DYNAMICS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF …
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DYNAMICS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS (2000-2014) By Muhammad Saleem Akhtar PhD in International Relations Session 2013-2018 Roll No. 07 Supervisor Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid Chairperson DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE
Transcript of DYNAMICS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF …
DYNAMICS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS
(2000-2014)
By
Muhammad Saleem Akhtar
PhD in International Relations
Session 2013-2018
Roll No. 07
Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid
Chairperson
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award
of
Degree
Ph.D. in
DYNAMICS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS
(2000-2014)
Supervisor Submitted by
PROF. DR. UMBREEN JAVAID MUHAMMAD SALEEM AKHTAR
H.E.C. Nominee Roll No. 07
Department of Political Science Ph.D.
University of the Punjab, Lahore. Session: - 2013-2018
Department of Political Science
University of the Punjab
Lahore.
iii
DEDICATION
To
Game changing bilateral ties of Pakistan and China in South Asian region
iv
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and I have
not submitted this thesis concurrently to any other university or institute for any
degree whatsoever.
Muhammad Saleem Akhtar
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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
It is certified that this Ph.D. Thesis of Muhammad Saleem Akhtar on the Subject matter of
“DYNAMICS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA AND
PAKISTAN RELATIONS (2000-2014)
is and original work and result of his own effort, in assessment of the ―Examining‘s
Committee‖, the thesis is sufficient standard to warrant its acceptance by the Department of
Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy
Degree in International Relations.
Thesis viva-voce examiners: _______________________
Internal Examiner: _______________________
External Examiner: _______________________
Chairperson of Political Science: _______________________
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CONTENTS
Sr. No. Page No.
List Of Maps Xii
List Of Tables Xiii
List Of Figures Xiv
Acknowledgements Xv
Abstract Xvi
CHAPTER 1 Page No.
INTRODUCTION 01-20
1.1 Introduction 01
1.2 Literature Review 04
1.2.1 Review regarding Chinese influence 04
1.2.2 Review regarding Chinese Foreign policy towards
India and Pakistan
06
1.2.3 Review regarding Chinese Intentions 08
1.2.4 Review regarding Chinese foreign policy‘s
approach and theories
11
1.2.5 Review regarding Chinese dealings with Pakistan 12
1.2.6 Review Analysis 14
1.3 Problem Statement 15
1.4 Objectives of the study 15
1.5 Significance of the Study 16
1.6 Research Questions: Analysis of dynamic Chinese
Foreign Policy
16
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1.7 Research Methodology 17
1.7.1 Method 17
1.7.2 Population 17
1.7.3 Instrumentation and data collection 18
1.7.4 Data analysis 18
1.7.5 Chapters demarcation 18
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF
CHINA’S SYSTEM-LEVEL FOREIGN
POLICY ANALYSIS TOWARDS SOUTH
ASIA
21-38
2.1 Introduction 21
2.2 Analysis of outreach policies 22
2.3 Level-wise Analysis 24
2.3.1 Individual level Analysis 25
2.3.2 State-Level Analysis 29
2.3.3 System-Level Analysis 32
2.3.4 Customs/Standards 34
2.4 Theoretical Analysis 34
CHAPTER 3
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
INDIA
39-59
3.1 Historical Background 39
3.1.1 1949–1962: Establishing Relations 40
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3.1.2 1962–1976: Political Stalemate 40
3.1.3 1976–1998: Rapprochement 41
3.1.4 1998–2011: Improving Relations Amid Unresolved
Disputes and tensions
41
3.1.5 2011-2014: Growing Economic and Trade
Relations
41
3.2 Implication of India‘s Rise as an Emerging Power 42
3.2.1 Consensus-Driven Process of China‘s Foreign
Policy
42
3.2.2 China‘s Core Interests 43
3.2.3 India‘s Rise-New Challenges 43
3.2.4 Re-adjustment of China‘s Foreign Policy towards
India
43
3.2.5 Policy of Conflict Prevention and Conflict
Management
44
3.2.6 Measure to obstruct certain India Policies 44
3.2.7 Historical Disputes 45
3.2.8 The Border Dispute 45
3.2.9 Chinese perceptions 47
3.2.10 A grand bargain on Aksai Chin/Arunachal Pradesh 47
3.2.11 The Tibetan government-in-exile 48
3.3 Chinese perceptions 48
3.3.1 India should strive to limit the activities of the
TGIE
48
3.3.2 The Tibet connection is likely to sour Sino-Indian
relations in years ahead
49
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3.3.3 Economic Interests 49
3.3.4 Natural Resources 49
3.3.5 China and India Should Cooperate More Closely in
the Energy Field
50
3.3.6 Bilateral Trade and Investment 50
3.3.7 India is Employing Protectionism to address its
Trade Deficit with China
51
3.3.8 Military Build-up 51
3.3.9 Military Capabilities, Force Posture and
Deployment
52
3.3.10 Defense Modernization of India 52
3.3.11 Worth of Indian Ocean for China 53
3.3.12 Defense Industry and Arms Procurement 54
3.3.13 Military-industrial developments in India are not a
cause of concern in China
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA-
PAKISTAN RELATIONS BEFORE 9/11
60-106
4.1 Historical Development 60
4.2 Pakistan‘s initiation in Development of Relations 60
4.2.1 Chinese support on Kashmir Issue 62
4.3 Geo-Strategic importance of China-Pakistan 65
4.3.1 China-Pakistan Strategic Relationship 68
4.3.2 Ideological basis of Friendship 69
4.3.3 Trade Relations between Pakistan and China 70
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4.3.4 Political Relations 73
4.3.5 Economic Cooperation 76
4.3.6 China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 76
4.4 Practicalities of Cooperation Framework for CPEC 77
4.5 The proposed Strategy and Development 80
4.5.1 Roads 81
4.5.2 Railways 84
4.5.3 Gwadar Seaport 85
4.5.4 Defense Cooperation 86
4.5.5 Nuclear Technology 87
4.5.6 Energy Sector Cooperation 88
4.5.7 Factors for Smooth Relations 89
4.5.8 The Seating of China in the World body and
Pakistan's Stance
90
4.6 Issues between China and Pakistan 90
4.7 Post-9/11 Political and Diplomatic Relations 98
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
107-116
5.1 Analysis 106
5.2 Conclusion 107
5.3 Recommendations 110
5.4 Side Endorsements 112
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117-1153
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APPENDICES 154-175
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
APPENDIX 3
APPENDIX 4
xii
LIST OF MAPS
SR NO PAGE #
1 Border Between China and India 46
2 China and Pakistan 66
3 CPEC 79
4
xiii
LIST OF TABLES
SR NO PAGE #
1 Comparative analysis of foreign policy approaches 35
2 Volume of Pakistan-China Bilateral Trade 72
xiv
LIST OF FIGURES
SR NO PAGE #
1 Planned Alignment Of The Cpec Road Network 83
2 Pak-China Economic Corridor Comparison of Planned and Alternate
Alignment
95
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Thanks to Almighty Allah, Who bestowed me with patience, courage and perseverance to
complete this laborious and difficult assignment. I believe that with the help of Almighty Allah I
have completed my research work. It is also a fact that without active support of people around
me, it would be difficult to do such kind of research.
First of all I am highly indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid, Chairman
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab. I am grateful for her guidance, support
and encouragement. I can‘t forget her special attention, keen observation and very professional
approach regarding this research. She checked the chapters thoroughly and proposed valuable
suggestions which proved helpful for achieving this goal. I am also thankful to my honorable
teacher Dr. Iram Khalid who not only helped me in finding out different sources but also
appreciated and encouraged me. Massive gratitude to the other staff of this department like
honorable Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi (Emeritus Professor), Dr. Rehana Saeed Hashmi, Dr. Gulshan
Majeed, Dr. Rana Ijaz Ahmed and Prof. Mohammad Shabeer Khan, for their fruitful cooperation
as well as encouragement. I also pay thanks to the supportive clerical staff of this department.
I also express gratefulness to those imminent personalities including Prof. Dr. Saleem Dogar, Prof.
Quttab Hussain Watto, Prof. Dr. Zahoor Ahmed, Dr. Zahid Yaseen, a lot of Foreign Officers,
Officials of Military, Judiciary and Bureaucracy, Politicians and other intellectuals who supported
and encouraged me to complete my research work.
I am grateful to the library staff of department of Political Science especially Mr.Akram, Asad and
Rahila. I also pay thanks to the staff of the Quaid-e-Azam library, library of Center for South
Asian Studies, Punjab Public library Lahore, the Main Library of the University, the library of
National Defense University Islamabad, National Documentation Centre Islamabad and Inter
Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate, Islamabad for their help and cooperation.
At the end my family deserves special praise. I have special regards for my wife. I can‘t forget
the prayers of my parents and valuable support of my bosom friends Salman Randawa and
Sabir Javaid. I must say that with the support of all these people I have completed this task,
but all the errors to be found in this work will remain my own.
Muhammad Saleem Akhtar
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ABSTRACT
Chinese Foreign policy is of vital importance in the South Asian region which in turn carries
highly significant prominence in defining the course of events that affect the contours of
international political order. The strategic importance of the region centers on the fact that it is
the gateway to the Indian Ocean which is known as the energy jugular of global trade. The
changing political dynamics of South Asia particularly in relation with Pakistan and India, the
two major nuclear capable actors, are also significant. In order to assess the foreign policy of
China with two regional rivals a constructivist analysis is undertaken based on a rational actor
model. A comparative rational analysis based on the five principles of coexistence i.e., respect
for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each
other‘s domestic affairs, equality and mutual cooperation is formulated along with strategic
and economic policies of China towards India and Pakistan. This dissertation also analyzes
the foreign policy of these actors namely China, Pakistan and India, to asses paradigm shifts
in policy from 2000 to 2014. The thesis highlights changing trends on various economic and
military levels to understand foreign policy.
1
Chapter No 01
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Over the most recent few decades China has turned into a pivot of change and is locked in
with local and multilateral associations, on occasion notwithstanding forming their motivation
in limited ways. Policymakers in China are giving careful consideration to progressively
differing global issues. Moreover, initiative in China have started "to take a gander at the
world through an arrangement of focal points which are far less tinted and tainted with the
remnants of history and belief system than in past years‖ (Ahmad, 2013). China's customary
uncertainty, carelessness, right state of mind, and darken moralism has reduced and assumed
progressively less part in its relations with the universal group. These changes supplicate the
inquiry with respect to what is birthplace of these new remote arrangement of thoughts?
Foreign policy strategists look into organizations in China have turned out to be more
noticeable and has started to assume an ever-critical part not just in the accumulation and plan
of data, yet additionally giving their contribution to the type of investigation, and insight on
differing outside strategy related issues. Their part has expanded over the most recent twenty
years as basic leadership on outside approach has turned out to be more pluralized, also as
there is an expanded interest for local and useful ability and access to data. This has prompted
the foundation of a rich scope to examine organizations that are concentrating on outside
approach inquire about and investigation in China. While, greater part of these organizations
2
are existed for decades and were set up in the mid of twentieth century most of these worked
around Marxist-Leninist philosophy (Shambaugh, 1991).
The current unsettled state of the field of foreign policy studies is revealed through the
diversity of theoretical frameworks and conceptual approaches that characterize research.
Some ―social scientists have given considerable attention to the role of paradigms in the
development of various areas of scientific inquiry following the work of Kuhn‖ (Kuhn, 1963).
If by a field or disciplinary paradigm one means a set of widely accepted, fundamental, and
critical assumptions that characterize the phenomena being studied and that also indicates
what questions, problems, and modes of inquiry appropriately constitute the frontier of
knowledge, then foreign policy studies have no accepted paradigm. A subset of scholars
concerned with the cross-national study of foreign policy using the scientific method have
come close to adopting a paradigm based primarily on the works of Rosenau (Rosenau, 2003),
but that too seems in disarray (Caporaso, 1987). Lack of serious examination of the concept of
foreign policy has not prevented its use in general orientations to foreign policy studies. The
variety of current frameworks and approaches can be organized by the relationship envisioned
between the usually undefined term, foreign policy, and other components in the framework.
The five categories used widely recognized features of research to suggest reasons in each set
why the concept of foreign policy has seldom been seriously investigated. If one of the trends
for the future is the fuller explication of the meaning and properties of foreign policy, we need
to classify the existing designs in a different fashion to propose how foreign policy is
incorporated and the functions it is expected to play. The most pervasive orientation, which
generates various approaches, views foreign policy as the dependent variable which is to be
3
understood and explained. Some frameworks, however, assign foreign policy as the
independent variable and consider its effects on other factors.
Finally, there are approaches that interpret foreign policy as a mediating variable, usually in a
continuous or cyclical process in which the distinction between independent and dependent
variables may not be useful.
Foreign policy analysis theory is implied to analyze the shifts in foreign policy from 2000-
2014 which is focused era of work. For a long time, the investigation of Foreign Policy
Analysis (FPA) has been a sort of free-gliding venture, sensibly detached to the principle
speculations of cross-national relations. Now and again, it has been subsumed under the
liberal or pluralist schools of thought, and at different circumstances set inside a dialog of
authenticity. Yet, the intelligent associations with both of these ideal models were constantly
stressed. The interest of FPA approaches has additionally waxed and wound down finished
the years, to some degree in light of the fact that these methodologies don't seem to "fit"
anyplace inside the structure of the bigger open deliberations going ahead in IR. This
dissertation recommends that a discourse with social constructivism gives the most intelligent
base from which to dispatch a rejuvenated way to deal with FPA, particularly the subjective
mental way to deal with the investigation of remote strategy. In the event that the FPA plan is
to be revitalized and considered more important outside the subfield itself, this article
recommends, it must hitch its wagon to a portion of the basic substantive level-headed
discussions going ahead in IR hypothesis these days. To be sure, there are, as of now a few
signs that the psychological way to deal with FPA, specifically, is progressively being related
with this bigger assortment of hypothesis.
4
1.2 Literature Review
During the collection of data for the research work published books, articles of scholars,
journals, magazines, official papers and positions, speeches and works of Chinese leadership
published in newspapers and available on electronic sources and libraries have been
consulted. This literature has helped the researcher a lot to understand China‘s alleged
hegemonic ambitions of being a super power, economic reforms, military modernization and
its world view. The major sources in regard of literature review are listed below:
1.2.1 Review regarding Chinese influence
Gurtov, Mel (2016), in his book ‘Will this be China’s century? A Skeptic’s View’, offers a
measured assessment of China‘s global influence. It explains the US-China relations in recent
times. His wide ranging and user-friendly survey of China‘s resurgence and US-China
interdependence deflates the claims of an emerging Chinese hegemony. The US-China bond
is the world most important bilateral relationship. It takes issue with the widespread view that
China is on the way to rivaling or even displacing the United States as the dominant world
power. He identifies series of constraints that will keep the country‘s leadership focused for
the foreseeable future on challenges at home. He argues that China‘s economic rise has
exacerbated problems of social inequality, environmental degradation, official corruption and
more.
Harris, (2014) writes a book entitled, ―China‘s Foreign Policy‖. In this book, the author
throws light on Chinese foreign policy as a whole. To implement foreign policy, states need to
deal bilateral and multilateral issues arising among a wide range of countries. This book is
sensitive and deals with the subject imperfectly and unable to fulfill its requirements. It seeks
5
to place foreign policy decisions in the context of the challenges and vulnerabilities that
Chinese leaders believe and how they face their international environment. According to this
book there are many reasons for criticizing the Chinese Communist Party‘s often abused
monopoly of political power, its claims to have maintained social and political stability in
China, at least since 1989, improved the material wellbeing of its citizens, and increased
China‘s standing and status in the world. All this criticism is not without substance. In India-
Pakistan perspective, a concern for China is India‘s naval development and its potential
impact on China‘s sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. China‘s need for resources supplies, notably
but not limited to oil are being met largely through the sea lanes from the Middle East and
Africa, which cross the Indian Ocean. In this connection Indian naval and other commentators
have expressed concern about China‘s increased activities in Indian Ocean, including ports in
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Kazmi (2014) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Area Study Center for Europe, University of
Karachi-Pakistan. Her article titled ―An analysis of the Shifting Policies of the EU and China
towards South Asia‖ studies some new judgment patterns and developments in South Asia,
especially in correlation with the EU‘s and China‘s strategy towards this region. Particularly,
the EU after the on-going international economic crisis and China with the new leadership
require a re-examination of their respective policies. South Asia is more concerned about their
future role in multilateral engagement and strategic settings with the EU and China that are
growing rapidly. The EU has set a goal for itself to become an influential actor in international
politics. Strategically, the EU is located between the Asia-Pacific and the NAFTA in the
trilateral configuration of the world in 21st century, where as China is emerging as an
economic giant. In spite of competition and clash of interests among EU and China in South
6
Asia, allocation of mutual interests and cooperation will better serve the Chinese security
concept. It is a good time for the South Asian countries to reassess their positional strength
and weaknesses to adopt all-around forward-looking strategies. Also, they need to espouse a
balanced and realistic approach toward EU and China.
1.2.2 Review regarding Chinese Foreign policy towards India and Pakistan
Javaid (2013) edited a book titled, ―South Asia in Perspective‖. This book contains eight
articles of different scholars on different topics. The editor has particularly discussed the
region of South Asia. The first four articles are indirectly relevant to different aspects of
China, India and Pakistan relations with one another. The first article is ―Compulsive Peace
Building in South Asia: Analysis of Pakistan-India Relations‖. This article addresses the
conflict resolving perspective in order to find a constructive solution. It emphasizes on the
mutual understandings, policies and confidence building measures (CBMs) between two
states of India and Pakistan. The second article is ―India‘s Foreign Policy towards South Asia
and Pakistan‖ authored by Prof. Dr. Muhammad Jahangir Tamimi. In this article, he says that
India considers its foreign policy an independent and non-aligned while, India‘s relations with
small neighboring countries manifest tension and anxiety. India is anxious to be in the line of
super-powers. Practically, India is not a non-aligned country. The third article is ―Pakistan
National Security Dilemma‖ by Mussarat Javed Cheema. This article also presents the critical
analysis on Pakistan defense and security.
Askari (1993) in ―Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment Study of Foreign Policy‖ tells
that situated in the vicinity of powerful countries like India, China and Soviet Union, and the
Persian Gulf, Pakistan is often confronted with difficult choices. But most of the time the first
and foremost choice for Pakistan is China. China always supports Pakistan in every mode, just
7
like wars with India, Afghanistan issue, Kashmir issue, security ties with neighboring
countries and above all, the economic and cultural relations between the two neighboring
countries.
Ahsan (1993) in ―Pakistan and the Troubled World‖ describes that since l962, there has been
an important alter in the foreign policy of Pakistan in general, and Pakistan's relationship with
China, in particular. In addition, both Pakistan and China have strengthened their ties of
friendship. This is the outcome; not of an alteration in the whims of decision-makers in
Pakistan or China, but, of a change in world setting.
Khan (1988) in ―Pakistan's Security, the Challenge and the Response‖ states that China's
relations with Pakistan have been excellent. China has proved to be a reliable and tested friend
of Pakistan. It has given generous and timely military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
China clearly has considerable interest in maintaining stability in the region. Its great
emphasis on education, health and work ethics will undoubtedly make it one day a great
economic power.
―Pakistan Foreign Relations‖ by Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Government of Pakistan,
Islamabad shows that year of 2001 was celebrated as the year of the Quaid-e-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. The key elements of that year were to
cooperate with enlightened Pakistan - China Strategic Relations: Future prospects (2001-
2010).
Ghosh (2010) has written a book entitled, ―International Relations‖. His comments on Indian
foreign policy are very realistic. He states that India and Pakistan have seen many ups and
downs. The major irritants in their relation have been disputes pertaining to borders,
distribution/sharing of river waters, territorial disputes, Afghanistan, cross-border terrorism,
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Indian interference in Baluchistan and above all Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan have over
the years cultivated bilateral relations involving rivalry and engagement. A number of irritants
have aggravated tension in the relations between the two. Long pending border disputes,
territorial claims, Chinese incursions, Tibet and Dalai Lama, burgeoning trade deficit,
assistance to Pakistan, developing closer ties of China with India‘s neighbors, China‘s
strategy of ―Strings of Pearls‖ and Indo-US nuclear deal are some of the major drawbacks in
the Sino-Indian relation.
Sutter, G (2012), in his fourth edition of ‗Chinese Foreign Relations‘ explains thoroughly the
determinants and significant development in Chinese foreign relations after the cold war. In
first two chapters he assesses the foreign policy priorities of Chinese leaders. In chapter 3, he
examines the changing pattern of Chinese decision-making behavior and changing Chinese
worldviews. In chapter 4, he explains the importance of Chinese economic global
development and how this development leads to increase Chinese involvement in regional and
global organizations which deals with global governance. In chapter 5, he assesses the
Chinese national security concerns and their effects on Chinese foreign policy, it also
discussed China‘s role in international treaties of nonproliferation and arms control regimes.
In last chapter, he analyzes China‘s relations with key major powers and outlook for Chinese
foreign relations.
1.2.3 Review regarding Chinese Intentions
Doctroff, Tom (2012), the North Asia Director and leading authority on marketing in China
has written a well thought provoking, book entitled, ―What Chinese Want‖. The author says
that Chinese influence is not merely confined to investment, trade and retail. Beijing rightly
expects the voices of its more than 1.3 billion people to be heard in global politics. The
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Chinese are determined and hard-working. They will succeed firstly to develop their home
market and then compete the market of developed countries. In his book Doctoroof argues
that China and the West are inherently different from each other. However, if their leaders
keep cool and America accepts that it will no longer be the only tiger on the peak, they can
happily coexist. China will always need partners. There are many books on Chinese economy
but very few books express the point of view of the Chinese people that is different from the
West.
Lanteigne, Marc (2009), in his book ‘Chinese Foreign Policy’, this book is an introduction to
the study of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. He examines the patterns of engagement
with various domestic and international actors who‘s shaped the Beijing foreign policy after
cold war. He explores the series of ongoing questions and modern trends, as well as offering
an in-depth outlook at key points of China‘s current relations with the world. Such as, the rise
of globalization; the bilateral and multilateral country‘s approaches to international problem
solving; modern security challenges of China; the question of American hegemony and
Beijing‘s changing political, strategic and economic linkages with the developed and
developing world.
Joseph (2001) wrote an essay ―China and America in the New World Polity‖. He illustrates
that China is not satisfied with the regional and international status quo and China would
challenge USA‘s hegemonic designs in Asia when it will have gained sufficient power to do
this. He also holds that China is not satisfied with the results produced by Chinese democracy.
So, according to the author, China is not in favor of applying democratic process. The other
group of analysts hold that China would be less assertive and its use of force will be solely for
the purpose of self-defense and internal unity. The book entitled ―The New Chinese Empire‖
10
written by Terrill (2004) describes that China is clinging to an imperial mind-set. The imperial
mind-set of China is obsessed with internal stability and the rising power of the peripheral
states. Terrill also describes the Chinese policies regarding self-defense and internal stability.
Swaine &Tellis (2000) in their book ―Interpreting China‘s Grand Strategy Past, Present and
Future‖ say that there are three interrelated objectives before China: ―first and foremost, the
preservation of domestic order and well-being in the face of different forms of social strife;
second, the defense against persistent external threats to national sovereignty and territory;
and third, the attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence as a major, and perhaps
primary state.‖ In the face of strong industrial powers in the region, a ―calculative strategy‖ is
pursued by China. Economic growth and friendly relations with other states are pursued by
this strategy in order to seek benefits. Swaine and Tellis go on to postulate that ―it is unlikely
that more cooperative China will emerge if Beijing‘s relative power grows to a point where a
systemic power transition becomes plausible‖. The researcher will try to further analyze the
factors behind China‘s hegemonic designs.
Brown (2000) wrote a book under the title of ―The Rise of China‖. It explores the nature and
implications of China‘s rise from a variety of angles. It also throws light on the geopolitical
significance of China‘s rise and focuses on the very important issue of Taiwan. This book also
highlights various other issues that require extended individual treatment from China‘s trade
relations to its environmental problems and to its growing AIDS crisis. It also traces the
factors which provided boost to the rise of China.
Cordesman, A.H., & Kleiber, M. (2007) wrote ―Chinese Military Modernization‖. They
examine various dimensions of modernization of Chinese armed forces and its implications
for regional security. They are of the opinion that China must acquire and establish an
11
environment suitable to its security. This environment should be conducive to continue
economic growth. The Chinese leadership believes that if China is to survive, national unity,
stability and sovereignty, must exist. The authors of this book argue that Beijing has launched
active domestic production Program in order to modernize its military. China relies heavily on
Russian Federation for the purchase of modern weapons and advance technology. This book
also presents the numbers and strength of Chinese forces.
Farquher, Roderick M (1997) has written a highly significant book ―The Politics of China‖
which presents an overview of political development in the PRC since 1949. He also discusses
the political instability during the times of Cultural Revolution. After the death of Mao in
1976, new period of Chinese history started in which Deng resorted domestic stability and
economic growth. Under Deng, economy was improved a lot and the living standard was
upgraded. With the opening of China‘s doors to foreign investment and capital, China‘s
economy grew rapidly. A transition from a planned economy to a market economy was
observed. But certain problems were there also. On the whole, this book provides
comprehensive analysis of Deng‘s policies.
1.2.4 Review regarding Chinese foreign policy’s approach and theories
Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995) in his book on ―Cultural Realism‖ presents an insight into the
Chinese strategic culture and grand strategy. This work is referenced extensively for three
objectives. Firstly, it is referred for the examination of ancient military texts of Chinese that
reveal the strategic thought of China. Secondly, for the analysis of the strategic preferences of
the Ming Dynasty, that is heavily emphasized. Thirdly, given its realist paradigm, it provides
a picture of China with hegemonic tendencies. Regarding strategic preferences of China, this
book has great significance. He opines that China‘s hegemonic intentions generally fall into
12
two categories. The first group of analysts holds that China‘s emerging powers would
challenge the supremacy of existing hegemony. The second group of analysts regards China
as a peaceful nation, applying force only for defense purposes.
Kaiming, Su (1985) in his book ―Modern China: A Topical History‖ has provided historical
facts to help the reader gain a deeper understanding of the events and people of China. It also
presents the facts of Chinese history in a chronological order. In this context, Robert E. Gamer
(2003) in his book ―Understanding Contemporary China‖ attempts to analyze the process of
modernization in the PRC started from 1980. He also elaborates the process of institutional
changes, China‘s world view and challenges faced by the PRC. This book provides a
comprehensive understanding of China‘s shift from a controlled economy to a market-
oriented economy as well.
Segal (1985) has written a highly significant book ―Defending China‖ which throws light on
the China‘s planned policy and its military thinking. China has the world‘s biggest army and
the third most influential state equipped with nuclear weapons. It offers a complete study of
China‘s defense policy. In addition, it also explores the main sources of Chinese military
strategy. This book presents a compressive view of China‘s defense as well.
George (1982) has written a highly informative book ―Economic Reforms in the PRC‖ which
throws light on the historical background of the process of economic reforms in the PRC to
gain a deeper understanding of the transition path. This book presents a wide range of policies
to reform the economy of the state.
1.2.5 Review regarding Chinese dealings with Pakistan
Rai, H.A. (1981) has written a book titled ―Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy‖. In this
book he views that Pakistan and China have many common bonds besides neighborhood.
13
Common memories of cultural contacts are rooted in the ancient past and can be traced back
to the beginning of Islam. Still older are their trade and commercial relations. First eight
foreign embassies established in China were as far back as 1000 B.C., one was from this part
of the globe which now constitutes the State of Pakistan. There are Muslims in every province
of China. Figures of their exact population before the revolution are not available.
Singh (1977) in ―Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal‖ describes that Pakistan and China
have one common objective i.e. to have a weak India as their neighbor. Pakistan feels secure
in her thinking that India's uncompromising position and the risk of Western involvement
would prevent China from over-extending herself into Indian province, while Pakistan's
companionship for China and the latter's menacing approach towards India would go a long
way to weaken India, both externally and internally. China thinks that as Pakistan is much
dependent on foreign economic and military aid therefore it will be a pliable tool to project
her image in the world, especially in the Afro-Asian countries.
Hussain Syed, A. (1974) in ―China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale States‖
says that pro-Chinese sentiment in Pakistan is truly amazing. On their return from visits to
China, even right-wing dignitaries, who do not want any kind of Socialism or Marxian, praise
Chinese virtues although they have no desire or intention of practicing them in Pakistan.
Pakistanis believe that if Chinese support during their wars with India did not produce desired
results, the blame must have gone to their own government, which agreed to hasty cease-fire
in 1965, and bungled the East Pakistan situation in the war with India in l97l. It is significant
that this awareness of Chinese inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union does not lower China in
estimation of Pakistan.
14
Sarwar (I966) in ―Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan‖ describes that apart from
geographical, Pakistan and China have links that go far back into history, perhaps in
prehistoric era. Presently culture of Pakistan is considered a young culture, which flourished
under Muslim rules. China had active relations with the Soviet Union alone in those early
days. However, amongst the first to recognize the new People's Republic of China, were India
and Pakistan.
Dreyer, T (1965) presents a comprehensive view of Chinese politics and history in his book
titled ―China‘s Political System: Modernization and Transition‖. She analyzes the Chinese
traditional system, its breakdown and the rise of communism in China. She also discusses the
determinants of Chinese foreign policy, its goals and mechanism of formulations. Post-Mao
policies have also been discussed in this book and the economic transformation resulted into a
dramatic increase of growth rate of economy. Also, the drawbacks of Mao policies have been
discussed in this book.
The article ―China-Pakistan Relations‖ by Jamal Afridi and Jatyshree Bajoria (2010) describes
about China-Pakistan relations. China has been providing Pakistan major military, technical,
and economic assistance, including the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment
which is no doubt a remarkable support. Both countries have enjoyed a close mutually fruitful
relationship. Pakistan was among those countries that recognized the People‘s Republic of
China in 1950. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Pakistan remained a steadfast ally during
Beijing‘s period of international isolation.
1.2.6 Review Analysis
Chinese foreign policy has been reviewed from different eras and angles. In order to analyze
the contemporary strategic thinking of China, official documents and positions have been
15
examined. The 2009 defense White Paper and the Rudd provide an insight into official view
of security situation. The official policies of China regarding its national defense are provided
by these white papers of China. Chinese key leadership‘s speeches and works have also been
reviewed by researcher. The strategic thoughts of these leaders are translated directly into
China‘s strategic orientation. Nevertheless, the consistency and trends in their rhetoric yield
many useful insights on China‘s strategic intentions.
Literature review has highlighted specific behavior of communism and socialist‘s effect too in
Chinese foreign policies. Where Chinese leadership tried to handle the international ties
basically on economic fronts and minor of strategic and defense angles. It can be estimated
that China intends to secure its future on all fronts by securing its economy. Chinese
leadership is trying to get control over the region by its ‗One Belt One Road‘ initiative etc. but
highlights the lacunae of choosing particular approach for south Asian relational ties.
1.3 Problem Statement
Advancing progression of Chinese decision-making process demands analytical study of the
dynamics of Chinese foreign policy to deal with changing international clout in South Asia for
regional stability contributing in international consolidation.
1.4 Objectives of the study
Literature review has highlighted many loopholes concerning study of Chinese foreign
policies, adopted theories and stances in the history. One of the important pinching points was
that Chinese foreign policy has perpetuity in it but have sequential changes are observed
which intrigued me to study the dynamic of Chinese foreign policy. It will be a new addition
16
to the related literature with analysis of foreign policy approach. Major concerns of this
dissertation are to examine the following major points:
To find out the point of origin of contemporary paradigm shifts in Chinese foreign
policy particularly after 9/11 incident
To study in detail how foreign policy stance is carried forward in each premiership of
Chinese government
To highlight the prospect of foreign policy dynamics of Chinese towards two major
identities of South Asia i.e. India and Pakistan
1.5 Significance of the Study
Dissertation is aiming to explain the uniqueness of Chinese foreign policy that how shifts in
policy approach is maintained with permanency like a felicitous phrase. Right after 9/11 many
changes have been measured in global politics, relational ties particularly related to USA. This
particular incident has changed international narrative and trend of bilateral ties in
international politics. So, particularly South Asian states i.e. India and Pakistan‘s ties with
China and internal relations are focused to understand a dimension of dynamic foreign policy
of Beijing. Dissertation is an effort to be intellectual towards Chinese international and
regional handling rather than being getting stereotypical in applying logical theories.
1.6 Research Questions: Analysis of dynamic Chinese Foreign Policy
Which approach will be most practicable to analyze changing foreign policy of
China but within specified perpetuity?
Why China has different approaches to deal with India and Pakistan adjacently?
17
Which factors cause change in the foreign policy of China since year 2000 to year
2014?
To respond former and these queries, this thesis arranges for an analysis of background study
of Chinese foreign policy under foreign policy analysis approach at different levels and
aspects. This research writing tries to explain era of year 2000 to year 2014 to understand
specific stance of Chinese government after 9/11 incident so that changing contemporary
dynamics could be focused. Jiang, Hu and Xi‘s governments in this era respectively are
important and their ground principles of working are focused to get best answers of the
mentioned queries and prospect questions too.
1.7 Research Methodology
1.7.1 Method
Taking an acute and qualitative approach, this study focuses on the case study of India and
Pakistan in context of Chinese foreign policy. Dissertation is done under the mixed method of
research i.e. qualitative intrigue and quantitative proofs to develop worthy argument to
support the answers of the research questions. Mix method approach gave coherence and
preciseness to the expected results of the research process. Contextual analysis research can
mean single and various contextual analyses, can incorporate quantitative confirmation,
depends on numerous wellsprings of proof, and advantages from the earlier improvement of
hypothetical recommendations.
Overview procedure will be used to lead this examination since this technique is most
appropriate if there emerges an event of tremendous populace by refining by and large modest
number of cases browsed the greater populace. The study will be utilizing semi-structured
18
interviews and questionnaire/opinionative filling from political Analysts, Academicians and
policy makers for better arguments in support of the notion under research.
1.7.2 Population
Case study is focused on two countries i.e. India and Pakistan in reference to the Chinese
foreign policy. So, the population falls under probabilistic category and stratified sampling is
done to make strata to perform interviews and questionnaires. Interviews were conducted by
the personnel form foreign affairs office and legislative committees of the parliament. Due to
restricted mode of communication indirect Chinese foreign policy maker‘s interviews were
taken by the help of journalists and foreign office assistance.
1.7.3 Instrumentation and data collection
Data was collected by the help of interviews which were semi structured and targeted. Later
draft of the instruments was submitted to panel of experts for review and analysis to develop
the sound argument as a result. Questionnaires were filled and analyzed to understand the
public stance from targeted population under study. Important document related to foreign
policy development and showing Chinese stance particularly towards India and Pakistan were
reviewed. It helped to understand the real time statement of the Chinese governments. Then
before developing any last statement it was triangulated so that validity of the argument and
proof can be maintained and claimed.
1.7.4 Data analysis
Eloquent insights (recurrence, rate, and so on.) was connected for breaking down quantitative
information utilizing SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). Independent information
was investigated by utilizing content examination for the improvement of solid contention.
19
1.7.5 Chapters demarcation
The research has been divided into five chapters starting from:
Chapter 1 that introduces the key concepts, explains the literature review, significance of the
research, research methodology and the research actions. This chapter has given detailed
account of the research stages and steps followed with complete understanding of the
requisitions of the mix method of research. Formation of samples and conducting case study
was although difficult but skill polishing part and gives reader easy understanding of the
implemented strategic approach to handle the topic with sound development of the argument.
Chapter 2, titled as ―Theoretical Framework‖ expounding foreign policy and in this respect a
theoretical understanding westered to be cleared. After that the clarification of Chinese
foreign policy in South Asia will also be discussed. This chapter has given understanding of
theories of foreign policy analysis and on what basis model of analysis have been selected.
Furthermore, this section of the dissertation dealt with types of foreign policy analysis and
levels. A slight comparative analysis of FPA is also discussed along with real time functioning
of the proposed theory.
In 3rd
Chapter, China-India relations from 1947-2000 then 2001 to 2014 are examined. In
this chapter the China-India relations will be elaborated with specific the perspective of
economic and military dimensions. Furthermore, chapter has touched obstructions and needs
of re-adjustments in the developed and continuously changing foreign policy approach of
China towards India. Chinese perceptions to cover the disputed area conflicts, protectionism
approach and military dealings with effect of modernization are penned in the chapter.
The 4th
chapter is titled ―China-Pakistan relations‖. First of all, history particularly is
discussed after the incident of 9/11 when there had been a U turn in the foreign policies of the
20
world that also affected the region. The interconnected relations of Pakistan and China from
2002 to 2014 has been summed up. Geo-strategic importance of Pakistan in upcoming shifts
of foreign policy of China has been focused along with strong basis of cooperation and tilt of
China towards Pakistan after the functionality of CPEC and Gwadar port.
The 5th
chapter is ―Conclusion‖. After completion of research work a comprehensive
summary of whole research work has been given then the key findings are also highlighted
and at the end suggestions are added for the future researchers. This chapter has given an
analysis not in particular to the region but on whole perspective and prospects of Chinese
foreign policy. It has given basic facts on which foreign policy of China must be based on any
nation in ties.
21
Chapter No 02
THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF CHINA’S SYSTEM-
LEVEL FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS TOWARDS SOUTH
ASIA
2.1 Introduction
The current unsettled state of the field of foreign policy studies is revealed through the
diversity of theoretical frameworks and conceptual approaches that characterize research.
Some ―social scientists have given considerable attention to the role of paradigms in the
development of various areas of scientific inquiry following the work of Kuhn‖ (Kuhn, 1963).
If by a field or disciplinary paradigm one means a set of widely accepted, fundamental, and
critical assumptions that characterize the phenomena being studied and that also indicates
what questions, problems, and modes of inquiry appropriately constitute the frontier of
knowledge, then foreign policy studies have no accepted paradigm.
In this section of the dissertation rational actor model theory is applied to understand different
levels of foreign policy formation, evolution and analysis. Despite not any clear paradigm in
foreign policy study, this dissertation has analyzed practiced paradigms on the basis of the
foreign policy analysis theory. A subset of scholars concerned with the cross-national study of
foreign policy using the Scientific method have come close to adopting a paradigm based
primarily on the works of Roseau (Roseau, 2003), but that too seems in disarray(Caporaso,
1987). Lack of serious examination of the concept of foreign policy has not prevented its use
in general orientations to foreign policy studies. The variety of current frameworks and
22
approaches can be organized by the relationship envisioned between the usually undefined
term, foreign policy, and other components in the framework.
The five categories used widely recognized features of research to suggest reasons in each set
why the concept of foreign policy has seldom been seriously investigated. If one of the trends
for the future is the fuller explication of the meaning and properties of foreign policy, we need
to classify the existing designs in a different fashion to propose how foreign policy is
incorporated and the functions it is expected to play. The most pervasive orientation, which
generates various approaches, views foreign policy as the dependent variable which is to be
understood and explained. Some frameworks, however, assign foreign policy as the
independent variable and consider its effects on other factors. Finally, there are approaches
that interpret foreign policy as a mediating variable, usually in a continuous or cyclical
process in which the distinction between independent and dependent variables may not be
useful.
2.2 Analysis of outreach policies
Remote policies‘ examination enables us to better see how political performers settle on
arrangement choices and how they identify with other remote government and non-
government elements. Foreign policy approach is an intricate train wherein various
performing artists work inside structures both inside and outside the state to affect the basic
leadership process. It is valuable to have scientific process models to light up the elements in
this field and help clarify how states lead their outside approach, worldwide relations and
strategic undertakings. In the concerned field of study for analysis I have chosen rational actor
23
model of analysis of foreign policy so that intentional approach of foreign policy parties may
be understood in wider frame.
Foreign policy belongs to the field of International Relations, as well as to History, Political
Science, Regional Studies, Sociology, or Psychology (multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary).
Modern ―foundations of the concept lie in the seventeenth century (although reflections on it
go as far as to)‖(Connor, 1977), (Berlin, 1997). The nineteenth century gives birth to the
reflection of ―higher and more important form of policy connected to safeguarding the
national interest (or survival of the state).It is a means of positioning of the state (society)
toward its surroundings, hence, toward other states or other players. Realism understands
foreign policy as rational behavior of a unitary actor (state), while liberalism focuses on
preferences of individuals or groups within the state and their influence on its external action.
Constructivism understands foreign policy as a feature of national identity‖ (Connor, 1977),
(Berlin, 1997).
The United Nations Security Council voted to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, and members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a few Arab states launched airstrikes
to protect civilians. ―By mid-2011, countries like the United States and Germany were
engaged in delivery of humanitarian supplies, while Italy and France deployed military
advisors to assist the rebels in the civil war. What began as a domestic uprising quickly
became a foreign policy issue for Libya and many other countries in the world? Another
example of this blurring between foreign and domestic issues can be found in comparative
public policy, a subject area that may seem less dramatic than war, but potentially can be
equally, or more dangerous to public health. Government safety standards for food are
typically aimed at the citizens of a country, but they also shape the amount and type of foods
24
exporting countries produce. When the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an
alert regarding Melamine—a chemical used in the manufacturing of food items like dairy
products and even baby formula—Chinese exports to the United States were adversely
affected‖(Steve Smith, 2008).
The answer to this question is also an important part of the definition of ―foreign policy.‖
Policies are typically thought of as the product of governments, and thus governments are the
―actors.‖ Other players whose actions are intended to influence targets outside a country‘s
borders may also be foreign policy actors. For example, ―businesses may market their
products in other countries. Multinational corporations are businesses that are owned by
interests in various countries or divide their production across country borders. International
organizations, such as the United Nations, act across borders. The traveling to foreign
countries, may be supporting their economies and interacting with foreign nationals. Although
these actions are certainly foreign and are an increasingly significant part of international
politics, but it is rarely considered as policy. Instead, the term policy is typically reserved for
the actions of governments, government institutions, and government officials. Hereafter,
when it is referred to countries or states in a discussion of foreign policy, it is being referring
to the governments or their officials that are acting in their name. Public opinion and media
are also taking part in the framing of foreign policy‖ (Barnett, 1985).
2.3 Level-wise Analysis
Theoretically states are free to make their foreign policy choices. But practically they have to
keep in consideration the prevailing realities of international system. In this connection the
realities of international system are important to understand. The foreign policy process is
25
complex in its nature; its chronological structure passes through different levels. The analysts
have studied the foreign policy making through three perspectives, the levels are known as
follows:
Individual-level Analysis
State-level Analysis
System-level Analysis
2.3.1 Individual level Analysis
The Individual level analysis is considered the root-level analysis. Simply it defines the
people who are involved in the process of policy making. Therefore, it involves the
understanding of how the human decision-making process occurs and leads to policy making.
The structure of individual level as follows,
Human as basic entity
Organizational Behavior
Leaders and their Individual Traits
Policy as a Mix of Rational and Irrational Factors
Following is explanation to the structural formation of the individual level analysis of the
foreign policy.
Human as basic entity
The foreign policy process is affected by rational and irrational constraints. Initially we will
be analyzing the foreign policy process through the rational perspective. This type of foreign
policy process is affected by different human related factors as:
Cognitive factors
26
Cognitive factor in the foreign policy process can be defined as ‗making decisions within the
constraints of bounded rationality‘. According to the author none of us is ready to accept that
we are not fully rational. We can identify the rational thinking in the foreign policy process,
through three strategies:
1) Seeking cognitive consistency: decision makers tend to seek cognitive consistency by
discounting ideas and information that contradict their existing views.
2) Wishful thinking: to self-justify our decisions, we human often convinces ourselves
that our choice will succeed.
3) Using heuristic devices: the mental shortcuts that help us make decisions more easily
by allowing us to skip the effort of gathering considerable information and analyzing it
thoroughly.
It has many types as stereotypes and analogies.
Emotional factors
We have discussed that the foreign policy process is fully rational and logical but the reality is
that all the decision makers get depressed, sad, angry and experience all their human
emotions.
Psychological factors
The humans share a number of common psychological traits that also affect the foreign policy
making process. For example, the frustration-aggression theory, which argues when
individuals are frustrated they result in aggressive attitude.
Biological factors
Various biological theories provide another aspect of biological factors that affect the human
behavior. As the degree to which human actions are based on animal instinct and other innate
27
emotional and physical drives or based on socialization and intellect. Under this perspective,
the foreign policy process will be analyzed through the physical nature and the political
behavior of humans. The Bio-politics will be analyzed through:
1) Ethology: the comparison of animal and human behavior.
2) Gender: the male and female factor that can affect decisions in the foreign policy process.
Perceptions
It is based on the ancient philosophical debate that wether there is an objective or the world is
based on what we perceive. This factor cannot be ignored because we view the world under
our own perception, which can distort the reality to some extent.
Organizational Behavior
The collective thinking in the foreign policy process defines the Organizational behaviour.
This approach has two main concepts:
1) Role behavior: the presidents and other policy makers play roles based on their
attitudes about the positions they have and the behavior they adopt in them.
2) Group decision making: when decision making process occurs within an organization,
they not only have to consider what they think but also how their opinions and
decisions will be viewed by others in the same organization.
Leaders and their Individual Traits
It is the third approach to Individual-level analysis; it explains that the foreign policy making
is centered on country‘s top leadership. It focuses on idiosyncratic analysis. Idiosyncratic
analysis is the study of humans as individuals and how each leader‘s personal characteristics
help shape his or her decisions. The idiosyncratic analysis is based on five basic components
28
1) Personality: it is the study of personality types and their impact on policy, scholars
examine a leader‘s basic orientations toward self and toward others, behavioral
patterns, and attitude about such politically relevant concepts as authority.
2) Physical and mental health: Leader‘s and policy maker‘s physical and mental health
is considered as an important factor in decision making process.
3) Ego and ambition: Leader‘s and policy maker‘s ego and ambition are also considered
important factor in decision making process.
4) Political history and personal experiences: decision makers and leaders are also
affected by the surrounded political history and their experiences.
5) Perceptions and operational reality: decision makers and leaders‘ images of reality
constitute a fifth idiosyncratic element that affects the foreign policy process.
Policy as a Mix of Rational and Irrational Factors
It is the best aspect to see the foreign policy process through mix of rational and irrational
inputs. This view has been seen through poly-heuristic theory. This theory depicts decision
making within two-stages. In the first stage of decision making, the policy makers use
shortcuts to eliminate policy options that are unacceptable for irrational personal reasons.
While the second stage explains the decision makers uses more analytical processing in an
attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits.
2.3.2 State-Level Analysis
This level of analysis explains how country‘s political structure, political forces and
substantial actors within a state causes and affects its government to decide a foreign policy.
The following are the important factors that construct the state-level analysis:
29
Making Foreign Policy: Type of Government, Situation and Policy
Making Foreign Policy: Political Culture
Foreign Policy: Making Actors
Making Foreign Policy: Type of Government, Situation and Policy
The foreign policy process is not a single process; there are many variables that affect the
policy process. As;
1) Type of government and the foreign policy process: the type of ruling government
affects the foreign policy process, as the authoritarian foreign policy process differs
from the democratic type of government.
2) Type of situation and the foreign policy process: the foreign policy process varies
according the prevailed situation and circumstances in any state.
3) Type of policy and the foreign policy process, the foreign policy process is also
affected by the nature of the issue.
Making Foreign Policy: Political Culture
Every country has its own political culture that has its impact on the foreign policy process.
The political culture of every country represents its traditional values and its fundamental
practices. The policy makers and leaders formulate their foreign policy according to their
political culture, which has compatibility with its people. The people of any state have their
deep impact and association with the implemented foreign policy traits.
Foreign Policy: Making Actors
The foreign policy-making actors of any state are the political executives, political opponents,
interest groups, and the people. These actors are involved in clash of ideas and decisions to
30
determine the foreign policy of a state. The main actors who are involved in foreign policy
process as defined by the author are as follows:
1) Heads of Government and other Political executives: the executive branch of any
state is supported by different factors as the a) the formal powers that has been
provided through the constitution, b) Informal powers that has been provided by the
people or nation‘s expectation towards its leader. c) and the last thing which affects the
foreign policy process is its leadership capabilities and the power to implement.
2) Bureaucracies: Bureaucrats are the carrier officers and they hold the actual power.
Although the legal authority rests in the hands of political leaders but they are the one
who translate it into actions. In a policy there can be divergence between politicians
and the bureaucrats. They can affect any decision by filtering the information
necessary for the policy makers. They possess expertise and their recommendations on
an issue can affect the vision of policy makers. More importantly they can make a
huge difference at the stage of implementation.
3) Legislature: the role of legislature is varied from system to system. In non-democratic
systems legislature is just a rubber stamp. In democracies they play a huge role. The
chief executive possesses legal powers in realm of foreign policy US Presidents enjoy
their executive powers not only through constitution but through norms as well. The
president is empowered by traditions, by the belief that a unified national voice is
important to successful foreign policy and with the fact that legislature tends to focus
on domestic policy.
4) Interest Groups: Pressure groups make a government to adopt their policies and
demands in their own way. These groups are of ethnic, racial, religious and cultural
31
types. There goals, attachments and their demands impact upon the foreign policy in
its distinct way. The economic groups are an innovation in this regard. With an
increase in the international trade there has been emerged a sense of competition
between many companies, communities and the workers. There are other types of
groups like Issue-oriented groups who are above the racial and ethnic sentiment but
they make their groups by virtue of same policy goals. The traditional interest
groups are equally important. They have their traditional task of lobbying which has
become significant with the increasing interdependence of the nations.
5) The people: the role of public is highly important variable in foreign policy. In few
countries public has a right to decide matters through referendum. While in democratic
system these are the public representatives who chalk out the foreign policy. The
public opinion has indirect effect on the foreign policy and decision making. Public
opinion is the phenomenon that is influencing the performance of not only the elected
but the appointed officials as well.
2.3.3 System-Level Analysis
A system is the outcome of multiple factors like:
Structural characteristics;
Power relationships;
Economic realities; and
Norms and behavioral patterns.
32
Structural Characteristics
The Organization of Authority The way authority is significant in determining the foreign
policy. International system is anarchical. It is comprised of sovereign state system. The
prevailing international system is horizontal. There are emerging new forces that are intended
to make it more centralized and vertical in nature. Currently states are depending on
themselves for their protection and there is no centralized institution or authority they could
call in the time of emergency. That is why all states are armed. Even then countries reject the
IGO. The sensitivity regarding the sovereignty has persisted to keep this horizontal and
anarchical system to exist. The policies are destined to be made in accordance with this
reality.
Scope, Level and Intensity of Interactions: although states are sensitive regarding their
sovereignty yet it is important to note that the interaction of the states is increasing and the
states have become more interdependent. There interaction of the states is on several issues
and factors but the economic interdependence is visibly significant.
Power Relationships
There are certain realities of power in international system. States are bound to keep them
under consideration while deciding their policies and acts.
The Number of Power Actors: the history of international systems is judged by the number
of power actors they have. These power actors are known as the power pole as well. It
includes a country or empire, possible alliances, global IGO like UNO and a regional IGO like
EU. These poles are important in the realist approach for its concern for the balance of power.
In the analysis of power relationship, it is important to understand that how many power poles
a system has. The current world system is unipolar with due dominance of USA. The rules of
33
game in the unipolar system suggest that fewer powers try to escape the dominance. This rule
of game is hardly anticipated by the rest of the players.
The Context of Power: Another factor in this system is the context or the acceptability of
power in a given situation. The policy of raising tariff by the US on the Chinese goods is
ample example of keeping China in accordance with the US desires. Such context or the
application of power is meaningful reality in an international system.
Economic Realities
Economic realities are crucial for the foreign policy choices of a state. Economic interaction
affects the state behavior. With this the natural resources production and the consumption
pattern also determine the international relations and the foreign policy choices. The US
attacked on Iraq in 1990 against the later invasion in Kuwait is the prime example of it.
Although US denies this fact but it is an open secret that it was the oil that attracted the
attention of US towards this invasion.
2.3.4 Customs/Standards
Norms have a significant place from local to global level and they affect the foreign policy
decision in a system. Norms provide the pattern of behavior. For example, no usage of nuclear
weapons is a norm. They also create a kind of predictability in a system. Norms are not
permanent phenomena. They can be challenged in international system, in the same way new
norms can also be created.
2.4 Theoretical Analysis
China's inflexible ascent as a noteworthy force to be reckoned with is one of the
characterizing highlights of the contemporary political scene. Be that as it may, would it be a
34
good idea for us to notice the notices of a purported 'China danger?' Is China set to wind up
the following superpower? Or then again will its desire be tempered by monetary and political
substances both at home and abroad?
The synergist stuns of the finish of the Cold War and the evident powerlessness of
international relations hypothesis to foresee this significant change have brought up issues
about how we ought to approach understanding the universe of today. Our acquired
apparatuses and methods for depicting the worldwide field appear not to function and in
addition they once did. To clarify and foresee the conduct of the human collectivities
involving country states, IR hypothesis requires a hypothesis of human political decision.
Inside the investigation of IR, remote arrangement examination has started to grow such a
hypothetical point of view. From its commencement, FPA has included the examination of
how outside strategy choices are made and has accepted that people, acting exclusively or in
collectivities, are the wellspring of much conduct and most change in universal legislative
issues. This section of dissertation has surveyed the field of foreign policy analysis, looking at
its exploration center and its development to date. The table additionally looks forward,
indicating the future of FPA itself as well as to the suggestions that future advancements in
FPA may have for the investigation of worldwide relations.
Table No 01 Comparative analysis of foreign policy approaches
Major IR Approaches Realism Liberalism Constructivism
Theoretical
proposition
States compete for
power and security
State‘ commitment
for liberal values
Collective norms and
social identities shape
behavior/argument
Instrument Policy Military and Institutional and Ideas and discourses
35
economic power liberal values/
networks of
independence
Post-cold war
Predictions
Resurgence of great
power competence
Increased
cooperation as liberal
values spread
Skeptical, Depends
upon ideas
Foreign policy
implementation
Targeted policies
with real time
application
Flexibility and shifts
on policy trends
Develop policy
according to needs
and logic
This table explains how former application of neoliberalists and institutionalists approaches of
foreign policy is different and worthy for application at state level relations and interaction
mechanisms. Paradigm shift of approach may open new ways to accept the changing
scenarios and to get adjusted to them.
36
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(2010). International Energy Agency, WorldEnergyoutlook 2010. Paris: International
energyAgency.
(2011). IndiaMinistry ofExternal Affairs, India-China relations, last Accessed.
Bagchi, I. (2008, March). "India breaks silence, calls for talks on Tibet". The Times of India.
Bhaskar, C. (2010). China and India in Indianocean region: neither conflict nor cooperation
preordained. China Report, vol. 46, no. 3.
Chellaney, B. (2011). India's growing China againstfar Eastern Economic Review.
Cohen, S. P. (2012). Arming without aiming: India's military modernization. Brooking
Institute Press.
Debanath, S. (n.d.). EVOLUTION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS WITH SPECIAL
REFRENCE TO BORDER DISPUTES SINCE 1990s1. Indian Journal of research in
MultidisciplinaryStudies, 102.
37
Frankel, F. (2011). The breakout of China-India strategic rivalry in Asia and the Indian
Ocean. Journal of International Affairs, 1-17.
Hailin, Y., & Zetterlund, K. (2009). China-Pakistan relations: all weather, but may be not all
dimensions. Stockholm: Swedish defense research agency.
Jakobsson, & Linda, K. D. (2010). New Foreignpolicy in China (p. 4). Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute.
Lamb, A. (1964). The China-India Border (Vol.2). Oxford University Press.
Li, Z. (2010). In China-India Relations, Strategic Engagement and Challenges (p. 9).
Liu, Q. (2008). China-India studies. Contemporary International Relations, vol.18, no.3 , 81-82.
Liu, X. (2010). On the issue of the Indian Ocean as part of Sino-Indian relations. Pacific Journal,
vol. 18, no. 1.
Lombardo, N. R. (aug. 2011). India's defense spending and military modernization. center for
strategic & international studies.
Ma, J. (2006). the posture of India’s rise. contemporary international relations, vol. 16, no.7.
Mescalf. (2001). crisis and confidence: major powers and maritime security in Indi-Pacific Asia.
In Rory. Lowy institute for international policy.
Mir, D. N. (2016, march). China-India defense strategies. (S. akhtar, Interviewer)
Official policy paper for the European union. (2003,206,2008). China: Chinese Government.
38
Pandit, R. (2011, 14, july). Sukhoi base in east to counter China. The Times of India.
Qu, T. D. (2005). Connecting the tropical Pacific with Indian Ocean through South China Sea.
Geographical Research Letters 32(24).Retrieved from: www.tribuneindia.com
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forces website.
Shambaugh, D. (2006). China's military views in the World: Ambivalent Security.
Sidhu, & Waheguru Pal Singh, J.-d. y. (2003). China and India: cooperation or conflict? Lynne
Rienner publishers.
Sindhu, W. P. (2003). China and India: cooperation or conflict. India Research Press.
Srinivasan, T. N. (2004). China and India: economic performance, competition and cooperation:
an update. Journal of Asian Economics, 613-636.
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arms importer according to news SIPRI data on international arms transfer.
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journal of international affairs vol.64, 2.
"Tibetans living outside Tibet: Tibetan survey". (2011, 11, Aug). Hindustan Times.
39
Chapter No 03
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA
3.1 Historical Background
China's strategy towards its outskirts appears to be dumbfounding to numerous outside
eyewitnesses. President Xi Jinping has appended top need to keeping up great relations with
China's neighbors, lifting the significance of China's fringe over its ties with the United States.
In the meantime, Xi persistently demands that China makes no concessions in question with
its neighbors over regional sway, and requests that Chinese oceanic rights and interests are
secured no matter what. In any case, close investigation uncovers that Xi thinks about these
twin goals as commonly fortifying and that he has built up a methodology to accomplish
them. In return for giving formative advantages to its neighbors through exchange, venture,
framework and vitality, China expects that they will suit Chinese 'center interests', including
in the long run surrendering to Beijing on regional question in the East and South China
oceans.
The historical development of Sino-Indian relations after World War II can be separated into
four special stages(Sidhu & Waheguru Pal Singh, 2003). The first era is between the late
1940s up to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. The second includes the post-war era,
ranging from the end of 1962 up to 1976, primarily characterized by political deadlock, two-
sided non-engagement and Cold War tensions. The third era ranges between 1976 and 1998,
in which the mutual relationship was characterized by rapprochement and the re-establishment
of political relationships. The fourth era, from 1998 up to the current date, has seen improving
bilateral relationships amid unsettled historical disputes and original areas of tension.
40
Having presumed that Deng Xiaoping's approach of staying under the radar never again serves
Chinese interests, Xi is supporting a dynamic outside strategy that looks to shape China's key
condition so it turns out to be more ideal to the restoration of the immense Chinese country –
a point that Xi has named the 'China dream'.
3.1.1 1949–1962: Establishing Relations
The two countries were formally established in the late 1940s, the Republic of India in 1947
and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Diplomatic relations were set up between
China and India on 1st April 1950, ―with the first state-to-state visits by the presidents of the
two countries ensuing in 1954‖(Sidhu & Waheguru Pal Singh, 2003). That was also the year
in which China and India vowed to adhere to the ―Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
often referred to as the Panchsheel agreement, paving the way for deepened bilateral
engagement. Prior to this, in 1950, China had annexed Tibet and placed it under its legal
control in 1951‖(Sidhu & Waheguru Pal Singh, 2003).
3.1.2 1962–1976: Political Stalemate
Sino-Indian relations entered a nearly two-decade long political stalemate after the 1962 war.
Although the two countries increased their conventional military capabilities around the
border areas, ―the realities of the Cold War produced separate geopolitical agendas for China
and India, prompting them to shift their attention away from each other. During the late 1960s
and early 1970s, China‘s relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated into animosity,
eventually leading to an armed conflict over a disputed border, the Ussuri river, in
1969‖(Sidhu & Waheguru Pal Singh, 2003).
41
3.1.3 1976–1998: Rapprochement
The first such CBM, ―the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the
Line of Actual Control, was signed by Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Li
Peng in Beijing in 1993‖(Sidhu & Waheguru Pal Singh, 2003).―This was followed by the
signing of an additional CBM in 1996, following a visit to New Delhi by PRC President Jiang
Zemin. The CBM, known as the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military
Field along the LAC, called for the reduction of troops along the LAC. These military
oriented CBMs were designed to offset the risk of a new border conflict but did not constitute
an attempt to establish a formal treaty between China and India to settle the border
dispute‖(Sindhu, 2003).
3.1.4 1998–2011: Improving Relations Amid Unresolved Disputes and
tensions
India at the end of the day thankful and ministerial and state visits between the two countries
rapidly resumed as of 1999. The JWG meetings also resumed (Sidhu & Waheguru Pal Singh,
2003). Thanks to the ―measures taken by both sides to stabilize the bilateral relationship, these
tensions were short-lived. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited New Delhi in 2002, signing
memorandums of understandings (MoUs) with his Indian counterpart A. B. Vajpayee. The
agreements covered bilateral cooperation on areas including tourism, space, science and
technology, and hydrological information on cross-border rivers‖(India Ministary of Extenal
affairs, India-China relations,last Accessed, 2011).
42
3.1.5 2011-2014: Growing Economic and Trade Relations
The latest readjustment of Beijing‘s India policy has been obsessed above all by its economic
interests. ―A fundamental aspect of this policy is to promote a regional security environment
that is conducive to growing economic interaction with India. On the other hand, China‘s
India policy is characterized by efforts to prevent New Delhi from challenging Chinese
interests, in particular in terms of its national core interests. These interests involve factors
which China will not compromise on, such as matters related to its territorial integrity. In
essence, this two-sided strategy implies that Beijing‘s efforts to increase engagement with
New Delhi run a constant risk of being disrupted by actions perceived as undermining China‘s
national interests‖(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2011).
3.2 Implication of India’s Rise as an Emerging Power
China is steadily becoming more caring to India, but has yet to issue any certified papers
describing its foreign policy towards its growing neighbor(offcial policy paper for the
European union, 2003,206,2008).―India has generally received very limited attention in
official documents such as the white book on China‘s national defense, underlining the fact
that the primary focus of China‘s foreign and national security policy is directed elsewhere.
Nevertheless, as Chinese analysts have noted, India‘s emergence as a rising power has
growing implications for China‘s foreign and security policy interests and has caused Beijing
to reassess its engagement with New Delhi‖(Li, 2010).In general, foreign policy decision
making in China is highly centralized in a few key decision-making bodies(Jakobsson &
Linda, 2010).
43
3.2.1 Consensus-Driven Process of China’s Foreign Policy
The decision-making procedure surrounding China‘s foreign policy includes additional few
actors as well as ―the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA), and the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Defense and the Central Military
Commission as well as various corporate actors and state-owned enterprises with interests of
their own. The Chinese strategic think-tank community, being connected to various
government departments, also plays an increasingly important role in policy
formation‖(Jakobsson & Linda, 2010).
3.2.2 China’s Core Interests
The India-based Tibetan government-in-exile (TGIE) is perceived by Beijing to be
undermining CCP authority in Tibet, thus destabilizing China domestically and, by extending,
its relations with India‖(Swaine, 2011).―Economic and political engagement with India, along
with maintaining stability in their relations, becomes increasingly important considering
China‘s profound interest in sustaining its current economic growth trajectory‖(United
Department of Defence, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2010).
3.2.3 India’s Rise-New Challenges
India‘s rise signals a rising rearrangement of power and thus a shifting regional dynamic in
South Asia. This brings new challenges to regional security tied with opportunities to
encourage cooperation that is deemed valuable for both China and India. Both states stress the
need to formulated a sovereign, nonaligned foreign policy – that is pursuing national interests
without external influence – and not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. ―Both
countries also have an interest in promoting a multipolar world conducive to their political
44
and economic growth‖(Li, 2010).―For Beijing, this convergence of principles and interests has
facilitated its engagement with New Delhi, despite the underlying tensions between the
two‖(Hailin & Zetterlund, 2009).
3.2.4 Re-adjustment of China’s Foreign Policy towards India
China‘s foreign policy is strictly shaped by its domestic needs, being inherently linked to the
legitimacy of the regime.―Primarily for the benefit of its economic and trade interests, China
has readjusted its foreign policy to focus more on India. Thus, China‘s India policy is strongly
influenced by the fact that both countries emphasize a need to ensure domestic economic and
social development‖(Li, 2010). Officially, ―China now takes an increasingly neutral stance in
regard to India‘s disputes with Pakistan, a major ally of China, based on the logic of
establishing a security environment that will be conducive to its own growth‖(offcial policy
paper for the European union, 2003,206,2008).
3.2.5 Policy of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management
As a further extension of China‘s economic interests and domestic policy, ―its foreign policy
towards India and indeed towards South Asia in general, is increasingly employing measures
of conflict prevention and crisis management. Preventing conflict in its periphery is deemed
essential in order to thwart potential disruption to its own economic development. To this end,
Beijing has taken a number of measures to safeguard regional stability. With regard to
India,China has advocated increased trade and economic interaction, seeking growing
economic cooperation between the two countries. Beijing has also explored new areas of
cooperation including joint unit-level counter-terrorism exercises‖(People's republic of China
information office of the state council,, 2008).
45
3.2.6 Measure to obstruct certain India Policies
However, China has at the same time taken measures in obstructing certain Indian policies
which Beijing perceives may undermine its interests. As Indian China scholar Swaran Singh
argues, ―it is unlikely that Beijing, despite increasing engagement with New Delhi, would
create space for India to achieve parity with its own power and influence. This is evident in
China‘s opposition to India both being given membership status in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) and its ambitions to become a permanent member, with the power of
veto, in the UNSC‖(Swaran, 2011).
3.2.7 Historical Disputes
China‘s relationship with India is burdened by two main historical disputes, which both relate
to ―Tibet and adjacent areas and which limit the possibilities of improving bilateral relations.
First, India is the only country with which China has an unresolved land border dispute.
Second, the Indian city of Dharamshala is the base of the Tibetan government-in-exile
(TGIE), which China claims is pursuing an agenda of separating Tibet from China. The
general assessment of how to handle these two historical disputes, heard from both officials
and scholars in China, is that they should continue to be managed outside of other
dialogues‖(Lamb, 1964).
3.2.8 The Border Dispute
China and India have competing claims on territory in the border regions, where Tibet meets
India‘s northern states. ―Large parts of the 3,500 km-long borders remain disputed. India
claims sovereignty over roughly 38,000 square kilometers in the Aksai Chin region as well as
pockets south of this region, areas which are controlled by China and form parts of its
46
autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. Moreover, India maintains that Pakistan illegally
ceded some 5,000 sq. km. of northern Kashmir to China in 1963‖(Securiy Invirnment - an
Overview, 2010).
Map No 01 Border Between China and India
Source: www.tribuneindia.com
47
3.2.9 Chinese perceptions
On the basis of the limited prospects for a near-term resolution of the issue, observers state
that the main task for ―both countries is to keep peace and tranquility along the border. Crisis
management is handled by the special representatives on the border issue. Accidental
incursions from both sides happen occasionally but are managed effectively thanks to the
hotline set up in 1997 to connect the special representatives, According to Indian academic
Brahma Chellaney, the Indian military in 2008 recorded 270 border violations and nearly
2,300 cases of aggressive border patrolling‖ by Chinese soldiers(Chellaney, 2011). Friendly
dialogue is the only way to resolve the border dispute.
3.2.10 A grand bargain on Aksai Chin/Arunachal Pradesh
While Chinese observers in general argue that China is satisfied with the status quo around the
border, they recognize that the long-term status quo is in the interest of neither country.
Eventually, both countries will want to resolve the dispute to their advantage. One observer
states that ―China should renegotiate with India and pull back from Aksai Chin, in spite of
Aksai Chin‘s strategic location adjacent to Kashmir. Both territorial disputes should be settled
at once.China should quit Aksai Chin, while Indian troops should pull out of Arunachal
Pradesh.
Through such a trade-off, the symbolically and strategically important area of Tawang would
come under Chinese control. Tawang, located in the northwestern part of Arunachal Pradesh,
is home to one of the most important monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism and the area in which
the 6th Dalai Lama was born. China has long wanted to resolve the Tawang issue in a way
that is favorable to itself, which is currently politically impossible‖(Debanath).
48
3.2.11 The Tibetan government-in-exile
Tibet has been located in the Indian city of Dharamshala since 1959. India is also home to the
absolute majority of Tibetans living outside China. According to the TGIE, more than
127,000 Tibetans live in exile(127935 Tibetans living outside tibet: Tibetan survey,
2011)―which can be compared to the Tibetan population in China of 5.4 million people,
according to China‘s 2000 census. The official position of the Chinese government is that the
TGIE (which lacks international recognition), and Tibet‘s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama in
particular, are pursuing an agenda aimed at separating the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
and adjacent Tibetan areas from China. China sees Indian support for the TGIE and the Dalai
Lama as conflicting with India‘s One-China Policy, due to India‘s official acknowledgement
in 2003 that the TAR forms part of China‖ (XInhua, 2009).
3.3 Chinese perceptions
3.3.1 India should strive to limit the activities of the TGIE
India in 2003 formally recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China, a
decision which Chinese scholars see as the end to the Tibet issue on the political
level.―Instead, the issue has since then been limited to the TGIE‘s activities in India. It is
argued that any Chinese suspicion of India is mainly rooted in the fact that the TGIE
maintains a presence in the country. Many observers argue that India uses the TGIE as a
bargaining chip to exert pressure on China and they are therefore concerned that India does
not honor its promise to crack down on the activities of the TGIE, which it is still active on
Indian soil. The Indian government has made clear that it expects Tibetan refugees in India to
49
refrain from political activities and those activities that affect our relations with other friendly
countries‖(Bagchi, 2008).
3.3.2 The Tibet connection is likely to sour Sino-Indian relations in years
ahead
While Chinese ―observers state that it is hard to predict what the Indian government‘s reaction
to the current Dalai Lama‘s death will be, most argue that it is in India‘s strategic interest to
continue to use the Tibet issue to justify its territorial claims. Hence, it is likely that the issue
of the TGIE will continue to complicate Sino-Indian relations in a post-Dalai Lama
environment as well. For example, the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) could potentially
become a difficult issue in the relationship. The TYC, which is based in Dharamshala, was
branded as a terrorist organization by Chinese state media in the aftermath of the March 2008
unrest in Lhasa‖(Xinhua, 2008).
3.3.3 Economic Interests
This is particularly obvious in regard to their efforts to gain access to natural resources. India
still lags behind China in terms of economic development and is mostly the weaker player in
terms of the investment and trade rivalry. ―While both are expanding their footprint overseas,
for example in Africa and in Latin America, India has been forced to play catch-up. The main
reason for this is the fact that India launched economic reforms more than a decade after Deng
Xiaoping began opening up China‘s economy in the early 1980s‖(Srinivasan, 2004).
50
3.3.4 Natural Resources
China and India have a rapidly growing demand for natural resources, in particular oil and
natural gas, in order to keep up economic growth. ―China and the US are currently the leading
consumers of primary energy and will be joined by India around 2035 as the world‘s top three
energy consumers according to the projections of the International Energy Agency
(IEA)‖(international Energy Egency, World Energy Outlook 2010, 2010). ―In both China and
India, oil is mainly imported from Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries,
where rivalry is intensifying. Sino-Indian energy competition has also become fierce in
Central Asia, underlined by the rival bids for a major oil company in Kazakhstan in
2005‖(Zhang, 2010).
3.3.5 China and India Should Cooperate More Closely in the Energy Field
The two countries have competed in acquiring access to a dozen energy projects overseas
since 2004. However, Beijing and New Delhi have realized that if they do not manage this
rivalry in an appropriate manner, it will have adverse effects on their overall bilateral
relations. According to one observer, the countries still lack mechanisms to keep the rivalry
on a stable level. On the other hand, ―it is argued that governments in both countries would
intervene to stabilize the situation if economic disputes were to escalate. While China and
India agreed in 2005 to jointly engage in the survey and exploration of petroleum and natural
gas resources in third countries, meaningful cooperation agreements have yet to
materialize‖(Zhang, 2010).
51
3.3.6 Bilateral Trade and Investment
By 2015, the two countries resolved to reach $100 billion in bilateral trade. As a result of this
development, Chinese manufactured goods, technology and labor have become an integral
part of the Indian economy. Sino-Indian trade relations are, however, also characterized by a
large Indian trade deficit. In 2010 alone, ―India‘s exports to China were $20 billion lower than
those of China to India. Its information technology (IT) services industry represents India‘s
main competitive advantage, but several of India‘s other business sectors have come under
pressure from Chinese imports. One Chinese observer notes that since 2009 India has
strengthened control of imports in sensitive products and has adopted measures to limit
imports of telecommunications equipment. Such measures are believed to be directly targeted
at limiting imports from China‖(Wu, 2011).
3.3.7 India is Employing Protectionism to address its Trade Deficit with
China
Based on the theory of realism, one observer argues that India should realize that the trade
imbalance is a normal result of the countries‘ competitive advantages – China being the
―workshop of the world‖ and India being the ―back office of the world‖. The two countries
simply have different models for their development: ―China‘s model is based on exports of
manufactured goods, while India‘s development is driven by high levels of consumption and
exports of IT services. At the same time, India is putting a great deal of effort into establishing
production capabilities. As one analyst points out, India‘s trade deficit will eventually
disappear as a bilateral issue as a result of the country‘s efforts to industrialize‖(Srinivasan,
2004).
52
Chinese investments in India remain modest, a fact which some observers blame on Indian
protectionist policies. ―The bulk of Chinese investments are directed toward the
manufacturing and telecom sectors; which India has not opened fully to Chinese investment.
This also applies to India‘s services sector, which dominates the Indian economy. China‘s
Ministry of Commerce asserts that Chinese companies have suffered from Indian regulations
in recent years. For example, India has adopted stricter visa regulations, hurting Chinese
companies who favor employing workers from home. The ministry also notes that India has
put restrictions on investments by Chinese companies in the telecoms sector, citing security
reasons‖(Ministry of commerce of people's republic of China,, 2009).
3.3.8 Military Build-up
Meanwhile, Chinese observers tend to view the border war as a historical relic reflecting past
enmity. While India perceives China as the biggest threat to its national security, prompting it
to modernize its military capabilities, China regards the United States as its main strategic
rival. Indian strategists ―calling for greater transparency on China‘s part regarding this
modernization, point out that some of China‘s capabilities can also be used to limit India‘s
regional influence and power projection capabilities. Consequently, India has identified a need
to maintain military parity with China by modernizing its military‖(Frankel, 2011).
3.3.9 Military Capabilities, Force Posture and Deployment
Although the two countries are restricted by the established CBMs to the extent in which they
can increase their force posture in the border areas, ―they have been upgrading existing
capabilities and border area infrastructure. New Delhi has developed its force posture on its
side of the Line of Actual Control, deploying units with improved operational capabilities. For
53
instance, India upgraded its air combat capabilities in the eastern sector by phasing out its
older MiG-21s there in favor of two new squadrons of Sukhoi-30 MKIs‖(Pandit, 2011).
As noted in a report published by Australia‘s Lowy Institute, ―China‘s reliance on the Indian
Ocean SLOCs for its access to energy resources makes an increased Chinese naval presence in
the Indian Ocean region (IOR) highly likely in the long run‖(Mescalf, 2001). Indeed, the PLA
Navy already has an active deployment in the western IOR as a part of an international anti-
piracy mission. China is also making substantial investments in ports in littoral states such as
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Although these are primarily economic investments,
observers in India fear they may be used as logistical forward operation bases for future
Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean (Bhaskar, 2010).
3.3.10 Defense Modernization of India
India‘s military build-up is primarily aimed at maintaining a military balance of power with
China. As such, ―its increase in military capabilities is primarily underlined by strategic
calculations aimed at safeguarding its long-term interests. India‘s increase of capabilities
around its side of the LAC‖ (Cohen, 2012), is not a reaction to China‘s increasing capabilities
on the other side. However, one Chinese observer argues that analysts in New Delhi
incorrectly believe that China has a large presence of troops along the LAC. ―It is argued that
the PLA only deploys three infantry regiments there, comparing to the additional two new
divisions and two fighter squadrons deployed by the Indians. However, due to the sensitive
nature of the border dispute and hence a lack of information, it is difficult to determine the
extent of China‘s military presence along the LAC. Regardless of its lack of transparency,
China has not identified a need to re-evaluate its own military build-up and has so far failed to
take substantial measures to address existing misperceptions. Observers argue that it is not
54
viable for China to give up its own modernization plans to ease India‘s concerns. Indeed,
China‘s military modernization is merely considered a consequence of its own economic
growth. India‘s military establishment is in need of resources and capital, and therefore
portrays China as a threat‖ (Shambaugh, 2006).
This view is often repeated by Chinese observers (Li, 2010). ―The framing of China as a
major concern to India‘s national security is primarily attributed to hawks in India‘s military
establishment. India‘s government itself does not, at least officially, portray China as a threat,
as that may be detrimental to improving bilateral relations‖(Liu Q. , 2008).
3.3.11 Worth of Indian Ocean for China
As outlined above, ―China has substantial interests in securing its trade and energy routes that
traverse the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the capabilities of the PLA Navy to do this and the
capabilities of China to assert its interests in the region are growing. There is an underlying
suspicion about the activities and long-term intentions of the United States Navy in the region.
The US Navy is currently the dominant naval force in the area and holds the capability to
control and disrupt China‘s trade flows‖(Liu X. , 2010). However, a Chinese analyst noted,
―China‘s interest in projecting naval power and furthering its engagement in the IOR is not
based on security considerations on its part. The intentions of the PRC are benign‖ (Qu,
2005).
3.3.12 Defense Industry and Arms Procurement
Both ―China and India have been rapidly developing their defense industry and arms
acquisitions in order to develop their military capabilities. China has increased its self-reliance
in military technology, largely owing to existing arms embargoes against it. In contrast, India
55
has surpassed China to become the world‘s largest arms importer. Between 2006 and 2010,
India received 9 per cent of the total volume of international arms transfers. During this
period, Russia accounted for 82 per cent of Indian arms imports, making it the foremost arms
supplier to India‖(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2011).
In order to serve its long-term goal of developing a domestic high-tech defense industry, India
increasingly requires access to technology in connection with the arms transfers(Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2011). For example, as a Chinese observer
noted, ―India has established several joint-venture projects with Russia, including the
production of cruise missiles and fighter aircraft‖(Ma, 2006). Considering the current
trajectory of India‘s arms procurements, it is predicted that India will stay on as one of the
world‘s largest defense customers over the coming years(Lombardo, aug. 2011).
3.3.13 Military-industrial developments in India are not a cause of
concern in China
Chinese observers recognize that India‘s annually growing defense appropriations and arms
procurements are substantially speeding up its military modernization (Ma, 2006).
Nevertheless, ―India‘s reliance on foreign suppliers to sustain its military build-up further
enhances the lack of concern among Chinese observers about the implications of India‘s
growing military power. It is considered to be strategically unreasonable to depend on other
states for one‘s own military capabilities. As one observer argued, a state needs to modernize
its military capabilities domestically‖(Mir, 2016).
56
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59
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60
Chapter No 04
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA-PAKISTAN
RELATIONS BEFORE 9/11
4.1 Historical Development
Pakistan and China are neighbors. The history of relations between them goes back to the
period when merchants, pilgrims, scholars and diplomats traveled on camels or horse back‘s
through the silk route from one country to another during the period of colonialism, however
contacts, between the people of China and Pakistan were restricted at both official and non-
official levels following the first aggression against China in 1856 or the opium war as it is
better known, China's foundation as state was seeped. Consequently, a chaos and confusion
prevailed in China for long period. From times immemorial, the area, which now comprises
Pakistan, had contact with China. As far back as ―1000 B.C according to Pakistani historians
one of the first eight embassies established in China was from the region which now constitute
the republic of Pakistan‖(Singh R. S., 2008) .
4.2 Pakistan’s initiation in Development of Relations
On January 4, 1950 Pakistan. Recognized Mao-Tze-Tung government as dejure Government
of China. ―The press communique further said that the Govt. of Pakistan trust friendly and
cordial relation between China and Pakistan and hope it will be cemented in all spheres of
their mutual advantages CITATION Hor50 \p 181-210 \l 1033 (Hornbeck, April, 1950, pp.
181-210) . Pakistan not only recognized China but also made endeavors to persuade other
61
nations to recognize it. On 10th
May l95l announcement of the initiation of diplomatic ties
Pakistan's fist was made and Ambassador Major General N.A.M Raza arrived in Peking, two
months later the first Chinese ambassador took up residence in Karachi. During the early age
of China emergence communist giant United States decided to call back American Consular
from Communist China. However, Pakistan reacted on the American act CITATION Jai74 \l
1033 (Jain, 1974) .
In 1954 Pakistan's tilt was towards West. On the eve of Manila Conference in Pakistan‘s
Ambassador Major General Raza stressed Pakistan's wishes to develop the cordial relations
with its great neighbor China CITATION Mas11 \l 1033 (Mason, 2011) . The second
development for furtherance of mutual political relations took place in the wake of Bandung
Conference in April 1955 CITATION Mas11 \l 1033 (Mason, 2011) . Both leaders had
availed the opportunity to discuss matters pertaining to the region as general and the Indian
factor as special. On the eve of the Conference Pakistan assured China that its military
alliance with west is not against China. The post Banding conference paved the way for
promoting the harmony and understanding for the collective peace and cooperation between
China and Pakistan, The Peoples Republic of China assured that there was no conceivable
clash of interest between the two countries, which could hamper their cordial relations. ―On
15 June 1956 premier Chou Eli remarked about the historic links between the peoples of
Pakistan and China and reaffirmed his desire for friendly political ties with Pakistan‖
ITATION Placeholder11 \p 3-6 \l 1033 (Khan S. a., Summer, 2013, pp. 3-6) . During the 12
days long visit of Premier Hussain Suhrawardy to China in October 1956, the Chinese premier
announced that Pakistan's membership of SEATO should not be considered as bar to friendly
relations between the two countries.
62
―At the conclusion of Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy visit the both primers in a joint statement
on October 1956 affirmed a further appreciation of their receptive problems" ITATION
Placeholder12 \p 45 \l 1033 (Khan U. A., Winter 2014, p. 45) . Two months later Chinese
premier Chou Enli paid a state visit to Pakistan and he remarked that there was no real conflict
of interest or friction and tension between the two countries. On account of these facts premier
Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy in February 1957 told at the National Assembly in Karachi that
Pakistan sought the friendship of China, and that during the time of any eventuality China
would support Pakistan in the shape of assistance. The importance of this official statement
noticed India whose leaders were still in the favor of slogan ―Hindi-China Bhai-Bhai‖
CITATION Cha62 \l 1033 (Chakravarti, 1962) .
4.2.1 Chinese support on Kashmir Issue
On the Kashmir issue in May 1957 China supported the stand of Pakistan for the settlement of
Kashmir problem according to United Nations resolution and bilateral negotiations. Premier
Choun Emli made clear that this was an imperialist design and Chinese support to Pakistan's
point of view on the issue of right of self-determination of the Muslim majority at Jammu and
Kashmir was not shift in Chinese foreign policy but as part of its policy to support the national
liberation movement CITATION Ahm13 \l 1033 (Rashid, 2013) . It is also a part of Chinese
policy against imperialism, colonialism, racism and expansionism in the world politics.
Indian naked illegal, immoral occupation of Kashmir emphasizes Pakistan to manage as well
formulate policy to gain support from world community. The history had proved that China
came forward to support Pakistan stand against stand of Indian expansionism. Keeping in
view of the Chinese stance on Kashmir the Afro-Asian nations also extended unqualified
supported to the justified cause of right of self-determination of the Kashmiris. Chinese
63
position on the Kashmir problem has contributed strength and justification in United Nations
because of her permanent seat at United Nations and in a capacity of member of Security
Council. Chinese support is based on the popular term or sovereignty, that sovereign people
run the state affairs without any kind of interference. Chinese support on the Kashmir issue is
an integral part of policy of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the affairs of other
states.
In Dec 1957, Malik Feroz Khan Noon formed seventh Government in Pakistan. He was
keenly interested to maintain sound political relations with China as previous regime were
inclined toward west. Addressing on Independence Day of Pakistan at London he remarked
―Pakistan Friendship with United State and Britain did not mean that it had any enmity against
communist countries" ITATION Placeholder11 \p 91 \l 1033 (Khan S. a., Summer, 2013, p.
91) .
On 7th October 1958 Martial law was imposed in Pakistan. The military regime announced
that new Government wanted to have cordial and friendly relations with all peace loving
countries. After October 1958 there was no change in the political relations between China
and Pakistan. President Ayoub remarked in the sixth session of ministerial level meeting of
the Baghdad pact ―We shall go on seeking peaceful arrangements, with all Nations of the
world specially with our neighbors‖ CITATION Chr14 \p 8 \l 1033 (Barber C. E., 2014, p.
8) .The above policy statement shows that there was no real conflict in Pak-China relations
due to changing of any regime in Pakistan and China.
Pakistan and China have many common bonds besides neighborhood. Common memories of
cultural contacts rooted in the ancient past can be traced down to the beginning of Islam.
Historical Chinese painting has left the positive effect on Pakistan because the Chinese
64
painting was model of Persian culture and art. The relations between Turkey Language
spoken in Sinkiang province and Urdu had been intimate in the past, even today Urdu can be
partly under stood in Sinkiang. Pakistan was amongst the first countries, that recognized
China in 1950 CITATION Wol83 \l 1033 (Wolf, 1983) . The China-Pakistan relations
started on low ebb as China was disappointed over latter‘s joining of the western military
alliances like South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) CITATION Bha96 \l 1033 (Bhatty, 1996) . Pakistan had expressed
its desire to foster friendly relations with China even before joining the SEATO.
The Bandung Conference 1955 provided Pakistan the opportunity to dispel Chinese mistrust
and to explain Pakistan‘s reasons for joining western alliances. Mohammad Ali, ―then
Pakistan‘s Prime Minister, took the occasion to personally assure Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
that Pakistan had no fear of aggression from China and it was an act to guard against Indian
threat‖ CITATION Bha96 \l 1033 (Bhatty, 1996) . On this occasion, Pakistan criticized
Soviet Union‘s expansionist policies and appreciated the Chinese policies. This dispelled the
Chinese government‘s misunderstanding and the Chinese Premier conceded that that
Pakistan‘s membership of ―SEATO should no way become a hurdle to friendly relations
between Pakistan and China‖ CITATION Nas11 \l 1033 (Naseer, 2011) .
In 1963, Pakistan and China signed a boundary agreement to demarcate the boundary between
Chinese region of Xinjiang and the contiguous areas, over which Indian government strongly
protested saying that ―there was no common border between Pakistan and the People‘s
Republic of China‖ CITATION Lam641 \p 299-312 \l 1033 (Lamb, 1964, pp. 299-312) ,
and described the decision as a step further in the China‘s aggressive aims towards India.
During the 1965 India-Pakistan War, China gave diplomatic, economic and moral support to
65
Pakistan and it was the ―Chinese ultimatum to India to dismantle its military works on the
Chinese side of the China-Sikkim border, which led to Security Council‘s urgent call for
ceasefire‖ CITATION Sim67 \l 1033 (Simon, 1967) .
During the 1971 India-Pakistani conflict, which led to dismemberment of Bangladesh from
Pakistan, China extended its complete diplomatic support to Pakistan and strongly condemned
India as an aggressor. ―China threatened to exercise its veto in favor of Pakistan and blocked
the entry of Bangladesh into UN in defense to Pakistan‘s demand of release of 90,000
prisoners of war by India‖ CITATION Tah73 \l 1033 (Tahir-kheli, 1973) . In the Post-Cold
War era, although Pakistan-China relations did undergo a slight shift, but the overall content
and strategic relevance remained as significant as ever. China still considers Pakistan an
important factor that can help it secure its strategic objectives CITATION Sin07 \l 1033
(Singh, 2007) .The historic bonds that existed between China and the Muslim lndian did not
finish when Muslims lost political power in the sub-continent. The cultural and commercial
relations between the two peoples continued to the British period in India CITATION Sid14
\l 1033 (Siddique, 2014) .
4.3 Geo-Strategic importance of China-Pakistan
China is Pakistan‘s powerful neighbor. ―The border of Sinkiang province of China meets
northern areas of Pakistan. The both countries have a common border; the boundary line has
been demarcated in arduous mountainous terrain. The borders of China meet with Gilgit and
other northern areas. The Pak-China relations are based on the principle of good
neighborhood. However, Pakistan and China have many common bonds besides
neighborhood" ITATION Placeholder13 \p 96 \l 1033 (Xulong, China-Pakistan community:
New starting point for a brighter future, 2014, p. 96) .
66
Map No 02 China and Pakistan
Source: www. Defence.pk
67
The Gwadar port would be the most viable option for these countries helping them to save
money as well as time in transporting their goods. As far as significance and implications of
the KKH, that runs through occupied Kashmir, for the Indian security are concerned,
CITATION Che04 \l 1033 (Chengappa, 2004) quotes Mahnaz Isphani: ―…No single highway
has run through such sensitive territory through an area, where the borders of Pakistan, India,
China, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan come close together. By traversing these lands, the
Karakoram Highway and its associated routes have posed threats and presented opportunities
to all states of the region…‖ CITATION Che04 \p 113 \l 1033 (Chengappa, 2004, p. 113) .
China has used the KKH as a form of ‗stadium diplomacy‘ that strengthened ties with the
enemy of its enemy. Although the route has yet to be used in wartime, CITATION Wil11 \l
1033 (Will, 2011) Pakistan and China have used it to send strong messages to their rivals and
neighbors. ―China has economic and strategic interest in Gwadar. Gwadar is expected to play
a key role in Beijing‘s development plans and will serve as a gateway for western China
because Xinjiang lies 4500 km from China‘s east coast but just 2500 km from Gwadar.
Pakistan can act as a transit facility giving China access to Central Asian markets and energy
sources‖ CITATION Kha06 \l 1033 (Khan M. , 2006) .
China is much concerned about the possibility of disruptions in the movement of oil and gas
tankers to China from the Gulf and Africa through the Malacca Straits due to attacks by
pirates and/or terrorists. For this reason, ―China wants to reduce its dependence on the
Malacca Straits and is making eminent efforts to develop alternate routes‖ CITATION Jos05
\l 1033 (Joseph, 2005) . ―Presence in Gwadar will allow China not only access and basing
facilities in the Indian Ocean but also the chance to control the Straits of Hormuz to ensure
smooth energy supplies from West Asia‖ CITATION Kap021 \l 1033 (Kapila, 2002) .
68
Pakistan has also agreed to let China set up a ―Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Gwadar,
exclusively for the use of Chinese industries manufacturing goods for export to Africa‖
CITATION Kum07 \p 757-790 \l 1033 (Kumar, 2007, pp. 757-790) . This would help
reducing the manufacturing and transport costs for Chinese goods. ―The Muslim rulers of the
Indo-Pak Sub-continent maintained diplomatic and commercial relations with China‖
ITATION Placeholder12 \l 1033 (Khan U. A., Winter 2014) .
4.3.1 China-Pakistan Strategic Relationship
Pakistan and China have signed a defense pact with the focus on joint defense research and
production. Exchange of high-level defense visits continues. In 1989, during the visit of
Chinese Premier Li Peng, China entered into agreement with Pakistan ―to assist with the
installation of a nuclear power station‖ CITATION Bha96 \p 183 \l 1033 (Bhatty, 1996, p.
183) . ―Pakistan and China signed The China-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Good-neighborly Relations, on April 5, 2005, ratified on January 4, 2006, which binds the two
nations to desist from joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity of the other side. It also forbids actions of similar nature by
both that include the conclusion of treaties of this nature with a third country‖ CITATION
Raj06 \l 1033 (Rajan, 2006) . It further emphasizes the significance of the treaty that ―As a
clear sign that the treaty would continue to occupy a key position in future bilateral relations,
the Joint Statement issued at Islamabad at the conclusion of Chinese President Hu Jintao‘s
visit to Pakistan, 23-26 November 2006, described it as one providing ‗an important legal
foundation for the Strategic Partnership‘ between Pakistan and China‖ CITATION Raj06 \l
1033 (Rajan, 2006) .
69
China has been associated with Pakistan‘s economic development now for decades. The
projects completed with Chinese assistance include the KKH and the Chashma-I nuclear
power station, the machine tool factory, and many others. The ―projects now underway with
Chinese assistance include the Chashma-II nuclear power, the second phase of the Gwadar
port, the Saindak copper mines development, the Gomal Zam dam and several oil and gas
exploration schemes. On the whole, China is involved in more than 100 on-going projects in
Pakistan. In the defense field, they have jointly developed the JF-17, a fighter aircraft, while
MiG‘s, tanks, artillery, frigates and other Chinese arms form a significant part of Pakistan‘s
armory‖ CITATION Kha06 \l 1033 (Khan M. , 2006) .
4.3.2 Ideological basis of Friendship
Both the People‘s Republic of China and Islamic Republic of Pakistan are ideological states,
the former proclaimed its socialist ideology on Oct 1949 resulting in Chinese civil war. The
later came into being with an Islamic ideology as result of partition of British India into two
dominions, which later became India and Pakistan. "The ideological gap, despite the
difference of ideology, has termed both countries into strong adherents to their causes and
principles, giving their foreign policies a considerably ideologist content which has militated
over the years against easy compromise despite the heavy sacrifices that they had to make in
the pursuit of respective aims and objectives‖ ITATION Placeholder14 \p 6 \l 1033 (Khan
A. U., Pak-China relations: Adding substance to slogans, Summer 2013, p. 6) . ―Chinese
relations with Pakistan have been proved to be reliable and tasted friend of Pakistan. She has
given generous, timely military and economic assistance to Pakistan‖. ITATION
Placeholder12 \p 46 \l 1033 (Khan U. A., Winter 2014, p. 46) . Thus, the relation between
70
Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan are deeply rooted in history, geography, politics,
economy and cultural CITATION Spe14 \l 1033 (Weidong, 2014) .
It is vital for Pakistan to maintain friendly relations with China to strengthen Asian Unity.
China has supported Pakistan's point of view ―on the issue of Kashmir; Chinese stand is based
on right of self-determination and called several times India as an aggressor. Chinese people
always attached a great value to their friendship with Pakistani people. It has been developed
in the common struggle against imperialist and expansionist aggression and intervention"
ITATION Placeholder13 \p 96 \l 1033 (Xulong, China-Pakistan community: New starting
point for a brighter future, 2014, p. 96) . In fact, the relations between China and Pakistan
have been very amicable for the last three decades. China has intimate relations with Pakistan
as well as with the other major powers. The ties between two countries were time tasted and
everlasting. The geographic changes on the international scene had never affected. Pakistan
had lauded the Chinese support and cooperation in all spheres of life. ―The both powers
adhere different social orders. However, Pakistan and China have a great deal in common‖
ITATION Placeholder13 \l 1033 (Xulong, China-Pakistan community: New starting point for
a brighter future, 2014) .
4.3.3 Trade Relations between Pakistan and China
The customary Sino-Pakistan fellowship of 65 years now has another target—to enhance the
monetary substance of their relationship, which includes exchange, venture and vitality co-
task inside a respective system. The after-effect of this assurance to execute the new monetary
motivation is noticeable in the quantum of Chinese interest in Pakistan. Nonetheless, there are
signs that the exchange motivation might be excessively eager or necessities a bigger
rebuilding of the Pakistani economy that will require some investment since it requires
71
execution of arrangement changes joined with cooperation in these activities from the
business group of Pakistan. While speculation basically benefits Pakistan, exchange gives
China access to another market for its merchandise. It will in the long run do likewise for
Pakistan. Vitality co-activity will profit China as it will access vitality supplies through
Gwadar port, a backup course of action to the one through the Malacca straits, and will serve
to build up its western areas. Pakistan has thus picked up from the vast scale foundation
advancement that has occurred in Gwadar and will keep on doing so once tentative
arrangements make progress
Karakorum highway is an all-weather trade route/road between Pakistan and China. It was a
hazardous jab and about 15000 Chinese and Pakistanis toilers including engineers completed
this enterprise in 20 years. It was 774 km long highway through 16,072 ft high mountains
CITATION Kha13 \l 1033 (Khan R. , 2013) . It gave China greater eminence and prestige in
Pakistan and also access to Arabian seaport of Karachi. ―The opening of this highway boosted
trade between Pakistan and China and established important link between the two countries,
to be used in case of emergency. The strategic importance of this highway is very obvious. It
links, Xinjiang with Tibet, through the Aksai China. In case of any attack on Pakistan by Sea,
military aid from China can reach Pakistan through this rout. The Karakoram road has become
an important life line between Pakistan and China and helped in the economic and social up
lift to the backward regions, and paved the way for the development of natural resources in its
vicinity. By virtue of the opening of this road the bilateral economic cooperation between
Pakistan and China especially between Xinjiang and northern areas has increased‖ ITATION
Placeholder15 \l 1033 (Khan A. U., 2014) .
72
During President Musharraf‘s visit to China in 2001, the total aid package extended to
Pakistan by the Chinese government was about 350 million dollars, both in terms of grant and
loan. The Chinese government extended 100 million dollars grant to Pakistan for various
projects. An amount of 200 million dollars was made available for concessional financing. In
addition, there were several projects totaling 260 million dollars with Chinese funding. These
included a hydel power station, sub-stations for Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA) and transmission lines CITATION Daw05 \l 1033 (Dawn, 2005) . An MoU was
signed during Prime Minister Aziz's visit to China in 2004 on a protocol on Preferential Trade
Agreement. During a meeting of senior officials of China's state-run Shenhua Group with
Prime Minister Aziz in Beijing, it was decided to start the Thar coal power project as early as
possible. ―Most importantly, the two sides reviewed progress on the 40 million-dollar Gwadar
port project‖ CITATION Daw05 \l 1033 (Dawn, 2005) .
73
Table No 02 Volume of Pakistan-China Bilateral Trade
Source: Fazal-ur-Rahman, Pakistan-China economic relations: Opportunities and
challenges/Strategic Studies, Vol.26, no.2.
74
4.3.4 Political Relations
High-level visits between the two countries are frequent. Underneath the positive statements
lies a genuine desire to strengthen relations, notably in the field of defense. The extent of
potential economic cooperation, however, is frequently overstated. These two areas have been
the primary focus of different visits. The detail of the visits are as below:
―May 1951: China and Pakistan established diplomatic relations.
April 1955: Premier Zhou Enlai held talks with Pakistan Prime Minister
Mohammad Ali Bogra during the Bandung Conference, and both sides agreed
to strengthen their bilateral ties.
October 1956: At the invitation of the Chinese government, Prime Minister
Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy paid an official visit to China.
December 1956: Premier Zhou Enlai visited Pakistan.
January 1963: China and Pakistan signed their first trade agreement.
March 1963: The two countries signed a boundary agreement on China's
Xinjiang province and the adjacent areas whose defense is under the actual
control of Pakistan.
February 1964: Premier Zhou Enlai visited Pakistan.
December 1964: President Ayub Khan visited China.
November 1970: President Yahya Khan visited China.
May 1980: President Zia-ul-Haq visited China.
October 1982: The Pakistan-China Joint Committee of Economy, Trade and
Technology was set up.
February 1989: Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited China.
75
November 1989: Premier Li Peng visited Pakistan.
December 1996: Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to Pakistan,
during which the two countries decided to establish a comprehensive
partnership.
May 2001: Premier Zhu Rongji visited Pakistan.
December 2001: President Pervez Musharraf paid a state visit to China.
March 2003: Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali paid an official visit
to China.
November 2003: President Hu Jintao held talks with President Musharraf in
Beijing.
December 2004: President Hu Jintao met Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in
Beijing.
April 2005: Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan.
February 2006: President Musharraf paid a visit to China.
November 2006: President Hu Jintao paid an official visit to Pakistan. Free
Trade Agreement was signed during the visit.
April 2007: Prime Minister Aziz visited China‖ CITATION htt07 \l 1033
(http://news.xinhuanet.com, 2007) .
February 2010: Pakistan foreign minister, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi,
visited China. Both sides discussed their willing to step-up cooperation in
various fields with a view to jointly upholding regional peace and stability.
May 2010: China‘s defense minister visited Pakistan. Three MoUs were
concluded that aimed at enhancing Pakistan‘s capabilities to fight terror. The
76
two sides agreed to hold joint military exercises; China said it would provide
four trainer aircraft for the Pakistan Air Force and Yuan60m for training
Pakistan‘s military. They also stressed the aim of forging a ―comprehensive
strategic partnership‖.
June 2010: Chinese Vice premier, Zhang Deijang, visited Pakistan. Talks
began in relation to Pakistan buying at least three Chinese submarines.
July 2010: Pakistan‘s president, Asif Ali Zardari, visited China. Talks and
agreements focused on economic cooperation, regional connectivity, energy
and security. China pledged to provide Yuan50m to Pakistan. MoUs were
signed in health and agriculture, and for the geological survey.
November 2010: Asif Ali Zardari visited China for the 16th Asian Games and
called for Chinese investment.
December 2010: China‘s premier, Wen Jiabao, along with 250 business leaders
visited Pakistan for a state visit. He committed to investment reportedly worth
US$30bn in sectors such as railways and renewable energy. 2011 was declared
―Pakistan-China Friendship Year‖, a ―Pakistan-China Friendship Centre was
inaugurated and 35 MoUs were signed. While the West is seen to frequently
focus on Pakistan‘s reluctance to tackle militant groups, Wen Jiabao
emphasized China‘s appreciation for its sacrifices in counter-terrorism.
2011 – Pakistan is expected to buy air-to-air SD 10 missiles from China for its
250 JF 17 thunder fighter fleet.
―2013 – On 24th
December 2013, China announced a commitment $6.5 billion
to finance the construction of a major nuclear power project in HYPERLINK
77
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karachi" \o "Karachi" Karachi , the project
which will have two reactors with a capacity of 1,100 megawatts each.
2014 – On 8 November 2014, Pakistan and China signed 19 agreements
particularly relating to HYPERLINK "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China
%E2%80%93Pakistan_Economic_Corridor" \o "China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor" China–Pakistan Economic Corridor , China pledged a total
investment worth of $42 billion. While Pakistan pledged to help China in its
fight concerning the HYPERLINK "https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Xinjiang_
conflict " \o "Xinjiang conflict" Xinjiang conflict ‖ CITATION LiC14 \l 1033
(Li, 2014) .
4.3.5 Economic Cooperation
China is world‘s second largest economy after United States. It has been largest exporter and
second largest importer of goods in the world. In 2011, ―China‘s exports were US$ 1.9 trillion
and imports $1.7 trillion. China‘s total trade was more than US$ 3.6 trillion and its foreign
direct investment was US$ 65 billion‖ CITATION Kat14 \l 1033 (Kataria, 2014) .
In November 2006, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Pakistan. Both states signed Free
Trade Agreement on 24th
November 2006. The FTA has very importance not only in the field
of economy but also in strategic relations. ―It became very significant when signed between
two friendly states. Pakistan gave market access to China in cotton, bed linen, marble, sports
goods, fruits, vegetables and other raw materials. China also gave access to Pakistan in
chemicals, organic, machinery, fishery, plastic, rubber, and leather produce, and industrial
machinery etc‖ CITATION Riz04 \l 1033 (Rizvi, 2004) .
78
4.3.6 China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
Regional connectivity is an important element of the recently unveiled Vision 2025 of the
Government of Pakistan. ―The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is mentioned as an
integral element in realizing the potential of regional connectivity and trade with the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), and the
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). On his part, Chinese President Xi Jinping also
proposed forging China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny‖ CITATION Che141 \l 1033
(Chen, 5-6 August, 2014) during his meeting with President of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain
on February 19, 2014.―According to Chinese analysts, the Pak-China Economic Corridor
(CPEC) serves as the backbone of President Xi‘s proposal. President Xi‘s foreign policy
concept of Community of Shared Destiny is predicated on cooperation for mutual benefit
with certain key characteristics; the most important one being the pursuit of common
interests through mutually beneficial partnerships” CITATION Kha131 \l 1033 (Khan
U. A., 2013) .
4.4 Practicalities of Cooperation Framework for CPEC
There are strong bilateral trade relations between Pakistan and China. Currently around $12
billion per year trade between the two countries is estimated to reach $15 billion in the next
couple of years. The ―volume of bilateral trade between Pakistan and China from January to
May 2014 was $6 billion, exhibiting a 12.66 percent growth rate. China also has substantial
investments in Pakistan with more than 120 Chinese companies operating in the country. The
79
importance of Chinese investment in Pakistan is well acknowledged by the leadership of
Pakistan‖ CITATION Bar14 \l 1033 (Barber C. E., 2014) .
In May 2013, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited Pakistan to sign the landmark CPEC
agreement. Prime Minister of Pakistan ―Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif visited China in July
2013, his first official visit abroad since assumption of the office. In February2014, President
of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain, visited China wherein Chinese President Xi Jinping put
forward the proposal of forging China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny‖ CITATION
Che141 \l 1033 (Chen, 5-6 August, 2014) . President Mamnoon Hussain visited China once
again in May 2014 to attend the 4th summit of the ―Conference on Interaction and
Confidence-Building Measures‖ in Asia. Prime Minister Sharif visited China again in April
2014 to attend the Asia Forum in Boao in April 2014. ―President Xi Jinping was scheduled to
visit Islamabad in September 2014, but the visit was postponed due to political crisis and
protest demonstrations in Islamabad. The postponement was compensated for when Prime
Minister Sharif visited China again in November 2014‖ CITATION Kha14 \l 1033 (Khan U.
A., China goes West: Reviving the Silk Route, 2014) .
Several important agreements have been signed ―between the two countries in these high-
level state visits. According to one estimate, the total number of agreements signed between
the two countries exceeds 250 with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good
Neighborly Relations signed in 2005 providing the foundation for recent developments‖
CITATION Sha07 \l 1033 (Shabir, 2007) . ―Many important agreements of this long list were
signed during the recent visits of high-level state leaders mentioned above. Eight cooperation
agreements were signed during PM Sharif‘s July visit to China. A broad agreement for the
Pak-China economic corridor was among them. Another of the agreements was for laying a
80
fiber-optic cable from the Chinese border to Rawalpindi for improving Pakistan‘s access to
international communications networks with 85 percent financing coming from China over
the three-year period of the $44 million project‖ CITATION But15 \l 1033 (Butt, 2015) .
Pakistan and China signed five agreements in the fields of economy and trade, regional
connectivity, ―energy and people- to-people contacts during President Mamnoon Hussain‘s
China visit in February 20l4‖ CITATION Hai14 \l 1033 (Haider, 2014) .
Map No 03 CPEC
Source: www.Pakistantoday.com.pk
81
The CPEC is a multidimensional project encompassing Pak-China connectivity through road
and railway networks, lying down of fiber-optic cables, the operationalization of the Gwadar
Port, and several energy projects. ―Chinese cooperation for the construction of the Diamer-
Bhasha Dam and the completion of the Nandipur power project are also part of the CPEC.
Implementation of the projects under the CPEC has been divided into three phases. Short-term
projects were estimated to be completed by 2017; medium- term by 2025, and long-term by
2030. Oversight of the implementation of the projects under the CPEC was given to a high-
level Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) on implementation of the agreement on 20 July
2013. The JCC met for the first time on August 27, 2013‖ CITATION Kee14 \l 1033 (Shirk,
2008) .
4.5 The proposed Strategy and Development
Early harvest projects related to transport and communication infrastructure under the CPEC
include: the rehabilitation and realignment of the Raikot-Islamabad section of the KKH; the
construction of Karachi-Lahore Motorway; the construction of ―Orange Line Metro Train in
Lahore; the upgrading of the existing railway track from Karachi to Peshawar; the
development of dry port and cargo holding facilities in Havelian; the construction of East Bay
Expressway in Gwadar; the construction of Gwadar International Airport; t he
construction of breakwaters at the port; the designing of berthing areas and channels at the
port, the infrastructure for Export Processing Zones and port-related industries in Gwadar; the
construction of necessary facilities for freshwater treatment and supply in Gwadar; and the
construction of a hospital and a vocational training institute in Pakistan‖ ITATION
Placeholder15 \l 1033 (Khan A. U., 2014) .
82
The overall scope of the CPEC is much broader than the early harvest projects. For instance,
as mentioned above, the construction of the Diamer Bhasha dam is part of the CPEC in the
field of energy cooperation. ―There are also two other coal-based power projects under the
CPEC in Gaddani and Sahiwal. In the field of transport infrastructure, the construction of a
new rail link from Gwadar to Jacobabad via Besima and Khuzdar is also part of the CPEC‖
CITATION Faz06 \l 1033 (Fzal-ur-Rahman, 2006) .
4.5.1 Roads
The Karakoram Highway (KKH), that connects Pakistan with China across the 4,693 meters
(15,397 feet) high Khunjerab Pass on the Pak-China border, was completed in 1979.
Rehabilitation and realignment of the ―highway is an important component of road
construction projects under the CPEC. Starting from the town of Hasanabdal in Attock district
of Punjab adjacent to Rawalpindi, the 806 km-long KKH goes all the way to the Chinese
border‖ CITATION Sad14 \l 1033 (Sadaqat, 2014) . Barber elaborates more details; ―The
rehabilitation of the Hunza-Raikot section of the KKH had already been completed before the
signing of the CPEC agreement. The CPEC envisages the rehabilitation and realignment of
the Raikot-Islamabad section of the KKH. The focus of the CPEC is on the rehabilitation of
the existing route of KKH with only minor realignments to avoid certain landslide-prone areas
or some sharp turns at least up to Mansehra from where the Burhan-Mansehra Motorway
would connect it with Islamabad as an alternative route‖ CITATION Chr14 \l 1033 (Barber
C. E., 2014) .
One strange anomaly of the CPEC is that while the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha Dam is
part of it, the required large-scale realignment of the KKH due to the presence of the reservoir
is not being considered at the moment. ―The 7.5 million-acre feet water reservoir of the
83
Diarner-Bhasha Dam could submerge 100 km of the highway. The Ministry of Planning,
Development, and Reform, which is taking the lead on the CPEC, insists that the cost of any
realignment of the KKH caused by the reservoir will have to be borne by the Ministry of
Water and Power that would in turn take the lead in constructing the dam, as and when
required‖ CITATION Ahm131 \l 1033 (Ahmed A. , 2013) .
The KKH would be connected with the road network of Pakistan through the existing
Islamabad-Peshawar Motorway (called M-l) at Burhan. M- 1 will be connected with the
Islamabad-Lahore Motorway (called M-2) while another network of highways and motorways
will connect it with Gwadar and Karachi. Another important element of the road network of
the CPEC is, thus: ―the Lahore-Karachi Motorway that would connect Lahore with Karachi
via Khanewal, Multan, Sukkur, Khairpur and Dadu. Work is already near completion on the
Lahore-Multan section of the motorway, while land has been acquired for the Multan-Sukkur
and Sukkur-Dadu sections. There is an existing motorway (called M-7) between Dadu and
Karachi that would be connected with the new Multan-Dadu Motorway. As for the connection
with Gwadar, a new Motorway called M-8 is under construction from Nodero near Sukkur to
Gwadar. During a meeting in August 2013, the Prime Minister also asked for the provision of
interconnectivity between various road networks of the country, i.e. between the Motorways,
the Indus Highway, and the GT Road for instance. Interconnectivity projects are not part of
the CPEC though‖ CITATION Ran15 \l 1033 (Ranjan, 2015) .
84
Figure No 01 Planned Alignment Of The Cpec Road Network
Source: globalsecurity.org
85
4.5.2 Railways
Supplementing the road link between China and Pakistan with a rail link is another essential
ingredient of the CPEC. There is no doubt that this added connection will greatly benefit the
connectivity project. On June 21 last year, ―Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Muhammad
Nawaz Sharif called for ‗out-of-the-box‘ ways for building a rail-link between Pakistan and
China at a meeting in his office. He proposed starting work early on the upgrading of existing
railway tracks up to Havelian in Abbottabad district. The keen personal interest of the prime
minister is, perhaps, one of the reasons that the upgrading of the existing railway track from
Karachi to Peshawar, and the development of a dry port and cargo handling facility in
Havelian are two early harvest projects of the CPEC‖ CITATION Ran15 \l 1033 (Ranjan,
2015) .
A 23-member delegation of Chinese railways experts visited Pakistan in October 2014 for a
feasibility study. The feasibility assessment was aimed at the prospective investment of about
$3.5 billion for ―replacement of rail tracks over 375km, deep screening of ballast over 1,260
km, conversion of unmanned level-crossing into underpasses at 50 places, conversion of
manned level-crossing into flyovers at 250 places, realignment of 40 big curves, strengthening
of 500 bridges and doubling a 438km track at various places between Shahdara and
Peshawar‖ CITATION Sum14 \p 7 \l 1033 (Sumra, 2014, p. 7) . The feasibility assessment
is scheduled to be completed by the end of February 20l5. A medium-term project for a new
rail link from Gwadar to Jacobabad via Besima and ―Khuzdar connection is also on the cards
but its implementation has not been started yet. While a lot of excitement has been generated
in the media about establishing a bullet-train link between Karachi and Peshawar, it is not
planned under the CPEC. Perhaps, the upgradation of the Karachi-Peshawar rail link (called
86
ML- 1) would help in slightly improving the speeds of trains plying on that route. As the
Director/General Manager of Sinotec Song Shuangping, a Chinese company operating in
Pakistan for about a decade, envisioned electric passenger trains running up to speeds of 180
km/hr and goods trains with speeds of 120 km/h in an interview‖ CITATION Sum14 \l 1033
(Sumra, 2014) .
4.5.3 Gwadar Seaport
Development of the Gwadar seaport is the foundation on which smooth functioning of the
CPEC will depend. Therefore, all the projects under the CPEC related to Gwadar are priority
projects. According to the ―CPEC plan, the construction of the Eastbay Expressway,
completion of the Gwadar International Airport, construction of breakwaters, and dredging of
berthing areas and channels are to be completed by 2017‖ CITATION Bha15 \l 1033
(Bhattacharjee, 2015) . Similarly, ―the integrated development of Gwadar, that includes:
infrastructure for the export processing zone and port related industries, necessary facilities
for fresh water treatment and supply, and construction of a coal-based power plant, a hospital,
and a vocational training institute are to be completed within the same time frame
CITATION Chi14 \l 1033 (China to invest $ 1.8 bn in Gwadar projects, 2014) . In March
2014, Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) Chairman Dostain Khan Jamaldini shared with the media
after a three-day visit of CEO of COPHCL, Zeng Qing Song, that the company was planning
on investing $775 million in the city‖ CITATION Bha15 \l 1033 (Bhattacharjee, 2015) .
Pakistan is essentially interested in the project to gain strategic leverage in order to minimize
its vulnerability against the dominant Indian Navy. ―The construction of the port and the
highway will give a boost to the domestic economic development of Pakistan by making it a
regional hub for commercial traffic, which can influence the geostrategic environment of the
87
region. Pakistan will earn significant profits in transit fees, as the port will enable the transfer
of Central Asia's vast energy resources to world markets. It will also help Pakistan in setting
things in Baluchistan in order by attracting considerable investment into Baluchistan and,
subsequently, turning it into a hub of economic activity‖ CITATION Sia14 \l 1033 (Sial,
2014) . Furthermore, discussions are underway to designate Gwadar port as a free trade zone.
With special incentives extended to Chinese companies, the Pakistani business community
advocates the eventual designation of Gwadar port as an export processing zone.
The existing misgivings between Kabul and Islamabad can be removed with the inception of
international trade through Gwadar, as it will create new stakeholders in Afghanistan,
avoiding conflict with its eastern neighbor by becoming beneficiaries of the transit trade to
Central Asia. This, in turn, can be expected to act as a catalyst for normalizing the situation in
war-torn Afghanistan and as an incentive for harmonizing Pakistan's relations with its
neighbor. Gwadar, thus, presents an opportunity to Pakistan for promoting good relations in
the region, especially to its immediate north-west.
4.5.4 Defense Cooperation
China is considered to be Pakistan's most trusted and enduring military ally. After the 1965
Pakistan-India war, Pakistan and China realized the importance of their bilateral defense
cooperation and from then onwards, China has been supporting Pakistan to build a strong
military and defense infrastructure. Both the countries have established strong defense ties and
cooperated with each other in every possible area in this regard. Several joint military
exercises have also been conducted by ―Pakistan and China with the recent ones in August
2004 and an eight-day joint exercise in December 2006‖ CITATION Zha06 \l 1033 (Zhang,
2006) . There are many indications that not only are the respective governments of the two
88
countries engaged in close defense cooperation, but the two militaries have also established
strong links. The main motive of the two states behind this close collaboration is to counter
India's increasing influence in the region and to maintain the balance of power in South Asia.
China provided assistance to Pakistan in setting up facilities at the Heavy Rebuild Factory
(HRF) at Taxila, which, in the 1980s, started license production of the state-of-the-art Chinese
T-69 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs). Later, a protocol was signed between China and Pakistan to
set up facilities for the license production of Chinese T-69 II BMPs (Boyevaya Mashina
Pekhoty,an in fantry fighting vehicle). China's Norinco has also helped ―Pakistan in the
manufacture of Chinese T-69 and T-85 II MBTs and M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers.
Similarly, the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra was established with Chinese
assistance. The F-6 Rebuild Factory was established as a turnkey project by China, which
became operational in November 1980‖ ITATION Placeholder15 \l 1033 (Khan A. U., 2014)
.
4.5.5 Nuclear Technology
In 1993, China and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to
apply IAEA safeguards to a Chinese nuclear power station sold to Pakistan (INFCIRC/418). It
was alleged that Chinese assistance in the construction of a 40 MW reactor at Khushab could
provide Pakistan with plutonium for its nuclear program. However, both China and Pakistan
rejected all those allegations, making it clear that their nuclear cooperation is only for peaceful
purposes. The nuclear deal reached between India and the US on March 2006, was viewed as
a security threat by both Pakistan and China in the region. Pakistan made earnest efforts to
convince Washington to conclude a similar nuclear deal with Islamabad. Once the US made it
clear that no such deal was possible with Pakistan, Islamabad turned towards Beijing to rule
89
out a possible conventional imbalance in the region. China had already been helping Pakistan
in building initial nuclear weapons designs and the development of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons complex; Pakistan's short and medium range solid fuel missile technology; and in the
development of Pakistan's Land Attack Cruise Missile, tested in 2005. China maintained its
civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan to help meet latter's growing energy needs. ―An
agreement to further deepen cooperation in peaceful application of nuclear power' was signed
during President Musharraf‘s visit to China in February 2006‖ CITATION RIA15 \l 1033
(RIAZ, 2015) .
4.5.6 Energy Sector Cooperation
China agreed to help Pakistan to set up another 300MW nuclear power plant at Chashma,
during Prime Minister Jamali‘svisit to China in March 2003. The emphasis on making
Pakistan an energy and trade corridor for the region was consolidated at a high-level meeting
in April 2006, ―where both countries agreed to increase cooperation in the energy sector,
promising to give China access to the gas and oil resources of Central and West Asia. An
MoU was signed on building this energy corridor, and it was suggested that China should
build direct pipelines to Karachi or Gwadar, which would be the shortest route for ensuring a
stable and fast supply of oil to China. Both countries also exchanged letters for the utilization
of 150 million dollars from the preferential buyers' credit for the Chashma-II Nuclear Power
Plant when Prime Minister Aziz visited China in 2004‖ CITATION Kum07 \l 1033 (Kumar,
2007) .
The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) will also get its share. And it‘s not
only Pakistan; the five Central Asian states-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the countries rich in oil, gas, coal, agricultural land, gold,
90
copper, uranium, are also targeted. ―There‘s a new highway from Kashgar to Osh, in
Kyrgyzstan, and a new railway between Urumqi and Almaty, in Kazakhstan. We maybe a
long way away from new high-speed Silk Rail, but trade between, for in- stance, the mega
cities of Chongqing or Chengdu in Sichuan with Germany now moves in only 20 days; that‘s
15 days less than the sea route. So, it‘s no wonder a special leading group was setup by
Beijing to oversee everything going on in the galaxy. The crucial action plan is here. Those
who‘re about to go silk, we salute you‖ CITATION Swa15 \l 1033 (Swaine, 2015) .
The development of common mutual friendship has developed from strengthen to strength.
Both countries had adopted a philosophy of world peace, friendship with China has been a
cordial principle of foreign policy of Pakistan; her relations with China have continued to
expand and remained based on mutual trust and confidence. China has continuously supported
Pakistan‘s Economic policies. The material and technical aid that she continues to extend is
important to strengthen Pakistan's security and economy. It is viral for Pakistan to maintain
friendly relations with China to strengthen Asian Unity. Pakistan and China have common
factor antipathy towards India CITATION Swa15 \l 1033 (Swaine, 2015) .
4.5.7 Factors for Smooth Relations
The common factor and interest between the two traditional friends is their common
apprehensions related to India because India holds aggressive designs in the region as nuclear
giant. Pakistan and China's common antipathy towards India has kept their relations intact.
Keeping in view of the security concern in order to maintain a balance of power in South
Asia, China as nuclear giant in the region is not security risk for Pakistan. On account of such
feature there is complete understanding between the two traditional friends. The Sino Pakistan
friendship has been consolidated and enhanced continuously despite the changing
91
international conditions. Such lasting friendship is result of enduring efforts by the two
governments and peoples. Both countries attached great importance to the development of
their friendship because it not only confirms to the region but also in the world. China always
pursues an independent foreign policy for peace and solidarity and co-operation with the third
world. ―The same path and stance had been adopted by Pakistan. This factor has kept Pak-
China friendship as more effective and assertive‖ CITATION Soh10 \l 1033 (Soherwordi,
2010) .
The Pak-China relations are time tasted in the events of difficulties. The Pak-China relations
are working in the best principles of a good neighbor‖, who continues full support to Pakistan
against all forces of war and expansion. ―Pak-China relations are being developed
continuously in different areas like military economic, political and cultural shapes. Further
more different factors are also counted, which provide base for Pak-China friendly relations,
however, discussion shall not be useful, fruitful and helpful for further studies without
counting these factors in detail therefore, these areas of corporation separately,
chronologically and in detail are being discussed to achieve our purpose‖ CITATION Soh10
\l 1033 (Soherwordi, 2010) .
4.5.8 The Seating of China in the World body and Pakistan's Stance
The seating of communist China in the United Nations was significant issue in international
politics. China represents communist ideology; it was against the west. After defeat of the
Nationalist elements in China, the nationalist regime of Taiwan was representative in United
Nations with the support of United States of America, which opposed the entry of the
People‘s Republic of China. Pakistan stood firmly in the favor of Mao. Sir Zafarullah Khan,
Foreign minister speaking in the session of General Assembly said. ―China is not applying for
92
admission to the United Nations. It is a member state, a permanent member of the security
council‖. In late sixties Pakistan opposed a ―15-member draft resolution in the general
assembly affirmed a decision that proposed to change the representation of China was an
important Question, acquiring two third majority‖ CITATION Wan11 \p 121 \l 1033 (Rong
W. , jan, 2011, p. 121) .
4.6 Issues between China and Pakistan
In September 1959 Pakistan received a Chinese map showing some parts of Hunza as part of
Chinese area. The mountain area in glaciers lay east of 75% longitude and north of 36.5,0
latitude. The Chinese lines began at Makita and set mean Kita Pass below the point where the
Afghan, Pakistan and China boundaries met, came to down to Shimshal pass, and turned East
towards Tibet CITATION Koc95 \l 1033 (Kocs, 1995) . October 23, 1959 President of
Pakistan Ayoub Khan announced to settle the border friction with China. In 1960 Pakistan
changed her policy in favor of socialist bloc especially with China. In early sixties president
Ayoub Khan visiting United States of America announced China should occupy her position
in United Nations. China was impressed at the action of Pakistan moral support for setting in
United Nations. ―Finally, the Border agreement was concluded between two neighbors for the
promotion of friendly relations‖ CITATION Ant05 \l 1033 (Antkiewicz, 2005) .
Pakistan and China both share security, military and economic concerns. Promoting and
strengthening traditional and cooperative relations with China is an important element of
Pakistan‘s foreign policy from the security perspective. China and Pakistan have common
perceptions on the international scenario and global strategic trends. China is the only major
power that shares Pakistan‘s concerns regarding Indian regional ambitions. Both have
93
concerns regarding India‘s nuclear policy. Pakistan fully supports China‘s vision of multipolar
world. Both support a just equitable international economic order and reform of the
international financial system. Although a smaller nation, Pakistan rivals India in
unconventional weapons. Above all, India has deputed 500,000 to 700,000 troops in the
Kashmir Valley for the past fifteen years. By keeping hundreds and thousands of Indian
troops engaged in Kashmir, ―Pakistan indirectly helps ease India's challenge to China‘s
defenses on their disputed borders. Given the reality of India-Pakistani suspicion and hostility,
a strong Pakistan means that India must keep the bulk of its armed forces deployed on its
western border‖ CITATION Gar05 \l 1033 (Garver, 2005) .
The pro-west military alliances and induction of Pakistan in those alliances 1954-1959
Pakistan became a party of military alliances, which were completely pro-west in nature. The
prime object of such military alliances was against communism and to stop the wave of
communism in Asia in general and South East Asia particular. Such designs of alliances/pacts
were against China CITATION Cho75 \l 1033 (Choudhury, 1975) . More over Pakistan's tilt
was towards west to counter and check the growing influence of radical communism and to
get military aid from west against the Indian expansionism. Since 1954-59 China supported
the policy of nonaligned, India having a track record of anti-imperialist and against aligned
Pakistan. The rise of China on the horizon of Asia as communist giant posed a serious setback
for western economic and political interest in South Asia. In the early fifties United States of
America started looking for allies in Asia, who could stand up and be counted with her in cold
war CITATION Placeholder16 \p 7 \l 1033 (Ahmed S. , 2013, p. 7) .
The Peking regime remarked that those Asian countries, that had joined those military pacts
they would only serve to tighten the United States grip on them. Pakistan made it clear that
94
her entry in the military pacts is not against China and also there was no aggression from
Chinese side. In 1956 Chaou-Enlai was the first premier who visited Pakistan. On the eve of
his visit both sides reaffirmed that there was difference in Social order and economic system
but these differences should not stand as gulf for the mutual and cordial relations between the
two immediate neighbors. Importance should be given to commercial and cultural relations
between the two friends. In spite of difference of opinion between China and Pakistan because
of security pacts there emerged no real conflict and their relations remained cool and normal.
―Pakistan inclined was to western security alliances and changed her policy of nonaligned and
pursued the path of security arrangements i.e. SEATO and CENTO‖ ITATION
Placeholder14 \l 1033 (Khan A. U., Pak-China relations: Adding substance to slogans,
Summer 2013) .
There were manifold reasons for joining of pro west alliances.
Security threat posed by India
Economic aid from west
Military aid from west for the protection of territorial integrity and political
independence.
Pakistan‘s admission/induction in the pro-western oriented pacts was clear change in its
foreign policy conduct. In years 1954-55 such dramatic change paved the way in the minds of
Chinese authorities as reaction against Pakistan and China remarked about these alliances as
''Aggressive‖ and "Hostile‖. ―The Chinese premier Mr. Chau-Enlai found the sole objectives
of establishing the organizations as to obtain a new military spring boards and bases‖
CITATION Placeholder17 \p 8 \l 1033 (Jawad R. , 2013, p. 8) . The Chinese leaders
regarded these above-mentioned pacts against the security of India and other Asian states.
95
This clearly shows that these pacts are directed not only against the socialist countries but are
in the first place also threat to such independent neighboring countries as India, China and
Afghanistan. These military pacts were considered threatening peace and security in Asia
CITATION Placeholder16 \l 1033 (Ahmed S. , 2013) .
The security situation in Pakistan would remain a major issue in the way of realizing the full
potential of the CPEC. ―Such is the level of anxiety in China vis-à-vis Pakistan‘s security that
the Chinese authorities closed the Pak-China border for trade and traffic owing to security
concerns during China‘s Independence Day celebrations in the first week of October 2013.
Therefore, if any trade will take place between Pakistan and China or between China and the
rest of the world through Pakistan, security of the CPEC will have to be a priority. As far as
the security of the CPEC‘s connectivity infrastructure is concerned, the motorway from
Gwadar to Ratodero (the M-8) is particularly tricky‖ CITATION Rin13 \l 1033 (Rind, 2013)
.
Violent incidents are reported from other districts of Pakistan in KPK, Punjab, and Sindh. The
planners of the CPEC have actually opted for a longer ―alignment of the road network,
avoiding the relatively shorter trajectory of linking Gwadar with the KKH via the Indus
Highway that goes through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), because of security concerns. Some
analysts have voiced their opinions against bypassing the shorter route. They argue that it
would deprive these marginalized areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan from much
needed economic development. There was also a debate in the Senate in June 2014 about the
CPEC route in which certain senators criticized the bypassing of the Pashtun and Baloch areas
in connection with the CPEC‖ CITATION Drr13 \l 1033 (Durrani, 2013) .
96
Figure No 02 Pak-China Economic Corridor comparison of Planned
and alternate alignments
Source: BlogSpot/ayeshaayub
The above figure 2 shows the planned alignment of the CPEC in comparison with the shorter
but insecure route that could have been adopted if security in the areas was not a big concern.
Although there is a political consensus in Pakistan when it comes to ―Pak-China relations,
97
political instability in Pakistan can affect and has affected the smooth-sailing of the CPEC.
Very few would have guessed at the inception of the current parliament and government
having taken charge from another democratically elected government through a smooth and
peaceful transition of power that there would be a serious political turmoil in the country in
about a year‘s time. Yet, there was a political crisis in the country with serious consequences
for some of the projects under the CPEC. A very glaring example of how it impacted the
Pakistan-China relations was when the Chinese president had to cancel his scheduled visit to
Islamabad for signing several agreements amid the political chaos in the capital. With long-
term plans like the vision 2025 in place, there is a serious need for political stability, and a
continuity of policy and planning, especially in connection with foreign relations‖
CITATION Kia14 \l 1033 (Kiani, 2014) .
Chinese officials have contended, however, that Pakistan is not singled out for such
quarantine checks. They maintain that trucks moving within China from some parts of the
country to the others are also subjected to such measures. They agree, ―however, that these
procedures need to be reviewed and that the situation could improve for transporters in the
future. As far as railways are concerned, although hundreds of millions of dollars are planned
to be spent on rehabilitation of the Karachi-Peshawar rail link, there is a big question mark on
the capacity of Pakistan Railways for utilizing the infrastructure it already has‖ CITATION
Aqe16 \l 1033 (Aqeel, 2016) . There are serious capacity issues that would need to be
addressed as well. For instance, ―the ongoing feasibility study would only assess the
infrastructure requirements for the upgrading of the track. It would be worthwhile to know
how much value would be added to the goods transport in the country after the upgrade is
complete, keeping in view the abysmal state of performance of the institution. Although the
98
projects related to the Gwadar Port have been given priority by the government, the Chairman
of the Gwadar Port Authority, Dostain Khan Jamaldini, recently told the Senate Standing
Committee on Ports and Shipping that delay in various projects related to Gwadar had
increased their costs from Rs8 billion (around $79 million) to Rs100billion (around $992
million) in six years. He specifically mentioned lack of progress on the construction of a
power grid, the failure of Pakistan Railways to acquire land for the railway lines, and the
failure of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to acquire land for connecting roads for the
airport‖ CITATION Kia14 \l 1033 (Kiani, 2014) .
On the eve of arrival of Muslim Haj mission at Karachi there termed a low Point developed
relations received set back between China and Pakistan. The delegations belong to Taiwan,
Chinese regime reacted and protested against Pakistan that she has supported the Chiang
Kishek agents in the shape of Muslim. A Chinese representative remarked on the role played
by Pakistani ruling clique, The Pakistani authorities made clear that Pakistan is not involved
in internal affairs of China, there is no miss-understanding in their dealing and due to the
formation of security pacts there emerged a gulf between the two countries. The irritation on
Haj delegation caused by Chinese Government was due to stay at Karachi, as to create two
China. ―Pakistan expressed surprise at this and pointed out that the visit had not in any way
affected adversely Pakistan's, friendly relations with China‖ CITATION Placeholder18 \p 9
\l 1033 (Nawaz, 2013, p. 9) . The Chinese government accused Pakistan for interference in
the internal affairs of ―China that showed lack of respect for the territorial integrity of China
and involved in support of United States interests in South Asia‖ CITATION Cha16 \l 1033
(Chaziza, 2016) .
99
4.7 Post-9/11 Political and Diplomatic Relations
With the changing regional and international scenario after 9/11, Pakistan-China relations
took a new dimension of understanding and cooperation. The frequency of the ―bilateral
exchange visits increased and high-level visits have been undertaken every year since 2003.
Soon after 9/11, President Musharraf visited China from 20-24 December 2001. Both
countries pledged to work together with complete unanimity for maintaining regional peace
and stability and China expressed its readiness to join the Pakistan government in its new
ventures. Various important agreements and MoUs were signed during Prime Minister
Jamali's official visit to China from 24-26 March 2003‖ CITATION Ras13 \l 1033 (Rashid
A. , 2013) . In 2006, ―four days after the killing of three Chinese engineers in the Hub area of
Baluchistan, President Musharraf made a scheduled visit to China from 19-23 February. The
visit, soon before the arrival of President George Walker Bush in Islamabad, indicated that
Pakistan gave greater priority to its strategic partnership with China and no unfortunate
incident could deter the long-time relationship between the two countries‖ ITATION
Placeholder11 \l 1033 (Khan S. a., Summer, 2013) .
100
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Chapter No 05
CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Analysis
Right now, the circumstance in the China-south Asia locale is steady all in all, with a solid
force for peace and advancement. The south Asian locale is a sometimes steady and
sometimes turbulent piece of the worldwide scene. To advance peace and look for security
and improvement is the vital objective and basic desire of most nations in the locale. Political
common trust among nations has been reinforced, and real nations have much of the time
interfaced and participated with each other. To address contrasts and question through
transaction and consultation is the significant arrangement of nations in the region.
The area has secured enduring and generally quick development, proceeding to lead the world
in this regard. Territorial incorporation has accumulated pace, with blasting sub-provincial
collaboration. Organized commerce game plans in different structures have gained relentless
ground, and another stage has developed for dynamic availability building. Be that as it may,
the south Asian area still faces various destabilizing and dubious components. The atomic
issue is mind boggling and touchy; the compromise procedure in Afghanistan stays moderate;
and disagreements about regional power and oceanic rights and interests keep on unfolding. A
few nations are expanding their military arrangement in the region, certain nation looks to
shake off military imperatives, and a few nations are experiencing complex political and
social changes. Non-customary security dangers, for example, fear-based oppression,
cataclysmic events and transnational wrongdoings have turned out to be more unmistakable.
108
Asia's economy still faces noteworthy descending weight because of its basic issues and in
addition outer monetary and money related dangers.
As a critical individual from the Asian family, China is completely mindful that its quiet
improvement is firmly connected with the eventual fate of the area. China has from the start
taken the headway of territorial success and strength as its own particular obligation. China is
prepared to seek after security through exchange and participation in the soul of cooperating
for commonly gainful outcomes, and protect peace and steadiness together with different
nations in the area.
Foreign policy analysis of the China towards two important nations of the south Asia has
given a different dimension to the China itself and the region‘s strategic importance. China
has to focus on these facts while developing its further foreign policy to keep sound place and
influence in the region being rising economic power. These extracted facts are:
Promotion of solid economic foundation
Promotion of political partnerships for peace and stability
Improvement of multilateral security mechanism
Formation of particular required laws and institutional strengthening
Improved military cooperation and exchanges
Resolving conflicts and disputes amicably
5.2 Conclusion
How Asia‘s geopolitical milieu will evolve over in the coming decades is not easy to
anticipate. However, it is evident that China is assertively reinforcing America‘s role in Asia
as the implicit patron of security and stability. China-Pakistan strategic nexus in the
109
foreseeable future will remain a continuing feature of China-India-Pakistan triangle, even
though Pakistan‘s own future course remains indecisive. Kashmir is likely to remain a
disputed territory, which can be managed well by the three disputants. Calls to settle down the
dispute are, in fact, equivalent to asking that an irretrievably broken-down marriage be fixed.
More broadly, the power dynamics in Asia are likely to be characterized by shifting equations.
Whereas China is considered to be aspiring to form a Sino-centric Asia, thus its actions hardly
make it a credible contender for Asian leadership. After all, leadership can come from other
states‘ assent or implicit approval. China‘s power, at any occasion, may be huge and swiftly
growing, yet it lacks the power of corpulence. In other words, China lacks the ability to
militarily rout or coerce any opponent, let alone impose its will on Asia. Even in Tibet and
Xinjiang, six decades of hardnosed oppression has failed to achieve China‘s acceptance, as
the2008and 2009 Tibetan and Uighur insurrections proved. Leadership is beyond the
possession of giant military and economic power. It demands the power of ideas that can
galvanize others.
China has revealed itself good at assertive progression of national interests and in playing
traditional power balance geopolitics. But to displace the United States and assume the
responsibility of leadership in Asia, it must do much more than to pursue its own benefits or
to contain potential opponents. China, by expanding and strengthening U.S. security
arrangements in Asia has proved a diplomatic boon for it. South Korea has strengthened its
military alliance with America. Japan has been backing off the U.S to move its airbase out of
India and Okinawa. ―Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, among others, have drawn
closer to the United States. In terms of power-projection force capabilities or the range of
military bases and security allies in Asia, no power or combination of powers is likely to
110
match the U.S. in the next quarter of a century. In other words, the U.S. is expected to remain
the main security player in Asia, as in Europe‖ CITATION Che10 \l 1033 (Chellaney, 2010)
.
Long before the 1962 China-India territorial dispute, China-India ties were held hostage by
the events in Tibet. Till today, the China-India-U.S. triangle is at the Centre of Himalayan
conflict. The growing India-U.S. strategic ties have emboldened China up the ante against
India and to assertively affirm its claim to Arunachal Pradesh state. Washington is expected to
caution China against crossing the red lines. Hitherto, U.S has opted for the course of implicit
neutrality on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh. The U.S move to sell India weapons worth more
than $5 billion in recent past signaled that its ties with India will not be at the cost of its rapid-
growing ties with China.
Through its assertive actions, China poses a challenge to U.S. interests in Asia. Washington,
however, has been willing to send out a clear message, as China tries to enforce its claim to
almost the entire South China Sea as its ―historical waters.‖ The move collides with
America‘s interests, including the traditional emphasis on freedom of navigation. The move,
in fact, comes out to be part of Beijing‘s ―access denial‖ strategy, intended for keeping U.S
navy from operating freely in the South China Sea. CITATION Ros09 \l 1033 (Ross, 2009)
The U.S. has also denied Chinese demands and halt further military exercises in Yellow Sea,
which China claims as its exclusive military-operation region. Yet, the U.S. has opted to play
a balancing role. It seems to reassure its Asian allies and partners that it will remain occupied
in Asia and will resolve the maritime and territorial disputes along with the claims over
undersea mineral wealth, islands and fishing rights.
111
The questions here arise that if the United States will remain cagey about Dalai Lama and the
Tibet issues, what example it will set for India. India is the host of Dalai Lama and the seat of
its government in-exile. Also, if understating human rights becomes a continuing factor of
U.S. policy on China, the globe‘s major executioner, how admit able it will be to target
merely the small states in Asian block; Kyrgyzstan and Burma, over their human-rights
record?―Nepal, after years of adhering to an UN-brokered agreement to allow Tibetan
refugees safe passage to India, has now— under Beijing‘s pressure — started arresting
escapees from Tibet and handing them over to Chinese authorities. A more consistent U.S.
human-rights policy will be able to stand up in defense of such hapless Tibetans‖ CITATION
Vau89 \l 1033 (Vause, 1989) .
It is crucial for China, India and Pakistan to move further in strengthening their similar
objectives and goals with that of other states and assist them in attaining economic liberty,
increasing their economy and energy security, additionally to pursue their own objective of
boosting the economies of the region like Afghanistan that could not be possible without its
neighbors. Each country should be more transparent in dealing with regional security issues.
In order to promote economic integration and political stability in the region, these three
countries should work together in tandem. The India-China-Pakistan axis could well be a
reality.
5.3 Recommendations
Following are the suggestions made in this regard:
1. China, in recent years has made enviable development in financial and economic areas
and, hence, enjoys huge value in global economy. Even though, Chinese technology
112
and products have swamped the world markets, but in the field of technology, other
regional countries are still reliant on Western countries. China, by conveying
technology to these countries, can not only earn foreign exchange but can give a boost
up to economic development in these countries, which sequentially advantages the
whole region.
2. Many Chinese companies are making investments throughout the world. They should
invest in their adjacent countries where low level of economic progress also owes to
very small foreign direct investment (FDI). These countries should try to make
regulations more appealing for Chinese investment.
3. It is essential to promote regional cooperation in trade and all the countries should give
importance in marketing each other‘s products, in order to introduce them. At regional
level, fairs and exhibitions should be organized for this purpose, and involvement of
industrialists and traders should be assured.
4. The implementation of transit traffic agreement from October 2003 between China,
Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is a good sign. The agreement had been signed
in 1995, but could not be implemented for eight years due to trivial matters like transit
fees and route permit etc. This slow pace hinders regional cooperation and should be
curbed henceforth. Considering its benefit for landlocked countries like Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the need is to make the agreement really effective.
5. The construction of gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan that passes through
Afghanistan and can go further into India, is in limbo due to rise in instability in
Afghanistan. For the better utilization of energy resources of Central Asia, there is the
need of peace and stability in Afghanistan.
113
6. China‘s northern Xinjiang province has common frontiers with eight countries
providing huge prospects of trade to China with these countries. The trade agreement
between China and Pakistan was existed since 1967 that was ended in 2000. The
agreement is meant to enable the people of Northern Areas of Pakistan and Xinjiang
province of China to meet their needs from areas across the frontiers without being
dependent on other distant economic hubs. The need is not just to renew the agreement
but to expand its area of jurisdiction as well as addition of more trade items in it. Other
countries of the world should also move in this trajectory through regional
arrangements or bilateral agreements.
5.4 Side Endorsements
There is need of planned draft to bring and meet desired changes in foreign policy of China
not only towards India and Pakistan but towards all other nations around the globe. But for
sure, this dissertation will make the enough ground to develop foreign policy under effect of
realism but base of constructivism will give life to the foreign policy implementation in the
real world.
Following are the suggestions made in this regard:
1. China, in recent years has made enviable development in financial and economic areas
and, hence, enjoys huge value in global economy. Even though, Chinese technology
and products have swamped the world markets, but in the field of technology, other
regional countries are still reliant on Western countries. China, by conveying
technology to these countries, can not only earn foreign exchange but can give a boost
114
up to economic development in these countries, which sequentially advantages the
whole region.
2. Many Chinese companies are making investments throughout the world. They should
invest in their adjacent countries where low level of economic progress also owes to
very small foreign direct investment (FDI). These countries should try to make
regulations more appealing for Chinese investment.
3. It is essential to promote regional cooperation in trade and all the countries should give
importance in marketing each other‘s products, in order to introduce them. At regional
level, fairs and exhibitions should be organized for this purpose, and involvement of
industrialists and traders should be assured.
4. The implementation of transit traffic agreement from October 2003 between China,
Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is a good sign. The agreement had been signed
in 1995, but could not be implemented for eight years due to trivial matters like transit
fees and route permit etc. This slow pace hinders regional cooperation and should be
curbed henceforth. Considering its benefit for landlocked countries like Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the need is to make the agreement really effective.
5. The construction of gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan that passes through
Afghanistan and can go further into India, is in limbo due to rise in instability in
Afghanistan. For the better utilization of energy resources of Central Asia, there is the
need of peace and stability in Afghanistan.
6. China‘s northern Xinjiang province has common frontiers with eight countries
providing huge prospects of trade to China with these countries. The trade agreement
between China and Pakistan was existed since 1967 that was ended in 2000. The
115
agreement is meant to enable the people of Northern Areas of Pakistan and Xinjiang
province of China to meet their needs from areas across the frontiers without being
dependent on other distant economic hubs. The need is not just to renew the agreement
but to expand its area of jurisdiction as well as addition of more trade items in it. Other
countries of the world should also move in this trajectory through regional
arrangements or bilateral agreements.
116
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Appendix-1
Official Document of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamabad, Pakistan
Pakistan‘s Foreign Policy seeks to protect, promote and advance Pakistan‘s national interests
in the external domain. The Foreign Ministry contributes towards safeguarding Pakistan‘s
security and advancing Pakistan‘s development agenda for progress and prosperity following
the guiding principles laid out by our founding fathers.
Guiding Principles of Pakistan‘s Foreign Policy
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan and its first Governor
General, in a broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948, outlined the following
goals of Pakistan‘s foreign policy: ―Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill
towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country
or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international
dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and
prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending
its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in
upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.‖
The Constitution of Pakistan also lays down guidelines for the conduct of foreign policy of the
country. Article 40 of the constitution provides that:
155
―The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim
countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa
and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly
relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means.‖
The foreign policy of Pakistan is primarily directed to the pursuit of national goals of seeking
peace and stability through international cooperation. Special emphasis is laid on economic
diplomacy to take advantages offered by the process of globalization as also to face challenges
of the 21st century. Our foreign policy is also geared to project the image of the country as a
dynamic and moderate society.
The foreign policy of Pakistan seeks to promote the internationally recognized norms of
interstate relations, i.e. respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other State; non-aggression and peaceful settlement of
disputes. Pakistan has therefore always sought to develop friendly and cordial relations with
all countries of the world.
Foreign Policy Objectives
In light of the guiding principles laid down by the founding fathers and the constitution as also
aspirations of the people of Pakistan, the objectives of foreign policy can be summarized as
under:
· Promotion Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate, and democratic Islamic
country.
156
· Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers
and immediate neighbours.
· Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests, including Kashmir.
· Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation with international community.
· Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad.
· Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for regional and international
cooperation.
A Year in Review
The year 2012-2013 witnessed continuing challenges for our immediate neighbourhood
and beyond. The situation in Afghanistan remained unstable having a negative spill over on
Pakistan‘s domestic security environment. The broader Middle East region experienced major
political transformations with the after shocks of the so-called Arab spring still being felt.
2. The country also continued to grapple with some wide ranging challenges including the
continuing threats of terrorism and extremism. Nonetheless, we remained steadfast in our
resolve and carried out an active foreign policy that sought engagement and cooperation with
the international community in order to fulfill our aspirations for development, peace and
security.
3. The major focus of our foreign policy was on promoting cooperation and improved
relations with all our immediate neighbors. This ―regional pivot‖ was based on a broad
political consensus of all segments of the society. We took initiatives for the normalization of
relations with India in all spheres. Although no progress could be recorded on the core issue
of Kashmir, the two countries took measures to normalize their trade relations and liberalize
157
the visa regime. 4. Our state policy demonstrated our sincere commitment to peace and
stability in Afghanistan. We are facilitating an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led process of
reconciliation as the date for the withdrawal of NATO forces approaches. Pakistan is also
supporting various reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan, and improving its
bilateral relations in the political, economic and commercial domains.
5. We are seeking mutually beneficial relations with Iran manifested by the numerous
agreements that have been signed between the two sides, the high point being the conclusion
of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline deal. Our traditional goodwill and historic relations with
Turkey are also being translated into a concrete political and economic partnership.
6. The past year saw further consolidation of our strategic partnership with China which
touched a new height of friendliness and cooperation, epitomized by the exchange of
numerous high level visits and conclusion of bilateral agreements.
7. In terms of global outreach, we took a proactive approach and reached out to all the
major power centers. With the United States, our relations are being upgraded from
transactional to collaborational. The US remains one of the most important development and
investment partners of Pakistan. The irritants in the relationship were also managed in a
prudent and practical manner.8. With the European Union, the concerted efforts of the
Government paid off in the form of ―Autonomous Trade Preferences‖ by the EU, paving the
way for an eventual GSP Plus status for Pakistan. The opportunities created by trade access to
the European market will create numerous jobs and lift millions of Pakistanis out of poverty.
158
9. Pakistan‘s relations with the Russian Federation have entered into a new phase of
congeniality. We have managed to shed the baggage of the cold war and made progress in
evolving a forward looking and mutually beneficial partnership. Our engagement with Japan,
the Republic of Korea and ASEAN states as well as our traditional fraternal ties with
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council also retained their positive trajectory.
10. On the multilateral front, Pakistan continued to play an active and constructive role in
the United Nations, including as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Two high
level events on counter-terrorism and peacekeeping were held during Pakistan‘s presidency of
the Security Council in January 2013.
11. Regarding strategic issues, Pakistan continued to act with restraint and responsibility
and strengthened its export control architecture bringing it in line with the best international
standards and practices. While seeking regional strategic stability and a level playing field in
South Asia, we were supportive of all non-discriminatory measures for non-proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.
12. In the modern world economic diplomacy is an integral part of the interstate relations.
Pakistan‘s location at the confluence of interlocking regions and civilizations of South Asia
West Asia, Central Asia, Gulf Region and China, offers the closet proximity to word‘s largest
markets. Being at the intersection of East Asia and the Middle East naturally endow Pakistan
with promising geo-economic possibilities as a transit corridor for energy pipelines, trade and
tourist flows. Our diplomatic Missions are actively striving to translate these opportunities for
the economic benefit of the country by promoting exports and by facilitating foreign
investment.
159
13. Pakistan today is a confident, responsible and well integrated member of the
international community. We do not harbor any aggressive or hegemonic design and aspire to
live in peace and harmony with all nations of the world. Socio-economic development in a
peaceful and secure neighbourhood remains our top most priority. The conduct of our foreign
policy in the years to come will continue to be based on these ideals.
Source: http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=Foreign%20PolicyPakistan‘s Foreign
Policy seeks to protect, promote and advance Pakistan‘s national interests in the external
domain.
The Foreign Ministry contributes towards safeguarding Pakistan‘s security and advancing
Pakistan‘s development agenda for progress and prosperity following the guiding principles
laid out by our founding fathers.
Guiding Principles of Pakistan‘s Foreign Policy
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan and its first Governor
General, in a broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948, outlined the following
goals of Pakistan‘s foreign policy:
―Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world.
We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the
principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to
make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of
the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to
the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the
160
United Nations Charter.‖ The Constitution of Pakistan also lays down guidelines for the
conduct of foreign policy of the country. Article 40 of the constitution provides that:
―The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim
countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa
and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly
relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means.‖
The foreign policy of Pakistan is primarily directed to the pursuit of national goals of seeking
peace and stability through international cooperation. Special emphasis is laid on economic
diplomacy to take advantages offered by the process of globalization as also to face challenges
of the 21st century. Our foreign policy is also geared to project the image of the country as a
dynamic and moderate society.
The foreign policy of Pakistan seeks to promote the internationally recognized norms of
interstate relations, i.e. respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other State; non-aggression and peaceful settlement of
disputes. Pakistan has therefore always sought to develop friendly and cordial relations with
all countries of the world.
Foreign Policy Objectives
In light of the guiding principles laid down by the founding fathers and the constitution as also
aspirations of the people of Pakistan, the objectives of foreign policy can be summarized as under:
· Promotion Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate, and democratic Islamic
161
country.
· Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers
and immediate neighbours.
· Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests, including Kashmir.
· Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation with international community.
· Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad.
· Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for regional and international cooperation.
A Year in Review
The year 2012-2013 witnessed continuing challenges for our immediate neighbourhood
and beyond. The situation in Afghanistan remained unstable having a negative spill over on
Pakistan‘s domestic security environment. The broader Middle East region experienced major
political transformations with the after shocks of the so-called Arab spring still being felt.
2. The country also continued to grapple with some wide ranging challenges including the
continuing threats of terrorism and extremism. Nonetheless, we remained steadfast in our
resolve and carried out an active foreign policy that sought engagement and cooperation with
the international community in order to fulfill our aspirations for development, peace and
security.
3. The major focus of our foreign policy was on promoting cooperation and improved
relations with all our immediate neighbors. This ―regional pivot‖ was based on a broad
political consensus of all segments of the society. We took initiatives for the normalization of
relations with India in all spheres. Although no progress could be recorded on the core issue
of Kashmir, the two countries took measures to normalize their trade relations and liberalize
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the visa regime. 4. Our state policy demonstrated our sincere commitment to peace and
stability in Afghanistan. We are facilitating an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led process of
reconciliation as the date for the withdrawal of NATO forces approaches. Pakistan is also
supporting various reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan, and improving its
bilateral relations in the political, economic and commercial domains.
5. We are seeking mutually beneficial relations with Iran manifested by the numerous
agreements that have been signed between the two sides, the high point being the conclusion
of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline deal. Our traditional goodwill and historic relations with
Turkey are also being translated into a concrete political and economic partnership.
6. The past year saw further consolidation of our strategic partnership with China which
touched a new height of friendliness and cooperation, epitomized by the exchange of
numerous high level visits and conclusion of bilateral agreements.
7. In terms of global outreach, we took a proactive approach and reached out to all the
major power centers. With the United States, our relations are being upgraded from
transactional to collaborational. The US remains one of the most important development and
investment partners of Pakistan. The irritants in the relationship were also managed in a
prudent and practical manner. 8. With the European Union, the concerted efforts of the
Government paid off in the form of ―Autonomous Trade Preferences‖ by the EU, paving the
way for an eventual GSP Plus status for Pakistan. The opportunities created by trade access to
the European market will create numerous jobs and lift millions of Pakistanis out of poverty.
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9. Pakistan‘s relations with the Russian Federation have entered into a new phase of
congeniality. We have managed to shed the baggage of the cold war and made progress in
evolving a forward looking and mutually beneficial partnership. Our engagement with Japan,
the Republic of Korea and ASEAN states as well as our traditional fraternal ties with
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council also retained their positive trajectory.
10. On the multilateral front, Pakistan continued to play an active and constructive role in
the United Nations, including as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Two high
level events on counter-terrorism and peacekeeping were held during Pakistan‘s presidency of
the Security Council in January 2013.
11. Regarding strategic issues, Pakistan continued to act with restraint and responsibility
and strengthened its export control architecture bringing it in line with the best international
standards and practices. While seeking regional strategic stability and a level playing field in
South Asia, we were supportive of all non-discriminatory measures for non-proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.
12. In the modern world economic diplomacy is an integral part of the interstate relations.
Pakistan‘s location at the confluence of interlocking regions and civilizations of South Asia
West Asia, Central Asia, Gulf Region and China, offers the closet proximity to word‘s largest
markets. Being at the intersection of East Asia and the Middle East naturally endow Pakistan
with promising geo-economic possibilities as a transit corridor for energy pipelines, trade and
tourist flows. Our diplomatic Missions are actively striving to translate these opportunities for
the economic benefit of the country by promoting exports and by facilitating foreign
investment.
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13. Pakistan today is a confident, responsible and well integrated member of the
international community. We do not harbor any aggressive or hegemonic design and aspire to
live in peace and harmony with all nations of the world. Socio-economic development in a
peaceful and secure neighbourhood remains our top most priority. The conduct of our foreign
policy in the years to come will continue to be based on these ideals.
Source: http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=Foreign%20Policy
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Appendix-2
Main Characteristics of China's Foreign Policy
China has unswervingly pursued an independent foreign policy of peace. The basic objectives
of the policy center on safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty, and creating
an international environment favorable to its reform, opening and modernization efforts, as
well as maintaining world peace and promoting common development. The policy is based on
the following main elements:
Maintaining independence. We are principled in international affairs, determining our own
position and policies in accordance with the merits of each case and never yielding to pressure
from major powers, nor entering into alliance with any major power or power bloc.
Maintaining world peace. China does not participate in the arms race, nor does it seek military
expansion. China resolutely opposes hegemonism, power politics, aggression and expansion
in whatever form, as well as encroachments perpetrated by one country on the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of another, or interference in the internal affairs of another nation under the
pretext of ethnic, religious or human rights issues.
Friendly relations and cooperation. China sincerely hopes to establish and develop friendly
ties and cooperative relationship with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence. Relations with other states are never based on social systems or
ideologies.
Good-neighborly and friendly relations. China has vigorously advanced friendly relations with
neighboring countries, worked diligently for regional peace and stability, and promoted
regional economic cooperation. Our nation stands for fair and reasonable settlements of
border and territorial disputes through negotiations and consultations, including the offshore
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territory. Disputes defying immediate solutions can be temporarily shelved in the spirit of
seeking common ground while putting aside differences. They should never be allowed to
stand in the way of the development of normal state-to-state relations.
Enhanced unity and cooperation with developing countries. This factor has always been a
cornerstone of our foreign policy. We attach great importance to the development of
comprehensive friendly relations and cooperation with other developing countries. We have
vigorously explored ways to engage in mutually complementary cooperation with other
developing nations in the economic, trade, scientific and technological sectors, and have
expanded consultations and cooperation with them on international issues in order to maintain
the rights and interests of all developing countries.
Opening policy. China is open to both developed and developing countries and has engaged in
extensive international cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit to promote
common development. China, the world's largest developing country and a permanent
member of the UN Security Council, stands ready to make unremitting efforts to ensure world
peace and development, and the establishment of a new fair and equitable international
political and economic order based on peace and stability.
(Excerpts of Premier Li Peng's speech at the 96th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on
September 19, 1996)
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Appendix-3
INDIA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS - 2013
India in 2013 remained engaged with the international community at several levels to promote
its political, security and economic interests. Security has, in fact, become the dominant
concern not only for India but for the whole world. It is one issue that no single country can
tackle by itself whatever means of defence and extent of resources it may possess. It is an
intra-regional and intra-continental concern. With means of communication and travel
becoming faster and availability of internet and mobile telephony, security has become multi-
dimensional. It is not only physical security that is important, but cyber security assumes
much greater importance in the technological driven world of today. It is a single point
enterprise where technology and communications converge and need cutting edge knowledge,
training and leadership to meet its challenge. The breakdown of the established post-world
war order and the conflicting interests of the permanent members of the UNSC, the apex
body, responsible for world peace under the UN Charter, has become victim of contradictory
pulls of its members. It finds itself unable to effectively address the problems of peace and
security. The inability of small and medium states to manage their own security makes them
vulnerable to intervention by the powerful, and at another level, it is a challenge of securing
national sovereignty for the vulnerable states. The UNSC's refusal to reform itself to reflect
the changed world order of the 21st century is in itself a matter of great concern to the nations
at large. In this scenario, India has managed to ensure for itself some modicum of security
from the non-state actors, both by strengthening its physical security and through interaction
with the states of the region and beyond. It is in this milieu, the Indian interaction with the
international community both at the regional and bilateral levels has to be studied. India
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understands the need to strengthen its economic and social institutions as well as those of the
developing countries to provide for security. In interacting with them it lays special emphasis
on institutional security.
South Asia, which is geographically a cohesive region, is also the least integrated region of
the world. The litmus test of integration is whether the region is a viable area for interaction at
political, economic and social levels like the ASEAN or the EU. Despite that the SAARC has
been in existence since the eighties of the last century. It has yet to gather enough mass to
make it viable for trade and investments to expand to enable free flow of intra-regional trade
and investments to take place. There is an urgent need to adopt forward looking steps at policy
level collectively and separately so that the connective tissues of a South Asian economic
community begin to be created. This would help the region to put aside its differences, which
had been its bane, within a construct aimed at collaboration on issues of general interest or
towards achievement of a common vision of general interest. ASEAN suggests itself as a
good example of the search for stability through architecture of regional cooperation. The
South Asian region unfortunately suffers from lack of stability in many ways. There is social
instability, economic backwardness, trade bumps, investment impediments, and many other
negative factors, which make it difficult for the region to achieve the aspired results ASEAN
has succeeded in achieving. Bilaterally, India ploughed on to craft goodwill and
understanding within the countries of South Asia, a region with which India's destines are
entwined. In Nepal it is the lack of consensus among the political parties that has delayed
inordinately the constitution making and deprived its people a stable political system. This
indeed has slowed down the economic growth and retarded meaningful economic and
political interaction with other neighbours. The security scenario both in Pakistan and
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Afghanistan is a worrying factor, particularly in the projected withdrawal of the US defence
forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Pakistan's internal security problem spilling into
Afghanistan creates political instability for the entire South Asian region. Bangladesh
successfully met its challenge to stability posed by the opposition which boycotted the
elections to Parliament. But government's steadfastness paid dividends and it was possible to
conduct elections peacefully and give stability to the political institutions. The Sheikh Hasina
government also successfully met the challenge of the Islamist fundamentalists who were
treacherous to the cause of Bangladesh liberation in 1971 and had all these years successfully
evaded justice. India underlined its friendship with Bangladesh when President Pranab
Mukherjee chose to make Bangladesh the first country for his foreign visits in September
2013. Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh too visited Dhaka shortly after taking over the charge.
A major step towards economic cooperation and integration was taken when Prime Minister
of India inaugurated the India-Bangladesh Grid Interconnection to feed 500 MW of power
into Bangladesh system, and laid the foundation of 1320 MW thermal power project to be
executed in Bangladesh as a joint venture. Bhutan has succeeded in its transition from a
monarchical polity to a stable popular democracy under the leadership of the His Majesty the
King. Its successful completion of its elections to the National Assembly in July, 2013
harbingered the maturity of its nascent political institutions. Bhutanese Prime Minister's visit
in September and Foreign Secretary's visit to Thimpu earlier in February were highlights of a
cordial and friendly year of relationship between India and Bhutan. The visit of Maldivian
Minister of Defence and Security in April provided an opportunity for sharing common
security concerns. Defence Minister Antony conveyed to him that "India stands committed to
enhance the ongoing defence and security partnership with Maldives." Ongoing exchanges
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between the Armed Forces of both sides in areas of training, exercises and strengthening of
infrastructure and capabilities were reviewed by both the Ministers. It was decided to further
enhance these exchanges. Both sides agreed that there was a need to continue to work together
to tackle security concerns, in the interests of peace and stability in the region. India was
happy to lend a helping hand by way of advice in the successful conduct of Presidential
election in the island country. India welcomed the elections in the Northern Province of Sri
Lanka, held for the first time after the end of the prolonged ethnic war. The elections resulted
in the victory of the Tamil National Alliance. The External Affairs Minister paid a bilateral
visit to the island country in October and inaugurated the Housing Project being promoted in
the North with Indian assistance for the internally displaced persons. He went to Colombo
again in November to represent the Prime Minister at the CHOGM. The question of fishermen
continued to agitate the people on both sides of the Palk Strait. However the two governments
successfully negotiated the release and return of fishermen whenever they were arrested for
being on the wrong side of the International maritime border. Unfortunately it has become a
perennial problem between the two countries, but it involves the livelihood issues on both the
sides. The general elections in Pakistan which for the first time in the history of Pakistan led
to a change in the government through a vote of the people, saw Nawaz Sharif leader of the
Muslim League (Nawaz) to the high office of prime minister for the record third time. He
promised to work with New Delhi for better relations. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in
his message of felicitations conveyed India's desire to work with the new government of
Pakistan in charting a new course for the relationship between the two countries and invited
Mr. Sharif to visit India at a mutually convenient time. In July Nawaz Sharif sent his Special
Envoy Shahryar Khan to New Delhi where he had meetings with the Prime Minister, NSA
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Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh and Satinder Lambah, Prime
Minister's Special Envoy. Lambah had himself visited Pakistan in May. Media described the
visit as only a 'reinforced signal" consonant with the imperative of better relations. In August
the relations between the two countries had a setback due to a number of incidents along the
LOC, in which there were casualties on the Indian side. On top of it the Pakistan National
Assembly and the Punjab (Pak) Assembly passed resolutions blaming and condemning the
Indian army for the LOC violations. The Indian Parliament took a strong exception at the
resolutions and rejecting them, adopted a resolution against the Pakistani violations thereby
causing casualties on the Indian side. The Resolution said: "Our restraint should not be taken
for granted nor should the capacity of our armed forces to ensure the territorial integrity of our
nation." The meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in New York in
September on the margins of the UNGA, helped to restore some semblance of normalcy in the
relations. The two Prime Ministers tasked the Directors General Military Operations
(DGMOs) of both the sides "to suggest effective means to restore the ceasefire and a way
forward". Various other aspects of the relationship too came up for discussion at this meeting.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh mentioned terrorism and the need for effective action on
bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to book. The ASEM Ministerial meeting in
Delhi in November, which was attended by Pakistan Foreign Affairs and National Security
Adviser Sartaj Aziz provided another opportunity to review the relations between the two
countries. December of 2013 offered yet another opportunity for review of relations when the
brother of Pakistan Prime Minister and Chief Minister of the Punjab Province Shahbaz Sharif
came to New Delhi and held meetings with the Indian leaders including the Prime Minister.
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Appendix- 4
President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at Pakistan's Parliament
Entitled "Building a China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny to
Pursue Closer Win-Win Cooperation"
On April 21, 2015, President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at Pakistan‘s
Parliament entitled ―Building a China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny to Pursue
Closer Win-Win Cooperation‖.
In the speech, Xi Jinping spoke highly of China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and all-round
cooperation, and stressed that China and Pakistan should constantly enrich the connotation of
China-Pakistan community of common destiny to play an exemplary role in forging an Asian
community of common destiny. Xi Jinping introduced the philosophy of China‘s peaceful
development, elaborated on China‘s good-neighborly and friendly policies to South Asia, and
said that China is willing to enhance cooperation with South Asian countries to achieve
mutually beneficial development and common prosperity.
Upon Xi Jinping‘s arrival at the Parliament House, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Chairman
Senate Raza Rabbani and Speaker of the National Assembly Sardar Ayaz Sadiq of Pakistan
and others welcomed Xi Jinping and then accompanied him to the lecture hall.
When Xi Jinping stepped into the lecture hall, the whole audience gave a standing ovation and
welcomed the distinguished Chinese guest in a traditional way of lapping the table. On behalf
of Pakistan‘s Parliament, Chairman Raza Rabbani delivered an enthusiastic speech to warmly
welcome Xi Jinping‘s visit to Pakistan and delivery of speech at the Parliament in person, and
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highly praised the increasingly unwavering Pakistan-China friendship. Amidst the warm
applause, Xi Jinping delivered the speech.
Xi Jinping pointed out that friendship between China and Pakistan is based on trust and
mutual support, and we have been devoted friends through both good and hard times. Our
friendship is a pacesetter for amicable relations between countries.
During my current visit, President Hussain, Prime Minister Sharif and I agreed to elevate
China-Pakistan relations to an all-weather strategic cooperative partnership. This description
of China-Pakistan partnership is a most appropriate one, as it aptly defines the all-weather
friendship and all-round cooperation between China and Pakistan.
Xi Jinping stressed that Over 2,000 years ago, the Silk Road became a bridge of friendship
linking our two ancient civilizations. In recent history, both China and Pakistan suffered from
imperialist and colonialist aggression and oppression. Similar historical sufferings and the
common struggle have brought our hearts and minds together. Since the establishment of
diplomatic ties, our two countries have forged an all-weather friendship and pursued all-round
cooperation., and we have supported each other on issues crucial to our respective core
interests. Having gone through weal and woe together, we couldn't feel more gratified to have
each other as great neighbor and friend.
Xi Jinping stressed that China and Pakistan both shoulder the historic mission of achieving
national renewal and realizing the great dream of building a strong country and delivering a
better life for our peoples. More than ever, we need to work together to strengthen the
traditional friendship, fully leverage on geographic proximity and economic complementarity
to share opportunities, meet challenges head on, pursue common development and
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substantiate the China-Pakistan community of shared destiny. This will enable us to create
greater benefits to the Chinese and Pakistani peoples, contribute to stability and prosperity of
our region and lead the way in building a community of common destiny in Asia.
First, we should strengthen mutual assistance and deepen strategic cooperation. We should
keep the good tradition of frequent high-level visits and meetings, work together on major
strategic issues, and each other on issues involving our respective core interests and major
concerns.
Second, we should advance our shared interests and achieve common development. We
should use China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to drive our practical cooperation with focus
on Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure development and industrial cooperation so that the
fruits of its development will reach both all the people in Pakistan and the people of other
countries in our region.
Third, we should enhance close exchanges to build lasting friendship. This year is the Year of
China-Pakistan Friendly Exchanges. We should conduct diverse and colorful events of
celebration and encourage more contacts and exchanges between young Chinese and
Pakistanis. In the next five years, China will provide 2,000 training opportunities for Pakistan
and train 1,000 Chinese language teachers for Pakistan.
Fourth, we should stick together in face of difficulty and jointly meet security challenges.
China will work with Pakistan to tackle non-traditional security threats so as to provide a
reliable security guarantee for bilateral economic cooperation and common development.
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Fifth, we should fulfill our due responsibilities and increase coordination on international issues. We
should maintain strategic communication on regional and international developments and increase
coordination and collaboration on major regional and global issues. China will work with Pakistan
to advance the reconciliation process and smooth transition in Afghanistan and work together to
build a new type of international relations of win-win cooperation.
Xi Jinping stressed that The Chinese nation loves peace. China will continue to pursue win-win
cooperation and enhance friendship and cooperation with other countries. It will stay committed to
the policy of affinity, sincerity, mutual-benefit and inclusiveness. It will deepen win-win cooperation
with its neighbors so as to deliver more benefits to them through its own development. China will
continue to pursue a win-win strategy for opening-up to build an open economy. This will create
new development opportunities and space to both Asia and the world. We will strengthen
cooperation with countries along the land and maritime Silk Roads, so as to jointly build an open
platform for cooperation and create new impetus to achieve sustainable development in the related
regions.
Xi Jinping also stressed that to build a China-Pakistan community of shared destiny is a strategic
decision made by our two governments and peoples. Let us work together to create an even brighter
future for China and Pakistan.
During Xi Jinping‘s speech, members of the Parliament lapped the tables and clapped for more than
50 times to express their agreement with and support for Xi Jinping‘s speech. After the speech,
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and leaders of Pakistan‘s Parliament made their speeches, in which
they thanked Xi Jinping again and highly praised Pakistan-China friendship.
