0

L_Ze,,,".--_en

n,"

XC_

_J

n_

U

,.o

i.m,

(.b

_J

_tvl4.._I

(-)l(%J

rw._I,.-._

i'_} i1,.,.COO_

_1',0

I&#} i_,-(em I i

._ C,_ It'"e'COOOh_-,_

I,.-

QJ IO, Jle,,,_

"P 0"_

_J*0 f,-

0 I .r--(..) _.j ¢1

L_

If)O0

0

U

(U_UUlI

E

.l.aEC)

U

II

II

(M

I

III

III

II

II

I

II

III

II

!

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

ry-CDp-

¢.J

I.¢J

C.)

CDu_

II.¢J

¢/)

a_

(__ (-

S- ""(J(11

C_

::>Jr,')

,_,

rOlUIC'_

,6-,i

[,._ I,-'-_

1_=..4| |

_lr-.mO

t'-- I !

O=h

I_D| i

"OO I,--4

or,-L

_2. IN

0J _oI_E

i !

• C_ I-

E ,-4 ,--0 I .P

U-

xO

.+_

_Uor-U (i)

r"

I Uv _j

I

-_"_ U

C-49

Ie--IOI-

4-)

U_U

l/1-I

IC_ OJ

(-I_. 0

I- I0

c-

O U

.I-) ,I-_

I ,-..I II I

I I I !--,I II I I I

_T

I l II l I

I I l I I II I I I I I

s,-I

UI,¢')

s,-4

Qvii

I

i.¢JiJ.-I

I'--ZC_¢J

I

U

l-

.p. ¢-0

l_.e",P- |

¢D 0

-I(J.l__j.r-X .=i(_I l.l

I,-.0 o0-,

or- 0_I 0£,_r- =

_..

0

_..(U0.0r-

E,r.-

II-" ¢I

=r- 0

=p-

1.=)

e==l

C-50

I

I=.¢I

Z

r,_

| ._-÷ v)

¢/!0

r_ (Uc"

_- 00 c"

I N i N II I I

I I ! i II ! I I I

cr

I-=i

o') op.

I

III

III

II

II

I

II

III

II

I!!

!I

!

!

!

I!

!Ii

I

III

I

-i(.-

,p.4J¢.-.0

(,J

-,=I0p,.-I---ZC_C,J

QJv_:3

0 E:

p.-

._ QJf,,... "YU

:>.J r_.4--*1

_'I_I(..) IcM

L.,) I,-.-I

IC',.lis-..,l

("0 II'.-.O(3

'-" I_,0i i11.-.4

IC',Jli--.i

¢=. , i•0,-) O,,Jtr'"r-.QOOO_

_-,--_

•_ n JO i,'--_

.r--LaJ

_. ICM

E_ O0 Ir_°r'- _

! !

IC, air,,,-I

Iv--,q

o0 I--

O I .,--U 1._. _

I.l-

C-51

"_ u'}0 _

I op_J I E 3

E :3 IJl.P _. U_=S r'- GJ (_4-) 0.) GJ

E _ O I_ O O -_

U_ I U I I I -I_

_ _ "_3 _.- l"_ _ _ O

O U r_ P'- _ (U :_ O 1.4

(_ E (/1 ._ _ I I I

V) E C::) .r-- "-_ O U E .P -P

r" E

I cMI

i _ II I

I I II I I

O _ ._

_Jt'-Oe-

.._ >._0 _ .._*- 0 GJ

0"1_

_- _ t O

-- I I= _

I I= cOO O E

°P _ 4-) "P

_I- QJ (J

(j e-_ £::.p

I I ,-_I I

CM !I

I I II I I

U "13 (_

"X3

{/1¢4

4.-)

(U>O

.2

I-

t'-

!

l-_Je-O(..

IU

e-.p-

E

O

t O

E to_ ,_

0G.' 4,-_

f,,.. ,,,,,-0 C:S-, 0

I.,.I _,=._

,.,¢b

I

f.,-,0

0

U

(_ O4-_ !--

I

(/)

!

(U

e-°f=.

c-O

Uv

C_Lid....J

0

I--Z0

¢.-

c-O

0°p.

5..Q_

G.}E

°_

,.o

p--

0

00

CO

i i11--4

IO, J

IO, J

i.--4

°C) _-r'_ 0 .-iE C) ,--"0 I .r-

U-

E

0E

(-.

I I(A I_E E

r--- r-=-

0 0

2- '--

E _ E

0

0 _ 0

C-52

I I

I ¢'- _-• .r- ,t-,-

i _ S.- f..Z "0 C_ ._'- .P

__ +_

_ 0 0

0 _.

I _ U U

_"- 4-_ t" 0 0la_ _ I U (.,)

_,I _.. "P" I I

E u_ -- ._- _- .,-

I iI I

L_

O0

I I

I I

1 t ! II I I I

,-N

,,-.4

_0

0 0 _'_ ,-_ ,-_ ,._

fl)

0

I I I I II I I I I

I I I I II I I I I

s.=-4

0¢-

0°l=-

E.p.

_..0

N-

t-O

=3

.p.-$.

.p."0

e--r-

"0_J

"0

p,.-¢.J

.#1.

.r-,

e_U

.p-

l.J

IIII

I

I

I

III

I

III

IIII

I

II!

IiIIIIIII

W

It

IIII

"0

'--sE

0U

n.,,i.l.i._1_Jc:)n,,.I--ZC)(_)

fJ_"-sn_

¢"-') c-

,.o

0 -!

U

_OJ

f_lUI_

J ,r,') Ir_gO

| ,ii.-_

h._4e"

e'CO

0 I,-_o1_

QJ

11._4

E_ _ I r,,,,,.

| J

_,_-.

•-.-4 |_

|_-,4

• o 5-

0 I .P(,J U- f_

U-

C-53

L 4__J_ c- 0 QJ "_ z

U or- t.,-- _ _ 0 I

E _ N .._ L "_ I I,-I _j _ ...

C) n:J _r_ _j -_ 0 4-)I 1_. I1D _ ¢- _ _,) 0

E E 0 _J _:_ ..1=- 0 f_ _ ._ "10 _1

LL .P" _,_ 0 I L 0 fl_ t'-

E Q-- I _- P" or-

> I _ I _ 0 3 E l----P "I_ 0 U

_ _ C) O (..).P _. O O _J .E: E: 0 ¢1 _.

e,-i

I,D r,.,.P-4

n,,') h.,.(.J

r,_e-,,4

e.-4

Gor'_

4-)

0e-I/1

0

of--U

L)I

0 _"5- 0

I(1,1"10

I_ 5.-

PO O

ell¢M

!-

4-)r-

E0E

0

U

UI

h f-

_. a

e'_ 5.E O

U

¢1e-

•J_ O_:_ 1:::

or-" |_" .1_

I

or.- 0

(..)

t.-'_0 I::

0

_Ju'l _J

N

i

O0C)¢_)C,_

¢lJ

"I

¢.-) c"

,.o4.a

_o

S_n_"U

_;_Jo _),,.i-, i

rillU IC,,,J

,.o.,._t

f,,,,.J i,,,_4

IO, Jit=,4

cO It,-.

I i

IC_

-i_ L",JIr'_EO0

_-,__

I_0

op.S,-el)

O_ IC_aii._l

Er-o,_

i---i ,-._1_| i

i_=-,i

,-,4 i_ D

I1)• C) _.-

_'_ C) -_E QO ,-"0 I --

¢_) b- _

c_

U

-I

0 -t-O_:_ _::__I

f,,,.

.p {,,-

U cO

C-54

I ,--_ ¢'_ ,--_ _I

I II I

I II I

un cx) C) C)

IIIi

i

IIII

II

,|

I

iIIIII

I.

I

II

Ii

i

IiI

/

I/

i

i

1I

Ii

r_WI--

Z¢__

c'_¢..)

E

L rFU

-e.-,,i

I'I_IUIC_

,.i,--,i

I'+'--+

IC'_.I11,--4

r'_ It.....

"--+ IUD

l,l,,_

IC'.J

1,- I I:%1It'-

E::_0

,_-- ,,._+

I,,O"E) . iO i,--'+

•I""I,,,-03

r.. IC",.Jl<l.--i

_:) Jr-,,.EoP" 33

i ii,r.-t

IC,4

:olr---

Iv-"_

"(_ I=

0 I -P"(,-) (.0 _

I.,.i_

gO

It')

Ic-O

•I,,.-

U0#EEOU

I

i+_O

0J_n0)

4-) i_P'- UO>'13

I:_- ,--

",1Q .P-

_D

C-55

r-.-Io'_s.- (_{:_.r-

o1-._.I-)E Ol.- E

,--&_ E

E G)_ m

Es,- _.

e.- 4_)

U

GJ

op-e-

EO

0J

•-I 0J

O 0JE

O

-',.,i

op. i-"

_+- _:

I_1 e"s4_.f-

+.-4

E E IO O I

I I E -P O(" 3_ 0 "

--s 0 E 0_

•,- e- _ .,.. 0 c- E0 --1 I 4-) I,.,,. IE _ .,_ ,._ E 0I _ U 0_ 0 UO r"

-I-+ _4 I=: 13_ 1::3. _ 03.P---i "1 I_I E I _ P- -I-)

O I -r--U ._-- Jr- i_ r'_ I 0.J

(.) I_ _- U _,- _ :3 U r" E0J 03 _ P _ I

-s • _. C3. 03 .PP- 0 E

"'- =_ I 0 _- E I_.-,-

•,-- e- U .,-- r"s .I-) 0 e-"_ 4-) -P 0J .1-) ::it'- O =1

C_ !- :_ w I- _ _-) _,- _ E_ O "_ _- _- :3_-- _ 0

lu- _ --I _ L_ E 0 0 CY U

I II I

I II I

(M

I I II I I

I I II I I

('M

{M

I_ ,_ _ _ _- If)+--4 _ i-.I +P-4

I

i.¢J

I_JZ,Y':E-r

CE(J

t--(JI.¢J..J

QJ{/1

U (--

,.o

p..

_o

U

:;_ (Y)•4-.-' I._|

UI_,I

4,,,,I |

I L'-"t

I I

ic'xJ

¢-- ! I

E_

=1_ I I

0 I_'=_.p

S.-

C_. IC, J

t=op

0"_

I,-'¢

op-

I

E E_ 0p,-

p---

"OI:_ e-E _

I

E Q.}

0. _ _ 0

I_-_- E i

$- _ 0 E ¢-_ _ _- _ 0m- __ C.9"0 QJ

0 _ U¢-- .p.

•_- ___

I _'- !

_.- > _ O 8_C) -P-_'- ._ E

I 4-_ U O

_._ E i,+_ _- E c..-_ O O O

"_ E .U',-I

$-"O QJ _

{J or- oP-

0",-" (_ 0

C-56

II.- ._1

£1. U..O

_= O.p. (.-.

E

O_O

f,_ (_) f,_ _-_O _ O .P

E O" E

O O O _(.J .I.._ (J E

I I 1 I _ II I I I I

I I I II I I I

I II I

CM

I I I ,PMI I I

I I I II I I I

s.-.1

0JE

"00

o_

f_

E

4-)

_U

0

c-O

-.i

M.=..

I-4..)

.p

"(3

=I-.-

QJ

.=_

Ur-

CUI-

U

Z

*r-*

¢IU

op

*p

I-U

III

I

IIiIi

I/!I

t1I!iI

I

I

IiIiI

IiII

'J

I

I

II

II

0

w(f)(._LiJZ

"-r-

.-J

(._)

..J

(IJ

rO

•r-- (_

L)

(1J

:;:_ (-v-)._=.,!

UIc'_

•4.=-,i

OOOh

'--_IuD

,,...., ic'%J

..C::C'%11r_

COOOOh

IUD

O iv-._o_L

E _m-.

I-- "-_ I_D

i_-.4

is--4

Oh

, |ip..=4

-'r-i.&_

c_

t

E

"_ 5...-0

•,'- ,_

e-- t-

e--_

_ 4-_ o_--

t" e-- L"_

_.,_,

5..,--0

i ._,-

e- c-o o

o

o

._E

o o

-i-) •

"5

"_ ¢/I

¢'- _j

113"_'_,Le" 0

o_1=

v

0 e"

!

0 0

C-57

(.)

5.

t cO

(X.) (.)

o_Qj c_

I

O.r-

0 5-p-- r_

t_

_D

4_0e"

I

0

l.J_Je"I=0

"0

tJ 0"0 e-_.. t

°,- '=0

or-

-,,m. o

I

04,_L)glJe"

0

_J

0

"01:=

Cn

r-.. o

,q,.

g=n

.:,,-,--'O

_" 4.-_,_ f,."" (lJi P'-

•_ ,--e,- c-

op. f,-•_ o

o 5.-

_J -.1_

o

f,_

i

0 r_I= 0

_-_

e- 00r- _-

te"

L- 0(]J ,_-

0

(.#5_n_J

i"0

(3_'0e- _j

Ic-o

Qj or-r" u_

or- 0

_J 0

,m=l

i

_j,.-

•t- l'_"0

sin'

•6,- l,"--'-- 0

I

0

0

0or-L

S,p=.

WJ_

I-0

0

J_

4_

"0

"0

U

,fn

I/)

i.J

>_

Utr-

M-.I-

I

E°r--

0(Jv

V_

V)

WZr_

-r-

..J

U

r_F"-

L__J

c'-

r---

Lr'_

U

a.)

.jlJi

rOIUI_,J

.4-_1,_1

,.-4 p,_

i,.--4

E_

O i_-..ior-.

I--" "'_ |tD

EO _

O _ "-U _

"t3

°r-

IE

OE

-SgE

I

%

°P- °r-

°r-

0 0r- E

>__n.c

0"_Z _n

co

C_

c_CM

C-58

E

I,,-¢}r-

I

0

o_-

0

•,- _:_

_- E

xe- O

O

rn _

_ M

Oe-

O°p-

(lJ

°p-4.1

QJ

4_

0

_.-0

.p

oli

_n

"0

QJ

E.p-

"0

"10

riC.Jt-

.f-

n_

/21

U

Z

4-)op

%U

.p

I

I

I

i

IiI

I

|

I

I

!I

I

I

I

I

I

I

!C-59

I

G)-It-

op.

t-O

L)

C:)V1zW

1.1.1

V1V11.1.1

Q..

..-I

L) l.-

,.oc.-4J0 -_

p-

l._ n"U{/1

.i-,i

UIC_

.e-,io_ i_J

11_-.-ii i

COCh

! !

e--

E_

O h--._0r-%-

Q) I_.J1_...4

E0_-. _

I-- ,-'4 i,_| ,if--t

lea

i i

,.io _-

o_._Ur'3 _

I

-5U

0p-

U

E

0i

0

U _J•P- 0

UO_

E0r-I

E

0EvE

IEO

.i-.-

_+.._

E

EE

,._ OU

£-0.._,

._--E

c_

t_O

r--O

U

I

E_2..0

E

O._-)E

EO E

0

0"'f,.- >

E

O

C-60

I r,3 Od _,_!

I .i_ II I

I I II I I

C_

"k

C) C) 0 0 C3

I I II I I

I I II I I

s..-i e-.I e=_

0J=(,n

0,i=-$.

Eor--

_,-

S,-0

0

4-)=3

.pS.-

"0_J

PU

.p

_J

U

Z

0p

U*r.-

Ip$..

U"k

I

II

IIi

i

!II

I

I

I

I

II

I

tI

II

I

giI

ItI

tI

0

Z

I.J.Jr.,."

I.JJ

I'--

-"s

E

0 _

.p... (_)._...."."L.}

a.J

::>.J_,')._-Ol

.4.--'1

L2 |_"4

IC_,Jl?--,dI I

('_") I r-..COC_

i i

OOh_- ,.._

O Ir-.._,r-£.

E

I--- "_ I_I n

leJi_=-i

_n i

°0 £--

C) I "P-

C-61

O,J

c_14.-

M

.Wr_ UU

I

E

,r-

"I_ "I_¢"-

"- I,..I ¢I

4-_ P"oP. tl_

U,'--I,..

U [''0

f,..C_QJ

s-,.l

oe..f,,-

U

I

E0 0

°P I

U

0

Oop

i4-'}

0I

lal(U

U

0

S-Oe-

e-_p

o•_ I

o_"

U

{I_ oP-U

•" _..U 0

e_e.-

e" e"

0

N "I_QJ .r.-

f,,.. "_'_' "_ i_l I_

I f1_ _ I_•4-) .P

i_.U .i-._ OJ•4_ 0._ "r=" "tO

0 U U _-

•,'- .0J U I=U e:F

£.- _._ I_-0

I I II I I

I I i I II l I I I

0!-I#1

{/}

0.f..f,.OJ

WI=

.y=.4=}

J_

5..

14=-

.,f=.

(/I.p"I0

.p

"I0W

r=.=.

S.-nP

,,,.-U

Z

.I=-

U,,f..

5-

"It

I

"0

(--or-

f--0

Uv

t,/')

C:)

.:,..I.l,.IV')

i.ip,,..

I'--

P.

I--

C-62

r-_ _ _ 1 I I II I I I

I I I i I I 1I I I i I I I

U "0r-.. r'-.

QO

cM

4( 4(

0

"00

o¢,...S-

Q_E

.I-}

S-O

w-

O,f-

S-.l.Ji#1

-F-,

Q_.c

.f-,

Q.)

Pu

{/1

u

z

.i,-

its

.e.-.l.a,,f.,S.-

4(

I

II

IiIiII

Ii!I

IIIII

I

Q.}

E°_

E0

U

t_

0t__r

t_

--_

CL_

X

O_t_

L) E

,.o

0 _

S_ m_

L_t_

O_

"6"I

UIC_

"¢'_I

| IIr-=_

IC_

e" C"J tr"

E_

_-,-_

I_O

n_0 i,---_°p

ll.-4

E

| ,

i_=.=I

_t,z

"11,,,0

i,e..-i

• 0 l-

0 I ,P-t.) "D _

_..

I

UcD

U

U

x

0

!

Cu

%U

0_.-

U

r...-

ct_M

OJE0E

cDU

X E

0 _-U UI

°P" I_

S--

t--_ U

S,-

•r- 00 ¢"E II E

0

•r-- t-

O 0Z U

Q;S--

°_0E

I

S-

.r-¢1

I.nQJ

QJ_J

°p_n_J

n,."

C-63

(L}

e--

U

IE0._4_

U.p

v¢..)

I.iJ1.1.1

O--Jla-

E'_" O

r- _. E

4_ _ EU _ v

_. "-!I/I _-- I

rr_ .,- 0

4_-1t-

OI/1E

E0

t'_ .r--u'l .l-a

I f---

"-!

.l-a I

O EO

U .f-°p 4_1

f,- I.-

C_

r,') ,l_ ,c_

C-64

QJ

E E

Ee-U

"-I

E I

•_ E•r- _j-s u'_¢J _.n

I

e- u

_ u

t_

o

w

u

FJU e-

_ 0

U

I_1UIC_

r_ll_00

_I_D

11-.-4

°f-

_J

E

t-- '-_IUD

lea

_01r__h

| i11._4

1:=00,.--0 I ",="

U "_ IOI.I.

I I Il I I

I I II I I

rO J'_

I

II

I1

I

II!

Ii

!I

;

III

II

II

IiIIiII

II

II

I

II

i

I

I..-U

LI.JZ

,.J

..JI.,l,J

I.i,.

=3

(.,JE

j.o

0f--•,I,,J O

Lnr"(,Jt/1

4--,i

UIC_

...-, i

u I,-'-

ICX,.II_--I| i

P') Ir'_COO',

h,,--_

V_

= _1_o=

*r--f,...

E r,--0p-

,--,_

.Of,,-

0 I .,-

I,.i,_

"O,P--I

L,)

C-65

u,,- I_ •._ U (,,.)

i--i

O

C'M

,,,..U

IZ) "_

O •,""OU,,-

i 0

f,..•r- (_

tel

0 E0 I

_N

_'_

_ E

¢1¢J_.,m_

I.-0 0

I•_ _..

t-- (U

• p .p,.

¢n I.-• P- IE _-

"-,,1

E U

O4-)i-_ V'l

CM

C%,1

(.,)

3:O

c_

"OO

.i,-.

E

&l,-.

0

O.p

,,f.,"0

_Je-

,p

_J"I0

U

,,f.,

_J$..

f_

U

Z

,pP

U

I

_U

{.-°m-

c-O

Uv

F-

Zi..-4.--I

-JI.iJ

LI-

(U

(J c-

O "_r--

._ QJS.. (:K(J

E_

b.M r_).+_i

(..I I_

IcM1_,,4

'-'_ hD

i_,..t

_,j Ir-...E_

_ I_:)

°p

le,-4

E

i i

lea1_,,4

"_ ItD

i f-,,,t

E ,.-4 p-

O _-," n_LI._

ET_E.p-p-

E

..EI

Q),=_OL

E

.,E E

E•r- C)

4-)

:3 .r--

C)

(._

E)

C-66

• _- I I _J -'_

• ,- _ _- ::3 .P-E

"_ _ _J 0 E U

E (_ E 4-) _ •P _J_J 0

g ,-_J u_ 4-) 0 U _J ._ I -P

0 l E 11_.r P 3 I_ E E I _" f=="O • 4-.) 0 _- E _) ET I I- (3.) "O (I) "P _J_.- P :3 {" 0 "_ .P O_ "_ E 0J > P C:

t,- O t.- O O _ E L) .-_ EP _ P 0 U .C: I_1 (_ _l E _J !.-"P U "P

(_ E (_ t,- ""-"P "_ 0 _- E 4-) "_ > "P t.- t,-

I I I I II I I t I

I I I I I II I I I I I

.O .O (J (J

I

Op-.

r"

04_U

C"4_0

4-_ U

"_-- 0

_1_ I

0

I

II

iI

II

II

II

lI

II

I

II

h-U

C_

Z

=_i

N

C_

X0

:3

U E

t 0

C_

Ui/ICZJ

.+-_l

r_) ir_

_1_=_o_

0°1--5,-

I_Qj .._ I

GJ• C) _-

0 I ,,-

i.a-

E

v'l1

•+J "E_v_ 0G) JE: Z•+-) -I_ I_J

S.- I

0 ,--_.r-

S,-

o_

(J

E:o ,- _,r- I 0 ",-')

i _ c/1(2) (1) S.- X

E .,- ¢+-i_ 5-- GJ I

I -P- c-v1

(1) -l.J "O E ,,+.. "1_ pS.- U P- .,- 0 _0 _..r'_ (1_ O._ ,-- I 4-_ -,'-

"_ 3: "_ _-- Q) S- __ E .,-,-- 0 r'_

(_'_ _ _ C:_ 0 _JI .E r- r_ S.-

v ,_ I • :_ I

rO 0 ""-_ U "t3

U U v) _ S- _l

,-- _ S.- S.- U ,1_ U

:_ --J "_ CL .P U ._

c'_ ,--i ('M

C-67

Zw

0I

GJ-1

"0.r-

8J

0S-

! I I I I II I I I I I

I I I I ! II I I I I I

M

p')

t_

L) UL_ IJr)

i ii i

i ii i

P_

I

Z

Zi.--4

C_¢,n-1fO

¢'-) E

S,.. "_¢,.)Ln

.d_,l

UIC'_._ i

E c_ ,--O I .P

i..) x/ c_

I.i.IZ

0-I--

C.Ji=-0I---

ZC_.

C-68

0 _

UM'I

,e-,, i

_II_I(JlCXa

U I,,--,I

llX,lle--_

I_I_! i

leai,/'i i_

_-4_ £xa II'_

ECO00_

_-,--_

,p5-

h_4

or-- _

I iI_',q

ICM

le=,-,g

G_• C) S-

_._) .-.IE u") ,'-0 I ",-

Uv cO

C_

C_

G_U G.)

V)

_ O e- _,__._E .,- I::

I !_ E _J 8J

4-_ O "O'O

O E GJ GJr-j=_ ,-v" f,.

O

"OO

0p

8JE

0r--

¢iJ

4-_

S-O

O

4-)-I

.p!-

I/1.r-"O

CUe'-

e".p

"13ClJ

"O

U

.p

(lJ

c_

n.-U

4-_

tJ.p4.-)el.-.I-

II

IIIII

II

I

I

!I

IIIIIi

I

I

IiI

II

I

I

iI

I

I

IiI

Ii

I

i"--(.3

(.0Z1=-4.,..J00U

r_

..../,...J0rv-O--Z0U

Ut-

,.o

(_)

'4--"1

U Ic_.J

°_ i

i ifc'H r_

i iI_--1

I('_.b

G_ Ir---it"" I I

E_

.p..-,

N

P- "'_ I_D

_,r-.

E ,'-0 _ID .,_

i

.p.

S-

r_O_L_-_ ___E _-

I

(.)_--

0

U _-

z

0Iv_

(Jt_

U

%E

r_

V_

C-69

<i:

U

I

0

t- Z0 Q# i,,

_-- E E

E _ _c_ 0

_- 0 "_'0

J_ tn nD (U 5.-

C-70

I I II I I

I I II I I

UM

',.)

i,--i

I

I

III

IIII

!i

I

I

II

III

.-J0

_JI---I=_r,,,"I--

Q.J

C._ E

E _0 _

S._ r_L.}(j'}

:>-,I r_

Ulr,_

.+-,1

_v

l{'_J

P") I f'.--

| ,ir=.1

IC'_

L..- ' '.4J Ifx.j I_EC_0_'_

E _:)Jr-.

I-" "-'_ I_

i_..t

_,_--

I_,,l

"Of,,-

0 ! "f-U.-J _

I"0

0

>0

E0

%

E.t-

O0

,-- E121 0

i

0

CL_UX

8_

I 0

0 $-

=%

Ot-.-l,- v'_

e,m z

i

I/I.r--

0

.._ _._

"0 I"_ E•_ 0

0 ,-"

°p. _"

f_

i

U

0

E0

,p.

l,,,,-P

E

I

I,,-

0l,-

,v.

C-71

w_

{-.0

or)

Z

0

I

,,./

E

,.o

U

r-,.

.4.--'I

U le',_

i |

! !

i i

O=h_-._

I_D

._ n nO u_

.p$..

_. ICM

8.1 _0 i r,,,,,.•P,.- _Pi

_|_

Q_

0 I .,-

h

I

I,/'I

U

E

0

E

.E EU E

_.. $.U

I_4J

I

...-I

n_

l/)"-I

U E

,.o

0

rl_lU IL"_

,4,--' I

I{'_,JI f-,,-4

,--'4I_C)

IL"_fj,} i_,---t

_ C_j Ir''-

EO000'_

_- ,...._

lu::)

noo i,,-_

°p

0J12_ ic._

E _0'r'"°r'- _

It'4I,"'--4

_,_-.

| ,

• 0 _--C}.O :_E 0 ,'-"0 I .,-

°_

°p

(J

"I0

0 E

IE)"_ rO

• p. (.)

E

I

U-

r_C-)E

c_

Z0

I--r_1.1.1I--0

--J

-r-l--

C-72

u')

(.-

¢- .¢-}0 _

,,.-,,

:>.d('_.i._l

_1_1(J IC'_J

u I,--_

is..=_

O0

h"=_f.. i i

4._ _.j Ir__": O00'0_

V I_D

_J_. IC_

iS _0 'r""P" O_

IC_J

O_

• 0 I.-

E 0,_ ,'--0 I ",--

UZ _1

t-O

°l--

(J°p

I S-I_ °r-

I-

EE I

• r- -1

m UE _

I

I

iII

II

II

iI

l

iI

II

iI

I

0l--

....J

0

,.o

p.-

Q_

.+-,i

_i_

.¢-_1

_i_,

t-

O,p-s-

_l_E _"

QJ

0 I ._

i,

Z

C_I

"0QJ4-a+a0r--

c-°_

tJtO$-

(J

C_

k_J"3

_D

tO

,.o

tJV1

_1_

!(Y) Jr'-,.O0

"-_ I_iOI

i.-4

i.-4

¢" c_ji /

C::::_00"_

i_C:)

0 i,,-,i

r._ o .=iEu_,--o i ._-

C-73

CO

I

¢IEf,,-O

oe-

,.+..0p-£.O

I I I II l I I

c_

I I | II I I I

C-74

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

III!

I

I

I

I

i

!I

II

liIi

I

I

Ii

Ii

APPENDIX D

UCR REVIEW

Summary of Component Failure Types Data

I

I

t

!II

11I X

i"-

C_

L__

r,,,"

,-.q

I

!

I

II

!

i1[

91[

Ip

D-1ORIGIN/IlL PAGE fS

0_ 0 O0_O0 O0 O 0 _0

0_0_ _ O00_O_ O0 0 0 _O

_000 0 00_00 O0 0 0 _0

_000 O O00000 O0 _ 0 _0

__oooo_o oooo __o

0 _'_ 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 k'_ 0

O_O _ OO00_O_ _O 0 0 _

_00 0 OO00_O O0 0 _ _

D-2

I

I

F"

r

I

I

I

F-

I

II I

Stl_ll.-I0_I3BI_qN

I

S3DNW3701

73A_1 SS3DX3

NOIlWBIA

3nOB01

_IX3/gNISSIW

NOIlVNIWVlNOD

lV31BI3373

_V3M

39VWVO 'SgNIO

S±_Vd N3_C_B

SI_Vd 3S007

NOI1VNIWV730

NOISO_3

$_3V'd3

S_V37

LUO,.

6_

,,.I

U.

CI.

>--

F--

66_

r?

,-J

L_-

>-

ram

r_

U

---_

0

gD_

mm

z

I

(_0

m

!

I

I

| E

!

I

I

|I-

!

I

II

II

I

II I I I I I

c_

s_I3N JO _3g_iN

F

f-

D-3

!I

IVgWI9

S_3NO

S_OSN3S

53553N_VH lV31_13313

B311Ngl

SBOIVNI3V

C)Q-

S3AlVA NIVW _-C)¢._)

B3111_ ONV $3AlVA _33H3 >_

dWndOB_nZ U3ZlOlXO 3unss3Ud MO1

dWndOBUnl 13n_ 3unss3_d MOl _dWndoBunl U3ZIGIXO 3_nss3_d HgIH i

dWNdOBBN1 73N_ 3BNSS3_d HgIH _"

_3N_NB3_d _3ZIGIXO

_3N_Ng3_d _3N_

31ZZON

B3BWVH3 NOIISNB6K)3 NIVW

I

wr,,"

(.g

UOI33DNI NIVW

B39NVH3X3 iV3H

OIO_IN_/W SV9 £OH

!

D-4

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I

I

!i|l!

i

!

!

Ii

I

!1

!I

!

APPENDIX E

UCR REVIEW

Listing of High Occurrence/Criticality FailureTypes and Probable Causes by Component

I

II

I

I

II

Il

l

IlI

I

l

I

ll

>.-

=E

w

:>

r...

u

>-).._

...J

,,::[

E-I

J:; E_ .1:: 0 "-_

P- "_ .i-)

_ "- _."_"o,-_- g_

_ °

¢,¢'1 _

"r_-

_'_ I=: r_ .1= _.P._._ _,_ ,"_

.p _.,.. _. >_ _._

EE

_ 2 -g

e,- op

_,,=)_Z

I

z

W

rv

r_

r_

ZC_

E-2

0 _ _ 0

o

0t_

0C_

c_

iI

I

I

III

II

I

II

II

III

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

l

I

I

I

I

l

l

Z

I--

ZQ

U

>-

U

E-3

u

z

r_

_.a -o a.a

• P C_ P Q_ G) E G; G_ E P

E0.p

ror_

V_

ro

.._ _-"_

C:: .._ G.) £;._ G;

er_ _j _.j e_ ,_ 5r- C3

0

v

C_

¢[

I

O

I.s.J

b--Z

C_

>-CZ:

=E:

i,J

LsJ

Oc:

r_

r_

r_

>-

...J

t.s-

C1.=E

E-4

EE

l- t-OO

r-r-

EE

00_-

_*_--c_" o_'- _ c _-,--_ _ s. _ "_

0

_.o_ _- _. _.

C_ ,"

¢oI.

_" c= (U0 O_

0_"

0 ,Y

r_

i

III

IIII

II

II

II

II

III

!

I

II

iI

II

II

II

II

I

I

III

:;=

)---

Z

0U

>..

(.,')

3=

U

>-

-%..J

(:C

(:3r_:E:C_U

"_

e- r-._

• . _ _"g

E-5

u_

4-) .P 4,-) _-

.G

_'_ "; _ "__

0 c_

t_D _ r_a

um

u

C_

I

Z

F--

Z

O

L)

i,I

i,i

r_

(J

u

tY

>-f_

_E

F--z

C_

E-6

•_ ___-_ ,-_ s_._I ul •

0 (2_

i_- :3S.

_' .E

0u

r_

I

I

I

II

II

I

I

II

II

II

III

E-7

!

l

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

Z

I"-"

0

{,._)

,,::[

:E:

I.l,,J

I..l,J

i,",,-"

tY

(.J

u

E

_"- E _C L

W _ 0 r_

...de,..- _ e'-

,4_ G.) _ ,,-_ _ _ _ VI.b_ U _"" k,i.I ,._ _ ,._ ICI_ _ ._ t,,_.l i,,_,J_,._ ,,_ ,._ _ _e'_ ,._ _ I1_

-.e _ t..

," ._ ,- GJ _" _-_ • _.l:: _)._ 0 •

> _,

L

°p

°_

C _ E _ w .P I_

G)U

e-°p

o

I

I.&J

Z

t--

c_

>-r,,-

s--=K

_>

Q_

>-

C)r_=E:0

E-8

s..

_ _ _. _._ O_-a 0 _ e" O_ 0"_ 0 _ "_ 0 04-a _ ._ e-

0 _.

en_ew

m

I

I

!I

II

II

mI

II

I

I

III!

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

C:3

l=¢J

:Z:

I--"

Z

E)

U

>-

E

'::E

:E

:E

¢/1

I.IJ

iJ.J

E

E

U

E-9

G-

>-

,::E

r_5"C_U

.p .p _ .P .p

"P • -P "O • .P-P {1_ I=-P i_ E I q-

I..

r_ )_.

]¢0

.p

L_ _ U _ S- 0 P_ V_

_._ __ ._ ._ = ,_,- .._._ o._,,.

_E 0 _ 0EO P C .P

P

"P_ S

• "_ _ X_

_E0U

C:_C_

I

#,-.,.

ill

:D

Z

I--zc)c_)

)-c_

n_

n_(_)

I--

c_

>-I--

-J

I.-z

C_Q_

C_¢-)

E-IO

c-

"F_u..

_v",-}clI::

(.-

r- (-._ _ I= 0 v _ _..t-) .'-_w-_ _ _," _ _'1 0 _-

• 0.= _" "_ 0 0 0

Z _-

eOr_ i,-o _ _-

D 0 0 L "_ X ._ 0 _ 0 0 ._ X 0

_ _N_

I

II

III

II

II

I

II

II

lI

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

l

l

I

I

I

i_J

Z

z¢:)(Jv

>-p,._E=E=E

(,,'I

i.lJ

(J

c..

F--

C_

xC_

E

_._ _. "¢}

_._ _ _. "_C E _ _

E*-'

g_gg;gg'-g" .-_ OX

u

°p -_

•_ _ .- _

0u

o{3

E-II

.p

•_ lb.-

_8_8 - W.. i._ e"

f,.,._f_.

I_._

i--

_ ° _

U (3 U _ "_ ":E

Q.,...i

(.,_

(b

(,-

I=

UZ_

_._(J (_)

,p °p

_=_

=._ Ic:,_cE C)

PI"- IE:

UU O _l: _ E

I

,.--...

Z

0v

>-rv-

:[

W

,,.,.-

CZ:

(..}

(:[

>-

5"

I

E-12 "C I

I_ U •

4_

t/1

N _ N_N

Z N_O_ _ _W

I

!I

II

I

II

II

I

II

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

Z

I--

Z

C_

L._

L._

C_

<...}

c_

>-

.:C

I---Z

E-13

E__E

c- c-

O _ O

E _ _-

O 0_ _

S C _ 0

_._ f _ ",-" IE "_ _- 0 0

vI-0

I. e- _-

_ e- f-

0

C)

_C> C)

I. I.-

e- .,_£ e._ +._ e..o &) ,_ e_ _ ._

• _ CE _ C) I=

0 0e-¢__

2_"_ 0

_Z

>_

L

Z

_Z

0

I

Z

I--"

Z

O

f,Jv

>..

:E:

,'-v"

r'r"

c.)

1>-I.--

z

XC)(..)

E-14

_= ,._ ,._=

U _P 5-4-) C ._ "-r- 0 _ ,.,Li

0

(,J o_0

¢..

oJ

0

.... =, -_ _ "_ ,- =, _ -=_

0L) _C

_ _ Z_

I

III

III

II

I

I

II

II

III

I

I

II

I

II

IL._

Z

I--"

I z0(_)

IL._

r',,"

I °

I

III

I

I

>.-l-.-

--j

C_

:E:C_

E

t" <--_ L.J _

z

(_ :3[

c_

I'-" CK

E-15

v

E 0 _ 0

_ (-.-) > X -'_ _ W.. "C) L _J

>

0 _ :_

_ _ _',_ g _ _ _"r. _

IE

0 ",

e-

{,,,.

o_ _ __ r e-

z_

qD e_0 _J

_r" _.

• _ I,--

_ _-_ _ _,_

0o_

"_ 0

_'_ "_ S

Z_0 C)0 _.J

I

C:3

;5

H-"

Z

C3

(.J

V')

laQ

LLJ

E-16

C;,

C_

EE C C

O O E OO

E E r" --J "_ E NOO O w- O O

S,- I.- C L L I-C I. _-

e-

- °o-ooo o__ooo_ -

0cn

e- *-

"0 "e_ f,- S.- 0 S. _ 0 (i_ -_

0_

t- o

t_

g ._.;.•_ E,,_

o_

_,o0 _ O,

e_

_m

III

II

II

II

II

I

I

III

II

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

r_

Z

I zC3

(J

_C

(J

I

I

I

II

I

v)p-Qc

>-p-

...J

F-z

C)

C_L)

E-17

(-

('-" r_

_ Or_

u_Z} .,,,_ _ r" E

_ _.,,- _ e" > ,,_ U (-_ E r-. -_

,,= =._ --,__ _ , _,,-_., _,_,__ _ _o_,_-o_ ,'_oOn.-

U CU _

T. ,-_ _"_._._ _.,

r_ u_0 _ e- {- _ _ E i" I- l" e-

I-0

v_

c.J

0 0 E _.

3Cr 00 _--_

>

:z: cJv

C_C_C:>C_

C) V_V_cM _._Z

I,--

C, Q-¢_r,_ _rz

I

L_

Z

I--

Z

O

v

r',-"

(..)

C_{.J

E-18

E u', E"-"

_ "_._

t.._ ,_ Z'-p _ e" G_ "0 _"_ t,,', t,.. u'_

w...v _

._ (L_ 'w.*.

$..

R}r,

_" _ t" .1:: ,I: &J " C G; ,'_

gJL _ f,..

_P GJ .k_ f_ .l_ .¢-t

0

0_J

t,-

r_

t- e.,. >,, _e,,' >,_._ '-_

:} 'L

I

III

II

II

II

I

II

II

III

I

I

I

II

II

I

III

II

I

II

II

I

2:

Z

C)

v

>-

_C

L._o..-4

-.j

t.Y

_=_

r_

0

E-19

4-)

0 "--'i'_ r" _ U i:. C

c_r

r- r- (o0 _ 0

0

N_-_

e_a _Z

I

i,i

Z

I--

1,1

1,1

r_

r_

0.

L v> w r- ,_

I=

_0 G P" _ O U

r- r-

_-.J

l_ ,"1 ''r

.=d

E-20

0 I.. I..

Iz ._._ _ _ t_ _:._ _._ "_ _

-,J _'-Wt_lt_

"2"

.--_ t-- C:)U')I_

C_--_

I

III

III

I

II

II

I

II

III

I

II

I

I

II

II

II

II

II

I

II

I

C:)L._

l-'-

v

>.-

C_

f_

>-i,.-

v J¢:00

L O0

Z I_ .,_ ,__

-_ ....... _,-,

C •

o_

E-21

I

E-22

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

III

II

II

!I

II

I

I

Ii

III

g

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

!

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

APPENDIX F

SUMMARIES OF SSME ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORTS

I

II

II

II

I

II

II

II

I

II

I

F-1

SSME ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT SUMMARIES

(I) TEST MPT SF6-003 STEERHORN FAILURE (February 25, 1980)

('I)

During a main propulsion test on the NSTL test stand, the HPOTPsecondary seal cavity pressure exceeded the i00 psi maximum redlinevalue. During the shutdown, Steerhorn No. 3 ruptured. According tostrain gage data and analysis, the loads were not sufficient to faila steerhorn for about 48 tests and this test was only the eighth forthe failed steerhorn. Investigation showed inadequate welds andrevealed Inconel 62 weld wire was used instead of Inconel 718. Theresulting joint strength was approximately half of the designstrength. The recommendations to prevent recurrence follow:

(I) Eliminate all 0.049 inch thick steerhorns(2) Continue steerhorn redesign(3) Reinforce all tee welds(4) Investigate nozzle aerodynamic shock loading(5) Continue strain gage and accelerometer monitoring(6) Conduct survey to determine critical welds and weld wire

utilization(7) Determine the need for additional controls on filler wire

certification

ENGINE 0010 TEST 901-284 HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP FIRE(January 15, 1981)

During a test at NSTL test stand A-l, the Redline Acceleration SafetyCutoff System (RASCOS) initiated the shutdown. The low-pressure oxi-dizer discharge duct ruptured during shutdown, causing extensiveengine damage. Failure of the duct was caused by a fire originatingin the main oxidizer pump.

Two unrelated failures caused abnormal operation of the engine. Thefirst failure was the loss of the channel B pressure measurement(chamber) due to controller channel B shutdown induced by a facilitypower surge. The other failure was the dislodging of a purge Lee Jetdevice introducing a large pressure bias. Deep throttling to 60 per-cent RPL and an engine mxiture ratio of 3.5 (6.0-normal) resulted.

The conditions caused a thrust balance towards the pump and a gradualice buildup in the turbine, which finally caused the thrust balance

capability to be exceeded. Rubbing caused metal ignition in an oxy-

gen environment and fire propagated throughout the pump causing thelow-pressure oxidizer discharge duct to rupture.

Had similar conditions been encountered during launch, an engineshutdown would have been initiated prior to launch commit for loss ofredundancy. The corrective actions recommended were:

(I) Implement shutdown on test stands for major componentfailures before SRB

!

(III)

(IV)

F-2

(2) Incorporate additional main chamber pressure reasonable-ness checks in the software during start transients toensure redundancy

(3) Delete the low main chamber pressure redline and add lowerHPOTP turbine discharge temperature redline to check forpossible icing

(4) Modify Lee Jet orifice retention method(5) Perform a pull test on all Lee Jet body installations(6) Stud), to assess engine control and redline logic for

vulnerability(7) Study to assess all other Lee Jet installations in SSME(8) Study of HPOTP turbine end clearances(9) Inspect all facility Invertron units10) Replace all facility Invertron unit power transistors

ENGINE 0009, TEST 901-307: ENGINE 0204, TEST 902-244 FUEL PREBURNERFAILURES (December 22, 1981)

Failures were in the LOX post injection elements caused by high-cyclefatigue. The mechanism for high alternating stress is the combinedmainstage mechanical vibration and the element hydrogen flow inducedvibration. Also, in engine 0204, the injector face plate was erodedand slag buildup was found on forty posts.

The design fix was to increase the moment of inertia and damping inthe cantilevered LOX posts. This would reduce peak alternatingstresses below the endurance limit. The fix incorporated three pinsupports between the LOX posts and the fuel sleeve to restrict themotion.

POWEREDUI,IT 2015 PROOF TEST FAILURE: FUEL PREBURNER-FUEL SUPPLYDUCT

The fuel preburner fuel supply duct ruptured during the powerheadproof pressure test. A hardness test performed on the duct found itto be low of the designed hardness. The supplier failed to heattreat the elbow because of a misunderstanding of Rocketdyne drawingrequirements. Also, Rocketdyne receiving inspection failed to detectthe omission of heat treatment. Recurrence control consisted of:

(1) The planning at the supplier incorporates heat treatment

(2) Future supplier planning for small suppliers will be

reviewed by Rocketdyne personnel

(3) Receiving inspection plans have been revised to incorpor-ate physical verification of heat treatment for all appro-

priate parts

(4) Previously accepted parts requiring heat treatment thatwere accepted by the same individual at prescreening have

been checked for compliance

(5) Personnel responsible for prescreening have been advisedof the requirements at a workshop

II

III

II

II

II

I

I

II

III

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

(V

(VI

(Vll

F-3

ENGINE 2013 NSTL TEST 901-364 HIGH-PRESSURE FUEL TURBOPUMP KAISER HATFAILURE (July 14, 1982)

A scheduled 500 second full power level mission simulation test wasterminated at 392.16 seconds due to the preburner pump radial accel-erometer redline. Major portions of the engine were severed from thetest stand attachments. Using various data, analyses, motion pic-tures, test fire simulations, and model simulations, it was concluded

that the recently redesigned HPFTP Kaiser hat provided a hot-gas leakpath of hot gas into the bearing coolant. Turbine bearing failurewas followed by rotor displacement, turbine blade failure, rotor

seizure, rupture of the HPFTP inlet, and an oxidizer rich shutdown.

This was the first test of the latest redesign of the Kaiser hatassembly. Recommendations were:

(i) Return to the old Kaiser hat assembly configuration(2) Periodic inspection of the Coolie hat nut for retention

Adoitional actions to prevent other recognized potential failures:

(I) Reduce turbine operating temperature(2) Improve HPFTP Liftoff seal dimensional control(3) Improve Kaiser hat inlet design with a seal(4) Improve fuel preburner propellant distribution by cooling

ASI core

ENGIr_E 0107, SSFL TEST 750-168 OXIDIZER PREBURNER OXIDIZER VALVE BALLSEAL FAILURE (January 27, 1983)

A scheduled 300 second test was terminated normally, but subsequentdata anal)ses showed the HPOTP discharge temperature rising signifi-cantly beginning two seconds after shutdown command until the temper-ature sensors failed. No external damage ws apparent, but signifi-cant high-mixture erosion was found in the HPOTP turbine area andnot-gas manifold. A leaking oxidizer preburner valve was found to bethe source of the high-mixture ratio. The ball seal had circumferen-tial erosion and a radial seal crack was found. The cause was a

fuel-rich ASI hot-gas backflow into the valve seal cavity duringShutdown.

Corrective action was recommended to preclude hot-gas backflow duringshutdown. Until an adequate solution is established, the OPOV sealtest life should be limited to ensure seal damage does not approachproportions experienced in this incident.

HE;T EXCHANGER COIL ARC BURN (July 25, 1983)

During the tungsten inert gas (TIG) weld operation that joins atransfer tube to the heat exchanger liner the welder made inadvertentcontact to the heat exchanger coil producing an arc burn. This inci-dent was the result of the welder being unable to see the weld jointfor about 1.5 inches of arc length. The welder removed the protec-tive closure around the heat exchanger coil to weld past the point of

i

(VIII)

F-4

visual obstruction. At this point the welder mis-positioned historch too close to the coil. Corrective actions were implemented:

(i) Manufacturing operations record (MOR) books were revisedto add caution notes at potentially hazardous operationsto prevent operators from removing protective covers.Caution notes will appear as follows:(a) At the beginning of each operation - "Do not remove

coil protection without manager's concurrence"(b) At the end of each operation - "Replace covers if

removed"2) Department 518 has met with welders to reinforce the need

for discipline in adhering to procedures.3) Improved heat exchanger coil shields which cannot be

removed unless a sealed safety wire is cut, were designedand installed.

4) Long term corrective action involves design of covers froma more durable heat and chemical resistant materials.This will eliminate the need to remove covers for cleanand oven dry operations.

5) Rocketdyne is developing special welding goggles with aface shield that protects the welder from heat and radia-tion. The new goggles will improve visibility over theentire weld area.

SSFL TEST 750-175, ENGINE 2208 HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER DUCT FAILURE(December 15, 1983)

A test at tne SSFL Laboratory was terminated prematurely by the pre-burner pump redline accelerometers sixteen seconds after the enginehad been throttled from FPL (109 percent) to 111 percent of ratedpower level and the high-pressure oxidizer discharge duct failed.

The investigation concluded the failure resulted from a high-cyclefatigue crack in the duct wall at the edge of one of the ultrasonicflow transducer blocks mounted on the duct wall. The failure wascuased by the combination of thinning the duct wall to install thetransducer blocks, the added block masses, and the increased localstresses caused by brazing the blocks to the wall of the duct.

It was recommended that to rely on braze fillets to reduce stressconcentration not be done in the future. Any such applications wouldnecessitate extensive analysis and testing to ensure integrity of theparts involved.

III

I

I

II

II

II

I

II

I

III

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

APPENDIX G

SSME FAULT TREE DIAGRAMS BY COMPONENT

I

I

!

I

FIGURE G-I. HOT-GAS MANIFOLD (AIO0) FAULT TREE

i Mishandling

InstallationError

VibrationFatigue

I ThermalCycling

I DefectiveWelds

Defective

Welds

Cracks,Wear

FIGURE G-2.

G-2

Coil ILeak

HEAT EXCHANGER (A150) FAULT TREE

It

II

i

II

II

Ii

I"- Fire I

!!!I!!I

_

I

!I

tiIi1il

I

IIf

,|

Secondary

FatigueI

LoadDistribution

! InstallQtionError L

I GasTurbulence K

ThermalOverload

I LiquidEmbrittlementAST Orifoce

Vibrationand Thermal

Fatigue

Blocked

Orifoce

IContamination

FIGURE G-3.

G-3

Part JjFailure

Joint, Seal 1

Damage [_

I L°°se I _J

I BoltsI/IHo=_1/

Hot-Gas ILeak

MAIN INJECTOR (A200) FAULT TREE

Jl Injector MCC JNozzle Damage

_ ! Engine I

I Fire J

I

G-4

Hot-Gas Wall

Center line Crack

LinearOelamination

Erosion

MCC Wall

Failure

InstallationError

IBad Weld

Hot- Gas

Joint Leak

MCC L

Burn Thru I_

I

[,n_,a,,o,ion_l Error

Coolant

Manifold

Leak

FIGURE G-4. MAIN COMBUSTION CHAMBER

Possible

EngineFire

_._ Fuel in Aft

Compartment !

(A330) FAULT TREE

,!I!II

IiIIi1II

II

II

I

I

!! I: o_I

i i///iI \%%

," /! ,1 /I

" __1

| -

! 7-

G-5

%

%\

oEo

NN

, !I I 1

iii

I..i.I

I--._I

I.I-

o

)-._Jnm

l.IJ

i.a.i

N

N

z

I

W

.-j

I,

I

l

G-6

iL_W

.J

_C

C_Or_

c_

OC_

Zr,-

W

.-JW

N

XO

I(-_

r,-

L_-

I!!

.i

I!II!II

i

IIIII

I

i8-7

!t

/

o_ /_ /

!I

|!ii

1IIII

\

\

//

//

//

n

IJ=/

.-vIn

o0QO

d_o

do

d

e_

I.-.

!

iY

ii

!G-8 j

II

_1._ .=--_

0,.. 0:) ..-,.. Io

/, 1

N

•_ |

!!

G-9

!, i

!.- vl II- i_ ",: I::: -- I I I _'_ r_' _ .c_"_

,, ! °LI I o'-._ g'E

,,,_ "-"I I'_ C. . ¢: ,0_

I ° ' _1_m

/'iI

, /i

i ¢j) __. :|

I--

I---_J

0

I

0

,.J

I

W

|!

(THIS PAGE

G-IO

INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

,

!I

!

II!I

!

!!i!

I!I

!

!

!

!!

!!

!!

!

!

!,

!!

iI

APPENDIX H

SUMMARY OF SSME TEST FIRING CUTOFF DATA

I H-1

!I!

!i

ii1

It

!I

|

!I

II1|

C_

I,

l'--

(.9Zw-i

I,

W

Z

(..9Z

0

1

I1=

&.

I-

0 0

E_--_

c_CO

C_CO

r...

|q_

0

• P G_ ID

_ _- _; _=

_zZ ZZZ

(I,)w _ o

I tJ :_

C 0 O" IO

"__ _ _"

: U

I

1

I

I

"-r-

1=. w

c_

c_-r

C_L

J=_J

C:>G-

I

I

r-

r'

i

ORIGINAL PAGE P3

iGl,,.L'ooe Qu,_Zl_.

H-2m_

0

(./')

i

I---

L_

C_

l---

,-v

i,

Z

Z

i,i

=E

(./')

t--o

m.J

i

-.s

m.-l__..),

0 O

E,-_

C

r_

E

vl

X

0

+.o++_ .:•_._ I _ I_ _ _ * <1_

_ f,'- "_ O_ J_: _ "

Z Z_ ZZ Z Z Z Z Z Z _ _Z

_ I_

-1-

I

p-

I

I

I

t--

.1=

g ,

•_ _._

e. e- o

e-

,_1 ZQ_

t_ I.,,_ v*)z ZZ

t

I

I

I

I

I

e-

t1:s.

s..

s '_

G.

!I

II

|iIItIti!I!1I1

i

IIII

IiI

tt!II!I1IIII

-,Q

G_

°r,,,,,

t-

O

(,_

r,-,,

I'--

L__

(_',9Z

r,,,"

Z

t,,-.-4

Z

I,J.J

L,_

r'.=)

,,J,,J

,:[t

aP

I.-

0 0S.. _-)

E.-)

ZZZ ZZ Z Z

,.-* f_ (_l ,-._ I P_

"i - "1

C

H-3

0

[:

r_0

e-

,1= o

t_ _- _-- Vt IO

Z

I

0

0

xw

Z Z _Z_Z Z

...... I_ _1 _

..... I_ _1 _

_ _ I _

"_c_.

OJ-_

G.

S-

I..¢_.

S- eL)

e- S.-

0 S.-'_ 0

C_

'-r"

ORIGINAL P_C_

OF POOR (_L_ALITY

-i

"0

8J

"-sl--

0

l/'lW

....I

I--

0

I"-

Z

Zi,.-,t

Z

c0

I

ll.

0 C

_'_

i=

vI

5"-

0

i. r.8,1 -_ Ci.

0t I,-

,l= I.- 0

_ I,.,i 0

H-4

ZZ 2: "J"ZZZZ'_-J" Z Z='ZZZ

r_

0_

I

0

I.

i.I

_Y0

c0

c

i 0I.

_E

c _

z7

_ ,..,I_

ex

I

!

!I

!iIiiIII'

IIIlII

II!Ii1l!il

l

I

I

lJ

Iii!

E

P

.J

H-6 I

Q)

(.--

.p..

4-)

E

OL)

(..,q

LIJ

_J

I'-

Ll-

ii

C::)

(-3

(-9

Z

L,I..

L.I.J

Z

Z

l=l.l

l=lJ

=E

r.F)

£:O

_Ci

u

L..)

o..

0 0

E_J

toP_

r,_

E

I.

0

U

Z _ _ Z Z

I-

t

r"

E

s.

u

.4=

,.,r

¢..

u

O)5- I

OJ

_- 0

E .,._ r-

E _

"1 -

e- N__ 0

P OJ _l_J I.- P

IIII

Ii1iI

i1

I

I

II

I

iiIiiI,

Ii

I!I

IuI

°p-

C"

O

.--J

C_

h--

U-

O

-=_

Z

s===_

L,,

Z

Z

C_

¢-O

i

¢+5.=s

¢V

P-i

.t.-i

I_=-O OS..b._

P_

E

CVZ

H-7

_ _ _ _Z ZZ Z

_J _J ..J

ZZ:_

_'_-I_. _1_ --I _ "-" "_1 -- - "

_-I _ _1_ -I- " I-

_--I _ _i _ --I _ _"

¢_ _ I (_

.J

r-- S. t" S: (U(IJ (0 S- S.CJ G) S- =}

• _ ._ 1-_._ a_ _ _-E

..p.

1- &;

S- G; 1-

e,.o

r.

t-O

!

1.

0

r-

Z

1.

1.

1.

ORIGINAL PAGE' F3OF POOR qUALiTY

H-8I

"0

c-

0

(-2v

I.iJ

-J

I---

LI-

0

k-"

Z

0

I

U

0,.

0 0

EU

"_ I

CO

E

0

i_ 3 u -,o

S.. U I=

I-- I...- _--

_[_zz Z ZZZ

(_

"0 U =1 P(1_ I,- I- I_ P

(I) S,- _ C_,._ _

I_ _,_ S.- _ e- _l Ill...l.a I_.'_" I _ e-

_" , i.. I _

S.- *_ 0 I,..

_ _.. _, _ -_ S..

:I[Z: _: _:(/1 Z Z

_'-'I _ "1- "''1 _ ~_l _ "_1 _ "1 - _l _

-'1 _ -I- "--I _ -_1 _ _1_ -I -

•- ...i _

C

S-

OI;. _

U

I- S..

J= P JEP i_

| =0 0

C

E:_ 0=E _"

II

I

iiI

iIiII

IIi

III

I!It

iIIiiII

ni

I'

p

II

Ii

II

"I

(,...

.p

0U

I.i.J.._1

<E

La-

U-

0

F--

Z

La-

Z

CO

LaJ

3

o_ i

0 0s. _a

S..._

¢"_1

i

I

i

I

r-a,)E

S-

!"

0

"I

C

t-O

0 uO.

3e ,_-

m _U

C _U

f- t'-U

O _n

S- I-O

I. U

E

O.P

zz

,-_ ,--.I_

C O

-'r-

H-9

I

_n I- I.

t- I N (_.1 .1_ _.

_ _; _ _- _ ._ £3.a- i_I,.-.-_.p e- I ,'--

O

O _" E "_ C _-

,e-

• _ _ I= _ 0

0 eX V'I X 0 I= I_ C

I

EOI.e_

e,-

O

e-l,.

OU J=

I _ 0

C_ u-

zZZZ _ zz Z _ z

"_ ..... I _ ~1" "l- -I"

"'1 " ~1 -

S.

S.

U

0U

"1-

L

t-- ,_

J= m IE

O I- O O _-) O

C "-r-._

U _ ¢.-)U _ (..)

H-IO

Q.)

r

ore.-

c-

0

l.iJ,--I

l"--

u_

0

I---

(..0

ZI-.-4

I,

i.,

Z

l.O

Z

I.,I.I

LI_J

i+q

0

O_

+0LJ

e-_ +.,_0 0

E _ _ E

"0 O+ _" 0 I _,OJ ._ GJ _ OJ_

_'0 0 t'"

= . + g _'

, ,-._- _,-_

I-0

0

e-

E ._ "_

l.J .,1_

o_

LI..

"=E0.)

+E0

!I

I

l

IIi

I

i

I

!

i

I

I

II

i

I

I H-11

I

i

II

i|

I

II!

tt

!ai

I

iI

r'-

.r-.

c-

O

I'"-

O

t---

Z

,-,,.,,t-.-4

W

Z

Z

I

,,.-4

S-

_._-O Oi.-

EJ

f13

I-

nPa;

O

!

_- E{_._-

Q; _ 0S- _ I_-_

_ _ S

_ ' ,_,

1.1,_ 0 I,- _J_J

L.

I-

_ C

0 D

._ _. _: _ _ I::

_I 0 "_ _ _:I

_ I_--__'_" e- I,- I_.O

_o_

>_

rI ._,.

OI,_,.. _._

_E

_-- 5.oe_I.

0

I=

I"

IO_

I=

0I--

H-12

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I

IIII

1IIIi,,|

I

IIiII

1I

!

!!!

!

!!I!!

!

!

II!

I

II

II

APPENDIX I

FAILURE MODE RANKING

Description of Procedure and Summary of Results

!

IIi

lI

IIli

I

III.

I-1

SSME FAILURE MODE RANKING PROCEDURE

I. Three Line UCR Review

A. Considered all UCR's of criticality 1, 2, and 3

B. Deleted UCR's that did not affect engine performanceC. Deletec UCR's that were minor and did not recur after corrective

action was taken by Rocketdyne

II. Full Page UCR Review

A. Deleted minor problems that did not affect engine performance andsafety

B. Deleted some minor problems that present quality assurance stepswould catch

Ranking of Failures

A. Risk Factor

Determine, from the criticality factor, the full page UCR descrip-tion, and the FME____AAreport

RISK FACTOR VALUES

I

I

I

a

I

B.

1.000O. 500

0.333

0.250

0.200

0.1670.143

0.1250.111

O.100

Loss of vehicle

Probable loss of vehicle

Loss of engine

Probable loss of engine

Extensive engine damage

Local engine damageMinor local engine damage

Very minor damagePiece part damagePart still OK

Time Factor

The estimated least amount of time from occurrence of failure mode

to engine loss or limit shutdown with reference to the FMEA report

TIME FACTOR VALUES

I

I

I

i

C.

Do

1.000

0.5000.333

0.2500.167

Instantaneous

Milliseconds

One to ten seconds

Ten to sixty secondsHour to never

Frequency of Failure FactorThe square root of the number of UCR's written for each failure

mode divided by one-hundred, which ranged from 0.1 to 1.02

Cost Factor

The square root of the estimated cost per annum in millions of dol-lars subtracting costs that detection would not eliminate.

!

I-2

. Ground rules for cost estimatesa. Estimate the probability per flight and test stand firing

of possible failure occurrences. Probabilities and costswill be broken down into the different levels of riskfactor. Probabilities are based on the number of UCR'sand their information content along with the FMEA reportand the Probabilities in the Space Shuttle Ranqe Safet XHazards Analysis Report.

b. Divide the probability by three if only applicable toflight. This assumes there are on average two test fir-ings for every engine flight firing.

c. Multiply the probability of occurrence times the cost.d. Add each subtotal and multiply by 150. The assumption is

that there are 150 firings total per year including testand flight firings.

e. Cost structure in dollarsVehicle loss 2 BillionMission loss 200 Million

Engine loss 33 MillionMajor engine damage 20 MillionLocal engine damage Varies

IV. Ranking Algorithm

a.

B.10,000 x RF x TF x FFF x CF = Total

Ranking divisionsTotal Rank

>400 i200-400 2100-200 3

50-100 430-50 520-30 612-20 7

7.5-12 83.5-7.5 9

<3.5 I0

!

!

!

!

Il

l!!!l

I

!

II

i

i

|

!

OJ

0

aJ

::3e---

or--

LJ-

0

C

0r--

c-

e-N

_. s_ _-

C 0

S-

°

,_ o_

.,,_o°

I-3

_ _ O0000000 I_'_" Z:IC Z 3_ZZ Z 3[ I

_o o_ _ _o__Z_

00 ,,°*°°*,, ,**.,,,, *****

,*°*_*,, °°,*0

• ,,,o.,. ,.,.,

°, °,.,,,°.,

.. ,,,,,,..,

_._'_

°..°..,, ,o..o

(.1

s-

I

"O(I)

::3

t-

4-J(-

O

(,'I

(I)

"OO

aJ

-I

,r-.

q--

O

(-,r-

c _.J

l-

.'_ou

2_2

>_

OE_._

u.

I-4

>- >- >.. >.- ).. >-o ozz

>..>- ;:,->.-

_oo=o_=o_,,,,>.> >- :ooo=o: ,,,,..=

>->->->->->->->-

L

°_

•"_ _0 00 EX

._ ._ ._ .__ . . .

o

_=_-3_'_'_.._

0

Q_

ORIGINAl. PAGE IS

II

I

i!

IIItI

II

iI

II

|

II

I

l

Ii

III

II

II

II

I

III

Q)

=3£:

°....

4.)

t-

O

¢....)

(,'I

(U

0

a.)

rB

U_

0

D')(.-

°r=.

c--

rv.

fo

to

Ca f,.._"_ 0

n_ c-J n:__.. U-

Q.I 0

L-- _ 00 S .,--_

u_

la.

E0

,',-,-,-_ ...... o ,'=°

° ° ° , , ° •

_c_c_c'_c_

0

r-a.a

0 0

I-5ORIGINAL P/M_ I_

OF POOR QUALITY

• 0°°o,°°°°°, • • °,o

c;c_c_

0 0

r_ r_

I

"0

(...

°e--

0

f_Jv

U'I

"0

0

S-

::3

-r--

&J..

'W.-

0

C

I-6

_'_v(-

o_c

ro

_ ou

_ a. G

_.2-_Q) u.

u..

E

_,o , , % % o , o _,, ,_-_-= , , = z =, = >-,, I 70: ,, =o,,, : o=o

_.=_ _ _ _o _ _ooo _o _,ooo _z >.- ).-z >-

.° ...... ° ° .,,, . ,.., ,.

_o _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _°___

Q

'.- ._

,_

It

Ii

I

I

I

i

I!I

III

II

II

I

II

II

I

¢IJ

-'s

°p-

c-

O

v

0

-r-

IJ..

0

_ _ 0

E0

o * o

I-7

i >- >,.

ORIGINAL PA_ iS

OF POOR QUALrTY

o>.7 >- of

....,.

O0 000000_ 0000_0 O0 _ _0_

KK KKKKKKKKKKKKKK KK KKK KKKKKK KK

• _ '_;_* °'_'_'_ _" '_._ _.._ _: .'i

C _ _ 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0

I

I-8

"0

a.)

_3c"

0r-

t-

O

C.J

¢1)

"0

0

_E

OJ

._.....

0

-r,-

f.,,.

u,_

-Ze_

_ 0 L_

_ _ o

u.. L _

e- Qj o

e_.P _j

u-

u_

E

>->- _-- >.- >-- >- >.- )- _.- >- z >- >-

>- >- >-

- _ _ _ _ _ _

_ C _ C_ C_ ¢3 C_ C3

I

i

I

I

I

lI

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

°p.-

r

0

v

0

(IJ

:3

o_...

0

C

o_...

v

rO

t0

-_._o

_Ou

I-

Eo

I-9

• o° 0° 00o

• ° ° o

°

a.a ._a 3 k

!

q

1-10

Final Ranking of Failure Modes

!

!

!Rank Comp. Failure

Possible Cost Savings

($ Million) per Annum I

6

B400

A150Vibration - bearing loading*Cracks, leak on coil

mD

0.840

0.410

0.330

0.480

0.550

0.1800.180

w_

0.200

0.2400.120

0.120

0.150

0.2140.168

--m

0.1650.160

0.120

0.126

0.2100.106

0.080

0.105

0.060

0.0870.084

0.069

0.0690.102

0.072

0.110

0.0650.133

0.051

0.063

0.123

AIO0

AIO0

A200B400

Cracks, rupture in duct

Leak in MCC ignition jt.ASI supply line cracks

Bearing ball and race wear

A330B200

Turbine drive manifold leak

G-5 joint erection

J200, J300A340

A600B200

B200

B200D140

D300

J300

Output failure*

Steerhorn ruptureFaceplate erosionDiffuser failure

Inlet failure

Missing shield nuts

Ball seal leak and meltingCracked poppet

Sensor debonding*

A200A600A600A600B200B200B200B200B400B400CIO0GO00HO00-O02HO00-O02HO00-O02LO00B200

Heat sheild retained cracksBaffle & LOX post erosionBaffle, molyshields & liner cracksMissing or extra support pinsTurbine blade & platform erosionSeal cracksCoolie cup nut cracksBroken turbine bladesTurbine blade cracks

Bearing cage delaminationCheck valve leaksIgniter tips erosionBirdcaged harnessLoose, defective connectorDebonded torque lockSeal damageVibration levels (cavitation)*

AIO0

AIO0

AIO0

A150

A200

Loose stud fasternersLeaks G-5 seals

Stud keys missing, broken

Tube clearance problemsLoose T-bolts

I

I1I

II

II

I

II

IIIi

!

!

!

1-11

Final Ranking of Failure Modes (Continued)

I Rank Comp. FailurePossible Cost Savings($ Million) per Annum

I

IIIll

II

l

I

II

l

6 A200

A340A600

B200

B200B200

B200

B200B200

B200

B200B400

B400

B400

C270

HO00-O02

MOO0MOO0

7 A200A200

A330

B200B800

D120

E001-150

GO00

J300J300

KIO0

KIO0N600

A200

B200A200

A340

A340

KIO0

K200

8 D130

A200

A330A330

Metal contaminationTube leaks

Nonconcentric lox postsStruts & post cracks

ist stage vane erosionBellows shield cracksLiftoff seal leak

Broken seals

T/A manifold damage

Missing locking pinsContamination

Housing cracksContamination

Shaft torque--rubbing dampersHPOTP purge PAY leak

Broken wire, backshell

Wear, fretting on gimbal

Crack in bushing

LOX post cracks

Face & Interprop. plate carcks

Burst diaphragm leaksExcess shaft travel*

Bearing ball wearBall seal leak

Early purge O-ring shaft

Bad output

Broken sensor tipLow insulation resistanceLeak

Broken burst diaphragmDeformed orifice

Reinforcement ring cracksVane failure

LOX post erosionTube cracksBroken welds

Weld cracks

Cracks on ducts

Low flow rate - bolt assy.Face plate erosion

Hot-gas wall centerline cracksLiner delamination

0.066

0.009

0.102

0.0360.115

0.104

0.0870.078

0.060

0.0750.025

0.042

0.024

0.123

0.051

0.1020.109

0.0770.067

0.033

0.0380.080

0.024

0.036

0.054

0.0300.048

0.0630.045

0.057

0.003

0.0150.026

0.023

0.0390.056

0.039

0.051

I

I

1-12

Final Ranking of Failure Modes (Continued)

!

I

!

Rank Comp. FailurePossible Cost Savings

($ Million) per Annum IA330A340A700A700B200B200B200B400B400B400B400B400B600B600B800DI20D300E001-150F800GO00HO00-O02J200J600J800K200K500LO00

AIO0A330A340A340B200B200B200B200B200B200B200B200B400B400B400B400B400B600

Coolant inlet welds mismatch

Outer jacket cracks

LOX post & liner erosionLOX post cracksSheetmetal cracks

T/A manifold cracks

Missing discharge nuts and lugsBearing support wear

Spring lands wearNozzle vane cracks

Turbine blade contamination

Strut damage

Insulation rupture, cracksExcessive torqueContamination

Ball seal leak

Poppet remained open

Wireway leakFID?

Low insulation resistance

Open or short circuit

Bent pin*

Output failure

Output failureContamination

Kink, twist, or compressedProtrusion on seals

ContaminationContamination

Hat band leaks

Misaligned fuel jointsTurbine blade shank cracksInlet duct cracks

Bearing ball dry-lube cracksTurbine end ring cracksBurnt vane

Nickel insulation damageBearing ball wearGouges in vaneStrut cracks

Sheetmetal cracksLiner erosion

Turbine disk rubbing

Shaft travel* - bearing loadingContamination

0.0360.0180.0510.1020.0160.0300.0360.0550.0550.0480.0110.0240.0160.0240.0110.0300.0130.0090.0060.0150.036

0.0400.0300.0170.0170.041

0.0130.0140.0060.0360.0330.0280.0190.0210.0240.0080.0260.0090.0080.0090.0240.036

0.011

I

III

II

II

IIl

iI

II

I

I

I

1-13

Final Ranking of Failure Modes (Continued)

Rank Comp. FailurePossible Cost Savings($ Million) per Annum

I

I

II

II

II

i

i

I

II

10

9 B800

B800

D120

DI30

D130DI40

D150

D300D500

E001-150

E001-150

E001-150J200

J200

J800

KIO0KIO0

L200

N600

A330A330A340

A600

B200

B400

B800Dl10

D130

D300

D500D600

D600

E001-150

E001-150E001-150

E001-150

E001-150E001-140

E001-005

E001-150

E001-150

Shaft torque* - bearing cagefriction

Flange surface undercut

Excessive pressure*Ball seal leakInternal leak

Excessive pressure*Studs overtorqued

LVDT signal erraticValve leak

Seal leakFID?

Electrical problemsOutput drift*

Low output resistance*

Missing dielectric insertJoint overmold debondedTolerances

Loose stretch bolts*

Tolerances

Hot-gas wall erosionWear on strut clevis

Defective temp., & radiometersensors

Contamination

Bearing support cracksStrut erosion

Stator dingContaminationContamination

Contamination

Port 0240.1 leak

LVDT voltage lowContamination

Vent port leakServoswitch failure

Vent port pittingBroken wireway nut

RVDT limit* - engine flashback

Defective O-ring

Sequence valve anomalyContamination

Hydraulic oil wetting

0.0O6

0.010

0.0260.014

0.018

0.0060.012

0.009

0.0170.009

0.0130.009

0.O09

0.3030.005

0.5040.015

0.012

0.006

0.004

0.0040.009

0.003

0.0060.006

0.0050.006

0.008

0.009

0.006

0.006

0.005

0.002

I

I

Final Ranking of

1-14

Failure Modes (Continued)

I

II

Rank Comp. FailurePossible Cost Savings($ Million) per Annum !

10 F800

HO00-O02KIO0

KIO0KIO0

KIO0

K200K200

K200

K300

K300K500

K600

N600

Chaffed wires

Insulation resistance lowJoint boot tear

Nickel insulation cracksSeal cracks

Frost on bellows

Support link cracksDuct wear

Impressions on ring

Misaligned jointContamination

Contamination in joint

Controller cooling duct cracks

Low torque

0.002

0.0030.003

0.003

0.0050.004

0.006

0.0040.006

0.001

0.005

0.0040.0030.005

II

Ii

II

II

i

i

IIII

I

I

i

I

II

II

I

lI

II

l

iI

IIII

APPENDIX J

LISTING OF SSME MEASUREMENTPARAMETERS BY COMPONENT

I

IIII

iI

I

II

liII

II

II

II

!II

iiII

J-1

MEASUREMENTPARAMETERTABLES KEY

F -- Inflight Measurement

G -- Between Flight Measurement

B -- Both Inflight and Between Flight Measurement

D -- Detection of Failure

T -- Trending Information

C__J

0

Z

(.9I

I-.-c_

I

I

0

O

I--

Z

0

oo

|

E

_- E

r- I-

r" u_

Z

GJ

_-C;.

q-

4_

0 iX

la.

0-2

u n:

•__ _=

0

°p

I-

* s..JE

I-

_ 0

c_

o

l_. S. I:: i_ *0 "3 a-_c

,,_ ¢-

_" 0E

0

I

IIII

II

III

II

I

iI

II

II

,]-3

I

I

I

I

II

III

i

I

II

I

I=_

(.9-.7

--1--UXI.i.I

l--

W

=r"I!

I--"Z

Z0

C_C.a

is=a

,'- i..

wx

._a ¢=-

X

ii_ I-.

cp

•-i Io

! io

I

_°

§ r_ __

d_

e.

_ ,%-

0

S-O

I=-

v

_- _,_ _,_

S-

0:_0

I

O

¢..)

W

"3

c_

!

!

C_

O

C_

Z

C_

C_.

C_¢..)

t-

Ot..)

GJ

G_e- S,.G_

.C G_C_E

Q_

S,. C_E

Qj n_

GJ

G;

XG_

C_

O'O

_|_,_

J-4

O_ r_

_ o

°_ _ o_ _-

z z z _1--

_ g

O_ O

_- <

O

o_S- I:

0 C_

_ _._

GO

o_

_ E

G_>_

_-_EO c_ O

A _

_

c_

C_

c

O _ _O

1- ¢,_0 _o_ _

S,- _ O"

= OE11

c_

o

I

i

I

IIi

II

II

I

II

II

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

I

I

i

l

lI

I

¢)

r-

°p..

0

I

I

C)

0

I'--

Z

I.¢J

ZC)

C)

¢--)

|

C

CU

C ¢n

Z

_ E

• _ _

0

OC_

o

¢.-°_

s--

,]-5

I

LAJrn

=[

"r

C3

)--

rn

C)

(.J

Z

I

!

O

t'v')('_

Z

laJ

Z

C:)

C)

(.J

r-

Jo

.c v_

u_ E

QJ w

Q_

a,a c

O_,E

c

_ E

o i

_ _ __=_'_ _o =_ _

_J-. r= _ :=j=

%

g

J-6 OR;GINAL PAGE IS

POOR(NALffY" . .T-

"Oo_ r-

• _.

_ O'F=,b'- = 5,,,..

o

,.a

• _ _ z

ro 0 _0 *0 _0 0

0 0

v

A

_v

-_,_o"_ "_ ._,.T.

£:

__ ._ ._

-'_, ._-_(u o

_ _ °_

I,.-I_ ._

I

II

II

II

II

I

II

I

II

IIII

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

(2)

C:

,p-

4-)C:

0

I

I

E)

_E

Z

Z

E:)

=EE:)

(.J

e-

3

..E a)

i:: u_

.,Jr

i_ .¢..J

.sr_.

cv

o *Z

_u

q_

Z Z

._ .p ,p

E

u u

_ E

e-

.p

E

_ _, _

a-7

ORIGINAL.PAQI[OF POOR QUALIfy

>-

--J

er,

=E

LI.I

l,.l,J

N

N

O

I

I

O_r

l.l,J

E:)

C3l,J

I::

|o

_: i.n

I: I,-

_z

,.E _,C_E•_ ea

2:

i0 .i._

i_i I.

_r_..

a-8

,,_.-_,_._._-___,__

w

o

u

- _ _.;_® "_'_

,.2 _m

; >g g z

g =0,_ .p

o,p

(.9 _:_-- .=:

{=

o

o_

_J :_. I.. i_. O.I::

I--

L.I IO

O0 e-

_ _-'_

c-

o c

I

IIII

II

II

II

I

I

II

III

I

II

II

I

III

lI

Il

II

II

I

r"or'-

4-)c-o

__)

II

o

f-.z

Z

c_

0(.J

Q_

_E

",Jr

to

_r_.

croQ_

_'_ 0 _- "_-_ 0 • _J_,_

t-O

°_

J-9

c

_o c_

i

°_

.,o i _

OR_JN_LP_1[ Ill

_=

_J

(._c.9 ,_

_ ,_ _,

I,,

I

"I

Z

m,."

mm

i,i

O:::

,,,,,

.1J

l.aJ

i.l-

i

I

0C::)

',,,0

,,:l::

I'--

I,i

Z

0

e-

|

_E

X

1_4.J

E

Z:c_

(..)

ii0

0,#

o i

C: r i-. ,,_ E

_ -_

_._.-_'_ _ _

J-10

r_O_

_E

_-._

_==

_3 I.*.

S ._

_ E

_¢3 O Cm

v_

o

E

•_'_ _ =o_

_'_ _. -_o_

O

8 8 8 8 8

,i,,0

___E

_ >_

i--

i_ _ 6m

_ ),=,. _,_(,.0 v S,.. _ (..'0 _

0_

a- N _

Co

Ox_c_

o

v

U

E

C_--

0:-:-

_ _._-_ _.0_ :i t _ Io 1"" i

oZ

_D 0_

¢:0

r- o

0

III

III

II

II

I

II

II

II

II

t

I

I

iI

i

I

I

II

II

I

,,,...

r'..J

><

!

I

C)

r...

Z

i,J.i

Z

C_

C)

•_'_ _ _ ==_"..=o._-.=.,.,._ _.__>_o,...,-,_ _._ _ >,_

.- _._ _ _,_._

5,. ,¢_ It" _._j_ ," ¢/s

oE

0 0

v

_._

G)

Le_

-_._ _ _

J-ll

0

_p

0

0

f..

r-

0

m

In

CL

0

r_

l---

...J

l,J.J

LL.

m,-

C_

L_

-I"-

c._

I

!

0C_

Od

I"

0

C_.

0o

e-

_- E

C s..

CmE

N:I._

vl mmm: l.-

L_

rl:,Y

0 i

C 00_

m:i-

Ca.

OE _ _

"o_._•"2 .'2

I,,,-

u_

O0 I,. _-

i,,-

J-12

..-

5-

0

v_ 0

I- 00 v_

.=

e_o_ 0_

c_

F-

v

¢- t_ .p

o

LC_

5- '--_ E

e"0

O_

_ E_ -'_,__

e-

r-e"

c-O

0

c-

O _

o _ _

e-

u

I

IIII

II

II

II

I

I

III

III

iI

I

II

II

II

II

II

I

II

II

*r.-

O

C..}v

I

I

O

C_

i'--Z

¢J=l

Z

0

Z

!

,p r-

c

Z

Lr_ i_• P 5.W _P

3E: C,.

O iE

L

J-13

-_=_ _:o___i_ _

(pE

OI,--

2

O

O

t-O

E-'-'

u

_ _00 uI-uu_,_.

A V

A_. v

:}

_ U

ORIGINAL PAGE 13

OF POOR QUALITY

_ Ow- > 0 0

_, ,._ | _ _..

0

0

u _

O

s.¢,

O

,,_E

_._ 0t.} u

,_,_

0 U _

_ U _0

v¢.9

O _-J

I

:Ze-

CO _D

i i I I

I.) ,i-_

I.. w- "1_

U0 >_,_

i _.

. ._

I

(1)

(-°f--

4-)t-O

v

I!

Ooc_Jrr_

z

zC_

C:)

t-

!

• ro

_n4-)

s-

to ._-J

_E

_" c1.

(.JO_q-q..w

r-

r_

w

_-.oo_.o_ _ _

o

e-o

_o

i-0

.[

J-14

,.. .V) 0 q" ,,_: '

._o _ _ o_

,- ,- o

• _ 0 _J 0

o _- 0 0

0 _ _

v _

&0

cg

_ _._ t'_l_ "

IIII

!II

II

I

II

I

III

III

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l

I

"C3

4-}

C

0

(..J

II

C)

C)

C_J

rn

I--"Z

Z

C)

C)

<_)

|

_- E

CU_"

2cu

_E

c

._ Cu

Eal_

fo I-

X"

e.-

_.

e_

8 8¢n e_

o onn

M=,

•- _ a_ _0

E 0

0,0 f.D Or-

C)

¢_) .l::

1. t-O

°_ o

_ 0

J-15

r- W,_ ,,_

OIw>_

_-

_'_ _

0

ORIGINAL PAGE _3

OF POOR QUALITY

I(":- "

_: _ _..

"_ O0

f_ o I-

I.. a.) al_ a.: GJ aaa.)

W

- _ _O_ 0 E_O

I. I¢ ¢: _ C3 al_ QJ

tJ I "_

I:I.I= _ t.- . i_ _,..--

0 I _- 1 0 I I 0

I

"O

°r'-

4-)

O

(__v

I

I

O

O

OD

t--

I.I..I

Z

O

O

°_ _-

r'- 5.-

3

._ e-

_E• m 0._

ii_ I,-

G.,,e-

1=

i'__

¢,.- t,-o O

_-, t-

_o _-._,

__

d,

J-16

I

• , (_ I:: E

C: I.-

0 _ 0

C_

i..._ _ _ {'_

_ c

_ 0 _

C I

I

I

II

III

II

I

II

I

III

III

I

ig

I

!II

!

iII

II

I

II

II

e-0_

t-

o

v

i

i

0Q

I--

Z

L_

C:)

(1.

C:)

(.)

t.-

|{_)

_u£; I.QJ

_E

C u_

:E

._ Qp_4.b

q.k_

c_

Qp

J-17

0 °

0 I _ I,..( .wa ,wwa _,._c

12._-

._o_

e_oI-

E_ 2t uE

ORIGINAL PAGE tF_

• 0@',..POOR QUALITY

"_ f.9

o-" _

_. e._0 0

0 o

l_ 1- I-I-- 0 0

I-

0

CU

0 E

0 _-

i

(I)

(-.

°_

4.-)c=

0

I

I

0

0

¢:Q

I---

Z

0

0

0

e-

!

o_

Cu

_c r:

mm

.1: Q.__E

e- Im

Z

E

I=1

_=_.

tt_

0 IZ

•_ ,

J-18

s.-4)

Owe- .,.) -_

°* _ _

o

s- s-

O 0'_ _ 0

S.

ooo_ _ _o(_ S*- 0 S- S.. 0 _

_ _ _ _=

_ 0

L_

0

E._._

E_-

o

•_ s.-

OE

c_

_7

o

z c_

III

III

II

II

II

I

II

II

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

r,

0..

0

r,,,.

N

,,--,

xo

-I-

!

!

0

C>

F--Z

Z

0

_r"C:)o

_- E

_" 5,.GJ

w

n_

r-

O_ar

Qj u_

_JL/_ n:_p L

q..

OJ

I.. :}AP

x_

--_ _

_*0_

,*,,) 0 ,,_ 0

.or____'_e_

1.

5

cp I,-

v_w _ 0

L

o,_

c-o

cp u.__ (i.I w

cpe.)

cp

_ °

._ ._ _ _ I---_/" _-_

I,---*"-, (=9

o

.E:__ _

0

_'; _

0 I

C 0

I--L

e_

aO'_ ICP _"

I

"0

l=.°_

c-

O

v

II

0

0

D_

Z

0

0

I

II

I

II

II

II

II

II

II

I

II

-,Ic-

c-o

I

I

0c_

l.--

U.J

Z

o

c_

|0

r- 5-

_u_"mm

•i.J (-

,I= I.

m=

0 i

c

o 0

E

_ cuo

0 _

_ 00

l.- I

J-21

I., _ I: ¢/I i= _ IE ,_

_:_:r;_ "

0 0

0 0

0(IJ-_

0

I,-

A _A _

l_ L_. '_._ 1_ I'_

0 ,¢I

"0

0

uI.

¢: I: _ GJ0 0 P

0.--I ¢.)

.ORIGINAL PAGE I_OF POOR QUALITY

I.

S

_- " U t-

O IU ,"*

p_ _ L

0_

I,-00

c-O

AA

0 U OU.

0

i- I I

,P

I

t'-°r--

¢-.o(..)

i

I

c)c),q-nn

I--z

zC)G.

C)o

£:

|

_- Ln

Z

0 i

m=

_';.

I:; ,.n 0_._.)

o._

o

_8

v_

vLOv

J-22

: (I_ 4,J "_: 4,") 4,,) _

| :i o'-_o- .oo o

e.-o

8I.-o

nn

0

W_ 0

_ 0

A _

ep

g-v

v

c

I-

",4

0

0

E._E

&e-

ra• _ 0

c-o

0

0 _ C_

_ c

._

I.

S-O

C:v

0

V_

C

mmO_

_D

w

o"S-Oi-

s..Q=

.c

c_

-r-

II

IIIII

I

II

I

II

!I

II

II

r_

3E

O

r_

I'-

._J

r_r_

C_

I

I

c_

I--"

Z

C_

o

c

!

C t.

4-_ *-

L,_ :3

c;Z

GJ

t_ u=m s.-

0J

I. s-

t--

O._

°_

t,J

_Av_

v _ AAV

_._ _ _

t=

r_ C_O

I.

i_ i I I_ i (.# Ir- o x

J-23

t- o_

PAGE

.=_

C_

n,."

.--J

W

1,4J

.=I

!I

C_

C:)

aO

mn

I---Z

Z

C_

G..

c_

r-

!

i,m]l n=,i.l Qj

mn

_E

e- Im

,s-_.

w

cu"o0 i

J-24

>_

,i,_-_ _ _"_ _ ._., ._.._._,..__ _-_ ._._ _ _ t,.-

• .=_

o.

0 0 o,,, N

L)

v _

>_._

G.e-EO

g_

0 0

_ _ _=_

0

_'_ i=E:

i.)s,.Ill

i

_o_

e-

_*_ C_0 S*. _ I

!I

II

III

II

II

II

I

II

iII

I

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

°i=.

4-)

0

0

....J

I.J..

C_

C_

rv"

0

..J

!

I

0

0O0

n-i

t'--

Z

0

C:)0

(.J

._ ¢=.

F..l_e- l..

_E

£: wf0

w

:[o,.

.¢..)u

q..

e-

s- "_

p- (=.)

_0

.¢..)

.1:: u_

E.l-_

_ v') I,

0

s.- 00 o

v _ t._9

e-c=_

J_ I,- 0•_ 0',.)

n_

e-

0

f.. o_

(uj: ,-_

..r-

J-25

ORIGINAL PAGE _OF POOR QUALITY

W

(.D

_2W

-r

I!

0

d

I"-

Z

i-

£: s.

3 _

_E

_ E

X _

>, -_

.,J

"Z "Z

e- co o

_ g z _ P,T.

_ ._._ E _._

E

e_

J-26

I

I

I

IIII

I

I

II

II

Ii

III

I

i

I

I

Ii!

Ii!

III

I

II

Ii

I

U

O

(=)

>-O

IJ-

O

I

!O

I

O

O

I--Z

Z

O

o

._ c-

t- s-

_E

I,..

@E

E

O i

I,-

_(.,_

;'3 _ ._

_ ,-'_. _, _ _

g"- §,.__ _ 0

o 0

_--_

_ _'_ _ _

_ x

J-27

_ _ 5. ,__-.

_" • O_ _ "_

_,_ _'r. '__ ___

{,.j'_

E

oc

o_

E

I.. O _

(,-._,.

w_

O

O

._ I I= I

E

_,,1=

0

_o

ORIGINAL PAGE ISOF POOR QUALITY

i

Z

c)

.=J

zc3

.=J

(,=)

(..)

Z

c_

zc_

xC_(.9

gC:)_Ji,

I--

!

!

d

dm

I---z

I=

|

_ E

<1.-, c

•_ (l#

c

Z

E

i1= $..

0 i

f,.- =1

t.,=

J-28

o

E

i

o.1=

z

_"i1= _ iI-

.1::

0

m:

0

el:

(uE

0

o

0 0 _0 _0

C=_E _E O_E 0 _E

0 C,

r-._

_ Ex 0

0

C

o "

0 0

r.O

e-.

o_

_b,.-GJ

(U..J

II

I

i

III

II

II

II

I

IIi

II

I

II

IIII

I

I1

I!

I

II

Ii

II

C_

W

-r

0

I

I

0

O

0:)

Z

LLJ

ZC_

c:)(_)

e-

|o

°_

mm

_E

-' E

0 I

L :3

3 -6

E_

e0

"o

G)._

_ E

_'_ ._

_o.__ _-

e-

._ o=

_5 __, ._

J-29

ORIGINAL PAGE 13

OF POOR QUALITY

LI.I

l---

Z

I

I

C)

C)

C)

I"--

Z

L_J

Z

0

C)f._)

r-

|o

f" I,-

C

X

= E

w

•_. _-._

_*__ ._ .

_= _>,-_.,

_'_E _.E

e-

,_._ _ _.

_._ _ _ ,-

_ _ _'_-'-

0

O_e-w_

r-

_e

v

"r.

J-30

r--. CO

C)

D J=

._- __-._ _

0

O_ _ i= OJ

..-, e

II!

IIII

I

Ii

I

I

I

III

iII

IJ-31 ORIQINN.-PAGE m

i OF POOR QUALITY0 _n

(/1W

v)LI.J

Z

m.-":E"1-

.-J

u

re,-I-ui,,

...J

I.lJ

I

I

CMC:)C3-r-

I

E)OC).-1-

p-Z

C_O.:EE)U

|

ear- i..

_X

•i_ i=

_E

v,_ =_

I.. Q)" Ei_ m:l

{u

_r,j

"r: '

I

I

II

I

I

I

II

I

II

I

II

I

"_ J=: I::: _ 4)

c= = =

f..

r-

C

u

_.._ _-

A

E

EU

L I

i I

]_3[ '- 000 I" w ._

I. i1_

t

I

nr

C)

Z

II

C3

C)

CO

C)

_0

"3

JC)

'--3

C)

'--3

l'--

Z

Z

0

C)

0

c

|

===

_._ s=•_ (LJ

w..- _3_: u*,

_ E

e-

o i

J-32

i

_._._ _ _ ___ ._ o_ °_ o_

(3

-_ ._

:>:

==,_ _ _ _

°_ _ _

(U -_--)

E

_ E

N_

I. i:: r- I,-

i

== "G "

i

e- I,,. i (3 _

III

II

IIl

I

II

i

II

III

ii

III

II

I

II

II

III

I

I

II

I

I---

U

Zt=..q

.--J

II

C_

0

I--"Z

Z

C_CL

O

(..)

r-

|

• P c

0_c s.

3 ro

.i= aJ_E

C vl

_r

eJ

_E

e= _..

=£c,.

eJ

fo

Q)

•-i n=

_ '" _..__ o _"

_ :._-_ _;_ _._

s_o_R_ _..

r- r-o o

w

=_..v

_-_ _ _l_ _'_

i-

_- t_

_ -_

_ >_'_

J-33ORIGINAL PAe£ _3

oF ,Poo_ QUAuTy

>_ >_

j= i_ =1 <.a J= _J IE j= i_ e- e- i_ i_

.p=) :) z

*- c-o o 0

0

x

(u>_

c=

_. F-- L_. r_ _

W_ 4J _ U vlU

I.-

.p:1 "P _- 0

_'{.9

U

_:[C3

1, E

_. 4-) I,

_ E

_t--w _.

_ (3 r0 ,_a _'l I

t, .1-_ _J I:: (-'PIE

• _ 0 i I 0 I t

u

E

.p

2_r-

_ E

_. fw. t-

I

(i.

.p-

0(..)

v

ill"

(..)

W

Z

I,I

l

!

0

0

l l"Z

l.l.I

Z

C)

5"

0

!

_I E

c_

_E

E

_'c;-

o l

l,-

"vc _

e'-_ S,- "_

g

E°_

0 _

0

0

_. (_ 0

?'? _l

,.1-341

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

II

II

II

II

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I--"

l.--,

l.l=l

Z¢=.=l

.--I

i.l=/

NI..==i

I..==i

X

O

I

I

C_

C_

Z

LIJ

Z

0lm

C_

{_}

¢.-

|

._ i=-

E

c I.-

c l.m

.9 E

0 ,X

_l..#

J-35

°_

I

°_ _ .

"0

,_- o

E E

E

,.."

._

-¢ .,= s-_°_

==- O

_=_

¢J

Ill

-_ o-

•_ e'.a

,1_ I= 0

0

c-

O

'- 0

O--

t

ORIGINAL PAQ_

oF POOR=QU/UJ'rY

I

I--u

I.¢d

Z

..d

N

xCD

I

I

0

C_

zlud

Z

¢D

CDc_)

8

°_ _-

_- E

_E

C _n

L G.JEn_

src_.

u

w

0 I

e: E 0

,_ E r" * 0

g .g o ®

E

e-

0

•r- 0

sr

.i.,I

G_ G_

0

C

|-_

0

J-36I

II

II

I

I

I

I

II

I

I

I

III

I

I

i

I

I

III

I

II

I

III

I

i.;_l

Z

....i

0

-r"

I--

=E:

Z

I

|

O

O

o(...)

_E

=E:

E

_-c,.

J-37

ORIGINAL PAGE P3

OF POOR QUALITY

.-./

0

F--

F--

II

0

0

C:)

F--

Z

Z

O

o

r-

t_._

r- S..

_E• _ (3.)

=E

lIE c_..

_ ._ _'_ ,, g

= ,, _._ _-._

_ >_

E E

'i '

J-38

II

III

II

II

II

I

II

Ii

III

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

J-39 _ POOR QUAL/TY!i

_- E(U

_r"mm

_rcb.

Q#

r.-

w

,--J

0

r_

)--

I

!

C_

Z

Z

0

0

_ S 0_00

,_'_ _ g .=

E

o

9=[ r..

A

cI;;_

,.g

C)

O

e-O

mm,.)

0 i0

I

.--J

n'_

I

IC:_

C)

I--

Z

Z

C)

C)0

f-

!

_L_

_E

c LnN

cu

._ cuep_.J5..•"_ IZ

npxa-

cue,..

f-

(uqoo iar

{u

rip

._ >_

c

_ u

x z

._

_ EE_

I,,-

._wE _ E

r,._ -.._ ¢.,,,_-,J

®_._ "_

,.]-40

III

I

III

I

II

II

I

II

II

II

l J-41

i "00__ -._-0 ORIGINAL PAGE IS;

i " _ -_:_[ _ OF POOR QUALITY

_':8=__

(,..}

m,,"

0

i,i

l,J

!

!

Z

Z

W

Z

c)f_

t.m

C

_- E

mm

',Jr" =.

QC

Q#

I,a...

I

I

II

III

II

I

II

II

S-

op .p

0

,I=

A _

0 _.

c

I

J-42

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

II

II

III

I

II

II

I

II

IIII